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Cedric Beny
Apr28-04, 01:29 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>Hi,\n\nI am curious about what strict n-category we can generate by\nspecifying a finite set of objects, 1-morphisms, ..., n-morphisms.\n\nBy "generate" I mean completing the category by all possible\ncompositions of k-arrows, k = 1...n. (no two different compositions\nbeing (strictly) equal.)\n\nIt looks like it can give rise to quiet complex structures.\n\nThis has probably been studyied. Any pointer?\n\n\nThe link to physics is as follows: when thinking about fundamental\nphysics one always face methodological questions. Mathematics is the\nmain tool used in physics, Nevertheless physicists rarely study formal\nlogic and have a poor idea of what mathematics are, fundamentally. (I\nfeel this is also true of most mathematicians.) Since we use math so\nmuch it seems crucial to me to be able to justify the usage we make of\nit.\n\nOne can study formal logic, which tells us that all of mathematics can\nbe reduced to algebra (symbols manipulation.) Nevertheless the basic\naxioms, deduction rules, and procedures one needs in order to\nimplement even the simplest mathematical concept (including category\ntheory) seem mysterious and cumbersome and don\'t enlighten much about\nwhy it has to be like that.\n\nIt seems to me that it would be of great interest to have a more\nstraightforward way to formalize mathematics. It would give more\nfreedom and power to the user (the physicist), it would allow to make\nmore efficient computer tools, and it may also help understanding how\nphysics influences the power of mathematical modelling. Indeed\ncomputation is a special case of mathematical reasoning, and from\nquantum computing we know that one cannot think about computation\nwithout making some physical assumptions. The same must be true of\nlogical reasoning and mathematics.\n\nNow John Baez\'s vulgarization papers contagiously spread the feeling\nthat n-categories could be a powerful tool for physical modelling.\n\nI wonder if one could formally define an n-category without having to\ngo through the folklore of formal logic. Indeed one usually define a\n1-category by specifying equations between arrows. Those equations\nhave to be defined in an external language (usually some kind of\nenglish informal first order logic.) But we know that instead we may\nreplace equations by 2-arrows between 1-arrows. So somehow it seems\nthat the 2-category provides part of the language needed to define a\n1-category. Can the rest of the language be found in an n-category?\n\nThe idea would go as follows: in order to define a category (a theory)\none first enumerate a finite (and small) number of k-arrows, k=0...n.\n(the axioms) and eventually promotes some couple of n-arrows to\nisomorphisms (or something like that.) This small set of "objects"\nwould then define a full category by composition of the "axioms". This\ncould be implemented on a computer directly (modulo a few technical\nissues.)\n\nDoes it make sense?\n\nCedric\n\n\n---\nCedric Beny\nGrad Student\nPhysics\nUniversity of Waterloo\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form">&nbsp;&nbsp;View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Hi,

I am curious about what strict n-category we can generate by
specifying a finite set of objects, 1-morphisms, ..., n-morphisms.

By "generate" I mean completing the category by all possible
compositions of k-arrows, k = 1...n. (no two different compositions
being (strictly) equal.)

It looks like it can give rise to quiet complex structures.

This has probably been studyied. Any pointer?


The link to physics is as follows: when thinking about fundamental
physics one always face methodological questions. Mathematics is the
main tool used in physics, Nevertheless physicists rarely study formal
logic and have a poor idea of what mathematics are, fundamentally. (I
feel this is also true of most mathematicians.) Since we use math so
much it seems crucial to me to be able to justify the usage we make of
it.

One can study formal logic, which tells us that all of mathematics can
be reduced to algebra (symbols manipulation.) Nevertheless the basic
axioms, deduction rules, and procedures one needs in order to
implement even the simplest mathematical concept (including category
theory) seem mysterious and cumbersome and don't enlighten much about
why it has to be like that.

It seems to me that it would be of great interest to have a more
straightforward way to formalize mathematics. It would give more
freedom and power to the user (the physicist), it would allow to make
more efficient computer tools, and it may also help understanding how
physics influences the power of mathematical modelling. Indeed
computation is a special case of mathematical reasoning, and from
quantum computing we know that one cannot think about computation
without making some physical assumptions. The same must be true of
logical reasoning and mathematics.

Now John Baez's vulgarization papers contagiously spread the feeling
that n-categories could be a powerful tool for physical modelling.

I wonder if one could formally define an n-category without having to
go through the folklore of formal logic. Indeed one usually define a
1-category by specifying equations between arrows. Those equations
have to be defined in an external language (usually some kind of
english informal first order logic.) But we know that instead we may
replace equations by 2-arrows between 1-arrows. So somehow it seems
that the 2-category provides part of the language needed to define a
1-category. Can the rest of the language be found in an n-category?

The idea would go as follows: in order to define a category (a theory)
one first enumerate a finite (and small) number of k-arrows, k=0...n.
(the axioms) and eventually promotes some couple of n-arrows to
isomorphisms (or something like that.) This small set of "objects"
would then define a full category by composition of the "axioms". This
could be implemented on a computer directly (modulo a few technical
issues.)

Does it make sense?

Cedric


---
Cedric Beny
Grad Student
Physics
University of Waterloo

John Baez
May2-04, 04:51 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>In article &lt;f59795c6.0404271321.385273a7@posting.google.com&gt;, \nCedric Beny &lt;cedric.beny@myrealbox.com&gt; wrote:\n\n&gt;I am curious about what strict n-category we can generate by\n&gt;specifying a finite set of objects, 1-morphisms, ..., n-morphisms.\n\n&gt;This has probably been studied. Any pointers?\n\nIf you\'re interested in "presenting" strict n-categories in terms\nof generators and relations, you want to learn about "computads".\nThese were invented by Ross Street. Here\'s a good modern reference\nthat cites lots of earlier work:\n\nM. A. Batanin, Computads and slices of operads,\nhttp://www.arXiv.org/abs/math.CA/0209035\n\n&gt;The link to physics is as follows: when thinking about fundamental\n&gt;physics one always face methodological questions. Mathematics is the\n&gt;main tool used in physics, Nevertheless physicists rarely study formal\n&gt;logic and have a poor idea of what mathematics are, fundamentally.\n\nThat\'s true, mainly because they have trouble understanding\nhow compelling the *internal* motivations of mathematics can be -\nas opposed to the (also very compelling) motivations that come\nfrom its application to nature. Those who don\'t understand this\ntend to view mathematics as either an "idle game" or a nasty\nobsession with rigor.\n\n&gt;Now John Baez\'s vulgarization papers contagiously spread the feeling\n&gt;that n-categories could be a powerful tool for physical modelling.\n\nGood! N-categories are really perfect for understanding\nhigher-dimensional versions of Feynman diagrams.\n\nBy the way, since you seem to like my papers, I\'m hoping you meant\n"popularization" rather than "vulgarization". They have different connotations.\n\nvulgar:\n\n1. crude and indecent: crude or obscene, particularly\nabout sex or bodily functions\n\n2. tastelessly ostentatious: showing a lack of taste or reasonable\nmoderation\n\n3. lacking refinement: lacking in courtesy and manners\n\n4. language of ordinary peoples language: relating to a form of a\nlanguage spoken by ordinary people\n\npopular:\n\n1. of or relating to the general public\n\n2. suitable to the majority: as a): adapted to or indicative of\nthe understanding and taste of the majority &lt;a popular history of the war&gt;\nb): suited to the means of the majority: INEXPENSIVE &lt;sold at popular prices&gt;\n\n3. frequently encountered or widely accepted\n\n4. commonly liked or approved\n\n&gt;I wonder if one could formally define an n-category without having to\n&gt;go through the folklore of formal logic. Indeed one usually define a\n&gt;1-category by specifying equations between arrows. Those equations\n&gt;have to be defined in an external language (usually some kind of\n&gt;english informal first order logic.) But we know that instead we may\n&gt;replace equations by 2-arrows between 1-arrows. So somehow it seems\n&gt;that the 2-category provides part of the language needed to define a\n&gt;1-category. Can the rest of the language be found in an n-category?\n\nThere\'s a lot to say about this, but I\'ll just mention that\nMakkai is developing a logical system called "FOLDS" - first-order\nlogic with dependent sorts - that eliminates equality entirely\nand goes directly to omega-categories. Find his webpage and read\nsome of his more vulgar papers!\n\nBest,\njb\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form">&nbsp;&nbsp;View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>In article <f59795c6.0404271321.385273a7@posting.google.com>,
Cedric Beny <cedric.beny@myrealbox.com> wrote:

>I am curious about what strict n-category we can generate by
>specifying a finite set of objects, 1-morphisms, ..., n-morphisms.

>This has probably been studied. Any pointers?

If you're interested in "presenting" strict n-categories in terms
of generators and relations, you want to learn about "computads".
These were invented by Ross Street. Here's a good modern reference
that cites lots of earlier work:

M. A. Batanin, Computads and slices of operads,
http://www.arXiv.org/abs/math.CA/0209035

>The link to physics is as follows: when thinking about fundamental
>physics one always face methodological questions. Mathematics is the
>main tool used in physics, Nevertheless physicists rarely study formal
>logic and have a poor idea of what mathematics are, fundamentally.

That's true, mainly because they have trouble understanding
how compelling the *internal* motivations of mathematics can be -
as opposed to the (also very compelling) motivations that come
from its application to nature. Those who don't understand this
tend to view mathematics as either an "idle game" or a nasty
obsession with rigor.

>Now John Baez's vulgarization papers contagiously spread the feeling
>that n-categories could be a powerful tool for physical modelling.

Good! N-categories are really perfect for understanding
higher-dimensional versions of Feynman diagrams.

By the way, since you seem to like my papers, I'm hoping you meant
"popularization" rather than "vulgarization". They have different connotations.

vulgar:

1. crude and indecent: crude or obscene, particularly
about sex or bodily functions

2. tastelessly ostentatious: showing a lack of taste or reasonable
moderation

3. lacking refinement: lacking in courtesy and manners

4. language of ordinary peoples language: relating to a form of a
language spoken by ordinary people

popular:

1. of or relating to the general public

2. suitable to the majority: as a): adapted to or indicative of
the understanding and taste of the majority <a popular history of the war>
b): suited to the means of the majority: INEXPENSIVE <sold at popular prices>

3. frequently encountered or widely accepted

4. commonly liked or approved

>I wonder if one could formally define an n-category without having to
>go through the folklore of formal logic. Indeed one usually define a
>1-category by specifying equations between arrows. Those equations
>have to be defined in an external language (usually some kind of
>english informal first order logic.) But we know that instead we may
>replace equations by 2-arrows between 1-arrows. So somehow it seems
>that the 2-category provides part of the language needed to define a
>1-category. Can the rest of the language be found in an n-category?

There's a lot to say about this, but I'll just mention that
Makkai is developing a logical system called "FOLDS" - first-order
logic with dependent sorts - that eliminates equality entirely
and goes directly to \omega-categories. Find his webpage and read
some of his more vulgar papers!

Best,
jb

Ralph E. Frost
May3-04, 05:47 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n"John Baez" &lt;baez@galaxy.ucr.edu&gt; wrote in message\nnews:c719fm\\$cct\\$1@glue.ucr.edu...\n&gt; In article &lt;f59795c6.0404271321.385273a7@posting.google.com&gt;, \n&gt; Cedric Beny &lt;cedric.beny@myrealbox.com&gt; wrote:\n&gt;\n&gt; &gt;I am curious about what strict n-category we can generate by\n&gt; &gt;specifying a finite set of objects, 1-morphisms, ..., n-morphisms.\n....\n&gt; &gt;The link to physics is as follows: when thinking about fundamental\n&gt; &gt;physics one always face methodological questions. Mathematics is the\n&gt; &gt;main tool used in physics, Nevertheless physicists rarely study formal\n&gt; &gt;logic and have a poor idea of what mathematics are, fundamentally.\n&gt;\n&gt; That\'s true, mainly because they have trouble understanding\n&gt; how compelling the *internal* motivations of mathematics can be -\n&gt; as opposed to the (also very compelling) motivations that come\n&gt; from its application to nature. Those who don\'t understand this\n&gt; tend to view mathematics as either an "idle game" or a nasty\n&gt; obsession with rigor.\n\nI\'m wondering if you would flesh out what you are thinking when you say\n"compelling *internal* motivations of mathematics"?\n\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form">&nbsp;&nbsp;View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"John Baez" <baez@galaxy.ucr.edu> wrote in message
news:c719fm$cct$1@glue.ucr.edu...
> In article <f59795c6.0404271321.385273a7@posting.google.com>,
> Cedric Beny <cedric.beny@myrealbox.com> wrote:
>
> >I am curious about what strict n-category we can generate by
> >specifying a finite set of objects, 1-morphisms, ..., n-morphisms.
....
> >The link to physics is as follows: when thinking about fundamental
> >physics one always face methodological questions. Mathematics is the
> >main tool used in physics, Nevertheless physicists rarely study formal
> >logic and have a poor idea of what mathematics are, fundamentally.
>
> That's true, mainly because they have trouble understanding
> how compelling the *internal* motivations of mathematics can be -
> as opposed to the (also very compelling) motivations that come
> from its application to nature. Those who don't understand this
> tend to view mathematics as either an "idle game" or a nasty
> obsession with rigor.

I'm wondering if you would flesh out what you are thinking when you say
"compelling *internal* motivations of mathematics"?

David Corfield
May11-04, 05:11 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Ralph E. Frost" &lt;ralph@REMOVErefrost.com&gt; wrote in message news:&lt;109cgmh79t7n181@corp.supernews.com&gt;...\n&gt;\n&gt; I\'m wondering if you would flesh out what you are thinking when you say\n&gt; "compelling *internal* motivations of mathematics"?\n\nThis is a very important topic for philosophy,\nsadly neglected for the most part. There\'s a\ncurious blindness about it, probably due to the\ndesire to hold mathematics as our most\nobjective form of knowledge. The worry is that\nby including mathematicians\' visions of\ntheir research within the scope of mathematical\nknowledge, a wholly subjective element will have\nbeen introduced. I disagree.\n\nI made my own modest start on this issue in my book\n"Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics", (ch.9\nespecially), but much remains to be said.\n\nDavid Corfield\nhttp://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0076/phorem.htm/\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form">&nbsp;&nbsp;View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ralph E. Frost" <ralph@REMOVErefrost.com> wrote in message news:<109cgmh79t7n181@corp.supernews.com>...
>
> I'm wondering if you would flesh out what you are thinking when you say
> "compelling *internal* motivations of mathematics"?

This is a very important topic for philosophy,
sadly neglected for the most part. There's a
curious blindness about it, probably due to the
desire to hold mathematics as our most
objective form of knowledge. The worry is that
by including mathematicians' visions of
their research within the scope of mathematical
knowledge, a wholly subjective element will have
been introduced. I disagree.

I made my own modest start on this issue in my book
"Towards a Philosophy of Real Mathematics", (ch.9
especially), but much remains to be said.

David Corfield
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~sfop0076/phorem.htm/

Cedric Beny
May14-04, 04:10 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>John Baez wrote\n&gt; M. A. Batanin, Computads and slices of operads,\n&gt; http://www.arXiv.org/abs/math.CA/0209035\n\nOops, that\'s not vulgar enough for me. I\'ll have to learn some stuffs\nbefore I can have any idea of what he is talking about.\n\n&gt; By the way, since you seem to like my papers, I\'m hoping you meant\n&gt; "popularization" rather than "vulgarization". They have different\n&gt; connotations.\n\nThanks for helping me improve my english. It seems to me that in\nfrench "popularisation" is not used in this context. So we are only\nleft with "vulgarisation".\n\n&gt; &gt;I wonder if one could formally define an n-category without having to\n&gt; &gt;go through the folklore of formal logic. (snip) it seems\n&gt; &gt;that the 2-category provides part of the language needed to define a\n&gt; &gt;1-category. Can the rest of the language be found in an n-category?\n&gt;\n&gt; There\'s a lot to say about this, but I\'ll just mention that\n&gt; Makkai is developing a logical system called "FOLDS" - first-order\n&gt; logic with dependent sorts - that eliminates equality entirely\n&gt; and goes directly to omega-categories.\n\nI\'ll have a look at this.\n\nBy the way is there any reason why logicians stick to formalizing\nmathematics as a "language" (a set of character strings)? It seems one\ncould use any other finite structure as well. Is there some work on\nthe formal foundations of mathematics that use languages of more\ncomplex structure (as far as i can tell Makkai do it the standard way,\nusing character strings)?\n\nStrings of characters are good for human being because of our ability\nto deal with such languages but it may not be the most efficient\nstructure to use when one wants to implement a theorem prover or when\none tries to reasonate about the theory itself.\n\nAn exemple is given by the graphical language for linear algebra used\nin John Baez and Toby Bartel notes on the Quantum Gravity Seminar,\ntrack 1. (Invented by Penrose ?) This allows to shortly describe\ncompositions of linear operator which are just impossible to describe\nusing the standard 1D way of writing a tensor product.\n\nThat seems to be one of John Baez\'s point. But instead of carrying the\nreasoning down to formal logic he seems to stop at the category level.\n\nAm I being pertinent or just naive/ignorant?\n\nCedric\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form">&nbsp;&nbsp;View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>John Baez wrote
> M. A. Batanin, Computads and slices of operads,
> http://www.arXiv.org/abs/math.CA/0209035

Oops, that's not vulgar enough for me. I'll have to learn some stuffs
before I can have any idea of what he is talking about.

> By the way, since you seem to like my papers, I'm hoping you meant
> "popularization" rather than "vulgarization". They have different
> connotations.

Thanks for helping me improve my english. It seems to me that in
french "popularisation" is not used in this context. So we are only
left with "vulgarisation".

> >I wonder if one could formally define an n-category without having to
> >go through the folklore of formal logic. (snip) it seems
> >that the 2-category provides part of the language needed to define a
> >1-category. Can the rest of the language be found in an n-category?
>
> There's a lot to say about this, but I'll just mention that
> Makkai is developing a logical system called "FOLDS" - first-order
> logic with dependent sorts - that eliminates equality entirely
> and goes directly to \omega-categories.

I'll have a look at this.

By the way is there any reason why logicians stick to formalizing
mathematics as a "language" (a set of character strings)? It seems one
could use any other finite structure as well. Is there some work on
the formal foundations of mathematics that use languages of more
complex structure (as far as i can tell Makkai do it the standard way,
using character strings)?

Strings of characters are good for human being because of our ability
to deal with such languages but it may not be the most efficient
structure to use when one wants to implement a theorem prover or when
one tries to reasonate about the theory itself.

An exemple is given by the graphical language for linear algebra used
in John Baez and Toby Bartel notes on the Quantum Gravity Seminar,
track 1. (Invented by Penrose ?) This allows to shortly describe
compositions of linear operator which are just impossible to describe
using the standard 1D way of writing a tensor product.

That seems to be one of John Baez's point. But instead of carrying the
reasoning down to formal logic he seems to stop at the category level.

Am I being pertinent or just naive/ignorant?

Cedric

John Baez
May17-04, 05:04 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\nIn article &lt;f59795c6.0405121939.febcd4f@posting.google.com&gt;,\ nCedric Beny &lt;cedric.beny@myrealbox.com&gt; wrote:\n\n&gt;John Baez wrote:\n\n&gt;&gt; M. A. Batanin, Computads and slices of operads,\n&gt;&gt; http://www.arXiv.org/abs/math.CA/0209035\n\n&gt;Oops, that\'s not vulgar enough for me. I\'ll have to learn some stuffs\n&gt;before I can have any idea of what he is talking about.\n\nMost papers on n-categories are rather technical. I\'ve tried\nto make the subject more accessible by writing lots of popularizations,\nbut when you actually try the real stuff, it takes work to read!\n\n&gt;&gt; &gt;I wonder if one could formally define an n-category without having to\n&gt;&gt; &gt;go through the folklore of formal logic. (snip) it seems\n&gt;&gt; &gt;that the 2-category provides part of the language needed to define a\n&gt;&gt; &gt;1-category. Can the rest of the language be found in an n-category?\n\n&gt;&gt; There\'s a lot to say about this, but I\'ll just mention that\n&gt;&gt; Makkai is developing a logical system called "FOLDS" - first-order\n&gt;&gt; logic with dependent sorts - that eliminates equality entirely\n&gt;&gt; and goes directly to omega-categories.\n\n&gt;I\'ll have a look at this.\n\nYou\'ll probably find this tough too, unless you\'re a logician.\n\n&gt;By the way is there any reason why logicians stick to formalizing\n&gt;mathematics as a "language" (a set of character strings)?\n\nDon\'t forget that logic comes from "logos" or "word"; logic originated\nas the science of correct verbal reasoning, so the syntactical side of\nlogic tends to focus on symbol strings. Also: historically, logic has\nbeen intimately tied to the quest for "certainty", and most people\nworking on this considered symbol strings to be more trustworthy than,\nsay, pictures. (Consider Hilbert\'s axiomatization of Euclidean geometry.)\n\n&gt;It seems one\n&gt;could use any other finite structure as well. Is there some work on\n&gt;the formal foundations of mathematics that use languages of more\n&gt;complex structure (as far as i can tell Makkai do it the standard way,\n&gt;using character strings)?\n\nMakkai does it the standard way. I don\'t know much about this issue,\nbut you might try the bibliography here:\n\nMichael Anderson\nDiagrammatic Reasoning Site\nhttp://www.hcrc.ed.ac.uk/gal/Diagrams/\n\n&gt;Strings of characters are good for human being because of our ability\n&gt;to deal with such languages but it may not be the most efficient\n&gt;structure to use when one wants to implement a theorem prover or when\n&gt;one tries to reason about the theory itself.\n\nRight.\n\n&gt;An example is given by the graphical language for linear algebra used\n&gt;in John Baez and Toby Bartels\' notes on the Quantum Gravity Seminar,\n&gt;track 1. (Invented by Penrose?)\n\nThis language seems to have been invented by Feynman (for use\nin quantum field theory) and Penrose (for use in general relativity),\nbut it was only formalized later, with the help of higher category theory.\n\n&gt;That seems to be one of John Baez\'s point. But instead of carrying the\n&gt;reasoning down to formal logic he seems to stop at the category level.\n&gt;\n&gt;Am I being pertinent or just naive/ignorant?\n\nWell, category theory gives a perfectly fine alternative to ordinary\nset theory as a "foundations of mathematics", but you\'re really suggesting\nsomething more - something like an n-categorical "foundations of mathematics"\nwhere all the considerations of "well-formed formulae" are done with\nhigher-dimensional structures, rather than symbol strings!\n\nI don\'t think people have worked on this very hard - though you should\nlook at that bibliography, since computer scientists are interested in\nsimilar things, and I don\'t know much about what they\'re up to.\n\nYou might also want to read the work of Peirce:\n\n"Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning."\n-- C. S. Peirce (1839 - 1914)\n\nAlso these papers:\n\nGeraldine Brady and Todd H. Trimble, A categorical interpretation\nof Peirce\'s propositional logic Alpha.\n\nGeraldine Brady and Todd H. Trimble, A string diagram calculus\nfor predicate logic and C. S. Peirce\'s system Beta.\n\nAs far as my own research goes, I don\'t feel an urgent need to go\nback and redo the "foundations" of mathematics as long as they\'re\nsufficiently flexible to accomodate what I want to do "on top".\nBut, it might be an interesting project for the foundationally\ninclined.\n\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form">&nbsp;&nbsp;View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>In article <f59795c6.0405121939.febcd4f@posting.google.com>,
Cedric Beny <cedric.beny@myrealbox.com> wrote:

>John Baez wrote:

>> M. A. Batanin, Computads and slices of operads,
>> http://www.arXiv.org/abs/math.CA/0209035

>Oops, that's not vulgar enough for me. I'll have to learn some stuffs
>before I can have any idea of what he is talking about.

Most papers on n-categories are rather technical. I've tried
to make the subject more accessible by writing lots of popularizations,
but when you actually try the real stuff, it takes work to read!

>> >I wonder if one could formally define an n-category without having to
>> >go through the folklore of formal logic. (snip) it seems
>> >that the 2-category provides part of the language needed to define a
>> >1-category. Can the rest of the language be found in an n-category?

>> There's a lot to say about this, but I'll just mention that
>> Makkai is developing a logical system called "FOLDS" - first-order
>> logic with dependent sorts - that eliminates equality entirely
>> and goes directly to \omega-categories.

>I'll have a look at this.

You'll probably find this tough too, unless you're a logician.

>By the way is there any reason why logicians stick to formalizing
>mathematics as a "language" (a set of character strings)?

Don't forget that logic comes from "logos" or "word"; logic originated
as the science of correct verbal reasoning, so the syntactical side of
logic tends to focus on symbol strings. Also: historically, logic has
been intimately tied to the quest for "certainty", and most people
working on this considered symbol strings to be more trustworthy than,
say, pictures. (Consider Hilbert's axiomatization of Euclidean geometry.)

>It seems one
>could use any other finite structure as well. Is there some work on
>the formal foundations of mathematics that use languages of more
>complex structure (as far as i can tell Makkai do it the standard way,
>using character strings)?

Makkai does it the standard way. I don't know much about this issue,
but you might try the bibliography here:

Michael Anderson
Diagrammatic Reasoning Site
http://www.hcrc.ed.ac.uk/gal/Diagrams/

>Strings of characters are good for human being because of our ability
>to deal with such languages but it may not be the most efficient
>structure to use when one wants to implement a theorem prover or when
>one tries to reason about the theory itself.

Right.

>An example is given by the graphical language for linear algebra used
>in John Baez and Toby Bartels' notes on the Quantum Gravity Seminar,
>track 1. (Invented by Penrose?)

This language seems to have been invented by Feynman (for use
in quantum field theory) and Penrose (for use in general relativity),
but it was only formalized later, with the help of higher category theory.

>That seems to be one of John Baez's point. But instead of carrying the
>reasoning down to formal logic he seems to stop at the category level.
>
>Am I being pertinent or just naive/ignorant?

Well, category theory gives a perfectly fine alternative to ordinary
set theory as a "foundations of mathematics", but you're really suggesting
something more - something like an n-categorical "foundations of mathematics"
where all the considerations of "well-formed formulae" are done with
higher-dimensional structures, rather than symbol strings!

I don't think people have worked on this very hard - though you should
look at that bibliography, since computer scientists are interested in
similar things, and I don't know much about what they're up to.

You might also want to read the work of Peirce:

"Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning."
-- C. S. Peirce (1839 - 1914)

Also these papers:

Geraldine Brady and Todd H. Trimble, A categorical interpretation
of Peirce's propositional logic \Alpha.

Geraldine Brady and Todd H. Trimble, A string diagram calculus
for predicate logic and C. S. Peirce's system \Beta.

As far as my own research goes, I don't feel an urgent need to go
back and redo the "foundations" of mathematics as long as they're
sufficiently flexible to accomodate what I want to do "on top".
But, it might be an interesting project for the foundationally
inclined.