View Full Version : I think, therefore, I am.
This philosophy of Descarte has been brought up numerous times, in the old PFs. I'm just starting it up again.
Descarte gave an illustration that went (somewhat) as follows:
And Evil Demon sought to convince a man that everything he (the man) had ever believed, was false. The Demon had such power that it almost succeeded. The only thing that the Demon could not prove to the man was that the man himself did not exist. It could not do this because you cannot convince someone that doesn't exist, of anything. From this came the saying, "I think, therefore, I am".
What is your opinion?
quantumcarl
Mar20-03, 04:58 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
This philosophy of Descarte has been brought up numerous times, in the old PFs. I'm just starting it up again.
Descarte gave an illustration that went (somewhat) as follows:
And Evil Demon sought to convince a man that everything he (the man) had ever believed, was false. The Demon had such power that it almost succeeded. The only thing that the Demon could not prove to the man was that the man himself did not exist. It could not do this because you cannot convince someone that doesn't exist, of anything. From this came the saying, "I think, therefore, I am".
What is your opinion?
You know my opinion on this one Mentat... so far its holding at 33.3 percent of the vote!
I don't think thinking has anything to do with proving that I exist. Thinking does not involve the exterior world... only the interior. If we were to rely on our interior thoughts as proof of existence... then we would believe that the "Demon" who approached the man exists as well. We would believe pretty well anything our brain could come up with and as has been pointed out in other threads... the mind can be wrong, a lot of the time
That's why I enjoy the idea of changing, slightly, the wording of good ol' Des Cartes statement to read as follows:
I drink, therefore I am.
Now, right off you think I'm talking about drinking alchohol when I say this... and even I get that drift... hmmm...
But... realistically... I am talking about "drinking" of experience.
I see the use of our senses and our logic as a kind of drinking... a way to meld with the experiences exterior to our mind and the experiences inside our mind.
This to me becomes a pathway to understanding that I exist... using the interaction of the exterior and the interior experiences to come to the conclusion that... yes... I exist, not only in my head... but out there... in this universe.
That's my opinion, for the moment.
EDIT: let me put it this way.
If I didn't drink (water for example) I would not exist.
Les Sleeth
Mar20-03, 05:57 PM
I like Carl's answer so much I hate to post after him but . . .
After reading Descartes you can see his point is how one knows one exists, and his conclusion is that he can know "so long as it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind."
Yet, my experience has been that the more still my mind is, the more I become aware of my existence, which seems just the opposite of Descartes' statement.
But after thinking about it, I've concluded that he might have meant thinking rationally (i.e., reason, not just a wandering mind) takes place in front of another part of consciousness that witnesses that thinking. So when one reasons, one is made more aware of the inner witness and consequently of one's existence.
Nevertheless, attentive stillness of the mind can also accentuate the inner witness, as does deeply feeling (attentively). So I believe it is more the attentiveness to one's being that makes one most aware of existence rather than thinking.
However, second to that I'd chose to drink.
(BTW Mentat, how did you get your "Radio Wave" status? Are we doing that here or is that your addition to your handle?)
Iacchus32
Mar20-03, 06:47 PM
I think therefore I am ... I think?
Even though the idea of "thinking" (being caught up in one's thoughts) is subjective, which is to say he may not "know" he exists, doesn't change the fact that he exists. Even an inanimate object such as a tree, which doesn't "think," still exists ...
RageSk8
Mar20-03, 07:11 PM
I like "I think therefore I know"
-Stolen from Nagel in his characterization of Davidson.
Iacchus32
Mar20-03, 07:22 PM
I'm not thinking at the moment I'm aware. I just see ...
wuliheron
Mar20-03, 08:06 PM
And Evil Demon sought to convince a man that everything he (the man) had ever believed, was false. The Demon had such power that it almost succeeded. The only thing that the Demon could not prove to the man was that the man himself did not exist. It could not do this because you cannot convince someone that doesn't exist, of anything. From this came the saying, "I think, therefore, I am".
Descartes was evidently an optimist, and a pretty self-assured one at that in light of this argument. Note that this is literally true from historical accounts of the man as well as from an analysis of this argument. However, he was also a rather sarcastic argumentative cuss as well. Perhaps that is where the ego thing of
"I think, therefore I am" comes from.
An Optimist is someone who believes this is the best of all possible worlds, and a pessimist is someone who's afraid they are right. In light of his extremes in attitude, for all I know he had a bit of both in him when he made this argument and was being sarcastic yet again. Certainly his sarcasm was more characteristic of his writing. Who can say? :0)
RuroumiKenshin
Mar20-03, 11:44 PM
I agree with Sensei and QuantumCarl. They've basically said what I was going to say.
Please, don't get caught up in the phrase. It is but the conclusion of an important argument.
I have to ask you people (especially people like carl), do you think that you can convince someone of something, if that person doesn't exist? If not, then you cannot convince me that I don't exist, because I have to exist for you to convince me of anything.
Here is the point of Descarte's reasoning (and his axiom):
I can think about not existing, thus, I exist
In shortened form: I think, therefore I am.
RuroumiKenshin
Mar21-03, 07:17 PM
I like your argument, Mentat. But how about inanimate objects? It doesn't apply to inanimate objects.
quantumcarl
Mar22-03, 03:22 AM
Originally posted by Mentat
Please, don't get caught up in the phrase. It is but the conclusion of an important argument.
I have to ask you people (especially people like carl), do you think that you can convince someone of something, if that person doesn't exist? If not, then you cannot convince me that I don't exist, because I have to exist for you to convince me of anything.
Here is the point of Descarte's reasoning (and his axiom):
I can think about not existing, thus, I exist
In shortened form: I think, therefore I am.
Mentat. I can switch sides in a second if you like. That's what philosphy is all about!
I can say... yes, I do agree, the statement holds true in one frame of mind and one way of seeing.
The mind is our only qualifying factor when it comes to the existence of anything and everything.
I can say the "sun" exists because I feel its warmth and I notice when its not there. The only way I can feel its warmth is by way fo receptors in my skin sending signals to my brain which then interprets the temperature change as being warmer. This information becomes a thought about how warm the sun is... or how the sun has just been hidden by the horizon.
Therefore, it is only by way of thinking that I can verify the existence of the sun... or of myself... or of you.
Therefore, again... Des Cartes was on to something... in a myopic way. His view was myopic in that it considers the mind to be the total authority when it comes to existence. And I strongly disagree with that.
I say this: "when a tree falls in the forest... if no one hears it... there is still the physical existence of a sound. Qualified, quantified or not.
Mind you... it is always the pioneers of any science that end up making mistakes or miscalulations about a new frontier. These were the people willing to make mistakes in the name of truth. They were often willing to stake their lives on such claims as those made by Des Cartes.
(2039 characters)
eleutheria
Mar22-03, 09:48 AM
I think therefore I am.
It must be read in its context. And the Meditatins suggest that what Descartes is talking about is not the thinking process, but the intuition of the "I", which is what one cannot doubt about. Therefore, one can conclude that he exists. Remember that the way we use the verb "to think" is different from the use Descartes made of it.
Originally posted by quantumcarl
Mentat. I can switch sides in a second if you like. That's what philosphy is all about!
I can say... yes, I do agree, the statement holds true in one frame of mind and one way of seeing.
The mind is our only qualifying factor when it comes to the existence of anything and everything.
I can say the "sun" exists because I feel its warmth and I notice when its not there. The only way I can feel its warmth is by way fo receptors in my skin sending signals to my brain which then interprets the temperature change as being warmer. This information becomes a thought about how warm the sun is... or how the sun has just been hidden by the horizon.
Therefore, it is only by way of thinking that I can verify the existence of the sun... or of myself... or of you.
Therefore, again... Des Cartes was on to something... in a myopic way. His view was myopic in that it considers the mind to be the total authority when it comes to existence. And I strongly disagree with that.
I say this: "when a tree falls in the forest... if no one hears it... there is still the physical existence of a sound. Qualified, quantified or not.
Mind you... it is always the pioneers of any science that end up making mistakes or miscalulations about a new frontier. These were the people willing to make mistakes in the name of truth. They were often willing to stake their lives on such claims as those made by Des Cartes.
(2039 characters)
Well, I don't want you to play Devil's Advocate in this particular occasion. I would prefer an argument for your side.
I think you may have come closer to the point of Descartes' Philosophy, and then missed it again. I mean no offense by this, I just think that the phrase "I think, therefore I am" detracts from the actual philosophy, and confused many of those who responded/voted. That's why I tried to break it down, in my last post. You see, Descartes was not saying that the qualifying factor for being alive was thinking, he was saying that the fact that he could think about not existing proved that he existed.
Originally posted by MajinVegeta
I like your argument, Mentat. But how about inanimate objects? It doesn't apply to inanimate objects.
And it doesn't have to, because you wouldn't try to convince an inanimate object that it didn't exist. Descartes' point was not that the qualifying factor for existing is thinking; his point was that the fact that he could think proved to him that he existed - and that the Evil Demon's attempt to convince him that he didn't exist (and thus cause him to contemplate non-existence) proves that he does exist.
Iacchus32
Mar22-03, 12:46 PM
I say this: "when a tree falls in the forest... if no one hears it... there is still the physical existence of a sound. Qualified, quantified or not.
Or the physical evidence of the tree laying on the ground when you happen to stumble upon it when hiking in the woods.
Don't mind me. This is related to an argument I had a long time ago, when someone tried explaining to me that it actually didn't happen.
wuliheron
Mar22-03, 12:52 PM
I think therefore I am.
It must be read in its context. And the Meditatins suggest that what Descartes is talking about is not the thinking process, but the intuition of the "I", which is what one cannot doubt about. Therefore, one can conclude that he exists. Remember that the way we use the verb "to think" is different from the use Descartes made of it.
Don't forget the personal context, not just the abstract. Descartes was using this abstract argument to fight the Church in an effort to promote experimental science and reason. Thus, from both the personal and the abstract it is more clearly a tautological assertion and affirmation of ego and reason.
eleutheria
Mar22-03, 06:44 PM
When coming to the personal context, things get a bit...uncertain. Descartes had an insane relation with the church, expecially with the jesuits. So while elaborating a scientific method on Galilei's line, at the same time he always searched the jesuits approval as his intellectual counterpart, as it is clear from the premises of his books.
I don't think his "cogito" was a tautological assertion, no more than it is tautological the identity of Esperus with Phosphorus. It is always Venus, but there was a time when it was regarded as two different celestial bodies, one of the morning, the other one of the evening.
If you're looking for a foundation, the I is a very good one. (What Descartes began to deduce from this foundation, is a totally different story). After hundreds of years of kantian "copernican revolution" and successive idealism, it looks like a banality, but it is not.
wuliheron
Mar22-03, 09:31 PM
A mad man's mind is always hard to distinguish from that of a genuis, hence the name.
I don't think his "cogito" was a tautological assertion, no more than it is tautological the identity of Esperus with Phosphorus. It is always Venus, but there was a time when it was regarded as two different celestial bodies, one of the morning, the other one of the evening.
Ohhhhh, sounds good. I admire good poetry. If it doesn't touch the ego, it speaks to the soul. Tell me the plot, I don't have the slightest idea what you are talking about.
If you're looking for a foundation, the I is a very good one. (What Descartes began to deduce from this foundation, is a totally different story). After hundreds of years of kantian "copernican revolution" and successive idealism, it looks like a banality, but it is not.
Sounds good. It sounds very pantheistic to me and denies the mystical if you want. Hence it speaks to the heart of the matter without actually necessarilly touching the situation. What remains unadressed is the inexplicable and, of course, ineffable.
steppenwolf
Mar23-03, 12:42 AM
i don't agree with descartes because i don't consider the thinking process a voluntary and premeditated one. if you think of an action like waving your arm around then you can definately say 'i wave my arm around' as there is a hierarchy involved in this decision, your brain can decide, plan and eventually carry out this task, thinking is however different, there is no higher brain that controls your doing (ie thinking) brain, therefore you don't think, thinking just happens.
when i realised this (although it might be wrong, counter-arguments are very welcome) it really annoyed me as i was trapped by this seemingly foreign thinking process, the ideas just happen and even though i feel they are 'mine' i didn't chose for them to happen as i chose to wave my arm around. the problem is you can't 'think' your way out of this conundrum as the thinking process is the very thing you can't control.
argh! [g)]
I voted yes, because while it is possible that none of what we percive or think really exsist (ie. we are a part of someone elses dream, ect.) it is so highly improbable that it is reasonable to asume that it is impossible.
If something is doing an action, then it must exsist. Laws of physics. Thinking is an action. However this also applies to drinking, kicking, sleeping, ect.) The problem lies in what people asume comes after the word "am" in that statement. People apply the idea "thinking being" after it. The statement is made as just proof that one exsist. Either we are alive or not, this statement does not inquire this. It simply asks if you exsist. Which if you think or do any action, you do.
Also, Stepenwolf, remember that thinking require the firing of neurons in your brain and thus is just a s physical a thing as moving your arm. Agreed there is no mystical thinking. It is a chemical and electrical response that moves us to thinking. Plus I do not think that the "I" in that statement was supposed to the the soul, but the person as a whole. I could be wrong in which case I would just disagree with descartes.
eleutheria
Mar23-03, 09:44 AM
Ohhhhh, sounds good. I admire good poetry. If it doesn't touch the ego, it speaks to the soul. Tell me the plot, I don't have the slightest idea what you are talking about.
Once upon a time....people knew of a morning star, the brightest, and they called it Phosphorus, the light bringer. There was another star that appeared in the evening, which was called Esperus. It came out, I don't know exactly when, maybe in the seventh century B.C., that the two stars were the same one, the planet which is called Venus. Later on it became a classic example in philosophy of language of how the same denoted can be conveyed in two different senses. I think Frege used this example firstly in Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.
wuliheron
Mar23-03, 10:11 AM
So, are you then proclaiming the rational is the paradoxical and vice versa as Parmenides and Hegel did?
eleutheria
Mar23-03, 10:29 AM
The example were meant to state that, being the cogito informative, it is not a mere tautology. But what you say is true, for individual identity is what reveals existence as an evidence, at the same time rational as an identity can be, and ineffable as existence can be.
Originally posted by steppenwolf
i don't agree with descartes because i don't consider the thinking process a voluntary and premeditated one. if you think of an action like waving your arm around then you can definately say 'i wave my arm around' as there is a hierarchy involved in this decision, your brain can decide, plan and eventually carry out this task, thinking is however different, there is no higher brain that controls your doing (ie thinking) brain, therefore you don't think, thinking just happens.
when i realised this (although it might be wrong, counter-arguments are very welcome) it really annoyed me as i was trapped by this seemingly foreign thinking process, the ideas just happen and even though i feel they are 'mine' i didn't chose for them to happen as i chose to wave my arm around. the problem is you can't 'think' your way out of this conundrum as the thinking process is the very thing you can't control.
argh! [g)]
With all due respect, I believe you missed the point of Descartes' philosophy (as have quite a few people on this thread). May I suggest that you read my previous posts on this thread?
steppenwolf
Mar24-03, 02:35 AM
Originally posted by Ishop
Also, Stepenwolf, remember that thinking require the firing of neurons in your brain and thus is just a s physical a thing as moving your arm. Agreed there is no mystical thinking. It is a chemical and electrical response that moves us to thinking. Plus I do not think that the "I" in that statement was supposed to the the soul, but the person as a whole. I could be wrong in which case I would just disagree with descartes.
that's fair enough then, i always considered the 'i' in descarte's philosophy to be a something more then the body, well i have made a right fool of myself and shall retreat with what scrap of dignity mentat will allow me [;)]
subjectively i can't see why you can't convince someone they don't exist as you yourself have no real evidence of their thinking procss (oh sure they try to tell you they exist and will kick up quite a fuss but it's all a front). just cos something doesn't exist doesn't mean you can't engage in the 'convincing' process, i once had to convince someone in a dream that they weren't real (gotta love those lucid dreams), the person in my dream could (apparenty) consider their own non-existence but that didn't mean they actually existed.
Originally posted by steppenwolf
that's fair enough then, i always considered the 'i' in descarte's philosophy to be a something more then the body, well i have made a right fool of myself and shall retreat with what scrap of dignity mentat will allow me [;)]
subjectively i can't see why you can't convince someone they don't exist as you yourself have no real evidence of their thinking procss (oh sure they try to tell you they exist and will kick up quite a fuss but it's all a front). just cos something doesn't exist doesn't mean you can't engage in the 'convincing' process, i once had to convince someone in a dream that they weren't real (gotta love those lucid dreams), the person in my dream could (apparenty) consider their own non-existence but that didn't mean they actually existed.
Well, to apparently consider something, and to actually consider something are two different things. And that is part of the point of Descartes' philosophy.
Steppenwolf, I would only think badly of you if you were wrong, and refused to admit the obvious. I admire that you can just state that you were wrong, upon realizing it.
I agree with Mentat in taking Descartes to mean that even if the evil demon is controlling all our sensory experiences and twisting our thoughts, we are certain of our own existence.
To put it into perspective: in the 1st meditation, Descartes questions everything and tries to find a firm foundation for the rest of his knowledge. What if everything he thought he knew was wrong? He then looks at how we can gain knowledge. By sensory experiences? But what if one is just dreaming? (Considering that inside a dream, a person usually doesn't know that he/she is dreaming!) How about rational thought? Surely when I think '2+2=4', I would be right whether I am thinking it awake or thinking it inside a dream. But what if there's some evil demon playing around with your mind and deceiving you, so that you are never thinking straight? So it seems that we can't be sure of ANYTHING at all. . .
Until Descartes thought about how one's self-awareness of existence can never be wrong. If I am being deceived, then I must exist. It all comes down to the self-referential nature of the word 'I'.
When I say 'I am seeing a horse', I may be wrong (because I may be dreaming, hallucinating, blind etc.) But I can never be wrong when I honestly say that 'I seem to be seeing a horse'. The fact 'that my sensory experiences and thoughts exist' is never in doubt, even if the content of such experiences is doubtful. Since 'I' am certain that thoughts and experiences exist, and that there can't be thoughts and experiences without someone/something doing the thinking, something must exist! And let's just call this something that thinks 'I'.
The sentence 'I am here now', when uttered by a subject directly, is always right, no? [;)]
I think Descartes is pretty much correct in the first 2 meditations.
Zimbo love your little.....marshmellow? cheering thing lol. I agree as well, I think you explained better exactly what I was trying to say. However I like Steppenwolf's dream. Just because the person in his dream said "I" doesn't make them real. I do not think you are saying this either, but thought it was good to point out that you weren't. The truth is that the man in your dream while you may hear him say "I" is not really thinking it, you are. And what proof do we have that "real" people are not the same....we do not. THe only thing we know is that we are real because we think "I" when we say it. And we know we think. The only reason why we should continue to believe other people are real is so that they will think we are real, for we only have the right to expect from others what we give. If we accept they are real, then they should accept that we are. And thus we accept everything.
MacTech
Mar26-03, 02:17 AM
he is right, but i would or rather say... this question should go first...
"The real problem is not whether machines think but whether men do." --B. F. Skinner, Contingencies of Reinforcement (1969)
hehe, do people really think, i mean many of our actions are quite sheepish...
Originally posted by zimbo
I agree with Mentat in taking Descartes to mean that even if the evil demon is controlling all our sensory experiences and twisting our thoughts, we are certain of our own existence.
To put it into perspective: in the 1st meditation, Descartes questions everything and tries to find a firm foundation for the rest of his knowledge. What if everything he thought he knew was wrong? He then looks at how we can gain knowledge. By sensory experiences? But what if one is just dreaming? (Considering that inside a dream, a person usually doesn't know that he/she is dreaming!) How about rational thought? Surely when I think '2+2=4', I would be right whether I am thinking it awake or thinking it inside a dream. But what if there's some evil demon playing around with your mind and deceiving you, so that you are never thinking straight? So it seems that we can't be sure of ANYTHING at all. . .
Until Descartes thought about how one's self-awareness of existence can never be wrong. If I am being deceived, then I must exist. It all comes down to the self-referential nature of the word 'I'.
When I say 'I am seeing a horse', I may be wrong (because I may be dreaming, hallucinating, blind etc.) But I can never be wrong when I honestly say that 'I seem to be seeing a horse'. The fact 'that my sensory experiences and thoughts exist' is never in doubt, even if the content of such experiences is doubtful. Since 'I' am certain that thoughts and experiences exist, and that there can't be thoughts and experiences without someone/something doing the thinking, something must exist! And let's just call this something that thinks 'I'.
The sentence 'I am here now', when uttered by a subject directly, is always right, no? [;)]
I think Descartes is pretty much correct in the first 2 meditations.
Very good summary, Zimbo.
So, who still disagrees with Descartes' on this matter? Who has had a change of heart (whether for or against)?
chosenone
Mar28-03, 01:54 PM
I think we are aware yes,but if god is evergy thing and created us,the gods life in his universe is to do something to pass the time,so he created us in the begining,and has waited 15 billion years to get the universe to this point,so all we are is what god decided for us,so all are thoughts now and forever are what god already decided they where going to be,so we don't think for ourselfs god does,so to say we are not just gods imagination being acted out by god,as we percieve the real world is an illusion,may be more truer that not.so i say he was wrong!
Originally posted by Mentat
So, who still disagrees with Descartes' on this matter? Who has had a change of heart (whether for or against)?
RuroumiKenshin
Apr5-03, 12:39 AM
Originally posted by Mentat
So, who still disagrees with Descartes' on this matter? Who has had a change of heart (whether for or against)?
So, "I think therefore I am" only applies to a conscious being, right? So the statement is limited.
Originally posted by MajinVegeta
So, "I think therefore I am" only applies to a conscious being, right? So the statement is limited.
Not just conscious things, but rather, it is restricted to *thinking* things. However, it is useful, especially in debates about whether we (humans) do or don't exist.
Manuel_Silvio
Apr10-03, 03:50 AM
Hi there,
1. For Mentat:
Well, I'm here. Please explain that post (the one I quoted) in details and also show that my proof posted on "Knowledge?" is problematic.
Alright, Manuel. I didn't see any proofs presented on the "Knowledge" thread, but I'll try to explain this...
I have to ask you people (especially people like carl), do you think that you can convince someone of something, if that person doesn't exist? If not, then you cannot convince me that I don't exist, because I have to exist for you to convince me of anything.
Here is the point of Descarte's reasoning (and his axiom):
I can think about not existing, thus, I exist
In shortened form: I think, therefore I am.
Come to think of it, that's a pretty sound explanation, what is it that you don't understand?
GlamGein
Apr10-03, 02:08 PM
To exist, one must be conscious of existence.
Manuel_Silvio
Apr10-03, 02:26 PM
Hi,
1. For Mentat:
The proof I'm referring to is on "Knowledge?" page 4 (and is one of the things I guess you ignored). It is enclosed in a pair of dash-sequences.
Your post needs explanation because of the following ambiguities:
If not, then you cannot convince me that I don't exist, because I have to exist for you to convince me of anything.
You say one can't be convinced of something unless one exists. You say you have to exist to be convinced. Where does that come from? As far as I know the first thing to be proven is existence. Being the prime primary it has to be proven without a single assumption. All assumptions can be made after proving that one exits. If one's still in hesitation about one's existence how can one assume that "I should exist to be convinced?"
Here is the point of Descarte's reasoning (and his axiom):
I can think about not existing, thus, I exist
Being able to think doesn't necessarily mean the existence of the thinker. That that one has to be before one is able to think is an "existence-based" assumption. Hence is doesn't qualify for proving existence.
Then, you say "his axiom." If it's an axiom it needn't be defended for or talked about. There's no problem with axioms. They're worthless for they're pre-assumed (means, they're not proven). Give a dime, have a dozen hot ready-made axioms for an hour's pleasure.
The point with Descartes' speech is that he insists that "je pons donc je suis" is a firm ground to base your entire life and philosophy on. Matter of fact (this is not the fact you called "fact" [:D]) it isn't that way.
I have no problem with this sentence as long as it isn't seen as a victory for human logic in proving/showing/ensuring existence. Human logic and all other human things in the world give no guarantee, they aren't firm enough to ensure one of the slightest truth/reality/righteousness/[beep] in the smallest piece of human knowledge/information/wisdom/[beep].
This sentence "may" give one the bravery to go on, the strength to endure or the stubbornness not to give up but it isn't a "proof."
For 101th time I repeat, I'm not posing against my/your/her/his/their/[beep] existence. Thus I needn't prove non-existence. I'm just posing against that you take someone's existence for granted.
Originally posted by GlamGein
To exist, one must be conscious of existence.
That's actually backwards. To be conscious of existence, one must exist. That's the point of Descartes' philosophy.
BTW, the reason it doesn't work the way you wrote it is that rocks exist, and are not conscious of their existence. But, when flipped around, as it were, your statement is in perfect agreement with Descartes'.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Hi,
1. For [b]Mentat:
The proof I'm referring to is on "Knowledge?" page 4 (and is one of the things I guess you ignored). It is enclosed in a pair of dash-sequences.
I don't see any proof against this statement. I see supposed proof against the statement, "I am talking to you", but not against Descartes' statement.
Your post needs explanation because of the following ambiguities:
You say one can't be convinced of something unless one exists. You say you have to exist to be convinced. Where does that come from? As far as I know the first thing to be proven is existence. Being the prime primary it has to be proven without a single assumption. All assumptions can be made after proving that one exits. If one's still in hesitation about one's existence how can one assume that "I should exist to be convinced?"
How about flipping that reasoning around? You are saying that you can convince something. This requires that there be something for you to convince, and thus you cannot convince me that I don't exist. Please remember, I'm not saying that you - personally - are trying to convince me of anything. I'm just saying that you couldn't, if you tried - which gives me certain amount of certainty that I do exist, because it can't be disproven [:)].
Being able to think doesn't necessarily mean the existence of the thinker. That that one has to be before one is able to think is an "existence-based" assumption. Hence is doesn't qualify for proving existence.
Say what? The proposition that something can think necessitates the existence of the "something" that is thinking.
The point with Descartes' speech is that he insists that "je pons donc je suis" is a firm ground to base your entire life and philosophy on. Matter of fact (this is not the fact you called "fact" [:D]) it isn't that way.
What does "je pons donc je suis" mean?
This sentence "may" give one the bravery to go on, the strength to endure or the stubbornness not to give up but it isn't a "proof."
No, it's an assertion. An assertion that you can't prove wrong, because you'd be attempting to prove it wrong to someone (even if just yourself), and that someone would have to exist, in order for you to prove something to them.
greeneagle3000
Apr13-03, 10:09 PM
if what you think you are, you will be what you are. your mind make this real and therefore, everything will be in the way your mind percieves things. that's why they have to make a system of orders and the orientation to percieve what they want us to see.
RuroumiKenshin
Apr14-03, 12:13 AM
Originally posted by GlamGein
To exist, one must be conscious of existence.
and thus think. Thinking and the act of consciousness is the same thing.
RuroumiKenshin
Apr14-03, 12:18 AM
Originally posted by greeneagle3000
if what you think you are, you will be what you are. your mind make this real and therefore, everything will be in the way your mind percieves things. that's why they have to make a system of orders and the orientation to percieve what they want us to see.
You are very right! Shaolin philosophy emphasizes this. When you are in pain, if you concentrate on being relaxed, and without pain, you will at least be releaved from pain. Also Reiki practices this sort of mind-body training. This is called autogenic meditation. And the central basis is thought.
greeneagle3000
Apr14-03, 03:44 AM
wow! and i thought that you would disagree like most people do!
Another God
Apr14-03, 10:21 AM
It is a pragmatic necessary truth.
If I am able to say that I exist, or that I am thinking, then of course I exist.
Manuel_Silvio
Apr14-03, 11:40 AM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
I don't see any proof against this statement...
No. Read it again, please. It's a "supposed" (we've this word in comon) proof against any statement of the form "I therefore I exist." You needn't go there again, it's here:
-------Copy-Pasted from "Knowledge?", Page 4-------------------------
Every statement of the sort "I [beep] therefore I am" is erroneous when viewed with linear logic (I mean, no self-contradiction and/or loops allowed). Here's my proof:
Consider having said "I [beep]", you have to choose one of the two following statements:
P([beep]) : There need be an "I" to "[beep]."
P'([beep]) : There needn't be an "I" to "[beep]."
Since the above statements are contrary, only one of them may be yours (for we're using Aristotelian logic where a statement can be either true or false and nothing else and there's no escape from having chosen one of them).
If you choose 1, you've clearly pre-assumed that there need be an "I" to "[beep]" and you haven't done much in mentioning the consequence that "therefore I am." This is a self-referential statement giving no more information than what was known before.
If you choose 2, you've made another mistake. How could you say it isn't necessary to be an "I" to "[beep]" and then conclude that "therefore I (necessarily) am?" This is paradoxical for the statement is made up of two parts which are contradictory.
(This proof may be wrong. If so, please show my mistake(s))
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Hint: I asked one of forum members to please take a look at this. She/he suggested it wasn't of much creditability and I agree with her/him. However, as long as "you" haven't shown its absurdity you have to take it.
... This requires that there be something for you to convince, and thus you cannot convince me that I don't exist...
I'm not convincing you that you don't exist, I repeat for 102th time. I'm showing how meaningless it may be to take any statement (even this well-shaped one) for granted.
You say it "requires" that so and so, where does this "requirement" come from? You think there's a "requirement", you think a specific entity must be prior to another one, how did you come to think so? I've learnt that you, like Descartes, are insisting that "I think therefore I am" is a firm ground. If everything is going to built upon this statement, the statement itself must be "proven" independently. No assumptions, no beliefs, no pre-suppositions are allowed.
Hint: the above paragraph suffers internal inconsistency, see if you can find the point of weakness.
Say what? The proposition that something can think necessitates the existence of the "something" that is thinking.
No, it's an assertion. An assertion that you can't prove wrong, because you'd be attempting to prove it wrong to someone (even if just yourself), and that someone would have to exist, in order for you to prove something to them.
There are no "necessities" at this level. See, Descartes had gone a long way when he came to "I think therefore I am." He'd put away his religious and scientific suppositions along with the common sense. This is the purifying of the mind. He purified his mind to see beyond what he was usually supposed to see.
He, however, slipped once, only once. He saw it necessary for the thinker to exist prior to thinking. He shouldn't have made this mistake but he was feeling the pain of groundlessness and that explains well why he made it. He was a great mathematician, he was a great thinker, he needed a firm ground to put all this upon. The efforts of his life, like the efforts of all human beings, would be lost if this firm ground wasn't found.
Unfortunately, you know, our deepest feelings have noway into the magnificent palace of logic. It's made of cold dull grey marble.
If he'd continued purifying his mind (perhaps he did but didn't find it suiting his favor) he would have seen that all "necessities", even the most basic ones, are assumptions unless that firm ground is found.
This level, this brink, this verge at which we're standing is the terminus. No assumptions, no suppositions, no beliefs, no obligations, no preferences, no prejudices, no discrimination, no significance, absolutely none is permitted.
Eventually, only few things are left: uncertainty, self-reference and paradox. These remain for they're as basic as the most basic.
Uncertainty is the principle of doubting everything, even uncertainty.
Paradox is the principle of the collocation of the opposites.
Self-reference is the principle by which everything may claim its status quo for its pointing at itself.
And these three penetrate both our feelings and our logic, they're the junction point.
These three are perhaps the facets of one entity. Since they're all self-sufficient perhaps the inner core facets of which they are may not be revealed. If one's going to assume something, "I think therefore I am" is too big an assumption compared to these three.
Proving one's existence is not an event happening everyday, it's the final quest to see if there's anything we can hold on to (Whitney Houston sang: "Oh! What I can hold on to?" Did she mean that? [;)]).
What does "je pons donc je suis" mean?
It's "I think therefore I am", "Cogito ergo sum", "je pons donc je suis." I thought Descartes' word would seem better in his native language.
There is a book, "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance" by Robert M. Pirsig. I've a translation of it into my native language. It's from the 1976 print published by Corgi Books. The book is available now and, simply put, is great. I suggest you read it. It may show you many things I'm unable to show.
2. For [b]Another God:
It is a pragmatic necessary truth.
If I am able to say that I exist, or that I am thinking, then of course I exist.
Being is a pragmatically superior supposition but it's nothing more than a supposition.
Being there or not being there won't affect our thoughts/lives. We live as we live. It's the way it is. We do it as we do it.
Nothing is prior to existence. If you say "If I'm able to [beep] then of course I exist" then you have to prove you're "able to [beep]." This is noway easier than proving you exist.
wuliheron
Apr14-03, 12:28 PM
You are very right! Shaolin philosophy emphasizes this. When you are in pain, if you concentrate on being relaxed, and without pain, you will at least be releaved from pain. Also Reiki practices this sort of mind-body training. This is called autogenic meditation. And the central basis is thought.
Another way of looking at this issue is that pain, anger, unhappiness, etc. are not necessarilly synonymous with suffering. By meditating and clearing our minds of preconceptions and expectations it is possible to allow these natural feelings to pass through our bodies and minds and be transformed into other things.
For example, if I touch a hot stove without thinking about it I may just automatically pull my hand back and think little of it. If I expect to get hurt and to suffer, then I very well might. The automatic spontaneous act of pulling my hand back from the stove was triggered by pain, not suffering, and thus the pain was transformed into action. If instead I dwell on expectations and preconceptions, its even possible to cause physical injury to myself.
Psychologists sometimes refer to such things as hysterical reactions. Occationally such hysterical reactions can lead to perminent changes in our very biochemistry on even a cellular level. Therefore suffering can be considered distinct from pain in that it is intimately related to preconceptions and expectations.
I'm reminded of my own children and others I've dealt with. As very small babies and toddlers they of course would occationally fall down or in some other way hurt themselves or become upset, such as when mamma leaves the room. The younger they are the easier it is to just distract them from their own self-impossed suffering. Suddenly shouting Googragilfraglesnort! and waving my hands in the air or somesuch nonsense usually suffices. :0)
Originally posted by greeneagle3000
if what you think you are, you will be what you are. your mind make this real and therefore, everything will be in the way your mind percieves things. that's why they have to make a system of orders and the orientation to percieve what they want us to see.
So you think there is no actual objective reality, and that our minds make up our reality for us?
If so, you should perhaps see the first posts of the thread, entitled "The Hurdles to the Mind hypothesis". It is fashioned in such a way as to combat ideas set out by lifegazer, in his "Mind" hypothesis, but it appears relevant to your post, as well.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
-------Copy-Pasted from "Knowledge?", Page 4-------------------------
Every statement of the sort "I [beep] therefore I am" is erroneous when viewed with linear logic (I mean, no self-contradiction and/or loops allowed). Here's my proof:
Consider having said "I [beep]", you have to choose one of the two following statements:
P([beep]) : There need be an "I" to "[beep]."
P'([beep]) : There needn't be an "I" to "[beep]."
Since the above statements are contrary, only one of them may be yours (for we're using Aristotelian logic where a statement can be either true or false and nothing else and there's no escape from having chosen one of them).
If you choose 1, you've clearly pre-assumed that there need be an "I" to "[beep]" and you haven't done much in mentioning the consequence that "therefore I am." This is a self-referential statement giving no more information than what was known before.
If you choose 2, you've made another mistake. How could you say it isn't necessary to be an "I" to "[beep]" and then conclude that "therefore I (necessarily) am?" This is paradoxical for the statement is made up of two parts which are contradictory.
(This proof may be wrong. If so, please show my mistake(s))
This reasoning doesn't seem right to me. You said that I had to pre-suppose that there is an "I", in order for "I" to "". Well, [b]DUH. How can I say that "I" , unless there is an "I"?
Hint: I asked one of forum members to please take a look at this. She/he suggested it wasn't of much creditability and I agree with her/him. However, as long as "you" haven't shown its absurdity you have to take it.
Well, I'm not sure what the other member saw, but it didn't seem to have much credibility to me either.
I'm not convincing you that you don't exist, I repeat for 102th time. I'm showing how meaningless it may be to take any statement (even this well-shaped one) for granted.
Did you miss this, in my previous post...
Originally Posted By Me
Please remember, I'm not saying that you - personally - are trying to convince me of anything. I'm just saying that you couldn't, if you tried - which gives me certain amount of certainty that I do exist, because it can't be disproven .
Or did you ignore this?
Originally Posted By Manuel_Silvio
You say it "requires" that so and so, where does this "requirement" come from? You think there's a "requirement", you think a specific entity must be prior to another one, how did you come to think so? I've learnt that you, like Descartes, are insisting that "I think therefore I am" is a firm ground. If everything is going to built upon this statement, the statement itself must be "proven" independently. No assumptions, no beliefs, no pre-suppositions are allowed.
Because to say that someone does something, is to imply "someone's" existence. You, yourself, have stated that when I say "I [bleep]" it implies an I. This is proof of my (and Descartes') stance.
Hint: the above paragraph suffers internal inconsistency
No kidding (no offense).
He, however, slipped once, only once. He saw it necessary for the thinker to exist prior to thinking.
He saw it necessary that the thinker exist, before the thinker thought? I ask you again: [b]How can the thinker think, if the thinker doesn't exist?. You are contradicting yourself.
If he'd continued purifying his mind (perhaps he did but didn't find it suiting his favor) he would have seen that all "necessities", even the most basic ones, are assumptions unless that firm ground is found.
Have you ever read his "Rules on the Direction of the Mind"? You fall under the category of what was to be avoided, according to Rule #2.
Uncertainty is the principle of doubting everything, even uncertainty.
The uncertainty is the death of all progressive knowledge. Again I reference you to the second Rule of Descartes. (BTW, if you'd like, I can quote the Second Rule for you).
It's "I think therefore I am", "Cogito ergo sum", "je pons donc je suis." I thought Descartes' word would seem better in his native language.
Well it certainly sounds cooler [a)][;)]
There is a book, "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance" by Robert M. Pirsig. I've a translation of it into my native language. It's from the 1976 print published by Corgi Books. The book is available now and, simply put, is great. I suggest you read it. It may show you many things I'm unable to show.
I'll try and find that. (Why the weird sounding name? I would have mistaken it for a book on actual Motorcycle Maintenance, and dismissed it.)
Directed at Another God
Being there or not being there won't affect our thoughts/lives. We live as we live. It's the way it is. We do it as we do it.
Are you sure you don't want to retract this, for fear of being mocked mercilessly? Seriously, "Being there...won't affect our thoughts/lives"? Come on!
Nothing is prior to existence. If you say "If I'm able to [beep] then of course I exist" then you have to prove you're "able to [beep]." This is noway easier than proving you exist.
That's a different matter. You see, the fact that the Evil Demon (or you, in this case [<:)][;)]) was able to try and convince someone that they didn't exist (not saying that that's what you are doing, you "could" though, and that's the point), proves that both people (the one convincing and the one being convinced) exist.
Manuel_Silvio
Apr15-03, 03:26 PM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
... You said that I had to pre-suppose that there is an "I", in order for "I" to "[bleep]". Well, DUH. How can I say that "I" [bleep], unless there is an "I"?
There are two things here. First, that my proof relies on linear logic's vulnerability to an uncertain statement. On the first step I ask you to define the state of truth for the two contrary statments, P([beep]) and P'([beep]). Since we're viewing it using linear logic, you've no escape from giving the statements their respective truth values. You'll either have (P([beep]) = T, P'([beep] = F)) or (P([beep]) = F, P'([beep] = T)). I've shown that either of your possible choices in the framework linear logic lead to situations that are out of context, again for linear logic.
This is the nature of dilemma (only if you read that book). You have two choices both of which lead to disaster. There's no escape from that unless a third state is assumed. If a third choice is assumed then a new logic is born. The birth of a new logic means that linear (aristotelian) logic isn't unique. The very implication of its not unique gives birth to countless other systems of logical deduction with their very own rules of deduction and their very own truth values.
Second, that you ask how could you "[beep]" unless there's an "I"? May I ask in counteraction how have you come to believe that there should be an "I" to "[beep]?"
By asking this question you give a hint that it's impossible to act if one doesn't exist. I'm questioning this belief of yours. Since the proof of existence must come first of all, you can't believe in anything before you've proven your being. Since you can't believe in anything, you can't believe that "if there's a deed there's an doer."
We, in our lives, have always connected an effect with a cause, a deed with a doer. This connection isn't necessary. We just haven't observed any contradiction of this rule but this doesn't mean that this rule is never to be contradicted.
The scientific examples are the principles of conservation. Some of them were believed to be unbreakable but they were broken as their corresponding symmetries were violated; the one and only conservation principle whose breakage has never been observed is the conservation of energy. Yet this doesn't make it an unbreakable rule. Physicists are exploring every corner of the Universe to find a contradiction. Principles of conservation can't be proven. They're found empirically so their rightness can always be doubted.
Or did you ignore this?
Well, everyone makes mistakes... even me and... [:D]
Because to say that someone does something, is to imply "someone's" existence. You, yourself, have stated that when I say "I [bleep]" it implies an I. This is proof of my (and Descartes') stance.
No, I haven't said that. In my proof I offered you a statement, P([beep]), and asked you to determine its truth value. Whatever truth value you've chosen, it doesn't relate to me. I only have to show that for every truth value something obscene happens.
It's your belief you're thinking I'm implying. That you talk this over and over tells me you have a deep affection for the relation of the cause and the effect, the deed and the doer.
No kidding (no offense).
I can't get this. I wasn't kidding and really meant the hint. The paragraph I'd written above that hint really suffers internal inconsistency. I meant is as an excercise to find out if you can find where I've slipped. The hint is still there. See if you can find the weak point in that paragraph.
He saw it necessary that the thinker exist, before the thinker thought? I ask you again: How can the thinker think, if the thinker doesn't exist?. You are contradicting yourself.
I'm not contradicting myself, I'm contradicting your idea. Causality is the bond that connects the doer and the deed. It isn't a necessity. It needn't be there. The deed can be there without a doer if we ignore causality. This won't be a bad ignorance for causality is an empirical pattern; it isn't a logical obligation.
Have you ever read his "Rules on the Direction of the Mind"? You fall under the category of what was to be avoided, according to Rule #2.
No, I haven't ever read the book or caught a glimpse of it. I'd be thankful if you quote the part you're referring to.
And those rules were to direct Descartes' mind, not my mind. My mind goes where it sees suitable to go. I'm certainly someone to be avoided but I don't fall under a category. I'll go there if I'm politely asked [;)].
The uncertainty is the death of all progressive knowledge...Uncertainty is the death of many other things. That's what I really enjoy about it. Uncertainty is the death of confidence, righteousness, significance, preference, prudence, supremacy, ... If they're dying perhaps they don't deserve living on.
See, I'm living here with uncertainty. I'm not sure of anything but that's no problem. I've taken many steps after uncertainty and I, the precious I, haven't yet perished.
I really don't care much what Descartes has said before coming to "cogito ergo sum." Everything else is dependent on this critical point and I'll say Descartes has missed it. Anyway, I'd be thankful if you teach me these rules of mind direction.
I'll try and find that. (Why the weird sounding name? I would have mistaken it for a book on actual Motorcycle Maintenance, and dismissed it.)
It's a book on actual Motorcycle Maintenance. Only the motorcycle is a bit bigger, a bit more complex, a bit stranger, a bit different, just a bit. For me, it ranks among the very best among the books I've read.
Are you sure you don't want to retract this, for fear of being mocked mercilessly? Seriously, "Being there...won't affect our thoughts/lives"? Come on!
Remember what you said before, "uncertainty won't affect our lives." I'm not going to take this back.
Let's suppose someone comes and really convinces you (by magical means) that you don't exist but you go on living like before. You'll preceive everything just like before. If everything is just like before except for that you know you don't exist, would there be a problem? There's absolutely no problem. Nothing will be changed in your world if you're convinced of your non-existence unless you have a certain discomfort that leads to a suicide when you're convinced you are not.
That's a different matter. You see, the fact that the Evil Demon (or you, in this case [<:)]) was able to try and convince someone that they didn't exist (not saying that that's what you are doing, you "could" though, and that's the point), proves that both people (the one convincing and the one being convinced) exist.
First, you must know the Evil Demon scenario is a very basic one. Many other much more elaborate scenarios can be made. I'm one of those scenarios.
Second, you're still beholding the bonds of causality. Causality isn't a necessity. Causality isn't even the superior supposition. Causality isn't even the most useful supposition... There neend't be a Demon if a Demon is tricking you, you'd ask then what's tricking you? I'd say a Demon of a race of non-existent Demons. They may play hard tricks.
Do you know what the EPR experiment is? And then do you know what is Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony?
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,
1. For [b]Mentat:
There are two things here. First, that my proof relies on linear logic's vulnerability to an uncertain statement. On the first step I ask you to define the state of truth for the two contrary statments, P([beep]) and P'([beep]). Since we're viewing it using linear logic, you've no escape from giving the statements their respective truth values. You'll either have (P([beep]) = T, P'([beep] = F)) or (P([beep]) = F, P'([beep] = T)). I've shown that either of your possible choices in the framework linear logic lead to situations that are out of context, again for linear logic.
You really lost me. From what I understand, your reasoning doesn't apply to something like the "I think therefore I am" philosophy. I say this because "I think therefore I am" is made up of the following propositions:
1) I exist (because I refer to myself as an entity).
2) I think.
3) Number 1 implies number 2.
This is the nature of dilemma (only if you read that book). You have two choices both of which lead to disaster. There's no escape from that unless a third state is assumed. If a third choice is assumed then a new logic is born.
Now this I understand - I've seen it applied to Euclidean Geometry before, too, and it makes sense. However, if you think that I don't have to exist in order for me to do something, you'd need a much stronger argument to convince me.
Second, that you ask how could you "[beep]" unless there's an "I"? May I ask in counteraction how have you come to believe that there should be an "I" to "[beep]?"
I come to believe this because the [bleep] on this particular occasion is substituted by "I think" - not just "think". There must be an "I" in order to [bleep], because "I" is part of the [bleep] itself.
By asking this question you give a hint that it's impossible to act if one doesn't exist. I'm questioning this belief of yours. Since the proof of existence must come first of all, you can't believe in anything before you've proven your being. Since you can't believe in anything, you can't believe that "if there's a deed there's an doer."
What do you mean "since you can't believe anything"? I can believe something, that's what proves that I exist. I rise to your challenge - because it is my opinion that there must be an "I", before "I" can do something. I hold this opinion, currently, because ther statement "I [bleep]" has an "I" in it (to put it basically).
We, in our lives, have always connected an effect with a cause, a deed with a doer.
That's because a "deed", by definition, is that which is done. And that which is done, is done by something. Also, "effect", is defined as something that is caused, otherwise it wouldn't be an "effect".
No, I haven't said that. In my proof I offered you a statement, P([beep]), and asked you to determine its truth value. Whatever truth value you've chosen, it doesn't relate to me. I only have to show that for every truth value something obscene happens.
I don't understand the relevance of this reasoning, to the topic at hand. Please explain it to me.
It's your belief you're thinking I'm implying. That you talk this over and over tells me you have a deep affection for the relation of the cause and the effect, the deed and the doer.
Well, one should have affection for that which one discusses. I have to go now, I will complete my response tomorrow...
greeneagle3000
Apr16-03, 01:13 AM
Originally posted by Mentat
So you think there is no actual objective reality, and that our minds make up our reality for us?
If so, you should perhaps see the first posts of the thread, entitled "The Hurdles to the Mind hypothesis". It is fashioned in such a way as to combat ideas set out by lifegazer, in his "Mind" hypothesis, but it appears relevant to your post, as well.
yes. i don't know about that guys post. i'll check it out when i'm free.
our minds make everything up for us. like when you see, smell, touch something, our minds tells us that it is there. therefore, thats what many people define, reality.
there is no such thing as reality.
RuroumiKenshin
Apr16-03, 02:16 AM
Originally posted by Mentat
So you think there is no actual objective reality, and that our minds make up our reality for us?
In a sense, you're right! But we may never know....
If so, you should perhaps see the first posts of the thread, entitled "The Hurdles to the Mind hypothesis". It is fashioned in such a way as to combat ideas set out by lifegazer, in his "Mind" hypothesis, but it appears relevant to your post, as well.
first off, see wuliheron's post.
secondly, I would like to expand on what wuliheron said. If you think that you will not, under any circumstances feel pain for example, you will feel little (as you can't stop the sensation altogether). Thoughts create our emotions, so to speak. this is yoga, reiki, zen....and other classifications. Is there like one word I could use!!?? [g)]
re: what am i?
well, you are who you are (oh, so very vague...and cool). IOW, I believe the question has two answers: one can be simply given through a taxonomical analysis, and another on a spiritual level. I'm sure wuliheron would be most pleased to explain this. as for me, i must go to bed.[:((]
greeneagle3000
Apr16-03, 02:42 AM
you are your soul.
Alright, I'm back. I'll finish my response now...
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
I can't get this. I wasn't kidding and really meant the hint. The paragraph I'd written above that hint really suffers internal inconsistency. I meant is as an excercise to find out if you can find where I've slipped. The hint is still there. See if you can find the weak point in that paragraph.
Well, I don't see any internal inconsistency. I'll keep looking, but maybe you should just tell me.
I'm not contradicting myself, I'm contradicting your idea. Causality is the bond that connects the doer and the deed. It isn't a necessity. It needn't be there. The deed can be there without a doer if we ignore causality. This won't be a bad ignorance for causality is an empirical pattern; it isn't a logical obligation.
Yes it is a logical obligation that all effects have causes. It would not be an "effect" otherwise.
Uncertainty is the death of many other things. That's what I really enjoy about it. Uncertainty is the death of confidence, righteousness, significance, preference, prudence, supremacy, ... If they're dying perhaps they don't deserve living on.
You see how many things uncertainty kills? And yet, kill uncertainty, and you get all the things that make human existence meaningful (IMO).
See, I'm living here with uncertainty. I'm not sure of anything but that's no problem. I've taken many steps after uncertainty and I, the precious I, haven't yet perished.
If you say that you aren't certain about anything, and don't allow for yourself to be certain of anything, then you are certain that you are not certain of anything. This is a self-contradictory statement.
I really don't care much what Descartes has said before coming to "cogito ergo sum." Everything else is dependent on this critical point and I'll say Descartes has missed it.
Wrong. The statement was dependent on the argument that he set out before, not the other way around - as you imply.
It's a book on actual Motorcycle Maintenance. Only the motorcycle is a bit bigger, a bit more complex, a bit stranger, a bit different, just a bit. For me, it ranks among the very best among the books I've read.
Well, I've reserved it from the library, and hope to read it soon.
Remember what you said before, "uncertainty won't affect our lives." I'm not going to take this back.
So you wont take back this statement...
Being there or not being there won't affect our thoughts/lives. We live as we live. It's the way it is. We do it as we do it.
? Well, that's up to you, but it is obviously wrong, because of it's self-contradictory nature. You say that being there wont affect our lives. How can you even be alive, if your not "there" - IOW, if you don't exist - ?
Let's suppose someone comes and really convinces you (by magical means) that you don't exist but you go on living like before. You'll preceive everything just like before. If everything is just like before except for that you know you don't exist, would there be a problem? There's absolutely no problem. Nothing will be changed in your world if you're convinced of your non-existence unless you have a certain discomfort that leads to a suicide when you're convinced you are not.
No, nothing changes if I'm convinced that I don't exist. However, I cannot be convinced that I don't exist, until someone shows me the flaw in Descartes' reasoning.
First, you must know the Evil Demon scenario is a very basic one. Many other much more elaborate scenarios can be made. I'm one of those scenarios.
And I've already shown you that your attempt to concvince me (please note my reference to myself) of something (even if it be my own existence) proves that I exist. Otherwise, there would be no one for you to convince.
Second, you're still beholding the bonds of causality. Causality isn't a necessity. Causality isn't even the superior supposition. Causality isn't even the most useful supposition... There neend't be a Demon if a Demon is tricking you, you'd ask then what's tricking you? I'd say a Demon of a race of non-existent Demons. They may play hard tricks.
"There needn't be a Demon, if a Demon is tricking you..."? This is embarrisingly self-contradictory. I don't think I really need to comment on the inconsistency of saying that there is a demon tricking me (which is made up of the propositions: 1) There is a demon; 2) It is trying to trick me), and then saying that there is no demon.
Also, there cannot be a "Demon of a race of non-existent Demons". If the Demons are truly non-existent, then there is no demon.
Do you know what the EPR experiment is? And then do you know what is Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony?
No, I don't.
BTW, I will quote the Rules of Direction for you later, I don't have them on-hand right now, and don't really have the time to get them right now. I apologize for not being better prepared.
Manuel_Silvio
Apr16-03, 04:09 PM
1. For Mentat:
You really lost me...
Aha! I'll take you back [;)]. Let me re-structure my proof into a storyline:
00. You say: "Ahoy! I'm gonna tell you I think therefore I am."
01. I say: "Behold! You can't say that!"
02. "Why not?"
03. "Wait a moment! Since you're the linear-logic-o-phile I may ask you anytime I wish if a statement is true or not, na?"
04. "Yep."
05. "So please tell me if P([beep]) is true or its contrary P'([beep]), P([beep]) being that there need be an I to [beep]."
06. You either say:
----a. "P([beep]) = T and P'([beep]) = F"
----b. "P([beep]) = F and P'([beep]) = T"
07. If you say (a) then I'd say: "You said there need be an I to [beep] before we've started the debate about Descartes' statement so you've pre-assumed Descartes' statement truth. Since you're informing of something you'd pre-assumed, you aren't doing much, you aren't proving. You're trapped in a loop, pre-assuming something and then debating about its truth."
08. If you say (b) then I'd say: "You said there needn't be an I to [beep] before we've started the debate about Descartes' statement. If it's so how could you say Descartes' statement is true? You'd said there's no necessary-sufficient relation between the I and the [beep] so you can no more say there's such relation."
The way out would be that you assume a third state for P([beep]), say the "suspension" state then you could say P([beep]) had to be suspended before talking about Descartes' statement.
... if you think that I don't have to exist in order for me to do something, you'd need a much stronger argument to convince me.
I needn't convince you. I'm not posing for or against, I'm posing neutral. I'm not saying you have to exist to [beep] neither do I say you have not to exist to [beep]. I say there needn't be an ontologic bond between you and [beep]. It would seem sensible to you if I said: "your being there isn't an indication of an action being done." The same way, I could say and I've said: "the action's being there isn't an indication of your being there." These two statements are complementary. That you accept the first easily but reject the second with so much effort means that you're still under Aristotle's spell.
Uncertainty doesn't need an argument. The Bill of Rights says one is innocent until proven otherwise. I say any statement is uncertain until proven otherwise. Uncertainty is the primordial state of every statement.
Well, I don't see any internal inconsistency. I'll keep looking, but maybe you should just tell me.
I'll tell you later.
Yes it is a logical obligation that all effects have causes. It would not be an "effect" otherwise.
No, it isn't. It isn't a "logical" obligation, it's an empirical pattern. For it isn't proven, it is observed. Do you consider Columb law of electric force between point charges an empirical pattern or a logical obligation?
I'll tell you of two instances where cause-effect bond isn't as important as you may think:
a. The EPR Experiment: EPR stands for Einstein-Pudolsky-Rosen. There are four important principles of conservation: conservation of energy, of spin, of charge and of momentum. EPR experiment deals with the conservation of spin. There are ways to tie a pair of particles so that they're obliged to follow the conservation of spin (eg, in an atomic orbital a pair of electrons live who're obliged to a have total spin of zero, (+1/2) + (-1/2) = 0), this procedure is called "quantum entanglement." Consider a pair of entangled particles, and then suppose we take the two far apart. Now what will happen if we change the spin of one of the particles? The other one changs its spin in order to preserve the total spin. How long will it take for this to happen? Absolute zero. That's very strange. Waves (of all sorts) are the messengers of this Universe and the fastest messengers are em-waves who travel at c. If the second particle is informed of a spin change far away, what could have informed it? No wave could have carried the message in zero time. The EPR experiment caused a divide in the Physicist community, one group was lead by the Coppenhagen school giants (Schroedinger, Heisenberg, Bohr, et al) and the other by Einstein. The details of their ideas aren't meant here. The main point here is zero time. You know, a very strict aspect of ontologic causality is the delay between the being of the cause and the being of the effect. Cause must be chronologically prior to effect. The basis for distinguishing cause and effect is this delay; the one that comes first is the cause and the pursuer is the effect. If the spin change in both particles happens at the same time then which of the events has been the cause and which has been the effect?
b. Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony: Leibniz was a founder of Calculus. He was specially in love with the concept of "infinitely small" (the differential element). This concept appeared both in his mathematics and his philosophy. In philosophy he proposed that the Universe was made of infinitely small units called "monads." Monads are independent and aren't interacting. One may ask: "then what happens when a telephone rings and I hear it?" The answer is Pre-established Harmony. The monads of the telephone and those of the individual hearing it ringing are independent but they were synchronized (at the dawn of time, creation, or something like that) to act mutually at a certain moment. This scenario is a substitute to the cause-effect scenario and is of equal creditability.
Considering (a) and (b), these points are clear:
00. Scientific rationale has come to a point where cause-effect pair fails even though scientific methodology has never been deviated from.
01. There are many substitutes to the cause-effect theory.
02. One such substitute is that of Leibniz.
03. Cause-effect pair has been common for many years perhaps because of its practicality. Nothing more.
You see how many things uncertainty kills? And yet, kill uncertainty, and you get all the things that make human existence meaningful (IMO).
I won't kill the result of my quest in exchange for a cold comfort. Uncertainty is the essence of dynamism and change. If I was certain I'll go to hell someday I would never move a finger for escaping the hell and winning the heavens.
If you say that you aren't certain about anything, and don't allow for yourself to be certain of anything, then you are certain that you are not certain of anything. This is a self-contradictory statement.
"There needn't be a Demon, if a Demon is tricking you..."? This is embarrisingly self-contradictory. I don't think I really need to comment on the inconsistency of saying that there is a demon tricking me (which is made up of the propositions: 1) There is a demon; 2) It is trying to trick me), and then saying that there is no demon.
Also, there cannot be a "Demon of a race of non-existent Demons". If the Demons are truly non-existent, then there is no demon.
Yes! You got it. That's the heart of this debate. I'm stating self-contradictory statements but am not embarrassed. Paradox is inevitable. You see my statements like lunacy but they're there just to make you think about it. I'm giving you self-contradictory statements to show the implications of uncertainty.
There's a deed, "a Demon tricking you," and a doer, "a Demon." What relates them in your mind is causality. For me, causality isn't more creditable than anything else so I can understand "a Demon tricking" without a need for "a Demon."
Wrong. The statement was dependent on the argument that he set out before, not the other way around - as you imply.
"Cogito ergo sum" was there to prove Descartes' existence. If he hadn't yet proven his existene how could have he proven his means of proving his existence?
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
1. For Mentat:
Aha! I'll take you back [;)]. Let me re-structure my proof into a storyline:
00. You say: "Ahoy! I'm gonna tell you I think therefore I am."
01. I say: "Behold! You can't say that!"
02. "Why not?"
03. "Wait a moment! Since you're the linear-logic-o-phile I may ask you anytime I wish if a statement is true or not, na?"
04. "Yep."
05. "So please tell me if P([beep]) is true or its contrary P'([beep]), P([beep]) being that there need be an I to [beep]."
06. You either say:
----a. "P([beep]) = T and P'([beep]) = F"
----b. "P([beep]) = F and P'([beep]) = T"
07. If you say (a) then I'd say: "You said there need be an I to [beep] before we've started the debate about Descartes' statement so you've pre-assumed Descartes' statement truth. Since you're informing of something you'd pre-assumed, you aren't doing much, you aren't proving. You're trapped in a loop, pre-assuming something and then debating about its truth."
08. If you say (b) then I'd say: "You said there needn't be an I to [beep] before we've started the debate about Descartes' statement. If it's so how could you say Descartes' statement is true? You'd said there's no necessary-sufficient relation between the I and the [beep] so you can no more say there's such relation."
Is this reasoning really applicable to Descartes' reasoning? If the proposition is "I think", then - if this proposition is true - both parts (sub-propositions, as I mentioned before) of it must be true.
I needn't convince you. I'm not posing for or against, I'm posing neutral. I'm not saying you have to exist to [beep] neither do I say you have not to exist to [beep].
Are you sure about that? You did say this:
I'm not contradicting myself, I'm contradicting your idea. Causality is the bond that connects the doer and the deed. It isn't a necessity. It needn't be there. The deed can be there without a doer if we ignore causality. This won't be a bad ignorance for causality is an empirical pattern; it isn't a logical obligation
Besides, it doesn't matter whether you are trying to convince me of whether I exist or not, all that matters is whether Descartes' reasoning allows you to do so at all.
I say there needn't be an ontologic bond between you and [beep]. It would seem sensible to you if I said: "your being there isn't an indication of an action being done." The same way, I could say and I've said: "the action's being there isn't an indication of your being there."
Don't you see that the proposition is not "thinking is occuring"? The proposition is "I think". If this proposition holds true (as it must, in order for me to even contemplate (or [b]think about) not existing) then I must exist.
Uncertainty doesn't need an argument. The Bill of Rights says one is innocent until proven otherwise. I say any statement is uncertain until proven otherwise. Uncertainty is the primordial state of every statement.
Even of the statement, "uncertainty is the primordial state of every statement."? If so, then your statement, itself, is also uncertain, and there is; but cannot be, because it is that very reasoning that I'm using to justify calling it uncertain; and thus, your statement - and the reasoning behind it - is paradoxical/self-contradictory.
I'll tell you later.
Oh, you will tell me later? Doesn't that statement also imply the existence of you and me? [;)]
No, it isn't. It isn't a "logical" obligation, it's an empirical pattern. For it isn't proven, it is observed. Do you consider Columb law of electric force between point charges an empirical pattern or a logical obligation?
How is that relevant? I am talking about the logical obligation of "that which was caused" having "been caused". This is a rather obvious connection, IMO - especially considering the words I've used.
I'll tell you of two instances where cause-effect bond isn't as important as you may think:
a. The EPR Experiment: EPR stands for Einstein-Pudolsky-Rosen. There are four important principles of conservation: conservation of energy, of spin, of charge and of momentum. EPR experiment deals with the conservation of spin. There are ways to tie a pair of particles so that they're obliged to follow the conservation of spin (eg, in an atomic orbital a pair of electrons live who're obliged to a have total spin of zero, (+1/2) + (-1/2) = 0), this procedure is called "quantum entanglement." Consider a pair of entangled particles, and then suppose we take the two far apart. Now what will happen if we change the spin of one of the particles? The other one changs its spin in order to preserve the total spin. How long will it take for this to happen? Absolute zero. That's very strange. Waves (of all sorts) are the messengers of this Universe and the fastest messengers are em-waves who travel at c. If the second particle is informed of a spin change far away, what could have informed it? No wave could have carried the message in zero time. The EPR experiment caused a divide in the Physicist community, one group was lead by the Coppenhagen school giants (Schroedinger, Heisenberg, Bohr, et al) and the other by Einstein. The details of their ideas aren't meant here. The main point here is zero time. You know, a very strict aspect of ontologic causality is the delay between the being of the cause and the being of the effect. Cause must be chronologically prior to effect. The basis for distinguishing cause and effect is this delay; the one that comes first is the cause and the pursuer is the effect. If the spin change in both particles happens at the same time then which of the events has been the cause and which has been the effect?
Don't you see that they are both the affect? They are both the same particle, for all practical purposes. Besides, I don't think this is very relevant to the simple reasoning that I must exist in order for a propostion, which requires me to exist, to be true.
b. Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony: Leibniz was a founder of Calculus. He was specially in love with the concept of "infinitely small" (the differential element). This concept appeared both in his mathematics and his philosophy. In philosophy he proposed that the Universe was made of infinitely small units called "monads." Monads are independent and aren't interacting. One may ask: "then what happens when a telephone rings and I hear it?" The answer is Pre-established Harmony. The monads of the telephone and those of the individual hearing it ringing are independent but they were synchronized (at the dawn of time, creation, or something like that) to act mutually at a certain moment. This scenario is a substitute to the cause-effect scenario and is of equal creditability.
How is that equally credible?
Considering (a) and (b), these points are clear:
00. Scientific rationale has come to a point where cause-effect pair fails even though scientific methodology has never been deviated from.
01. There are many substitutes to the cause-effect theory.
02. One such substitute is that of Leibniz.
03. Cause-effect pair has been common for many years perhaps because of its practicality. Nothing more.
The fact that it's so practical is evidence (IMO) that it may be true. Besides, Leibniz's idea cannot be proven. I can, however, show you that when I push something, it moves (for example). This is cause-and-effect, even if it is because of "monads". My action produced another action.
Yes! You got it. That's the heart of this debate. I'm stating self-contradictory statements but am not embarrassed. Paradox is inevitable. You see my statements like lunacy but they're there just to make you think about it. I'm giving you self-contradictory statements to show the implications of uncertainty.
Paradox is only inevitable if you choose to stick to your belief of uncertainty. It does not, however, help you to learn anything, to keep this uncertain attitude - and, since I devote myself to learning, I don't stick to irrationality (which leads to paradox, which is the death of all learning and progressive knowledge).
There's a deed, "a Demon tricking you," and a doer, "a Demon." What relates them in your mind is causality. For me, causality isn't more creditable than anything else so I can understand "a Demon tricking" without a need for "a Demon."
No you can't. Not if you fully understand the statement, "a Demon tricking", and the propositions required for such a statment to be true.
"Cogito ergo sum" was there to prove Descartes' existence. If he hadn't yet proven his existene how could have he proven his means of proving his existence?
They fulfill each other. He prove that he exists, by the fact that he can think about existing. It is obvious that he really was thinking about this, otherwise we would have nothing to discuss.
Manuel_Silvio
Apr18-03, 02:03 AM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
Is this reasoning really applicable to Descartes' reasoning?...
Don't ask me. Show where the logical fault is. I described a step-by-step procedure whose steps are logical. Nothing wrong happens during the transition from one step to the other. Consequently, this can be considered a logical proof.
This reasoning is applicable to Descartes' statement for it's concerned with showing this statement's state. It shows that, with regard to an independent statement named P([beep]), the procedure of determining Descartes' statement's state leads to a dilemma.
For an understanding of this, you must be aware that P([beep]) has nothing to do with Descartes' statement. It's only an engineered statement that will, in association with Descartes' statement, cause this dilemma.
Are you sure about that? You did say this:
Yes, I said that. I said that about Causality. Causality has no relation to your existence. Anyway, I didn't pose pro/contra Causality. I only said "it needn't be there." Saying it "needn't" be there doesn't mean it "mustn't" be there, means it's not necessary if one's going to talk Philosophy.
Again, I'm not posing against "Causality." I'm posing against an unjustified claim, "causality is indeed there." Posing against "Causality" is a claim while posing against an unjustified claim is the regulation of dialog.
Don't you see that the proposition is not "thinking is occurring"? ...
May I ask if "thinking" is "not occurring" when you "think?" The implication of Descartes' statement is that a certain action, "thinking," when performed by the mind is a ground for the mind's existence.
Saying "I think" is equal to saying "I execute the task of thinking" which is equal to "thinking is occurring and it's occurring in my mind."
Even of the statement, "uncertainty is the primordial state of every statement."? ... your statement - and the reasoning behind it - is paradoxical/self-contradictory.
It's indeed paradoxical/self-contradictory but not at first glance.
My way of approaching the uncertainty is a step-by-step one. You take steps along a way that little by little exhausts your pre-judices and pre-suppositions. This will go on until you no more have any pre-suppositions and then comes the uncertainty. At first glance it seems like the uncertainty is a universal principle. You'll delight so much with having found a universal principle. After a while, however, you see how uncertainty plagues itself and now you learn something that's even more important than uncertainty. You learn there's a problem, a very basic problem, in human knowledge and in human ways of knowing/understanding. Where's the problem? No one knows. You won't go far with this single assumption, "there's a problem somewhere" but it gives you hints other manners of approaching the problem won't give you.
Now that you know "there's a problem somewhere," you'll be cautious, precise, clear, unbiased and always warned against whatever comes your way. For every forthcoming statement may be exactly where the problem lies and if you take the statement for granted or show bias towards it, you've fallen into the abyss, that very basic problem.
Moreover, you'll always try to look beyond and look through. Looking beyond and looking through, someday you may find that fatal crack in the Great Wall of Knowledge.
Even more, the self-contradicting principle of uncertainty doesn't prevent you from assuming whatever statement you please. You can assume the methodology of science for observing the Universe and take your chance that way. Uncertainty has only one use, that's to keep warned. When you come to say "when a ball hits a wall, the momentum will remain constant," you'll know deep inside that you may be dead wrong. Again, when you come to say "[beep] is superior to [beep]" you have your choice to assume this but you won't be imposing it on others for you know for all purposes superiority is an uncertain matter. This knowledge won't do you harm, it won't change your mind, it won't change your attitude but it will increase your acceptance for whatever thought or attitude you're offered.
Uncertainty is safeguard against supposition, prejudice and discrimination. An individual who's uncertain of her/his manners won't be imposing or preaching them. She/he also won't condemn others' attitude and beliefs, no matter how harsh it may seem to her/his common sense.
How is that relevant? I am talking about the logical obligation of "that which was caused" having "been caused". This is a rather obvious connection, IMO - especially considering the words I've used.
Don't play around with definitions, you'll get burnt! You should've known how I indulge in loops [:D]
You just made a loop. You said, "that which was caused" has "been caused." What have you said? Nothing special. Let's assume someone defined causality as the bond between the following two:
a. That causes.
b. That has been caused.
Do you think it is a subtle definition? I don't think so; (a) and (b) make a logical loop in which the meaning of causation is lost. Even if this loss is compensated (although it can't be), you won't gain much from this definition.
This definition points nowhere while Aristotle's Causality (which has been practiced for 2000 years) points at natural phenomena. It points outwards, to the Universe. Causality is a well-defined term and can't be simply played with.
Circular definitions (which are important to me) are like axioms. They can be made readily. They can be made for free and without any effort.
Let me make one such definition: temperature is that which is measured with a thermometer and thermometer is that by which temperature is measured. Do you think this definition will inform anyone of what temperature and thermometer are?
Don't you see that they are both the affect? They are both the same particle, for all practical purposes...
I don't think that's a decent way of talking about EPR Experiment. This experiment has consumed years of physicists' lives and is still a hot topic. Is that you with few lines of argument have shown how much it should be credited?
They're similar particles and if one loses track of them will no more be able to distinguish them. This, however, doesn't mean they're one entity. They may have different linear momentums and loci. They're only entangled in spin, nothing more. These two are distinct entities. When something happens between them, one "must" be the cause and the other "must" be the effect.
I don't know what you mean with "all practical purposes" and I don't want to know but it's an annoying phrase to see over and over again. For all practical purposes, you've wasted the precious heart of the EPR experiment.
It was meant to show that Causality may be a simplified form of a higher degree interconnection or may be a (hopefully) recurring pattern. If this concept is understood then it's clear that the bond between the doer and the deed (which are an exemplary cause-effect pair) is not as strong as it was assumed to be. Consequently, a deed is no more an indication of a doer, ie the thinking is no more an indication of the thinker.
The fact that it's so practical is evidence (IMO) that it may be true. Besides, Leibniz's idea cannot be proven. I can, however, show you that when I push something, it moves (for example)...I thought I was the stubborn one. For the zillionth time, Leibniz's idea and yours can't be proven. That's why they're equally creditable. Both are uncertain like any other idea one may think of.
Who says that an object moves when you push it? Where did you come to believe this? You can't point at an object, push it, show me that it moves and then say "causality is a logical obligation." It's an empirical pattern shared by you and me.
I'm wondering if you know the difference between "a logical obligation" and "an empirical pattern." Do you know the difference?
Causality's being practical is noway an evidence. I told you of internal consistency and its implications on a post in "Knowledge?" thread. Being practical, handy, good, easy, simple, whatever is a characteristic of a system of thoughts when it's viewed from inside, ie the viewers is committed to those thoughts.
... It does not, however, help you to learn anything, to keep this uncertain attitude - and, since I devote myself to learning, I don't stick to irrationality (which leads to paradox, which is the death of all learning and progressive knowledge).
Irrationality? Who said it was irrationality? And who said rationality is the only way of learning? And who said uncertainty hasn't helped me learn more? And who said progressive knowledge was worth throwing away the inevitable? And who said I'm stuck to uncertainty? And who said the death of progressive knowledge means that it can't be used anymore?
The same principle of uncertainty lets me be uncertain of what I know and seek more knowledge. For all human history, uncertainty has been the motive to gain certainty. And for all human history, after a certain amount of knowledge was gathered uncertainty was forgotten although it still prevailed. We're living the certainty era, everyone's certain of one's life, everyone's certain of one's political/social/philosophical/[beep] stance, and that leads to blindness. Uncertainty will only motivate further thought while certainty will relieve and soothe the minds until they're too lazy and inert to move even the least bit.
In case of progressive knowledge, what dies is the blind belief in its success. For a long time now, human beings have thought they know much and they will know more with any further step. Lame! They're wrapped in the encompassing Unknown and suppose their knowledge is/will become encompassing.
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
Apr18-03, 02:49 AM
... continued from the previous post
Progressive knowledge can be seen more clearly in the light of uncertainty. It will become richer if it's accompanied by knowledge of its being temporal and its being uncertain.
No you can't. Not if you fully understand the statement, "a Demon tricking", and the propositions required for such a statement to be true.
It's not you who determines if I can. I can think of "a Demon tricking" without "a Demon being there" because I'm not under Aristotle's spell, or at least I'm aware of the rune that's been cast here.
P: A Demon playing nasty tricks.
Q: A Demon is there.
(P => Q) truth table for all Boolean P and Q values:
P---Q---(P => Q)
T---T---T
T---F---F
F---T---T
F---F---T
You say that if P = T then Q should be T in order for (P => Q) to be true. You're right only if you're bound to Boolean logic. Multi-value logic has been around for many decades now, and fuzzy logic is readily used in CD-ROM Drive manufacturing. Add to all these Gödel’s theorem and all the meta-mathematics stuff (don't ask me what it really is, I don't know). Now you can have countless states for a statement, eg the Demon can be 13.666 (accurate to 3 decimal places) existent or it may assume "null" state. Simply put, for every statement you can assume a logical structure in which it assumes any arbitrarily chosen state. And these are only the rationalized and/or scientific parts of this realm, the realm of uncertainty.
The philosophical parts of this realm are even more interesting. The Demon may assume states that transcend our understanding of "existence." We declare a thing either "existent" or "non-existent" and then say it to "be" existent or non-existent while it "may" (only "may" not "must," "ought to" or "should") "be" in a wholly different state, a state which "may" even transcend our understanding of a state where "being there" may be meant in some unknown implementation which may transcend our understanding of "being."
Anecdote: "Don't impose the burden of your limits unto this unknown Universe, please!"
They fulfill each other. He proves that he exists, by the fact that he can think about existing. It is obvious that he really was thinking about this, otherwise we would have nothing to discuss.
Before proving he existed he had to assume he didn't exist until he could prove his existence. Then if he didn't exist how could he believe he was thinking? He had to know and be sure that he was thinking but he couldn't be thinking if he didn't exist so his statement turns into: "I am therefore I am." What a miracle! He is therefore he is. That's why he no more "is" [:))]
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
Don't ask me. Show where the logical fault is. I described a step-by-step procedure whose steps are logical. Nothing wrong happens during the transition from one step to the other. Consequently, this can be considered a logical proof.
Hey, did you ignore the rest of what I said?
Originally posted by Me
Is this reasoning really applicable to Descartes' reasoning? If the proposition is "I think", then - if this proposition is true - both parts (sub-propositions, as I mentioned before) of it must be true.
You only quoted and responded to the first sentence.
Posted By Manuel
This reasoning is applicable to Descartes' statement for it's concerned with showing this statement's state. It shows that, with regard to an independent statement named P(), the procedure of determining Descartes' statement's state leads to a dilemma.
No, it's not applicable. It doesn't satisfy the fact that the statement, "I think", requires two premises to be true.
May I ask if "thinking" is "not occurring" when you "think?" The implication of Descartes' statement is that a certain action, "thinking," when performed by the mind is a ground for the mind's existence.
Please tell me that you are just feigning ignorance. No offense, but how is it possible that you missed the fact that [b]two premises are required for the statement "I think"? It is not anything like "P[bleep]". Descartes is saying that if P is [bleep]ing then P exists. (I've asked this before, but...) isn't that obvious? You cannot truthfully say that P does something, unless P exists.
Saying "I think" is equal to saying "I execute the task of thinking" which is equal to "thinking is occurring and it's occurring in my mind."
Yes, and the first statement requires that I exist (because "I" am executing the task of thinking). The second statement requires that both "I" exists, and "my mind" exists.
[quote]
My way of approaching the uncertainty is a step-by-step one. You take steps along a way that little by little exhausts your pre-judices and pre-suppositions. This will go on until you no more have any pre-suppositions and then comes the uncertainty. At first glance it seems like the uncertainty is a universal principle. You'll delight so much with having found a universal principle. After a while, however, you see how uncertainty plagues itself and now you learn something that's even more important than uncertainty. You learn there's a problem, a very basic problem, in human knowledge and in human ways of knowing/understanding. Where's the problem? No one knows. You won't go far with this single assumption, "there's a problem somewhere" but it gives you hints other manners of approaching the problem won't give you.
There is no point in my following such a path, as it destroys all need of learning/science.
Now that you know "there's a problem somewhere," you'll be cautious, precise, clear, unbiased and always warned against whatever comes your way. For every forthcoming statement may be exactly where the problem lies and if you take the statement for granted or show bias towards it, you've fallen into the abyss, that very basic problem.
I don't have time (or typing space) to discuss why uncertainty is only good, if not taken to extremes. Perhaps you should start a thread on that.
Don't play around with definitions, you'll get burnt! You should've known how I indulge in loops [:D]
Have you ever noticed how a path that loops infinitely, doesn't get you anywhere but where you started. Philosophically, scientificall, and logically this is not a good path to follow.
You just made a loop. You said, "that which was caused" has "been caused." What have you said? Nothing special. Let's assume someone defined causality as the bond between the following two:
No, it's not anything special, and yet you seem to have missed entirely when you said "and effect doesn't require a cause".
Do you think it is a subtle definition? I don't think so
Then why was it so easy for you to miss it?
Circular definitions (which are important to me) are like axioms. They can be made readily. They can be made for free and without any effort.
My definition is not circular. I was saying that that which has been caused has been caused. It is obvious, and seems unnecessary to actually say, but you were the one who said that an "effect" doesn't always require a "cause".
I don't think that's a decent way of talking about EPR Experiment. This experiment has consumed years of physicists' lives and is still a hot topic. Is that you with few lines of argument have shown how much it should be credited?
Well, I'm sorry, if I offended you or anyone else in my indifference to what seemed to me to be obviously wrong.
They're similar particles and if one loses track of them will no more be able to distinguish them. This, however, doesn't mean they're one entity. They may have different linear momentums and loci. They're only entangled in spin, nothing more. These two are distinct entities. When something happens between them, one "must" be the cause and the other "must" be the effect.
If they are Quantum Mechanically bound, they are one entity.
I don't know what you mean with "all practical purposes" and I don't want to know but it's an annoying phrase to see over and over again. For all practical purposes, you've wasted the precious heart of the EPR experiment.
[:(]
Please forgive my sarcasm, but it really doesn't matter to me that I have defied that which you held sacred, because it doesn't appear right that you should hold it so, in the first place.
It was meant to show that Causality may be a simplified form of a higher degree interconnection or may be a (hopefully) recurring pattern. If this concept is understood then it's clear that the bond between the doer and the deed (which are an exemplary cause-effect pair) is not as strong as it was assumed to be. Consequently, a deed is no more an indication of a doer, ie the thinking is no more an indication of the thinker.
It has no such application. If I connect the fact that both of the particles changed in spin, to a cause (the physicist which made the "observation") then I still have a simple cause-and-effect relationship.
I thought I was the stubborn one. For the zillionth time, Leibniz's idea and yours can't be proven. That's why they're equally creditable. Both are uncertain like any other idea one may think of.
Leibniz's idea is also one of cause-and-effect. Just because he describes what is happening differently than I do, doesn't change the fact that he acknowledges there being a person who caused the effect.
Who says that an object moves when you push it? Where did you come to believe this? You can't point at an object, push it, show me that it moves and then say "causality is a logical obligation." It's an empirical pattern shared by you and me.
Well, I could show you this, if you were physically in my presence. But I can't now, if that's what you mean.
I'm wondering if you know the difference between "a logical obligation" and "an empirical pattern." Do you know the difference?
Not really. A logical obligation should be readily demonstrable, as should an empirical pattern. However, if you think that it is relevant to the thread, please explain the difference between the two.
Irrationality? Who said it was irrationality? And who said rationality is the only way of learning? And who said uncertainty hasn't helped me learn more? And who said progressive knowledge was worth throwing away the inevitable? And who said I'm stuck to uncertainty? And who said the death of progressive knowledge means that it can't be used anymore?
You are talking in stupified and irrational contradictions. I see no point in replying to the above.
continued on the next post...
As is my reply...
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
It's not you who determines if I can. I can think of "a Demon tricking" without "a Demon being there" because I'm not under Aristotle's spell, or at least I'm aware of the rune that's been cast here.
The statement "a Demon tricking" has two premises (at least). One is that there is a Demon. That is why I said that you cannot believe in one without the other.
P: A Demon playing nasty tricks.
Q: A Demon is there.
(P => Q) truth table for all Boolean P and Q values:
P---Q---(P => Q)
T---T---T
T---F---F
F---T---T
F---F---T
You say that if P = T then Q should be T in order for (P => Q) to be true. You're right only if you're bound to Boolean logic. Multi-value logic has been around for many decades now, and fuzzy logic is readily used in CD-ROM Drive manufacturing. Add to all these Gödel’s theorem and all the meta-mathematics stuff (don't ask me what it really is, I don't know). Now you can have countless states for a statement, eg the Demon can be 13.666 (accurate to 3 decimal places) existent or it may assume "null" state. Simply put, for every statement you can assume a logical structure in which it assumes any arbitrarily chosen state. And these are only the rationalized and/or scientific parts of this realm, the realm of uncertainty.
I don't see how any of this applies. Please explain it to me. As far as I can tell, this only applies to a set of seperate propositions, that are bound to each other, possibly by the cause-and-effect reasoning. However, I was not talking about two different propositions. I was talking about one proposition - "A Demon tricking" - which has a sub-proposition (or a proposition that helps make it up) - "there is a Demon".
The philosophical parts of this realm are even more interesting. The Demon may assume states that transcend our understanding of "existence." We declare a thing either "existent" or "non-existent" and then say it to "be" existent or non-existent while it "may" (only "may" not "must," "ought to" or "should") "be" in a wholly different state, a state which "may" even transcend our understanding of a state where "being there" may be meant in some unknown implementation which may transcend our understanding of "being."
May I ask that you stick to that which we currently understand as logically obligatory, instead of wandering of into dreams of uncertainty?
Before proving he existed he had to assume he didn't exist until he could prove his existence.
Not true. In fact, before proving that he existed, he had to exist.
Then if he didn't exist how could he believe he was thinking?
Exactly. That's why Descartes would never assume that he didn't exist, and the Evil Demon could never convince him.
Manuel_Silvio
Apr19-03, 10:55 AM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
Hey, did you ignore the rest of what I said?...
I didn't. You only repeated what you'd written many times before, so I wrote nothing in response. I asked you to show me the logical fault in my proof. If there isn't a logical fault in my proof and it leads to a dilemma while studying Descartes' statement then the statement must be erroneous. This is simple; if a logical procedure leads to an illogical result, there should have been problems in either the procedure or its subject of study.
No, it's not applicable. It doesn't satisfy the fact that the statement, "I think", requires two premises to be true.
The proof has nothing to do directly with "I think." That P([beep]) statement in the proof is not (how many times have I said this?) related to Descartes' statement. It's a statement I made and asked you (in the course of that storyline) to determine its value as you liked. Since we're talking in a framework of Aristotelian logic you had to choose either T or F as the value for the P([beep]) I offered. P([beep]) can assume no states other than T and F, and you had to choose one. Then I showed that (whatever your choice has been) Descartes' statement, with regard to your choice about P([beep)'s value, leads to a dilemma.
This proof has absolutely nothing to do with the premises for "I think" for it isn't directly touching this phrase. You say for "I think" to be true one has to "exist," so for a statement like "I think therefore I am" the critique must satisfy the premise for "I think" and that is "existence." This is right but is irrelevant to this proof. This proof isn't studying "I think," it doesn't even care if it is "I think" or "I eat" that have obviously different premises. That's why I use [beep] in place of "think" or any other word, [beep] means any word that makes sense in that place, it can be "think," "eat," "drink," "walk," "fly," "understand," whatever. You see, the proof is independent of whatever specific word is replaced by [beep]. Its flow is simply so general that every literally sensible word can be in place of [beep].
... how is it possible that you missed the fact that two premises are required for the statement "I think"? It is not anything like "P[bleep]". Descartes is saying that if P is [bleep]ing then P exists. (I've asked this before, but...) isn't that obvious?...
The "fact?" Do you mean "fact" as you defined it? That sort of fact has no place in Philosophy. What I'm struggling over with you for such a long time is this "fact." You say it is necessary, it is a "fact," that one exists in order for one to think. I asked it over and over how you can be sure of this necessity. You said it was simple Causality (or so I understood) and I'm showing how trivial Causality is.
Your way of talking my proof shows you haven't understood it. Read it over and over until you understand it. How many times have I repeated that P([beep]) is not Descartes' statement but an engineered statement by me? Once again, P([beep]) is not Descartes' statement but a statement that leads to dilemma along with Descartes' statement. It's the core to this proof and its misunderstanding (like in your case) means that the entire proof is lost.
If you show a fault in that proof, I'll accept and take a chance with my other ways of talking this over. Until now you haven't stated anything worth noting other than your initial stance.
There is no point in my following such a path, as it destroys all need of learning/science.
Please forgive my sarcasm, but it really doesn't matter to me that I have defied that which you held sacred, because it doesn't appear right that you should hold it so, in the first place.
I don't hold the EPR Experiment sacred but I think it's very interesting, nor do I hold sacred its results. I would have a hard time with uncertainty if I wanted to hold something sacred. What I don't like so much is ignorance and careless conclusions.
It seems you're the one who holds something sacred. You say you won't follow that way for it will destroy all need of learning/science. Let's suppose this really happens. If the way you follow has merit (for you, at least) you won't have lost much.
I think I described how uncertainty is a motive for learning and for gathering knowledge, including science. I told you how uncertainty is a drive towards certainty (hence, a drive towards more knowledge if not absolute knowledge) while certainty is a narcotic for the minds. Your worries about losing interest in science/knowledge/[beep] because of uncertainty are out of place. What you should worry for is the Mare Constans of certainty. Uncertainty is a manifestation of change and dynamism while certainty is the last station. Why should you take the next step if you're sure of whatever you know, whatever you want, whatever you have to do and whatever you are?
By the way, learning and science aren't synonyms, what you can learn is not always science and science is not the only thing you can learn.
Have you ever noticed how a path that loops infinitely, doesn't get you anywhere but where you started. Philosophically, scientificall, and logically this is not a good path to follow.
It isn't that I've chosen a path that loops infinitely; it is that all known human paths are infinite loops. Loops are all you can see. Our knowledge is self-referenced. It doesn't include what "is" (if "being" in the sense we understand is sensible to the Universe) but what "is represented." There's a chasm of Unknown between what "is" and what "is represented."
No, it's not anything special, and yet you seem to have missed entirely when you said "and effect doesn't require a cause".
Did I write this sentence? Or this is what you understood of what I wrote? There's a big difference between these two.
I never said "effect doesn't require a cause" (I'm not sure but I couldn't find such sentence). For cause and effect by their definition are bound to Causality and saying that would be a big mistake. I said this definition may be non-informative, irrelevant and even misleading. First you make a definition, say Causality, then you map it into the Universe by saying "the telephone" is an instance of a cause and "the individual hearing the ring" is an instance of an effect. What I've been denying is this process of mapping. You're free to make as many definitions, circular and non-circular, as you like but aren't free to map them into the Universe and expect compliance. I told you of another definition, the Pre-established Harmony, which worked and was compliant just like Causality. You relate a pair of phenomena with Causality while this bond needn't be "out" there. It's "in" here. It's an optimization method become prominent (too prominent, in fact).
My definition is not circular. I was saying that that which has been caused has been caused. It is obvious, and seems unnecessary to actually say, but you were the one who said that an "effect" doesn't always require a "cause".
It is circular. "That has been caused has been caused" lacks the meaning of causation. You say "that has been caused," so you're expected to say "what causation is" independent of "that has been caused." Then you say "has been caused" implying that "causation" is the event happening to "that has been caused." The first part "that has been caused" promises to define "causation" in its following part while the following part points back at the firs part.
This is a circular definition for it makes perfect sense while it's absolute nonsense. This is the indication of loops. A circular definition somehow (sometimes subtly) points at itself; hence, the main task of a definition (that is, defining) remains undone while the definition makes sense for it's confirmed by itself.
If they are Quantum Mechanically bound, they are one entity.I'm not a Physicist but I'm wondering what you're thinking of Quantum Mechanics. It isn't sorcery, it's science. Being "quantum mechanically" bound doesn't means anything more than being bound. Protons and Neutrons in an atom nucleus are "quantum mechanically" bound to each other by strong nuclear force. They aren't one entity; they're one group of distinct entities. The same way, a pair of entangled particles isn’t one entity; they're simply a pair gathered into one group under a certain rule of conduct.
One entity, here, refers to a single particle of fermion family (which have odd half-integral spin like 1/2 or 3/2) as designated by being made up of either 2 (in mesons) or 3 (in baryons) quarks and anti-quarks (together hadrons) or being a lepton. I don't know if bosons are also subject to EPR experiment.
If you name every group of more than one members "one" entity and refrain from analyzing its members then the entire Universe is one entity and it shouldn't be divided in order to be analyzed. Do you agree with that?
It has no such application. If I connect the fact that both of the particles changed in spin, to a cause (the physicist which made the "observation") then I still have a simple cause-and-effect relationship.
How could the Physicist (the cause) cover the delay between two far-off events? A Physicist is usually located at one place and can affect (act as the cause to) things in a radius of a few meters and there's always a delay between what she/he does (as the cause) and what happens (as the effect). In this case you can consider the Physicist the cause to the spin change but then how can you explain absolute zero delay between her/his action and the spin change in the remote particle? Nothing changes here, whatever the cause may be, the zero delay can't be explained with a Causality bond that takes the chronological order as a basis to the distinction of the cause and the effect.
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
Apr19-03, 12:45 PM
... continued from the previous post
Leibniz's idea is also one of cause-and-effect. Just because he describes what is happening differently than I do, doesn't change the fact that he acknowledges there being a person who caused the effect.
Don't use this word, "fact," this much. As long as we're debating uncertainty and existence, fact is out of context and using it is premature for if uncertainty is shown to prevail, no such thing as fact can be called for. You can't talk of some "fact" as a certain piece of knowledge before you've shown certainty has any chance here.
Leibniz's idea was exactly meant as a rival to Causality. Pre-established Harmony hasn't been caused by a person/thing. Saying that something hasn't been "caused" is clearly insane viewed from a view point committed to Causality. However, it is equally creditable when viewed from an unbiased point of view. It maps a certain mental pattern to the flow of events in the Universe (an empirical pattern), so does Causality. For such mental pattern to be creditable, its characteristics must be shown to be compliant to those of the empirical pattern it corresponds to. Causality, a mental pattern imposed on an empirical pattern, is creditable for it describes and predicts the flow of events in the Universe, so does Pre-established Harmony. In order to make use of Causality one studies those things considered the cause to certain events and tries to invoke the cause to achieve the effect. In order to make use of Pre-established Harmony one studies the harmony of phenomena in order to act to the beat of that harmony and achieve the desirable target (some fugue, perhaps [:D]).
Well, I could show you this, if you were physically in my presence. But I can't now, if that's what you mean.
Even if I was in your physical presence you couldn't point at something. We talked about this before on "Knowledge?" thread where I described that before being certain of your existence, your audience's existence, your qualia, your audience's qualia and a big bunch of other things, you can't "point at" or "show" something. We're discussing certainty and uncertainty so we ought not to be bound to either point of view and/or use their suppositions/obligations.
You didn't disagree with me, also didn't agree with me, you posted nothing about that. Now it's up for discussion.
Not really. A logical obligation should be readily demonstrable, as should an empirical pattern. However, if you think that it is relevant to the thread, please explain the difference between the two.
A logical obligation is the outcome of deduction from the axioms of a logical system. As long as the participants of the dialog are bound to that logical system, these logical obligations must be held inviolate. Let's see this example in Boolean algebra:
Boolean algebra truth table for "AND" operator:
^ : AND operator
A-----B-----A ^ B
T-----T-----T
T-----F-----F
F-----T-----F
F-----F-----F
The above truth table is a premise for Boolean logic so it should never be violated. So if we have A = T and B = F, a logical obligation of Boolean logic is that A ^ B should be evaluated as F.
An empirical pattern, on the other hand, is the outcome of observation. It isn't necessary to be true in any logical system. Science has used Boolean logic for so many years while the outcome of its observation has been always changing in those years. Causality is an empirical pattern (better said, a mental pattern imposed on an empirical pattern) for it's been observed.
Suppose you throw a stone and you watch it break some glass, if you do this many times and observe the repeated pattern of the glass being broken you'll make a mental pattern that is imposed on that empirical pattern. This mental pattern says "a rightly directed stone thrown at glass will break it" and is meant as an optimization so that you won't be re-observing a thrown stone every time you want to see if it breaks the glass. This mental pattern is the bond of Causality between two phenomena.
Two things must always be kept in mind about a mental pattern. First, it isn't an obligation for the corresponding empirical pattern may change and the mental pattern may become invalid. Second, the mental pattern may impose itself on some phenomenon so that the phenomenon is re-shaped to correspond to that mental pattern. Examples of such false imposition are optical illusions. Human visual system wants to impose a certain mental pattern that corresponds to a continuously-observed empirical pattern on a new empirical pattern, hence, the empirical pattern is perceived other than what its representation would be if that mental pattern didn't exist. And optical illusions are only low-level examples of mental patterns. These patterns appear at all levels of abstraction. They sometimes show up as prejudice, eg you're scared at the sight of a tame and shy dog because you have a mental pattern saying "all dogs bite and do harm" which was formed as a result of your unlucky encounters with dogs.
Descartes first noticed optical illusions and based his manner of doubting on them, but he didn't extend this concept to higher levels of abstraction. Causality, which seems to be necessary for your version of Descartes' statement, is a mental pattern at a not-so-high level of abstraction.
Every mental pattern may and has been shown to be possibly invalid. At lower levels of abstraction mental patterns can be broken easily and new ones can be made to avoid mistakes, like what happens with optical illusions, eg after a while you adapt to the illusion and figure out much about its shape. At higher abstraction levels, mental patterns become exceedingly difficult to break; like that you seem never to accept that Causality may simply be a long-enduring mental pattern which has many substitutes to be replaced with.
You are talking in stupified and irrational contradictions. I see no point in replying to the above.
I only asked a few questions. You could show me if there was a problem with them. Don't you think avoiding the answers to possibly "stupefied and irrational" questions is even more "stupefied and irrational?"
The statement "a Demon tricking" has two premises (at least). One is that there is a Demon. That is why I said that you cannot believe in one without the other.
Isn't that there are those certain premises to this statement, another premise? Where does this premise of yours take it validity from?
... As far as I can tell, this only applies to a set of separate propositions, that are bound to each other, possibly by the cause-and-effect reasoning. However, I was not talking about two different propositions. I was talking about one proposition - "A Demon tricking" - which has a sub-proposition (or a proposition that helps make it up) - "there is a Demon".
You told me the Demon may be either "existent" or "non-existent" and that this statement, "a Demon tricking," implies that a Demon exists. What I wrote in response was that the Demon may assume many states other than "existent" and "non-existent." And that for your deduction (a Demon must be there if a Demon is playing tricks) to be creditable it was necessary that we're bound to Boolean logic, where the statement "a Demon is there" (one of your sub-propositions) may only be either T or F.
Your claim here is made of two parts, "a Demon is playing tricks" and "so the Demon exists." These two parts are related to each other in a conditional statement: "if a Demon is playing tricks then there is a Demon." I wrote and shown that even if this statement is considered true (Causality bond is taken serious), your deduction on the truth values for the necessary condition, "a Demon is playing tricks," and the sufficient condition, "there is a Demon," is limited to Boolean logic which is rivaled by many other equally creditable logical systems in which your deduction becomes invalid (sometimes even senseless).
May I ask that you stick to that which we currently understand as logically obligatory, instead of wandering of into dreams of uncertainty?
I wasn't wandering in dreams of uncertainty (although it's much fun to do); I was showing you the vista of uncertainty and the vast realm beyond Aristotle.
Not true. In fact, before proving that he existed, he had to exist.
Exactly. That's why Descartes would never assume that he didn't exist, and the Evil Demon could never convince him.
Let's go the other way. If Descartes "had" to exist in order to think then why do you bother "proving" his "cogito ergo sum?"
Proving means to show a statement's truth using other statements that have been shown or assumed to be true along with the rules of deduction. If "thinking" is the corollary of "being" then why should you prove "I think therefore I am?"
Saying that "thinking" is the corollary of "being" you've already admitted that "I think therefore I am" is a self-referenced statement. With your assumption (one "has" to be if one thinks), "I think therefore I am" can be replaced with "I am therefore I am." This statement, "sum ergo sum," is clearly self-referenced for it assumes its own truth. Aside from being self-referenced, it is non-informative for if you knew "I am" why should you deduce "I am?"
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
I didn't. You only repeated what you'd written many times before, so I wrote nothing in response. I asked you to show me the logical fault in my proof. If there isn't a logical fault in my proof and it leads to a dilemma while studying Descartes' statement then the statement must be erroneous. This is simple; if a logical procedure leads to an illogical result, there should have been problems in either the procedure or its subject of study.
I repeated what I said before, because you don't seem to get it. I am telling you that your reasoning does not apply, when there is only a proposition and it's sub-proposition being considered.
The proof has nothing to do directly with "I think." That P([beep]) statement in the proof is not (how many times have I said this?) related to Descartes' statement. It's a statement I made and asked you (in the course of that storyline) to determine its value as you liked. Since we're talking in a framework of Aristotelian logic you had to choose either T or F as the value for the P([beep]) I offered. P([beep]) can assume no states other than T and F, and you had to choose one. Then I showed that (whatever your choice has been) Descartes' statement, with regard to your choice about P([beep)'s value, leads to a dilemma.
I did choose. I said that you must believe that "I think" is true, because - in the illustration - the Evil Demon has tried to convince me that I don't. And, since I contemplated existence/non-existence, I am thinking. Now, my whole reasoning is (how many times have I said this?) that in order for it to be said that P does in fact [bleep], there must exist an entity "P".
This proof has absolutely nothing to do with the premises for "I think" for it isn't directly touching this phrase. You say for "I think" to be true one has to "exist," so for a statement like "I think therefore I am" the critique must satisfy the premise for "I think" and that is "existence." This is right but is irrelevant to this proof. This proof isn't studying "I think," it doesn't even care if it is "I think" or "I eat" that have obviously different premises. That's why I use [beep] in place of "think" or any other word, [beep] means any word that makes sense in that place, it can be "think," "eat," "drink," "walk," "fly," "understand," whatever. You see, the proof is independent of whatever specific word is replaced by [beep]. Its flow is simply so general that every literally sensible word can be in place of [beep].
No, this is my point. It doesn't matter what you substitute [bleep] with, one of the premises will be that there is an entity "P".
The "fact?" Do you mean "fact" as you defined it? That sort of fact has no place in Philosophy. What I'm struggling over with you for such a long time is this "fact." You say it is necessary, it is a "fact," that one exists in order for one to think. I asked it over and over how you can be sure of this necessity. You said it was simple Causality (or so I understood) and I'm showing how trivial Causality is.
You haven't showed that yet. You may be intending to, but your examples coincide with my reasoning.
Your way of talking my proof shows you haven't understood it. Read it over and over until you understand it. How many times have I repeated that P([beep]) is not Descartes' statement but an engineered statement by me? Once again, P([beep]) is not Descartes' statement but a statement that leads to dilemma along with Descartes' statement. It's the core to this proof and its misunderstanding (like in your case) means that the entire proof is lost.
Well, this is something that I tried to tell you long ago: the subject is Descartes' philosophy. The subject is not the proof of any other statement, of the form P[bleep] or any other form.
If you show a fault in that proof, I'll accept and take a chance with my other ways of talking this over. Until now you haven't stated anything worth noting other than your initial stance.
Which you haven't countered satisfactorily yet.
I don't hold the EPR Experiment sacred but I think it's very interesting, nor do I hold sacred its results. I would have a hard time with uncertainty if I wanted to hold something sacred. What I don't like so much is ignorance and careless conclusions.
You do, however, seem to hold uncertainty itself as the only certainty (which is a sickening paradox, as we've already talked about, and I don't want to talk about on this thread).
It seems you're the one who holds something sacred. You say you won't follow that way for it will destroy all need of learning/science. Let's suppose this really happens. If the way you follow has merit (for you, at least) you won't have lost much.
Science, learning, progressive knowledge... these things have merit for me. Thus, that which attempts to kill them has very little merit. It reduces what would have been rational human beings, to babbling/speculating fools (I don't include you in that, because you haven't abandoned science, you just entertain this uncertainty because you don't mix it with your progressive learning).
I think I described how uncertainty is a motive for learning and for gathering knowledge, including science. I told you how uncertainty is a drive towards certainty (hence, a drive towards more knowledge if not absolute knowledge) while certainty is a narcotic for the minds.
Uncertainty doesn't progress towards certainties. This is utterly wrong. Uncertainty doesn't even allow for any certainties.
Your worries about losing interest in science/knowledge/[beep] because of uncertainty are out of place. What you should worry for is the Mare Constans of certainty. Uncertainty is a manifestation of change and dynamism while certainty is the last station. Why should you take the next step if you're sure of whatever you know, whatever you want, whatever you have to do and whatever you are?
I told you, a certain amount of uncertainty is required (and so I partially take back what I said above), however the kind of uncertainty you are talking about doesn't allow for any progress, and is thus unhealthy to progressive knowledge.
By the way, learning and science aren't synonyms, what you can learn is not always science and science is not the only thing you can learn.
I know that. I mentioned that in your "Knowledge" thread.
It isn't that I've chosen a path that loops infinitely; it is that all known human paths are infinite loops. Loops are all you can see. Our knowledge is self-referenced. It doesn't include what "is" (if "being" in the sense we understand is sensible to the Universe) but what "is represented." There's a chasm of Unknown between what "is" and what "is represented."
And that chasm cannot be crossed by turning around and doubting the few things that do have an amount of certainty to them.
I never said "effect doesn't require a cause" (I'm not sure but I couldn't find such sentence). For cause and effect by their definition are bound to Causality and saying that would be a big mistake. I said this definition may be non-informative, irrelevant and even misleading. First you make a definition, say Causality, then you map it into the Universe by saying "the telephone" is an instance of a cause and "the individual hearing the ring" is an instance of an effect. What I've been denying is this process of mapping. You're free to make as many definitions, circular and non-circular, as you like but aren't free to map them into the Universe and expect compliance. I told you of another definition, the Pre-established Harmony, which worked and was compliant just like Causality. You relate a pair of phenomena with Causality while this bond needn't be "out" there. It's "in" here. It's an optimization method become prominent (too prominent, in fact).
And yet there was a cause to this percieved effect, wasn't there? If so, Causality appears to only be validated in the Pre-established Harmony idea.
How could the Physicist (the cause) cover the delay between two far-off events? A Physicist is usually located at one place and can affect (act as the cause to) things in a radius of a few meters and there's always a delay between what she/he does (as the cause) and what happens (as the effect). In this case you can consider the Physicist the cause to the spin change but then how can you explain absolute zero delay between her/his action and the spin change in the remote particle? Nothing changes here, whatever the cause may be, the zero delay can't be explained with a Causality bond that takes the chronological order as a basis to the distinction of the cause and the effect.
Ah, then you've missed the point of a "neighborhood" universe. You say that the physicist is "here" or "there", and this is true. But the two particles are bound such that they are not far apart from each other at all, in spite of appearing to be so.
Please, Manuel, let's drop the discussion of Causality and Uncertainty, in this thread, unless you can make all of the arguments directly relevant to Descartes' philosophy. We can discuss those other things in other threads.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
I only asked a few questions. You could show me if there was a problem with them. Don't you think avoiding the answers to possibly "stupefied and irrational" questions is even more "stupefied and irrational?"
Please forgive the hostility in the afore-quoted post. I just don't like how you keep asking such baiting questions. I wouldn't mind them, if they were in a thread dedicated to such reasoning, but this thread is solely about Descartes' philosophy.
Isn't that there are those certain premises to this statement, another premise? Where does this premise of yours take it validity from?
Observation. Besides, while it can be considered it's own proposition, if you were to actually take this proposition (a demon tricking) apart, you would find the same two propositions that I speak of.
You told me the Demon may be either "existent" or "non-existent" and that this statement, "a Demon tricking," implies that a Demon exists. What I wrote in response was that the Demon may assume many states other than "existent" and "non-existent." And that for your deduction (a Demon must be there if a Demon is playing tricks) to be creditable it was necessary that we're bound to Boolean logic, where the statement "a Demon is there" (one of your sub-propositions) may only be either T or F.
But if the sub-proposition is false, then the actual proposition must also be false, musn't it?
Your claim here is made of two parts, "a Demon is playing tricks" and "so the Demon exists." These two parts are related to each other in a conditional statement: "if a Demon is playing tricks then there is a Demon." I wrote and shown that even if this statement is considered true (Causality bond is taken serious), your deduction on the truth values for the necessary condition, "a Demon is playing tricks," and the sufficient condition, "there is a Demon," is limited to Boolean logic which is rivaled by many other equally creditable logical systems in which your deduction becomes invalid (sometimes even senseless).
Well, if Boolean Logic has been used by Science and philosophy for so long (as you mentioned earlier) then I like it.
I wasn't wandering in dreams of uncertainty (although it's much fun to do); I was showing you the vista of uncertainty and the vast realm beyond Aristotle.
I don't know any of Aristotle's philosophy. I may agree with some of what he postulated, but not on purpose [;)].
Let's go the other way. If Descartes "had" to exist in order to think then why do you bother "proving" his "cogito ergo sum?"
I'm not proving it, I'm saying you can't disprove it. It is the proof, within itself, as I've shown.
Saying that "thinking" is the corollary of "being" you've already admitted that "I think therefore I am" is a self-referenced statement. With your assumption (one "has" to be if one thinks), "I think therefore I am" can be replaced with "I am therefore I am." This statement, "sum ergo sum," is clearly self-referenced for it assumes its own truth. Aside from being self-referenced, it is non-informative for if you knew "I am" why should you deduce "I am?"
You are almost right. The difference between "I think therefore I am" and "I am therefore I am" is (obviously) that there is a different verb involved (and the verb is "thinking", which is required when something tries to prove that I don't exist). Does that make sense?
Manuel_Silvio
Apr22-03, 02:51 PM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
First of all, there's one thing I'd like to draw your attention to: I put my words in the place I seem suitable for them so the way my words are is an expression of my opinion, I'm not humming dial tone I'm talking so please don't ignore the words.
... I am telling you that your reasoning does not apply, when there is only a proposition and it's sub-proposition being considered.
... Now, my whole reasoning is (how many times have I said this?) that in order for it to be said that P does in fact [bleep], there must exist an entity "P" ...
No, this is my point. It doesn't matter what you substitute [bleep] with, one of the premises will be that there is an entity "P".
And I'm telling you it does apply. The problem here is your misunderstanding of the notation I used.
See, you do understand the concept of function f(x), don't you? Like you've learnt in Mathematics, the function f(x) takes x from its domain and maps it into f(x) value from its range. Now consider P(), P is a function that takes the action [beep] as the input and outputs a statement "there need be an I to [beep]." Function P works like a juicer, it takes apples (the action [beep], where you can place any action in place of [beep]) then it gives back apple juice (it gives you a statement, "there need be an I to [beep]").
This notation, P([beep]), doesn't mean "P [beep]s therefore P is." P doesn't substitute the entity being studied, it is the notation of a function. P is used only as a generalization. P is only a word substitution function; it maps words (anything like [beep]) from its domain (all sensible words for [beep]) into its range (all possible sentences of the form "there need be an I to [beep]").
Now, if you understand what I'm talking about, it will be clear that P([beep]) isn't Descartes' statement, it is a "helper" device for this proof. P([beep]) is independent from and irrelevant to Descartes' statement. In the course of the proof you're asked to determine its state (T or F). It's your choice and is irrelevant to that you're defending Descartes' statement. For P([beep]) is just another statement, see, "another" statement.
Please read that storyline again. I guess you're way far from having understood the proof, and you can't criticize what you haven't understood yet.
Well, this is something that I tried to tell you long ago: the subject is Descartes' philosophy. The subject is not the proof of any other statement, of the form P[bleep] or any other form.This thread is named "I think therefore I am" and I'm trying to show this statements and all statements of the form "I [beep] therefore I am" lead to undesirable situations when viewed from the viewpoint of Boolean logic. I came to this thread because we had a debate on another thread where I claimed the Uncertainty applies to all human knowledge and you opposed saying there are certain parts of human knowledge one can be sure of.
My job here is to show this certain piece of knowledge, existence of the self, is absurd enough to be counted along with other uncertain things.
P([beep]) is a word substitution function, like I said above. It's used as a generalization and a helper device in a specific proof that shows Descartes' statement, "cogito ergo sum," will result in confusion if it's viewed from the viewpoint of Boolean logic, which is the sort of logic used in these discussions.
Which you haven't countered satisfactorily yet.
It'd be helpful to know that your stance could be modified to comply with Uncertainty. I'm opposing you because you see Descartes' statement as a proof of existence. I think this statement can't be held as a proof but as a between-the-lines hint. This between-the-lines hint doesn't prove or guarantee but it intrigues.
The intonation and strength by which you say "I think therefore I am" is vital to the distinction made between a statement and a hint. You seem to like to shout it loud like there's something important, there's a victory. If you whispered it, like having found some tiny thing you liked then I wouldn't have opposed. For I would've understood that you hold "I think therefore I am" for your pleasure. Your tendency to shout the thing out makes this hint absurd and displays your stance as an aggressive attempt for certainty. Such attempt is, well, only heading for the wall. I suggest there would be a hit then, but then do you think this would happen if you quietly went around the wall?
You do, however, seem to hold uncertainty itself as the only certainty (which is a sickening paradox, as we've already talked about, and I don't want to talk about on this thread).I don't hold the Uncertainty sacred. For me, it's just a between-the-lines hint, nothing more. And yes, we've talked about the paradox but we haven't reached a compromise.
Like I told you (and you ignored), I approach Uncertainty in steps whose order makes sense out of nonsense. The first step is the discovery of Uncertainty. The next step is to see how Uncertainty plagues itself. Having passed these stages in order, Uncertainty is washed along with itself as the last of all universal principles (for Uncertainty is the most general universal principle) but there remains a residue. That residue is an understanding that can't be found if Uncertainty is either ignored or held sacred. Ignoring Uncertainty is ignoring the common point of all human knowledge. Holding Uncertainty sacred, as that wouldn't contradict itself and remain a universal principle that doesn't apply to itself, will deprive one from that residual understanding. I won't attempt to describe what and how this understanding is but I'll say it's the only thing that remains after having doubted everything and anything; it's the last residue of philosophical thought. I guess you don't oppose the principle of skepticism in the face of what one knows (and what one doesn't know) for that's the foundation of Philosophy. You must ask "why?" in the face of what is seen as apparent by others and what seems apparent to yourself.
Science, learning, progressive knowledge... these things have merit for me. Thus, that which attempts to kill them has very little merit. It reduces what would have been rational human beings, to babbling/speculating fools (I don't include you in that, because you haven't abandoned science, you just entertain this uncertainty because you don't mix it with your progressive learning).After having understood what Uncertainty is, how it works, what its results are and how it is inevitable and paradoxical, you're left on your own to choose what has merit for you. That's why I emphasize Uncertainty this much. No certainty can bring those degrees of freedom, even though there're still boundaries, that Uncertainty brings. Uncertainty is the most general point of view for it simply allows everything.
You're committed to Science and that's your choice. Uncertainty won't lower, honor or change that but it gives you the freedom to see countless other options. I, too, have to some extents chosen my way of life, for now. Uncertainty gives me the freedom to see how worthless may be all that I hold dear. I, too, am interested in Science (you see, I'm a student of Physics) and will learn whatever comes my way. This, however, doesn't prevent me from seeing how trivial all Science may be, and what complexities may be beyond what I see, and that I may be dead wrong with all this.
Anecdote (derived from a Kundera quote): [b]"Things are more complex than what you think." (it'd be great if you read his "Testaments Betrayed").
It isn't easy to call irrational human beings "babbling/speculating fools." You aren't the one who determines what is babbling and who are fools. No human being can see what is right/wrong, what good/evil is, what is wise/foolish and what is better/worse. Your opinion is meaningful only in your own domain. You, passionate for Science, see irrationality as absolute mishmash. Matter of fact irrationality has very often its own rationale. That you can't see the complexity beyond what you understand doesn't mean it won't someday strike you hard from ambush.
Uncertainty doesn't progress towards certainties. This is utterly wrong. Uncertainty doesn't even allow for any certainties.Uncertainty needn't allow certainties but again it's a drive towards them. A Physicist is uncertain of her/his findings so she/he will try to gather more about her/his subject of study. This is the Uncertainty drive although it's aimed at certainty. And then why do you like certainty this much? You like to be certain that you are, that you are the way you see yourself in the mirror, that the Universe be the way you currently perceive. Isn't this liking a bit too simplistically oriented? What do you want out of certainty?
Certainty is clearly the end to research. When you know something and know it for sure, will you do research activities? Isn't Uncertainty about your subject a better station to start from?
You're misinterpreting Uncertainty. It simply doubts everything and this doubt has proven to be worth noting.
I told you, a certain amount of uncertainty is required (and so I partially take back what I said above), however the kind of uncertainty you are talking about doesn't allow for any progress, and is thus unhealthy to progressive knowledge.Where does your passion for progress come from? Who says progress in its current form is better than stability? All your reasoning is based on your suppositions (suppositions like, "science is good," "learning is good," "progress is necessary") that don't seem to be more valid to me.
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
Apr22-03, 03:25 PM
... continued from the previous post
But if the sub-proposition is false, then the actual proposition must also be false, musn't it?That's another rule from Boolean logic. Another system of logic may even assign other states to a statement, no true or false.
Well, if Boolean Logic has been used by Science and philosophy for so long (as you mentioned earlier) then I like it.Sorry for the roughness of the analogy but your saying deserves some hard opposition. There was once a horse that loved her blinders for she had them on for so long.
I don't know any of Aristotle's philosophy. I may agree with some of what he postulated, but not on purpose.Aristotelian way of thinking is woven into our everyday lives. It's endured 2000 years and will endure much longer for it's easy (not quite easy but much easier than a sincere study of our knowledge) and frees one from the burden of thinking further into the complexity.
Aristotle was a genius and his ideas have originality but in his own context and his own time. His way wouldn't gain this much publicity if it was introduced somewhere other than ancient Greece.
The horse said she couldn't see any blinders and what was all this story about blinders.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,
1. For [b]Mentat:
First of all, there's one thing I'd like to draw your attention to: I put my words in the place I seem suitable for them so the way my words are is an expression of my opinion, I'm not humming dial tone I'm talking so please don't ignore the words.
There is something that I'd like to bring to your attention as well. I don't ignore anything you say. I read all of it. I reply to that which I question, provided it appears relevant to the discussion at hand (namely: I think therefore I am).
And I'm telling you it does apply. The problem here is your misunderstanding of the notation I used.
See, you do understand the concept of function f(x), don't you? Like you've learnt in Mathematics, the function f(x) takes x from its domain and maps it into f(x) value from its range. Now consider P(), P is a function that takes the action [beep] as the input and outputs a statement "there need be an I to [beep]." Function P works like a juicer, it takes apples (the action [beep], where you can place any action in place of [beep]) then it gives back apple juice (it gives you a statement, "there need be an I to [beep]").
Either you are still missing the point, or I am. You still keep implying that I'm saying "there need be an I to ". I am not saying that. I am saying that there need be an "I" [b]for "I" to [bleep].
This notation, P([beep]), doesn't mean "P [beep]s therefore P is." P doesn't substitute the entity being studied, it is the notation of a function. P is used only as a generalization.
Which is why the "P" reasoning doesn't apply to Descartes' philosophy. You must substitute an entity for "P" in order for it to be at all relevant to Descartes' philosophy.
Now, if you understand what I'm talking about, it will be clear that P([beep]) isn't Descartes' statement, it is a "helper" device for this proof. P([beep]) is independent from and irrelevant to Descartes' statement.
Then how can it possibly be relevant to this discussion?
This thread is named "I think therefore I am" and I'm trying to show this statements and all statements of the form "I [beep] therefore I am" lead to undesirable situations when viewed from the viewpoint of Boolean logic.
But you haven't showed that. You have showed that all statements of the form "P[bleep]" (the function notation) lead to undesirable results. And yet, you yourself have said that this reasoning (P[bleep] reasoning) is irrelevant to Descartes' philosophy.
P([beep]) is a word substitution function, like I said above. It's used as a generalization and a helper device in a specific proof that shows Descartes' statement, "cogito ergo sum," will result in confusion if it's viewed from the viewpoint of Boolean logic, which is the sort of logic used in these discussions.
Is it really a "helper device" if it is entirely seperate from and irrelevant to Descartes' type of reasoning (as shown above)?
The intonation and strength by which you say "I think therefore I am" is vital to the distinction made between a statement and a hint. You seem to like to shout it loud like there's something important, there's a victory. If you whispered it, like having found some tiny thing you liked then I wouldn't have opposed. For I would've understood that you hold "I think therefore I am" for your pleasure. Your tendency to shout the thing out makes this hint absurd and displays your stance as an aggressive attempt for certainty. Such attempt is, well, only heading for the wall. I suggest there would be a hit then, but then do you think this would happen if you quietly went around the wall?
I don't think that Descartes' philosophy is a victory over uncertainty. I know that there is debate to be had ([b]about that particular philosophy, not just statements of the same kind), that's why I started this thread. However, I do think that it is an interesting/meritable philosophy, and that it has not been disproven yet (on this thread).
Like I told you (and you ignored), I approach Uncertainty in steps whose order makes sense out of nonsense. The first step is the discovery of Uncertainty. The next step is to see how Uncertainty plagues itself.
Which should lead you to discard Uncertainty. If Uncertainty plagues itself (because of it's paradoxical and self-contradictory nature), then it isn't useful, it's plagued. Why would you stay with something that was plagued, when you could continue with non-paradoxical studies, such as Science/Philosophy?
Having passed these stages in order, Uncertainty is washed along with itself as the last of all universal principles (for Uncertainty is the most general universal principle) but there remains a residue. That residue is an understanding that can't be found if Uncertainty is either ignored or held sacred. Ignoring Uncertainty is ignoring the common point of all human knowledge. Holding Uncertainty sacred, as that wouldn't contradict itself and remain a universal principle that doesn't apply to itself, will deprive one from that residual understanding. I won't attempt to describe what and how this understanding is but I'll say it's the only thing that remains after having doubted everything and anything; it's the last residue of philosophical thought. I guess you don't oppose the principle of skepticism in the face of what one knows (and what one doesn't know) for that's the foundation of Philosophy. You must ask "why?" in the face of what is seen as apparent by others and what seems apparent to yourself.
I do question that which is apparent. However, I do so through the use of logic and progressive knowledge. [b]I build off of foundations, instead of reinventing the wheel at every point. I will question the foundation later, but if you question everything at once, you start all over again, every time.
[quote]
After having understood what Uncertainty is, how it works, what its results are and how it is inevitable and paradoxical, you're left on your own to choose what has merit for you.
It is not inevitable. It is a choice, that you already seem certain of.
That's why I emphasize Uncertainty this much. No certainty can bring those degrees of freedom, even though there're still boundaries, that Uncertainty brings. Uncertainty is the most general point of view for it simply allows everything.
If one is Uncertain about all things, then there can be no boundary. However, this creates a paradox similar to that of the paradox of limitlessness, which I have discussed on numerous threads. This means that Uncertainty itself, when applied to all things, is paradoxical. Not just plagued/dirty/difficult, but paradoxical, and paradox is the dead-end of progressive knowledge, as I see it.
You're committed to Science and that's your choice. Uncertainty won't lower, honor or change that but it gives you the freedom to see countless other options. I, too, have to some extents chosen my way of life, for now. Uncertainty gives me the freedom to see how worthless may be all that I hold dear. I, too, am interested in Science (you see, I'm a student of Physics) and will learn whatever comes my way. This, however, doesn't prevent me from seeing how trivial all Science may be, and what complexities may be beyond what I see, and that I may be dead wrong with all this.
Well, sure, I should be able to see other options. But, in doing so, I have to be able to look beyond Uncertainty itself. The only thing other than Uncertainty is Certainty, and since there isn't supposed to be anything certain, I shouldn't be able to look beyond Uncertainty. Thus, Uncertainty is a dead-end, isn't it?
You, passionate for Science, see irrationality as absolute mishmash. Matter of fact irrationality has very often its own rationale. That you can't see the complexity beyond what you understand doesn't mean it won't someday strike you hard from ambush.
Irrationality is mere "mishmash". That's the point of the irrational. If you say that there is something rational about irrationality, then you have another paradox on your hands. How many paradoxes must one run into, before abandoning a certain line of reasoning?
Uncertainty needn't allow certainties but again it's a drive towards them.
And thus, you use Uncertainty to get certainty. And yet, Uncertainty dictates that there are no certainties. How can a line of reasoning lead to something, when it (the line of reasoning) is based on teh premise that that "something" doesn't exist?
What do you want out of certainty?
A foundation, from which to question that which I am not certain about. There's not enough time in life to question everything. I'm only 14 and I know that.
Certainty is clearly the end to research. When you know something and know it for sure, will you do research activities? Isn't Uncertainty about your subject a better station to start from?
I told you, a degree of uncertainty is good - necessar in fact. I only object to being uncertain about everything (I don't even think you can be, but that's a subject for another thread).
Where does your passion for progress come from? Who says progress in its current form is better than stability? All your reasoning is based on your suppositions (suppositions like, "science is good," "learning is good," "progress is necessary") that don't seem to be more valid to me.
Well, it's my outlook on life. How is "nothing is certain" better than "progressive knowledge is necessary"?
Manuel_Silvio
Apr22-03, 05:08 PM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
Either you are still missing the point, or I am. You still keep implying that I'm saying "there need be an I to [bleep]". I am not saying that. I am saying that there need be an "I" for "I" to [bleep].
No, no, no! I'm not implying anything. Only if you got the catch of that proof! Suppose there are two independent statements, one is Descartes' statement and the other is my P([beep]). We want to see if Descartes' statement is true or not, but before we do this I ask of you of the state you associate with P([beep]). See, P([beep]) is just a helper. Then you say that P([beep]) is true or false. The true/false state of P([beep]) has nothing to do with Descartes' statement. After you've given P([beep]) its state, we come to study Descartes' statement. Then I turn to you and show that Descartes' statement will lead to undesirable situations, "with regard to P([beep])." And I show that this happens for all states P([beep]) can assume.
This means there's an incompatibility between all the states P([beep]) may assume and Descartes' statement. Now, with asking for P([beep]) state and assigning a state to it, I haven't done anything illogical and I've also let you choose its state as you wish. There must be something wrong with the view point from which the problem is viewed. Simply put, Descartes' statement is incompatible with this viewpoint.
Which is why the "P[bleep]" reasoning doesn't apply to Descartes' philosophy. You must substitute an entity for "P" in order for it to be at all relevant to Descartes' philosophy.
I designed the proof and then you tell me what to do? I wanted to design it the way it is. P is a function, can you understand this? It has an input and an output, nothing more. P isn't part of the statement, it's the function that maps [beep] into the statement I wanted.
Let me see, do you know what f(x) means in Mathematics?
Then how can it possibly be relevant to this discussion?I told you many times before. P is a helper device. In that proof P isn't being studied, P is "being used." P "is used" to study Descartes' statement. A tin-opener is not a can but it's used to open a can. When you open cans, you don't say "how can a tin-opener be relevant here?" The tin-opener and the can are different but they're both involved in the mutual task of opening a can.
But you haven't showed that. You have showed that all statements of the form "P[bleep]" (the function notation) lead to undesirable results. And yet, you yourself have said that this reasoning (P[bleep] reasoning) is irrelevant to Descartes' philosophy.
I've shown, you didn't get it. P([beep]) leads to undesirable results, that's right but how then? In association with Descartes' statement.
I didn't say P([beep]) reasoning is irrelevant to Descartes' statement, I said P([beep]) is distinct and irrelevant to that statement. A tin-opener's action isn't irrelevant to the can being opened but the tin-opener itself is irrelevant to and distinct from the can.
Is it really a "helper device" if it is entirely seperate from and irrelevant to Descartes' type of reasoning (as shown above)?
Yes! You see how it works if you understand what is going on in that proof.
Which should lead you to discard Uncertainty. If Uncertainty plagues itself (because of it's paradoxical and self-contradictory nature), then it isn't useful, it's plagued. Why would you stay with something that was plagued, when you could continue with non-paradoxical studies, such as Science/Philosophy?
Once again, this isn't the way I've chosen. This is the way it is. Science is a disguise and Philosophy is not what you call Philosophy.
It is not inevitable. It is a choice, that you already seem certain of.
It is inevitable for it is the most general. How can you avoid the most general while you're concerned with its particulars?
If one is Uncertain about all things, then there can be no boundary. However, this creates a paradox similar to that of the paradox of limitlessness, which I have discussed on numerous threads. This means that Uncertainty itself, when applied to all things, is paradoxical. Not just plagued/dirty/difficult, but paradoxical, and paradox is the dead-end of progressive knowledge, as I see it.How did you conclude that? That I'm uncertain of everything (you're right, I can't be but I pretend to) doesn't have any implication but that I'm uncertain of everything. It won't give me power over something so it won't break any hard boundaries. Broken are the boundaries of my mind, those chains that needn't be there.
And I have no problem with paradoxes and paradoxical speech. Your paradoxes are merely lexical ambiguities but those paradoxes I'm concerned with are those relying not on ambiguity in literary expressions but on the nature of human knowledge.
Well, sure, I should be able to see other options. But, in doing so, I have to be able to look beyond Uncertainty itself. The only thing other than Uncertainty is Certainty, and since there isn't supposed to be anything certain, I shouldn't be able to look beyond Uncertainty. Thus, Uncertainty is a dead-end, isn't it?Yes, you have to look beyond Uncertainty, too. That's when that residual understanding I wrote of comes in.
Suppose Uncertainty is a dead-end, what then? Just tell me what then? Suppose you (and all humanity) have tried to sincerely study human knowledge or human being and you've encountered a dead-end. Wouldn't that be much more honorable than making an excuse, named Certainty, to intoxicate your mind and shield it against what is forthcoming? Certainty is a narcotic, I told you before. Narcotics aren't all bad, you need them sometimes to relieve but take it too much and you'll never get out of it.
I do question that which is apparent. However, I do so through the use of logic and progressive knowledge. I build off of foundations, instead of reinventing the wheel at every point. I will question the foundation later, but if you question everything at once, you start all over again, every time.
One such apparent thing would be "the use of logic and progressive knowledge." Don't you mind questioning this one?
Those foundations you're talking of are for others. They had their own and you should have your own, if you're really interested in having them. I told you before, this isn't re-inventing the same wheel all the time, it's inventing your "own" "all-new" wheel which's "unlike" any wheel that's come before and that'll come after.
Irrationality is mere "mishmash". That's the point of the irrational. If you say that there is something rational about irrationality, then you have another paradox on your hands. How many paradoxes must one run into, before abandoning a certain line of reasoning?
Irrationality has its own rationale like I said. That "rationale" is an extended version of the "rationale" you understand.
You think of irrationality and imagine picturesque scenes of humans fighting to death for nothing. That's one sort of irrationality. There are other kinds of it. Think of so many hermits with all sorts of odd faith, and even no faith, who've lived peaceful lives without your rationality. They had their own way of ordering things and that was their rationale. The order of things was different for them but it wasn't mishmash. Think of all peoples of ancient times who've lived their lives in so many ways that would seem absurd to the people of these days. Yet they were righteous over what they did.
Once again, if you insist that's a paradox, well, that's a paradox, what then?
And thus, you use Uncertainty to get certainty. And yet, Uncertainty dictates that there are no certainties. How can a line of reasoning lead to something, when it (the line of reasoning) is based on teh premise that that "something" doesn't exist?I don't use Uncertainty to "get" Certainty. I use it to "approach" Certainty. That's the twist. A Physicist will never be certain of the physical Universe but she/he will, led by the Uncertainty drive, approach Certainty day by day step by step.
A foundation, from which to question that which I am not certain about. There's not enough time in life to question everything. I'm only 14 and I know that.You can take any foundation you like but I think, being uncertain is much more honorable that being certain of something that holds no certainty.
I understand what you mean. The life is short, you're right and I agree with you but then couldn't we be wrong? Couldn't we be dying for we think we must die someday? This isn't ridicule, think about it.
Well, it's my outlook on life. How is "nothing is certain" better than "progressive knowledge is necessary"?Now that's a brilliant question. My answer is "noway." Suppositions of any sort are equally creditable but they can be more or less general. "Nothing is certain" leaves a way open for any new idea to come in while "progressive knowledge is necessary" is like condemning a whole bunch of new ideas that have equal creditability to those ideas enhanced and promoted by the supposition, "progressive knowledge is necessary."
"Nothing is uncertain" is so general that it can incorporate the other supposition but the other supposition isn't that general.
You may ask why I prefer more general suppositions. I'd say that's a matter of taste. If you agree to Uncertainty, everything and every choice will become a matter of taste. I don't know if you like this.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,
1. For [b]Mentat:
No, no, no! I'm not implying anything. Only if you got the catch of that proof! Suppose there are two independent statements, one is Descartes' statement and the other is my P([beep]). We want to see if Descartes' statement is true or not, but before we do this I ask of you of the state you associate with P([beep]). See, P([beep]) is just a helper. Then you say that P([beep]) is true or false. The true/false state of P([beep]) has nothing to do with Descartes' statement. After you've given P([beep]) its state, we come to study Descartes' statement. Then I turn to you and show that Descartes' statement will lead to undesirable situations, "with regard to P([beep])." And I show that this happens for all states P([beep]) can assume.
This means there's an incompatibility between all the states P([beep]) may assume and Descartes' statement. Now, with asking for P([beep]) state and assigning a state to it, I haven't done anything illogical and I've also let you choose its state as you wish. There must be something wrong with the view point from which the problem is viewed. Simply put, Descartes' statement is incompatible with this viewpoint.
But, Descartes' statement is not of the form "P()". That's what I've been trying to say. I understand functions in Algebra, but I don't think that Descartes' statement is using "I" as a function. Hence, I don't think that any reasoning on the problems of statments of the form "P([bleep])" is relevant to Descartes' philosophy.
I designed the proof and then you tell me what to do? I wanted to design it the way it is. P is a function, can you understand this? It has an input and an output, nothing more. P isn't part of the statement, it's the function that maps [beep] into the statement I wanted.
Yes, "P" is a function. But "I" in Descartes' statement is not. It doesn't work the same way. I didn't mean to tell you what to do, when discussing a "P([bleep])" philosophy, I was telling you that - if you wanted to use a variable in the place of the word "I" in Descartes' statement - you had to replace "I" with some other entity.
I told you many times before. P is a helper device. In that proof P isn't being studied, P is "being used." P "is used" to study Descartes' statement. A tin-opener is not a can but it's used to open a can. When you open cans, you don't say "how can a tin-opener be relevant here?" The tin-opener and the can are different but they're both involved in the mutual task of opening a can.
But, as I've been trying to tell you, P is a helper device [b]for other philosophies - not this philosophy of Descartes' (for the above reasons).
I've shown, you didn't get it. P([beep]) leads to undesirable results, that's right but how then? In association with Descartes' statement.
I didn't say P([beep]) reasoning is irrelevant to Descartes' statement, I said P([beep]) is distinct and irrelevant to that statement. A tin-opener's action isn't irrelevant to the can being opened but the tin-opener itself is irrelevant to and distinct from the can.
Yes, I know what you said. However, a tin-opener is useful for a can, while the P[bleep]-type philosophy that you are examining is not useful for understanding Descartes' statment.
Yes! You see how it works if you understand what is going on in that proof.
Once again, this isn't the way I've chosen. This is the way it is. Science is a disguise and Philosophy is not what you call Philosophy.
It is inevitable for it is the most general. How can you avoid the most general while you're concerned with its particulars?
How did you conclude that? That I'm uncertain of everything (you're right, I can't be but I pretend to) doesn't have any implication but that I'm uncertain of everything. It won't give me power over something so it won't break any hard boundaries. Broken are the boundaries of my mind, those chains that needn't be there.
And yet, in "breaking" those "chains", you enslave yourself to irrationality and paradox, and this is no better than being enslaved to progressive understanding.
And I have no problem with paradoxes and paradoxical speech. Your paradoxes are merely lexical ambiguities but those paradoxes I'm concerned with are those relying not on ambiguity in literary expressions but on the nature of human knowledge.
Yes, you have to look beyond Uncertainty, too. That's when that residual understanding I wrote of comes in.
You can't look beyond Uncertainty, if Uncertainty is your premise. That is the nature of absolute Uncertainty. It doesn't allow you to use it (or anything else, for that matter) as a foundation, because nothing is certain, and foundations must be at least partially certain.
Suppose Uncertainty is a dead-end, what then? Just tell me what then? Suppose you (and all humanity) have tried to sincerely study human knowledge or human being and you've encountered a dead-end. Wouldn't that be much more honorable than making an excuse, named Certainty, to intoxicate your mind and shield it against what is forthcoming? Certainty is a narcotic, I told you before. Narcotics aren't all bad, you need them sometimes to relieve but take it too much and you'll never get out of it.
And I have (repeatedly) told you that I like uncertainty, and I recognize it's necessity. I just know that too much of it is also bad. I'm certain of very few things, and leave most things uncertain. However, this is all - as I've said before - the subject for another thread.
One such apparent thing would be "the use of logic and progressive knowledge." Don't you mind questioning this one?
Not when the argument that I'm currently on requires this as a premise. As a matter of form, I cannot question all foundations at the same time. It's not just paradoxical, but it also doesn't allow me to ever answer the question that I started out trying to answer.
Those foundations you're talking of are for others. They had their own and you should have your own, if you're really interested in having them. I told you before, this isn't re-inventing the same wheel all the time, it's inventing your "own" "all-new" wheel which's "unlike" any wheel that's come before and that'll come after.
Yes, but your still inventing a wheel, when the problem your really trying to resolve has to do with the combustion engine of a Dodge Viper (please try to understand my illustration, I don't think I have enough space left, on this post, to explain it).
Irrationality has its own rationale like I said. That "rationale" is an extended version of the "rationale" you understand.
Irrationality, by definition and common use, cannot have a rationale of any kind.
You think of irrationality and imagine picturesque scenes of humans fighting to death for nothing. That's one sort of irrationality. There are other kinds of it. Think of so many hermits with all sorts of odd faith, and even no faith, who've lived peaceful lives without your rationality. They had their own way of ordering things and that was their rationale.
Yes, they didn't have my rationale, but they had one. That's the point. If they were truly irrational, they would have no rationale, whatsoever.
The order of things was different for them but it wasn't mishmash. Think of all peoples of ancient times who've lived their lives in so many ways that would seem absurd to the people of these days. Yet they were righteous over what they did.
Again, they were still rational, just in a different way than the typical person of today.
Once again, if you insist that's a paradox, well, that's a paradox,
what then?
You shouldn't speak of paradox as though it were just another logical approach. Or just another consequence. A paradox is the dead-end of reasoning on any one idea. Resulting in paradox usually leads people to discard that idea and try another.
A Physicist will never be certain of the physical Universe but she/he will, led by the Uncertainty drive, approach Certainty day by day step by step.
You can take any foundation you like but I think, being uncertain is much more honorable that being certain of something that holds no certainty.
Uncertainty doesn't hold any certainty either.
Couldn't we be dying for we think we must die someday? This isn't ridicule, think about it.
Well, if we're dying because we think we will die, then discussing it is making us all the more likely to die [;)].
"Nothing is certain" leaves a way open for any new idea to come in while "progressive knowledge is necessary" is like condemning a whole bunch of new ideas that have equal creditability to those ideas enhanced and promoted by the supposition, "progressive knowledge is necessary."
Well, actually, if your premise is "progressive knowledge is necessary", then those "other ideas" don't really have "equal creditability".
"Nothing is uncertain" is so general that it can incorporate the other supposition but the other supposition isn't that general.
"Nothing is uncertain" is not the premise that we were talking about. "Nothing is uncertain" is the opposite of your Uncertainty, and is equally wrong, IMO.
You may ask why I prefer more general suppositions. I'd say that's a matter of taste. If you agree to Uncertainty, everything and every choice will become a matter of taste. I don't know if you like this.
No, I don't. I think that moderation is important. Thus, whether to behave in a civilised manner on every occasion (for example) will not be a matter of taste, but a matter of form.
Manuel_Silvio
Apr25-03, 10:08 AM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
But, Descartes' statement is not of the form "P([bleep])"...
... But "I" in Descartes' statement is not. It doesn't work the same way. I didn't mean to tell you what to do, when discussing a "P([bleep])" philosophy ...That's right. The P([beep]) statement is not the statement category ("I think therefore I am" and similar) proven absurd in that proof. You're just stating the reason I wrote that P([beep]) was "irrelevant to" and "independent from" Descartes' statement, that it was just a helper device.
I've times described how this helper device works. It's irrelevant to Descartes' statement but it's engineered so that it causes trouble when the study of Descartes' statement is seen in association with P([beep]) state.
There may be faults in that proof. It may be wrong but what you're pointing out is "your" misconception. I've wrote so many times that the subject of study in that proof is Descartes' statement and P([beep]) is only a "helper device," so you can't tell me that since my P([beep]) isn't Descartes' statement the proof isn't studying that statement. Back to the tin-opener analogy, you can't tell me that since a tin-opener isn't a can, its task can't be opening cans.
I've done the best I could to describe it for you. Understanding that proof and criticizing it in its own context is your job. I think it'd be beneficial if you invite some PF member to take a look at it and explain it some other way so that you can understand.
And yet, in "breaking" those "chains", you enslave yourself to irrationality and paradox, ...At every given time, one is chained to a specific system of thoughts. What matters is the fairness and sincerity of that system of thoughts. Another thing that matters is the awareness of the chained mind of its chains.
So far that I've learnt, Uncertainty (if you like, Paradox and Irrationality) is the most sincere way to study something. Uncertainty implies absence of bias and prejudice.
Obviously enough, Uncertainty isn't a practical way. This isn't because of Uncertainty being useless, it's because of what we mean with "practice" and "practicality." We see practicality in terms of what satisfies our desires (the roots of these desires I don't know) and the more of satisfaction is the more of practicality. Uncertainty is for known and unknown reasons dissatisfying for it robs one of security, simplicity, ease, self-confidence and self-righteousness. These aspects of human life that fade away when Uncertainty comes in, are necessary for leading a normal life. Without them we could never be choosing our next moments' actions. These aspects are so important that they simply can't be taken away. Resultant is a milder version of Uncertainty that won't hurt these aspects much.
There's a fair way to avoid the loss of these aspects while avoiding being unfair with ignoring Uncertainty. That's the way of simultaneous acceptance and denial (another paradox, spot it, get it right there, get it up against "The Wall" [:D]). One will be aware and cautious of Uncertainty while one acts as if nothing's happened.
In order not to waste the fairness of this way, one should be warned against any unnecessary certainties. One such "unnecessary" certainty is the existence (lest you see me, I know [;)]). It really won't change much of one's perspective if one's informed of her/his existence/non-existence if this information doesn't change any aspect of her/his life.
I have to admit you wrote of "mild" Uncertainty before and were right with that but I didn't like the way you talked of it; it sounded to me like you were saying "well, we have this here and that there, I like this you like that, but if you insist I'll take a bit of that, too."
... As a matter of form, I cannot question all foundations at the same time. It's not just paradoxical, ...Let me see, you question a part of the foundation, make it up with it and go to the next. Seems pretty procedural task! Yet it's problematic. Whilst you question a certain part of the foundation you'll be assuming other parts true, won't you? And if the foundation is a coherent structure the validity of every part of it will be enough to prove other parts valid. Now "you" have a dead-end at hand, if you only question one part of the foundation, which is a coherent structure, every time you'll simply prove that part valid because you've assumed the other parts of the foundation.
The foundation, as a coherent structure, must be removed, thoroughly examined and then put back where it belongs. No part of the foundation can be allowed as a premise for studying the same foundation.
Yes, but your still inventing a wheel, when the problem your really trying to resolve has to do with the combustion engine...I understand what you wrote as "you are trying to modify the whole while you're asked to modify only the particulars."
This doesn't seem right to me. Making one's own system of thoughts involves the re-thinking of all one has as thoughts and then thinking new thoughts. This task must be done bottom-to-top and in order of complexity. The most basic intuition seems to be an intuition of existence (one that you're trying to change into a solid statement) so the first thing to be re-thought is the meaning, validity and works of existence. For this re-thinking one can't rely on any other thoughts for they are yet-to-come thoughts that haven't been revised.
Re-thinking isn't a work on particulars, it's ought to alter the whole. Consqeuently, it's equal to re-inventing a "new" wheel, not a mistake between the rudimentary conecpt of a wheel and the much higher level concept of a combustion engine peculiar to a specific car. Systems of thoughts are peculiar to their owners, the thinkers, so every system of thoughts must be built from the bottom to the top and without referencing other systems for the validity of other systems is, in the best case, limited to their owner. External references can only be used as helpers in explaining common or similar concepts, ie you can't point out Kant's idea on something and take that for a part of your system of thoughts but you may point at his idea and say "see, it's these points in common." It's obvious that similarities between two systems of thoughts one of which has gained public credit can't be held as an advantage for either of the systems.
Irrationality, by definition and common use, cannot have a rationale of any kind.
Yes, they didn't have my rationale, but they had one. That's the point. If they were truly irrational, they would have no rationale, whatsoever.Let's have your word. The consequence: there's never been such thing as irrationality for there's never been actions without some sort of rationale behind them. And there's never been systems of thoughts without a supportive skeleton of "rationale," one way or the other.
You claim that Uncertainty leads to irrationality but then you claim that every order in the things can be considered a rationale and isn't included in irrationals list. Now, Uncertainty has its own order of things. This order may be comlicated or even too complicated to comprehend but it is there. To conclude, Uncertainty isn't irrationality or irrational.
If you like it that way I can say that Uncertainty isn't irrational but has it's own not-so-much-publicized rationale. Does that work?
You shouldn't speak of paradox as though it were just another logical approach...I don't speak of paradox as another logical approach. I speak of it as the end to a "specific" form of logic. That which is a paradox in one logical system can be worked out simply in another system. The sight of a paradox isn't a dead-end. It's a call to change and a call to a new system. A paradox indicates that a logical system isn't even self-sufficient, let alone sufficient. A paradox is the rise of countless possibilities that were oppressed by the materialization of a certain possibility which hasn't "necessarily" been superior to those countless possibilities.
And what "people" do isn't the measure of what we do.
Uncertainty doesn't hold any certainty either.That's true but it gives you a perspective of countless options, at least. I didn't say it held certainty. I said it was more honorable than the "usual" excuse, certainty.
Well, if we're dying because we think we will die, then discussing it is making us all the more likely to die.You see the dark side of it. The same discussion may make us re-think the concept of death and, who knows, perhaps discard it.
Well, actually, if your premise is "progressive knowledge is necessary", then those "other ideas" don't really have "equal creditability".That's it. If you want to be fair in judging suppositions, first you have to be independent of them. In the court of fair judgment all suppositions are equally creditable for the judge isn't initially committed to any of them. It's after the judgment that premises come. Premises are the outcome of judgment and a choice of suppositions that've seemed the best to the court of fair judgment.
"Nothing is uncertain" is not the premise that we were talking about...Shame on me! I've played this certain-uncertain thing so much that I mix them all up. I beg your pardon. I meant "nothing is certain."
No, I don't. I think that moderation is important...You mean you tend to choose certain behavior and "officially" declare them "superior in form" and then present them as the "right" behavior?
Every choice is a matter of the chooser's taste. You may like to behave in a civilized manner on every ocassion while this me likes better not to do it that way every once in a while.
Do you give up chooser's choice for the groundless superiority assigned by the society?
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
1. For Mentat:
That's right. The P([beep]) statement is not the statement category ("I think therefore I am" and similar) proven absurd in that proof. You're just stating the reason I wrote that P([beep]) was "irrelevant to" and "independent from" Descartes' statement, that it was just a helper device.
Ok, for the millionth time. P([bleep]) reasoning is a helper device for other philosophies. It cannot be applied to Descartes' philosophy, unless you have some argument that you haven't yet presented. A tin-opener can be fitted to a can, thus it can be useful. However, I'm telling you that P([bleep]) reasoning doesn't "fit" with Descartes' statement. It cannot be made to fit, as far as I've seen - and you have not made any effort to "fit" them, taking it as obvious that this kind of reasoning (P([bleep])) is helpful.
I've times described how this helper device works. It's irrelevant to Descartes' statement but it's engineered so that it causes trouble when the study of Descartes' statement is seen in association with P([beep]) state.
There is no association. P([bleep]) requires that P is a function of whatever [bleep] stands for. Descartes' statement requires that P is an entity, that acts out [bleep].
There may be faults in that proof. It may be wrong but what you're pointing out is "your" misconception. I've wrote so many times that the subject of study in that proof is Descartes' statement and P([beep]) is only a "helper device," so you can't tell me that since my P([beep]) isn't Descartes' statement the proof isn't studying that statement. Back to the tin-opener analogy, you can't tell me that since a tin-opener isn't a can, its task can't be opening cans.
The proof isn't studying the statement, but not because they are different. It's because they are unrelated, the don't "fit" (see above).
At every given time, one is chained to a specific system of thoughts. What matters is the fairness and sincerity of that system of thoughts.
And yet, to assertain the "fairness and sincerity" of that system, you need to look at it from outside that system. In doing so, you must make use of another system, whose "fairness and sincerity" you haven't determined.
Obviously enough, Uncertainty isn't a practical way. This isn't because of Uncertainty being useless, it's because of what we mean with "practice" and "practicality." We see practicality in terms of what satisfies our desires (the roots of these desires I don't know) and the more of satisfaction is the more of practicality.
I'll tell you the root of these desires: survival. Humans would not have survived this long, if they hadn't used "practicality" and "progressive knowledge". Now, they are safe enough to question, but the "roots" are now deeply engrained.
Uncertainty is for known and unknown reasons dissatisfying for it robs one of security, simplicity, ease, self-confidence and self-righteousness.
This sounds like wuliheron's reasoning, and I only partially agree. I think that some uncertainty can accomplish this purpose, but full Uncertainty just robs you of any progressive knowledge, and thus you get "stuck".
There's a fair way to avoid the loss of these aspects while avoiding being unfair with ignoring Uncertainty. That's the way of simultaneous acceptance and denial (another paradox, spot it, get it right there, get it up against "The Wall" [:D]). One will be aware and cautious of Uncertainty while one acts as if nothing's happened.
I don't get this. You are saying, "I have an answer", then you say "My answer is paradoxical". What is supposed to incline me toward listening to this "answer"?
It really won't change much of one's perspective if one's informed of her/his non-existence
But, this "information" (of his/her non-existence) cannot be true, otherwise who would you be "informing" (Descartes' reasoning again)?
I have to admit you wrote of "mild" Uncertainty before and were right with that but I didn't like the way you talked of it; it sounded to me like you were saying "well, we have this here and that there, I like this you like that, but if you insist I'll take a bit of that, too."
That wasn't the way I intended you to take it. I meant that it's good to have some uncertainty, and that everything can be questioned, but in turns. You must take some things for granted while questioning others, and then later question the things that you previously took for granted, while taking the previous uncertainties as now certain. You just shouldn't be uncertain of all things at once. Can't be, IMHO.
Whilst you question a certain part of the foundation you'll be assuming other parts true, won't you? And if the foundation is a coherent structure the validity of every part of it will be enough to prove other parts valid. Now "you" have a dead-end at hand, if you only question one part of the foundation, which is a coherent structure, every time you'll simply prove that part valid because you've assumed the other parts of the foundation.
This reasoning isn't just for questioning foundations, but for questioning new assumptions/speculations, as well.
I'll finish my response in the next post...
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
The foundation, as a coherent structure, must be removed, thoroughly examined and then put back where it belongs. No part of the foundation can be allowed as a premise for studying the same foundation.
I understand what you wrote as "you are trying to modify the whole while you're asked to modify only the particulars."
What you are missing is that it is impossible to question all foundations at once. I've tried to reason on it, and I can't, it's just not possible to do it. Let me explain: If it tried to question all foundations, then my foundation would become "question all previous foundations". However, since this is a foundation in itself, you are not questioning all foundations.
This doesn't seem right to me. Making one's own system of thoughts involves the re-thinking of all one has as thoughts and then thinking new thoughts. This task must be done bottom-to-top and in order of complexity. The most basic intuition seems to be an intuition of existence (one that you're trying to change into a solid statement) so the first thing to be re-thought is the meaning, validity and works of existence. For this re-thinking one can't rely on any other thoughts for they are yet-to-come thoughts that haven't been revised.
Exactly, and it is thus impossible to disprove existence! If re-thinking relies on other thoughts (which it obviously does) and you can't have had other thoughts without existing (as you've pointed out, in so many words), then you cannot really re-think your existence.
Re-thinking isn't a work on particulars, it's ought to alter the whole. Consqeuently, it's equal to re-inventing a "new" wheel, not a mistake between the rudimentary conecpt of a wheel and the much higher level concept of a combustion engine peculiar to a specific car.
That's what I've been saying you are not supposed to do. If you keep reinventing the wheel, then you'll never get to a car. Also, if you cannot work on any particular problem, without having to start form scratch, you will never solve any problem.
External references can only be used as helpers in explaining common or similar concepts, ie you can't point out Kant's idea on something and take that for a part of your system of thoughts but you may point at his idea and say "see, it's these points in common." It's obvious that similarities between two systems of thoughts one of which has gained public credit can't be held as an advantage for either of the systems.
I don't understand this. Do you mean that I can't use someone else's opinion to help create my own?
Let's have your word. The consequence: there's never been such thing as irrationality for there's never been actions without some sort of rationale behind them. And there's never been systems of thoughts without a supportive skeleton of "rationale," one way or the other.
You claim that Uncertainty leads to irrationality but then you claim that every order in the things can be considered a rationale and isn't included in irrationals list.
Yes, that's why Uncertainty (btw, I capitalize the first letter of "uncertainty" when I want it to mean "uncertainty of all things at once") is unusable, IMO.
Now, Uncertainty has its own order of things. This order may be comlicated or even too complicated to comprehend but it is there. To conclude, Uncertainty isn't irrationality or irrational.
Uncertainty does not have an order of things. If your uncertainty has an order to it, then it is not true Uncertainty.
If you like it that way I can say that Uncertainty isn't irrational but has it's own not-so-much-publicized rationale. Does that work?
No. It is, demonstrably, irrational and paradoxical (we've already shown this in previous posts).
I don't speak of paradox as another logical approach. I speak of it as the end to a "specific" form of logic. That which is a paradox in one logical system can be worked out simply in another system. The sight of a paradox isn't a dead-end. It's a call to change and a call to a new system. A paradox indicates that a logical system isn't even self-sufficient, let alone sufficient.
Which means that Uncertainty isn't sufficient, because it leads to paradox, right?
That's it. If you want to be fair in judging suppositions, first you have to be independent of them.
That, in itself, is a supposition. I have to get off-line now, but I hope you think about what I've written.
Until next time...
dr-dock
Apr25-03, 04:06 PM
Originally posted by RageSk8
I like "I think therefore I know"
-Stolen from Nagel in his characterization of Davidson.
yeah.this one is good.
by the way i'm means a lots of other things not just thinking.
let me put it this way:
i have 36 oC therefore i'm.
Manuel_Silvio
Apr26-03, 02:11 PM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
I won’t discuss the proof anymore. You’re in harsh misunderstanding of it and I’ve done my best to clarify but have failed. I re-shape and re-explain the proof one more time, but I won’t discuss it until you show you’ve understood what I mean. I don’t mean for you to agree with it, I just want you to understand it and then say whatever you like. For one time only put aside all you think of the proof and read these lines, forget what we wrote before:
Take the statement “I think therefore I am” and call it Descartes’ statement and show it with Q. Now put this in the back of your mind. Put it away for later study. Don’t think about it for a moment.
Take the statement “There need be an I to think” and show it with P.
Since this proof is meant to be understood in Boolean logic framework, P may only assume one of these two states, T or F. I ask of you: “What state do you assign to P?” You may choose either T or F.
Now we come to study Q. We know nothing of its state because this is what we’re going to find out.
For P you have chosen either T or F.
If you’ve chosen P to be T, then you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q. P is independent of Q and you’ve chosen P to be true before we come to study Q, so you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q because Q is a corollary of P. In pre-assuming truth for Q and coming to study it after this pre-assumption you’ve made a circular deduction. You’ve first assumed Q is true then come to study it and then concluded, again, that Q is true. Circular deduction is non-informative and isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.
If you’ve chosen P to be F, then you’ve contradicted this pre-assumption with asserting that Q is true. If P is false then Q can’t be true so Q must be false, too. P being F and Q being T is a paradox and this isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.
Questions that may be asked concerning the proof:
00. How are P and Q related?
01. Why should I assign any state to P?
02. What if I want to study Q before assigning a state to P?
03. What does this whole mean?
04. Could this proof be applied to other statements?
Answers:
00. P and Q are semantically equal but logically independent. In the course of proof, they’re studied independently but then the results are synthesized and shown to be incompatible in a specific logical framework, namely Boolean logic.
01. For in a logical framework where only two states, true (T) or false (F), can be assigned to a statement, the state of any statement should be definitively determinable at any given time. Other logical frameworks, too, have this characteristic but they may incorporate additional/totally different states that make them more flexible and less vulnerable.
02. You can’t because even if you don’t assign a state to P it must have some state which is either T or F. No matter what the state for P is, it’s shown in the proof that either way will cause trouble.
03. Anyone can generate countless statements. These statements may be studied in countless logical systems, one of which is Boolean logic. The best logical system is the most consistent one, one that doesn’t contain any internal inconsistency. For this purpose the logical system must be able to synthesize and analyze all of the countless statements that can be generated without contradicting its own axioms. Out of countless statements two are chosen, P and Q. If a logical system is minimally consistent it must be, at least, able to synthesize these two statements. Boolean logic assumes an axiom that prohibits the collocation of contraries (which we call paradox) and the study of axioms or rather pre-assumed statements (which we call a loop, a circle or a self-referenced statement). In this proof it’s shown that Boolean logic is unable to synthesize these two statements although these two are valid statements (validity is not equal to truth, it means they’re really statements that can be assigned states).
04. Many other statements may be proven to be incompatible in the framework of Boolean logic.
And yet, to assertain the "fairness and sincerity" of that system, you need to look at it from outside that system. In doing so, you must make use of another system, whose "fairness and sincerity" you haven't determined. That’s right. Isn’t that another plus for Uncertainty? Since no system of thoughts can be shown fair and sincere without being committed to another or the same system of thoughts, one must always be aware of distortions in the judgment. Wouldn’t it be the fairest to be uncertain of everything? Being uncertain is just another way of thinking, the most general one.
I'll tell you the root of these desires: survival. Humans would not have survived this long, if they hadn't used "practicality" and "progressive knowledge". Now, they are safe enough to question, but the "roots" are now deeply engrained. Survival exists in the scientific Universe, it needn’t exist anywhere else. The struggle for survival has been scientifically observed in the nature. To say the root of desires is survival is equal to saying that there’s the nature, that it can be observed, that these observations can be concluded from and that the certain conclusion is the struggle for survival. This doesn’t seem to be much of Philosophy.
You can’t make any scientific claim in a realm beyond and over Science. Philosophy may study Science but Science may not get involved in Philosophy. Philosophy is meant as the study of anything and everything using all possible tools while Science is the study of a certain realm of knowledge with specific methodic tools.
This sounds like wuliheron's reasoning, and I only partially agree. I think that some uncertainty can accomplish this purpose, but full Uncertainty just robs you of any progressive knowledge, and thus you get "stuck". You tend to mention that “progressive knowledge,” too much. Perhaps I like it, too, but it won’t prevent me from seeing clearly that sticking to “progressive knowledge” may be as bad as “getting stuck.”
Let’s have your word and “suppose,” only “suppose,” that one will “get stuck” in Uncertainty. I just don’t see the problem with that. You may hate “getting stuck” but that’s your emotional state of mind, it may not enter this discussion.
I don't get this. You are saying, "I have an answer", then you say "My answer is paradoxical". What is supposed to incline me toward listening to this "answer"? Nothing. Absolutely nothing can incline you, or anyone else, towards listening to anything. One’s inclinations lie deep in the dark labyrinth of one’s mind. There’s as much rationale behind your preference of “progressive knowledge” to “Uncertainty,” as there’s behind your preference of, say, McDonald’s fast food to fish and chips.
You may be inclined towards inquisitiveness and like to see other options. One such option that you’re offered is Uncertainty. You aren’t obliged to accept it, you aren’t even invited to take a look at it but you’ve come to, at least, flash past it once. What makes you choose something over the other is unknown to me, and I guess it’s unknown to you as well. I, too, have no idea what drives me towards choosing something.
A solid mountain of logic or an ocean of emotion or a blinding lightning of power, when applied from outside of you won’t change your mind. However, the slightest breeze of logic, emotion or power blowing “in” your mind may become a critical point to your life.
But, this "information" (of his/her non-existence) cannot be true, otherwise who would you be "informing" (Descartes' reasoning again)? I’d be informing the “non-existing one.” Your system of thoughts doesn’t allow such thing, mine does. It’s up to you to fairly decide if a change is necessary somewhere.
… and that everything can be questioned, but in turns. You must take some things for granted while questioning others, and then later question the things that you previously took for granted, while taking the previous uncertainties as now certain. You just shouldn't be uncertain of all things at once… I want to emphasize these words of yours. You say I “must” do this, you say I “should” do that, where do you take these from? These “must” and “should” of yours aren’t of our points of agreement in this discussion.
Once again, if my knowledge is a coherent structure the truth of every part of it will directly result in the truth of other parts of it. Now if I question things in turn, I’ll always be taking something for granted. That something will be part of this coherent structure so it will always prove other parts true. Nothing will change if I do that. Is that all with fair questioning? I question but go back to where I was? My saying “everything happens in loops” is much similar to this. Isn’t it?
Even worse (from you point of view), is that every part of my knowledge is an assertion of other parts. Now if I take some part for granted, I’ll be asserting the truth of other parts and then getting into showing their truth. Isn’t that self-reference come back again?
This reasoning isn't just for questioning foundations, but for questioning new assumptions/speculations, as well.
What you are missing is that it is impossible to question all foundations at once. I've tried to reason on it, and I can't, it's just not possible to do it... I understand this but I don’t view it like you do. You’re assessing these situations according to your own priorities. You say paradoxes, self-reference, dead-ends and “getting stuck” are the results of being as fair as one can (that “fairness” is Uncertainty), and then insist one would better be a bit less fair but gain something worth that much effort put into many years of thinking.
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
Apr26-03, 02:14 PM
... continued from the previous post
You have your choice but then I’m also interested in Certainty just as much as I’m interested in Uncertainty. In spite of this interest I don’t assess those situations, assessed by you as “must-be-avoided,” as “must-be-avoided” but as “must-be-thought-of.”
Those situations are inevitable whenever one’s trying to use an encompassing logical system (see Gödel’s Theorem, I’m not much into it but I know a bit about it). Think about them and think why you think they must be avoided.
Exactly, and it is thus impossible to disprove existence! If re-thinking relies on other thoughts (which it obviously does) and you can't have had other thoughts without existing (as you've pointed out, in so many words), then you cannot really re-think your existence. I didn’t mean you have to exist to think. I “only” said that re-thinking “existence” as “the most basic intuition” when done in a “bottom-to-top” manner must occur independent of any other thoughts. One such thought is “there should be an entity if an entity is thinking.”
However, there’s something good with your words. I’ve never said it is possible to disprove existence, I only said it is impossible to prove it. These two are complementary sides of one thing, that one thing being Uncertainty. If one’s uncertain of one’s existence, one wouldn’t be thinking one exists, one wouldn’t also be thinking one doesn’t exist.
That's what I've been saying you are not supposed to do. If you keep reinventing the wheel, then you'll never get to a car. Also, if you cannot work on any particular problem, without having to start form scratch, you will never solve any problem. You like it the practical way. I won’t give up fairness for practicality. I haven’t come to solve a problem. I haven’t come to help the human species. I haven’t come to take something out of this. I want to build my own way of thought and for that purpose I’ll be scrutinizing every bit of every bit.
I’m doing it from scratch for I want to have it cleansed. Others seem to have introduced a hell of a lot of their own obsessions and absolute rubbish into the field. Even though there’ve surely been a few whose speech deserves reverence.
I don't understand this. Do you mean that I can't use someone else's opinion to help create my own? You can but you can’t take their validity and/or truth for granted. You have to question them and take them apart to see if they’re valid and/or true in the context for/in which you’re going to use them.
Uncertainty does not have an order of things. If your uncertainty has an order to it, then it is not true Uncertainty. The order of things in Uncertainty is their being uncertain and their being equally creditable.
No. It is, demonstrably, irrational and paradoxical (we've already shown this in previous posts). Paradox and irrationality aren’t synonyms. Paradoxes are the brinks of rationality; they’re as much rational as they’re irrational.
… I have to get off-line now, but I hope you think about what I've written. I seem to have thought about them [;)].
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,
1. For [b]Mentat:
I won’t discuss the proof anymore. You’re in harsh misunderstanding of it and I’ve done my best to clarify but have failed. I re-shape and re-explain the proof one more time, but I won’t discuss it until you show you’ve understood what I mean. I don’t mean for you to agree with it, I just want you to understand it and then say whatever you like.
I had a pretty good understanding of what you were trying to say. My problem was that I couldn't make it "fit" the statement, "I think therefore I am".
Oh well, I don't think it was applicable anyway, so I'm glad enough to move on without it.
For one time only put aside all you think of the proof and read these lines, forget what we wrote before:
Take the statement “I think therefore I am” and call it Descartes’ statement and show it with Q. Now put this in the back of your mind. Put it away for later study. Don’t think about it for a moment.
Take the statement “There need be an I to think” and show it with P.
Just so long as you don't think that I ever implied proposition P. I never did. I said (and this is important): There need be an I for 'I' to think". The distinction being, obviously, the reference to the entity doing the thinking.
Since this proof is meant to be understood in Boolean logic framework, P may only assume one of these two states, T or F. I ask of you: “What state do you assign to P?” You may choose either T or F.
Rephrased as "There need be an I, for 'I' to think" - I say it is true.
Now we come to study Q. We know nothing of its state because this is what we’re going to find out.
For P you have chosen either T or F.
If you’ve chosen P to be T, then you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q. P is independent of Q and you’ve chosen P to be true before we come to study Q, so you’ve pre-assumed truth for Q because Q is a corollary of P. In pre-assuming truth for Q and coming to study it after this pre-assumption you’ve made a circular deduction. You’ve first assumed Q is true then come to study it and then concluded, again, that Q is true. Circular deduction is non-informative and isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.
Wait a minute now. I said "P" was true, not "Q". Yes, I may be implying it, but that's just because Q inevitably follows P (as you've said). I was not even considering Q, because you told me not to.
If you’ve chosen P to be F, then you’ve contradicted this pre-assumption with asserting that Q is true. If P is false then Q can’t be true so Q must be false, too. P being F and Q being T is a paradox and this isn’t allowed in the framework of Boolean logic.
Questions that may be asked concerning the proof:
00. How are P and Q related?
01. Why should I assign any state to P?
02. What if I want to study Q before assigning a state to P?
03. What does this whole mean?
04. Could this proof be applied to other statements?
Answers:
00. P and Q are semantically equal but logically independent. In the course of proof, they’re studied independently but then the results are synthesized and shown to be incompatible in a specific logical framework, namely Boolean logic.
You didn't show them incompatible. You just showed that if P is true, then Q must be, what's wrong with that?
Besides, your proposition "P" is not the same as any of the propositions that I have made (as I've shown above, it (P) requires some adjustment before it becomes one of my postulates). I don't agree with: "There need be an I to think", but I do agree with: "There need be an I, for 'I' to think".
02. You can’t because even if you don’t assign a state to P it must have some state which is either T or F. No matter what the state for P is, it’s shown in the proof that either way will cause trouble.
No, you just showed that calling it false could be problematic, and I tend to agree.
04. Many other statements may be proven to be incompatible in the framework of Boolean logic.
That’s right. Isn’t that another plus for Uncertainty? Since no system of thoughts can be shown fair and sincere without being committed to another or the same system of thoughts, one must always be aware of distortions in the judgment. Wouldn’t it be the fairest to be uncertain of everything? Being uncertain is just another way of thinking, the most general one.
Has the paradox of trying to be completely Uncertain gone over your head, or are you just ignoring it?
Survival exists in the scientific Universe, it needn’t exist anywhere else. The struggle for survival has been scientifically observed in the nature. To say the root of desires is survival is equal to saying that there’s the nature, that it can be observed, that these observations can be concluded from and that the certain conclusion is the struggle for survival. This doesn’t seem to be much of Philosophy.
You forget, Science is a branch of Philosophy. Thus, any Scientific claims that I make, can be considered Philosophical.
You can’t make any scientific claim in a realm beyond and over Science. Philosophy may study Science but Science may not get involved in Philosophy. Philosophy is meant as the study of anything and everything using all possible tools while Science is the study of a certain realm of knowledge with specific methodic tools.
Science is one of the tools that Philosophy uses.
You tend to mention that “progressive knowledge,” too much. Perhaps I like it, too, but it won’t prevent me from seeing clearly that sticking to “progressive knowledge” may be as bad as “getting stuck.”
It may be, but the human race (and other animal races) seem to have a greater chance of surviving, if they progress in knowledge and understanding.
Also, you seem to like Philosophy. In case you haven't heard this before, Philosophy is the love and pursuit of Wisdom. Wisdom is applied Knowledge. Thus you cannot Philosophize without taking in knowledge, can you?
Let’s have your word and “suppose,” only “suppose,” that one will “get stuck” in Uncertainty. I just don’t see the problem with that. You may hate “getting stuck” but that’s your emotional state of mind, it may not enter this discussion.
No, it's not that I have a problem with getting stuck, it's that Uncertainty is not just "sticky", it's unusable. With paradox at it's very heart, it's impossible to use it in any way. In fact, it can be (and has been, by me) argued that it is impossible to completely Uncertain.
Nothing. Absolutely nothing can incline you, or anyone else, towards listening to anything. One’s inclinations lie deep in the dark labyrinth of one’s mind. There’s as much rationale behind your preference of “progressive knowledge” to “Uncertainty,” as there’s behind your preference of, say, McDonald’s fast food to fish and chips.
Didn't I already show that Uncertainty is inherently irrational? If so, then isn't it obvious that there can be no "rationale" to Uncertainty, while there is some to "progressive knowledge"? If so, then my choice is rather a bit more justified then my choice of Pizza Hut (one of my personal favorite restaurants), to Little Ceasers (who also makes good pizza, but not as good IMO [:)]).
You may be inclined towards inquisitiveness and like to see other options. One such option that you’re offered is Uncertainty. You aren’t obliged to accept it, you aren’t even invited to take a look at it but you’ve come to, at least, flash past it once. What makes you choose something over the other is unknown to me, and I guess it’s unknown to you as well. I, too, have no idea what drives me towards choosing something.
I don't know either. You know, It's interesting enough to point out that the fact that you can settle on Uncertainty, means that you aren't truly Uncertain.
I’d be informing the “non-existing one.” Your system of thoughts doesn’t allow such thing, mine does.
Then why do you still refer to "it" as "the non-existing one?
Once again, if my knowledge is a coherent structure the truth of every part of it will directly result in the truth of other parts of it. Now if I question things in turn, I’ll always be taking something for granted. That something will be part of this coherent structure so it will always prove other parts true. Nothing will change if I do that. Is that all with fair questioning? I question but go back to where I was? My saying “everything happens in loops” is much similar to this. Isn’t it?
And yet this reasoning only applies to questioning your foundations.
Even worse (from you point of view), is that every part of my knowledge is an assertion of other parts. Now if I take some part for granted, I’ll be asserting the truth of other parts and then getting into showing their truth. Isn’t that self-reference come back again?
I understand this but I don’t view it like you do. You’re assessing these situations according to your own priorities. You say paradoxes, self-reference, dead-ends and “getting stuck” are the results of being as fair as one can (that “fairness” is Uncertainty), and then insist one would better be a bit less fair but gain something worth that much effort put into many years of thinking.
Fairness and Uncertainty (please notice the capitalized "U") are not the same thing. Uncertainty requires a bias also. (Of course, that bias is just the bias of trying to be unbiased...which is a paradoxical concept of the same type as the Paradox of Limitlessness).
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Those situations are inevitable whenever one’s trying to use an encompassing logical system (see Gödel’s Theorem, I’m not much into it but I know a bit about it). Think about them and think why you think they must be avoided.
I didn’t mean you have to exist to think. I “only” said that re-thinking “existence” as “the most basic intuition” when done in a “bottom-to-top” manner must occur independent of any other thoughts. One such thought is “there should be an entity if an entity is thinking.”
But who is doing the reasoning then? The thought that there should be an entity if an entity is thinking, can be taken apart into it's two parts ("there should be an entity", and "an entity is thinking"), the second of which is composed of two propositions, one of which is "there is an entity". Oh well, I've already said this same thing before, and I still haven't gotten a good response, on this particular point.
However, there’s something good with your words. I’ve never said it is possible to disprove existence, I only said it is impossible to prove it. These two are complementary sides of one thing, that one thing being Uncertainty. If one’s uncertain of one’s existence, one wouldn’t be thinking one exists, one wouldn’t also be thinking one doesn’t exist.
You like it the practical way. I won’t give up fairness for practicality. I haven’t come to solve a problem. I haven’t come to help the human species. I haven’t come to take something out of this. I want to build my own way of thought and for that purpose I’ll be scrutinizing every bit of every bit.
I’m doing it from scratch for I want to have it cleansed. Others seem to have introduced a hell of a lot of their own obsessions and absolute rubbish into the field. Even though there’ve surely been a few whose speech deserves reverence.
You can but you can’t take their validity and/or truth for granted. You have to question them and take them apart to see if they’re valid and/or true in the context for/in which you’re going to use them.
The order of things in Uncertainty is their being uncertain and their being equally creditable.
Paradox and irrationality aren’t synonyms. Paradoxes are the brinks of rationality; they’re as much rational as they’re irrational.
I would respond to this whole quote, but I don't have time. I think you make some excellent points, and some that I don't agree with, especially to do with Uncertainty. However, let me draw your attention to your last sentence. You see, I believe you are wrong about Paradox. They may be the brinks of rationality, but that means that they are still in "irrational" territory. Besides, I don't see them as the brinks of rationality, so much as they are the end of one line of reasoning, and thus - when pursued - can easily lead one to irrationality.
Manuel_Silvio
Apr27-03, 07:17 AM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
I had a pretty good understanding of what you were trying to say. My problem was that I couldn't make it "fit" the statement, "I think therefore I am".
Oh well, I don't think it was applicable anyway, so I'm glad enough to move on without it.
No, unfortunately you don't seem to have a phantom of a shadow of having understood this proof. Your following sentences show this. And it's me who must be assured that you've understood the proof for you yourself are always sure you've understood the whole thing.
Please don't be glad. I'm not moving on without it, I only suspend it until you get the point. If you don't the entire discussion has been pointless. Here are my last words on this proof.
Just so long as you don't think that I ever implied proposition P. I never did. I said (and this is important): There need be an I for 'I' to think". The distinction being, obviously, the reference to the entity doing the thinking.
I didn't say you implied it. I proposed it. The proof doesn't care who's proposed this statement.
Rephrased as "There need be an I, for 'I' to think" - I say it is true.You may not rephrase it. It’s my statement. I propose a specific statement and ask of you of its state. I'm not interested in any statements you may think are equal to that statement.
Wait a minute now. I said "P" was true, not "Q". Yes, I may be implying it, but that's just because Q inevitably follows P (as you've said). I was not even considering Q, because you told me not to.This is logic. P and Q are independent but I may derive Q's state from the state you assigned to Q. I asked you not to consider Q in order to take care of this independence but the logical system can be used at any time to derive and conclude. That's why I say P and Q show inconsistency in Boolean logic. I use the rules and never break them but I arrive at a forbidden point.
You didn't show them incompatible. You just showed that if P is true, then Q must be, what's wrong with that? I showed. That P's truth will result in Q's truth is taken from your premise that "for an entity to think there must be an entity," it doesn't relate to this proof. The proof shows that whatever state has been chosen for P, either T or F, P and Q together lead into either a loop or a paradox.
Besides, your proposition "P" is not the same as any of the propositions that I have made ... I don't agree with: "There need be an I to think", but I do agree with: "There need be an I, for 'I' to think".See, it isn't important which state your choose for P. You may agree or disagree with it. The point in this proof is that no matter you agree or disagree with P, it will cause trouble. And for Boolean logic you must either agree or disagree with P, you can't postpone or suspend judgment. This is the vulnerability I'm talking of. P can't be suspended to be judged after Q has been judged. They must be judged at one time and this coincidence causes trouble.
P needn't be one of your premises. It's only a statement and for every given statement you have to be able to definitely determine its state, if you claim consistency in Boolean logic.
No, you just showed that calling it false could be problematic, and I tend to agree.I also showed calling it true will be problematic. How then you ask? If you call it true you've slipped into pre-assuming an assertion of what you're just going to prove, the other statement, Q.
Has the paradox of trying to be completely Uncertain gone over your head, or are you just ignoring it?Being uncertain isn't absolutely fair but it's relatively fairer than any other stance. This relative fairness in comparison to other stances is what I call a plus for Uncertainty.
Being uncertain requires no assumption but "nothing is certain."
You forget, Science is a branch of Philosophy. Thus, any Scientific claims that I make, can be considered Philosophical.
Science is one of the tools that Philosophy uses.
It may be, but the human race (and other animal races) seem to have a greater chance of surviving, if they progress in knowledge and understanding.
Also, you seem to like Philosophy. In case you haven't heard this before, Philosophy is the love and pursuit of Wisdom. Wisdom is applied Knowledge. Thus you cannot Philosophize without taking in knowledge, can you?
If Science is a branch of Philosophy, it can be seen as Philosophy's subset. A subset has all its members contained in its superset but it doesn't contain all of the superset's members. Hence Philosophy may embrace non-scientific or even anti-scientific claims, which means scientific claims don't qualify for assessing philosophical claims. Philosophy is simply "over" Science.
Philosophy may study Science and scientific tools but it may not use Science as a tool. Using Science as a tool to assess/evaluate/judge will result in all scientific claims being approved and all non-scientific ones disapproved. It also limits the borders of Philosophy to Science.
And I don't like your way of talking the words, Philosophy, Wisdom and applied Wisdom. "Survival" is a piece of knowledge from scientific Universe; it may not be mixed with philosophical thought.
Philosophy is the study of human situation in all of its aspects. Philosophy must use tools independent of specific viewpoints, Science for example, in order to avoid confirming those viewpoints with their own tools. It's obvious that Science will seem consistent viewed by its own tools and premises. Philosophy must study Science and other ways of viewing the Universe from their outside.
No, it's not that I have a problem with getting stuck, it's that Uncertainty is not just "sticky", it's unusable... Let's suppose, only suppose, that Uncertainty is unusable. What's the problem with that? Suppose we've tried to study human situation and we've come to this unusable concept, is there a problem with that?
You may argue that total Uncertainty is impossible and I may "perhaps" accept that. In which logical framework has this happened? Boolean logic. Aren't there any other logical systems? There are. You must prove this for all logical systems and now this is impossible.
Didn't I already show that Uncertainty is inherently irrational? If so, then isn't it obvious that there can be no "rationale" to Uncertainty, while there is some to "progressive knowledge"?...You didn't show for I wrote of the order of things in Uncertainty and you accepted that every order may be considered rationale.
Even if we suppose, only suppose, Uncertainty is irrational, nothing is more "justified." Why do you think rationalization can distinguish one idea among others, that a rational idea is "better" than an irrational one?
You know, It's interesting enough to point out that the fact that you can settle on Uncertainty, means that you aren't truly Uncertain.For me, Uncertainty is only one step in a way. I don't settle on it. I take this step and then come new understandings. You view my stance as an aggressive attempt to Certainty about Uncertainty while it actually isn't that way. My way is another between-the-lines hint. Try to see the hint, between the lines, don't struggle to break the lines up, they aren't worth the effort.
Then why do you still refer to "it" as "the non-existing one?
"It" may include and refer to the "non-existing" ones as well as the "existing" ones.
And yet this reasoning only applies to questioning your foundations.Accept it for the foundations. Extend it to all knowledge for every piece of knowledge may be taken as an equally creditable foundation.
... Uncertainty requires a bias also...Yes, it is. Yet it's the fairest bias.
But who is doing the reasoning then? The thought that there should be an entity if an entity is thinking, can be taken apart into it's two parts ... the second of which is composed of two propositions, one of which is "there is an entity"...The non-existing one. See, I understand what you mean. You say "thinking" is so firmly in correspondence with "existing" (by the bond of Causality, that there must be a doer for a deed to be) that any form of "thinking" (eg, thinking about non-existence) can be an undeniable indication of "existing." I doubted that bond of Causality and talked of it being broken and its substitutes. Did you take this into account? If you avoid relying on Causality then a deed will no more be an undeniable indication of a doer, be the deed reasoning, thinking, eating, whatever.
Once again, I suggest you take a look at Gödel’s Theorem. Many things will be clear then.
... They may be the brinks of rationality, but that means that they are still in "irrational" territory. Besides, I don't see them as the brinks of rationality, so much as they are the end of one line of reasoning, and thus - when pursued - can easily lead one to irrationality.Let's see how you come to a paradox. A paradox is reached when you start out with valid premises, use valid rules of deduction but you end with an invalid result (the collocation of contraries). Everything in here is rational. It's rationalization come to a brink for only rationality may have brinks. Irrationality may even be "limitless" for it's irrational, where your argument of "limitlessness" no more works.
Paradox lies on the border of rationality and irrationality. You come to a paradox after some lines of reasoning and then you "may" bypass it into irrationality. You stop at the sight of a paradox, that's what you do. You won't go on after a paradox and that's exactly why it's the brink of rationality. You reach the border and you don't want to step into irrationality so you'll take aback for a while and then try to find another way.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
No, unfortunately you don't seem to have a phantom of a shadow of having understood this proof. Your following sentences show this. And it's me who must be assured that you've understood the proof for you yourself are always sure you've understood the whole thing.
Truth be told, I haven't made all that much effort to understand the proof, as you have yet to show me how it "fits" Descartes' statement. It still doesn't appear to.
Please don't be glad. I'm not moving on without it, I only suspend it until you get the point. If you don't the entire discussion has been pointless.
Only because you have placed so much emphasis on a proof that doesn't have anything to do with Descartes' statement. If you would argue the statement itself, I would not declare anything you said to be irrelevant.
I didn't say you implied it. I proposed it. The proof doesn't care who's proposed this statement.
No, I know, but then this statement would just be a random statement, designed for proving that Boolean Logic was inconsistent, but not designed to attack the statement in any way.
It now becomes apparent (please correct me if I'm wrong) that that's what you've been doing this entire time. You've just been trying to prove that Boolean Logic is inconsistent, while still claiming ultimate Uncertainty. This is obviously also contradictory, as you've said that Uncertainty is fair to all systems.
This is logic. P and Q are independent but I may derive Q's state from the state you assigned to Q. I asked you not to consider Q in order to take care of this independence but the logical system can be used at any time to derive and conclude. That's why I say P and Q show inconsistency in Boolean logic. I use the rules and never break them but I arrive at a forbidden point.
I'm sorry, I really do not see it. Maybe there's something wrong with me, but I can't see anything wrong with one proposition's implying another.
I showed. That P's truth will result in Q's truth is taken from your premise that "for an entity to think there must be an entity," it doesn't relate to this proof. The proof shows that whatever state has been chosen for P, either T or F, P and Q together lead into either a loop or a paradox.
Where is the paradox?
See, it isn't important which state your choose for P. You may agree or disagree with it. The point in this proof is that no matter you agree or disagree with P, it will cause trouble. And for Boolean logic you must either agree or disagree with P, you can't postpone or suspend judgment. This is the vulnerability I'm talking of. P can't be suspended to be judged after Q has been judged. They must be judged at one time and this coincidence causes trouble.
Why? There coincidence means that they are inter-related. So? What's wrong with that? Is there some proposition of Boolean Logic that states that there can be no two inter-related propositions?
P needn't be one of your premises. It's only a statement and for every given statement you have to be able to definitely determine its state, if you claim consistency in Boolean logic.
I understand. Please forgive my past attempts to show that it didn't apply to Descartes' statement. It's obvious that you didn't care about Descartes' statement, but were trying to show an inconsistency with Boolean Logic as a whole. That's what the P() analogy was for too, wasn't it? While I still don't see the inconsistency caused by these proofs, I do see that that's all you were trying to show (inconsistency in Boolean Logic).
I also showed calling it true will be problematic. How then you ask? If you call it true you've slipped into pre-assuming an assertion of what you're just going to prove, the other statement, Q.
So? In deciding that P is true, I pre-suppose that another (very related) statement is also true. So what?
For example, if I say "I'm alive" = proposition P. Then I say that propostion Q = "I exist". Taking "P" to be true necessitates that I pre-suppose the truth of "Q" - but what's wrong with that?
Being uncertain requires no assumption but "nothing is certain."
Yes, and that would be an assumption, wouldn't it? If that is an assumption, then Uncertainty is not entirely free of assumptions, is it? However, if the one assumption that it has is "there are no assumptions", then it must both have and not have any assumptions...this is a paradox/self-contradictory idea, just like limitlessness.
Philosophy may study Science and scientific tools but it may not use Science as a tool. Using Science as a tool to assess/evaluate/judge will result in all scientific claims being approved and all non-scientific ones disapproved. It also limits the borders of Philosophy to Science.
Not necessarily. Let's say that Philosophy makes use of both religious philosophy, and nihilism. So what if they contradict each other? They are still both important Philosophies. Neither of them limit Philosophy, they simply provide structures - within the realm of Philosophy - for different kinds of people to form their opinions in.
Let's suppose, only suppose, that Uncertainty is unusable. What's the problem with that? Suppose we've tried to study human situation and we've come to this unusable concept, is there a problem with that?
You have called Uncertainty "fair", "more reliable then certainty", "better conclusion", etc... . If Uncertainty is unusable, then none of these terms apply to it.
You may argue that total Uncertainty is impossible and I may "perhaps" accept that. In which logical framework has this happened? Boolean logic. Aren't there any other logical systems? There are. You must prove this for all logical systems and now this is impossible.
Why do you ask me to do something that you know very well is impossible? Different logic systems often contradict each other directly. That means that no one can use all of them to prove something, at the same time.
You didn't show for I wrote of the order of things in Uncertainty and you accepted that every order may be considered rationale.
There is no order of things in true Uncertainty. You have shown the rationale (by my definition) of uncertainty, but not of Uncertainty.
Even if we suppose, only suppose, Uncertainty is irrational, nothing is more "justified." Why do you think rationalization can distinguish one idea among others, that a rational idea is "better" than an irrational one?
You think so too, otherwise you wouldn't have tried to assign a rationale to Uncertainty.
"It" may include and refer to the "non-existing" ones as well as the "existing" ones.
"It" may not include "non-existing" [b]ones. In speaking of specific "ones" you imply their existence, at least in a conceptual manner.
Yes, it is. Yet it's the fairest bias.
No it's not, because it denies all other biases. At least Science allows for some of the things that it finds/theorizes to be wrong. Uncertainty has only one premise, and that is that there can be no premises (which doesn't allow for any of the other fields of study to be correct). How is that fair?
The non-existing one. See, I understand what you mean. You say "thinking" is so firmly in correspondence with "existing" (by the bond of Causality, that there must be a doer for a deed to be) that any form of "thinking" (eg, thinking about non-existence) can be an undeniable indication of "existing." I doubted that bond of Causality and talked of it being broken and its substitutes. Did you take this into account? If you avoid relying on Causality then a deed will no more be an undeniable indication of a doer, be the deed reasoning, thinking, eating, whatever.
I took your "substitutions" into account. As it turns out, they all rely on Causality anyway. Or at least it appears that way to me. For example, the inter-relationship between two "Quantum-bound electrons"; the reaction is instantaneous, and thus neither of the two can be considered the "cause". However, the "observer" can be considered the "cause", and without him/her, there would be no effect (the change of spin of the two electrons).
Let's see how you come to a paradox. A paradox is reached when you start out with valid premises, use valid rules of deduction but you end with an invalid result (the collocation of contraries). Everything in here is rational. It's rationalization come to a brink for only rationality may have brinks. Irrationality may even be "limitless" for it's irrational, where your argument of "limitlessness" no more works.
Paradox lies on the border of rationality and irrationality. You come to a paradox after some lines of reasoning and then you "may" bypass it into irrationality. You stop at the sight of a paradox, that's what you do. You won't go on after a paradox and that's exactly why it's the brink of rationality. You reach the border and you don't want to step into irrationality so you'll take aback for a while and then try to find another way.
Yes, and that's what so many logicians/philosophers/scientists/mathematicians/etc... have done in the past. When they come to a paradox, they realize that there must be some flaw in the particular line of reasoning that they've been following, and they abandon it in search of a better one.
Lifegazer
Apr27-03, 03:25 PM
As I see it, 'thinking' is how existence is assertained - along with 'sensation-of-awareness'. Thus thinking is the source of knowing that 'existence is'.
Therefore, it can definitely be claimed that 'thought' is evidence of existence. Since it is.
Therefore, since am-ness equates to existence, we can definitely say that I think, therefore I am.
Descartes was correct I think, about this. The only talking-point is the meaning of 'I'. "Who exactly am I?", is the only thing left to ponder.
Originally posted by Lifegazer
As I see it, 'thinking' is how existence is assertained - along with 'sensation-of-awareness'. Thus thinking is the source of knowing that 'existence is'.
Therefore, it can definitely be claimed that 'thought' is evidence of existence. Since it is.
Therefore, since am-ness equates to existence, we can definitely say that I think, therefore I am.
Descartes was correct I think, about this. The only talking-point is the meaning of 'I'. "Who exactly am I?", is the only thing left to ponder.
So Descartes' reasoning applies, whether there is anything other than the Mind's thoughts, or not, right?
Good point, lifegazer.
Lifegazer
Apr27-03, 03:51 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
So Descartes' reasoning applies, whether there is anything other than the Mind's thoughts, or not, right?
I claim to be a rationalist too. I don't know alot about Descartes, though I understand that his statement "I think, therefore I am." is rationally correct. Though like I say, the question of "Who am I?" is left untouched. By Descartes, anyway.[;)]
Originally posted by Lifegazer
I claim to be a rationalist too. I don't know alot about Descartes, though I understand that his statement "I think, therefore I am." is rationally correct. Though like I say, the question of "Who am I?" is left untouched. By Descartes, anyway.[;)]
That's very true, at least as far as I've read from his Philosophies.
Lifegazer
Apr27-03, 04:49 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
That's very true, at least as far as I've read from his Philosophies.
You surprise me. Do you realise that Descartes' axiom puts you within touching-distance of my own personal mind-hypothesis? I'm not asking you to discuss my hypothesis - I'm just 'shocked' (pardon the exaggeration) at your responses here.
Originally posted by Lifegazer
You surprise me. Do you realise that Descartes' axiom puts you within touching-distance of my own personal mind-hypothesis? I'm not asking you to discuss my hypothesis - I'm just 'shocked' (pardon the exaggeration) at your responses here.
I've always agreed with some of the points of your idea. I just don't agree with the premise/conclusion (there really should be a word for a premise that is also a conclusion). You are probably correct that we can't get information without the use of the "senses". And perhaps even correct that we can thus never prove the existence of an external reality. I just don't agree with your alternative.
Besides, even if I fully agreed with you, I would probably still present an argument against you [;)]. That's just the kind of person I am: The true Devil's Advocate [:))].
Lifegazer
Apr28-03, 02:47 PM
Originally posted by Mentat
I've always agreed with some of the points of your idea. I just don't agree with the premise/conclusion (there really should be a word for a premise that is also a conclusion).
My premise builds upon sensation & thought. The conclusion about God is not the same as the opening-premise.
Besides, even if I fully agreed with you, I would probably still present an argument against you [;)]. That's just the kind of person I am: The true Devil's Advocate [:))].
There's nothing wrong with that. But you should apply the same challenges to your own philosophies. Never close your mind to anything that you cannot disprove.
Originally posted by Lifegazer
There's nothing wrong with that. But you should apply the same challenges to your own philosophies. Never close your mind to anything that you cannot disprove.
Good point. I do try to apply my Devil's Advocate mentality to my own philosophies. I don't, however, type my contradictions to my own philosophy on the Forums (unless other people aren't making any worthy attempt to contradict it, in which case I decide to give them something to work off of, but this is rare).
Manuel_Silvio
Apr30-03, 03:52 PM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
Apologies for the delay.
Truth be told, I haven't made all that much effort to understand the proof, as you have yet to show me how it "fits" Descartes' statement. It still doesn't appear to.How could you say that if you still haven't understood what it's talking about?
I explained many times the reason I think that proof applies, just look around the posts. Did you counter my reasons?
Only because you have placed so much emphasis on a proof that doesn't have anything to do with Descartes' statement. If you would argue the statement itself, I would not declare anything you said to be irrelevant.It was/is relevant. Only because you place so much emphasis on a stance that doesn't have anything to do with my proof doesn't mean you've shown it's irrelevant.
... but then this statement would just be a random statement, designed for proving that Boolean Logic was inconsistent, but not designed to attack the statement in any way.
... You've just been trying to prove that Boolean Logic is inconsistent, while still claiming ultimate Uncertainty. This is obviously also contradictory, as you've said that Uncertainty is fair to all systems.
... It's obvious that you didn't care about Descartes' statement, but were trying to show an inconsistency with Boolean Logic as a whole. That's what the P([bleep]) analogy was for too, wasn't it?...First, you're right. I've been trying to show the inconsistency but there's a specific place where the inconsistency occurs and that's when statements like "I think therefore I am" are studied. This shows an incompatibility between this statement and the viewpoint from which it's meant to be seen.
My statement, P, isn't random. If it was then I needn't even mention it. It's a statement engineered to suit your "I think therefore I am." If you had another statement, which fell in the category of statements that I think are incompatible with Boolean logic then I'd have made P different.
Like I wrote before, Descartes' statement isn't intrinsically problematic. Problems rise when this statement is viewed in a specific logical framework.
Uncertainty's fairness doesn't mean that it can't detect inconsistencies of knowledge structures. Uncertainty is fair in the sense that it lets one see inconsistencies that wouldn't be seen if the knowledge structure isn't doubted. To study a knowledge body you have to live outside that body, and then observe it. Uncertainty provides this "living outside." It lets one doubt the principles and that's why it's fair. It's worth noting that Uncertainty won't give an evaluation system by which to rank knowledge bodies, it only shows (or is meant to show) their status quo, show them as they are not as they're seen from inside. Uncertainty won't prefer one idea over the other but it enables its user to see that one idea is consistent while the other one isn't. It should be clear that inconsistency is only an attribute of a knowledge body, not a means of preference or else.
I'm sorry, I really do not see it. Maybe there's something wrong with me, but I can't see anything wrong with one proposition's implying another.It isn't a simple implication; it's pre-assumption. This situation is similar to that you say: "I must live for living is an obligation." By saying "living is an obligation," you've already assumed you have to live, consequently deducing that "I must live" is logically incorrect (if you're bound to Boolean logic).
You may pre-assume something and then prove it, apparently, true. For me, there's no real problem with this, except that it's circular reasoning and it's non-informative.
Where is the paradox?If you say "P is T and Q is T" you've gone the way of circular reasoning. If you say "P is F and Q is T" then you've made paradox because P is an assertion of Q and may not be F when Q is considered T.
One way to overcome this loop and this paradox is to say "P is F and Q is F." Q and its assertion, P, can be simultaneously wrong without causing any trouble. The only problem is that you insist that Q is T.
Why? There coincidence means that they are inter-related. So? What's wrong with that? Is there some proposition of Boolean Logic that states that there can be no two inter-related propositions?No, but circular reasoning is forbidden (for you, of course). An assertion of Q, that is P, may not be assumed T when one is about to study Q's state. If Q is pre-assumed T then there's no need for studying it.
P may not be set T but it also must have a definite state and what remains is F, and P set as F will lead to paradox. Only if there was a third state like "null" then P could be assumed "null" while Q was being studied and then set to whatever suitable state. Such suspension is impossible in the framework of Boolean logic.
For example, if I say "I'm alive" = proposition P. Then I say that propostion Q = "I exist". Taking "P" to be true necessitates that I pre-suppose the truth of "Q" - but what's wrong with that?If you pre-suppose the truth of Q then there's no point in discussing if Q is true for its truth is your premise. Q must be kept "untouched" before it's studied thoroughly and during the time it's being studied. If Q's state is pre-supposed then the outcome of every study or discussion of Q will not result in a state for Q that's different from that pre-supposition.
You surely know of Vienna Circle and their "verifiability criterion." In analogy to that "verifiability criterion" (ie, "that which can't be verified may not be claimed"), one can say "that which can't be proven wrong may be claimed but is non-informative."
Yes, and that would be an assumption, wouldn't it? If that is an assumption, then Uncertainty is not entirely free of assumptions, is it? However, if the one assumption that it has is "there are no assumptions", then it must both have and not have any assumptions...this is a paradox/self-contradictory idea, just like limitlessness.Uncertainty has only one assumption which makes it fairer compared to other stances that require a plethora of assumptions.
Uncertainty's paradoxical nature makes it all open even to paradoxes. That's another plus compared to the selective nature of many other viewpoints (eg, they let some paradoxes in while they keep others out).
And, like I said before, Uncertainty should better be viewed as a step in a way. It isn't far different from countless other stances one may assume but it's distinguished by the degrees of freedom it offers. One step after Uncertainty there may be anything, even Certainty, who knows.
Not necessarily. Let's say that Philosophy makes use of both religious philosophy, and nihilism. So what if they contradict each other? They are still both important Philosophies...Philosophy doesn't "make use" of these viewpoints. Its main task is to "study" and "compare" them and in order to remain fair it must remain neutral to them. After having "studied" and "compared" them, they "may" be evaluated and ordered based on some criteria. Resultant is the choice of a viewpoint that would be one's stance on the subject. This stance is also called "one's Philosophy" but this is merely a lexical ambiguity. Philosophy happens before the selection, manipulation and implementation of a viewpoint.
Viewpoints may contradict each other while Philosophy, as the means of study, remains intact. Philosophy only needs to reflect these contradictions as comparative reports but need not and should not get involved in them. One such viewpoint is Science, another is Christianity, yet another is Logical Positivism and so on. Philosophy's task is to study these one by one and then comparatively. That a scientist thinks this planet has been around for some 4.5 billion years while biblical words say that the Creation happened some thousands of years ago, is something worth noting for Philosophy but nothing worth getting involved in.
You have called Uncertainty "fair", "more reliable then certainty", "better conclusion", etc... . If Uncertainty is unusable, then none of these terms apply to it."You" associate "fairness", "reliability," and "supremacy" of an idea with its "practicality."
By the way, I couldn't find out where I'd claimed Uncertainty to be "reliable." I said what we think we know is unreliable. This doesn't mean that doubting our knowledge is more reliable. I clearly said that Uncertainty (quoting myself) "robs one of security, simplicity, ease, self-confidence and self-righteousness."
Why do you ask me to do something that you know very well is impossible? Different logic systems often contradict each other directly. That means that no one can use all of them to prove something, at the same time.Because, as a result of this impossibility, one can't claim one's reasoning inbound some logical system is encompassing. You said: "total Uncertainty is impossible." If it's possible for you to claim something is impossible then it's possible for me to ask for something impossible. I wanted you to see that your statement doesn't work outside the framework it's designed for and to see that this framework is just one out of countless possible frameworks. If you say you've proven total Uncertainty impossible, you must have proven it for all logical systems (which is a cumbersome task, at least).
Many concepts may be invalid inbound a logical system but this is no indication of those concepts being erroneous in other systems. And all logical systems are equally creditable.
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
Apr30-03, 04:08 PM
... continued from the previous post
There is no order of things in true Uncertainty. You have shown the rationale (by my definition) of uncertainty, but not of Uncertainty.Let's see what "order" means. The books in the Library of Congress are "ordered." What does this mean? I guess it means there's a well-defined well-rounded rule set that assigns them to their respective places. This rule set has been chosen based on an analysis of the premises assumed for building a library (eg, accessibility, exactness, clarity, whatever). Notice that this rule set doesn't give significance or distinction to some books. It only orders them but doesn't rank them. There is an "order" but it isn't an order of "significance" or "preference."
So an "order" is the placing of things under a well-defined rule set based on the premises for assuming a viewpoint or for doing a task.
Now what's the premise for Uncertainty? "Nothing is certain." And what's the rule set? A rule set containing one rule, "everything is to be doubted." This rule set assigns everything one place, the place of equality. Nothing is different from nothing in any aspect. This is an "order" which places everything in the same attribute class, "uncertain."
You think so too, otherwise you wouldn't have tried to assign a rationale to Uncertainty.I don't. If it was me, Uncertainty needn't even be discussed because it's part of the past for me. It's "you" I'm talking to and for that purpose I need to satisfy your requests and your way of talking this over.
By showing (or at least, trying to show) that Uncertainty can be well interpreted as having rationale (within the boundaries of this discussion), I'm showing that "rationale" isn't as strict and significant as it appears to be.
"It" may not include "non-existing" ones. In speaking of specific "ones" you imply their existence, at least in a conceptual manner.This is "your" interpretation of what "referring to ones" implies. Ones can be non-existent ones (a paradox and a loop, you'd say [:D]).
No it's not, because it denies all other biases. At least Science allows for some of the things that it finds/theorizes to be wrong. Uncertainty has only one premise, and that is that there can be no premises (which doesn't allow for any of the other fields of study to be correct). How is that fair?Premises are chosen by individuals. Uncertainty's fairness is in that it allows everything, for it doesn't honor or lower any state of mind. All states of mind are equally doubtable thus equally creditable. Uncertainty doesn't judge the situation; it informs of the situation. Being uncertain, one may choose whatever premises that seem suitable to her/him, including those premises of Science.
That one isn't certain of the situation doesn't mean one must not, should not or ought not to choose her/his own way. It means condition, diversity, value, significance and outcome of every choice are wrapped in Uncertainty. One can risk choosing or even risk not choosing.
Science, on the other hand, prefers a methodic way of thinking and treating the Universe and not every method but a specific method. Out of countless ways, one way is chosen. That's what I call "unfair." Why would you choose one way out of countless ways and then insist it's the way to go? You could reason that Science is "practical" and "useful." Then I have to repeat, "practicality" and "usefulness" are intra-scientific criteria and it's clear they'll see Science consistent with their implications. Practicality can be defined either as "what Science is concerned with" or as anything else. The first definition is intra-scientific so it doesn't qualify to evaluate anything but Science. If the second definition, anything else, is allowed then there would be countless other definitions. If one of the countless definitions can be chosen at will one may choose one that corresponds with what Uncertainty concerned with. Now, with this new definition, Uncertainty is "practical."
I took your "substitutions" into account. As it turns out, they all rely on Causality anyway. Or at least it appears that way to me. For example, the inter-relationship between two "Quantum-bound electrons"; the reaction is instantaneous, and thus neither of the two can be considered the "cause". However, the "observer" can be considered the "cause", and without him/her, there would be no effect (the change of spin of the two electrons).I wrote of the structure and the function for Causality and for that "proposed" substitute which was Pre-established Harmony. The structure is different, the function is different, yet you say they're (almost) the same. What prevents you from seeing the difference is your affection for Causality as a means of scientific interpretation of the Universe.
Like I wrote, Pre-established Harmony is different from Causality in that it doesn't assume the cause-effect pair. Causality is the bond between cause and effect while Pre-established Harmony is the harmonized incidence of two (or more) phenomena. For Causality to work, there should be a distinction between two phenomena which are coinciding and what distinguishes the cause from the effect is the chronological order. For Pre-established Harmony to work, nothing is necessary. No interaction, stimulus-response set or similar concept is required. The two coinciding phenomena can be considered isolated just like two spatially or chronologically far apart phenomena would be. The pattern of events and the distribution of coincidences are governed by the Harmony. This central governance of Harmony ensures the simultaneous occurring of many pairs of phenomena but it doesn't require any bond or relation between them. There are no spatial or chronological limits to seemingly related phenomena.
What if I told you I've thrown a coin three times and have got tails every time and then conclude that an invisible bond relates this phenomenon with the presence of a mosquito in my room? You'd possibly say, in the best case, that I have to experiment many more times before I conclude. You know, however, that Probability Theory is all about a limit when the number of experiments yields to infinity. And I can never conclude (not without experimenting infinite number of times) if these two phenomena are really related or I've only experienced a statistical not-very-odd oddity. The Causality bond isn't a necessity; it isn't even a probabilistic conclusion. Causality is an optimization method based on hopes for recurring of events. One may use it as much as one wants but relying on it is senseless.
As for the EPR experiment, there are two problems with your interpretation. First, even if you consider the Physicist you can't find a delay between her/his action and the spin change in the far off particle. Exactly when the action takes place a far off event occurs. Second, the distinction you make here is based on your knowledge of the Physicist's intention. You know she/he wants to initiate a change somewhere so you conclude a relation between her/his action and the change. This knowledge of intention isn't intrinsic to your understanding of the situation. You could have observed an alien Physicist with her/his invisible particles performing the EPR experiment. Then, you couldn't have concluded based on your knowledge of her/his intention. Even though the same experiment occurs in both cases (eg, human Physicist and alien Physicist), you're able to distinguish the cause and the effect in the former while you wouldn't be able to do so in the latter. This means that the distinction of cause and effect is nothing but a mental pattern you try to impose on this event.
Yes, and that's what so many logicians/philosophers/scientists/mathematicians/etc... have done in the past. When they come to a paradox, they realize that there must be some flaw in the particular line of reasoning that they've been following, and they abandon it in search of a better one.Their actions were valid for them, yours should be proven valid for you. Nevertheless, a real paradox isn't made in case of erroneous reasoning but in case of an erroneous reasoning system.
Achilles and the tortoise (I'm not sure if it was a tortoise or a turtle) paradox, has been around for almost 2000 years. Is it there because of a mistake in reasoning? And 2000 years haven't been enough to find this mistake? Or is it solved now?
Not all Philosophers/Scientists have given up at the sight of paradox. There've been some to think of its nature and why it's faced everywhere. The great example is Kurt Gödel. Some of them have even based their views on the paradox-ridden ruins of the previous views. Some whole new concepts have been invented to avoid paradoxes, for example the concept of a Universal set in Set Theory came after Russell's Paradox. And these are only the outcome of evading Paradox. Great thoughts have been all put into diving into the depth of Paradox, especially by Eastern thinkers.
There's been a clear evasion in face of paradox in Science history. The reason may have been Paradox being "impractical" or something similar. This, however, means nothing here.
Hint: I told you Uncertainty is a double-edged sword. See if you can use the other edge.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
Apologies for the delay.
How could you say that if you still haven't understood what it's talking about?
I explained many times the reason I think that proof applies, just look around the posts. Did you counter my reasons?
It was/is relevant. Only because you place so much emphasis on a stance that doesn't have anything to do with my proof doesn't mean you've shown it's irrelevant.
I also apologize for the delay, your post was simply too long for me to respond to, with the time I had left, yesterday.
You never showed how your reasoning applied to Descartes' statement. You showed the problems with your proof. You also showed that a "helper device" need not be of the same form as the proposition that they are trying to resolve/explain. However, you didn't show how your particular proof "fit" Descartes' philosophy.
My statement, P, isn't random. If it was then I needn't even mention it. It's a statement engineered to suit your "I think therefore I am." If you had another statement, which fell in the category of statements that I think are incompatible with Boolean logic then I'd have made P different.
How does it "suit" Descartes' statement? Your statement only examines the inconsistency found when trying to analyze a proof of the form "P(), doesn't it? Descartes' statement isn't of the form "P([bleep])".
Uncertainty's fairness doesn't mean that it can't detect inconsistencies of knowledge structures. Uncertainty is fair in the sense that it lets one see inconsistencies that wouldn't be seen if the knowledge structure isn't doubted.
But it's still not entirely "fair", because it contradicts itself.
To study a knowledge body you have to live outside that body, and then observe it. Uncertainty provides this "living outside." It lets one doubt the principles and that's why it's fair.
I agree with you, provided you are talking about limited uncertainty. I don't think that Uncertainty (which is the full form of uncertainty) can give you the "outside perspective", because you have to doubt that premise (the Uncertainty premise) as well. Of course, you only have to doubt the Uncertainty premise if you accept it (because it is that premise which states that you must doubt all premises). Do you see why this is paradoxical?
Uncertainty won't prefer one idea over the other...
Except it's own idea/premise? Come one, it's obviously no more useful than any other premise, because in any case, you are taking something for granted.
This situation is similar to that you say: "I must live for living is an obligation." By saying "living is an obligation," you've already assumed you have to live, consequently deducing that "I must live" is logically incorrect (if you're bound to Boolean logic).
[b]This is a very important point that I don't understand. Please explain it to me. I don't get why the fact that a proposition's truth necessitates the truth of another proposition means that that it is logically incorrect.
You may pre-assume something and then prove it, apparently, true. For me, there's no real problem with this, except that it's circular reasoning and it's non-informative.
Yes, it is non-informative. However (briefly returning to the point of the thread), if someone were to try to prove to me that I don't exist, then they are also pre-assuming my existence (otherwise, who are they trying to convince?), and thus it doesn't "inform" them of anything that they didn't already know, it just doesn't allow them to try to disprove that which they knew (that I exist) without contradicting themselves.
If you say "P is T and Q is T" you've gone the way of circular reasoning. If you say "P is F and Q is T" then you've made paradox because P is an assertion of Q and may not be F when Q is considered T.
It (assuming that P is T and that Q is T) is not so much circular as it is non-productive. However, the Evil Demon is assuming that P is T (otherwise, who is he trying to convince?), and then trying to prove that Q is F at the same time. Thus the paradox, and thus the conviction that trying to prove my non-existence is futile (according to Descartes).
One way to overcome this loop and this paradox is to say "P is F and Q is F." Q and its assertion, P, can be simultaneously wrong without causing any trouble. The only problem is that you insist that Q is T.
No, but circular reasoning is forbidden (for you, of course). An assertion of Q, that is P, may not be assumed T when one is about to study Q's state. If Q is pre-assumed T then there's no need for studying it.
I've already said that there is no need of studying it. It is the Evil Demon that has the problem of trying to prove that Q is F, while pre-assuming that P is T.
Also, isn't it just as "circular" (non-productive) to assume that P is F, and then to assume that Q is also F?
P may not be set T but it also must have a definite state and what remains is F, and P set as F will lead to paradox. Only if there was a third state like "null" then P could be assumed "null" while Q was being studied and then set to whatever suitable state. Such suspension is impossible in the framework of Boolean logic.
But it is also unnecessary. We are assuming the truth of both statements at the same time. What's wrong with that?
If you pre-suppose the truth of Q then there's no point in discussing if Q is true for its truth is your premise. Q must be kept "untouched" before it's studied thoroughly and during the time it's being studied. If Q's state is pre-supposed then the outcome of every study or discussion of Q will not result in a state for Q that's different from that pre-supposition.
Tell that to the Evil Demon.
Uncertainty has only one assumption which makes it fairer compared to other stances that require a plethora of assumptions.
Wrong. Uncertainty's one assumption makes it paradoxical and self-contradictory, not "fair".
Uncertainty's paradoxical nature makes it all open even to paradoxes. That's another plus compared to the selective nature of many other viewpoints (eg, they let some paradoxes in while they keep others out).
Uncertainty's paradoxical nature doesn't make it open to anything, it just makes it unusable. If it cannot even "agree with" itself, how can you use it to explain other phenomena?
And, like I said before, Uncertainty should better be viewed as a step in a way. It isn't far different from countless other stances one may assume but it's distinguished by the degrees of freedom it offers. One step after Uncertainty there may be anything, even Certainty, who knows.
Uncertainty shouldn't be viewed as a "step in a way" (IMO). It should be viewed as a road-block, because it's paradoxical.
Besides, if it leads to Certainty (which would the absolute form of "certainty") then it's not much good anyway. I don't want "Certainty". I want a healthy amount of uncertainty. If one can keep these things (certainty and uncertainty) in balance, then one doesn't run into the paradoxes of either extreme. This is the "fair" way (or so it seems to me).
"You" associate "fairness", "reliability," and "supremacy" of an idea with its "practicality."
As do you. You keep talking about how much better Uncertainty is than Certainty, and you also talk alot about it's being more "fair".
You said: "total Uncertainty is impossible." If it's possible for you to claim something is impossible then it's possible for me to ask for something impossible. I wanted you to see that your statement doesn't work outside the framework it's designed for and to see that this framework is just one out of countless possible frameworks. If you say you've proven total Uncertainty impossible, you must have proven it for all logical systems (which is a cumbersome task, at least).
You yourself have said (posted but un-quoted - ran out of room) that many systems contradict each other. So how is it that you ask me to use all of them at the same time, to prove anything?
Many concepts may be invalid inbound a logical system but this is no indication of those concepts being erroneous in other systems. And all logical systems are equally creditable.
Except those unusable ones, like Uncertainty (couldn't resist [;)]).
continued on the next post...
As is my response...
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
... continued from the previous post
So an "order" is the placing of things under a well-defined rule set based on the premises for assuming a viewpoint or for doing a task.
OK.
Now what's the premise for Uncertainty? "Nothing is certain." And what's the rule set? A rule set containing one rule, "everything is to be doubted." This rule set assigns everything one place, the place of equality. Nothing is different from nothing in any aspect. This is an "order" which places everything in the same attribute class, "uncertain."
But the one rule contradicts the very concept of forming any "order" at all. You cannot assign this rule to things that will be "put in place", because the rule is that things cannot be "put in place" in any certain manner.
I don't. If it was me, Uncertainty needn't even be discussed because it's part of the past for me. It's "you" I'm talking to and for that purpose I need to satisfy your requests and your way of talking this over.
Fine, but you still haven't proven it's usefulness, or even it's existence (IMO).
By showing (or at least, trying to show) that Uncertainty can be well interpreted as having rationale (within the boundaries of this discussion), I'm showing that "rationale" isn't as strict and significant as it appears to be.
It doesn't matter. Uncertainty's only premise is that nothing is certain. In taking this premise as true, you have eliminated any possibility of producing any rationale of any kind.
This is "your" interpretation of what "referring to ones" implies. Ones can be non-existent ones (a paradox and a loop, you'd say [:D]).
Then why are you using this reasoning (when even you see the loop/paradox)?
Premises are chosen by individuals. Uncertainty's fairness is in that it allows everything, for it doesn't honor or lower any state of mind. All states of mind are equally doubtable thus equally creditable. Uncertainty doesn't judge the situation; it informs of the situation. Being uncertain, one may choose whatever premises that seem suitable to her/him, including those premises of Science.
Let me try to be more clear than I've been (though I don't know if that's possible): Uncertainty does not allow you to choose a premise, at any time, for any reason, because it's premise is that you cannot have premises.
That one isn't certain of the situation doesn't mean one must not, should not or ought not to choose her/his own way.
No, but that one is certain that nothing can be certain does mean that one must/should/ought not choose a "way".
Science, on the other hand, prefers a methodic way of thinking and treating the Universe and not every method but a specific method. Out of countless ways, one way is chosen. That's what I call "unfair." Why would you choose one way out of countless ways and then insist it's the way to go?
It's not the only way I go.
You could reason that Science is "practical" and "useful." Then I have to repeat, "practicality" and "usefulness" are intra-scientific criteria and it's clear they'll see Science consistent with their implications.
Now this I disagree with. "Practicality" and "usefulness" are intrinsic of many different reasoning systems. The fact that Science satisfies them, in spite of coming into existence after them, is what makes it so appealing to humans.
I wrote of the structure and the function for Causality and for that "proposed" substitute which was Pre-established Harmony. The structure is different, the function is different, yet you say they're (almost) the same. What prevents you from seeing the difference is your affection for Causality as a means of scientific interpretation of the Universe.
I don't understand the question (was it a question?). I was saying that Pre-established Harmony also necessitates a form of Cause-and-effect relationship, and is thus not an alternative to Causality, but merely one of the forms of it.
Like I wrote, Pre-established Harmony is different from Causality in that it doesn't assume the cause-effect pair. Causality is the bond between cause and effect while Pre-established Harmony is the harmonized incidence of two (or more) phenomena. For Causality to work, there should be a distinction between two phenomena which are coinciding and what distinguishes the cause from the effect is the chronological order. For Pre-established Harmony to work, nothing is necessary. No interaction, stimulus-response set or similar concept is required. The two coinciding phenomena can be considered isolated just like two spatially or chronologically far apart phenomena would be. The pattern of events and the distribution of coincidences are governed by the Harmony. This central governance of Harmony ensures the simultaneous occurring of many pairs of phenomena but it doesn't require any bond or relation between them. There are no spatial or chronological limits to seemingly related phenomena.
No, the limit is not between them, as it would under "usual" Causal reasoning. But that doesn't mean that there is no cause at all. I really don't remember what Pre-established harmony is. I thought it had to do with the Quantum binding of two particles, and that there states change instaneously/simultaneouly. It is in this particular case that I still see a cause (the "observer").
What if I told you I've thrown a coin three times and have got tails every time and then conclude that an invisible bond relates this phenomenon with the presence of a mosquito in my room? You'd possibly say, in the best case, that I have to experiment many more times before I conclude. You know, however, that Probability Theory is all about a limit when the number of experiments yields to infinity. And I can never conclude (not without experimenting infinite number of times) if these two phenomena are really related or I've only experienced a statistical not-very-odd oddity. The Causality bond isn't a necessity; it isn't even a probabilistic conclusion. Causality is an optimization method based on hopes for recurring of events. One may use it as much as one wants but relying on it is senseless.
Relying on it when speaking of abstract, unlikely, causes is rather senseless, I agree. However, if when I smack someone, they get hurt I can assume the bond, because science shows us exactly what chemical reactions are occuring.
As for the EPR experiment, there are two problems with your interpretation. First, even if you consider the Physicist you can't find a delay between her/his action and the spin change in the far off particle. Exactly when the action takes place a far off event occurs.
I can see that I confused the EPR experiment with "Pre-established Harmony". I'm sorry. Could you re-explain "Pre-established Harmony" please?
Now, for your counter-argument: You said "exactly when the action takes place, a far off event occurs". Does this not illustrate the relationship between the action and the far-off event?
Second, the distinction you make here is based on your knowledge of the Physicist's intention. You know she/he wants to initiate a change somewhere so you conclude a relation between her/his action and the change. This knowledge of intention isn't intrinsic to your understanding of the situation. You could have observed an alien Physicist with her/his invisible particles performing the EPR experiment. Then, you couldn't have concluded based on your knowledge of her/his intention. Even though the same experiment occurs in both cases (eg, human Physicist and alien Physicist), you're able to distinguish the cause and the effect in the former while you wouldn't be able to do so in the latter. This means that the distinction of cause and effect is nothing but a mental pattern you try to impose on this event.
But I wasn't taking their intention into account. I was saying that their making the observation (regardless of intent) caused the change.
Their actions were valid for them, yours should be proven valid for you. Nevertheless, a real paradox isn't made in case of erroneous reasoning but in case of an erroneous reasoning system.
But all reasoning systems are erroneous at some level, and will thus all yield paradoxes. However, in all cases - and within all reasoning systems - paradox signifies that you've been headed "in the wrong direction".
Achilles and the tortoise (I'm not sure if it was a tortoise or a turtle) paradox, has been around for almost 2000 years. Is it there because of a mistake in reasoning? And 2000 years haven't been enough to find this mistake? Or is it solved now?
It seems resolved. See the thread, "Zeno's Paradoxes".
Some of them have even based their views on the paradox-ridden ruins of the previous views. Some whole new concepts have been invented to avoid paradoxes, for example the concept of a Universal set in Set Theory came after Russell's Paradox. And these are only the outcome of evading Paradox. Great thoughts have been all put into diving into the depth of Paradox, especially by Eastern thinkers.
No, all of these people (including Kurt Godel) were forced to make their new conclusions, because paradox was "getting in the way" of progress.
There's been a clear evasion in face of paradox in Science history. The reason may have been Paradox being "impractical" or something similar. This, however, means nothing here.
It means everything here. It is the reason why I don't use Uncertainty.
Manuel_Silvio
May3-03, 03:13 PM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
You never showed how your reasoning applied to Descartes' statement...I repeat, you said you didn't understand the proof (or you haven't put much in effort into that) then how could you criticize it?
The storyline I used in describing the proof first goes through defining the state for P and then studies Q by asking what state you associate with it (which is T, for you're the defender of Q). On the next step it shows how P will lead into either a loop or a paradox when it's seen along with Q. This is how the proof is suitable for studying Q: it shows that Q results in undesirable results (loop or paradox) when it's studied along with P. It seems clear to me, exactly where do you see an ambiguity?
To criticize that proof you must be able to show one or more of these faults have happened:
00. P isn't a valid statement (but it is).
01. P can't be studied along with Q (but it can be for any two statements may be studied together).
02. There's a fault in deduction (there's none, as far as I can see).
03. Q won't lead to loop or paradox (the paradox case you've accepted, there remains the loop and that I will explain more).
But it's still not entirely "fair", because it contradicts itself.
Why do you think "fairness" can't be found "paradox?" By contradicting itself it's doing its task of fairness. It tells you: "this isn't the end of it, this isn't an absolute point, and it’s only a relative climax."
You say it isn't "entirely fair," and you're right. I haven't claimed it's "entirely fair;" I claimed it's "the fairest." Relatively more fairness when seen in comparison to other stances doesn't mean absolute fairness. It's only "the fairest" and not "absolutely fair."
... I don't think that Uncertainty (which is the full form of uncertainty) can give you the "outside perspective", because you have to doubt that premise (the Uncertainty premise) as well...I see why it's paradoxical but I don't run away at the sight of paradox. You accept that uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" to whatever subject of study you've chosen. See, whatever subject of study "except uncertainty itself," and Uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" for everything including itself.
You accept that for studying a knowledge body one must stand and view it from "outside." Now, by standing "outside" where does one exactly stand? Isn't it the "inside" to another knowledge body? And the "inside" to another knowledge body means the acceptance of its premises. Could then one be fair in studying a knowledge body while one is submitted to the premises of another?
The situation, even without Uncertainty, is naturally paradoxical. Running away from paradox dawned on one in one specific form won't get one far, soon paradox will come back in another form but with the same content.
Two knowledge bodies have had many firm defenders in the course of history: Science and Religion. Do you think it's fair to stand inside Science and judge Religion? I think not, for Science will call to discard Religion because it's "impractical;" why should one take into account an intangible agent that acts in an unforeseeable manner? And then, do you think it's fair to stand inside Religion and judge Science? I think not, for Religion will call to give up Science because it's "blasphemy," "sin," "interference in the work of God," "rudeness against the Creation," whatever; why should one commit something against the rule of a supreme power ready to take revenge on the sinners?
So if one's to study Science or Religion fairly one has to stay outside both of them and whatever other knowledge body that may interfere in fair judgment by the means of its premises. The same is valid for any study of any other knowledge body.
Is that possible? I think not but there's a way to offset those interferences, to doubt them. Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty. One premise that may interfere with fair judgment is that premise of Uncertainty (ie, "nothing is certain"), and Uncertainty itself advises one on doubting (and being cautious of) everything. That's why Uncertainty's paradoxical nature helps it be the fairest. This paradoxical nature is a reflection of the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. I guess you don't oppose a fair observer, do you?
Except it's own idea/premise? Come one, it's obviously no more useful than any other premise, because in any case, you are taking something for granted.First, it won't prefer even its own premise over others for it's paradoxical and contradicts itself. This is the function of paradox; it's simultaneous acceptance and denial that means it won't prefer anything over the other even itself.
Second, even if it prefers one premise over the others, like all other stances do, that premise is one that offers high degrees of freedom. If one has to assume one or more premise(s) in any case then wouldn't it better be chosen to be more flexible?
This is a very important point that I don't understand. Please explain it to me. I don't get why the fact that a proposition's truth necessitates the truth of another proposition means that that it is logically incorrect.This isn't true for any two statements, it's true for two statements which are assertions of each other.
For the statement Q, there's the statement P that asserts it. If P, the assertion of Q, is assumed T before Q is studied then Q itself has been assumed T before Q is studied. What happens here is what I call "circular" reasoning: a line of deduction which starts with the pre-assumed truth of some statement, Q here, and ends with the truth of the same statement, again Q.
I wrote that P was "engineered" to suit Q. The trick in this "engineering" is that P is an assertion of Q. If you set P as T, then you've set Q as T and later you start talking about Q but if you've set Q as T before even starting with your study of Q then the outcome of your study can't be anything other than Q being T.
Circular reasoning is non-informative because it starts and ends with the same thing. Starting with Q "pre-assumed" (you see, it's assumed "before" anything else) as T and ending with Q as T is non-informative and circular. One can start with any statement "pre-assumed" T and end with that statement being T.
Remember when you said "one can't be thinking if one doesn't exist" and I responded that such premise will turn "I think therefore I am" into "I am therefore I am." "I am therefore I am" is an ever-true statement but it's circular. One can't oppose a statement that is made of itself and that's why one can't oppose "I am therefore I am." Unfortunately, or fortunately, circular reasoning that makes up such statements is forbidden in the framework of Boolean logic. "I am therefore I am" is circular hence incompatible with Boolean logic. And for those who "like" Boolean logic too much and want to find "absolute truth" out of statements, as claimed by Boolean logic, "I am therefore I am" is, well, out of question.
... if someone were to try to prove to me that I don't exist, then they are also pre-assuming my existence (otherwise, who are they trying to convince?), and thus it doesn't "inform" them of anything that they didn't already know... And if "you" try to convince them that they exist, you'll get "the same problem."
There's a reason to that I accompany a discussion of Descartes' statement with a discussion of Uncertainty. Descartes' statement is one of the many places that Uncertainty shows up in full strength. Particularly because the statement has to do with foundations of one's thoughts (existence in this case). Descartes' statement can't be disproved (for it's circular) but it also can't be proven (for it's incompatible with Boolean logic). Where's the way out? Uncertainty. That statement is both ways equally creditable, and that's the essence of Uncertainty.
Uncertainty's paradoxical nature doesn't make it open to anything, it just makes it unusable. If it cannot even "agree with" itself, how can you use it to explain other phenomena?One thing to notice, have you thought of the name by which "that which agrees with itself" is called? That which expects and asserts its own righteousness is called a "loop," I guess.
Any knowledge body, in order to remain consistent, must somewhere assert its own premises. Many times though, this is done with much subtlety.
Let's see an example, Science. If I come to you and claim "there's an intangible unforeseeable uncontrollable agent acting in this Universe," you (depicted as a defender of Science) will possibly tell me to throw it away because it's an "impractical" premise. Where's the twist? By comparing that premise to a scientific criterion, that is practicality, you've pre-assumed Science's righteousness. Obviously enough, having pre-assumed Science's righteousness, you won't go much further than asserting that righteousness by telling me to throw away an "impractical" premise.
Furthermore, Uncertainty needn't care for explaining the "phenomenal" Universe. The "phenomenal" Universe is the "sensible" one and "senses" and "relying on the input from the senses" are all from the "scientific" Universe. Philosophy comes before one chooses to submit to the scientific Universe.
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
May3-03, 03:28 PM
... continued from the previous post
The balance you talk about is achieved after both extremes are experienced. That balance, I guess, is somehow like that "residual understanding" I wrote of. One experiences Certainty (in the form of scientific and/or religious and/or whatever belief) then one experiences Uncertainty and then comes the residual understanding, or as you call it "the balance." If you're in balance then you won't be sure that you're absolutely right but you also won't be sure that you're wrong. You have a good amount of hope in that that your thoughts may work as you wish and choose and think on the basis of that hope. Am I correct here? If yes, then I think you already have experienced with Uncertainty and Certainty.
As do you. You keep talking about how much better Uncertainty is than Certainty, and you also talk alot about it's being more "fair".I never said it's "better." I said it's a "fairer" substitute. And again "you" interpret the "fairness" I talk about as "practicality." I don't put any value on Uncertainty for it's worthless but it's "fair" and "sincere" to that which is called Philosophy.
You yourself have said ... that many systems contradict each other. So how is it that you ask me to use all of them at the same time, to prove anything?Don't prove and don't claim your argument "encompassing" and "ever-true." Your arguments are good inside a framework of Boolean logic, beyond that isn't in your, or anyone else's, power.
We can discuss the thing in some framework and get results for that framework and we can be satisfied with those results in their respective framework. However, there's no warranty, even limited, for outside of that framework. And clearly there's much more to outside than to inside.
Except those unusable ones, like Uncertainty...Seriously, do you have some grounds for that claim? If yes, do you know that if your grounds are creditable you would have overcome one of the most compelling challenges humanity has faced?
Claiming that some logical systems are "less creditable" makes a basis for choosing among logical systems. Do you know what this means? This means some forms of attitude can be preferred to other forms. This means some individuals have been "right" while some others have been "wrong." This means there's always been "absolute rightness" and "absolute wrongness." Do you know of what order of magnitude is such a claim?
But the one rule contradicts the very concept of forming any "order" at all. You cannot assign this rule to things that will be "put in place", because the rule is that things cannot be "put in place" in any certain manner.No, the rule is "there's no distinction between any two places, put them wherever and they'll be equal." Things are "put into place" but all into "one place" and that's the "place of equality."
Fine, but you still haven't proven it's usefulness, or even it's existence (IMO).I can't prove what I haven't even claimed. I never claimed that Uncertainty is useful; I said it shouldn't be assessed by practicality criterion. I never claimed its existence, I said it's paradoxical and can't be given a definite state.
... Uncertainty's only premise is that nothing is certain. In taking this premise as true, you have eliminated any possibility of producing any rationale of any kind.Why? And how? "Nothing is uncertain" doesn't seem to me like opposing "any" order. It surely opposes "many" orders but not "any" order. I wrote of an order that is well suited to this premise, the order that places everything in one place, the place of equality.
Then why are you using this reasoning (when even you see the loop/paradox)?For I don't run away from loops and paradoxes. I like to see how they work and why they appear all around.
Let me try to be more clear than I've been (though I don't know if that's possible): Uncertainty does not allow you to choose a premise, at any time, for any reason, because it's premise is that you cannot have premises.
No, but that one is certain that nothing can be certain does mean that one must/should/ought not choose a "way".Again, this is "your" interpretation (or rather "misinterpretation"). Uncertainty asks for caution, clarity and hesitation in the face of anything and everything; not a bit less, not a bit more. Uncertainty is of paradoxical nature that means it's nothing more than a between-the-lines hint. One may choose one's premises at will while one's uncertain of their truth.
One's choice for one's life isn't associated with one's stance on one's choice. Uncertainty provides a ground for always being cautious of what one chooses but doesn't prevent a choice from being made. Being cautious of one's choice one will always be ready to change it if one finds out that choice has been erroneous. This readiness is a basis for a dynamic system of thoughts that can change with new packets of knowledge (even though uncertain they are). Instead of taking "progression" as a premise (like with Science) one will be experiencing "change" as a consequence of a fairer, more general, less demanding and more open premise.
It's not the only way I go.
You seem to.
Now this I disagree with. "Practicality" and "usefulness" are intrinsic of many different reasoning systems. The fact that Science satisfies them, in spite of coming into existence after them, is what makes it so appealing to humans.Practicality does have meaning in many knowledge bodies but doesn't have the same meaning all over these places. Practicality can be defined even for a Religion, as "conformance to God's commandments" for example. This practicality is apparently different from the other one discussed in words of Science.
Science has to do with its own definition of this term which is an intra-scientific concept confined to a scientific understanding of scientific Universe. I don't think "practicality" in this sense is even an outcome of observing the scientific Universe. One can study the scientific Universe with scientific method but nowhere around this Universe it's written "survival, longevity, prosperity is our motto." We know that living beings, being living beings by scientific definition in the scientific Universe, want to live, live longer, produce more of their instances and get more energy/matter for their lives. Anyway, that's no necessity, it's not an obligation. We know there's this desire but we can't say it's an aim. That we want to "live, live long and prosper" doesn't make this desire a logical obligation. Nowhere in any description of the scientific method is stated that we have to reach for this target by the means of that method. This aim isn't intrinsic even to Science; it's intrinsic to scientifically-defined living beings, when they're viewed scientifically.
Relying on it when speaking of abstract, unlikely, causes is rather senseless, I agree. However, if when I smack someone, they get hurt I can assume the bond, because science shows us exactly what chemical reactions are occuring.
I can see that I confused the EPR experiment with "Pre-established Harmony". I'm sorry. Could you re-explain "Pre-established Harmony" please?
Now, for your counter-argument: You said "exactly when the action takes place, a far off event occurs". Does this not illustrate the relationship between the action and the far-off event?Causality bond is explained for scientifically through the declaration of forces. The four forces are the source of all interaction including that you smack someone. Forces are elements from the scientific Universe. They're of fundamentals of Science. Let's think of them for a moment. What's a force? An obscure concept that explains for a coincidence that is later called an "interaction."
How do you know they're hurt when you smack them? You see them getting hurt but do you see them? You see a consistent representation in your mind that goes through a transition but what's the nature of this representation? No one knows and is that what "really" (supposing there's some "real" thing around) happening? No one knows.
I meant EPR Experiment and Pre-established Harmony as two separate lines of discussion. Here comes my re-explanation of Pre-established Harmony:
You ask if there isn't a bond between two coinciding events and that's the central question to Causality and its substitutes. All of them try to explain for coincidences that are observed over and over.
Pre-established Harmony explains these coincidences as parts of the Harmony that governs the events of this Universe. The coincidence of two events is a part of the Harmony but not a necessity of Universe's structure which is supposed to be made of abstract Monads that are isolated from each other. While one part of the Harmony may force a coincidence and a seemingly relation between some of the Monads (of the two coinciding phenomena), a repetition is noway guaranteed. Monads are totally isolated and play their own roles in the Harmony but these roles may or may not be synchronized to mimic some relation.
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
May3-03, 03:32 PM
... continued from the previous post
But I wasn't taking their intention into account. I was saying that their making the observation (regardless of intent) caused the change.How do you know they're observing something? Isn't that you have a picture of an observing Physicist to compare them to? The alien Physicist may not comply with this picture so you'll never know it's been observing but you'll see the change.
Moreover, this doesn't solve the problem with zero time. Some "cause" (say, a Physicist or a particle) "causes" some "effect" but there's no time delay between them. How could you say which one is the cause and which one is the effect without previously knowing one of them (eg, the Physicist) has an intention for a change?
But all reasoning systems are erroneous at some level, and will thus all yield paradoxes. However, in all cases - and within all reasoning systems - paradox signifies that you've been headed "in the wrong direction"."The wrong direction" for that system but maybe "the right direction" for another totally unnoticed one which can bring you extension to the horizons of your thought.
No, all of these people (including Kurt Godel) were forced to make their new conclusions, because paradox was "getting in the way" of progress.Kurt Gödel’s "Incompleteness Theorem" seems different. I read a second-hand (or even worse, who knows) version of the theorem like this: "every encompassing system of logic must have at least one premise that can not be proven or verified without contradicting itself." It was referenced to "Scientific American, Gödel’s Proof, Vol. CXCVI.6, 71-86 (1965)." We can check it out if necessary.
Not "all" of them for sure. Eastern thinkers (that you seem not to count in "all") didn't do as you say, they even didn't go the way of "progression."
heusdens
May3-03, 07:56 PM
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
[BKurt Gödel’s "Incompleteness Theorem" seems different. I read a second-hand (or even worse, who knows) version of the theorem like this: "every encompassing system of logic must have at least one premise that can not be proven or verified without contradicting itself." It was referenced to "Scientific American, Gödel’s Proof, Vol. CXCVI.6, 71-86 (1965)." We can check it out if necessary.
[/B]
The wording I know of for the theorem of Godel reads that any formal, axiomatic system is either incomplete or inconsistent (or both).
incomplete:
the system has not the capacity to produce all the truths. there are truths that can not be produced by the axiomatix rules of the system
inconsistent:
the system has some internal problem of consistently defining the truth value of statements based on the axiomatic rules
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
I repeat, you said you didn't understand the proof (or you haven't put much in effort into that) then how could you criticize it?
I repeat, I am not criticizing the proof, I am waiting for you to show me it's applicability, otherwise it's not important to the discussion.
The storyline I used in describing the proof first goes through defining the state for P and then studies Q by asking what state you associate with it (which is T, for you're the defender of Q). On the next step it shows how P will lead into either a loop or a paradox when it's seen along with Q. This is how the proof is suitable for studying Q: it shows that Q results in undesirable results (loop or paradox) when it's studied along with P. It seems clear to me, exactly where do you see an ambiguity?
It may seem clear to you, but perhaps you are witholding something from me, because it doesn't make any sense - to me - to say that one proposition's implying another proposition's truth leads to a paradox/loop.
To criticize that proof you must be able to show one or more of these faults have happened:
00. P isn't a valid statement (but it is).
01. P can't be studied along with Q (but it can be for any two statements may be studied together).
02. There's a fault in deduction (there's none, as far as I can see).
03. Q won't lead to loop or paradox (the paradox case you've accepted, there remains the loop and that I will explain more).
I perfectly agree with point 03. Q won't lead to paradox, and I haven't agreed to anything of the kind.
Why do you think "fairness" can't be found "paradox?" By contradicting itself it's doing its task of fairness. It tells you: "this isn't the end of it, this isn't an absolute point, and it’s only a relative climax."
No, it's telling you "I'm unreliable, and self-contradictory". If something cannot even be self-consistent, how can it be consistent with any other system?
You say it isn't "entirely fair," and you're right. I haven't claimed it's "entirely fair;" I claimed it's "the fairest."
It's not that it's not "entirely fair". It's that it cannot exist. It's supposed "fairness" just contradicts it's premise, and thus leads to unusability.
You accept that uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" to whatever subject of study you've chosen. See, whatever subject of study "except uncertainty itself," and Uncertainty gives the "outside perspective" for everything including itself.
No, Uncertainty doesn't give a perspective for anything, [b]because it's unusable/paradoxical/self-contradictory - and thus self/defeating.
You accept that for studying a knowledge body one must stand and view it from "outside." Now, by standing "outside" where does one exactly stand? Isn't it the "inside" to another knowledge body?
Yeah.
And the "inside" to another knowledge body means the acceptance of its premises. Could then one be fair in studying a knowledge body while one is submitted to the premises of another?
Yes.
The situation, even without Uncertainty, is naturally paradoxical. Running away from paradox dawned on one in one specific form won't get one far, soon paradox will come back in another form but with the same content.
How is it paradoxical, without the use of "Uncertainty"?
Two knowledge bodies have had many firm defenders in the course of history: Science and Religion. Do you think it's fair to stand inside Science and judge Religion? I think not, for Science will call to discard Religion because it's "impractical;" why should one take into account an intangible agent that acts in an unforeseeable manner? And then, do you think it's fair to stand inside Religion and judge Science? I think not, for Religion will call to give up Science because it's "blasphemy," "sin," "interference in the work of God," "rudeness against the Creation," whatever; why should one commit something against the rule of a supreme power ready to take revenge on the sinners?
First off, there are many (rather intelligent) people, that I know of, that can study science with the Bible as their premise, and they have no problem. I think your problem here is that you are saying "stand inside X, to judge Y". This is not what I was talking about. I'm saying "take X for granted (as part of the foundation/premise), to judge Y".
Is that possible? I think not but there's a way to offset those interferences, to doubt them. Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty.
But saying that something necessitates Uncertainty is also contradictory to the premise of Uncertainty, can you see why?
One premise that may interfere with fair judgment is that premise of Uncertainty (ie, "nothing is certain"), and Uncertainty itself advises one on doubting (and being cautious of) everything. That's why Uncertainty's paradoxical nature helps it be the fairest. This paradoxical nature is a reflection of the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. I guess you don't oppose a fair observer, do you?
First, it won't prefer even its own premise over others for it's paradoxical and contradicts itself. This is the function of paradox; it's simultaneous acceptance and denial that means it won't prefer anything over the other even itself.
You are totally missing the point (IMO). You are saying "it will do this" and "it will do that". This implies it's practicality, when in fact such a thing (as practicality) cannot exist in an Uncertain world, nor can it exist along with paradox.
Second, even if it prefers one premise over the others, like all other stances do, that premise is one that offers high degrees of freedom. If one has to assume one or more premise(s) in any case then wouldn't it better be chosen to be more flexible?
It's not more flexible, when will you get this? It's unusable, that's not the same thing as "flexible".
answer continued on next post...
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
This isn't true for any two statements, it's true for two statements which are assertions of each other.
For the statement Q, there's the statement P that asserts it. If P, the assertion of Q, is assumed T before Q is studied then Q itself has been assumed T before Q is studied. What happens here is what I call "circular" reasoning: a line of deduction which starts with the pre-assumed truth of some statement, Q here, and ends with the truth of the same statement, again Q.
I wrote that P was "engineered" to suit Q. The trick in this "engineering" is that P is an assertion of Q. If you set P as T, then you've set Q as T and later you start talking about Q but if you've set Q as T before even starting with your study of Q then the outcome of your study can't be anything other than Q being T.
I understand this. That still doesn't show any inconsistency the logic. Yes, assuming the proof of one of these things assumes the proof of the other. So what? What is wrong with my saying "I'm fifteen", and then saying "I was born fifteen years ago"? In fact, I could just omit one, and it wouldn't matter, because these things don't prove each other, they just assume the same thing.
Circular reasoning is non-informative because it starts and ends with the same thing. Starting with Q "pre-assumed" (you see, it's assumed "before" anything else) as T and ending with Q as T is non-informative and circular. One can start with any statement "pre-assumed" T and end with that statement being T.
Yes, you are right, they can. Also, why is it that it matters to you that it is "non-informative", when you were previously trying to show the folly of sticking to that which leads to progressive understanding/knowledge?
Remember when you said "one can't be thinking if one doesn't exist" and I responded that such premise will turn "I think therefore I am" into "I am therefore I am." "I am therefore I am" is an ever-true statement but it's circular.
I know. The point of all of Descartes' reasoning was not so much to prove that he existed (pay attention, please, this is important), it was to prove that the fact that he could contemplate not existing proved his existence - thus any attempt to prove his non-existence further validated his existence.
Unfortunately, or fortunately, circular reasoning that makes up such statements is forbidden in the framework of Boolean logic. "I am therefore I am" is circular hence incompatible with Boolean logic. And for those who "like" Boolean logic too much and want to find "absolute truth" out of statements, as claimed by Boolean logic, "I am therefore I am" is, well, out of question.
Again, and this is important, it is not so much circular, as restating the same thing twice. Pay attention to this, please, [b]Boolean Logic doesn't say that it is wrong to postulate the same thing twice (does it?), so "I am therefore I am" shouldn't be forbidden.
(Just to make sure you get this): The point of the statement is not to be found in the statement, it is found in the context. As I've said before, the point is that, the more one tries to prove that I don't exist, the more proof I have of my existence.
And if "you" try to convince them that they exist, you'll get "the same problem."
There's a reason to that I accompany a discussion of Descartes' statement with a discussion of Uncertainty. Descartes' statement is one of the many places that Uncertainty shows up in full strength. Particularly because the statement has to do with foundations of one's thoughts (existence in this case). Descartes' statement can't be disproved (for it's circular) but it also can't be proven (for it's incompatible with Boolean logic). Where's the way out? Uncertainty. That statement is both ways equally creditable, and that's the essence of Uncertainty.
One thing to notice, have you thought of the name by which "that which agrees with itself" is called? That which expects and asserts its own righteousness is called a "loop," I guess.
See above, for why it's not a loop; why Uncertainty is not an answer; and why the statement ought not be studied outside of it's context (the story about the Evil Demon).
Let's see an example, Science. If I come to you and claim "there's an intangible unforeseeable uncontrollable agent acting in this Universe," you (depicted as a defender of Science) will possibly tell me to throw it away because it's an "impractical" premise. Where's the twist? By comparing that premise to a scientific criterion, that is practicality, you've pre-assumed Science's righteousness. Obviously enough, having pre-assumed Science's righteousness, you won't go much further than asserting that righteousness by telling me to throw away an "impractical" premise.
However, Science is a perfectly sound branch of Philosophy, and thus there is nothing wrong with my using it to prove something's practicality (which, btw, is not just a scientific tool, it is a tool of practically all of the different reasoning systems that I've ever been introduced to).
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
The balance you talk about is achieved after both extremes are experienced. That balance, I guess, is somehow like that "residual understanding" I wrote of. One experiences Certainty (in the form of scientific and/or religious and/or whatever belief) then one experiences Uncertainty and then comes the residual understanding, or as you call it "the balance."
No, this isn't anything like what I was saying at all. I was saying that "uncertainty" is a balance, and you can't reach "uncertainty" (which means "partial uncertainty", btw) if you use the premise of "Uncertainty" at any time.
If you're in balance then you won't be sure that you're absolutely right but you also won't be sure that you're wrong. You have a good amount of hope in that that your thoughts may work as you wish and choose and think on the basis of that hope. Am I correct here? If yes, then I think you already have experienced with Uncertainty and Certainty.
You act like these are the only two choices. There is also the choice of "uncertainty", which is the one I've been pushing.
I never said it's "better." I said it's a "fairer" substitute. And again "you" interpret the "fairness" I talk about as "practicality." I don't put any value on Uncertainty for it's worthless but it's "fair" and "sincere" to that which is called Philosophy.
How can you say that it's both worthless and fair at the same time.
We can discuss the thing in some framework and get results for that framework and we can be satisfied with those results in their respective framework. However, there's no warranty, even limited, for outside of that framework. And clearly there's much more to outside than to inside.
There is no point in leaving a logical framework that works.
Seriously, do you have some grounds for that claim? If yes, do you know that if your grounds are creditable you would have overcome one of the most compelling challenges humanity has faced?
Honestly, have you ignored all of my posts in the past couple of pages?! Let me spell it out for you: Uncertainty is unusable because it requires you to accept a premise, while at the same time telling you not to accept any premises. This leaves you with no place to go, and thus you can't get anywhere. For a more detailed explanation of it's ineptitude, read my previous posts.
No, the rule is "there's no distinction between any two places, put them wherever and they'll be equal." Things are "put into place" but all into "one place" and that's the "place of equality."
I can't prove what I haven't even claimed. I never claimed that Uncertainty is useful; I said it shouldn't be assessed by practicality criterion. I never claimed its existence, I said it's paradoxical and can't be given a definite state.
In refering to "it", you claim "it's" existence, and you know it. You've been speaking about "it" as a reasoning system, and thus (obviously) implying it's existence.
Why? And how? "Nothing is uncertain" doesn't seem to me like opposing "any" order. It surely opposes "many" orders but not "any" order. I wrote of an order that is well suited to this premise, the order that places everything in one place, the place of equality.
Yes, it makes them all [b]equally unreliable, and unimportant, if taken as a premise. It opposes all order, because to assume an order is to violate it's premise of not assuming anything.
Again, this is "your" interpretation (or rather "misinterpretation"). Uncertainty asks for caution, clarity and hesitation in the face of anything and everything; not a bit less, not a bit more.
DEAD wrong, even by your own previous explanations of Uncertainty. In case you've forgotten, Uncertainty relies on the premise that "nothing is certain". This means that to believe in "caution" is against it's very premise. To believe in "clarity and hesitation" is against it's very premise.
Uncertainty is of paradoxical nature that means it's nothing more than a between-the-lines hint. One may choose one's premises at will while one's uncertain of their truth.
No, that's how "uncertainty" works, not "Uncertainty".
Uncertainty provides a ground for always being cautious of what one chooses but doesn't prevent a choice from being made.
YES IT DOES! [s(]
If you make a choice of premise to take for granted, you have violated the premise of Uncertainty, which doesn't allow you to take anything for granted (at least, that's how you've presented it).
Being cautious of one's choice one will always be ready to change it if one finds out that choice has been erroneous. This readiness is a basis for a dynamic system of thoughts that can change with new packets of knowledge (even though uncertain they are). Instead of taking "progression" as a premise (like with Science) one will be experiencing "change" as a consequence of a fairer, more general, less demanding and more open premise.
Don't you see that all through this you are speaking of the ability to take a certain premise for granted when you choose to. Uncertainty doesn't allow one to take anything for granted.
Practicality does have meaning in many knowledge bodies but doesn't have the same meaning all over these places. Practicality can be defined even for a Religion, as "conformance to God's commandments" for example. This practicality is apparently different from the other one discussed in words of Science.
It doesn't matter, it still exists in all reasoning systems.
Causality bond is explained for scientifically through the declaration of forces. The four forces are the source of all interaction including that you smack someone. Forces are elements from the scientific Universe. They're of fundamentals of Science. Let's think of them for a moment. What's a force? An obscure concept that explains for a coincidence that is later called an "interaction."
Or, it is that which causes the interaction. Haven't you considered that yours is a viewpoint based solely on non-conformance to other viewpoints, while Causality is explaining what is happening without postulating any extra speculations?
How do you know they're hurt when you smack them? You see them getting hurt but do you see them? You see a consistent representation in your mind that goes through a transition but what's the nature of this representation? No one knows and is that what "really" (supposing there's some "real" thing around) happening? No one knows.
I'm definitely not going to get into a discussion of whether there is a reality or not. I 1) don't have time right now; and 2) don't see it's relevance, because you are assuming your own reality/existence every time you argue with me anyway. What's to make you think that I'm actually seeing what you type? It doesn't matter, because that's not the topic of our discussions.
Pre-established Harmony explains these coincidences as parts of the Harmony that governs the events of this Universe. The coincidence of two events is a part of the Harmony but not a necessity of Universe's structure which is supposed to be made of abstract Monads that are isolated from each other. While one part of the Harmony may force a coincidence and a seemingly relation between some of the Monads (of the two coinciding phenomena), a repetition is noway guaranteed. Monads are totally isolated and play their own roles in the Harmony but these roles may or may not be synchronized to mimic some relation.
So the "mimicing" of relation isn't caused by the "Monadic" (is that a word? [:)]) nature of the universe?
Manuel_Silvio
May5-03, 07:46 AM
Greetz,
1. For heusdens:
Thank you. A logical system is a form of an axiomatic system, right? Truth values, structuring of statements and rules of deduction are the axioms of a logical system, I guess.
2. For Mentat:
I repeat, I am not criticizing the proof, I am waiting for you to show me it's applicability, otherwise it's not important to the discussion.You "are" criticizing it by claiming it's inapplicable. Isn't that sort of critique?
The proof's aim is to show that Q (Descartes' statement) and a valid statement, P, together make either a loop or a paradox based on arbitrarily-chosen state for P. "If" it succeeds in showing this point, it's also succeeded in showing that Q is somehow incompatible with the viewpoint in which all the proof has taken place. This seems so apparent to me. Is it unclear?
If one's to criticize this proof one must show one of those cases numbered 00-03 has happened.
... it doesn't make any sense - to me - to say that one proposition's implying another proposition's truth leads to a paradox/loop.
I perfectly agree with point 03. Q won't lead to paradox, and I haven't agreed to anything of the kind.Loop is one case and Paradox is another. The proof follows either of two different lines according to the state chosen for P. If P is set T then, so the proof claims, a loop is made. If P is set F then, so the proof claims, a paradox is made.
You accepted that if Q is set T then its assertion, P, may not be set F because that would lead to a paradox (saying that Q is both T and F is a paradox). So one of the lines that the proof follows has been approved. The other line should be followed when P is set T, and that's the loop case.
How is it paradoxical, without the use of "Uncertainty"?You didn't consider what I said. I asked if one could remain fair to some knowledge body as one's subject of study while one's submitted to another knowledge body's premises. And you answered "yes" but how could you ever answer "yes?"
Isn't it clear that one can't be fair if one's got premises? If one assumes some premises one will always assess everything with those premises in mind. Consequently, one won't evaluate one's subject(s) of study fairly anymore. Do you think an observer whose premise is "the event X will happen in this experiment" can observe that experiment fairly?
One wants to be fair in assessing a knowledge body. To be fair, one has to stand outside that knowledge body. Standing "outside" a knowledge body is standing "inside" another. Standing "inside" another knowledge body means being submitted to its premises. Now that one's submitted to some premises one isn’t fair. One can't stand in any place and claim that one's fair. This is the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. And this paradoxical situation is independent from Uncertainty.
First off, there are many (rather intelligent) people, that I know of, that can study science with the Bible as their premise, and they have no problem. I think your problem here is that you are saying "stand inside X, to judge Y". This is not what I was talking about. I'm saying "take X for granted (as part of the foundation/premise), to judge Y".One can't be both "religious" and "scientific" at the same time. Because Science and Religion have contradictory predispositions.
The Old Testament starts with Genesis, the cosmogony of Judaism and Christianity. Scientific cosmogony is totally different and in contradiction to Genesis. One can't believe in both of them at the same time.
Then, you don't seem to have the faintest idea what you were told with that Science and Religion example. Try to understand it.
But saying that something necessitates Uncertainty is also contradictory to the premise of Uncertainty, can you see why?I see, but did I say something "necessitates" Uncertainty? I said Uncertainty is a way to offset the interference of premises.
... You are saying "it will do this" and "it will do that". This implies it's practicality, when in fact such a thing (as practicality) cannot exist in an Uncertain world, nor can it exist along with paradox."You" think that's implied by my words. And you say practicality may not exist for an uncertain viewpoint, now wouldn't this claim of yours be wrong if I've really shown that Uncertainty does this and that?
It's not more flexible, when will you get this? It's unusable, that's not the same thing as "flexible".Is there a problem with saying that something is "unusable" (as you claim) yet "flexible?"
... That still doesn't show any inconsistency the logic. Yes, assuming the proof of one of these things assumes the proof of the other. So what? What is wrong with my saying "I'm fifteen", and then saying "I was born fifteen years ago"?...No problem as long as you don't assume one of them as a proof for the other. You may say that "I'm fifteen" and "I was born fifteen years ago" are logically equal but you may not assume "I'm fifteen" and deduce "so I was born fifteen year ago" exactly because these two are logical equivalents. In assuming one of them true you've assumed the other one true. This is starting with "I'm fifteen" as true and ending with "I'm fifteen" as true, and this is a loop. "I'm fifteen" can be true but this truth must be deduced through the rules of deduction for the logical system in which you're working from the truth of "a distinct statement."
"I am therefore I am" is a loop because the deduction starts with "I am" pre-assumed T and ends with "I am" deduced T. "I am" may be true or false but this true/false state may only be deduced from another statement. Suppose we call "I am" statement R. Saying "I am therefore I am" is saying "R is T so R is T."
... it was to prove that the fact that he could contemplate not existing proved his existence - thus any attempt to prove his non-existence further validated his existence.And any attempt to prove his existence further validated his non-existence, right?
However, Science is a perfectly sound branch of Philosophy, and thus there is nothing wrong with my using it to prove something's practicality (which, btw, is not just a scientific tool, it is a tool of practically all of the different reasoning systems that I've ever been introduced to).What do you mean with "perfectly sound?" To whose evaluation is it "perfectly sound" and by which means of assessment?
Practicality? Some American Churches' "practical" way was not to install lightning rods until many years after their invention by Benjamin Franklin. And to oppose birth control for many years until now. Is that practical by scientific measures? Surely not, but it's practical and favorable by those Churches' measures. Practicality isn't a solid idea shared among everyone. Any individual/group has its own view of practicality. Hence, practicality isn't a universal criterion to measure everything with.
You act like these are the only two choices. There is also the choice of "uncertainty", which is the one I've been pushing.As far as I've understood your "uncertainty" allows for doubting things but not all of them. Why not all of them? What's the difference between those things you doubt and those you don't?
How can you say that it's both worthless and fair at the same time.Is there a problem with something being worthless yet fair?
There is no point in leaving a logical framework that works.
Is it really working? Medieval Churches thought their logical framework and their way of governance really worked. I guess they really believed this from the depths of their hearts.
I hear the voice of an Inquisitor: "Burn him! He's leaving our framework that really works, what's made him leave the Kingdom of our Lord?"
That Inquisitor apparently believed his way was "working" but the one being burnt didn't think so, I guess. Every framework will seem working when it's evaluated by its own criteria.
... Uncertainty is unusable because it requires you to accept a premise, while at the same time telling you not to accept any premises. This leaves you with no place to go, and thus you can't get anywhere...And in this self-contradiction lies a reflection of "fair" observer's paradoxical situation.
In refering to "it", you claim "it's" existence, and you know it. You've been speaking about "it" as a reasoning system, and thus (obviously) implying it's existence.And who says this? Who says referring to "it" is an implication of "existence?"
"You" may think one way or the other but you may not generalize your way to everyone.
Yes, it makes them all [b]equally unreliable, and unimportant, if taken as a premise. It opposes all order, because to assume an order is to violate it's premise of not assuming anythingYou don't "assume" an order. You "discover" an order. One takes Uncertainty and discovers the order I wrote of. Uncertainty asks to take nothing for granted but doesn't require an avoidance from discovering that Uncertainty has made everything equally unreliable thus equally creditable.
... This means that to believe in "caution" is against it's very premise. To believe in "clarity and hesitation" is against it's very premise.This isn't a belief, it's a suggestion.
If you make a choice of premise to take for granted, you have violated the premise of Uncertainty, which doesn't allow you to take anything for granted (at least, that's how you've presented it).Since I know that Uncertainty contradicts itself, I won't be taking anything too serious, Uncertainty included.
Once again, Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step has much to tell us but it isn't meant to be the terminus.
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
May5-03, 07:51 AM
... continued from the previous post
It doesn't matter, it still exists in all reasoning systems.
You mean you've studied all "known" and "unknown" logical systems? How did you do this? And suppose, only suppose, it really exists in all logical systems. Doesn't it matter that its meaning changes from one system to the other?
So the "mimicing" of relation isn't caused by the "Monadic" ... nature of the universe?No. Monads are isolated. They don't interact but they may undergo harmonized changes. Two events coincide but aren't bound to each other by Universe's structural properties for the monads taking part in those events are isolated.
Note that I'm not particularly interested in Pre-established Harmony but I think it's a creditable substitute for Causality.
Greetings, Manuel_Silvio.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
For Mentat:
You "are" criticizing it by claiming it's inapplicable. Isn't that sort of critique?
Yes, in that way, I am criticizing it. What I meant was that I am not criticizing the proof itself, but rather, it's applicability to Descartes' philosophy.
The proof's aim is to show that Q (Descartes' statement) and a valid statement, P, together make either a loop or a paradox based on arbitrarily-chosen state for P. "If" it succeeds in showing this point, it's also succeeded in showing that Q is somehow incompatible with the viewpoint in which all the proof has taken place. This seems so apparent to me. Is it unclear?
It's not that it's unclear, it's that I disagree. (I've asked this a few times...) how does the fact that one proposition suggests (or, really, requires) the truth of another propostion lead to a paradox/loop?
Loop is one case and Paradox is another. The proof follows either of two different lines according to the state chosen for P. If P is set T then, so the proof claims, a loop is made. If P is set F then, so the proof claims, a paradox is made.
But I don't see a loop, so much as I see a restating of the same premise. If I state "I'm 15 years old", and then state "I was born 15 years ago", I have no loop/paradox, I have merely restated the same thing. Of course, accepting one necessitates that you accept the other, but there is still no paradox, IMO.
You didn't consider what I said. I asked if one could remain fair to some knowledge body as one's subject of study while one's submitted to another knowledge body's premises. And you answered "yes" but how could you ever answer "yes?"
Isn't it clear that one can't be fair if one's got premises? If one assumes some premises one will always assess everything with those premises in mind. Consequently, one won't evaluate one's subject(s) of study fairly anymore. Do you think an observer whose premise is "the event X will happen in this experiment" can observe that experiment fairly?
No. So? I wasn't saying that you had to actually believe any other premises, merely that you should take them for granted (as being true) for the purpose of testing something else.
I'll give you an example: If I want to test the response of a particle to near-light-speed velocities, I have to take for granted that the speed of light is ~186,000 miles/per second. I can test the other premise (that the speed of light is what I think it is) later, but I need it as a premise, when testing what happens at near-light-speed velocities.
One wants to be fair in assessing a knowledge body. To be fair, one has to stand outside that knowledge body. Standing "outside" a knowledge body is standing "inside" another. Standing "inside" another knowledge body means being submitted to its premises. Now that one's submitted to some premises one isn’t fair. One can't stand in any place and claim that one's fair. This is the paradoxical situation of a "fair" observer. And this paradoxical situation is independent from Uncertainty.
I don't get this last sentence. Uncertainty has it's own premises as well. You cannot stand within the framework of Uncertainty, and [fairly] judge another framework - according to your own reasoning.
One can't be both "religious" and "scientific" at the same time. Because Science and Religion have contradictory predispositions.
The Old Testament starts with Genesis, the cosmogony of Judaism and Christianity. Scientific cosmogony is totally different and in contradiction to Genesis. One can't believe in both of them at the same time.
Yes you can. However, I don't suppose this is the thread to discuss that in.
Then, you don't seem to have the faintest idea what you were told with that Science and Religion example. Try to understand it.
You need to start recognizing the difference between misunderstanding and disagreement. I used to do the same thing, and I got quite a few people angry with me (please don't think that I'm angry with you, I'm not, I just don't approve of this misunderstanding about misunderstandings [:)]).
I don't agree with the application of the Science vs. Religion reasoning, to our discussion, because I wasn't talking about stepping outside of an entire reasoning system. I was talking about studying one premise at a time, which necessitates the acceptance of some other premises. If you want to test an entire reasoning system, then there is no "fair" place to stand.
I see, but did I say something "necessitates" Uncertainty? I said Uncertainty is a way to offset the interference of premises.
Indirectly. You said:
Previously Posted by Manuel_Silvio
Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty.
In this, you are using the concept "should" (forget about word-usage, the concept has been present throughout most of this discussion).
"You" think that's implied by my words. And you say practicality may not exist for an uncertain viewpoint, now wouldn't this claim of yours be wrong if I've really shown that Uncertainty does this and that?
No. If you can find practicality in a reasoning system, then the reasoning system doesn't fit in the framework of Uncertainty. Something's practicality is an assumption, and Uncertainty doesn't allow for any assumptions.
Is there a problem with saying that something is "unusable" (as you claim) yet "flexible?"
Yes. The premises of "it's flexible" are (basically):
1. "It" exists.
2. "It is usable in a flexible manner".
No problem as long as you don't assume one of them as a proof for the other. You may say that "I'm fifteen" and "I was born fifteen years ago" are logically equal but you may not assume "I'm fifteen" and deduce "so I was born fifteen year ago" exactly because these two are logical equivalents. In assuming one of them true you've assumed the other one true. This is starting with "I'm fifteen" as true and ending with "I'm fifteen" as true, and this is a loop. "I'm fifteen" can be true but this truth must be deduced through the rules of deduction for the logical system in which you're working from the truth of "a distinct statement."
"From the truth of a distinct statement"? "I'm fifteen" is a distinct statement. The fact that I restate it later (even if in the same sentence) doesn't change that, does it?
"I am therefore I am" is a loop because the deduction starts with "I am" pre-assumed T and ends with "I am" deduced T. "I am" may be true or false but this true/false state may only be deduced from another statement. Suppose we call "I am" statement R. Saying "I am therefore I am" is saying "R is T so R is T."
Yes, stating the same things twice, so what? If I say "God doesn't exist, therefore God cannot act on anything", I am stating God's inability to act twice, but there is no loop. Besides, it was the Evil Demon who made the error of trying to convince someone (thus assuming their existence) of their not existing.
And any attempt to prove his existence further validated his non-existence, right?
No! Have you been reading my words and not my reasoning this whole time? No offense, but I think you have entirely missed the point of "keep the statement within it's context".
Any individual/group has its own view of practicality.
Yes, and thus "practicality" is not a strictly Scientific concept.
Hence, practicality isn't a universal criterion to measure everything with.
Yes it is, you just need to define which kind of practicality you are using at any given time.
As far as I've understood your "uncertainty" allows for doubting things but not all of them. Why not all of them?
Because I would then have to doubt my doubt, and doubt that doubt, and so on ad infinitum. If I doubt that I must doubt, then I can just as easily fall into Certainty as Uncertainty.
What's the difference between those things you doubt and those you don't?
Isn't that obvious?
Is there a problem with something being worthless yet fair?
Yes, it can't be fair, otherwise it would be (at least in some way) worthwile, instead of worthless.
Reponse continued on next post...
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
That Inquisitor apparently believed his way was "working" but the one being burnt didn't think so, I guess. Every framework will seem working when it's evaluated by its own criteria.
And in this self-contradiction lies a reflection of "fair" observer's paradoxical situation.
Yes, thus your striving for a "fair" standpoint is in vain, is it not?
And who says this? Who says referring to "it" is an implication of "existence?"
Oh, come on! If I refer to "it", "him", or "her", I am refering to an individual entity, through the use of a pronoun. This is much too basic, and it's why I said that you fall under the unadvisable category of Descates' Second Rule.
"You" may think one way or the other but you may not generalize your way to everyone.
Says who? [;)]
Uncertainty asks to take nothing for granted...
This is wrong, and you know it.
...but doesn't require an avoidance from discovering that Uncertainty has made everything equally unreliable thus equally creditable.
"Equally unreliable" and "equally creditable" are opposites not synonymous, as you would have me believe.
This isn't a belief, it's a suggestion.
A suggestion is fine, but you cannot ask that one accept - or, even for an instant, take for granted - these suggestions, without contradicting the rule of Uncertainty.
Since I know that Uncertainty contradicts itself, I won't be taking anything too serious, Uncertainty included.
And yet, your "cautiousness" is based on Uncertainty, isn't it?
Once again, Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step has much to tell us but it isn't meant to be the terminus.
Once again, if Uncertainty were a step in the way, it would be one with no physical substance, and without any imaginable usefulness.
continued on the next post...
As is my response...
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
... continued from the previous post
You mean you've studied all "known" and "unknown" logical systems? How did you do this?
I never said I did.
And suppose, only suppose, it really exists in all logical systems. Doesn't it matter that its meaning changes from one system to the other?
Sure it matters. It just doesn't change the fact that "practicality", by definition, is just something's usefulness in practice. Thus, people can have different ideas of what is "practical", but if they actually try their ideas out, they may (not necessarily, but likely) find that it is not really useful in practice.
No. Monads are isolated. They don't interact but they may undergo harmonized changes. Two events coincide but aren't bound to each other by Universe's structural properties for the monads taking part in those events are isolated.
Interesting. However, let's say that 100 times out of 100, certain Monads (harmoniously) change, after I clap my hands. Then it can be concluded that it is practical to assume a relationship (betwixt clapping and the change of those particular Monads). It is practical because it can be "put into practice" (and has been 100 times). If, at some point in the future, the clapping of my hands is not accompanied by the change of those particular Monads, then I will have to assume that something out-of-the-ordinary has happened. This is all just human nature.
Manuel_Silvio
May6-03, 08:24 AM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
... What I meant was that I am not criticizing the proof itself, but rather, it's applicability to Descartes' philosophy.
... how does the fact that one proposition suggests (or, really, requires) the truth of another propostion lead to a paradox/loop?Questioning the applicability of this proof is senseless. "If" this proof is all right then it will show something about Descartes' statement (and that's clear), so it's applicable. It's "clear" that this proof is applicable for studying Descartes' statement because its aim is to show Descartes' statement's incompatibility with Boolean logic. Now "if" and only "if" this proof is all right "then" and only "then" we learn something about Descartes' statement. That's the "applicability" of "this proof" to "Descartes' statement."
The proof has "two" lines. These "two" lines are "different." One line leads to a "paradox." The other leads to a "loop." The paradox line is "clear." The loop line is what we are talking about right now. Don't use "loop/paradox," use "loop."
The proof claims that if statement P is set T, then any deduction resulting in statement Q set T will be circular reasoning, a "loop." Why is it that way? Because of the word "therefore" put there. We know P and Q are logical equivalents, so they can be used in place of each other. If one says "Q and Q" one would have said "P and Q" or "P and P." This isn't circular reasoning for it combines statements P and Q with the logical operator "and." (using mathematical notation, "Q ^ Q" isn't circular because it may be either T or F based on Q's state and the truth table for "and" operator).
Truth table for AND operator on statements R and S:
R----S----(R ^ S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----F
F----F----F
According to truth table:
If Q = T then (Q ^ Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q ^ Q) = F;
On the other hand, it would be circular to say "Q therefore Q" or equally "P therefore Q" because "therefore" is the conditional logical operator, mathematically shown as "Q => Q." This form of reasoning is circular and non-informative because regardless of Q's "real" state, Q's conditional combination with Q will be true.
Truth table for CONDITIONAL operator on statements R and S:
R----S----(R => S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----T
F----F----T
According to truth table:
If Q = T then (Q => Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q => Q) = T;
The difference here lies in the obvious distinction between AND and CONDITIONAL logical operators. Saying "Q and Q" is right but saying "Q therefore Q" is wrong. "Q and Q" is stating the same thing twice while "Q therefore Q" is deduction of Q's state from itself.
Clear enough?
No. So? I wasn't saying that you had to actually believe any other premises, merely that you should take them for granted (as being true) for the purpose of testing something else. Taking premises for granted means "believing" them. If you take a premise "true" then you'll judge everything according to the "truth" of that premise.
... If I want to test the response of a particle to near-light-speed velocities, I have to take for granted that the speed of light is ~186,000 miles/per second...This is different. Speed of light isn't a premise, it's a measurement. The premise here is that "everything in scientific Universe can be measured."
The premises of a knowledge body, Science for example, are the most basic statements which are necessary for conformance to that knowledge body.
Speed of light is a particular from scientific Universe. Particulars aren't challenged here, generalizations are called to judgment.
... Uncertainty has it's own premises as well. You cannot stand within the framework of Uncertainty, and [fairly] judge another framework - according to your own reasoning."Fair" observer's situation is paradoxical. Uncertainty's paradoxical nature is a reflection of that other more basic paradox.
The point with Uncertainty is that there's "no framework." You said that "Uncertainty" can never be achieved because it's paradoxical. That's right and that's why Uncertainty has no framework. I wrote many times before that "Uncertainty is a between-the-lines hint." It's a hint of "fair" observer's paradoxical situation.
By working inside Uncertainty one's working actually nowhere. It's surely somewhere but no certain place. Uncertainty provides dynamism. At any given time one's submitted to some set of premises, but Uncertainty lets one be aware of the uncertain nature of these premises and of interferences caused by them and also prepares one for change at every moment.
Like I wrote before, Uncertainty is one facet of something more basic. The other facets are Paradox and Self-reference. That more basic thing seems unreachable to me but its facets give clues to its nature.
Absolute fairness can't be achieved but relative fairness is at hand. Uncertainty is relatively fairer than other stances because it has a hint to the more basic concept of "fair" observer while many other stances only hide away that more basic problem.
Yes you can. However, I don't suppose this is the thread to discuss that in.No, you can't. Nonetheless, I don't think this is the thread to talk that over [:D]
You need to start recognizing the difference between misunderstanding and disagreement.And you need to start recognizing the difference between a well-thought disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding (and I'm not angry with you [:)]).
I was talking about studying one premise at a time, which necessitates the acceptance of some other premises. If you want to test an entire reasoning system, then there is no "fair" place to stand.We talked about this before. There's no point in studying one premise at a time while other premises are taken for granted.
Every knowledge body is "internally consistent." Inconsistencies and discrepancies can't be seen from "inside." This means you have no option of proving one of premises wrong when you have accepted other premises to be true.
Neither "inside" nor "outside" is fair. Now this is a point of agreement for us, right?
Previously Posted by Manuel_Silvio
Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty.
In this, you are using the concept "should" (forget about word-usage, the concept has been present throughout most of this discussion).That isn't a "should" which is an obligation. It's a "should better" which is a suggestion.
As an aside, at this level nothing is necessitated because necessities are against "fairness." If something is necessitated then it's been "preferred" and "preference" has no place here.
... If you can find practicality in a reasoning system, then the reasoning system doesn't fit in the framework of Uncertainty. Something's practicality is an assumption, and Uncertainty doesn't allow for any assumptions."Practicality" isn't an assumption. It's a "criterion." You define it and then compare things to it. One may define "practicality" as "being uncertain" and then Uncertainty is practical.
You've accepted that practicality may be defined at will.
Yes. The premises of "it's flexible" are (basically):
1. "It" exists.
2. "It is usable in a flexible manner".Who has associated these premises with "flexibility?" And what's given her/him an undeniable right to do so and to generalize her/his personal definition?
"From the truth of a distinct statement"? "I'm fifteen" is a distinct statement. The fact that I restate it later (even if in the same sentence) doesn't change that, does it?Yes, it changes based on the logical operator used in statement synthesis (see above).
No! Have you been reading my words and not my reasoning this whole time? No offense, but I think you have entirely missed the point of "keep the statement within it's context".Even if it's an "unfair, biased and personal" context that is claimed to be "fair, unbiased and encompassing?"
Yes it is, you just need to define which kind of practicality you are using at any given time.
It just doesn't change the fact that "practicality", by definition, is just something's usefulness in practice. Thus, people can have different ideas of what is "practical", but if they actually try their ideas out, they may (not necessarily, but likely) find that it is not really useful in practice.Smells like "self-contradiction." [;)]
The fact? What fact?
By definition? Whose definition?
Usefulness? What use?
Practice? Which practice?
Actually? Which, what or whose Actuality?
Because I would then have to doubt my doubt, and doubt that doubt, and so on ad infinitum. If I doubt that I must doubt, then I can just as easily fall into Certainty as Uncertainty.That's the dear price of "relative fairness." Be cautious, you will fall nowhere.
Isn't that obvious?No.
Yes, it can't be fair, otherwise it would be (at least in some way) worthwile, instead of worthless.And who associates "fairness" with "worthiness?"
Yes, thus your striving for a "fair" standpoint is in vain, is it not?Hell knows, it's in vain. All in vain but I didn't know this when I started out. I started doubting and went on till nothing remained but doubting itself. I doubted the doubt and I asked why ask why.
There's much more to the landscapes one sees on the way than to those one sees at the destination. The way is the destination.
This is humane treatment of human situation.
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
May6-03, 08:34 AM
... continued from the previous post
If I refer to "it", "him", or "her", I am refering to an individual entity, through the use of a pronoun. This is much too basic...Yes, "you" are doing that and "you" think it's "much too basic."
Says who?Me [:))].
"Equally unreliable" and "equally creditable" are opposites not synonymous, as you would have me believe.On a homogenous scale of credibility that starts from "most unreliable" and ends with "most creditable" those which are "equally unreliable" are "equally creditable."
Scale of credibility:
(-) most unreliable
(+) most creditable
X is at (*)
(-)----------------*------(+)
Y is at (*)
(-)----------------*------(+)
X and Y are equally close to (-);
Hence, X and Y are equally close to (+);
Note that saying X is as much creditable as it's unreliable is wrong (because X is 16 dashes away from (-) and 6 dashes away from (+)). However, saying that X and Y are equally creditable thus equally unreliable is right (because this means they occupy the same place on the scale).
A suggestion is fine, but you cannot ask that one accept - or, even for an instant, take for granted - these suggestions, without contradicting the rule of Uncertainty.Descartes' statement was fine, too, as long as it was a suggestion.
You're right but Uncertainty is a step in a way. What one gathers at this step can be used on next steps (seems like I've always got too many metaphors).
And yet, your "cautiousness" is based on Uncertainty, isn't it?Not "based on" but rather "derived from."
Once again, if Uncertainty were a step in the way, it would be one with no physical substance, and without any imaginable usefulness.Do you take your steps of thought for "usefulness?" Have you considered a situation in which you may take a step essentially creditable yet essentially impractical to scientific measures?
Why did you start asking why somewhere in your childhood? Is that scientifically practical? I think not, for those things you've asked "why" from have been of no scientific use.
Wouldn't it be more "practical" to swallow all scientific premises and then start out with them "blindly?" You could have taken many more "practical" steps if you studied Calculus all the time you were contemplating more basic things.
I never said I did.You said, however, that practicality exists in all logical systems.
Interesting. However, let's say that 100 times out of 100, certain Monads (harmoniously) change, after I clap my hands. Then it can be concluded that it is practical to assume a relationship (betwixt clapping and the change of those particular Monads). It is practical because it can be "put into practice" (and has been 100 times). If, at some point in the future, the clapping of my hands is not accompanied by the change of those particular Monads, then I will have to assume that something out-of-the-ordinary has happened. This is all just human nature.A "bond" among Monads can't be concluded. No structural property can be devised for the Universe.
Nevertheless, one can devise a property for the Harmony and hope that this property remains there within a very long (but not infinite) stretch of time. Now this property of Harmony may be put to "use," whatever "use" may mean.
Causality and all of its substitutes, including Pre-established Harmony, are mental patterns imposed on events happening here and there. That's why they're all equally creditable.
Using these mental patterns may end in desirable results but this use introduces a risk factor (for there's a considerable possibility that these patterns become invalid). That's why I call Causality and its substitutes "optimization" methods. These methods can "optimize" processing routines but at the cost of a new risk factor.
And notice, "probabilistic" conclusions can't be made because number of experiments never yields to infinity. Moreover, "probabilistic" conclusions don't describe the "distribution" of possible events in order of happening.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
Questioning the applicability of this proof is senseless. "If" this proof is all right then it will show something about Descartes' statement (and that's clear), so it's applicable.
So, the fact that 1+1=2 is right means that it is applicable to Descartes' statement? What I mean by this is that any proposition could be proven correct in some framework, but that doesn't mean that all of them are "helper devices" for Descartes' philosophy. I can show you the inapplicability of "1+1=2" to Descartes' philosophy, but can you show me the applicability of your proof to his philosophy?
The proof has "two" lines. These "two" lines are "different." One line leads to a "paradox." The other leads to a "loop." The paradox line is "clear." The loop line is what we are talking about right now. Don't use "loop/paradox," use "loop."
Yes sir! [:)]
However, a loop is a paradox. If you have looping reasoning, then you have a paradox. But I'll just use "loop" from now on.
The proof claims that if statement P is set T, then any deduction resulting in statement Q set T will be circular reasoning, a "loop." Why is it that way? Because of the word "therefore" put there. We know P and Q are logical equivalents, so they can be used in place of each other. If one says "Q and Q" one would have said "P and Q" or "P and P." This isn't circular reasoning for it combines statements P and Q with the logical operator "and." (using mathematical notation, "Q ^ Q" isn't circular because it may be either T or F based on Q's state and the truth table for "and" operator).
I still don't think that the use of the word "therefore" makes a loop. Here's why: If I say "I'm fifteen, therefore I will be 30 in 15 years", I have no logical loop. Yes, the second proposition has a sub-proposition that is equal to the first proposition (in the sentence), but there is still no loop.
Also, I would like to take this opportunity to remind you that you are examining the sentence outside of it's context. This would be fine, if there were no story involving a Demon that does create a loop (by trying to convince someone that they don't exist), but as it is I don't think it correct that one examine the statment, without making any reference to the context.
Truth table for AND operator on statements R and S:
R----S----(R ^ S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----F
F----F----F
According to truth table:
If Q = T then (Q ^ Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q ^ Q) = F;
On the other hand, it would be circular to say "Q therefore Q" or equally "P therefore Q" because "therefore" is the conditional logical operator, mathematically shown as "Q => Q." This form of reasoning is circular and non-informative because regardless of Q's "real" state, Q's conditional combination with Q will be true.
I know this. I've already admitted to it's non-informative nature. However, I stil disagree. You are saying that because I say "this is true, therefore it is true", there is a loop. I just don't see the loop. Also, look at the example of my age. I have written that one in the same style as Descartes' statement, to get the point across. "I was born 15 years ago, therefore I am 15" is not circular, even though the first premise contains (as a sub-premise) the second premise.
Truth table for CONDITIONAL operator on statements R and S:
R----S----(R => S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----T
F----F----T
According to truth table:
If Q = T then (Q => Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q => Q) = T;
The difference here lies in the obvious distinction between AND and CONDITIONAL logical operators. Saying "Q and Q" is right but saying "Q therefore Q" is wrong. "Q and Q" is stating the same thing twice while "Q therefore Q" is deduction of Q's state from itself.
Clear enough?
No, sorry (I mean that I'm really sorry, if my disagreeing is frustrating you). See above for why.
Taking premises for granted means "believing" them. If you take a premise "true" then you'll judge everything according to the "truth" of that premise.
Exactly, that's why Uncertainty doesn't allow one to take anything for granted - which is something that you seemed to disagree with me on before.
Also, there is something wrong with the (above quoted) comment. You said that I would then judge everything according to the "truth" of that premise. This is not necessarily true, I may just be judging one thing with that premise as my basis, and then discarding the premise later.
This is different. Speed of light isn't a premise, it's a measurement. The premise here is that "everything in scientific Universe can be measured."
No, it's that the speed of light can, and has been measured. It has nothing to do with any other measurements. Besides, how is it that I am not taking for granted the measurement, when performing an experiment on what happens at near-light-speed?
The premises of a knowledge body, Science for example, are the most basic statements which are necessary for conformance to that knowledge body.
Speed of light is a particular from scientific Universe. Particulars aren't challenged here, generalizations are called to judgment.
True Uncertainty must challenge everything. You may not like this one example (I don't much either, but it was the first thing that popped into my head), but that doesn't mean that you can take it for granted, and still be Uncertain.
"Fair" observer's situation is paradoxical. Uncertainty's paradoxical nature is a reflection of that other more basic paradox.
I know, that's the point I was making: Your attempt to find a "fair" (or even "fairer") observer's situation is doomed to failure, and Uncertainty is probably a step backwards, because that's just accepting that it can't be done, while (at the same time) believing that you have the answer.
By working inside Uncertainty one's working actually nowhere.
Exactly why it is utterly pointless, and impossible.
It's surely somewhere but no certain place.
Beware of contradictions.
Uncertainty provides dynamism. At any given time one's submitted to some set of premises, but Uncertainty lets one be aware of the uncertain nature of these premises and of interferences caused by them and also prepares one for change at every moment.
No, that's what uncertainty does. Uncertainty doesn't allow you (even for a moment) to submit yourself to any knowledge body or any premise of any kind.
Like I wrote before, Uncertainty is one facet of something more basic. The other facets are Paradox and Self-reference. That more basic thing seems unreachable to me but its facets give clues to its nature.
A true paradox is unsolvable. Self-reference is truly paradoxical. Thus, the grand thing that your searching for is probably going to end up being complete acceptance of the unsolvable nature of everything. I don't like this conclusion, therefore I don't like it's facets.
Answer continued on next post...
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Absolute fairness can't be achieved but relative fairness is at hand. Uncertainty is relatively fairer than other stances because it has a hint to the more basic concept of "fair" observer while many other stances only hide away that more basic problem.
Look, the fact that it hints at paradox more than any other reasoning system does not make it more fair. I just makes it closer to what the concept of fairness actually is, impossible.
No, you can't. Nonetheless, I don't think this is the thread to talk that over [:D]
Well, if we were discussing it (which we're not), I would reply that knowing which things are symbolic and which things are literal resolves the situation. But, of course, we're not discussing it, so it really doesn't matter [:D].
And you need to start recognizing the difference between a well-thought disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding
Actually, the difference I mentioned was not between a disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding. It was between a disagreement (any disagreement) and a misunderstanding.
We talked about this before. There's no point in studying one premise at a time while other premises are taken for granted.
And there's not point in denying all premises. They're both wrong. But, it does seem that one has had greater success in the history of humankind [;)].
Besides, you have made it rather obvious that Uncertainty does exactly the same thing as any other system (it takes one premise for granted while examining all others), so it's no better.
Neither "inside" nor "outside" is fair. Now this is a point of agreement for us, right?
[quote]
Sure, we can agree on that - provided you realize that that leaves out Uncertainty.
[quote]
That isn't a "should" which is an obligation. It's a "should better" which is a suggestion.
No, it's a proposition. You are assuming that you know what's better. You are also assuming that the way you have posted here is better than others. Both of these are assumptions, not suggestions.
As an aside, at this level nothing is necessitated because necessities are against "fairness." If something is necessitated then it's been "preferred" and "preference" has no place here.
Then why do you prefer Uncertainty? *Contradiction Alert!!*
"Practicality" isn't an assumption. It's a "criterion." You define it and then compare things to it. One may define "practicality" as "being uncertain" and then Uncertainty is practical.
None of this fits the definition of "praciticality".
You've accepted that practicality may be defined at will.
Not exactly. I have accepted that people may have different views of what is practical, but "practical" retains the meaning of "useful when put into practice".
Who has associated these premises with "flexibility?" And what's given her/him an undeniable right to do so and to generalize her/his personal definition?
I/myself have associated these premises with "flexibility". Prove that they are inapplicable, and I/myself will change my/his mind [:D].
Yes, it changes based on the logical operator used in statement synthesis (see above).
(See previous post for refutation.)
Even if it's an "unfair, biased and personal" context that is claimed to be "fair, unbiased and encompassing?"
How can you know any of this, if you don't put the statement where it belongs (in it's context) and try to study it as it was intended.
Smells like "self-contradiction." [;)]
Not self-contradiction, completion of a point. I've already explained this (previous post) so I suggest that you read that explanation
In fact, I must go now. I apologize, but I will complete my response later.
heusdens
May7-03, 07:07 AM
Originally posted by Mentat
This philosophy of Descarte has been brought up numerous times, in the old PFs. I'm just starting it up again.
Descarte gave an illustration that went (somewhat) as follows:
And Evil Demon sought to convince a man that everything he (the man) had ever believed, was false. The Demon had such power that it almost succeeded. The only thing that the Demon could not prove to the man was that the man himself did not exist. It could not do this because you cannot convince someone that doesn't exist, of anything. From this came the saying, "I think, therefore, I am".
What is your opinion?
The statement "I think, therefore, I am" I regard as a statement regarding the issue of the relation between being and thinking.
It says that thinking requires being.
The inverse statement is "I am, therefore, I think".
This would claim that all being requires thinking. Something is, only if it is able of thinking.
I would consider the first "I think, therefore, I am" as the right statement regarding the relation between being and thinking. Thinking requires being. The inverse statement, claims a false relationship between being and thinking. Being does not require thinking.
Manuel_Silvio
May8-03, 06:14 AM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
... can you show me the applicability of your proof to his philosophy?Let's see. If I gave you a proof (just some proof not this one) that shows that Descartes' statement is incompatible with Boolean logic then would this exemplary proof be applicable to Descartes' statement? I think the answer is "yes."
Now I claim that the proof we're discussing here is one that shows such incompatibility. If this proof succeeds in its task, that is showing some incompatibility, then it can be considered an "applicable" proof. Do you agree?
And in order to prove this proof "inapplicable" one has to "understand" it and then show that it either doesn't succeed in its task or that it just does another task. Please "show" either of these cases.
By the way, this proof isn't "every" proof. It's a specific one concerned with its specific task (and it isn't 1 + 1 = 2).
However, a loop is a paradox.How did you make that? A loop is based on self-reference. A paradox is based on the collocation of contraries. Are these two equal? If yes, why have they been forbidden through distinct rules of logic and not under a single rule?
You are saying that because I say "this is true, therefore it is true", there is a loop.Please make sure you read and re-read my following words until you get the point. I'm really tired of this and I can't describe my point more clearly.
No. (Q => Q) isn't "this is true therefore it is true." It's "because this is true therefore it is true." A loop is an instance of self-reference, where the validity/truth of some statement is taken from the validity/truth of the same statement.
As I showed on the previous post a (Q => Q) statement is "always" true, no matter whether or not Q is T. It was rock solid Boolean logic. You may insist that your (Q => Q) statement (which is "I am therefore I am" or "I'm fifteen therefore I'm fifteen") is T and you're right with that but you must note that the truth of Q can't be deduced from this.
Suppose we have (Q => Q) = T (means, "I am therefore I am" is considered T). You can't deduce Q = T (means, "I am" is T) because regardless of Q's state (means, the truth of "I am" which is I's existence and the matter of debate here) (Q => Q) is ever-true.
Whether or not I exist (means, whether or not "I am" is T), "I am therefore I am" is true. "I am therefore I am" leads nowhere but "I am therefore I am." From that you can't get "I am" as true and for I to be proven to exist "I am" must be proven true (and there's no discussion about that).
Non-informative-ness isn't only a "disadvantage," it's a "fault." The only non-informative statements in Boolean logic are those forbidden ones (they were forbidden because they were non-informative). If you have a non-informative statement you can know for sure that you have a "fault" at hand.
"I was born 15 years ago, therefore I am 15" is not circular, even though the first premise contains (as a sub-premise) the second premise.This can't be compared to a (Q => Q). Here you have (R => Q) where Q's truth is deduced from R's truth and R's truth is independent of Q.
You may be born 15 years ago but have 20 years of age because you were involved in a hypothetical time machine experiment. "I was born 15 years ago" isn't a logical equivalent to "I am 15." These two can be converted to each other in presence of other statements which declare solemnly that you haven't experienced any time distortions.
Consequently, this statement isn't analogous to Descartes' statement which is a (Q => Q) (deduction of a statement's truth from its logical "equivalent" and not from its "result along with other auxiliary statements").
Exactly, that's why Uncertainty doesn't allow one to take anything for granted - which is something that you seemed to disagree with me on before. Uncertainty is paradoxical so one can be taking its premise for granted while one doesn't violate "nothing is certain."
Uncertainty's premise assumes no definite state of T or F, its value is none of the members of truth value set defined for Boolean logic. It can be taken simultaneously T and F or none of them or a mixture of T and F or something beyond T and F.
Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step can be taken under many names, call it Uncertainty, call it Angst, call it whatever. Under one name or the other, this step must be taken. It's the righteous successor of all previous steps. One starts out with doubts, with precision, with clarity, with cautiousness, with hopes and with desire for knowledge. This individual will, I think, someday somehow understand how these starting steps give the clues to a critical step beyond them.
That critical step is where limits of knowledge, its righteousness, its fairness and the honesty in one's desire for knowledge become subjects to one's quest for knowledge. Knowledge is all we know. Consider the situation where knowledge itself becomes a subject for being known. What happens? Would our knowledge give us clues to its own nature? Isn't this another paradox?
If our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge then we'd be knowing it and there's no point in asking. If our knowledge doesn't contain the knowledge about its own nature then we'd never acquire that knowledge for we can't access something that lies outside itself (knowledge of any form or about anything must be somewhere inside knowledge and can't be outside of knowledge).
Uncertainty, Paradox and Self-reference are all evaded for they're the borders to rationalized knowledge. In studying the knowledge itself the most important aspects of study are the limits of knowledge - those borders.
No, it's that the speed of light can, and has been measured. It has nothing to do with any other measurements. Besides, how is it that I am not taking for granted the measurement, when performing an experiment on what happens at near-light-speed?
... This is not necessarily true, I may just be judging one thing with that premise as my basis, and then discarding the premise later.
I think we have different understandings of "premises" for a knowledge body. For me, the premises of a knowledge body are the "most basic" statements whose truth enforces the truth of all other statements of that knowledge body.
Science, for example, has its premises (historically) told in Francis Bacon's "Novum Organum." The most basic to Science is its methodology. Assuming that methodology will in time result in "all" scientific achievements, including a measurement of light speed.
You can't be working in a knowledge body without being "totally" (consciously or otherwise) believing in its premises (which are the "most basic" of all). You can't assume Science's methodology for studying stones but look from Bible's outlook at human beings. This is a paradox just like Uncertainty.
You choose to be a scientist. You understand Science's methodology. You use it to view the Universe, to view all. Then you get everything out of it. Science and all other knowledge bodies are self-sufficient encompassing systems of thought applied to an entire Universe (some knowledge bodies may assume more Universes or some Multiverse or no Universe at all).
Uncertainty's task is to detect inconsistencies and discrepancies in these knowledge bodies that wouldn't be seen if one's "inside" (or even "outside") these knowledge bodies. One concerned with Uncertainty won't fulfill the requirements of Uncertainty (eg, won't be "totally" Uncertain, as you say) but will be assuming a relatively fairer stance compared to other stances.
True Uncertainty must challenge everything. You may not like this one example (I don't much either, but it was the first thing that popped into my head), but that doesn't mean that you can take it for granted, and still be Uncertain.Uncertainty challenges Science's methodology instead. This challenge invalidates all that relies on this methodology including but not limited to a measurement of light speed.
I know, that's the point I was making: Your attempt to find a "fair" (or even "fairer") observer's situation is doomed to failure, and Uncertainty is probably a step backwards, because that's just accepting that it can't be done, while (at the same time) believing that you have the answer.This is humane treatment of human situation.
No, that's what uncertainty does. Uncertainty doesn't allow you (even for a moment) to submit yourself to any knowledge body or any premise of any kind.Your "uncertainty" allows for unfair preference of some premises over others. Uncertainty, by its paradoxical nature, doesn't "allow" and/or "disallow" anything.
A true paradox is unsolvable. Self-reference is truly paradoxical. Thus, the grand thing that your searching for is probably going to end up being complete acceptance of the unsolvable nature of everything. I don't like this conclusion, therefore I don't like it's facets.My current guess of that "grand" thing (as you call it) is that it's Unknown [;)]
There's even enough "scientific evidence" to the unsolvable nature of everything. Even Science doesn't claim "direct" observation or manipulation of everything or anything. Even Science asserts that what we observe and manipulate is a "representation," nothing more. However, this "unsolvable" case isn't my point here and now.
Look, the fact that it hints at paradox more than any other reasoning system does not make it more fair. I just makes it closer to what the concept of fairness actually is, impossible.So the fact that one is always ready to review one's thoughts doesn't make one fairer?
continued on the next post…
Manuel_Silvio
May8-03, 06:18 AM
… continued from the previous post
Well, if we were discussing it (which we're not), I would reply that knowing which things are symbolic and which things are literal resolves the situation. But, of course, we're not discussing it, so it really doesn't matter.Nevertheless, if we were discussing it (which we never ever are) I would counter that knowing that symbolic things can be interpreted at will worsens the situation, but, more apparently than obviously we aren’t discussing it, so it more really than really doesn't matter and has never mattered to no one [:D]
Actually, the difference I mentioned was not between a disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding. It was between a disagreement (any disagreement) and a misunderstanding.Well, I'm gradually learning to know that difference. Did you try, too? [;)]
And there's not point in denying all premises. They're both wrong. But, it does seem that one has had greater success in the history of humankind.Success? From what point of view? By what definition of success? In what history of human beings?
No, it's a proposition. You are assuming that you know what's better. You are also assuming that the way you have posted here is better than others. Both of these are assumptions, not suggestions.
Then why do you prefer Uncertainty? *Contradiction Alert!!*
You're right. Have you noticed you're using the other edge of the double-edged sword that Uncertainty is?
None of this fits the definition of "praciticality".
Not exactly. I have accepted that people may have different views of what is practical, but "practical" retains the meaning of "useful when put into practice".And how "useful" and "practice" are defined?
I/myself have associated these premises with "flexibility". Prove that they are inapplicable, and I/myself will change my/his mind.First you tell me, "inapplicable" to which measures and tell your grounds for choosing those measures.
How can you know any of this, if you don't put the statement where it belongs (in it's context) and try to study it as it was intended.As far as I know, the context is an entity's opposition to a denial of that specific entity's existence. That entity used a statement that was problematic within the framework that that entity intended that statement to be understood in.
Not self-contradiction, completion of a point. I've already explained this (previous post) so I suggest that you read that explanation.I'd read it. You used terms that weren't subject to consensus (in this two-individual community, of course) while we'd agreed to use terms that refer to the same (or almost the same) things on both sides of dialogue.
Originally posted by heusdens
The statement "I think, therefore, I am" I regard as a statement regarding the issue of the relation between being and thinking.
It says that thinking requires being.
The inverse statement is "I am, therefore, I think".
This would claim that all being requires thinking. Something is, only if it is able of thinking.
I would consider the first "I think, therefore, I am" as the right statement regarding the relation between being and thinking. Thinking requires being. The inverse statement, claims a false relationship between being and thinking. Being does not require thinking.
And I would agree with you entirely.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Let's see. If I gave you a proof (just some proof not this one) that shows that Descartes' statement is incompatible with Boolean logic then would this exemplary proof be applicable to Descartes' statement? I think the answer is "yes."
Now I claim that the proof we're discussing here is one that shows such incompatibility. If this proof succeeds in its task, that is showing some incompatibility, then it can be considered an "applicable" proof. Do you agree?
Yes, if it can be used to show an incompatibility between Boolean Logic and Descartes' philosophy, then I agree to it's applicability.
And in order to prove this proof "inapplicable" one has to "understand" it and then show that it either doesn't succeed in its task or that it just does another task. Please "show" either of these cases.
Didn't you already show that it is the type statement, wherein "P" is a function of ? If this is so then I may understand the proof, but I still don't see how it accomplishes the aforementioned task.
By the way, this proof isn't "every" proof. It's a specific one concerned with its specific task (and it isn't 1 + 1 = 2).
Yes, but it's specific task is to show an incompatibility between Boolean Logic and a statment of the form "P ([bleep])", isn't it?
How did you make that? A loop is based on self-reference. A paradox is based on the collocation of contraries. Are these two equal? If yes, why have they been forbidden through distinct rules of logic and not under a single rule?
Hm, I guess a loop isn't a paradox. I had read a book that dealt with paradox (Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid), and it seems to have said that self-referential statements are paradoxical. Oh well, I have already agreed to use the word "loop".
Please make sure you read and re-read my following words until you get the point. I'm really tired of this and I can't describe my point more clearly.
No. (Q => Q) isn't "this is true therefore it is true." It's "because this is true therefore it is true." A loop is an instance of self-reference, where the validity/truth of some statement is taken from the validity/truth of the same statement.
As I showed on the previous post a (Q => Q) statement is "always" true, no matter whether or not Q is T. It was rock solid Boolean logic. You may insist that your (Q => Q) statement (which is "I am therefore I am" or "I'm fifteen therefore I'm fifteen") is T and you're right with that but you must note that the truth of Q can't be deduced from this.
Suppose we have (Q => Q) = T (means, "I am therefore I am" is considered T). You can't deduce Q = T (means, "I am" is T) because regardless of Q's state (means, the truth of "I am" which is I's existence and the matter of debate here) (Q => Q) is ever-true.
Whether or not I exist (means, whether or not "I am" is T), "I am therefore I am" is true. "I am therefore I am" leads nowhere but "I am therefore I am." From that you can't get "I am" as true and for I to be proven to exist "I am" must be proven true (and there's no discussion about that).
Alright. I understand it. It isn't much different then I thought it was. You are showing that "Q=>Q" doesn't prove anything. I agree entirely. Now, put the statement back into context, please, and see the impossible nature of the Evil Demon's task (to prove to someone that they don't exist), and we will have nothing left to discuss.
I keep mentioning context because I already knew that the statement itself doesn't get you anywhere. It is the application to the story that shows that, when someone tries to prove to you that you don't exist, they only further validate belief in your existence.
Non-informative-ness isn't only a "disadvantage," it's a "fault." The only non-informative statements in Boolean logic are those forbidden ones (they were forbidden because they were non-informative). If you have a non-informative statement you can know for sure that you have
a "fault" at hand.
Why is a non-informative statement forbidden by Boolean Logic?
This can't be compared to a (Q => Q). Here you have (R => Q) where Q's truth is deduced from R's truth and R's truth is independent of Q.
Oh no it's not independent. It's not possible that I was born 15 years ago, and yet am not 15 years old. Thus, this statement is of exactly the same nature as "I think therefore I am", [b]because the first statement has the second statement as one of it's sub-premises.
You may be born 15 years ago but have 20 years of age because you were involved in a hypothetical time machine experiment. "I was born 15 years ago" isn't a logical equivalent to "I am 15." These two can be converted to each other in presence of other statements which declare solemnly that you haven't experienced any time distortions.
So now you introduce context? This is a little irritating.
Besides, if I was born 15 years ago, then I must be 15 years old. If I travel through time, I was still born 15 subjective years ago, and that's all that matters to the statement.
Consequently, this statement isn't analogous to Descartes' statement which is a (Q => Q) (deduction of a statement's truth from its logical "equivalent" and not from its "result along with other auxiliary statements").
Actually, Descartes' statement isn't the one that you showed to be equivalent to "Q=>Q", it was "I am therefore I am" that was of this kind.
Uncertainty is paradoxical so one can be taking its premise for granted while one doesn't violate "nothing is certain."
This is backward reasoning. You must take the premise for granted while not violating "nothing is certain", and thus Uncertainty is paradoxical.
Uncertainty's premise assumes no definite state of T or F, its value is none of the members of truth value set defined for Boolean logic. It can be taken simultaneously T and F or none of them or a mixture of T and F or something beyond T and F.
Then it isn't useful. You said that it's usefulness (and it's "fairness") were that it could be used to determine the truth of another knowledge body.
Response Continued on the Next Post...
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step can be taken under many names, call it Uncertainty, call it Angst, call it whatever. Under one name or the other, this step must be taken. It's the righteous successor of all previous steps. One starts out with doubts, with precision, with clarity, with cautiousness, with hopes and with desire for knowledge. This individual will, I think, someday somehow understand how these starting steps give the clues to a critical step beyond them.
I don't want to sound repetitious, but you leave me no choice: You are not describing Uncertainty, you are describing uncertainty.
That critical step is where limits of knowledge, its righteousness, its fairness and the honesty in one's desire for knowledge become subjects to one's quest for knowledge. Knowledge is all we know. Consider the situation where knowledge itself becomes a subject for being known. What happens? Would our knowledge give us clues to its own nature? Isn't this another paradox?
Not really. Knowledge is not a system for learning, and thus does not fall into the paradoxes of Russel or Godel.
If our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge then we'd be knowing it and there's no point in asking. If our knowledge doesn't contain the knowledge about its own nature then we'd never acquire that knowledge for we can't access something that lies outside itself (knowledge of any form or about anything must be somewhere inside knowledge and can't be outside of knowledge).
You are (IMO) misusing the word "knowledge". You are asking things like "if our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge...", when in fact, unless you know something about the nature of knowledge, it is obvious that "our knowledge" doesn't (yet) contain knowledge about the nature of knowledge.
Uncertainty, Paradox and Self-reference are all evaded for they're the borders to rationalized knowledge. In studying the knowledge itself the most important aspects of study are the limits of knowledge - those borders.
Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops are not the borders of rationality. "Borders" have recognizable existence on both sides of them. Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops do not have recognizable (or understandable) existence on either side of the rationality/irrationality.
I think we have different understandings of "premises" for a knowledge body. For me, the premises of a knowledge body are the "most basic" statements whose truth enforces the truth of all other statements of that knowledge body.
That's what I think a premise of a knowledge body is as well.
Science, for example, has its premises (historically) told in Francis Bacon's "Novum Organum." The most basic to Science is its methodology. Assuming that methodology will in time result in "all" scientific achievements, including a measurement of light speed.
You can't be working in a knowledge body without being "totally" (consciously or otherwise) believing in its premises (which are the "most basic" of all). You can't assume Science's methodology for studying stones but look from Bible's outlook at human beings. This is a paradox just like Uncertainty.
Not paradoxical, but yes, it is as unusable as Uncertainty.
You choose to be a scientist. You understand Science's methodology. You use it to view the Universe, to view all. Then you get everything out of it. Science and all other knowledge bodies are self-sufficient encompassing systems of thought applied to an entire Universe (some knowledge bodies may assume more Universes or some Multiverse or no Universe at all).
Uncertainty's task is to detect inconsistencies and discrepancies in these knowledge bodies that wouldn't be seen if one's "inside" (or even "outside") these knowledge bodies. One concerned with Uncertainty won't fulfill the requirements of Uncertainty (eg, won't be "totally" Uncertain, as you say) but will be assuming a relatively fairer stance compared to other stances.
Again you describe "uncertainty" instead of "Uncertainty". This is not fitting, as my argument is against your belief in "Uncertainty".
Uncertainty challenges Science's methodology instead. This challenge invalidates all that relies on this methodology including but not limited to a measurement of light speed.
Then you agree with me?
This is humane treatment of human situation.
Thank you [;)].
Your "uncertainty" allows for unfair preference of some premises over others. Uncertainty, by its paradoxical nature, doesn't "allow" and/or "disallow" anything.
Until you can prove to me that this reasoning system (Uncertainty) can even exist, I will keep on repeating myself: If it doesn't allow or disallow anything, then it is unusable.
My current guess of that "grand" thing (as you call it) is that it's Unknown [;)]
It's obviously unknown, the point is in getting to know it, isn't it?
So the fact that one is always ready to review one's thoughts doesn't make one fairer?
One cannot even take it for granted that they should review their thoughts, under the framework of Uncertainty.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Nevertheless, if we were discussing it (which we never ever are) I would counter that knowing that symbolic things can be interpreted at will worsens the situation, but, more apparently than obviously we aren’t discussing it, so it more really than really doesn't matter and has never mattered to no one [:D]
Yeah, so who cares that your absolutely wrong, and that the Bible supplies it's own interpretations, and makes itself clear to anyone who actually studies it? It isn't even an issue that historians don't call Herodutus' writings foolish, just because they use symbolisms. [:D]
Success?
Yes.
From what point of view?
The common one.
By what definition of success?
The usual one.
In what history of human beings?
The only one.
You're right. Have you noticed you're using the other edge of the double-edged sword that Uncertainty is?
I don't really consider it a double-edged sword. I consider it to have only one edge, and it's the one that pierces through whoever tries to use it. One may not turn it about, either, because that would be making use of it, and thus would (inevitably) lead to their being pierced, before any useful progress is made.
And how "useful" and "practice" are defined?
In my post, or in general use?
First you tell me, "inapplicable" to which measures and tell your grounds for choosing those measures.
Any measure that you choose. It is you that was assigned to prove the inapplicability of my premises, so it is you who decides what is and is not applicable. If I disagree with your definition of applicability, then I will argue that point later.
As far as I know, the context is an entity's opposition to a denial of that specific entity's existence. That entity used a statement that was problematic within the framework that that entity intended that statement to be understood in.
The statement is not problematic, merely self-evident (and thus non-informative, just as you said). He was telling the Evil Demond what it should have known to begin with: You can't convince me of [bleep] if I don't exist, and thus will never prove to me that I don't exist.
I'd read it. You used terms that weren't subject to consensus (in this two-individual community, of course) while we'd agreed to use terms that refer to the same (or almost the same) things on both sides of dialogue.
Please explain. What terms did I use, and which ones should I have used instead?
Manuel_Silvio
May8-03, 06:54 PM
Greetz,
1. For Mentat:
Didn't you already show that it is the type statement, wherein "P" is a function of [bleep]?
Yes, but it's specific task is to show an incompatibility between Boolean Logic and a statment of the form "P ([bleep])", isn't it?
That P([beep]) was a generalization. I used it to prove that incompatibility case for all statements of the form "I [beep] therefore I am" ("I think therefore I am," "I eat therefore I am," "I want therefore I am," etc). Instead of using the specific verb, "think," I used a non-specific variable [beep]. You could say whatever verb in place of [beep] (for example "I discuss therefore I am") and P([beep]) would be a statement like "there need be an I to [beep]" (means, for example, "there need be an I to discuss").
Remember you claimed that one can't be thinking if one's not being. The function P([beep])'s value for [beep] = "think" is "there need be an I to think." P([beep]) is the generalization of your premise that thinking (or [beep]ing) and being are firmly bound. There's a reason for my using P([beep]). I took your premise (and generalized it, an action that complicated the matter), then I showed, during that proof, that your premise by which you claim the truth for Descartes' statement leads to a loop along with the same Descartes' statement. This was the loop case in that proof where I said if P = T and Q = T then we'll have a loop. And then I showed even if you put away your premise (eg, you say P = F) and we get P = F and Q = T you won't get much out of it because that would be a paradox. This was the paradox case.
Now, let's forget the P([beep]) generalization for it only complicates the matter (even though it's a decent generalization).
With or without P([beep]), it's clear that statements of form (Q => Q) are ever-true and that they "can't" be used to deduce the truth of Q itself. Take a look at this new formulation of the same proof, perhaps this one works for you.
You repeated many times that "if there wasn't an I, who could be thinking?" Let's have your word and say that "thinking" is the "undeniable" companion of "being." Saying this necessitates that "I think" be logically equivalent to "I am."
Descartes' statement is "I think therefore I am." Take "I think" and name it R. Take "I am" and name it Q. Descartes' statement can be expressed as (R => Q). Since R = Q (thinking is always the companion of being), we can always substitute Q with R so (R => Q) becomes (Q => Q). This (Q => Q) is an equivalent of Descartes' statement, (R => Q), by your premise that thinking and being are firmly bound. We know that any statement of form (Q => Q) is ever-true and the truth of Q itself (Q being "I am") can't be deduced from it. This is a non-informative case, a loop. You can't say if Q is T or F (eg, if you exist or not) by knowing that (Q => Q) is true.
It's worth noting that the equivalence of (R => Q) and (Q => Q) was taken from your premise. If you decide to put aside the firm bond between thinking and being then such equivalence can't be claimed and we have a (R => Q) which deduces Q's truth from R's truth like many other plain statements. However, in putting aside the firm bond between thinking (eg, "I think" which is R) and being (eg, "I am" which is Q) you've already accepted that Q's truth is irrelevant to R's truth and deducing Q's truth from R's truth isn't allowed. This is a self-contrary case, a paradox. You can't say R indicates Q when you've previously stated that R and Q are independent (eg, aren't bound).
Now, put the statement back into context, please, and see the impossible nature of the Evil Demon's task (to prove to someone that they don't exist), and we will have nothing left to discuss.Back to Evil Demon scenario, we have the Evil Demon claiming there's no Rene Descartes and Descartes claiming there is indeed a Rene Descartes by deducing from his ability to think of this scenario. Descartes is saying Q (eg, that "he is") is T because he's thinking of an Evil Demon scenario and from his thinking, his being can be directly derived, that (R => Q). Descartes is saying R = Q (eg, one's being can be derived from one's ability to think) and that (R => Q). The loop case happens here: (R => Q) can be turned to (Q => Q) and then Evil Demon can turn back to Descartes and tell him that from (Q => Q)'s truth (from "I think therefore I am"'s truth) Q's truth can't be derived without making a loop and violating the rules of game which are the boundaries of Boolean logic.
The incompatibility of Descartes' statement and Boolean logic gives the Evil Demon a chance to trap Descartes in a corner of the fight arena he's chosen to deal with the Evil Demon in; that fight arena being Boolean logic. Descartes' only way out is on the street and out of fight arena.
Why is a non-informative statement forbidden by Boolean Logic?For those who invented and developed it didn't like what wasn't "productive" and "practical" based on "their" understanding of "practice" and "production."
Searching for non-informative statements you won't find any but those statements that are inherently paradoxical and/or self-referenced. A statement is a sentence that can be assigned a "state" (in case of Boolean logic, either of T and F states). If a statement can be assigned a definite state then it's informative for it surely tells us something about something. There remain those statements which can't be assigned a definite state, these can only be of the above categories and because of their indefiniteness are non-informative.
So now you introduce context? This is a little irritating.
Besides, if I was born 15 years ago, then I must be 15 years old. If I travel through time, I was still born 15 subjective years ago, and that's all that matters to the statement.No, that wasn't a new context. I was only saying that "I was born 15 years ago" doesn't directly result in "I am 15." Hence, an "I was born 15 years ago therefore I am 15" can't be equaled to an "I am 15 therefore I am 15."
Even in the case you talk of 15 subjective years, those auxiliary statements (eg, those that must accompany "I was born 15 years ago" to get "I am 15") are present. Now they solemnly declare that there's a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Or they may declare Special Relativity and time dilation. Nonetheless, there should be some statements additional to "I was born 15 years ago" to deduce "I was 15." Your statement is of form (R => Q), R and Q being convertible to each other only under special circumstances, thus it isn't of form (Q => Q).
This is backward reasoning. You must take the premise for granted while not violating "nothing is certain", and thus Uncertainty is paradoxical.What happens after I realize Uncertainty's paradoxical nature? I know that its premise has no definite state and can be rejected while it is accepted.
Then it isn't useful. You said that it's usefulness (and it's "fairness") were that it could be used to determine the truth of another knowledge body.Truth or falsity aren't of the properties of knowledge bodies; they're states defined "within" knowledge bodies. Uncertainty doesn't determine "truth," it determines "attributes."
Here's an example. We can use aerial photos and telemetry to understand the geomorphology of Sierra Nevada. We can use the same methods to understand the geomorphology of Rockies. A geomorphologic assessment will determine the "attributes" of these terrains. Sierra Nevada will be seen with much more discontinuities than Rockies. Whether or not discontinuities are "good" or "bad" isn't a matter of geomorphology's interest; it's up to the inhabitants of these terrains to honor or lower the discontinuities of their land.
In analogy, Uncertainty isn't interested in finding out the "truth" (it would be biased if it was interested in truth which requires much debate before it can be defined), it will only reveal the attributes of knowledge bodies, for example if one specific knowledge body is consistent (or if is has whatever attribute) or not. It's up to the inhabitants of that knowledge body to decide if they like consistency (or any other attribute) or not. For example, those who live within Science like to see it consistent with observations while those who live within a Religion like to see their observations consistent with their Religion.
Not really. Knowledge is not a system for learning, and thus does not fall into the paradoxes of Russell or Godel.I wasn't talking about Gödel’s theorem or Russell’s paradox. Knowledge isn't a system for learning but this has nothing to do with its being studied. I was only asking if a study of knowledge, or rather gathering knowledge about knowledge, doesn't give rise to new problems.
... You are asking things like "if our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge...", when in fact, unless you know something about the nature of knowledge, it is obvious that "our knowledge" doesn't (yet) contain knowledge about the nature of knowledge.That's a repetition of my own question. If I ask "what's the nature of knowledge?" two possibilities are faced:
00. I know about the nature of knowledge, or the nature of my knowledge is contained in it. If so, why could I be asking this question?
01. I don't know about the nature of knowledge, or the knowledge of the nature of knowledge isn't contained in the knowledge. One part of the knowledge lies outside itself, so it can never be accessed.
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
May8-03, 07:03 PM
... continued from the previous topic
Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops are not the borders of rationality. "Borders" have recognizable existence on both sides of them. Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops do not have recognizable (or understandable) existence on either side of the rationality/irrationality.I have another definition of a "border," that's where one realm ends and another starts, a virtual line that inhabitants of one realm would pass in order to get to the other realm.
Suppose I'm a rational thinker. I start sorting out things rationally. I go on and on but then isn't there a limit to this task? I think there is. Whenever I, being a rational thinker, face Paradox, Self-reference and Uncertainty I go back and change my way in order to remain rational. If I went on my way I would've become irrational. I can pass these "borders" to go back and forth between these two realms. If I want to know in which realm I reside I only have to check out my log and see if I've passed these borders (eg, took into account these three or evaded them). Regardless of the nature of these three, they function like "borders" so I call them "borders."
Not paradoxical, but yes, it is as unusable as Uncertainty.
Yeah, so who cares that your absolutely wrong, and that the Bible supplies it's own interpretations, and makes itself clear to anyone who actually studies it? It isn't even an issue that historians don't call Herodutus' writings foolish, just because they use symbolisms.Not paradoxical, just in case you want to force match Science and Bible by interpreting Bible words as scientific statements. Does Bible include an interpretation of the symbolism used in Genesis? Does it say how to understand what "the throne of God" is? Does it say how to explain for Eve being second to Adam? Does it contain instructions to map Genesis' naïveté about Creation or Cosmogony into the hyper-complexity that this Universe is?
You can compare Genesis to Big Bang and then map the Christian God into Big Bang's primary fireball. Do you like it that way?
I haven't studied Bible. I haven't even read it completely once. However, I've seen people of the three major Western faiths (Christian, Judaist and Muslim) and seen them interpreting their "holy" books into scientific concepts. I've seen how they contradict both Science and their own Religion. I've seen how they modify Science to work to their liking and how they modify their Religion to work to the this-worldly necessity that is Science. In both of situations they were modifying these rigid bodies not to match them honestly but to explain for their actions, to make excuse for what they would anyway do.
Again you describe "uncertainty" instead of "Uncertainty". This is not fitting, as my argument is against your belief in "Uncertainty".Your "uncertainty" doesn't allow to see the inconsistencies in "uncertainty" itself but Uncertainty does even encourage one into looking at the inconsistency, the paradox that Uncertainty points at.
What I described required this condition and this condition is peculiar to Uncertainty and can't be satisfied with "uncertainty."
Then you agree with me?Conditionally yes. If you, too, think that Uncertainty challenges the generalizations and not the particulars because particulars are challenged naturally.
Until you can prove to me that this reasoning system (Uncertainty) can even exist, I will keep on repeating myself: If it doesn't allow or disallow anything, then it is unusable.Unusable for what use? And why do you want to "use" everything?
It's obviously unknown, the point is in getting to know it, isn't it?No. By the nature of its facets, it can't be known but it can be guessed at. Every two guesses are equally creditable [:))].
One cannot even take it for granted that they should review their thoughts, under the framework of Uncertainty.One needn't take that for granted. One will naturally be continuously reviewing one's thoughts to find out where this Uncertainty comes from and why one's is Uncertain.
The common one.
The usual one.
The only one.Common? Common among whom?
Usual? What's the usual definition of something? What's called usual?
Only one? Is this only one the only one written in history books or in cultural sediments or the only one advertised by governments? Viewed from whose point of view, from Blue Whales' point of view?
I don't really consider it a double-edged sword. I consider it to have only one edge, and it's the one that pierces through whoever tries to use it.I saw it flashing past me [:D] then I saw nothing. It's double-edged for it first challenges everything else then itself, it first pierces all other stances then itself.
In my post, or in general use?Neither. In your opinion.
Any measure that you choose. It is you that was assigned to prove the inapplicability of my premises, so it is you who decides what is and is not applicable. If I disagree with your definition of applicability, then I will argue that point later.My measures? I can make bizarre requests. Well, only those ideas are applicable that their written form is made up of 10,000 words each containing exactly 10 letters. By this measure, no idea is applicable.
Please explain. What terms did I use, and which ones should I have used instead?You said:It just doesn't change the fact that "practicality", by definition, is just something's usefulness in practice. Thus, people can have different ideas of what is "practical", but if they actually try their ideas out, they may (not necessarily, but likely) find that it is not really useful in practice.Where I think the terms:
00. Fact
01. Definition (you say by "definition" like there is "the" definition, a solemn one that is common among all beings)
02. Usefulness and/or Use
03. Practice
04. Actuality (referred to by the adverb "actually")
are unclear in the context of their containing sentences. I don't suggest any words in place of them, but I suggest we use them after we've made a common definition of them.
heusdens
May8-03, 07:12 PM
I think that the statement "I think, therefore I am" tells a different story as is stated above.
I think the statement is about telling a relationship between "thinking" and "being". The statement just says that "thinking" implies "being". The reverse statement however ("I am, therefore I think") is not necesseraliy true, which does not contradict the fact that if Descartes says it, or anyone else, it is nevertheless true.
Being is not reserved for the entities that think. A rock "is". But nowhere this implies that therefore the rock also "thinks".
When thinking about being, I could in principle doubt my being. But that would deny the fact that in any case I think. Because I know I think, it necessitates me to assume also I exist.
The main proposition therefore is:
~P -> ~Q
where P stand for "being" and Q stands for "thinking"
The proposition claims that non-being implies non-thinking. It does not however claim that non-thinking implies non-being, or that being implies thinking.
If the it is stated that Q is true ("I think") the argument is then that P also must be true ("I am").
As we can see, this makes logical sense. If we assume that "non-being" impies "non-thinking", and we can state that there is thinking, this implies that there is being.
Hence: I think, therefore I am.
How's it going, Manuel?
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
That P([beep]) was a generalization. I used it to prove that incompatibility case for all statements of the form "I [beep] therefore I am" ("I think therefore I am," "I eat therefore I am," "I want therefore I am," etc). Instead of using the specific verb, "think," I used a non-specific variable [beep]. You could say whatever verb in place of [beep] (for example "I discuss therefore I am") and P([beep]) would be a statement like "there need be an I to [beep]" (means, for example, "there need be an I to discuss").
Yes, I know. I was refering to the time when you started to talk about P[bleep] reasoning in the term of functions (like f(x)), and you said that you need not substitute an entity for "P".
Remember you claimed that one can't be thinking if one's not being. The function P([beep])'s value for [beep] = "think" is "there need be an I to think." P([beep]) is the generalization of your premise that thinking (or [beep]ing) and being are firmly bound. There's a reason for my using P([beep]). I took your premise (and generalized it, an action that complicated the matter), then I showed, during that proof, that your premise by which you claim the truth for Descartes' statement leads to a loop along with the same Descartes' statement. This was the loop case in that proof where I said if P = T and Q = T then we'll have a loop. And then I showed even if you put away your premise (eg, you say P = F) and we get P = F and Q = T you won't get much out of it because that would be a paradox. This was the paradox case.
Yes, I understood this as well.
With or without P([beep]), it's clear that statements of form (Q => Q) are ever-true and that they "can't" be used to deduce the truth of Q itself. Take a look at this new formulation of the same proof, perhaps this one works for you.
Well, first I have to point out that Descartes was not trying to deduce the truth of Q, when he made the statment, he was just proving the Evil Demon's attempt to be in vain.
You repeated many times that "if there wasn't an I, who could be thinking?" Let's have your word and say that "thinking" is the "undeniable" companion of "being." Saying this necessitates that "I think" be logically equivalent to "I am."
Descartes' statement is "I think therefore I am." Take "I think" and name it R. Take "I am" and name it Q. Descartes' statement can be expressed as (R => Q). Since R = Q (thinking is always the companion of being), we can always substitute Q with R so (R => Q) becomes (Q => Q). This (Q => Q) is an equivalent of Descartes' statement, (R => Q), by your premise that thinking and being are firmly bound. We know that any statement of form (Q => Q) is ever-true and the truth of Q itself (Q being "I am") can't be deduced from it. This is a non-informative case, a loop. You can't say if Q is T or F (eg, if you exist or not) by knowing that (Q => Q) is true.
It's worth noting that the equivalence of (R => Q) and (Q => Q) was taken from your premise. If you decide to put aside the firm bond between thinking and being then such equivalence can't be claimed and we have a (R => Q) which deduces Q's truth from R's truth like many other plain statements. However, in putting aside the firm bond between thinking (eg, "I think" which is R) and being (eg, "I am" which is Q) you've already accepted that Q's truth is irrelevant to R's truth and deducing Q's truth from R's truth isn't allowed. This is a self-contrary case, a paradox. You can't say R indicates Q when you've previously stated that R and Q are independent (eg, aren't bound).
You are mostly right about all of this. One thing to keep in mind, R does not equal Q, but rather contains Q as a sub-premise. The difference is that R's truth necessitates that Q be true, but Q can be true without R.
Back to Evil Demon scenario, we have the Evil Demon claiming there's no Rene Descartes and Descartes claiming there is indeed a Rene Descartes by deducing from his ability to think of this scenario. Descartes is saying Q (eg, that "he is") is T because he's thinking of an Evil Demon scenario and from his thinking, his being can be directly derived, that (R => Q). Descartes is saying R = Q (eg, one's being can be derived from one's ability to think) and that (R => Q). The loop case happens here: (R => Q) can be turned to (Q => Q) and then Evil Demon can turn back to Descartes and tell him that from (Q => Q)'s truth (from "I think therefore I am"'s truth) Q's truth can't be derived without making a loop and violating the rules of game which are the boundaries of Boolean logic.
Incorrect. The Demon is the one that tried to convince an existent entity that he didn't exist, so it is the Demon that is at fault. Descartes would not tell the Demon "I think therefore I am", but would, rather, say "I can think about what you are trying to convince me of, therefore you are defeating your own purpose".
Something to remember about Descartes (I've read a few of his works now) is that he often starts with a statment or concludes with a statement, but the statement doesn't even need to make sense outside of it's context. He gives the context at some point, and the statement should be evaluated only within the framework of the context.
For those who invented and developed it didn't like what wasn't "productive" and "practical" based on "their" understanding of "practice" and "production."
Searching for non-informative statements you won't find any but those statements that are inherently paradoxical and/or self-referenced. A statement is a sentence that can be assigned a "state" (in case of Boolean logic, either of T and F states). If a statement can be assigned a definite state then it's informative for it surely tells us something about something. There remain those statements which can't be assigned a definite state, these can only be of the above categories and because of their indefiniteness are non-informative.
Well this makes sense. However, Descartes' was making the statement within a context that allowed it to be relevant. It was the conclusion of an entire "lesson", so to speak.
He started out with the Evil Demon, trying to convince Descartes that all of the things that he believed were false. Then the Evil Demon went on to try to convince Descartes that he didn't exist. But Descartes came back at him by (basically) saying that the fact that the Demon is making an effort to convince him (Descartes) that he didn't exist, and the fact that Descartes could think about not existing, proved that Descartes did (in fact) exist. At the end of it, Descartes compacted this reasoning into "I think therefore I am".
No, that wasn't a new context. I was only saying that "I was born 15 years ago" doesn't directly result in "I am 15." Hence, an "I was born 15 years ago therefore I am 15" can't be equaled to an "I am 15 therefore I am 15."
Look at the statement "I was born fifteen years ago": One of it's sub-premises is "I was born", and another is "it's been fifteen years since then".
Thus, the second statement of "I was born fifteen years ago, therefore I am 15" (let's call it Q') is one of the sub-premises of the first statement (P'). This is the same situation as "I think therefore I am", as I have shown before.
Even in the case you talk of 15 subjective years, those auxiliary statements (eg, those that must accompany "I was born 15 years ago" to get "I am 15") are present. Now they solemnly declare that there's a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Or they may declare Special Relativity and time dilation. Nonetheless, there should be some statements additional to "I was born 15 years ago" to deduce "I was 15." Your statement is of form (R => Q), R and Q being convertible to each other only under special circumstances, thus it isn't of form (Q => Q).
And neither is "I think therefore I am", as I've shown above.
Response continued on the next post...
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
What happens after I realize Uncertainty's paradoxical nature? I know that its premise has no definite state and can be rejected while it is accepted.
No, a paradoxical state is also definite. It is the state of "damned if you do, damned if you don't", so to speak, and doesn't allow you to choose either to reject or to accept.
Truth or falsity aren't of the properties of knowledge bodies; they're states defined "within" knowledge bodies. Uncertainty doesn't determine "truth," it determines "attributes."
But each "attribute" is seen as either being true or false.
I really apologize, but I must go now. I will finish my response later.
P.S. Please wait for the rest of my response, before responding [:)].
"I can think only if I exist"
Premises:
1. to think, i must have intelligence
2. to have intelligence, i must have brain
3. to have brain, i must exist in one way or other
I think - is evidence, not reason or cause. its observable. true
if I exist = true
if I have brain = true
if I have intelligence = true
then I am thinking = true
negating any of above without negating conclusion invalidates logic.
invalidating of any of above will lead to invalid reasoning, or basically that answer is undefined and above inference cannot be used for reasoning
Thus, if you observe thinking, then it falls out that all of the above MUST be true.
if I exist = false
then I am thinking = false
if I exist = unknown
then I am thinking = unknown, maybe true, maybe false
not that this prooves you can't know if you exist, but that if your existence is undefined, then this reasoning is invalid. It cannot be used to inquire new information or check validity of claims.
if I exist = true
if I have brain = false
if I have intelligence = false (because of premise 2)
then I am thinking = false
if I exist = true
if I have brain = invalid
if I have intelligence = unknown
then I am thinking = invalid
if I exist = true
if I have brain = true
if I have intelligence = false
then I am thinking = false
Observation: there exists only 1 valid logical reasoning that yields statement I am thinking = true. And it is only when all of premises are both defined and true. Therefore we can safely backtrace and claim that if evidence supports that we are thinking, then all of the above must be true. There are no other valid cases.
Therefore, it is impossible to convince one into 'thinking' that he 'does not exist'.
Descartes was right.
Manuel is pointing out that logical reasoning is broken when encountering invalid premises. This means that conclusion of such reasoning cannot be used in further reasonings as premise, even though reasoning line itself is perfectly logical.
When premise's truth is unknown as is awfully often, then same long chain of reasoning can produce any of unknown, false, true, invalid, depending just on combination of truthness of premises and complexity of reasoning chain.
Thats the reason why circular reasoning is banned strongly, its truthness is undefined. Its easy when Q=>Q and thats not problem. Much worse is when such circular reference is hidden inside long chain of reasoning. When such circular reasoning is found, its usually evidence of confusing between anteriority and posteriority of statements and must be rearranged. This can be both killer and fruitful in finding more fundamental things.
Any theory depends of premises that cannot be proved. Because depending on these premises whole theory can go south, they are postulated true. Thats it, the rest is to find out how far you can get without hitting contradictions and complying with observable evidence.
So there are 3 components: premises -> internal consistency -> conclusions (testable).
When someone says 'this is logical' then only 'internal consistency' is implied.
One can only proove one thing: from this bunch of premises there exists internally consistent path to that bunch of conclusions. Nothing else. One cannot proove premises or that conclusions are true, their truthness depends on premises.
What Manuel seems to imply with Uncertainty is that you can never be completely sure that your premises are true. Similarily you can never be completely sure in your conclusions. You can only be sure in internal consistency. Postulates are arbitrary choices made under influence of beliefs.
Descartes just showed that given true observable and internally consistent reasoning there can be only one premise that can lead to thinking: to exist.
So at times it seems one can 'proove' premises by means of evidence. But quite often such 'proof' is illusion, there may exist other internally consistent reasoning that leads to opposite conclusions. This just tells that one must never be imagining that he has solid ground to start from, that this solid ground has been proved by evidence shouldn't get dogmatic.
Logical reasoning has no start and no end, its just endless swamp.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Here's an example. We can use aerial photos and telemetry to understand the geomorphology of Sierra Nevada. We can use the same methods to understand the geomorphology of Rockies. A geomorphologic assessment will determine the "attributes" of these terrains. Sierra Nevada will be seen with much more discontinuities than Rockies. Whether or not discontinuities are "good" or "bad" isn't a matter of geomorphology's interest; it's up to the inhabitants of these terrains to honor or lower the discontinuities of their land.
In analogy, Uncertainty isn't interested in finding out the "truth" (it would be biased if it was interested in truth which requires much debate before it can be defined), it will only reveal the attributes of knowledge bodies, for example if one specific knowledge body is consistent (or if is has whatever attribute) or not. It's up to the inhabitants of that knowledge body to decide if they like consistency (or any other attribute) or not. For example, those who live within Science like to see it consistent with observations while those who live within a Religion like to see their observations consistent with their Religion.
Nice analogy. Think of this, the arieal photos cannot be used to analyze the camera, can they? Apply that to Uncertainty (in analogy), and you'll see my point.
I wasn't talking about Gödel’s theorem or Russell’s paradox. Knowledge isn't a system for learning but this has nothing to do with its being studied. I was only asking if a study of knowledge, or rather gathering knowledge about knowledge, doesn't give rise to new problems.
Why would it?
That's a repetition of my own question. If I ask "what's the nature of knowledge?" two possibilities are faced:
00. I know about the nature of knowledge, or the nature of my knowledge is contained in it. If so, why could I be asking this question?
01. I don't know about the nature of knowledge, or the knowledge of the nature of knowledge isn't contained in the knowledge. One part of the knowledge lies outside itself, so it can never be accessed.
I don't understand point "00". Please explain it, and the I will respond.
Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
I have another definition of a "border," that's where one realm ends and another starts, a virtual line that inhabitants of one realm would pass in order to get to the other realm.
But does this line not exist on both sides of it, like I said?
Suppose I'm a rational thinker. I start sorting out things rationally. I go on and on but then isn't there a limit to this task? I think there is. Whenever I, being a rational thinker, face Paradox, Self-reference and Uncertainty I go back and change my way in order to remain rational. If I went on my way I would've become irrational. I can pass these "borders" to go back and forth between these two realms.
Not really. As I see it, a (defined) border is a rational concept, and cannot exist on the irrational side. Once you get to "irrational", you lose track of all rational concepts, including the border, or what's on the other side.
Does Bible include an interpretation of the symbolism used in Genesis?
Yes, for all practical purposes. Besides, the only symoblism I can think of (in the Creation account of Genesis) is the use of the word "days" - and this is easily resolved with an understanding of the Hebrew term, rendered "day" in English.
Does it say how to understand what "the throne of God" is?
Yes, it is symbolic of His authority, and His right to rule - much like His having a "white beard" is symbolic of His wisdom, because that was the common-place opinion in the past (age = wisdom).
Does it say how to explain for Eve being second to Adam?
Common sense dictates that He wanted to try it (creating a human) out once, before making his masterpiece [;)]. (Or, He just didn't want someone telling Him how to do the job [:D]).
Seriously, it was to demonstrate the head-ship arrangement, as explained later in the letter to the Colossians (by the apostle Paul).
Manuel, we should drop the religious discussion now. This isn't the thread, or the Forum, for it. Can we agree on that, please?
Your "uncertainty" doesn't allow to see the inconsistencies in "uncertainty" itself but Uncertainty does even encourage one into looking at the inconsistency, the paradox that Uncertainty points at.
"uncertainty" is not inconsistent, merely lacking (like any other knowledge body). Uncertainty, OTOH, is inconsistent, and thus there is no reason to study it any further, because all you are going to get is further knowledge about why it is inwardly inconsistent, and thus outwardly unusable.
What I described required this condition and this condition is peculiar to Uncertainty and can't be satisfied with "uncertainty."
Conditionally yes. If you, too, think that Uncertainty challenges the generalizations and not the particulars because particulars are challenged naturally.
I don't understand this, can you please explain what you mean?
Unusable for what use? And why do you want to "use" everything?
Open foot and insert mouth, Manuel [;)] (no offense). You are the one who came up with reasons why Uncertainty was "fair" and "helpful". This was your attempt to make it appear usuable.
No. By the nature of its facets, it can't be known but it can be guessed at. Every two guesses are equally creditable [:))].
Every two usable guesses are equally creditable.
One needn't take that for granted. One will naturally be continuously reviewing one's thoughts to find out where this Uncertainty comes from and why one's is Uncertain.
Don't you get it? One will only continue to examine this after having taken Uncertainty's premise for granted.
Common? Common among whom?
Humans.
Usual? What's the usual definition of something? What's called usual?
Usual things. Things that are common.
Only one? Is this only one the only one written in history books or in cultural sediments or the only one advertised by governments?
Probably both.
I saw it flashing past me [:D] then I saw nothing. It's double-edged for it first challenges everything else then itself, it first pierces all other stances then itself.
Who assigns this order to it? If it has an order in which to challenge things, then it contradicts it's own premise of taking nothing (including such an order as you have posted here) for granted.
Neither. In your opinion.
Ok, practical is "useful when put into practice"; and useful is "able to be used".
My measures? I can make bizarre requests. Well, only those ideas are applicable that their written form is made up of 10,000 words each containing exactly 10 letters. By this measure, no idea is applicable.
By this post alone, one can see that you are stuck on the "irrational" side of the border.
You said:Where I think the terms:
00. Fact
01. Definition (you say by "definition" like there is "the" definition, a solemn one that is common among all beings)
02. Usefulness and/or Use
03. Practice
04. Actuality (referred to by the adverb "actually")
are unclear in the context of their containing sentences. I don't suggest any words in place of them, but I suggest we use them after we've made a common definition of them.
Fact: Something that is demonstrably, and unquestionably true. You don't have to agree that such a thing exists, but can we agree that that is it's definition?
Definition: Something assigned to the ink mark/electrically produced symbol/audible noise, produced by the mouth/or any other form of communicating "words", which gives the word meaning.
Actuality: Reality, being factual in nature.
Manuel_Silvio
May11-03, 04:41 AM
Greetz,
1. For wimms:
Thanks for your help. You said much more than, I think, I could've said.
2. For Mentat:
How's it going, Manuel?I have a cold and I'm having a feverish time but I can take it, or make it, with Uncertainty [:D].
Well, first I have to point out that Descartes was not trying to deduce the truth of Q, when he made the statment, he was just proving the Evil Demon's attempt to be in vain.Q is "I am." To show the Evil Demon's attempt was in vain, Descartes must have been able to prove that Q was true, that "he was." Otherwise, the Evil Demon's attempt could be considered successful. If he wasn't trying to prove that "he was," it's been him who's worked out of context. For the Evil Demon had only claimed that "he wasn't."
One thing to keep in mind, R does not equal Q, but rather contains Q as a sub-premise. The difference is that R's truth necessitates that Q be true, but Q can be true without R.Notice that the equality sign "=" used there meant "logical equivalence" and not "literal equivalence." If two statements always have the same state (like R and Q, because by your premise R's truth means Q's truth and vice versa) they are "logically equivalent" and each of them can be replaced with the other at any time.
The equality sign used in symbolic logic for logical equivalence of statements is a set of three horizontal lines put on top of each other, like a numerical equality sign (the "=," I mean) plus one other horizontal line. I couldn't find this symbol among PF symbols so I used "=" in place of it.
... Descartes would not tell the Demon "I think therefore I am", but would, rather, say "I can think about what you are trying to convince me of, therefore you are defeating your own purpose". And the Demon could tell him that by his premise that is the firm bond between "thinking" and "being" he has made loop in saying "I think about your attempts therefore I am and you've defeated your own purpose."
Descartes attacks the Demon with his rigorous Aristotelian logic but the Demon (at least, this Demon that I am) knows that logic has its own rules and the rules can be used to show Descartes that he has violated his own logic by making a premise that necessitates a self-reference.
Many centuries ago (even before Descartes, I think) there was a proof for a God. Many Religions and religious people refer to God as "the being whose being is necessary." You see, they've made up a statement that is "God is therefore God is." Some monk proved God this way: "if God is the one whose being is necessary then the God is necessarily there." The monk later interpreted this God as the Christian God and lived a life of relieved faith; the monk had proved God, at last.
You can always define a being whose being is part of the being's definition, for example you can say "a green Ostrich is a being that is." By this definition, the being of a "green Ostrich" can never be logically denied. Since you can make countless definitions of this form at will, you can fill the Universe with countless beings who can never be logically proven non-existent. After all, they all "are," by definition.
The monk made two mistakes. The first and the easier one to detect, is to interpret that "being that is" as the Christian God. The monk could define as many "being that is" beings as he wished but he couldn't tell of what nature they were or even if these beings could interact with this Universe or not. The being's being could be defined but its attributes had to be "investigated" and such investigation wasn't possible because the being didn't seem to have any tendency to show up around human inhabited places.
The second mistake was to include a being's being in its definition. Immanuel Kant (or some other philosopher, I'm not sure) later forbid this form of definition (in the boundaries of Aristotelian logic, of course). Such definitions were "impractical" and "unproductive" to the inventors and developers of Aristotelian logic.
Descartes' "I am therefore I am," is of the same nature. Descartes wanted to show that logical validity of this deduction can do in place of the validity of its premises. This act is logically forbidden by forbidding loops. His manner of using an "undeniable" indication of his being, which was "thinking," led him into making a loop with two elements that were "being" and "thinking." If "being" and "thinking" are so firmly bound that "thinking" can be an undeniable indication of being then "being" and "thinking" are the same thing and deducing "being" from "thinking" is like deducing a statement's truth from itself. It's a loop.
Something to remember about Descartes (I've read a few of his works now) is that he often starts with a statment or concludes with a statement, but the statement doesn't even need to make sense outside of it's context. He gives the context at some point, and the statement should be evaluated only within the framework of the context.I don't think I understand this well. The only context I can see is Descartes' conversation with the Demon.
The Demon says that Descartes "isn't there" and Descartes says the "he's indeed there." They are discussing the matter logically and have opposing opinions. One of these opinions can come out as the result of their debate, the one that's logically proven right or the one whose opponent is proven logically wrong. If either of these opinions, that of Descartes' or that of Demon's, has a logical fault inside then it's considered logically wrong so it's opposition is right. This is another limitation imposed by Aristotelian logic: it says "that which isn't right, is wrong."
Discussion about context is a new aspect of philosophical debates, compared to Aristotelian logic. Contextual conclusions can include uncertainties of many forms while Aristotelian logic allows for absolutely no uncertainty. It judges everything the harsh way, everything is either true of false. That's the reason why multi-value logic and later fuzzy logic were invented.
However, Descartes' was making the statement within a context that allowed it to be relevant. It was the conclusion of an entire "lesson", so to speak.A statement's validity is context-dependent. For example, "there's an intangible being right under my bed" is valid within a philosophical debate while it isn't valid within a scientific debate; there it's just out of context.
A statement's truth, on the other hand, isn't context-dependent. The statement "there's an intangible being right under my bed" is one calling for investigation of some being and its truth value can "always" be determined by investigation of its premises under the regulations of the logical system chosen for this investigation. Or the statement can be postulated and used for the formation of a new axiomatic construct. For Philosophy, there can "always" be countless intangible being right under everyone's bed.
Descartes' statement, being a statement and being discussed under the rule of Boolean logic, "must" be assigned a definite state that will remain with it all the time. The Evil Demon scenario makes a context in which this statement becomes valid but this statement's truth won't be limited to that context. Its truth can and should always be questioned until a proof or disproof (within the bounds the logical system it’s associated with) is found for it.
Look at the statement "I was born fifteen years ago": One of it's sub-premises is "I was born", and another is "it's been fifteen years since then".
Thus, the second statement of "I was born fifteen years ago, therefore I am 15" (let's call it Q') is one of the sub-premises of the first statement (P'). This is the same situation as "I think therefore I am", as I have shown before.The point is that "it's been fifteen years since then" isn't the logical equivalent to "I am 15."
"I am 15" is a statement about the chronology of a biological phenomenon (that's "you"). It means, "15 solar years have been past after the turnover that was my birth." For this statement to be true there need be other statements than your "it's been fifteen years since then." There need be the truth of a statement like "and I have never been in a time machine" to deduce
Symbolically expressed we have (P ^ R) => Q which isn't a loop.
P: I've seen 15 years passing by.
Q: I am fifteen.
R: I haven't experienced any time distortions.
Truth table for (P ^ R) => Q
P-------Q-------R-------(P ^ R)-------(P ^ R) => Q
T-------T-------T----------T----------T
T-------T-------F----------F----------T
T-------F-------T----------T----------F
F-------T-------T----------F----------T
T-------F-------F----------F----------T <-
F-------T-------F----------F----------T
F-------F-------T----------F----------T
F-------F-------F----------F----------T
This truth table has 8 rows (2 raised to the power of 3), for all possible combinations of P, Q and R.
(P ^ R) => Q isn't an ever-true statement so it's surely not a loop. Ever-true-ness is a characteristic of all loops.
As seen on the table (P ^ R) => Q deduction is T in 7 cases out of 8 while Q (whose truth is the desirable result, that you're 15) can be F in 3 scenarios without any problems in your deduction. (P ^ R) => Q which is a logical deduction can be valid and true while your desired result Q is valid and false.
With a look at the line marked with "<-" you can see the scenario I proposed. You're born 15 years ago (P = T) but you've experienced a time distortion (R = F), so you aren't 15 (Q = F); and this is a valid and true deduction (for ((P ^ R) => Q) = T).
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
May11-03, 05:05 AM
... continued from the previous post
By the way, suppose this "I was born 15 years ago therefore I am fifteen" is really an "I am 15 therefore I am 15." If you're right in that supposition then you have another loop at hand, nothing more. What's the point in finding another loop?
And neither is "I think therefore I am", as I've shown above.
Neither of which you mean?
No, a paradoxical state is also definite. It is the state of "damned if you do, damned if you don't", so to speak, and doesn't allow you to choose either to reject or to accept.Let's see the bright side of it: "blessed if you do, blessed if you don't." It's much fairer than "blessed if you do, damned if you don't" or "damned if you do, blessed if you don't." For it incorporates the "Hypothesis of Damnation and Blessing Equality" [;)].
Quoting Lao-tzu from Tao-te Ching (James Legge’s translation):
13. 1. Favour and disgrace would seem equally to be feared; honour and great calamity, to be regarded as personal conditions (of the same kind).
2. What is meant by speaking thus of favour and disgrace? Disgrace is being in a low position (after the enjoyment of favour). The getting that (favour) leads to the apprehension (of losing it), and the losing it leads to the fear of (still greater calamity):--this is what is meant by saying that favour and disgrace would seem equally to be feared.
And what is meant by saying that honour and great calamity are to be (similarly) regarded as personal conditions? What makes me liable to great calamity is my having the body (which I call myself); if I had not the body, what great calamity could come to me?
3. Therefore he who would administer the kingdom, honouring it as he honours his own person, may be employed to govern it, and he who would administer it with the love which he bears to his own person may be entrusted with it.
But each "attribute" is seen as either being true or false.This is a different story. Attributes themselves may be attributed some states, such as T/F. Uncertainty may be right/wrong in reporting an inconsistency or consistency in a knowledge body but the inconsistency attribute itself has no truth/falsity.
We have a database with data records like this:
Knowledge Body ~~ Consistency/Inconsistency Data
KB1---------------Consistent
KB2---------------Inconsistent
KB3---------------Inconsistent<-wrong data record, KB3 is consistent
KB4---------------Consistent
.
.
.
KBn---------------Inconsistent
Now, each of data records may contain wrong data but the contained data itself isn't about rightness/wrongness.
In that geomorphology example, we could have some topographic maps of the studied terrains. These maps might report wrong height values but height values themselves aren't about rightness/wrongness. Height values are chosen over an arbitrary range of real numbers and no real number is true/false (eg, 666.13 isn't true/false).
Nice analogy. Think of this, the arieal photos cannot be used to analyze the camera, can they? Apply that to Uncertainty (in analogy), and you'll see my point.Well-thought extension to analogy [:)].
That's a good question. Your "uncertainty" basically prohibits doubting its own premise(s) in order to avoid paradox. It tells one: "there's no point in trying to see a camera through the same camera." Uncertainty responds: "I know, but let's give it a try or at least pretend we're trying." By giving this "hint" of the situation it informs one of the aspects of one's situation. Your "uncertainty," on the other hand, hides away this basic piece of knowledge. If you explain Uncertainty to someone, that someone will be challenged in all aspects of her/his knowledge while if you explain "uncertainty," that someone will only be given another set of premises that challenges everything but itself and doesn't contain the basic rule of fairness: "challenge everything even yourself."
We could achieve absolute fairness if we could see a camera through the same camera, if we could analyze our premises without being committed to some premises. This isn't achievable, so absolute fairness isn't achievable. Relative fairness is in that you, at least, try "in vain" to view the camera through the same camera. It would be "in vain" but has a "hint" at one's desire of fairness. Without this "hint," it's easy to forget one's own desire.
In case of existence, it isn't logically provable or, at least, yet logically proven. That's where a form of uncertainty comes in. No one can indulge in playing with one's existence for too long but turning the existence into "a solid statement" is problematic. One breaks the rules of game by that action; a new game is created but this new game is blind and unfair. Existence would better be kept as a sort of "I know it, you know it, they know it, but I won't tell." Otherwise, the long debate is started over, possibly going through the same stages of development and experiencing the same downfall which spoils both existence and non-existence.
Why would it?Because of the situation faced after asking "what's the nature of knowledge?" Nonetheless, such problems are still in question; I'm asking not negating/affirming.
00. I know about the nature of knowledge, or the nature of my knowledge is contained in it. If so, why could I be asking this question?
I don't understand point "00". Please explain it, and the I will respond.For every piece of possible knowledge, either of the two states can be assumed:
00. It's contained in your knowledge (you know it).
01. It isn't contained in your knowledge (you don't know it).
Suppose you asked "what's the nature of knowledge?" (or similarly, "what're the limits of knowledge?" or any other questions concerned with knowing the knowledge itself). The answer to that question would be a possible piece of knowledge, for which either of the above states can be assumed:
00. The answer is contained in your knowledge, or your knowledge contains the knowledge of its own nature (you know the answer). If so, why could you be asking the question?
01. The answer isn't contained in your knowledge, or your knowledge doesn't contain the knowledge about its own nature (you don't know the answer). If so, the answer would be unreachable because this piece of possible knowledge lies totally outside your current knowledge and there's no way to get to something that lies totally outside itself (for the knowledge of the knowledge is some knowledge itself).
But does this line not exist on both sides of it, like I said?Does the equator exist on both Northern and Southern hemispheres? Equator is a virtual line of zero thickness. What gives meaning to this virtual line is its function: it divides.
Uncertainty, Paradox and Self-reference are virtual lines. They don't exist on no side (in fact, on the irrational side existence itself can be a varying concept) but they function like borders: they divide.
Not really. As I see it, a (defined) border is a rational concept, and cannot exist on the irrational side. Once you get to "irrational", you lose track of all rational concepts, including the border, or what's on the other side.See above. And irrationality doesn't have to do with "losing track of everything." One "needn't" keep track of anything when one's irrational but one may "like" to keep track of things and that liking works on both sides, rational and irrational.
Rationalization itself is a subset of irrationality. What's the rationale behind rationalization?
Yes, for all practical purposes. Besides, the only symoblism I can think of (in the Creation account of Genesis) is the use of the word "days" - and this is easily resolved with an understanding of the Hebrew term, rendered "day" in English.It wasn't me who said Bible is symbolic. If Genesis isn't symbolic, then it's meant literally and if it's meant literally it's in contradiction to scientific Cosmogony.
Manuel, we should drop the religious discussion now. This isn't the thread, or the Forum, for it. Can we agree on that, please?Yes. I won't make any other comments on that subject. However, it wasn't a religious discussion, it was one about two incompatible knowledge bodies as examples.
Manuel_Silvio: Your "uncertainty" doesn't allow to see the inconsistencies in "uncertainty" itself but Uncertainty does even encourage one into looking at the inconsistency, the paradox that Uncertainty points at.
Mentat: "uncertainty" is not inconsistent, merely lacking (like any other knowledge body). Uncertainty, OTOH, is inconsistent, and thus there is no reason to study it any further, because all you are going to get is further knowledge about why it is inwardly inconsistent, and thus outwardly unusable.I didn't say "uncertainty" is inconsistent even though it is. I was referring to the inconsistency (or the paradox) of "fair" observer.
Uncertainty contains a hint of that paradox while "uncertainty" doesn't. And I think this hint would better be present but there's no necessity and that's why I personally "like" Uncertainty more than "uncertainty" but use "uncertainty" (or rather a form of certainty) in my everyday life.
I've studied Uncertainty and I've learnt much. It wasn't unusable in my experience. Even if it's unusable, it's the "fairest." Suppose you (and all humanity) have tried to study human situation but have come to a possible dead-end. Close your eyes to the dead-end and you're stuck in a deadlock. Open your eyes and you'll possibly find some way out.
continued on the next post...
Manuel_Silvio
May11-03, 05:13 AM
... continued from the previous post
1. What I described required this condition and this condition is peculiar to Uncertainty and can't be satisfied with "uncertainty."
2. Conditionally yes. If you, too, think that Uncertainty challenges the generalizations and not the particulars because particulars are challenged naturally.
I don't understand this, can you please explain what you mean?
1 and 2 are separate. The condition called for in 1 isn't the one talked about in 2.
In case 1, the condition is that any system of thoughts one chooses after the realization of "fair" observer's paradox would better have a hint of that very basic paradox. Uncertainty satisfies this condition while "uncertainty" doesn't.
In case 2, the condition is that you put away discussion of particulars of scientific Universe and challenge its generalizations, its methodology for example. You've already satisfied this condition by not talking of measurement of light speed but talking of Science's generalizations.
Open foot and insert mouth, Manuel (no offense). You are the one who came up with reasons why Uncertainty was "fair" and "helpful". This was your attempt to make it appear usuable.What does that idiom mean?
I was the one who asked why you wanted to "use" something and what "use" meant.
I said it's "fair" and "helpful." You associate these with your "use."
Every two usable guesses are equally creditable.Usable to whom? Usable for what use? What does "use" mean? Why only usable guesses?
Don't you get it? One will only continue to examine this after having taken Uncertainty's premise for granted.And one will only realize one's paradoxical situation after having impossibly made possible the impossible.
Humans.
Usual things. Things that are common.
Probably both.
What are humans? How did you summon them all and ask their opinions?
Am I non-human in striving for something else?
What is common? Who has the right to determine what is common and what is uncommon?
Both? They were three, not two and these three have countless equally creditable substitutes. Human history isn't a solid entity sitting somewhere, it's the fluid colloid of previous representations of human interactions. What human history means, is dependent on the observer and on the context. Human history isn't the same thing for any two individuals or