View Full Version : Another EPR question
Blake Winter
Oct11-04, 03:52 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\nI was contemplating the relation between the Bell inequality\nviolations and relativistic QFT. If we assume the usual collapse\npicture, then we have to have one measurement affect the other accross\na spacelike interval, which, although undetectable, still seems to go\nagainst the spirit of relativity. Then I was thinking, what if we do\nsomething with spin/polarization or any other physical quantity where\nwe assume that we can\'t talk differences in polarization at two\ndifferent points? Sort of like the idea of Yang and Mills with\nisospin, to say that we can define a proton and a neutron differently\nat every point in spacetime without changing the situation physically.\nIf we did this, we\'d be saying that you can talk about defining\npolarization and/or spin or whatever physical quantities are in the\nexperiment differently at every point of spacetime without changing\nthe physics of the situation. Then it only becomes meaningful to talk\nabout correlations when we bring information from the two events\ntogether, which restores locality to the problem. This also seems\nsuggested by GR where we can\'t talk about global conservation of\nenergy or anything else in a meaningful way. But, of course, I\'m not\nsure if what I\'m suggesting is possible or, if it is possible, if it\nis helpful. That is, would it be possible to suggest that spin and\npolarization must be defined only in a purely local sense? If so,\nwould this allow for the derivation of the Bell inequalities without\nassuming some nonlocal effect from the wavefunction collapse (i.e.\ncollapse could become a local effect as well)?\nIf this were so, then the answer to the Bell inequalities would not be\na nonlocal effect of collapse but rather an increase in locality: that\nit is not even meaningful to talk about correlations unless those\ncorrelations are locally compared. On the other hand, my idea could\nbe purely ridiculous - I suppose I\'m just not sure whether it could be\ncast into a useful form or not.\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>I was contemplating the relation between the Bell inequality
violations and relativistic QFT. If we assume the usual collapse
picture, then we have to have one measurement affect the other accross
a spacelike interval, which, although undetectable, still seems to go
against the spirit of relativity. Then I was thinking, what if we do
something with spin/polarization or any other physical quantity where
we assume that we can't talk differences in polarization at two
different points? Sort of like the idea of Yang and Mills with
isospin, to say that we can define a proton and a neutron differently
at every point in spacetime without changing the situation physically.
If we did this, we'd be saying that you can talk about defining
polarization and/or spin or whatever physical quantities are in the
experiment differently at every point of spacetime without changing
the physics of the situation. Then it only becomes meaningful to talk
about correlations when we bring information from the two events
together, which restores locality to the problem. This also seems
suggested by GR where we can't talk about global conservation of
energy or anything else in a meaningful way. But, of course, I'm not
sure if what I'm suggesting is possible or, if it is possible, if it
is helpful. That is, would it be possible to suggest that spin and
polarization must be defined only in a purely local sense? If so,
would this allow for the derivation of the Bell inequalities without
assuming some nonlocal effect from the wavefunction collapse (i.e.
collapse could become a local effect as well)?
If this were so, then the answer to the Bell inequalities would not be
a nonlocal effect of collapse but rather an increase in locality: that
it is not even meaningful to talk about correlations unless those
correlations are locally compared. On the other hand, my idea could
be purely ridiculous - I suppose I'm just not sure whether it could be
cast into a useful form or not.
Ilja Schmelzer
Oct12-04, 10:49 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n"Blake Winter" <blake.winter@houghton.edu> schrieb\n> Then I was thinking, what if we do\n> something with spin/polarization or any other physical quantity where\n> we assume that we can\'t talk differences in polarization at two\n> different points? Sort of like the idea of Yang and Mills with\n> isospin, to say that we can define a proton and a neutron differently\n> at every point in spacetime without changing the situation physically.\n> If we did this, we\'d be saying that you can talk about defining\n> polarization and/or spin or whatever physical quantities are in the\n> experiment differently at every point of spacetime without changing\n> the physics of the situation. Then it only becomes meaningful to talk\n> about correlations when we bring information from the two events\n> together, which restores locality to the problem.\n\nIt cannot help. The point is that the proof of Bell\'s inequality does\nnot use any hypothesis about particles, spins and whatever.\n\nWhat is assumed is only that there is some "reality" - an element\nlambda of some space Lambda of "possible realities" - and that\nthere are (local, independent,macroscopic) decisions of\nexperimenters a,b and observable (macroscopic) results A,B,\nand that the results depend on a, b, and lamdba as\nA(a,lambda), B(b,lambda).\nThis is already sufficient to derive Bell\'s inequalities.\n\nThus, we have used here no definition of spin and so on, no notion\nof particles at all. Wave function collapse is also not even\nmentioned.\n\n> that\n> it is not even meaningful to talk about correlations unless those\n> correlations are locally compared.\n\nSounds like an idea that allows to discuss away even a working\nFTL phone.\n\nIlja\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Blake Winter" <blake.winter@houghton.edu> schrieb
> Then I was thinking, what if we do
> something with spin/polarization or any other physical quantity where
> we assume that we can't talk differences in polarization at two
> different points? Sort of like the idea of Yang and Mills with
> isospin, to say that we can define a proton and a neutron differently
> at every point in spacetime without changing the situation physically.
> If we did this, we'd be saying that you can talk about defining
> polarization and/or spin or whatever physical quantities are in the
> experiment differently at every point of spacetime without changing
> the physics of the situation. Then it only becomes meaningful to talk
> about correlations when we bring information from the two events
> together, which restores locality to the problem.
It cannot help. The point is that the proof of Bell's inequality does
not use any hypothesis about particles, spins and whatever.
What is assumed is only that there is some "reality" - an element
\lambda of some space \Lambda of "possible realities" - and that
there are (local, independent,macroscopic) decisions of
experimenters a,b and observable (macroscopic) results A,B,
and that the results depend on a, b, and lamdba as
A(a,\lambda), B(b,\lambda).
This is already sufficient to derive Bell's inequalities.
Thus, we have used here no definition of spin and so on, no notion
of particles at all. Wave function collapse is also not even
mentioned.
> that
> it is not even meaningful to talk about correlations unless those
> correlations are locally compared.
Sounds like an idea that allows to discuss away even a working
FTL phone.
Ilja
rof@maths.tcd.ie
Oct12-04, 10:49 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\nblake.winter@houghton.edu (Blake Winter) writes:\n\n>I was contemplating the relation between the Bell inequality\n>violations and relativistic QFT. If we assume the usual collapse\n>picture, then we have to have one measurement affect the other accross\n>a spacelike interval, which, although undetectable, still seems to go\n>against the spirit of relativity. Then I was thinking, what if we do\n>something with spin/polarization or any other physical quantity where\n>we assume that we can\'t talk differences in polarization at two\n>different points?\n>... Then it only becomes meaningful to talk\n>about correlations when we bring information from the two events\n>together, which restores locality to the problem.\n\nThis only works if we adopt a very solipsistic view. After the EPR\nexperiment, two experimenters meet and compare what they have in their\nnotebooks, at which point they realise that the choices of one experimenter\nhad affected the results of the other. Each experimenter will testify\nthat he remembers aligning his detector and recording his result (which\nhe will remember as being a very clear and definite "up" or "down"\nin each case).\n\nOne of them can then say to the other, "The experiences you had, of\nseeing this or that result, and writing it in your notebook, didn\'t\nexist until you met me just now," which is what I think you\'re\nsaying, or perhaps, "Whether you saw these results or different\nresults wasn\'t defined until you met me just now". The other\nexperimenter would probably disagree.\n\nR.\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>blake.winter@houghton.edu (Blake Winter) writes:
>I was contemplating the relation between the Bell inequality
>violations and relativistic QFT. If we assume the usual collapse
>picture, then we have to have one measurement affect the other accross
>a spacelike interval, which, although undetectable, still seems to go
>against the spirit of relativity. Then I was thinking, what if we do
>something with spin/polarization or any other physical quantity where
>we assume that we can't talk differences in polarization at two
>different points?
>... Then it only becomes meaningful to talk
>about correlations when we bring information from the two events
>together, which restores locality to the problem.
This only works if we adopt a very solipsistic view. After the EPR
experiment, two experimenters meet and compare what they have in their
notebooks, at which point they realise that the choices of one experimenter
had affected the results of the other. Each experimenter will testify
that he remembers aligning his detector and recording his result (which
he will remember as being a very clear and definite "up" or "down"
in each case).
One of them can then say to the other, "The experiences you had, of
seeing this or that result, and writing it in your notebook, didn't
exist until you met me just now," which is what I think you're
saying, or perhaps, "Whether you saw these results or different
results wasn't defined until you met me just now". The other
experimenter would probably disagree.
R.
Caroline Thompson
Oct12-04, 10:50 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n"Blake Winter" <blake.winter@houghton.edu> wrote in message\nnews:87423d2a.0410090950.15cc9540@posting .google.com...\n>\n>\n> I was contemplating the relation between the Bell inequality\n> violations and relativistic QFT. If we assume the usual collapse\n> picture, then we have to have one measurement affect the other accross\n> a spacelike interval, which, although undetectable, still seems to go\n> against the spirit of relativity. Then I was thinking, what if we do\n> something with spin/polarization or any other physical quantity where\n> we assume that we can\'t talk differences in polarization at two\n> different points?\n\n> [snip] That is, would it be possible to suggest that spin and\n> polarization must be defined only in a purely local sense? If so,\n> would this allow for the derivation of the Bell inequalities without\n> assuming some nonlocal effect from the wavefunction collapse (i.e.\n> collapse could become a local effect as well)?\n> If this were so, then the answer to the Bell inequalities would not be\n> a nonlocal effect of collapse but rather an increase in locality: that\n> it is not even meaningful to talk about correlations unless those\n> correlations are locally compared. On the other hand, my idea could\n> be purely ridiculous -\n\nYou said it! Simpler by far to suggest that this part of QM is wrong!\n\nDo I hear you say, "The Bell tests have been violated and this proves QM\nright"? My answer is that they have only been violated in experiments with\n"loopholes", and this is a polite way of saying the tests have not been\nvalid ones. Since my studies have suggested that there are always ordinary\n"local realist" explanations available if you look for them (taking account\nof the actual experimental conditions), there is no compulsion to believe QM\ncorrect.\n\n> I suppose I\'m just not sure whether it could be\n> cast into a useful form or not.\n\nHmmm ... it might be interesting if it were not so self-evident in real\nexperiments that polarisation *can* be measured and compared at two\ndifferent locations. Have I understood you correctly here?\n\nCaroline\n\nch.thompson1@virgin.net\nhttp ://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Blake Winter" <blake.winter@houghton.edu> wrote in message
news:87423d2a.0410090950.15cc9540@posting.google.c om...
>
>
> I was contemplating the relation between the Bell inequality
> violations and relativistic QFT. If we assume the usual collapse
> picture, then we have to have one measurement affect the other accross
> a spacelike interval, which, although undetectable, still seems to go
> against the spirit of relativity. Then I was thinking, what if we do
> something with spin/polarization or any other physical quantity where
> we assume that we can't talk differences in polarization at two
> different points?
> [snip] That is, would it be possible to suggest that spin and
> polarization must be defined only in a purely local sense? If so,
> would this allow for the derivation of the Bell inequalities without
> assuming some nonlocal effect from the wavefunction collapse (i.e.
> collapse could become a local effect as well)?
> If this were so, then the answer to the Bell inequalities would not be
> a nonlocal effect of collapse but rather an increase in locality: that
> it is not even meaningful to talk about correlations unless those
> correlations are locally compared. On the other hand, my idea could
> be purely ridiculous -
You said it! Simpler by far to suggest that this part of QM is wrong!
Do I hear you say, "The Bell tests have been violated and this proves QM
right"? My answer is that they have only been violated in experiments with
"loopholes", and this is a polite way of saying the tests have not been
valid ones. Since my studies have suggested that there are always ordinary
"local realist" explanations available if you look for them (taking account
of the actual experimental conditions), there is no compulsion to believe QM
correct.
> I suppose I'm just not sure whether it could be
> cast into a useful form or not.
Hmmm ... it might be interesting if it were not so self-evident in real
experiments that polarisation *can* be measured and compared at two
different locations. Have I understood you correctly here?
Caroline
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\nBlake Winter:\n> Then it only becomes meaningful to talk\n> about correlations when we bring information\n> from the two events together, which restores\n> locality to the problem. [....] If so,\n> would this allow for the derivation of the\n> Bell inequalities without assuming some nonlocal\n> effect from the wavefunction collapse (i.e.\n> collapse could become a local effect as well)?\n\nThe EPR argument (apparently) did not take into\naccount that the observers\' information is\nalways localized. See a paper by Peres at:\nhttp://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310010\nIn EPR experiments observers (and their\napparata) are local, in space and time.\nAnd these observers (together) learn there\nis a "non-separability" between entangled\nsystems. Sometimes I wonder whether it is\npossible to have a unique non-local (or non-\nseparable) observer, to match the non-\nseparability of entangled quantum systems.\nThis is of course possible in the trivial\ncase below, where the source emits two\nentangled photons. to the right and to the\nleft.\n\n/---<----- source ------>----------\n| observer\n\\-------------->-------------------\n\nBut this is perhaps a sure sign of my stupidity.\n\nSanin,\ns.\n\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Blake Winter:
> Then it only becomes meaningful to talk
> about correlations when we bring information
> from the two events together, which restores
> locality to the problem. [....] If so,
> would this allow for the derivation of the
> Bell inequalities without assuming some nonlocal
> effect from the wavefunction collapse (i.e.
> collapse could become a local effect as well)?
The EPR argument (apparently) did not take into
account that the observers' information is
always localized. See a paper by Peres at:
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310010
In EPR experiments observers (and their
apparata) are local, in space and time.
And these observers (together) learn there
is a "non-separability" between entangled
systems. Sometimes I wonder whether it is
possible to have a unique non-local (or non-
separable) observer, to match the non-
separability of entangled quantum systems.
This is of course possible in the trivial
case below, where the source emits two
entangled photons. to the right and to the
left.
/---<----- source ------>----------
| observer
\-------------->-------------------
But this is perhaps a sure sign of my stupidity.
Sanin,
s.
Ilja Schmelzer
Oct13-04, 03:45 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> schrieb\n> The EPR argument (apparently) did not take into\n> account that the observers\' information is\n> always localized. See a paper by Peres at:\n> http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310010\n> In EPR experiments observers (and their\n> apparata) are local, in space and time.\n> And these observers (together) learn there\n> is a "non-separability" between entangled\n> systems.\n\nHm. Even if I do not understand the point of\nthese consideration, I can use the FTL phone\nargument to reject it.\n\n"The FTL phone did not take into\naccount that the observers\' information is\nalways localized. See a paper by Peres at\nhttp://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310010\nwith similar argumentation in the EPR case.\nUsing FTL phones observers (and their\napparata) are local, in space and time.\nAnd these observers (together) learn there\nis a "non-separability" between entangled\nsystems. "\n\nDoes this argument fail? If yes, why?\nIf not, would you accept that a working FTL\nphone falsifies relativity? Why?\n\nIlja\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> schrieb
> The EPR argument (apparently) did not take into
> account that the observers' information is
> always localized. See a paper by Peres at:
> http://www.arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310010
> In EPR experiments observers (and their
> apparata) are local, in space and time.
> And these observers (together) learn there
> is a "non-separability" between entangled
> systems.
Hm. Even if I do not understand the point of
these consideration, I can use the FTL phone
argument to reject it.
"The FTL phone did not take into
account that the observers' information is
always localized. See a paper by Peres at
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0310010
with similar argumentation in the EPR case.
Using FTL phones observers (and their
apparata) are local, in space and time.
And these observers (together) learn there
is a "non-separability" between entangled
systems. "
Does this argument fail? If yes, why?
If not, would you accept that a working FTL
phone falsifies relativity? Why?
Ilja
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n"Ilja Schmelzer":\n> The FTL phone did not take into account that\n> the observers\' information is always localized.\n> Does this argument fail? If yes, why?\n> If not, would you accept that a working FTL\n> phone falsifies relativity? Why?\n\n[The \'FTL-phone\' works as follows ...]\n<< Imagine there is a preferred frame and we learn in some future\nhow to communicate FTL. You have a working FTL phone - two black boxes\nand some channel between them which allows you to talk with somebody\non Mars without any time delay. Surely, this FTL phone falsifies\nrelativity. Now imagine some old crank who, despite the obvious\nfalsification of relativity, wants to save relativity and presents\nsome arguments which suggest that relativity is not violated.\nYou don\'t really want to be as stupid as that crank? In this case,\nit should be clear that there is something wrong with his arguments.\nThus, any sort of argument which allows to save relativity if there\nexists an FTL phone should be wrong. Now, the point is that the\nloophole can be used by that crank too. If there is no free will\nof the experimenter, you can do whatever you like with your FTL\nphone but you will be unable to prove that there exists some FTL\neffects inside the phone. >>\n\nI do not understand here (my fault) the FTL-phone argument.\nBut philosophers of QM (Shimony, Ghirardi, Eberhard, etc.) say\nthat FTL effects (influences, passions, fashions, etc.) are\nallowed. Uncontrollable FTL signals are allowed. Controllable\nFTL signals are not allowed by SR, and are not possible\nwithin orthodox QM (they are allowed - sometimes even\nrequired - by "deterministic" QMs, like Bohmian theory).\n\nIf I remember well, it seems that between Cirel\'son\nbounds \'2 sqrt2\' and \'2 sqrt2 sqrt2\' orthodox QM\nis still \'causal\' and does not require superluminal\nsignals. The problem is: what kind of nonlocality\n(nonseparability) there is between those two bounds\n(unknown land)?\n\n"Would you accept that a working FTL phone falsifies\nrelativity?". Leaving apart the possibility of tachyons\n(Eberhard) and that of possible specific time reversals\n(Shumacher and Bennett suggested something like this to explain\n"teleportation", Klyshko to explain the "ghost effect", see also\nSuarez, here are two links\nhttp://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9801061\nhttp://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9805021 )\nI would say, in that case: yes, peaceful coexistence kaputt.\n\ns.\n\n\n\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ilja Schmelzer":
> The FTL phone did not take into account that
> the observers' information is always localized.
> Does this argument fail? If yes, why?
> If not, would you accept that a working FTL
> phone falsifies relativity? Why?
[The 'FTL-phone' works as follows ...]
<< Imagine there is a preferred frame and we learn in some future
how to communicate FTL. You have a working FTL phone - two black boxes
and some channel between them which allows you to talk with somebody
on Mars without any time delay. Surely, this FTL phone falsifies
relativity. Now imagine some old crank who, despite the obvious
falsification of relativity, wants to save relativity and presents
some arguments which suggest that relativity is not violated.
You don't really want to be as stupid as that crank? In this case,
it should be clear that there is something wrong with his arguments.
Thus, any sort of argument which allows to save relativity if there
exists an FTL phone should be wrong. Now, the point is that the
loophole can be used by that crank too. If there is no free will
of the experimenter, you can do whatever you like with your FTL
phone but you will be unable to prove that there exists some FTL
effects inside the phone. >>
I do not understand here (my fault) the FTL-phone argument.
But philosophers of QM (Shimony, Ghirardi, Eberhard, etc.) say
that FTL effects (influences, passions, fashions, etc.) are
allowed. Uncontrollable FTL signals are allowed. Controllable
FTL signals are not allowed by SR, and are not possible
within orthodox QM (they are allowed - sometimes even
required - by "deterministic" QMs, like Bohmian theory).
If I remember well, it seems that between Cirel'son
bounds '2 sqrt2' and '2 sqrt2 sqrt2' orthodox QM
is still 'causal' and does not require superluminal
signals. The problem is: what kind of nonlocality
(nonseparability) there is between those two bounds
(unknown land)?
"Would you accept that a working FTL phone falsifies
relativity?". Leaving apart the possibility of tachyons
(Eberhard) and that of possible specific time reversals
(Shumacher and Bennett suggested something like this to explain
"teleportation", Klyshko to explain the "ghost effect", see also
Suarez, here are two links
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9801061
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9805021 )
I would say, in that case: yes, peaceful coexistence kaputt.
s.
Blake Winter
Oct14-04, 11:07 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\nGenerally speaking, I think we can conclude that this method is\nprobably too complicated to work. In fact, considering that the\nenvironments around each detector have been interacting in the past,\nthere would have to be some way of defining the spin relative to each\nother, or at least relative to the place in the past. So I don\'t\nthink it would work.\n\nThe reason this concerns me is because I don\'t take the perspective\nthat the Bell tests so far have been "wrong" - there\'s a small chance,\nI suppose, that when we take better data, we will find that they\naren\'t violated, but I tend to fall with the more traditional point of\nview which accepts them at face value. However, understanding the\nnonlocal effect from the point of view of relativistic QFT, which is\nmanifestly local, is not easy. That\'s why I generally try to think of\nways for local theories to account for the effects.\nOn that note has anyone critiqued the papers by Daniele Tommasini\n(quant-ph/0110059 and others)?\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Generally speaking, I think we can conclude that this method is
probably too complicated to work. In fact, considering that the
environments around each detector have been interacting in the past,
there would have to be some way of defining the spin relative to each
other, or at least relative to the place in the past. So I don't
think it would work.
The reason this concerns me is because I don't take the perspective
that the Bell tests so far have been "wrong" - there's a small chance,
I suppose, that when we take better data, we will find that they
aren't violated, but I tend to fall with the more traditional point of
view which accepts them at face value. However, understanding the
nonlocal effect from the point of view of relativistic QFT, which is
manifestly local, is not easy. That's why I generally try to think of
ways for local theories to account for the effects.
On that note has anyone critiqued the papers by Daniele Tommasini
(http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0110059 and others)?
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n"Blake Winter"\n> However, understanding the nonlocal effect from the point\n> of view of relativistic QFT, which is manifestly local,\n> is not easy.\n\nThis is the subject of a little but very interesting\nbook: \'An Introduction to a Realistic Quantum Physics\'\nby Giuliano Preparata (who was a smart physicist and\na good teacher), World Scientific Publishing, 2002,\n80 pages (circa).\nRegards,\ns.\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Blake Winter"
> However, understanding the nonlocal effect from the point
> of view of relativistic QFT, which is manifestly local,
> is not easy.
This is the subject of a little but very interesting
book: 'An Introduction to a Realistic Quantum Physics'
by Giuliano Preparata (who was a smart physicist and
a good teacher), World Scientific Publishing, 2002,
80 pages (circa).
Regards,
s.
Caroline Thompson
Oct20-04, 10:48 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message\nnews:Ok9bd.38459\\$N45.1107976@twister2.l ibero.it...\n\n> I do not understand here (my fault) the FTL-phone argument.\n> But philosophers of QM (Shimony, Ghirardi, Eberhard, etc.) say\n> that FTL effects (influences, passions, fashions, etc.) are\n> allowed.\n\nAre you sure they say this? Can you tell me where Shimony does?\n\nAnyway, how are such "influences, passions, fashions, etc" supposed to work\nin the real world?\n\n> If I remember well, it seems that between Cirel\'son\n> bounds \'2 sqrt2\' and \'2 sqrt2 sqrt2\' orthodox QM\n> is still \'causal\' and does not require superluminal\n> signals. The problem is: what kind of nonlocality\n> (nonseparability) there is between those two bounds\n> (unknown land)?\n>\n> "Would you accept that a working FTL phone falsifies\n> relativity?". Leaving apart the possibility of tachyons\n> (Eberhard) and that of possible specific time reversals\n> (Shumacher and Bennett suggested something like this to explain\n> "teleportation", Klyshko to explain the "ghost effect", see also\n> Suarez, here are two links\n> http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9801061\n> http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9805021 )\n> I would say, in that case: yes, peaceful coexistence kaputt.\n>\n> s.\n\nWhy are you considering all the above? If you look at the actual\nexperimental evidence and revert to the rules of physics as they used to be\n(ignoring mere mathematical fictions such as Newton\'s *apparent* acceptance\nof FTL gravity) then isn\'t it obvious that quantum entanglement does not\nactually happen? Why should it?\n\nYesterday I looked at:\n\nDaniele Tommasini, "Quantum Electrodynamics is free from the\nEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox", quant-ph/0110059\n\nwhich someone had mentioned a few days ago.\n\nTommasini seems to be saying that if you do QFT correctly you find that it\ndoes *not* predict entanglement. Though I don\'t think the arguments in\nterms of soft photons that enable you to forget about exact conservation\nlaws is correct (I think it better to forget conservation laws as far as the\n*detection* stage is concerned), I\'ve long suspected that the conclusion is\nright. Quantum theorists should not ever have accepted the nonseparable\nformula.\n\nCaroline\n\nch.thompson1 @virgin.net\nhttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message
news:Ok9bd.38459$N45.1107976@twister2.libero.it...
> I do not understand here (my fault) the FTL-phone argument.
> But philosophers of QM (Shimony, Ghirardi, Eberhard, etc.) say
> that FTL effects (influences, passions, fashions, etc.) are
> allowed.
Are you sure they say this? Can you tell me where Shimony does?
Anyway, how are such "influences, passions, fashions, etc" supposed to work
in the real world?
> If I remember well, it seems that between Cirel'son
> bounds '2 sqrt2' and '2 sqrt2 sqrt2' orthodox QM
> is still 'causal' and does not require superluminal
> signals. The problem is: what kind of nonlocality
> (nonseparability) there is between those two bounds
> (unknown land)?
>
> "Would you accept that a working FTL phone falsifies
> relativity?". Leaving apart the possibility of tachyons
> (Eberhard) and that of possible specific time reversals
> (Shumacher and Bennett suggested something like this to explain
> "teleportation", Klyshko to explain the "ghost effect", see also
> Suarez, here are two links
> http://www.arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9801061
> http://www.arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9805021 )
> I would say, in that case: yes, peaceful coexistence kaputt.
>
> s.
Why are you considering all the above? If you look at the actual
experimental evidence and revert to the rules of physics as they used to be
(ignoring mere mathematical fictions such as Newton's *apparent* acceptance
of FTL gravity) then isn't it obvious that quantum entanglement does not
actually happen? Why should it?
Yesterday I looked at:
Daniele Tommasini, "Quantum Electrodynamics is free from the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox", http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0110059
which someone had mentioned a few days ago.
Tommasini seems to be saying that if you do QFT correctly you find that it
does *not* predict entanglement. Though I don't think the arguments in
terms of soft photons that enable you to forget about exact conservation
laws is correct (I think it better to forget conservation laws as far as the
*detection* stage is concerned), I've long suspected that the conclusion is
right. Quantum theorists should not ever have accepted the nonseparable
formula.
Caroline
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\nCaroline Thompson:\n\n> Are you sure they say this?\n> Can you tell me where Shimony does?\n\nAbner Shimony on FTL? He introduced the expression\n\'passion-at-a-distance\' for a subtle form of\nnonlocality, namely that it is possible to\nthink in terms of FTL causation between two\nspace-like separated events. It is only the\n\'uncontrollability\' resulting from indeterminism\nthat stands in the way of FTL (uncontrollable)\ncommunication via \'passion-at-a-distance\'.\nSo this kind of FTL communication, or FTL causation,\nactually is an \'uncontrollable nonlocality\', which\nproduces no conflict with the first signal principle\nof SR.\nAbout all the above and the \'peaceful coexistence\'\nbetween QM and SR see:\n- Abner Shimony: \'Controllable and Uncontrollable\nNon-Locality\'in \'Foundations of Quantum Mechanics\nin the Light of New Technology\', Tokyo, Japan\nPhysical Society, (Kamefuchi et al. eds), 1984;\n- Abner Shimony: \'Events and Processes in the\nQuantum World\', in \'Quantum Concepts in Space and\nTime\', (Penrose and Isham eds), Oxford U.P., 1986.\n\n> Why are you considering all the above?\n> If you look at the actual experimental evidence\n> and revert to the rules of physics as they used\n> to be (ignoring mere mathematical fictions such as\n> Newton\'s *apparent* acceptance of FTL gravity)\n> then isn\'t it obvious that quantum entanglement\n> does not actually happen?\n\nI cannot answer to that. Schroedinger - as far as\nI remember - thought that the entanglement was a\nphysical effect but also a short-range effect.\nExperimental evidence - unless there is a\nworld-wide conspiracy - says that entanglement\nis not a short-range effect. I would also say:\nlet us try to explain - in classical terms -\nresults such as Aspect\'s, or like the Franson\ntwo-photon energy-time interference effect\n(see experiments performed by the group in\nGeneva, Gisin-Tittel-et al.).\n\nSaluti,\ns.\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Caroline Thompson:
> Are you sure they say this?
> Can you tell me where Shimony does?
Abner Shimony on FTL? He introduced the expression
'passion-at-a-distance' for a subtle form of
nonlocality, namely that it is possible to
think in terms of FTL causation between two
space-like separated events. It is only the
'uncontrollability' resulting from indeterminism
that stands in the way of FTL (uncontrollable)
communication via 'passion-at-a-distance'.
So this kind of FTL communication, or FTL causation,
actually is an 'uncontrollable nonlocality', which
produces no conflict with the first signal principle
of SR.
About all the above and the 'peaceful coexistence'
between QM and SR see:
- Abner Shimony: 'Controllable and Uncontrollable
Non-Locality'in 'Foundations of Quantum Mechanics
in the Light of New Technology', Tokyo, Japan
Physical Society, (Kamefuchi et al. eds), 1984;
- Abner Shimony: 'Events and Processes in the
Quantum World', in 'Quantum Concepts in Space and
Time', (Penrose and Isham eds), Oxford U.P., 1986.
> Why are you considering all the above?
> If you look at the actual experimental evidence
> and revert to the rules of physics as they used
> to be (ignoring mere mathematical fictions such as
> Newton's *apparent* acceptance of FTL gravity)
> then isn't it obvious that quantum entanglement
> does not actually happen?
I cannot answer to that. Schroedinger - as far as
I remember - thought that the entanglement was a
physical effect but also a short-range effect.
Experimental evidence - unless there is a
world-wide conspiracy - says that entanglement
is not a short-range effect. I would also say:
let us try to explain - in classical terms -
results such as Aspect's, or like the Franson
two-photon energy-time interference effect
(see experiments performed by the group in
Geneva, Gisin-Tittel-et al.).
Saluti,
s.
Italo Vecchi
Oct22-04, 12:31 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message news:<QPxdd.51028\\$H11.1733405@twister1.libero.it >\n\n>... Schroedinger - as far as\n> I remember - thought that the entanglement was a\n> physical effect but also a short-range effect.\n> Experimental evidence - unless there is a\n> world-wide conspiracy - says that entanglement\n> is not a short-range effect. I would also say:\n> let us try to explain - in classical terms -\n> results such as Aspect\'s, or like the Franson\n> two-photon energy-time interference effect\n> (see experiments performed by the group in\n> Geneva, Gisin-Tittel-et al.).\n>\n\nOne may view entanglement in Rovelli\'s RQM framework where there are\nno observer-independent values of physical quantities. Entanglement\nappears then naturally as the observers\' blueprint for state vector\nreduction. It is part of a protocol on information exchange that\nguarantees locality (i.e. bars superluminal information sharing) but\nguarantees "a posteriori" consistency of measurement outcomes, as in\nEPR.\n\nIV\n\n[1] http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9609002\n\n-----------------------\n\n"I know not what they mean by things considered in themselves. This is\nnonsense, jargon."\nGeorge Berkeley, Notebook A 832\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message news:<QPxdd.51028$H11.1733405@twister1.libero.it>
>... Schroedinger - as far as
> I remember - thought that the entanglement was a
> physical effect but also a short-range effect.
> Experimental evidence - unless there is a
> world-wide conspiracy - says that entanglement
> is not a short-range effect. I would also say:
> let us try to explain - in classical terms -
> results such as Aspect's, or like the Franson
> two-photon energy-time interference effect
> (see experiments performed by the group in
> Geneva, Gisin-Tittel-et al.).
>
One may view entanglement in Rovelli's RQM framework where there are
no observer-independent values of physical quantities. Entanglement
appears then naturally as the observers' blueprint for state vector
reduction. It is part of a protocol on information exchange that
guarantees locality (i.e. bars superluminal information sharing) but
guarantees "a posteriori" consistency of measurement outcomes, as in
EPR.
IV
[1] http://www.arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9609002
-----------------------
"I know not what they mean by things considered in themselves. This is
nonsense, jargon."
George Berkeley, Notebook A 832
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\nItalo Vecchi:\n\n> One may view entanglement in\n> Rovelli\'s RQM framework where\n> there are no observer-independent\n> values of physical quantities.\n\n\nAs David Mermin wrote:\n"Fields in empty space have physical reality;\nthe medium that supports them does not.\nCorrelations have physical reality;\nthat which they correlate does not."\n\nBut there is, perhaps, also a distinction,\nto be made, between the limited information\ncarried by quantum states (which cannot be described\nby means of a sequence of classical symbols\non the tape of a Turing machine) and quantum\nstates themselves, the carriers of that limited\ninformation. Something already thought\nby Aristotle, who called it hylomorphism.\n\nSaluti,\nserafino\n\n\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Italo Vecchi:
> One may view entanglement in
> Rovelli's RQM framework where
> there are no observer-independent
> values of physical quantities.
As David Mermin wrote:
"Fields in empty space have physical reality;
the medium that supports them does not.
Correlations have physical reality;
that which they correlate does not."
But there is, perhaps, also a distinction,
to be made, between the limited information
carried by quantum states (which cannot be described
by means of a sequence of classical symbols
on the tape of a Turing machine) and quantum
states themselves, the carriers of that limited
information. Something already thought
by Aristotle, who called it hylomorphism.
Saluti,
serafino
Caroline Thompson
Oct25-04, 08:10 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message\nnews:QPxdd.51028\\$H11.1733405@twister1.l ibero.it...\n\n> Abner Shimony on FTL? He introduced the expression\n> \'passion-at-a-distance\' for a subtle form of\n> nonlocality, namely that it is possible to\n> think in terms of FTL causation between two\n> space-like separated events ...\n\nThanks for the refs, but it\'s a pity they are both in books and not on the\ninternet. His latest (as far as I know) publication on the internet is:\n\n"Bell\'s Theorem", http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bell-theorem/ , 2004\n\nI haven\'t read the whole article carefully but don\'t remember anything about\nFTL causation. On the other hand, since he continues to think that\neventually a loophole-free Bell test will be done and will support the QM\nformula, I suppose he must believe something of the kind re causation.\n\n> It is only the\n> \'uncontrollability\' resulting from indeterminism\n> that stands in the way of FTL (uncontrollable)\n> communication via \'passion-at-a-distance\'.\n> So this kind of FTL communication, or FTL causation,\n> actually is an \'uncontrollable nonlocality\', which\n> produces no conflict with the first signal principle\n> of SR.\n> About all the above and the \'peaceful coexistence\'\n> between QM and SR see:\n> - Abner Shimony: \'Controllable and Uncontrollable\n> Non-Locality\'in \'Foundations of Quantum Mechanics\n> in the Light of New Technology\', Tokyo, Japan\n> Physical Society, (Kamefuchi et al. eds), 1984;\n> - Abner Shimony: \'Events and Processes in the\n> Quantum World\', in \'Quantum Concepts in Space and\n> Time\', (Penrose and Isham eds), Oxford U.P., 1986.\n>\n> > Caroline:\n> > Why are you considering all the above?\n> > If you look at the actual experimental evidence\n> > and revert to the rules of physics as they used\n> > to be (ignoring mere mathematical fictions such as\n> > Newton\'s *apparent* acceptance of FTL gravity)\n> > then isn\'t it obvious that quantum entanglement\n> > does not actually happen?\n>\n> scerir:\n> I cannot answer to that. Schroedinger - as far as\n> I remember - thought that the entanglement was a\n> physical effect but also a short-range effect.\n\nYes, possibly, though here it is easier to see how it could be an artifact\nof the maths resulting from the fact that QM attempts to model the results\nof measurements and not the "real thing" that caused the measurements.\n\n> Experimental evidence - unless there is a\n> world-wide conspiracy -\n\nNo, scerir, there is no need to invoke a world-wide conspiracy on the behalf\nof the doubters. It anything there might be a conspiracy among the\nbelievers in entanglement!\n\nThere is evidence that the great majority of people who believe in it have\nnever even tried to read an original experimental report. They have either\nused second-hand information or none at all on the experimental side,\nlooking only at the theory. Frequently, for instance, you find popular\nreports that say that entanglement of the spins of two electrons has been\ndemonstrated. No actual experiment has ever even tested this! And you find\ngraphs reproduced from optical experiments (a favourite is one of Aspect\'s)\nand (a) no mention made of the fact that the data presented is the\n*adjusted* data and (b) the implication that it was obtained from an\nexperiment on spin-1/2 particles. The adjustment that Aspect used -- the\nsubtraction of accidentals -- though legitimate in many contexts is now\nrecognised as being a potential cause of bias in Bell tests. [See my papers\non the subject, including\nhttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/Tangled/tangled.html re my\nstruggles to get the matter publicised and quant-ph/9903066, which gives\nmore of the facts.]\n\n> ... I would also say:\n> let us try to explain - in classical terms -\n> results such as Aspect\'s, or like the Franson\n> two-photon energy-time interference effect\n> (see experiments performed by the group in\n> Geneva, Gisin-Tittel-et al.).\n\nAs it happens, two of Aspect\'s experiments and the first Geneva experiment\nare among those that are severely affected by the data adjustment. Look at\nthe raw data and you find that the natural local realist explanation fits it\nalmost perfectly -- which is surprising really, in view of the various other\nfactors that one would expect to reduce the visibility of the coincidence\ncurves.\n\nMost Bell test experiments use tests that are only valid if the "fair\nsampling" assumption is valid. It is now well known that, in general, it is\nnot. In many cases a test that could have shown that the sample is *not*\nfair is, as far as I can tell, conducted using an inappropriate choice of\ndetector settings. Local realist models as well as quantum theory predict\nthat the total coincidence counts for the "Bell test angles" will all be\nequal. The ones that need to be tested are the ones in between. [See\nquant-ph/0210150 and various other papers on the Chaotic Ball model on my\nweb site.]\n\nCheers\nCaroline\n\nCaroline H Thompson\n\nch.thompson1@virgin.net\nhttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message
news:QPxdd.51028$H11.1733405@twister1.libero.it...
> Abner Shimony on FTL? He introduced the expression
> 'passion-at-a-distance' for a subtle form of
> nonlocality, namely that it is possible to
> think in terms of FTL causation between two
> space-like separated events ...
Thanks for the refs, but it's a pity they are both in books and not on the
internet. His latest (as far as I know) publication on the internet is:
"Bell's Theorem", http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bell-theorem/ , 2004
I haven't read the whole article carefully but don't remember anything about
FTL causation. On the other hand, since he continues to think that
eventually a loophole-free Bell test will be done and will support the QM
formula, I suppose he must believe something of the kind re causation.
> It is only the
> 'uncontrollability' resulting from indeterminism
> that stands in the way of FTL (uncontrollable)
> communication via 'passion-at-a-distance'.
> So this kind of FTL communication, or FTL causation,
> actually is an 'uncontrollable nonlocality', which
> produces no conflict with the first signal principle
> of SR.
> About all the above and the 'peaceful coexistence'
> between QM and SR see:
> - Abner Shimony: 'Controllable and Uncontrollable
> Non-Locality'in 'Foundations of Quantum Mechanics
> in the Light of New Technology', Tokyo, Japan
> Physical Society, (Kamefuchi et al. eds), 1984;
> - Abner Shimony: 'Events and Processes in the
> Quantum World', in 'Quantum Concepts in Space and
> Time', (Penrose and Isham eds), Oxford U.P., 1986.
>
> > Caroline:
> > Why are you considering all the above?
> > If you look at the actual experimental evidence
> > and revert to the rules of physics as they used
> > to be (ignoring mere mathematical fictions such as
> > Newton's *apparent* acceptance of FTL gravity)
> > then isn't it obvious that quantum entanglement
> > does not actually happen?
>
> scerir:
> I cannot answer to that. Schroedinger - as far as
> I remember - thought that the entanglement was a
> physical effect but also a short-range effect.
Yes, possibly, though here it is easier to see how it could be an artifact
of the maths resulting from the fact that QM attempts to model the results
of measurements and not the "real thing" that caused the measurements.
> Experimental evidence - unless there is a
> world-wide conspiracy -
No, scerir, there is no need to invoke a world-wide conspiracy on the behalf
of the doubters. It anything there might be a conspiracy among the
believers in entanglement!
There is evidence that the great majority of people who believe in it have
never even tried to read an original experimental report. They have either
used second-hand information or none at all on the experimental side,
looking only at the theory. Frequently, for instance, you find popular
reports that say that entanglement of the spins of two electrons has been
demonstrated. No actual experiment has ever even tested this! And you find
graphs reproduced from optical experiments (a favourite is one of Aspect's)
and (a) no mention made of the fact that the data presented is the
*adjusted* data and (b) the implication that it was obtained from an
experiment on spin-1/2 particles. The adjustment that Aspect used -- the
subtraction of accidentals -- though legitimate in many contexts is now
recognised as being a potential cause of bias in Bell tests. [See my papers
on the subject, including
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/Tangled/tangled.html re my
struggles to get the matter publicised and http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9903066, which gives
more of the facts.]
> ... I would also say:
> let us try to explain - in classical terms -
> results such as Aspect's, or like the Franson
> two-photon energy-time interference effect
> (see experiments performed by the group in
> Geneva, Gisin-Tittel-et al.).
As it happens, two of Aspect's experiments and the first Geneva experiment
are among those that are severely affected by the data adjustment. Look at
the raw data and you find that the natural local realist explanation fits it
almost perfectly -- which is surprising really, in view of the various other
factors that one would expect to reduce the visibility of the coincidence
curves.
Most Bell test experiments use tests that are only valid if the "fair
sampling" assumption is valid. It is now well known that, in general, it is
not. In many cases a test that could have shown that the sample is *not*
fair is, as far as I can tell, conducted using an inappropriate choice of
detector settings. Local realist models as well as quantum theory predict
that the total coincidence counts for the "Bell test angles" will all be
equal. The ones that need to be tested are the ones in between. [See
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0210150 and various other papers on the Chaotic Ball model on my
web site.]
Cheers
Caroline
Caroline H Thompson
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
Italo Vecchi
Oct27-04, 10:56 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n\n"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message news:<neyed.55885\\$H11.1884915@twister1.libero.it >...\n\n> ... there is, perhaps, also a distinction,\n> to be made, between the limited information\n> carried by quantum states (which cannot be described\n> by means of a sequence of classical symbols\n> on the tape of a Turing machine) and quantum\n> states themselves, the carriers of that limited\n> information. Something already thought\n> by Aristotle, who called it hylomorphism.\n>\n\nHylomorphism may indeed be viewed as the ancestor of Cartesian "res\ncogitans" vs. "res extensa" duality. From there it\'s downhill to Bohr.\n\nHowever , as far as I understand, intersubjective agreement becomes a\nkey issue with Malebranches and Berkeley.\n\nIn "My View of the World" Schroedinger writes:\n\n"In all the world, there is no kind of framework within which we can\nfind consciousness in the plural; this is simply something we\nconstruct because of the spatio-temporal plurality of individuals, but\nit is a false construction. Because of it, all philosophy succumbs\nagain and again to the hopeless conflict between the theoretically\nunavoidable acceptance of Berkeleian idealism and its complete\nuselessness for understanding the real world."\n\nPretty desperate, huh?\n\nThere is a pleasant philosophers\' conversation on Aristotle\'s\nrelevance to modern science under the headings "Cause" and\n"Hylomrphism" at\n\nhttp://www.uni-heidelberg.de/subject/hd/fak7/hist/o1/logs/mdvlphil/log.started940122/index.html\n\nIn gamba,\n\nIV\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message news:<neyed.55885$H11.1884915@twister1.libero.it>...
> ... there is, perhaps, also a distinction,
> to be made, between the limited information
> carried by quantum states (which cannot be described
> by means of a sequence of classical symbols
> on the tape of a Turing machine) and quantum
> states themselves, the carriers of that limited
> information. Something already thought
> by Aristotle, who called it hylomorphism.
>
Hylomorphism may indeed be viewed as the ancestor of Cartesian "res
cogitans" vs. "res extensa" duality. From there it's downhill to Bohr.
However , as far as I understand, intersubjective agreement becomes a
key issue with Malebranches and Berkeley.
In "My View of the World" Schroedinger writes:
"In all the world, there is no kind of framework within which we can
find consciousness in the plural; this is simply something we
construct because of the spatio-temporal plurality of individuals, but
it is a false construction. Because of it, all philosophy succumbs
again and again to the hopeless conflict between the theoretically
unavoidable acceptance of Berkeleian idealism and its complete
uselessness for understanding the real world."
Pretty desperate, huh?
There is a pleasant philosophers' conversation on Aristotle's
relevance to modern science under the headings "Cause" and
"Hylomrphism" at
http://www.uni-heidelberg.de/subject/hd/fak7/hist/o1/logs/mdvlphil/log.started940122/index.html
In gamba,
IV
Thomas Trotter
Nov3-04, 09:47 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message news:<Ok9bd.38459\\$N45.1107976@twister2.libero.it >...\n> "Ilja Schmelzer":\n> > The FTL phone did not take into account that\n> > the observers\' information is always localized.\n> > Does this argument fail? If yes, why?\n> > If not, would you accept that a working FTL\n> > phone falsifies relativity? Why?\n>\n> [The \'FTL-phone\' works as follows ...]\n> << Imagine there is a preferred frame and we learn in some future\n> how to communicate FTL. You have a working FTL phone - two black boxes\n> and some channel between them which allows you to talk with somebody\n> on Mars without any time delay. Surely, this FTL phone falsifies\n> relativity. Now imagine some old crank who, despite the obvious\n> falsification of relativity, wants to save relativity and presents\n> some arguments which suggest that relativity is not violated.\n> You don\'t really want to be as stupid as that crank? In this case,\n> it should be clear that there is something wrong with his arguments.\n> Thus, any sort of argument which allows to save relativity if there\n> exists an FTL phone should be wrong. Now, the point is that the\n> loophole can be used by that crank too. If there is no free will\n> of the experimenter, you can do whatever you like with your FTL\n> phone but you will be unable to prove that there exists some FTL\n> effects inside the phone. >>\n>\n> I do not understand here (my fault) the FTL-phone argument.\n\nI don\'t think I do either. :-)\n\n> But philosophers of QM (Shimony, Ghirardi, Eberhard, etc.) say\n> that FTL effects (influences, passions, fashions, etc.) are\n> allowed. Uncontrollable FTL signals are allowed.\n\nOk, they\'re allowed. But, that certainly doesn\'t entail\nthat they exist. These words,\'influences\', \'passions\', and\n\'fashions\' are words for what *isn\'t* known.\n\'Nonseparability\' (another vagueness) does not\nimply FTL signals (communicative or not) or instantaneous\ncausal relationships between spatially separated objects.\n\nThe simplest working assumption is that nature is\nlocal, and that there are some correlational contexts\nwhich have thus far resisted clear and precise\nformalization in terms of local interactions.\nIn other words, there are no \'controllable\' FTL\nsignals, because there are no FTL signals.\n\nIn place of a clear and precise local formalization\nthe correlations are spoken of in terms of instantaneous\nacausal influences at a distance -- which isn\'t even\nuseful hand-waving. Mermin\'s coining of the term\n\'fashion-at-a-distance\' was meant, I think, to point\nout the absurdity of taking these vaguaries as\nexplanations.\n\nWhat *is* nonseparability? Indications are, I think,\nthat it has everything to do with common sources,\nand local interactions that are not understood in\nsufficient detail to supplement or supercede\nthe qm formulation.\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message news:<Ok9bd.38459$N45.1107976@twister2.libero.it>...
> "Ilja Schmelzer":
> > The FTL phone did not take into account that
> > the observers' information is always localized.
> > Does this argument fail? If yes, why?
> > If not, would you accept that a working FTL
> > phone falsifies relativity? Why?
>
> [The 'FTL-phone' works as follows ...]
> << Imagine there is a preferred frame and we learn in some future
> how to communicate FTL. You have a working FTL phone - two black boxes
> and some channel between them which allows you to talk with somebody
> on Mars without any time delay. Surely, this FTL phone falsifies
> relativity. Now imagine some old crank who, despite the obvious
> falsification of relativity, wants to save relativity and presents
> some arguments which suggest that relativity is not violated.
> You don't really want to be as stupid as that crank? In this case,
> it should be clear that there is something wrong with his arguments.
> Thus, any sort of argument which allows to save relativity if there
> exists an FTL phone should be wrong. Now, the point is that the
> loophole can be used by that crank too. If there is no free will
> of the experimenter, you can do whatever you like with your FTL
> phone but you will be unable to prove that there exists some FTL
> effects inside the phone. >>
>
> I do not understand here (my fault) the FTL-phone argument.
I don't think I do either. :-)
> But philosophers of QM (Shimony, Ghirardi, Eberhard, etc.) say
> that FTL effects (influences, passions, fashions, etc.) are
> allowed. Uncontrollable FTL signals are allowed.
Ok, they're allowed. But, that certainly doesn't entail
that they exist. These words,'influences', 'passions', and
'fashions' are words for what *isn't* known.
'Nonseparability' (another vagueness) does not
imply FTL signals (communicative or not) or instantaneous
causal relationships between spatially separated objects.
The simplest working assumption is that nature is
local, and that there are some correlational contexts
which have thus far resisted clear and precise
formalization in terms of local interactions.
In other words, there are no 'controllable' FTL
signals, because there are no FTL signals.
In place of a clear and precise local formalization
the correlations are spoken of in terms of instantaneous
acausal influences at a distance -- which isn't even
useful hand-waving. Mermin's coining of the term
'fashion-at-a-distance' was meant, I think, to point
out the absurdity of taking these vaguaries as
explanations.
What *is* nonseparability? Indications are, I think,
that it has everything to do with common sources,
and local interactions that are not understood in
sufficient detail to supplement or supercede
the qm formulation.
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>Italo Vecchi:\n> There is a pleasant philosophers\' conversation on Aristotle\'s\n> relevance to modern science under the headings "Cause" and\n> "Hylomorphism" at [...]\n\nInteresting, thanks. About the \'intersubjective\nagreement\'. There is an interesting discussion\non the intersubjectivity of \'knowledge\'\n[Moderators: I just mean density matrices that\nconvey the knowledge *different* people might\nhave about *one and the same* physical system]\nin the paper here below by D. Mermin\nhttp://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0107151\nfollowing another paper by Rudolph Peierls.\n\nSanin,\n- serafino\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Italo Vecchi:
> There is a pleasant philosophers' conversation on Aristotle's
> relevance to modern science under the headings "Cause" and
> "Hylomorphism" at [...]
Interesting, thanks. About the 'intersubjective
agreement'. There is an interesting discussion
on the intersubjectivity of 'knowledge'
[Moderators: I just mean density matrices that
convey the knowledge *different* people might
have about *one and the same* physical system]
in the paper here below by D. Mermin
http://www.arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0107151
following another paper by Rudolph Peierls.
Sanin,
- serafino
Caroline Thompson
Nov4-04, 03:40 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> wrote in message\nnews:21970122.0410271839.56fbf7f2@posting .google.com...\n\n> The simplest working assumption is that nature is\n> local, and that there are some correlational contexts\n> which have thus far resisted clear and precise\n> formalization in terms of local interactions.\n> In other words, there are no \'controllable\' FTL\n> signals, because there are no FTL signals.\n>\n> In place of a clear and precise local formalization\n> the correlations are spoken of in terms of instantaneous\n> acausal influences at a distance -- which isn\'t even\n> useful hand-waving. Mermin\'s coining of the term\n> \'fashion-at-a-distance\' was meant, I think, to point\n> out the absurdity of taking these vaguaries as\n> explanations.\n>\n> What *is* nonseparability? Indications are, I think,\n> that it has everything to do with common sources,\n> and local interactions that are not understood in\n> sufficient detail to supplement or supercede\n> the qm formulation.\n\nWell said! I think the local realist models I have been investigating are\nalong the right lines, and it would not be hard to fill in the details if\nthe will to do so were there. The details in a realistic model always\ndepend on the exact experimental conditions, though, so it is only the\nexperimenters on the spot who are in a position to complete them.\n\nSee http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory\n\nTom: Sorry I have not yet got around to making the promised improvements.\n\nCaroline\n\nCaroline H Thompson\n\nch.thompson1@virgin.net\nhttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> wrote in message
news:21970122.0410271839.56fbf7f2@posting.google.c om...
> The simplest working assumption is that nature is
> local, and that there are some correlational contexts
> which have thus far resisted clear and precise
> formalization in terms of local interactions.
> In other words, there are no 'controllable' FTL
> signals, because there are no FTL signals.
>
> In place of a clear and precise local formalization
> the correlations are spoken of in terms of instantaneous
> acausal influences at a distance -- which isn't even
> useful hand-waving. Mermin's coining of the term
> 'fashion-at-a-distance' was meant, I think, to point
> out the absurdity of taking these vaguaries as
> explanations.
>
> What *is* nonseparability? Indications are, I think,
> that it has everything to do with common sources,
> and local interactions that are not understood in
> sufficient detail to supplement or supercede
> the qm formulation.
Well said! I think the local realist models I have been investigating are
along the right lines, and it would not be hard to fill in the details if
the will to do so were there. The details in a realistic model always
depend on the exact experimental conditions, though, so it is only the
experimenters on the spot who are in a position to complete them.
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory
Tom: Sorry I have not yet got around to making the promised improvements.
Caroline
Caroline H Thompson
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov5-04, 06:10 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n> > But philosophers of QM (Shimony, Ghirardi, Eberhard, etc.) say\n> > that FTL effects (influences, passions, fashions, etc.) are\n> > allowed. Uncontrollable FTL signals are allowed.\n>\n> Ok, they\'re allowed. But, that certainly doesn\'t entail\n> that they exist. These words,\'influences\', \'passions\', and\n> \'fashions\' are words for what *isn\'t* known.\n> The simplest working assumption is that nature is\n> local, and that there are some correlational contexts\n> which have thus far resisted clear and precise\n> formalization in terms of local interactions.\n\nThis working assumption is falsified, empirically,\nby observing violations of Bell\'s inequality (modulo\ndetector efficiency loophole).\n\n"A clear, precise formalization in terms of local\ninteraction" is a nice description of what Bell uses\ntogether with Einstein causality as the assumption\nin his proof. In this sense, a clear, precise formalization\nwithout nonlocal interactions is proven to be impossible.\n\n> In place of a clear and precise local formalization\n> the correlations are spoken of in terms of instantaneous\n> acausal influences at a distance -- which isn\'t even\n> useful hand-waving. Mermin\'s coining of the term\n> \'fashion-at-a-distance\' was meant, I think, to point\n> out the absurdity of taking these vaguaries as\n> explanations.\n\nThere is a clear and precise mathematical theory\nwhich explains the correlations nicely - Bohmian mechanics.\nThere is no hand-waving in Bohmian mechanics but\nprecise equations.\n\nWhatever terms people coin about the nonlocalities\nin Bohmian mechanics doesn\'t change the precise\ncharacter of this theory.\n\nIlja\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
> > But philosophers of QM (Shimony, Ghirardi, Eberhard, etc.) say
> > that FTL effects (influences, passions, fashions, etc.) are
> > allowed. Uncontrollable FTL signals are allowed.
>
> Ok, they're allowed. But, that certainly doesn't entail
> that they exist. These words,'influences', 'passions', and
> 'fashions' are words for what *isn't* known.
> The simplest working assumption is that nature is
> local, and that there are some correlational contexts
> which have thus far resisted clear and precise
> formalization in terms of local interactions.
This working assumption is falsified, empirically,
by observing violations of Bell's inequality (modulo
detector efficiency loophole).
"A clear, precise formalization in terms of local
interaction" is a nice description of what Bell uses
together with Einstein causality as the assumption
in his proof. In this sense, a clear, precise formalization
without nonlocal interactions is proven to be impossible.
> In place of a clear and precise local formalization
> the correlations are spoken of in terms of instantaneous
> acausal influences at a distance -- which isn't even
> useful hand-waving. Mermin's coining of the term
> 'fashion-at-a-distance' was meant, I think, to point
> out the absurdity of taking these vaguaries as
> explanations.
There is a clear and precise mathematical theory
which explains the correlations nicely - Bohmian mechanics.
There is no hand-waving in Bohmian mechanics but
precise equations.
Whatever terms people coin about the nonlocalities
in Bohmian mechanics doesn't change the precise
character of this theory.
Ilja
Thomas Trotter
Nov6-04, 11:07 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message news:<cmcva1\\$c5a\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de>...\n> "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n> > > But philosophers of QM (Shimony, Ghirardi, Eberhard, etc.) say\n> > > that FTL effects (influences, passions, fashions, etc.) are\n> > > allowed. Uncontrollable FTL signals are allowed.\n> >\n> > Ok, they\'re allowed. But, that certainly doesn\'t entail\n> > that they exist. These words,\'influences\', \'passions\', and\n> > \'fashions\' are words for what *isn\'t* known.\n> > The simplest working assumption is that nature is\n> > local, and that there are some correlational contexts\n> > which have thus far resisted clear and precise\n> > formalization in terms of local interactions.\n>\n> This working assumption is falsified, empirically,\n> by observing violations of Bell\'s inequality (modulo\n> detector efficiency loophole).\n\nNo, it isn\'t. What *is* falsified via violations of BI\nis the assumption that the randomly varying direction\nof polarization, DP,(the property of the polarizer-incident\nlight pulses that, if known, would facilitate accurate\npredictions of individual results) is the parameter that\ndetermines coincidental detection. But it isn\'t. The\nparameter that *is* relevant in the correlational context is\nthe identical polarization, IP, of light pulses emitted\nin opposite directions by the same atom. In the experiments,\nthis is what\'s being analyzed by the crossed linear polarizers.\nIP isn\'t a variable.\n\n>\n> "A clear, precise formalization in terms of local\n> interaction" is a nice description of what Bell uses\n> together with Einstein causality as the assumption\n> in his proof. In this sense, a clear, precise formalization\n> without nonlocal interactions is proven to be impossible.\n>\n\nNo, invoking nonlocal interactions is unnecessary on the\nrealization that Bell locality and Einstein causality are\nnot the crucial assumptions in Bell\'s formulation. As I\nmentioned above, it\'s the assumption that DP is relevant\nwrt coincidental detection that is contradicted by QM\nand experiment. But, IP is also an emission-produced\ncommon property of the polarizer-incident light, and it,\nnot DP, is what\'s relevant wrt coincidental detections.\n\nIP determines coincidental detection, but not individual\ndetection. DP determines individual detection, but not\ncoincidental detection. Both IP and DP are produced\nvia emission.\n\nBell\'s question and formulation concerned only DP. So,\nan experimental violation of BI doesn\'t falsify IP, or\nthe local/causal emission model on which IP is based.\n\nThe physical question is: where is the entanglement\nbetween the light pulses produced, at the emitter or at\nthe detectors? The assumption, which hasn\'t yet been\nfalsified, is that it\'s produced at the emitter (due\nto conservation of angular momentum).\n\n> > In place of a clear and precise local formalization\n> > the correlations are spoken of in terms of instantaneous\n> > acausal influences at a distance -- which isn\'t even\n> > useful hand-waving. Mermin\'s coining of the term\n> > \'fashion-at-a-distance\' was meant, I think, to point\n> > out the absurdity of taking these vaguaries as\n> > explanations.\n>\n> There is a clear and precise mathematical theory\n> which explains the correlations nicely - Bohmian mechanics.\n> There is no hand-waving in Bohmian mechanics but\n> precise equations.\n\nBohmian mechanics is, at least, superfluous -- and,\nif nonlocality isn\'t a fact of nature (which so far it\ndoesn\'t appear to be), then BM is conceptually wrong.\n\n>\n> Whatever terms people coin about the nonlocalities\n> in Bohmian mechanics doesn\'t change the precise\n> character of this theory.\n\nYes, but the goal is to develop theories which are\never closer to approximating, conceptually, the way\nnature really is.\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message news:<cmcva1$c5a$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de>...
> "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
> > > But philosophers of QM (Shimony, Ghirardi, Eberhard, etc.) say
> > > that FTL effects (influences, passions, fashions, etc.) are
> > > allowed. Uncontrollable FTL signals are allowed.
> >
> > Ok, they're allowed. But, that certainly doesn't entail
> > that they exist. These words,'influences', 'passions', and
> > 'fashions' are words for what *isn't* known.
> > The simplest working assumption is that nature is
> > local, and that there are some correlational contexts
> > which have thus far resisted clear and precise
> > formalization in terms of local interactions.
>
> This working assumption is falsified, empirically,
> by observing violations of Bell's inequality (modulo
> detector efficiency loophole).
No, it isn't. What *is* falsified via violations of BI
is the assumption that the randomly varying direction
of polarization, DP,(the property of the polarizer-incident
light pulses that, if known, would facilitate accurate
predictions of individual results) is the parameter that
determines coincidental detection. But it isn't. The
parameter that *is* relevant in the correlational context is
the identical polarization, IP, of light pulses emitted
in opposite directions by the same atom. In the experiments,
this is what's being analyzed by the crossed linear polarizers.
IP isn't a variable.
>
> "A clear, precise formalization in terms of local
> interaction" is a nice description of what Bell uses
> together with Einstein causality as the assumption
> in his proof. In this sense, a clear, precise formalization
> without nonlocal interactions is proven to be impossible.
>
No, invoking nonlocal interactions is unnecessary on the
realization that Bell locality and Einstein causality are
not the crucial assumptions in Bell's formulation. As I
mentioned above, it's the assumption that DP is relevant
wrt coincidental detection that is contradicted by QM
and experiment. But, IP is also an emission-produced
common property of the polarizer-incident light, and it,
not DP, is what's relevant wrt coincidental detections.
IP determines coincidental detection, but not individual
detection. DP determines individual detection, but not
coincidental detection. Both IP and DP are produced
via emission.
Bell's question and formulation concerned only DP. So,
an experimental violation of BI doesn't falsify IP, or
the local/causal emission model on which IP is based.
The physical question is: where is the entanglement
between the light pulses produced, at the emitter or at
the detectors? The assumption, which hasn't yet been
falsified, is that it's produced at the emitter (due
to conservation of angular momentum).
> > In place of a clear and precise local formalization
> > the correlations are spoken of in terms of instantaneous
> > acausal influences at a distance -- which isn't even
> > useful hand-waving. Mermin's coining of the term
> > 'fashion-at-a-distance' was meant, I think, to point
> > out the absurdity of taking these vaguaries as
> > explanations.
>
> There is a clear and precise mathematical theory
> which explains the correlations nicely - Bohmian mechanics.
> There is no hand-waving in Bohmian mechanics but
> precise equations.
Bohmian mechanics is, at least, superfluous -- and,
if nonlocality isn't a fact of nature (which so far it
doesn't appear to be), then BM is conceptually wrong.
>
> Whatever terms people coin about the nonlocalities
> in Bohmian mechanics doesn't change the precise
> character of this theory.
Yes, but the goal is to develop theories which are
ever closer to approximating, conceptually, the way
nature really is.
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\nIlja Schmelzer <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> writes\n>There is a clear and precise mathematical theory\n>which explains the correlations nicely - Bohmian mechanics.\n>There is no hand-waving in Bohmian mechanics but\n>precise equations.\n>\n>Whatever terms people coin about the nonlocalities\n>in Bohmian mechanics doesn\'t change the precise\n>character of this theory.\n\nAny chance of a brief description of the main points of bohmian\nmechanics and perhaps why some find it unacceptable?\n\n--\nOz\nThis post is worth absolutely nothing and is probably fallacious.\n\nUse oz@farmeroz.port995.com [ozacoohdb@despammed.com functions].\nBTOPENWORLD address has ceased. DEMON address has ceased.\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Ilja Schmelzer <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> writes
>There is a clear and precise mathematical theory
>which explains the correlations nicely - Bohmian mechanics.
>There is no hand-waving in Bohmian mechanics but
>precise equations.
>
>Whatever terms people coin about the nonlocalities
>in Bohmian mechanics doesn't change the precise
>character of this theory.
Any chance of a brief description of the main points of bohmian
mechanics and perhaps why some find it unacceptable?
--
Oz
This post is worth absolutely nothing and is probably fallacious.
Use oz@farmeroz.port995.com [ozacoohdb@despammed.com functions].
BTOPENWORLD address has ceased. DEMON address has ceased.
Italo Vecchi
Nov7-04, 04:06 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message news:<qt0gd.4738\\$Es2.104296@twister2.libero.it>. ..\n\n> There is an interesting discussion\n> on the intersubjectivity of \'knowledge\'\n> [Moderators: I just mean density matrices that\n> convey the knowledge *different* people might\n> have about *one and the same* physical system]\n> in the paper here below by D. Mermin\n> http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0107151\n> following another paper by Rudolph Peierls.\n\nInteresting indeed. You may have noticed that Fuchs\' counterexample to Peierls\'\nfirst criterion depends on Alice\'s free will, i.e. on Alice "secretly"\nimplementing a procedure that Bob does not envisage. In other words, the\ncriterion\'s failure is induced by Alice\'s secret breach of intersubjective\nagreement between her and Bob.\n\nI suppose that Peierls\' criterion may well hold whenever the involved parties\nstick to an agreed protocol, but I am not sure.\n\nAlegher,\n\nIV\n\n-----------------------------\n\n"Occhio non vede, cuore non duole"\n"Eye doesn\'t see, heart doesn\'t bleed"\n\nItalian Proverb\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"scerir" <scerir@libero.it> wrote in message news:<qt0gd.4738$Es2.104296@twister2.libero.it>...
> There is an interesting discussion
> on the intersubjectivity of 'knowledge'
> [Moderators: I just mean density matrices that
> convey the knowledge *different* people might
> have about *one and the same* physical system]
> in the paper here below by D. Mermin
> http://www.arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0107151
> following another paper by Rudolph Peierls.
Interesting indeed. You may have noticed that Fuchs' counterexample to Peierls'
first criterion depends on Alice's free will, i.e. on Alice "secretly"
implementing a procedure that Bob does not envisage. In other words, the
criterion's failure is induced by Alice's secret breach of intersubjective
agreement between her and Bob.
I suppose that Peierls' criterion may well hold whenever the involved parties
stick to an agreed protocol, but I am not sure.
Alegher,
IV
-----------------------------
"Occhio non vede, cuore non duole"
"Eye doesn't see, heart doesn't bleed"
Italian Proverb
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\nThomas Trotter\n> The physical question is: where is the entanglement\n> between the light pulses produced, at the emitter or at\n> the detectors? The assumption, which hasn\'t yet been\n> falsified, is that it\'s produced at the emitter (due\n> to conservation of angular momentum).\n\n*If* the measurement of an observable of a part\nof a bi-photon is accompanied by an advanced field,\nas well as by a retarded field, then some information\nabout that measurement of that observable of that part\nof a bi-photon - in example the details about the\npolarizer orientation at the moment of measurement -\nwill ride the advanced wave back to the source\nof the bi-photon. This way we could understand how,\neven if the orientation of a polarizer is changed\nat the last moment, the measurement can still carry\nsome information back to the source. Or not?\ns.\n\n"A quantum possibility is more real\nthan a classical possibility,\nbut less real than a classical reality"\n- Boris Tsilerson (Ciler\'son)\n\n\n\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Thomas Trotter
> The physical question is: where is the entanglement
> between the light pulses produced, at the emitter or at
> the detectors? The assumption, which hasn't yet been
> falsified, is that it's produced at the emitter (due
> to conservation of angular momentum).
*If* the measurement of an observable of a part
of a bi-photon is accompanied by an advanced field,
as well as by a retarded field, then some information
about that measurement of that observable of that part
of a bi-photon - in example the details about the
polarizer orientation at the moment of measurement -
will ride the advanced wave back to the source
of the bi-photon. This way we could understand how,
even if the orientation of a polarizer is changed
at the last moment, the measurement can still carry
some information back to the source. Or not?
s.
"A quantum possibility is more real
than a classical possibility,
but less real than a classical reality"
- Boris Tsilerson (Ciler'son)
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov9-04, 02:52 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n\n> > > The simplest working assumption is that nature is\n> > > local, and that there are some correlational contexts\n> > > which have thus far resisted clear and precise\n> > > formalization in terms of local interactions.\n> >\n> > This working assumption is falsified, empirically,\n> > by observing violations of Bell\'s inequality (modulo\n> > detector efficiency loophole).\n>\n> No, it isn\'t. What *is* falsified via violations of BI\n> is the assumption that the randomly varying direction\n> of polarization, DP,(the property of the polarizer-incident\n> light pulses that, if known, would facilitate accurate\n> predictions of individual results) is the parameter that\n> determines coincidental detection. But it isn\'t. The\n> parameter that *is* relevant in the correlational context is\n> the identical polarization, IP, of light pulses emitted\n> in opposite directions by the same atom. In the experiments,\n> this is what\'s being analyzed by the crossed linear polarizers.\n> IP isn\'t a variable.\n\nI don\'t understand your point.\n\nIf you argue here about possible loopholes in real experiments\nwith polarizers (beyond the detector efficiency loophole), then\nI would not like to argue with you. In this case, what\nwe have observed yet are simply not violations of BI.\n\nElse I would recommend you to read Bell. In the\nproof and the assumptions of Bell\'s inequality there is no\nnecessity to mention polarizers at all. What matters are\ndecisions of experimenters (by pressing, for example,\nsome buttons on a black box containing the polarizers)\nand the results of the observation, as seen as the output\nof these black boxes.\n\n> > "A clear, precise formalization in terms of local\n> > interaction" is a nice description of what Bell uses\n> > together with Einstein causality as the assumption\n> > in his proof. In this sense, a clear, precise formalization\n> > without nonlocal interactions is proven to be impossible.\n>\n> No, invoking nonlocal interactions is unnecessary on the\n> realization that Bell locality and Einstein causality are\n> not the crucial assumptions in Bell\'s formulation.\n\nI don\'t know what means "Bell locality". What is sufficient\nto prove, together with Einstein causality, the BI is IMHO\nbetter named realism. The hidden variables assumed by\nBell are in no way required to be local. (For example,\nin Bohmian mechanics, which is a realistic theory in Bell\'s\nsense, but not Einstein-causal, we have wave functions\npsi(q_1,q_2,...) as variables which are clearly nonlocal.)\n\n> Bell\'s question and formulation concerned only DP. So,\n> an experimental violation of BI doesn\'t falsify IP, or\n> the local/causal emission model on which IP is based.\n\nI have no understanding what you mean with this.\n\n> The physical question is: where is the entanglement\n> between the light pulses produced, at the emitter or at\n> the detectors? The assumption, which hasn\'t yet been\n> falsified, is that it\'s produced at the emitter (due\n> to conservation of angular momentum).\n\nThere is no question of type "where entanglement is\nproduced". BI does not (have to) mention the word\nentanglement.\n\n> > > In place of a clear and precise local formalization\n> > > the correlations are spoken of in terms of instantaneous\n> > > acausal influences at a distance -- which isn\'t even\n> > > useful hand-waving.\n\n> > There is a clear and precise mathematical theory\n> > which explains the correlations nicely - Bohmian mechanics.\n> > There is no hand-waving in Bohmian mechanics but\n> > precise equations.\n>\n> Bohmian mechanics is, at least, superfluous\n\nDecide for yourself if you want to have a clear and\nprecise formalization of the instantaneous acausal influences\nor not. But, if you reject a precise formulation as superfluous,\ndon\'t argue against hand-waving.\n\n> -- and,\n> if nonlocality isn\'t a fact of nature (which so far it\n> doesn\'t appear to be), then BM is conceptually wrong.\n\nOf course, if BM is wrong, then BM is wrong.\n\nNote also that my argumentation is that violations of BI\nare an observational _proof_ of existence of violations\nof Einstein causality. A proof as strong as possible in\nnatural science at all. A much stronger form of\n"appearance" seems unlikely. Of course, if somebody\nis ready to reject realism if confronted with a falsification of\nhis pet theory, it will never appear to him that his pet theory\nis false.\n\n> > Whatever terms people coin about the nonlocalities\n> > in Bohmian mechanics doesn\'t change the precise\n> > character of this theory.\n>\n> Yes, but the goal is to develop theories which are\n> ever closer to approximating, conceptually, the way\n> nature really is.\n\nHm, and how is this related to BM?\n\nIt is a realistic theory, IOW, a theory which tries to\nguess the way nature really is. Of course, this guess\nmay be wrong. But if you care about the way\nnature really is, you should not give up the search for\ntheories which are realistic.\n\nIf you think that in Bell\'s sense is a too strong notion of\nrealism, propose a weaker one and justify your thesis\nthat the stronger version of Bell should be rejected,\ndespite the fact that such stronger realistic theories exist\nfor our universe.\n\nIlja\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
> > > The simplest working assumption is that nature is
> > > local, and that there are some correlational contexts
> > > which have thus far resisted clear and precise
> > > formalization in terms of local interactions.
> >
> > This working assumption is falsified, empirically,
> > by observing violations of Bell's inequality (modulo
> > detector efficiency loophole).
>
> No, it isn't. What *is* falsified via violations of BI
> is the assumption that the randomly varying direction
> of polarization, DP,(the property of the polarizer-incident
> light pulses that, if known, would facilitate accurate
> predictions of individual results) is the parameter that
> determines coincidental detection. But it isn't. The
> parameter that *is* relevant in the correlational context is
> the identical polarization, IP, of light pulses emitted
> in opposite directions by the same atom. In the experiments,
> this is what's being analyzed by the crossed linear polarizers.
> IP isn't a variable.
I don't understand your point.
If you argue here about possible loopholes in real experiments
with polarizers (beyond the detector efficiency loophole), then
I would not like to argue with you. In this case, what
we have observed yet are simply not violations of BI.
Else I would recommend you to read Bell. In the
proof and the assumptions of Bell's inequality there is no
necessity to mention polarizers at all. What matters are
decisions of experimenters (by pressing, for example,
some buttons on a black box containing the polarizers)
and the results of the observation, as seen as the output
of these black boxes.
> > "A clear, precise formalization in terms of local
> > interaction" is a nice description of what Bell uses
> > together with Einstein causality as the assumption
> > in his proof. In this sense, a clear, precise formalization
> > without nonlocal interactions is proven to be impossible.
>
> No, invoking nonlocal interactions is unnecessary on the
> realization that Bell locality and Einstein causality are
> not the crucial assumptions in Bell's formulation.
I don't know what means "Bell locality". What is sufficient
to prove, together with Einstein causality, the BI is IMHO
better named realism. The hidden variables assumed by
Bell are in no way required to be local. (For example,
in Bohmian mechanics, which is a realistic theory in Bell's
sense, but not Einstein-causal, we have wave functions
\psi(q_1,q_2,...) as variables which are clearly nonlocal.)
> Bell's question and formulation concerned only DP. So,
> an experimental violation of BI doesn't falsify IP, or
> the local/causal emission model on which IP is based.
I have no understanding what you mean with this.
> The physical question is: where is the entanglement
> between the light pulses produced, at the emitter or at
> the detectors? The assumption, which hasn't yet been
> falsified, is that it's produced at the emitter (due
> to conservation of angular momentum).
There is no question of type "where entanglement is
produced". BI does not (have to) mention the word
entanglement.
> > > In place of a clear and precise local formalization
> > > the correlations are spoken of in terms of instantaneous
> > > acausal influences at a distance -- which isn't even
> > > useful hand-waving.
> > There is a clear and precise mathematical theory
> > which explains the correlations nicely - Bohmian mechanics.
> > There is no hand-waving in Bohmian mechanics but
> > precise equations.
>
> Bohmian mechanics is, at least, superfluous
Decide for yourself if you want to have a clear and
precise formalization of the instantaneous acausal influences
or not. But, if you reject a precise formulation as superfluous,
don't argue against hand-waving.
> -- and,
> if nonlocality isn't a fact of nature (which so far it
> doesn't appear to be), then BM is conceptually wrong.
Of course, if BM is wrong, then BM is wrong.
Note also that my argumentation is that violations of BI
are an observational _proof_ of existence of violations
of Einstein causality. A proof as strong as possible in
natural science at all. A much stronger form of
"appearance" seems unlikely. Of course, if somebody
is ready to reject realism if confronted with a falsification of
his pet theory, it will never appear to him that his pet theory
is false.
> > Whatever terms people coin about the nonlocalities
> > in Bohmian mechanics doesn't change the precise
> > character of this theory.
>
> Yes, but the goal is to develop theories which are
> ever closer to approximating, conceptually, the way
> nature really is.
Hm, and how is this related to BM?
It is a realistic theory, IOW, a theory which tries to
guess the way nature really is. Of course, this guess
may be wrong. But if you care about the way
nature really is, you should not give up the search for
theories which are realistic.
If you think that in Bell's sense is a too strong notion of
realism, propose a weaker one and justify your thesis
that the stronger version of Bell should be rejected,
despite the fact that such stronger realistic theories exist
for our universe.
Ilja
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov9-04, 02:53 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Oz" <oz@farmeroz.port995.com> schrieb\n> Ilja Schmelzer <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> writes\n> >There is a clear and precise mathematical theory\n> >which explains the correlations nicely - Bohmian mechanics.\n> >There is no hand-waving in Bohmian mechanics but\n> >precise equations.\n\n> >Whatever terms people coin about the nonlocalities\n> >in Bohmian mechanics doesn\'t change the precise\n> >character of this theory.\n\n> Any chance of a brief description of the main points of bohmian\n> mechanics and perhaps why some find it unacceptable?\n\nReality is described by a wave function Psi(Q) on the\nconfiguration space Q and a configuration q in Q.\n\nEquations are the Schroedinger equation and the\nguiding equation which may be written as\n\ndq/dt = <psi|J|psi> / <psi|psi>\n\nQ is the configuration space, in field theory it should be\nsomething like a space of functions (g_ij(x),psi(x),A_i(x))\non R^3. Then the wave function Psi(q) becomes a functional\non this function space (which should not be mingled with\nfermion fields psi(x)).\n\nAgreement with the predictions of QM is reached if we assume\nrho(q) = <Psi|Psi> (quantum equilibrium) in the initial state.\nThe guiding equation allows to prove that the property\nrho(q) = <Psi|Psi> is preserved for all times. A more general\nway is to consider subsystems of the universe and to\ndescribe them with effective wave functions, using the math\napparatus of decoherence. This allows to prove that, given the\nassumptions we need for decoherence, the effective state\nappears to be in quantum equilibrium rho(q) = <Psi|Psi>\nfor effective distributions rho(q) and effective wave function\nPsi(q) of the subsystem.\n\nResults of observations are part of the global configuration\nat some moment after the end of the observation. The properties\nof observations and observables may be derived from this,\nshould not be postulated as in QM. This gives a natural\ngeneralization (positive operator measures instead of\nprojection measures) of the observables of QM which is\nreasonable and has been developed for QM\nindependently.\n\nPeople don\'t like it because it needs a preferred frame,\ntherefore violates deeply held beliefs about the fundamental\nnature of relativistic symmetry. The observable effects do\nnot allow to measure the preferred frame in quantum equilibrium,\nthus, this is not a physical problem, but a metaphysical preference.\n\nIlja\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Oz" <oz@farmeroz.port995.com> schrieb
> Ilja Schmelzer <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> writes
> >There is a clear and precise mathematical theory
> >which explains the correlations nicely - Bohmian mechanics.
> >There is no hand-waving in Bohmian mechanics but
> >precise equations.
> >Whatever terms people coin about the nonlocalities
> >in Bohmian mechanics doesn't change the precise
> >character of this theory.
> Any chance of a brief description of the main points of bohmian
> mechanics and perhaps why some find it unacceptable?
Reality is described by a wave function \Psi(Q) on the
configuration space Q and a configuration q in Q.
Equations are the Schroedinger equation and the
guiding equation which may be written as
dq/dt = <\psi|J|\psi> / <\psi|\psi>
Q is the configuration space, in field theory it should be
something like a space of functions (g_{ij}(x),\psi(x),A_i(x))
on R^3. Then the wave function \Psi(q) becomes a functional
on this function space (which should not be mingled with
fermion fields \psi(x)).
Agreement with the predictions of QM is reached if we assume
\rho(q) = <\Psi|\Psi> (quantum equilibrium) in the initial state.
The guiding equation allows to prove that the property
\rho(q) = <\Psi|\Psi> is preserved for all times. A more general
way is to consider subsystems of the universe and to
describe them with effective wave functions, using the math
apparatus of decoherence. This allows to prove that, given the
assumptions we need for decoherence, the effective state
appears to be in quantum equilibrium \rho(q) = <\Psi|\Psi>
for effective distributions \rho(q) and effective wave function
\Psi(q) of the subsystem.
Results of observations are part of the global configuration
at some moment after the end of the observation. The properties
of observations and observables may be derived from this,
should not be postulated as in QM. This gives a natural
generalization (positive operator measures instead of
projection measures) of the observables of QM which is
reasonable and has been developed for QM
independently.
People don't like it because it needs a preferred frame,
therefore violates deeply held beliefs about the fundamental
nature of relativistic symmetry. The observable effects do
not allow to measure the preferred frame in quantum equilibrium,
thus, this is not a physical problem, but a metaphysical preference.
Ilja
Caroline Thompson
Nov14-04, 06:28 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message\nnews:cn21j6\\$hql\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...\n> "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n\n>> ... The conclusion that the coincidence curves\n>> produced in experiments cannot, in principle, be explained\n>> in terms of a locally produced relationship is unwarranted, imo.\n>\n> Explain why.\n>\n> Do you argue about loopholes in the experiments? (That\'s\n> nothing I would like to argue about, leaving this to\n> experimenters and future.)\n\nSorry, but if you ignore the loophole you end up with self-contradictory\nstatements such as:\n\n>> The only thing we know for sure via Bell\'s theorem is\n>> that Bell\'s lhv formulation doesn\'t work (apparently,\n>> if any experimental violations of BI are considered\n>> conclusive).\n\nWe *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what\'s the point of the\nexperiments? Are we simply to accept something impossible because we happen\nto believe QM to be correct?\n\n>> The crucial assumption, according to Bell, underlying his\n>> formulation is that the results at one end of the setup\n>> don\'t depend on the settings at the other. And, as far\n>> as I can tell, they don\'t.\n>\n> They do, because there is essentially nothing else used in the\n> assumptions, and the conclusions are false.\n\n*If* QM is correct then you are right and Bell\'s assumption of independence\nof the two ends of the setup must be wrong, but this is what that Bell test\nexperiments are supposed to be investigating. A loophole-free one has yet\nto be performed.\n\nCaroline\n\nCaroline H Thompson\n\nch.thompson1@virgin.net\nhttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message
news:cn21j6$hql$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...
> "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
>> ... The conclusion that the coincidence curves
>> produced in experiments cannot, in principle, be explained
>> in terms of a locally produced relationship is unwarranted, imo.
>
> Explain why.
>
> Do you argue about loopholes in the experiments? (That's
> nothing I would like to argue about, leaving this to
> experimenters and future.)
Sorry, but if you ignore the loophole you end up with self-contradictory
statements such as:
>> The only thing we know for sure via Bell's theorem is
>> that Bell's lhv formulation doesn't work (apparently,
>> if any experimental violations of BI are considered
>> conclusive).
We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what's the point of the
experiments? Are we simply to accept something impossible because we happen
to believe QM to be correct?
>> The crucial assumption, according to Bell, underlying his
>> formulation is that the results at one end of the setup
>> don't depend on the settings at the other. And, as far
>> as I can tell, they don't.
>
> They do, because there is essentially nothing else used in the
> assumptions, and the conclusions are false.
*If* QM is correct then you are right and Bell's assumption of independence
of the two ends of the setup must be wrong, but this is what that Bell test
experiments are supposed to be investigating. A loophole-free one has yet
to be performed.
Caroline
Caroline H Thompson
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n\n\nCaroline Thompson:\n>"Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> wrote in message\n>news:cmri1v\\$904\\$1@ra.nrl.navy.mil... \n>\n>> ... giving up strong realism results in a clean theory with\n>> no redundant parts, giving up locality does not.\n>\n>Why give up either? There are ordinary "scientific" local realist models\n>that can explain all the actual observations in Bell test experiments. They\n>do not quite agree exactly with QM, but nobody has yet done the experiments\n>needed that could, in my view, show that they are more general than QM.\n>They ought to give *better* predictions when polarisers and detectors are\n>less than perfect.\n\nHere in the real world, reality hasn\'t caught up to perfection,\nunless you believe the daily newsfeed from the whitehouse.\n\n>Nobody has looked to see if they do! Instead of repeating experiments\n>with everything unchanged except, for instance, the sensitivity of the\n>detector, experimenters rush on to the next experiment, as different\n>from the first as they can make it.\n\nIt\'s a catch-22 situation. To order those improved detectors we need to\nteleport the order form to a manufcturer\'s representative somewhere in the\nconstellation leo, but we can\'t do that until we get the improved\ndetectors to figure out how. In the meantime, everyone will just have to\nbe satisfied with doing many different experiments to try and cover the\nparameter space the old fashioned way - using the scientific method and\nlots of graduate students.\n\n>Is there not room for better scientific method here?\n\nYou mean on usenet? Probably not. You\'ll have to go to a physics\nlab for that.\n\n>The debate between local realism and QM has surely gone on long enough.\n\nI agree. Despite the overwhelming success of quantum mechanics, some\npeople continue to wax nostalgic for something they can understand in\nterms of blocks sliding down frictiolness, inclined planes. On the\nother hand, one might legitimately ask the question, ``If quantum\nmechanics is really correct, why are the innovations which depend on\nquantum mechanics responsible for only 38% of the us gross domestic\nproduct?\'\'\n\n>Quantum theorists argue that the way forward is to find a loophole-free\n>test. They seem to be ignoring an easier option: check existing\n>experiments against the various local realist models that have been\n>suggested.\n\nActually, I don\'t think anyone seriously thinks better experiments are\ngoing to rescue classical mechanics from it\'s status as ``superceded\'\' and\nrestore it as the reigning theory of mechanics. The reason quantum\nmechanics ever came up at turn-of-the-century physics soirees, was that\nclassical mechanics gave up the ghost (pun intended) a century ago.\n\nHowever, if you have a better idea, you should (1) perform some\ncalculations, since a handwaving expository article oulining a personal\nphiliosphical agenda doesn\'t get very far, unless it\'s also funny,\n(2) demonstrate that you get the same numbers as quantum mechanics in\nevery case that quantum mechanics gets the right numbers, which so far,\nis every case. Any predictions of new phenomena that can only be observed\nwith impossible experiments should be reserved until after you determine\nthat your idea gets the right numerical values for all of the more mundane\nstuff everyone already knows about and and you complete the final item,\n(3) make a quantitative prediction for an experiment that can be done\nusing technology available on this planet for a good bit less than the\ncost of a shuttle launch.\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Caroline Thompson:
>"Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> wrote in message
>news:cmri1v$904$1@ra.nrl.navy.mil...
>
>> ... giving up strong realism results in a clean theory with
>> no redundant parts, giving up locality does not.
>
>Why give up either? There are ordinary "scientific" local realist models
>that can explain all the actual observations in Bell test experiments. They
>do not quite agree exactly with QM, but nobody has yet done the experiments
>needed that could, in my view, show that they are more general than QM.
>They ought to give *better* predictions when polarisers and detectors are
>less than perfect.
Here in the real world, reality hasn't caught up to perfection,
unless you believe the daily newsfeed from the whitehouse.
>Nobody has looked to see if they do! Instead of repeating experiments
>with everything unchanged except, for instance, the sensitivity of the
>detector, experimenters rush on to the next experiment, as different
>from the first as they can make it.
It's a catch-22 situation. To order those improved detectors we need to
teleport the order form to a manufcturer's representative somewhere in the
constellation leo, but we can't do that until we get the improved
detectors to figure out how. In the meantime, everyone will just have to
be satisfied with doing many different experiments to try and cover the
parameter space the old fashioned way - using the scientific method and
lots of graduate students.
>Is there not room for better scientific method here?
You mean on usenet? Probably not. You'll have to go to a physics
lab for that.
>The debate between local realism and QM has surely gone on long enough.
I agree. Despite the overwhelming success of quantum mechanics, some
people continue to wax nostalgic for something they can understand in
terms of blocks sliding down frictiolness, inclined planes. On the
other hand, one might legitimately ask the question, ``If quantum
mechanics is really correct, why are the innovations which depend on
quantum mechanics responsible for only 38% of the us gross domestic
product?''
>Quantum theorists argue that the way forward is to find a loophole-free
>test. They seem to be ignoring an easier option: check existing
>experiments against the various local realist models that have been
>suggested.
Actually, I don't think anyone seriously thinks better experiments are
going to rescue classical mechanics from it's status as ``superceded'' and
restore it as the reigning theory of mechanics. The reason quantum
mechanics ever came up at turn-of-the-century physics soirees, was that
classical mechanics gave up the ghost (pun intended) a century ago.
However, if you have a better idea, you should (1) perform some
calculations, since a handwaving expository article oulining a personal
philiosphical agenda doesn't get very far, unless it's also funny,
(2) demonstrate that you get the same numbers as quantum mechanics in
every case that quantum mechanics gets the right numbers, which so far,
is every case. Any predictions of new phenomena that can only be observed
with impossible experiments should be reserved until after you determine
that your idea gets the right numerical values for all of the more mundane
stuff everyone already knows about and and you complete the final item,
(3) make a quantitative prediction for an experiment that can be done
using technology available on this planet for a good bit less than the
cost of a shuttle launch.
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>Caroline Thompson:\n>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message\n>news:cn21j6\\$hql\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...\n>> "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n>\n>>> ... The conclusion that the coincidence curves\n>>> produced in experiments cannot, in principle, be explained\n>>> in terms of a locally produced relationship is unwarranted, imo.\n>>\n>> Explain why.\n>>\n>> Do you argue about loopholes in the experiments? (That\'s\n>> nothing I would like to argue about, leaving this to\n>> experimenters and future.)\n>\n>Sorry, but if you ignore the loophole you end up with self-contradictory\n>statements such as:\n>\n>>> The only thing we know for sure via Bell\'s theorem is\n>>> that Bell\'s lhv formulation doesn\'t work (apparently,\n>>> if any experimental violations of BI are considered\n>>> conclusive).\n>\n>We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what\'s the point of the\n>experiments? Are we simply to accept something impossible because we happen\n>to believe QM to be correct?\n\nSince it\'s impossible to close every possible loophole in any theory,\nthe correct question is ``are we to accept [quantum mechanics] just because\nit predicts the correct results and no one has offered another theory\nwhich agrees with the experimental data and explains something that\n[quantum mechanics] doesn\'t?\'\'\n\nThe answer, of course, is ``yes.\'\' Classical mechanics was accepted for\na long time, based on exactly the same line of reasoning. If I employ your\nreasoning regarding loopholes, then for centuries, physicists, engineers,\netc., were engaged in an elaborate fraud. Anyone with a fertile imagination\nand a resistance to logic can come up with an example of an experiment that\nhas never literally been performed to test classical mechanics and declare\nit a loophole in newton\'s laws. If the example is also impractical, does\nthat constitute a better case against classical mechanics than one which\nmight easily be done but is likely to confirm classical mechanics?\n\n>> They do, because there is essentially nothing else used in the\n>> assumptions, and the conclusions are false.\n>\n>*If* QM is correct then you are right and Bell\'s assumption of independence\n>of the two ends of the setup must be wrong, but this is what that Bell test\n>experiments are supposed to be investigating.\n\nWhy is that? Nature doesn\'t have an obligation to consult anyone\nprior to making up the rules.\n\n> A loophole-free one has yet to be performed.\n\nThat is true for any theory of anything that has ever been proposed.\nPhysicists just tend to accept the theories which haven\'t yet been\nfalsified.\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Caroline Thompson:
>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message
>news:cn21j6$hql$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...
>> "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
>
>>> ... The conclusion that the coincidence curves
>>> produced in experiments cannot, in principle, be explained
>>> in terms of a locally produced relationship is unwarranted, imo.
>>
>> Explain why.
>>
>> Do you argue about loopholes in the experiments? (That's
>> nothing I would like to argue about, leaving this to
>> experimenters and future.)
>
>Sorry, but if you ignore the loophole you end up with self-contradictory
>statements such as:
>
>>> The only thing we know for sure via Bell's theorem is
>>> that Bell's lhv formulation doesn't work (apparently,
>>> if any experimental violations of BI are considered
>>> conclusive).
>
>We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what's the point of the
>experiments? Are we simply to accept something impossible because we happen
>to believe QM to be correct?
Since it's impossible to close every possible loophole in any theory,
the correct question is ``are we to accept [quantum mechanics] just because
it predicts the correct results and no one has offered another theory
which agrees with the experimental data and explains something that
[quantum mechanics] doesn't?''
The answer, of course, is ``yes.'' Classical mechanics was accepted for
a long time, based on exactly the same line of reasoning. If I employ your
reasoning regarding loopholes, then for centuries, physicists, engineers,
etc., were engaged in an elaborate fraud. Anyone with a fertile imagination
and a resistance to logic can come up with an example of an experiment that
has never literally been performed to test classical mechanics and declare
it a loophole in newton's laws. If the example is also impractical, does
that constitute a better case against classical mechanics than one which
might easily be done but is likely to confirm classical mechanics?
>> They do, because there is essentially nothing else used in the
>> assumptions, and the conclusions are false.
>
>*If* QM is correct then you are right and Bell's assumption of independence
>of the two ends of the setup must be wrong, but this is what that Bell test
>experiments are supposed to be investigating.
Why is that? Nature doesn't have an obligation to consult anyone
prior to making up the rules.
> A loophole-free one has yet to be performed.
That is true for any theory of anything that has ever been proposed.
Physicists just tend to accept the theories which haven't yet been
falsified.
Ralph Hartley
Nov16-04, 02:18 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>Ilja Schmelzer wrote:\n\n> Do you argue about loopholes in the experiments? (That\'s\n> nothing I would like to argue about, leaving this to\n> experimenters and future.)\n\nHistory would suggest that that is exactly what she argues about. I agree\nwith you on that.\n\n> BM gives precise answers. Of course, it has to give\n> such precise answers also for questions which we cannot\n> decide with experiments. These answers have to be\n> hypothetical.\n\nBut the answers it gives are not unique, they depend on unobservable\nthings. It gives unique answers for exactly those questions for which QM\ngives answers, and it always agrees with QM (by design).\n\nBM is just quantum mechanics with an Ontology grafted on. It does not\nanswer any real (as opposed to hypothetical) questions that QM does not.\nYou can *always* do that, because whenever you encounter a purely\nhypothetical question you can just make up an answer.\n\nI can imagine a theory that gives an answer to the question "are electrons\nred?" But I don\'t see why I should prefer one of those over the other, or\nover a theory in which the question is considered meaningless.\n\nI\'m pretty sure "are electrons red?" is just as meaningless in BM as in\nordinary QM. BM does not answer *any* question, just the meaningful ones.\n\n> I would propose to define the word\n> "explanation" as "description in terms of a realistic theory\n> in Bell\'s sense".\n\nThe problem with your definition is that it is *both* too wide and too\nnarrow. It throws out the baby but keeps the bathwater.\n\n> This is a very, very wide sense of explanation. It includes\n> explanations using ghosts, God, aliens, karma, influences\n> from other dimensions and other nonsense. For all of them\n> we can postulate some set /\\ of possible states of all these\n> ghosts and postulate some probability distribution on them\n> to make predictions.\n\nPerhaps, many would prefer a definition of "explanation" that excludes\nthose things, at least unless there is evidence for them, but includes\nQuantum Mechanics (without the ontological baggage).\n\nA theory that does *not* give precise answers to meaningless questions is\npreferable to one that does.\n\nIf one considers hypothetical questions (like "did A cause B or B cause A?"\nor "*which* frame is preferred?") that have no observable answer, to be\nmeaningless (at least as far as physics is concerned), then BM is worse\nthan QM.\n\nRalph Hartley\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> Do you argue about loopholes in the experiments? (That's
> nothing I would like to argue about, leaving this to
> experimenters and future.)
History would suggest that that is exactly what she argues about. I agree
with you on that.
> BM gives precise answers. Of course, it has to give
> such precise answers also for questions which we cannot
> decide with experiments. These answers have to be
> hypothetical.
But the answers it gives are not unique, they depend on unobservable
things. It gives unique answers for exactly those questions for which QM
gives answers, and it always agrees with QM (by design).
BM is just quantum mechanics with an Ontology grafted on. It does not
answer any real (as opposed to hypothetical) questions that QM does not.
You can *always* do that, because whenever you encounter a purely
hypothetical question you can just make up an answer.
I can imagine a theory that gives an answer to the question "are electrons
red?" But I don't see why I should prefer one of those over the other, or
over a theory in which the question is considered meaningless.
I'm pretty sure "are electrons red?" is just as meaningless in BM as in
ordinary QM. BM does not answer *any* question, just the meaningful ones.
> I would propose to define the word
> "explanation" as "description in terms of a realistic theory
> in Bell's sense".
The problem with your definition is that it is *both* too wide and too
narrow. It throws out the baby but keeps the bathwater.
> This is a very, very wide sense of explanation. It includes
> explanations using ghosts, God, aliens, karma, influences
> from other dimensions and other nonsense. For all of them
> we can postulate some set /\ of possible states of all these
> ghosts and postulate some probability distribution on them
> to make predictions.
Perhaps, many would prefer a definition of "explanation" that excludes
those things, at least unless there is evidence for them, but includes
Quantum Mechanics (without the ontological baggage).
A theory that does *not* give precise answers to meaningless questions is
preferable to one that does.
If one considers hypothetical questions (like "did A cause B or B cause A?"
or "*which* frame is preferred?") that have no observable answer, to be
meaningless (at least as far as physics is concerned), then BM is worse
than QM.
Ralph Hartley
Thomas Trotter
Nov16-04, 02:19 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message news:<cn21j6\\$hql\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de>...\n> "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n> > "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > > "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n> > > > "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > > > > "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n>\n> > > > > > The simplest working assumption is that nature is\n> > > > > > local, and that there are some correlational contexts\n> > > > > > which have thus far resisted clear and precise\n> > > > > > formalization in terms of local interactions.\n> > > > >\n> > > > > This working assumption is falsified, empirically,\n> > > > > by observing violations of Bell\'s inequality (modulo\n> > > > > detector efficiency loophole).\n>\n> > I disagree. The conclusion that the coincidence curves\n> > produced in experiments cannot, in principle, be explained\n> > in terms of a locally produced relationship is unwarranted, imo.\n>\n> Explain why.\n\nIs it possible that when more details of emission and\ndetection processes, and the behavior of light, and\npolarization, etc. are known that the correlation\ncurves will be explained without recourse to action\nat a distance?\n\nJust because no one has, as yet, been able to describe the\nemission-produced behavior of, and the emission-produced\nrelationship between, paired light pulses in sufficient\ndetail to account for the correlation curves, doesn\'t\nnecessarily mean that action at a distance is the answer.\nDoes it? I mean, we don\'t even know what it means\nphysically. So I\'m just saying that *maybe* it doesn\'t\nmean anything. And, maybe it does. I don\'t know.\n\n[snip]\n\n> > I suspect that it has more to do with an incomplete\n> > understanding of polarization than any sort of instantaneous\n> > \'transmission\' between spacelike separated polarizers.\n>\n> Sorry, you don\'t need any understanding of polarizers in the\n> proof of Bell\'s inequality.\n\nOk. I\'m just saying that maybe a better understanding\nof polarization, etc. will be sufficient to explain the\ncorrelations. In any case, I don\'t think it would be\nwise to just stop looking in that direction. Do you?\n\n[snip]\n\n> In BM it is, for example, clear that there\n> are causal influences which are FTL.\n\nNot just FTL, but instantaneous, iiuc. That is, a\nphysical disturbance here is not just correlated with, but\n*causes*, instantaneously, a physical disturbance a\nbillion billion light years away. This is *almost* as\nnonsensical as backward in time causation which is just\na contradiction in terms.\n\n>\n> > But, I think that what we now refer to as nonlocality\n> > will eventually be explained wrt observational *contexts*\n> > in a universe where interaction between different\n> > wave systems and the propogation of disturbances is\n> > circumscribed by the limitations imposed via the (finite)\n> > isotropic expansion.\n>\n> It will not. This is what Bell has proven.\n>\n\nOk. Let me get this straight. Bell has proven\nthat \'entanglement\' can *never* be understood as a function\nof context. It can *only* be understood as a function\nof disturbances transferred instantaneously (via some\nunknown medium) between the entangled entities. Is\nthat it?\n\n[snip]\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message news:<cn21j6$hql$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de>...
> "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
> > "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > > "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
> > > > "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > > > > "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
>
> > > > > > The simplest working assumption is that nature is
> > > > > > local, and that there are some correlational contexts
> > > > > > which have thus far resisted clear and precise
> > > > > > formalization in terms of local interactions.
> > > > >
> > > > > This working assumption is falsified, empirically,
> > > > > by observing violations of Bell's inequality (modulo
> > > > > detector efficiency loophole).
>
> > I disagree. The conclusion that the coincidence curves
> > produced in experiments cannot, in principle, be explained
> > in terms of a locally produced relationship is unwarranted, imo.
>
> Explain why.
Is it possible that when more details of emission and
detection processes, and the behavior of light, and
polarization, etc. are known that the correlation
curves will be explained without recourse to action
at a distance?
Just because no one has, as yet, been able to describe the
emission-produced behavior of, and the emission-produced
relationship between, paired light pulses in sufficient
detail to account for the correlation curves, doesn't
necessarily mean that action at a distance is the answer.
Does it? I mean, we don't even know what it means
physically. So I'm just saying that *maybe* it doesn't
mean anything. And, maybe it does. I don't know.
[snip]
> > I suspect that it has more to do with an incomplete
> > understanding of polarization than any sort of instantaneous
> > 'transmission' between spacelike separated polarizers.
>
> Sorry, you don't need any understanding of polarizers in the
> proof of Bell's inequality.
Ok. I'm just saying that maybe a better understanding
of polarization, etc. will be sufficient to explain the
correlations. In any case, I don't think it would be
wise to just stop looking in that direction. Do you?
[snip]
> In BM it is, for example, clear that there
> are causal influences which are FTL.
Not just FTL, but instantaneous, iiuc. That is, a
physical disturbance here is not just correlated with, but
*causes*, instantaneously, a physical disturbance a
billion billion light years away. This is *almost* as
nonsensical as backward in time causation which is just
a contradiction in terms.
>
> > But, I think that what we now refer to as nonlocality
> > will eventually be explained wrt observational *contexts*
> > in a universe where interaction between different
> > wave systems and the propogation of disturbances is
> > circumscribed by the limitations imposed via the (finite)
> > isotropic expansion.
>
> It will not. This is what Bell has proven.
>
Ok. Let me get this straight. Bell has proven
that 'entanglement' can *never* be understood as a function
of context. It can *only* be understood as a function
of disturbances transferred instantaneously (via some
unknown medium) between the entangled entities. Is
that it?
[snip]
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov16-04, 02:56 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > Do you argue about loopholes in the experiments? (That\'s\n> > nothing I would like to argue about, leaving this to\n> > experimenters and future.)\n\n> We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what\'s the point\n> of the experiments? Are we simply to accept something\n> impossible because we happen to believe QM to be correct?\n\nThe points of the experiments is to falsify some theories.\nExperiments which support QM predictions falsify some\npossible alternative theories.\n\nOnce I prefer alternatives which more or less follow the\nscheme of BM or Nelsonian stochastics, and alternative\nrealistic theories with preferred frames in general, I do not\ncare much about possible alternatives of realistic\nEinstein-causal theories.\n\n> >> The crucial assumption, according to Bell, underlying his\n> >> formulation is that the results at one end of the setup\n> >> don\'t depend on the settings at the other. And, as far\n> >> as I can tell, they don\'t.\n> >\n> > They do, because there is essentially nothing else used in the\n> > assumptions, and the conclusions are false.\n>\n> *If* QM is correct then you are right and Bell\'s assumption of\n> independence of the two ends of the setup must be wrong,\n> but this is what that Bell test experiments are supposed to be\n> investigating. A loophole-free one has yet\n> to be performed.\n\nNo problem. But people who invent new theories usually\nhave to invent them in a situation where we have no certain\nproofs. Certain proofs are, in general, exceptions in science,\nnot the rule. And, from a philosophical point of view, we never\nhave certainty. Last not least, there may be a great conspiracy\namong scientists, somebody can manipulate the experimental\ndevices and so on. If you strongly want a loophole, you will\nfind one. Always.\n\nI would recommend you not to bed on Einstein-causal realism.\nThere is realism, combined with the preferred frame hypothesis.\nA much simpler alternative.\n\nIlja\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > Do you argue about loopholes in the experiments? (That's
> > nothing I would like to argue about, leaving this to
> > experimenters and future.)
> We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what's the point
> of the experiments? Are we simply to accept something
> impossible because we happen to believe QM to be correct?
The points of the experiments is to falsify some theories.
Experiments which support QM predictions falsify some
possible alternative theories.
Once I prefer alternatives which more or less follow the
scheme of BM or Nelsonian stochastics, and alternative
realistic theories with preferred frames in general, I do not
care much about possible alternatives of realistic
Einstein-causal theories.
> >> The crucial assumption, according to Bell, underlying his
> >> formulation is that the results at one end of the setup
> >> don't depend on the settings at the other. And, as far
> >> as I can tell, they don't.
> >
> > They do, because there is essentially nothing else used in the
> > assumptions, and the conclusions are false.
>
> *If* QM is correct then you are right and Bell's assumption of
> independence of the two ends of the setup must be wrong,
> but this is what that Bell test experiments are supposed to be
> investigating. A loophole-free one has yet
> to be performed.
No problem. But people who invent new theories usually
have to invent them in a situation where we have no certain
proofs. Certain proofs are, in general, exceptions in science,
not the rule. And, from a philosophical point of view, we never
have certainty. Last not least, there may be a great conspiracy
among scientists, somebody can manipulate the experimental
devices and so on. If you strongly want a loophole, you will
find one. Always.
I would recommend you not to bed on Einstein-causal realism.
There is realism, combined with the preferred frame hypothesis.
A much simpler alternative.
Ilja
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov16-04, 02:59 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n"Oz" <oz@farmeroz.port995.com> schrieb\n> Ilja Schmelzer <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> writes\n> [NB This is a first response, it will take me time to work out\n> precisely, or even roughly, what you meant in the rest of the post.]\n>\n> >People don\'t like it because it needs a preferred frame,\n> >therefore violates deeply held beliefs about the fundamental\n> >nature of relativistic symmetry.\n>\n> So, let me try and get this about right.\n>\n> 1) How is the preferred frame to be defined? That is, what is special\n> about this particular frame?\n\nIt has to be postulated by the theory. As a variable. It may appear,\nin a later, more detailed consideration, that it appears to be a hidden\nvariable. Or, as well, it may be a variable which is hard to observe,\nobservable only with quantum gravity experiments.\n\nThis is the usual way. Realistic theories define what really happens.\n(postulate it). Based on this assumption, we derive what may be\nobserved in this theory. It is in no way obvious that internal observers\nwill be able to observe everything. For a physical theory it is\nimportant that they are able to observe something - than the theory\nis falsifiable, if we, as observers, observe in reality something very\ndifferent.\n\n> 2) Earlier you (or someone) said that it implied FTL \'communication\' but\n> in what was clearly a somewhat proscribed manner. Could you perhaps\n> expand on that?\n\nMy opinion is that a violation of Bell\'s inequality is an observation which\nallows exactly two explanations: (A->B or B->A). One consequence\nof (A->B or B->A) is that Einstein causality is false. Another one is\nthat the effect cannot be used to transfer information FTL. Indeed,\ninformation transfer FTL A->B is in contradiction with the explanation\nB->A.\n\n> 3) On reflection I find I am not entirely clear what you really mean by\n> a preferred frame in this context. Relativity says that we can always\n> transform from one frame to another and get the same result. Am I to\n> infer that different frames will get a different result in some way,\n> that is its not lorentz invariant?\n\nA realistic theory has to define what really happens. Therefore it has\nto define which of the two explanations (A->B or B->A) is correct.\nIf it defines that for every pair of events in a consistent way, then\nthere is only one absolute time t which fulfills the condition of classical\ncausality: (A->B <=> t(A) < t(B)).\n\n> 4) You said earlier that it is compatible with conventional QM. I took\n> this to mean that for any interaction, it delivers the same result.\n\nYep. The agreement of BM, which is a realistic theory,\nwith conventional QM is a simple and strongly proven fact.\n\n> >The observable effects do\n> >not allow to measure the preferred frame in quantum equilibrium,\n> >thus, this is not a physical problem, but a metaphysical preference.\n\n> Ok. So in effect its an unobservable preferred frame that has no effect\n> on the physics.\n\nIf there are many possible explanations, but all of them have a common\nproperty - that they have some preferred frame - then it is reasonable to\npostulate that there exists a preferred frame.\n\nBTW, I don\'t believe that it has no effect. I think the initial\ndistribution\nof matter is an effect (in the domain of some more fundamental theory\nwith preferred frame) which depends on the preferred frame. As a\nconsequence, we can observe the preferred frame in a sufficiently\naccurate way as the CMBR frame.\n\n> The only criterion should thus fall to occham, does it explain things in\n> a simpler manner to the alternatives?\n\nIt does. Classical realism is common sense, very simple.\n\nAnd my "ether theory" of the standard model - a lattice\nAff(3)(Z^3) with defects as the configuration space - is\nIMHO almost ultimate simplicity. It explains the three generations,\nthree colors, 2^3 particles in each generation, the three generators\nof SU(2)_W and the 2^3 components of a fermion with the\ndimension 3 of space.\n\n> NB To what extent does this preferred frame cause a direct\n> clash with GR, and does it do so in a clear manner?\n\nIn no manner. I have proposed an alternative theory of gravity\nwith preferred frame. It has exact EEP and a natural GR limit,\nand all this without conspiracy but derived from simple axioms.\n\nThe additional terms are quite reasonable, may be used to explain\nsome part of dark matter and inflation, and stop the gravitational\ncollapse in a sort of gravastar with extremal surface redshift. In the\ndomain where GR has been tested successfully above theories give\nthe same predictions.\n\nSee gr-qc/0205035.\n\nIlja\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Oz" <oz@farmeroz.port995.com> schrieb
> Ilja Schmelzer <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> writes
> [NB This is a first response, it will take me time to work out
> precisely, or even roughly, what you meant in the rest of the post.]
>
> >People don't like it because it needs a preferred frame,
> >therefore violates deeply held beliefs about the fundamental
> >nature of relativistic symmetry.
>
> So, let me try and get this about right.
>
> 1) How is the preferred frame to be defined? That is, what is special
> about this particular frame?
It has to be postulated by the theory. As a variable. It may appear,
in a later, more detailed consideration, that it appears to be a hidden
variable. Or, as well, it may be a variable which is hard to observe,
observable only with quantum gravity experiments.
This is the usual way. Realistic theories define what really happens.
(postulate it). Based on this assumption, we derive what may be
observed in this theory. It is in no way obvious that internal observers
will be able to observe everything. For a physical theory it is
important that they are able to observe something - than the theory
is falsifiable, if we, as observers, observe in reality something very
different.
> 2) Earlier you (or someone) said that it implied FTL 'communication' but
> in what was clearly a somewhat proscribed manner. Could you perhaps
> expand on that?
My opinion is that a violation of Bell's inequality is an observation which
allows exactly two explanations: (A->B or B->A). One consequence
of (A->B or B->A) is that Einstein causality is false. Another one is
that the effect cannot be used to transfer information FTL. Indeed,
information transfer FTL A->B is in contradiction with the explanation
B->A.
> 3) On reflection I find I am not entirely clear what you really mean by
> a preferred frame in this context. Relativity says that we can always
> transform from one frame to another and get the same result. Am I to
> infer that different frames will get a different result in some way,
> that is its not lorentz invariant?
A realistic theory has to define what really happens. Therefore it has
to define which of the two explanations (A->B or B->A) is correct.
If it defines that for every pair of events in a consistent way, then
there is only one absolute time t which fulfills the condition of classical
causality: (A->B <=> t(A) < t(B)).
> 4) You said earlier that it is compatible with conventional QM. I took
> this to mean that for any interaction, it delivers the same result.
Yep. The agreement of BM, which is a realistic theory,
with conventional QM is a simple and strongly proven fact.
> >The observable effects do
> >not allow to measure the preferred frame in quantum equilibrium,
> >thus, this is not a physical problem, but a metaphysical preference.
> Ok. So in effect its an unobservable preferred frame that has no effect
> on the physics.
If there are many possible explanations, but all of them have a common
property - that they have some preferred frame - then it is reasonable to
postulate that there exists a preferred frame.
BTW, I don't believe that it has no effect. I think the initial
distribution
of matter is an effect (in the domain of some more fundamental theory
with preferred frame) which depends on the preferred frame. As a
consequence, we can observe the preferred frame in a sufficiently
accurate way as the CMBR frame.
> The only criterion should thus fall to occham, does it explain things in
> a simpler manner to the alternatives?
It does. Classical realism is common sense, very simple.
And my "ether theory" of the standard model - a lattice
Aff(3)(Z^3) with defects as the configuration space - is
IMHO almost ultimate simplicity. It explains the three generations,
three colors, 2^3 particles in each generation, the three generators
of SU(2)_W and the 2^3 components of a fermion with the
dimension 3 of space.
> NB To what extent does this preferred frame cause a direct
> clash with GR, and does it do so in a clear manner?
In no manner. I have proposed an alternative theory of gravity
with preferred frame. It has exact EEP and a natural GR limit,
and all this without conspiracy but derived from simple axioms.
The additional terms are quite reasonable, may be used to explain
some part of dark matter and inflation, and stop the gravitational
collapse in a sort of gravastar with extremal surface redshift. In the
domain where GR has been tested successfully above theories give
the same predictions.
See http://www.arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0205035.
Ilja
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov17-04, 10:46 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message\n> news:cmq3qi\\$7fm\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...\n>\n> > I don\'t know what means "Bell locality". What is sufficient\n> > to prove, together with Einstein causality, the BI is IMHO\n> > better named realism. The hidden variables assumed by\n> > Bell are in no way required to be local. (For example,\n> > in Bohmian mechanics, which is a realistic theory in Bell\'s\n> > sense, but not Einstein-causal, we have wave functions\n> > psi(q_1,q_2,...) as variables which are clearly nonlocal.)\n>\n> I\'m quite sure that what Bell meant by "local" coincides with what I\'ve\n> always understood: that no interactions between bodies take place\n> instantaneously.\n\nThat\'s what I name "Einstein causality".\n\n> Perhaps\n> I\'ve misinterpreted things, but I distinctly get the impression that he\n> accepted Bohmian theory only reluctantly, knowing that it was "non-local".\n\nThe purpose of the proof of Bell\'s inequality was to prove that the\ndistinguishing property of BM - its nonlocality, its preferred frame -\nis not a bug but a necessary feature of every hidden variable theory.\n\n> In the derivation of his inequality it is assumed that correlations are\n> caused by factors set at the source.\n\nRead again.\n\n> > Note also that my argumentation is that violations of BI\n> > are an observational _proof_ of existence of violations\n> > of Einstein causality. A proof as strong as possible in\n> > natural science at all.\n>\n> Sorry, but this is not the case. The experiments have been interpreted\nwith\n> a strong bias towards the quantum-mechanical point of view.\n\nI have talked about _violations_of_BI_ , not about actual\nexperiments. Nobody has AFAIR claimed that there already\nexists a loophole-free experiment.\n\n> > It is a realistic theory, IOW, a theory which tries to\n> > guess the way nature really is. Of course, this guess\n> > may be wrong. But if you care about the way\n> > nature really is, you should not give up the search for\n> > theories which are realistic.\n>\n> This being the case, do look into the matter of the Bell test loopholes!\n\nWhy? I feel quite comfortable with theories\nlike BM or Nelsonian stochastics which have\na preferred frame.\n\nI leave the development of Einstein-causal realistic theories\nto people who believe that Einstein causality is something\nfundamental. I see no reason for this assumption.\n\nIlja\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message
> news:cmq3qi$7fm$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...
>
> > I don't know what means "Bell locality". What is sufficient
> > to prove, together with Einstein causality, the BI is IMHO
> > better named realism. The hidden variables assumed by
> > Bell are in no way required to be local. (For example,
> > in Bohmian mechanics, which is a realistic theory in Bell's
> > sense, but not Einstein-causal, we have wave functions
> > \psi(q_1,q_2,...) as variables which are clearly nonlocal.)
>
> I'm quite sure that what Bell meant by "local" coincides with what I've
> always understood: that no interactions between bodies take place
> instantaneously.
That's what I name "Einstein causality".
> Perhaps
> I've misinterpreted things, but I distinctly get the impression that he
> accepted Bohmian theory only reluctantly, knowing that it was "non-local".
The purpose of the proof of Bell's inequality was to prove that the
distinguishing property of BM - its nonlocality, its preferred frame -
is not a bug but a necessary feature of every hidden variable theory.
> In the derivation of his inequality it is assumed that correlations are
> caused by factors set at the source.
Read again.
> > Note also that my argumentation is that violations of BI
> > are an observational _proof_ of existence of violations
> > of Einstein causality. A proof as strong as possible in
> > natural science at all.
>
> Sorry, but this is not the case. The experiments have been interpreted
with
> a strong bias towards the quantum-mechanical point of view.
I have talked about _violations_of_BI_ , not about actual
experiments. Nobody has AFAIR claimed that there already
exists a loophole-free experiment.
> > It is a realistic theory, IOW, a theory which tries to
> > guess the way nature really is. Of course, this guess
> > may be wrong. But if you care about the way
> > nature really is, you should not give up the search for
> > theories which are realistic.
>
> This being the case, do look into the matter of the Bell test loopholes!
Why? I feel quite comfortable with theories
like BM or Nelsonian stochastics which have
a preferred frame.
I leave the development of Einstein-causal realistic theories
to people who believe that Einstein causality is something
fundamental. I see no reason for this assumption.
Ilja
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov17-04, 10:47 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> schrieb\n> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:\n> > BM gives precise answers. Of course, it has to give\n> > such precise answers also for questions which we cannot\n> > decide with experiments. These answers have to be\n> > hypothetical.\n>\n> But the answers it gives are not unique, they depend on unobservable\n> things. It gives unique answers for exactly those questions for which QM\n> gives answers, and it always agrees with QM (by design).\n\nOk, but we can do the same in the other way. QM is\nthe result of forgetting ontology of BM. Such an artificial\nforgetting operation can be applied to any realistic theory.\n\n> BM is just quantum mechanics with an Ontology grafted on. It does not\n> answer any real (as opposed to hypothetical) questions that QM does not.\n> You can *always* do that, because whenever you encounter a purely\n> hypothetical question you can just make up an answer.\n\nIt is not that obvious. Remember that there have been\n"proofs" that such things like BM are not possible in principle.\nAnd only based on such "proofs" people have accepted that\nrealism should be weakened.\n\n> I can imagine a theory that gives an answer to the question "are electrons\n> red?"\n\nFor example the SM. According to SM electrons are not red but white.\nSCNR ;-).\n\n> But I don\'t see why I should prefer one of those over the other, or\n> over a theory in which the question is considered meaningless.\n> I\'m pretty sure "are electrons red?" is just as meaningless in BM as in\n> ordinary QM. BM does not answer *any* question, just the meaningful ones.\n\nYep. But "which objects define reality" is a meaningful\nquestion. It is a question which clarifies which questions\nare meaningful and which are not meaningful.\n\n> > I would propose to define the word\n> > "explanation" as "description in terms of a realistic theory\n> > in Bell\'s sense".\n\n> The problem with your definition is that it is *both* too wide and too\n> narrow. It throws out the baby but keeps the bathwater.\n\n;-).\n\n> > This is a very, very wide sense of explanation. It includes\n> > explanations using ghosts, God, aliens, karma, influences\n> > from other dimensions and other nonsense. For all of them\n> > we can postulate some set /\\ of possible states of all these\n> > ghosts and postulate some probability distribution on them\n> > to make predictions.\n\n> Perhaps, many would prefer a definition of "explanation" that excludes\n> those things, at least unless there is evidence for them, but includes\n> Quantum Mechanics (without the ontological baggage).\n\nThese people are in error. Because they mingle useful predictions with\nexplanations. Of course, we all prefer QM in comparison with religion.\nBut because it makes testable predictions, which agree with observation.\nNot because it gives an explanation.\n\n> A theory that does *not* give precise answers to meaningless questions is\n> preferable to one that does.\n\nIt is the theory which defines what is observable and which\nquestions are meaningful and meaningless.\n\n> If one considers hypothetical questions (like "did A cause B or B cause\nA?"\n> or "*which* frame is preferred?") that have no observable answer, to be\n> meaningless (at least as far as physics is concerned), then BM is worse\n> than QM.\n\nOh, I see, you follow a variant of positivistic philosophy which has been\nrejected almost 70 years ago by Karl Popper. There are no such animals\nin the world as meaningful or meaningless questions without an underlying\ntheory.\n\nThe question if electrons are red are meaningless in SR,GR, NM, but\nmeaningful in QCD. Questions about trajectories are meaningful in BM,\nmeaningless in QM. Questions about the boundary between classical\ndevices and quantum devices are meaningful (and unanswered) in QM\nbut meaningless in BM. The question if there is a wave function of the\nuniverse is meaningful in BM and QM, but only in BM it has a\nconsistent answer.\n\nIlja\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> schrieb
> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> > BM gives precise answers. Of course, it has to give
> > such precise answers also for questions which we cannot
> > decide with experiments. These answers have to be
> > hypothetical.
>
> But the answers it gives are not unique, they depend on unobservable
> things. It gives unique answers for exactly those questions for which QM
> gives answers, and it always agrees with QM (by design).
Ok, but we can do the same in the other way. QM is
the result of forgetting ontology of BM. Such an artificial
forgetting operation can be applied to any realistic theory.
> BM is just quantum mechanics with an Ontology grafted on. It does not
> answer any real (as opposed to hypothetical) questions that QM does not.
> You can *always* do that, because whenever you encounter a purely
> hypothetical question you can just make up an answer.
It is not that obvious. Remember that there have been
"proofs" that such things like BM are not possible in principle.
And only based on such "proofs" people have accepted that
realism should be weakened.
> I can imagine a theory that gives an answer to the question "are electrons
> red?"
For example the SM. According to SM electrons are not red but white.
SCNR ;-).
> But I don't see why I should prefer one of those over the other, or
> over a theory in which the question is considered meaningless.
> I'm pretty sure "are electrons red?" is just as meaningless in BM as in
> ordinary QM. BM does not answer *any* question, just the meaningful ones.
Yep. But "which objects define reality" is a meaningful
question. It is a question which clarifies which questions
are meaningful and which are not meaningful.
> > I would propose to define the word
> > "explanation" as "description in terms of a realistic theory
> > in Bell's sense".
> The problem with your definition is that it is *both* too wide and too
> narrow. It throws out the baby but keeps the bathwater.
;-).
> > This is a very, very wide sense of explanation. It includes
> > explanations using ghosts, God, aliens, karma, influences
> > from other dimensions and other nonsense. For all of them
> > we can postulate some set /\ of possible states of all these
> > ghosts and postulate some probability distribution on them
> > to make predictions.
> Perhaps, many would prefer a definition of "explanation" that excludes
> those things, at least unless there is evidence for them, but includes
> Quantum Mechanics (without the ontological baggage).
These people are in error. Because they mingle useful predictions with
explanations. Of course, we all prefer QM in comparison with religion.
But because it makes testable predictions, which agree with observation.
Not because it gives an explanation.
> A theory that does *not* give precise answers to meaningless questions is
> preferable to one that does.
It is the theory which defines what is observable and which
questions are meaningful and meaningless.
> If one considers hypothetical questions (like "did A cause B or B cause
A?"
> or "*which* frame is preferred?") that have no observable answer, to be
> meaningless (at least as far as physics is concerned), then BM is worse
> than QM.
Oh, I see, you follow a variant of positivistic philosophy which has been
rejected almost 70 years ago by Karl Popper. There are no such animals
in the world as meaningful or meaningless questions without an underlying
theory.
The question if electrons are red are meaningless in SR,GR, NM, but
meaningful in QCD. Questions about trajectories are meaningful in BM,
meaningless in QM. Questions about the boundary between classical
devices and quantum devices are meaningful (and unanswered) in QM
but meaningless in BM. The question if there is a wave function of the
universe is meaningful in BM and QM, but only in BM it has a
consistent answer.
Ilja
Caroline Thompson
Nov17-04, 10:51 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message\nnews:cncdj0\\$gtg\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...\n> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n>> We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what\'s\n>> the point of the experiments? Are we simply to accept something\n>> impossible because we happen to believe QM to be correct?\n[snip]\n> I would recommend you not to bed on Einstein-causal realism.\n> There is realism, combined with the preferred frame hypothesis.\n> A much simpler alternative.\n\nBut I can have both! I too believe there are preferred frames.\n\nCaroline\n\nch.thompson1@virgin.net\nht tp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message
news:cncdj0$gtg$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...
> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
>> We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what's
>> the point of the experiments? Are we simply to accept something
>> impossible because we happen to believe QM to be correct?
[snip]
> I would recommend you not to bed on Einstein-causal realism.
> There is realism, combined with the preferred frame hypothesis.
> A much simpler alternative.
But I can have both! I too believe there are preferred frames.
Caroline
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov17-04, 11:13 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n\n\n"Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> schrieb\n> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:\n> > Note also that my argumentation is that violations of BI\n> > are an observational _proof_ of existence of violations\n> > of Einstein causality.\n>\n> Perhaps I am finally seeing what you are going on about.\n> You have an unfalsifiable (i.e. unscientific) belief that nature must be\n> "realistic" in a very strong sense.\n\nMy first objection is that the notion of realism I use is a strong one.\n\nIt is not strong at all. If you would like to explain the correlations\nusing fairies, ghosts, karma, God, aliens from other dimension,\nwormholes or whatever else acting inside the black box, it fits into\nBell\'s realism without any problem. You have to describe the\npossible states of the ghosts and postulate some probablity\ndistribution.\n\n(There is only some class of explanations which in some sense\nmay be called "realistic" - explanations which influence the free\ndecisions of the experimenters. But these should be excluded\nfrom science, because allowing these explanations would be the end\nof reasonable explanation. You would be able to explain everything.\nThis is the type of explanations I try to reject using the FTL phone\nbusiness.)\n\n> Violations of BI and "Einstein causality" are inconsistent with that,\n> therefore you reject Einstein causality.\n>\n> I still don\'t see what the whole FTL phone business is supposed to prove.\n> (Almost) everyone knows that your strong realism, together with Einstein\n> causality, rule out violations of BI, which are observed.\n\nThere is a large class of something you would name "weak realism",\nI would prefer to name it "hand-waving without giving any explanation".\n\nMy problem is how to make it obvious that all this alternative hand-waving\nis nonsense which should be rejected. For this purpose I use a simple test:\nIf it is possible to explain away a working FTL phone using the same type\nof argumentation, it is nonsense.\n\nAt least, I think, this should be an argument for people who believe that\nEinstein causality is a theory which predicts that there exist no FTL\nphones,\nand that it should be rejected if somebody presents a working FTL phone.\nAnd that every defense of relativity, given such an FTL phones, is\nantiscience.\n\n> You seem to think that without strong realism, anything can happen.\n\nNot exactly. Of course, what can happen depends on reality, not on\nour theories. If we believe in almighty Gods, we only believe that mystery\nis possible. It is not really possible.\n\n> That without it one cannot think at all.\n\nOf course, we can think without realism, even without logic. The point is\nconsistent thinking. We can think in a realistic, rational way in one\ndomain and ignore rational thinking in other domains, like women\nor foundations of QM.\nThis certainly does not prevent our success in other domains,\nand sometimes we may have correct guesses even in the domains where\nwe reject rational thinking.\n\n> One needs *some* kind of realism, but\n> not that kind, you have to distinguish the different kinds.\n\nFeel free to present us a different kind of realism. Explain how to\ndo science using it. The starting example is the working FTL phone in the\nblack box, and you have to explain why Einstein causality should be\nrejected. The next test example is an indirect observation. If your\nprecise variant of realism survives above tests, I will have to think\nabout new arguments against your weak realism.\n\nUntil this is done, your weak realism does not even exist. Do your\nhomework and define a weak realism.\n\n> But (any non BM interpretation of) QM is a counter example! Even after\n> giving up strong realism, if you showed me an FTL phone, it *would*\n> falsify Einstein causality.\n\nThe FTL phone argument is not a universal argument.\nIt is a counter-argument against a large class of quite typical\narguments used in the discussion.\n\nSome of the arguments which can be countered with the FTL phone\nargument involve references to QM. For example, the following\nargument:\n\n"There exists a theory (even if it is not \'realistic\' in your sense), which\nallows to compute the observed probabilities."\n\nIn this case, I construct, together with the hypothetical FTL phone,\nsome hypothetical theory which describes the working of this phone.\nI do this by starting with a realistic theory (with FTL) and forgetting\neverything related with a realistic interpretation of this theory. That\nmeans, I\'m doing the same what may be done with BM to obtain\nQM.\n\nOther arguments involving references to QM, probably, need\nsome modifications or variants of this construction. And there are\ncertainly arguments which cannot be countered with the FTL phone\nargument.\n\n> I suppose I could give up a much weaker form of realism instead; I could\n> conclude that the world is absolutely incomprehensible, but I don\'t think\n> I would.\n\nBut there is absolutely no reason to give up realism in the form\nI have given. Last not least, with BM where exists a quite simple\ntheory which does the job.\n\n> > It [BM] is a realistic theory, IOW, a theory which tries to\n> > guess the way nature really is.\n>\n> IOW? That isn\'t what you said "realistic" meant before!\n> You are now using it in a weaker sense.\n\nI don\'t think so. I cannot imagine a way which may be described\nas "to guess the way nature really is" which cannot be presented\nin the form used in Bell\'s theorem.\n\n> > But if you care about the way\n> > nature really is, you should not give up the search for\n> > theories which are realistic.\n\n> One can ask how nature really is without assuming\n> that "did A cause B, or B cause A?" is a more meaningful\n> question than "are electrons red?".\n\nOf course, we can. A definition of causality is not necessary\nin a realistic theory. But the whole discussion is about the\nquestion if it is possible to save Einstein causality. Thus, I\nassume we talk about theories with a meaningful notion of\ncausality.\n\nGiving up the idea of causality in general is another way to solve\nthe problem. But it does not save Einstein causality. The main\nconclusion remains the same: confronted with a violation of\nBell\'s inequality we have to reject Einstein causality.\n\n> > If you think that in Bell\'s sense is a too strong notion of\n> > realism, propose a weaker one\n>\n> Picking one isn\'t as important as keeping the different notions separate.\n> You can argue that "realism" is needed for rational thought, and that\n> "realism" is incompatible with locality, but you would be confusing two\n> different notions.\n\nNo. I use a notion of realism which is used by Bell to prove his\ninequality. Looking at this definition, I cannot imagine a really\nweaker there it nonetheless remains meaningful to say that\nthe theory gives a realistic explanation of some observed\ncorrelation.\n\nI have not claimed that realism is needed for rational thought.\n\n> I could think of several, some stronger than others.\n>\n> "A world exists independent of my thoughts and senses, and through my\n> senses, and thought, I can at least partially know that world."\n>\n> That\'s pretty weak. Reject that, and you\'re on your own!\n>\n> "There is an ultimate underlying Law Of The Universe, from which any\n> objective observation can be predicted, at least statistically, and we can\n> find that Law."\n>\n> That\'s pretty strong, but still weaker than yours!\n\nNo, they are of a different class.\n\nThe notion of realism I use is not a theory about the universe, but\na definition of a class of theories - theories which fit into this scheme\nare realistic theories, other theories are not realistic theories.\n\nIf I would have to formulate this meaning of realism as a theory\nabout the universe, it would be more like the following:\n\n"It is reasonable for human scientists to restrict their research to\n\'realistic\' theories."\n\nThis theory may be true even if your theories are wrong. For example,\nif we live in a universe without ultimate underlying law but the part\nwe are able to understand in principle may be formulated in a realistic\nway. For example, if QM would be the ultimate theory it would be true,\nbecause the restriction would force us to use BM, and there would be\nno need for this discussion (economy of time).\n\n> > and justify your thesis\n> > that the stronger version of Bell should be rejected,\n> > despite the fact that such stronger realistic theories exist\n> > for our universe.\n\n> BM carries a lot of baggage that makes it hard to understand and use, but\n> is *guaranteed* not to pay it\'s way, since it agrees with other\n> interpretations on every experiment.\n\nI disagree. The theory is simple, we need a lower number of\naxioms for BM in comparison with QM. (That\'s because all\nwe need to define observations is that the results of observations\nare part of the configuration of the universe. The mathematical\napparatus of QM observables, then, may be derived.) Once\nthe mathematical apparatus of QM is derived, the theory may\nbe used in exactly the same way as QM.\n\n> Justify your thesis that Einstein causality should be rejected despite the\n> fact that such local theories exist in the universe.\n\nThere exists no realistic Einstein-causal theories in the universe.\n\nAs long as realistic theories of the universe exist, there is no reason\nto give up realism. (There was some period of time, when it was\nnot known if a realistic theory exists, and when it was even claimed\nthat no such theory is possible. In such a situation, it is reasonable\nto discuss if realism should be weakened. But this situation no longer\nexists.)\n\nIn case of conflict between a general principle like realism and some\nvery particular theory of space and time as Einstein causality,\nwhich is, moreover, in conflict with lots of other physical principles\n(problem of time of quantum gravity and other GR quantization\nproblems, local energy of the gravitational field) it is clear that\nwe have to prefer realism and to reject Einstein causality.\n\n> We know we have to give up one or the other, but giving up strong realism\n> results in a clean theory with no redundant parts, giving up locality does\n> not.\n\nQM is in no way a clean theory. Their metaphysical foundations are\na crap, nonsense, absurd. The generally accepted part is known as\n"shut up and calculate". These calculations agree with the calculations\nwe have to make in a sufficiently simple realistic theory known as BM.\nThus, they cannot be used as arguments in favour of these absurd\nmetaphysics.\n\nIlja\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> schrieb
> Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> > Note also that my argumentation is that violations of BI
> > are an observational _proof_ of existence of violations
> > of Einstein causality.
>
> Perhaps I am finally seeing what you are going on about.
> You have an unfalsifiable (i.e. unscientific) belief that nature must be
> "realistic" in a very strong sense.
My first objection is that the notion of realism I use is a strong one.
It is not strong at all. If you would like to explain the correlations
using fairies, ghosts, karma, God, aliens from other dimension,
wormholes or whatever else acting inside the black box, it fits into
Bell's realism without any problem. You have to describe the
possible states of the ghosts and postulate some probablity
distribution.
(There is only some class of explanations which in some sense
may be called "realistic" - explanations which influence the free
decisions of the experimenters. But these should be excluded
from science, because allowing these explanations would be the end
of reasonable explanation. You would be able to explain everything.
This is the type of explanations I try to reject using the FTL phone
business.)
> Violations of BI and "Einstein causality" are inconsistent with that,
> therefore you reject Einstein causality.
>
> I still don't see what the whole FTL phone business is supposed to prove.
> (Almost) everyone knows that your strong realism, together with Einstein
> causality, rule out violations of BI, which are observed.
There is a large class of something you would name "weak realism",
I would prefer to name it "hand-waving without giving any explanation".
My problem is how to make it obvious that all this alternative hand-waving
is nonsense which should be rejected. For this purpose I use a simple test:
If it is possible to explain away a working FTL phone using the same type
of argumentation, it is nonsense.
At least, I think, this should be an argument for people who believe that
Einstein causality is a theory which predicts that there exist no FTL
phones,
and that it should be rejected if somebody presents a working FTL phone.
And that every defense of relativity, given such an FTL phones, is
antiscience.
> You seem to think that without strong realism, anything can happen.
Not exactly. Of course, what can happen depends on reality, not on
our theories. If we believe in almighty Gods, we only believe that mystery
is possible. It is not really possible.
> That without it one cannot think at all.
Of course, we can think without realism, even without logic. The point is
consistent thinking. We can think in a realistic, rational way in one
domain and ignore rational thinking in other domains, like women
or foundations of QM.
This certainly does not prevent our success in other domains,
and sometimes we may have correct guesses even in the domains where
we reject rational thinking.
> One needs *some* kind of realism, but
> not that kind, you have to distinguish the different kinds.
Feel free to present us a different kind of realism. Explain how to
do science using it. The starting example is the working FTL phone in the
black box, and you have to explain why Einstein causality should be
rejected. The next test example is an indirect observation. If your
precise variant of realism survives above tests, I will have to think
about new arguments against your weak realism.
Until this is done, your weak realism does not even exist. Do your
homework and define a weak realism.
> But (any non BM interpretation of) QM is a counter example! Even after
> giving up strong realism, if you showed me an FTL phone, it *would*
> falsify Einstein causality.
The FTL phone argument is not a universal argument.
It is a counter-argument against a large class of quite typical
arguments used in the discussion.
Some of the arguments which can be countered with the FTL phone
argument involve references to QM. For example, the following
argument:
"There exists a theory (even if it is not 'realistic' in your sense), which
allows to compute the observed probabilities."
In this case, I construct, together with the hypothetical FTL phone,
some hypothetical theory which describes the working of this phone.
I do this by starting with a realistic theory (with FTL) and forgetting
everything related with a realistic interpretation of this theory. That
means, I'm doing the same what may be done with BM to obtain
QM.
Other arguments involving references to QM, probably, need
some modifications or variants of this construction. And there are
certainly arguments which cannot be countered with the FTL phone
argument.
> I suppose I could give up a much weaker form of realism instead; I could
> conclude that the world is absolutely incomprehensible, but I don't think
> I would.
But there is absolutely no reason to give up realism in the form
I have given. Last not least, with BM where exists a quite simple
theory which does the job.
> > It [BM] is a realistic theory, IOW, a theory which tries to
> > guess the way nature really is.
>
> IOW? That isn't what you said "realistic" meant before!
> You are now using it in a weaker sense.
I don't think so. I cannot imagine a way which may be described
as "to guess the way nature really is" which cannot be presented
in the form used in Bell's theorem.
> > But if you care about the way
> > nature really is, you should not give up the search for
> > theories which are realistic.
> One can ask how nature really is without assuming
> that "did A cause B, or B cause A?" is a more meaningful
> question than "are electrons red?".
Of course, we can. A definition of causality is not necessary
in a realistic theory. But the whole discussion is about the
question if it is possible to save Einstein causality. Thus, I
assume we talk about theories with a meaningful notion of
causality.
Giving up the idea of causality in general is another way to solve
the problem. But it does not save Einstein causality. The main
conclusion remains the same: confronted with a violation of
Bell's inequality we have to reject Einstein causality.
> > If you think that in Bell's sense is a too strong notion of
> > realism, propose a weaker one
>
> Picking one isn't as important as keeping the different notions separate.
> You can argue that "realism" is needed for rational thought, and that
> "realism" is incompatible with locality, but you would be confusing two
> different notions.
No. I use a notion of realism which is used by Bell to prove his
inequality. Looking at this definition, I cannot imagine a really
weaker there it nonetheless remains meaningful to say that
the theory gives a realistic explanation of some observed
correlation.
I have not claimed that realism is needed for rational thought.
> I could think of several, some stronger than others.
>
> "A world exists independent of my thoughts and senses, and through my
> senses, and thought, I can at least partially know that world."
>
> That's pretty weak. Reject that, and you're on your own!
>
> "There is an ultimate underlying Law Of The Universe, from which any
> objective observation can be predicted, at least statistically, and we can
> find that Law."
>
> That's pretty strong, but still weaker than yours!
No, they are of a different class.
The notion of realism I use is not a theory about the universe, but
a definition of a class of theories - theories which fit into this scheme
are realistic theories, other theories are not realistic theories.
If I would have to formulate this meaning of realism as a theory
about the universe, it would be more like the following:
"It is reasonable for human scientists to restrict their research to
'realistic' theories."
This theory may be true even if your theories are wrong. For example,
if we live in a universe without ultimate underlying law but the part
we are able to understand in principle may be formulated in a realistic
way. For example, if QM would be the ultimate theory it would be true,
because the restriction would force us to use BM, and there would be
no need for this discussion (economy of time).
> > and justify your thesis
> > that the stronger version of Bell should be rejected,
> > despite the fact that such stronger realistic theories exist
> > for our universe.
> BM carries a lot of baggage that makes it hard to understand and use, but
> is *guaranteed* not to pay it's way, since it agrees with other
> interpretations on every experiment.
I disagree. The theory is simple, we need a lower number of
axioms for BM in comparison with QM. (That's because all
we need to define observations is that the results of observations
are part of the configuration of the universe. The mathematical
apparatus of QM observables, then, may be derived.) Once
the mathematical apparatus of QM is derived, the theory may
be used in exactly the same way as QM.
> Justify your thesis that Einstein causality should be rejected despite the
> fact that such local theories exist in the universe.
There exists no realistic Einstein-causal theories in the universe.
As long as realistic theories of the universe exist, there is no reason
to give up realism. (There was some period of time, when it was
not known if a realistic theory exists, and when it was even claimed
that no such theory is possible. In such a situation, it is reasonable
to discuss if realism should be weakened. But this situation no longer
exists.)
In case of conflict between a general principle like realism and some
very particular theory of space and time as Einstein causality,
which is, moreover, in conflict with lots of other physical principles
(problem of time of quantum gravity and other GR quantization
problems, local energy of the gravitational field) it is clear that
we have to prefer realism and to reject Einstein causality.
> We know we have to give up one or the other, but giving up strong realism
> results in a clean theory with no redundant parts, giving up locality does
> not.
QM is in no way a clean theory. Their metaphysical foundations are
a crap, nonsense, absurd. The generally accepted part is known as
"shut up and calculate". These calculations agree with the calculations
we have to make in a sufficiently simple realistic theory known as BM.
Thus, they cannot be used as arguments in favour of these absurd
metaphysics.
Ilja
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov17-04, 11:13 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n\n"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n> > > "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > > I disagree. The conclusion that the coincidence curves\n> > > produced in experiments cannot, in principle, be explained\n> > > in terms of a locally produced relationship is unwarranted, imo.\n> >\n> > Explain why.\n>\n> Is it possible that when more details of emission and\n> detection processes, and the behavior of light, and\n> polarization, etc. are known that the correlation\n> curves will be explained without recourse to action\n> at a distance?\n\nNo. It is impossible. (Except the theoretical possibility\nthat current BI tests have loopholes and sufficiently\nclose to ideal BI tests fail to show a violation of BI and\nfalsify QM. In this case, it would be necessary to\nstudy the details of the violations of QM.)\n\nElse, any imaginable (sufficiently clear and well-defined)\ndescription can be given the general form of a "hidden variable\ntheory" as used by Bell. And, if such a description is given,\nand works without FTL, then BI holds.\n\nThis is a simple mathematical theorem.\n\n> > Sorry, you don\'t need any understanding of polarizers in the\n> > proof of Bell\'s inequality.\n>\n> Ok. I\'m just saying that maybe a better understanding\n> of polarization, etc. will be sufficient to explain the\n> correlations. In any case, I don\'t think it would be\n> wise to just stop looking in that direction. Do you?\n\nDepends on what you want. It is never wrong to look\nat reality. I\'m looking out of the window to get a reasonable\nguess if I need a raincoat today. But I see no reason to look\nat polarizers now.\n\n> > In BM it is, for example, clear that there\n> > are causal influences which are FTL.\n>\n> Not just FTL, but instantaneous, iiuc. That is, a\n> physical disturbance here is not just correlated with, but\n> *causes*, instantaneously, a physical disturbance a\n> billion billion light years away. This is *almost* as\n> nonsensical as backward in time causation which is just\n> a contradiction in terms.\n\nThe difference is minimal. Taking into account that our\ntheories usually are only approximations, there may be\nsome bounding velocity in reality. We have lived quite\nnice with Newtonian mechanics, which has also postulated\nsuch instantaneous disturbances, so what?\n\n> > It will not. This is what Bell has proven.\n> >\n>\n> Ok. Let me get this straight. Bell has proven\n> that \'entanglement\' can *never* be understood as a function\n> of context. It can *only* be understood as a function\n> of disturbances transferred instantaneously (via some\n> unknown medium) between the entangled entities. Is\n> that it?\n\nGiven that you don\'t like instantaneous things, I would\nformulate it in another way. Bell has proven that, whenever\nwe observe a violation of Bells inequality between events\nA and B (in real experiments this means some time intervals\naround A and B containing decisions of experimenters and\nobservation) then A->B or B->A.\n\nThus, there is enough place for theories with higher limiting\nspeeds.\n\nIlja\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > "Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
> > > "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > > I disagree. The conclusion that the coincidence curves
> > > produced in experiments cannot, in principle, be explained
> > > in terms of a locally produced relationship is unwarranted, imo.
> >
> > Explain why.
>
> Is it possible that when more details of emission and
> detection processes, and the behavior of light, and
> polarization, etc. are known that the correlation
> curves will be explained without recourse to action
> at a distance?
No. It is impossible. (Except the theoretical possibility
that current BI tests have loopholes and sufficiently
close to ideal BI tests fail to show a violation of BI and
falsify QM. In this case, it would be necessary to
study the details of the violations of QM.)
Else, any imaginable (sufficiently clear and well-defined)
description can be given the general form of a "hidden variable
theory" as used by Bell. And, if such a description is given,
and works without FTL, then BI holds.
This is a simple mathematical theorem.
> > Sorry, you don't need any understanding of polarizers in the
> > proof of Bell's inequality.
>
> Ok. I'm just saying that maybe a better understanding
> of polarization, etc. will be sufficient to explain the
> correlations. In any case, I don't think it would be
> wise to just stop looking in that direction. Do you?
Depends on what you want. It is never wrong to look
at reality. I'm looking out of the window to get a reasonable
guess if I need a raincoat today. But I see no reason to look
at polarizers now.
> > In BM it is, for example, clear that there
> > are causal influences which are FTL.
>
> Not just FTL, but instantaneous, iiuc. That is, a
> physical disturbance here is not just correlated with, but
> *causes*, instantaneously, a physical disturbance a
> billion billion light years away. This is *almost* as
> nonsensical as backward in time causation which is just
> a contradiction in terms.
The difference is minimal. Taking into account that our
theories usually are only approximations, there may be
some bounding velocity in reality. We have lived quite
nice with Newtonian mechanics, which has also postulated
such instantaneous disturbances, so what?
> > It will not. This is what Bell has proven.
> >
>
> Ok. Let me get this straight. Bell has proven
> that 'entanglement' can *never* be understood as a function
> of context. It can *only* be understood as a function
> of disturbances transferred instantaneously (via some
> unknown medium) between the entangled entities. Is
> that it?
Given that you don't like instantaneous things, I would
formulate it in another way. Bell has proven that, whenever
we observe a violation of Bells inequality between events
A and B (in real experiments this means some time intervals
around A and B containing decisions of experimenters and
observation) then A->B or B->A.
Thus, there is enough place for theories with higher limiting
speeds.
Ilja
Caroline Thompson
Nov17-04, 11:13 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n\n\n"Bilge" <dubious@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net> wrote in message\nnews:slrncpgn9k.5i8.dubious@radioactivex. lebesque-al.net...\n\n> >"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote:\n\n> >> Do you argue about loopholes in the experiments? (That\'s\n> >> nothing I would like to argue about, leaving this to\n> >> experimenters and future.)\n\nCaroline Thompson responded:\n> >Sorry, but if you ignore the loophole you end up with\n> >self-contradictory statements ...\n> > ... We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise\n> >what\'s the point of the experiments? Are we simply to\n> >accept something impossible because we happen\n> >to believe QM to be correct?\n>\n> Since it\'s impossible to close every possible loophole in any\n> theory, the correct question is ``are we to accept [quantum\n> mechanics] just because it predicts the correct results and no\n> one has offered another theory which agrees with the experimental\n> data and explains something that [quantum mechanics] doesn\'t?\'\'\n>\n> The answer, of course, is ``yes.\'\'\n\nOr rather, "No", since\n\n(a) in view of the loopholes in the Bell tests, there is as yet no proof\nthat QM really does predict the correct results (see Santos\' recent\nconclusion:\n"the validity of local realism may be either refuted by a single\nloophole-free experiment or increasingly confirmed by the passage of time\nwithout [a successful loophole-free] experiment. "\nhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410193 , and\n\n(b) those same loopholes mean that there *are* other theories that can\npredict the same results. [See\nhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory . Similar theory\ncan, incidentally, explain a great many other experiments in quantum\noptics.]\n\n> Classical mechanics was accepted for a long time, based on exactly the\n> same line of reasoning. If I employ your reasoning regarding loopholes,\n> then for centuries, physicists, engineers, etc., were engaged in an\n> elaborate fraud. Anyone with a fertile imagination and a resistance to\n> logic can come up with an example of an experiment that has never\n> literally been performed to test classical mechanics and declare it a\n> loophole in newton\'s laws.\n\nCome on now, Bilge! The two are scarcely in the same category! There are\nno obvious phenomena that refute Newton\'s Law, whereas every day, in every\nwalk of ordinary life as well as every science, we take it for granted that\nthere are no "nonlocal" effects (in the Bell sense. Of course there are\nnonlocal effects all over the place in the sense of everything being\naffected by the environment.). Everything we have ever encountered in our\nlives refutes the possibility of nonlocal effects.\n\n> > A loophole-free one has yet to be performed.\n>\n> That is true for any theory of anything that has ever been proposed.\n> Physicists just tend to accept the theories which haven\'t yet been\n> falsified.\n\nHmmm ... but, as I said, nonlocality is refuted by everything else in the\nworld. Quantum entanglement is supposed to be the one exception. I think\nwe are entitled to expect extraordinary evidence.\n\nCaroline\n\nCaroline H Thompson\n\nch.thompson1@virgin.net\nhttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Bilge" <dubious@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net> wrote in message
news:slrncpgn9k.5i8.dubious@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net...
> >"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote:
> >> Do you argue about loopholes in the experiments? (That's
> >> nothing I would like to argue about, leaving this to
> >> experimenters and future.)
Caroline Thompson responded:
> >Sorry, but if you ignore the loophole you end up with
> >self-contradictory statements ...
> > ... We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise
> >what's the point of the experiments? Are we simply to
> >accept something impossible because we happen
> >to believe QM to be correct?
>
> Since it's impossible to close every possible loophole in any
> theory, the correct question is ``are we to accept [quantum
> mechanics] just because it predicts the correct results and no
> one has offered another theory which agrees with the experimental
> data and explains something that [quantum mechanics] doesn't?''
>
> The answer, of course, is ``yes.''
Or rather, "No", since
(a) in view of the loopholes in the Bell tests, there is as yet no proof
that QM really does predict the correct results (see Santos' recent
conclusion:
"the validity of local realism may be either refuted by a single
loophole-free experiment or increasingly confirmed by the passage of time
without [a successful loophole-free] experiment. "
http://arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410193 , and
(b) those same loopholes mean that there *are* other theories that can
predict the same results. [See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory . Similar theory
can, incidentally, explain a great many other experiments in quantum
optics.]
> Classical mechanics was accepted for a long time, based on exactly the
> same line of reasoning. If I employ your reasoning regarding loopholes,
> then for centuries, physicists, engineers, etc., were engaged in an
> elaborate fraud. Anyone with a fertile imagination and a resistance to
> logic can come up with an example of an experiment that has never
> literally been performed to test classical mechanics and declare it a
> loophole in newton's laws.
Come on now, Bilge! The two are scarcely in the same category! There are
no obvious phenomena that refute Newton's Law, whereas every day, in every
walk of ordinary life as well as every science, we take it for granted that
there are no "nonlocal" effects (in the Bell sense. Of course there are
nonlocal effects all over the place in the sense of everything being
affected by the environment.). Everything we have ever encountered in our
lives refutes the possibility of nonlocal effects.
> > A loophole-free one has yet to be performed.
>
> That is true for any theory of anything that has ever been proposed.
> Physicists just tend to accept the theories which haven't yet been
> falsified.
Hmmm ... but, as I said, nonlocality is refuted by everything else in the
world. Quantum entanglement is supposed to be the one exception. I think
we are entitled to expect extraordinary evidence.
Caroline
Caroline H Thompson
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\nCaroline Thompson:\n>Bilge:\n>>\n>> Since it\'s impossible to close every possible loophole in any\n>> theory, the correct question is ``are we to accept [quantum\n>> mechanics] just because it predicts the correct results and no\n>> one has offered another theory which agrees with the experimental\n>> data and explains something that [quantum mechanics] doesn\'t?\'\'\n>>\n>> The answer, of course, is ``yes.\'\'\n>\n>Or rather, "No", since\n\nOnly by those who object based on philosophical bias, but who have not\nmade any real attempt to construct an alternative theory which actually\ngenerates real numbers to compare with experimental data. Since nature has\nprobably not consulted with you on how to run the universe, your\nphilosophical objections carry no weight. Of course, if you could provide\na note from nature that I could authenticate regarding that consultation\nor a theory which is better than quantum mechanicsI\'ll reconsider. By\n``better\'\', I mean reproduces every result with which experiments are\nknown to agree with quantum mechanics as well as predict something which\nis contrary to a quantum mechanical prediction which would constitute a\ntest to choose between your theory and quantum mechanics. That is how\nscience works and how science has always worked since the scientific\nmethod replaced the decrees of the pope.\n\n>(a) in view of the loopholes in the Bell tests, there is as yet no proof\n>that QM really does predict the correct results (see Santos\' recent\n>conclusion:\n>"the validity of local realism may be either refuted by a single\n>loophole-free experiment or increasingly confirmed by the passage of time\n>without [a successful loophole-free] experiment. "\n>http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410193 , and\n>\n>(b) those same loopholes mean that there *are* other theories that can\n>predict the same results. [See\n>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory . Similar theory\n>can, incidentally, explain a great many other experiments in quantum\n>optics.]\n>\n>> Classical mechanics was accepted for a long time, based on exactly the\n>> same line of reasoning. If I employ your reasoning regarding loopholes,\n>> then for centuries, physicists, engineers, etc., were engaged in an\n>> elaborate fraud. Anyone with a fertile imagination and a resistance to\n>> logic can come up with an example of an experiment that has never\n>> literally been performed to test classical mechanics and declare it a\n>> loophole in newton\'s laws.\n>\n>Come on now, Bilge! The two are scarcely in the same category!\n\nI agree. Quantum mechanics not only encompasses newtonian mechanics,\nbut explains many phenomena for which newtonian mechanics fails. So,\nrather than have two theories, I only need quantum mechanics.\n\n>There are no obvious phenomena that refute Newton\'s Law, whereas\n>every day, in every walk of ordinary life as well as every science,\n>we take it for granted that there are no "nonlocal" effects (in the\n>Bell sense.\n\nThere are lots of such phenomen, the most obvious being the stability\nof matter. Last time I checked, matter was fairly stable using the\ntime scale of ``every day\'\' as a figure of merit. Right off the bat,\nyou\'ll note that there is no atomic ground state one can obtain from\nnewtonian mechanics. Even more bewildering without quantum theory would\nbe the fact that accelerated charges are known to radiate (which is\nevident by the existence of radios and televisions), which from newtonian\nmechanics, one would deduce the electron will spiral into the nucleus\non a time scale a lot shorter than a day. By any chance do you have\na theory that quantizes the energy levels in atoms using newtonian\nmechanics? My guess is, no.\n\n>Of course there are nonlocal effects all over the place in the sense\n>of everything being affected by the environment.). Everything we have\n>ever encountered in our lives refutes the possibility of nonlocal effects.\n\nThe environment is not a non-local effect. I obviously cannot respond to\nyour post until you post it and it propagates to me, which in principle\ncan occur faster than usually occurs with the implementaition of the news\nprotocol, but is still limited by relativity.\n\n>> > A loophole-free one has yet to be performed.\n>>\n>> That is true for any theory of anything that has ever been proposed.\n>> Physicists just tend to accept the theories which haven\'t yet been\n>> falsified.\n>\n>Hmmm ... but, as I said, nonlocality is refuted by everything else in the\n>world. Quantum entanglement is supposed to be the one exception. I think\n>we are entitled to expect extraordinary evidence.\n\nI think you need to review what the meaning of the terms in your argument\nand try to come up with an argument that argues against the theories to\nwhich you allude. It\'s easy to misconstrue a theory to fit your argument.\nIt\'s a bit more difficult to actually take the theory in question and\ncreate a real objection. As far as ``extraordinary evidence\'\' goes, there\nexists a great deal of it. So much in fact, that it stopped being anything\nbut ordinary a long time ago.\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Caroline Thompson:
>Bilge:
>>
>> Since it's impossible to close every possible loophole in any
>> theory, the correct question is ``are we to accept [quantum
>> mechanics] just because it predicts the correct results and no
>> one has offered another theory which agrees with the experimental
>> data and explains something that [quantum mechanics] doesn't?''
>>
>> The answer, of course, is ``yes.''
>
>Or rather, "No", since
Only by those who object based on philosophical bias, but who have not
made any real attempt to construct an alternative theory which actually
generates real numbers to compare with experimental data. Since nature has
probably not consulted with you on how to run the universe, your
philosophical objections carry no weight. Of course, if you could provide
a note from nature that I could authenticate regarding that consultation
or a theory which is better than quantum mechanicsI'll reconsider. By
``better'', I mean reproduces every result with which experiments are
known to agree with quantum mechanics as well as predict something which
is contrary to a quantum mechanical prediction which would constitute a
test to choose between your theory and quantum mechanics. That is how
science works and how science has always worked since the scientific
method replaced the decrees of the pope.
>(a) in view of the loopholes in the Bell tests, there is as yet no proof
>that QM really does predict the correct results (see Santos' recent
>conclusion:
>"the validity of local realism may be either refuted by a single
>loophole-free experiment or increasingly confirmed by the passage of time
>without [a successful loophole-free] experiment. "
>http://arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410193 , and
>
>(b) those same loopholes mean that there *are* other theories that can
>predict the same results. [See
>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory . Similar theory
>can, incidentally, explain a great many other experiments in quantum
>optics.]
>
>> Classical mechanics was accepted for a long time, based on exactly the
>> same line of reasoning. If I employ your reasoning regarding loopholes,
>> then for centuries, physicists, engineers, etc., were engaged in an
>> elaborate fraud. Anyone with a fertile imagination and a resistance to
>> logic can come up with an example of an experiment that has never
>> literally been performed to test classical mechanics and declare it a
>> loophole in newton's laws.
>
>Come on now, Bilge! The two are scarcely in the same category!
I agree. Quantum mechanics not only encompasses newtonian mechanics,
but explains many phenomena for which newtonian mechanics fails. So,
rather than have two theories, I only need quantum mechanics.
>There are no obvious phenomena that refute Newton's Law, whereas
>every day, in every walk of ordinary life as well as every science,
>we take it for granted that there are no "nonlocal" effects (in the
>Bell sense.
There are lots of such phenomen, the most obvious being the stability
of matter. Last time I checked, matter was fairly stable using the
time scale of ``every day'' as a figure of merit. Right off the bat,
you'll note that there is no atomic ground state one can obtain from
newtonian mechanics. Even more bewildering without quantum theory would
be the fact that accelerated charges are known to radiate (which is
evident by the existence of radios and televisions), which from newtonian
mechanics, one would deduce the electron will spiral into the nucleus
on a time scale a lot shorter than a day. By any chance do you have
a theory that quantizes the energy levels in atoms using newtonian
mechanics? My guess is, no.
>Of course there are nonlocal effects all over the place in the sense
>of everything being affected by the environment.). Everything we have
>ever encountered in our lives refutes the possibility of nonlocal effects.
The environment is not a non-local effect. I obviously cannot respond to
your post until you post it and it propagates to me, which in principle
can occur faster than usually occurs with the implementaition of the news
protocol, but is still limited by relativity.
>> > A loophole-free one has yet to be performed.
>>
>> That is true for any theory of anything that has ever been proposed.
>> Physicists just tend to accept the theories which haven't yet been
>> falsified.
>
>Hmmm ... but, as I said, nonlocality is refuted by everything else in the
>world. Quantum entanglement is supposed to be the one exception. I think
>we are entitled to expect extraordinary evidence.
I think you need to review what the meaning of the terms in your argument
and try to come up with an argument that argues against the theories to
which you allude. It's easy to misconstrue a theory to fit your argument.
It's a bit more difficult to actually take the theory in question and
create a real objection. As far as ``extraordinary evidence'' goes, there
exists a great deal of it. So much in fact, that it stopped being anything
but ordinary a long time ago.
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov18-04, 12:52 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n> "Bilge" <dubious@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net> wrote\n> > Since it\'s impossible to close every possible loophole in any\n> > theory, the correct question is ``are we to accept [quantum\n> > mechanics] just because it predicts the correct results and no\n> > one has offered another theory which agrees with the experimental\n> > data and explains something that [quantum mechanics] doesn\'t?\'\'\n> >\n> > The answer, of course, is ``yes.\'\'\n\nI agree.\n\n> Or rather, "No", since\n>\n> (a) in view of the loopholes in the Bell tests, there is as yet no proof\n> that QM really does predict the correct results (see Santos\' recent\n> conclusion:\n> "the validity of local realism may be either refuted by a single\n> loophole-free experiment or increasingly confirmed by the passage of time\n> without [a successful loophole-free] experiment. "\n> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410193 ,\n\nThe passage of time alone does not refute or confirm any theory.\nIf the passage of time alone has some consequences at all (in\npure scientific methodology it shouldn\'t) then it is usually\nconsidered as a confirmation of the mainstream theory.\nWhich is, in this case, QM.\n\nThe status of QM is that it predicts the correct results whenever they\nhave been tested.\n\n> (b) those same loopholes mean that there *are* other theories that can\n> predict the same results. [See\n> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory . Similar\ntheory\n> can, incidentally, explain a great many other experiments in quantum\n> optics.]\n\nLoopholes alone do not mean that there are other theories. It means\nthat we cannot prove that no other theories exist.\n\n> Come on now, Bilge! The two are scarcely in the same category! There are\n> no obvious phenomena that refute Newton\'s Law, whereas every day, in every\n> walk of ordinary life as well as every science, we take it for granted\nthat\n> there are no "nonlocal" effects (in the Bell sense. Of course there are\n> nonlocal effects all over the place in the sense of everything being\n> affected by the environment.). Everything we have ever encountered in our\n> lives refutes the possibility of nonlocal effects.\n\nNo. There is a large body of experiments which support\nquantum theory. And quantum theory is (if we ignore\nthe metaphysical nonsense of its currently favoured interpretations\nand use BM as a realistic interpretation) a nonlocal theory.\n\nBTW, Newtonian mechanics is, as well, a nonlocal theory.\n\nIlja\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> "Bilge" <dubious@radioactivex.lebesque-al.net> wrote
> > Since it's impossible to close every possible loophole in any
> > theory, the correct question is ``are we to accept [quantum
> > mechanics] just because it predicts the correct results and no
> > one has offered another theory which agrees with the experimental
> > data and explains something that [quantum mechanics] doesn't?''
> >
> > The answer, of course, is ``yes.''
I agree.
> Or rather, "No", since
>
> (a) in view of the loopholes in the Bell tests, there is as yet no proof
> that QM really does predict the correct results (see Santos' recent
> conclusion:
> "the validity of local realism may be either refuted by a single
> loophole-free experiment or increasingly confirmed by the passage of time
> without [a successful loophole-free] experiment. "
> http://arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410193 ,
The passage of time alone does not refute or confirm any theory.
If the passage of time alone has some consequences at all (in
pure scientific methodology it shouldn't) then it is usually
considered as a confirmation of the mainstream theory.
Which is, in this case, QM.
The status of QM is that it predicts the correct results whenever they
have been tested.
> (b) those same loopholes mean that there *are* other theories that can
> predict the same results. [See
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory . Similar
theory
> can, incidentally, explain a great many other experiments in quantum
> optics.]
Loopholes alone do not mean that there are other theories. It means
that we cannot prove that no other theories exist.
> Come on now, Bilge! The two are scarcely in the same category! There are
> no obvious phenomena that refute Newton's Law, whereas every day, in every
> walk of ordinary life as well as every science, we take it for granted
that
> there are no "nonlocal" effects (in the Bell sense. Of course there are
> nonlocal effects all over the place in the sense of everything being
> affected by the environment.). Everything we have ever encountered in our
> lives refutes the possibility of nonlocal effects.
No. There is a large body of experiments which support
quantum theory. And quantum theory is (if we ignore
the metaphysical nonsense of its currently favoured interpretations
and use BM as a realistic interpretation) a nonlocal theory.
BTW, Newtonian mechanics is, as well, a nonlocal theory.
Ilja
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov18-04, 12:52 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n> >> We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what\'s\n> >> the point of the experiments? Are we simply to accept something\n> >> impossible because we happen to believe QM to be correct?\n> [snip]\n> > I would recommend you not to bed on Einstein-causal realism.\n> > There is realism, combined with the preferred frame hypothesis.\n> > A much simpler alternative.\n>\n> But I can have both! I too believe there are preferred frames.\n\nWhat means both? If you believe there are preferred frames,\nyou need arguments in favour of them. That means, you have\nto search for arguments against Einstein causality. Instead, you\ntry to defend Einstein causality. Thus, if you believe in\npreferred frames you argue against your own beliefs.\n\nIf BI is really violated, then this is the best argument in favour\nof a preferred frame, not?\n\n(At least I cannot imagine an argument based on physics\nwhich is in principle better - any argument can be explained\naway by somebody who agrees to reject even realism.\nOn the other hand, who knows what argument may\nturn people into accepting the preferred frame. Explaining\nthe three generations, three colors and three generators\nof su(2)_W as related with the three dimensions of space,\nespecially in combination, can do it as well.\nEven if they can be explained away as coincidences in\na much simpler way - you don\'t have to give up anything\nexcept these very simple explanation.)\n\nNote what you have to do if you want to win: Present not only\na particular explanation of the existing experiments, but a general\ntheory - a theory as general as QM - which predicts all things\npredicted by QM in the domain where QM has been tested,\nbut is fundamentally different from QM in the domain of the\nBI tests. That\'s a hard job. Very hard. And I\'m sure\nit cannot be done.\n\nIn comparison, my program to justify the preferred frame\nis much much simpler: I use existing theories and give\nthem realistic interpretations. Ether interpretations.\nDuring this job, probably at some point some minor\nmodifications of existing theory will simplify the theory.\nOnly then I start to make predictions which\nare different from standard theory. This job can be done\nbecause it almost completely has been done already.\n\nIlja\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> >> We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what's
> >> the point of the experiments? Are we simply to accept something
> >> impossible because we happen to believe QM to be correct?
> [snip]
> > I would recommend you not to bed on Einstein-causal realism.
> > There is realism, combined with the preferred frame hypothesis.
> > A much simpler alternative.
>
> But I can have both! I too believe there are preferred frames.
What means both? If you believe there are preferred frames,
you need arguments in favour of them. That means, you have
to search for arguments against Einstein causality. Instead, you
try to defend Einstein causality. Thus, if you believe in
preferred frames you argue against your own beliefs.
If BI is really violated, then this is the best argument in favour
of a preferred frame, not?
(At least I cannot imagine an argument based on physics
which is in principle better - any argument can be explained
away by somebody who agrees to reject even realism.
On the other hand, who knows what argument may
turn people into accepting the preferred frame. Explaining
the three generations, three colors and three generators
of su(2)_W as related with the three dimensions of space,
especially in combination, can do it as well.
Even if they can be explained away as coincidences in
a much simpler way - you don't have to give up anything
except these very simple explanation.)
Note what you have to do if you want to win: Present not only
a particular explanation of the existing experiments, but a general
theory - a theory as general as QM - which predicts all things
predicted by QM in the domain where QM has been tested,
but is fundamentally different from QM in the domain of the
BI tests. That's a hard job. Very hard. And I'm sure
it cannot be done.
In comparison, my program to justify the preferred frame
is much much simpler: I use existing theories and give
them realistic interpretations. Ether interpretations.
During this job, probably at some point some minor
modifications of existing theory will simplify the theory.
Only then I start to make predictions which
are different from standard theory. This job can be done
because it almost completely has been done already.
Ilja
Caroline Thompson
Nov19-04, 12:07 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message\nnews:cnhpb7\\$ltp\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...\n>\n> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\nSantos wrote:\n>> "the validity of local realism may be either refuted by a single\n>> loophole-free experiment or increasingly confirmed by the passage\n>> of time without [a successful loophole-free] experiment. "\n>> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410193 ,\n>\n> The passage of time alone does not refute or confirm any theory.\n> If the passage of time alone has some consequences at all (in\n> pure scientific methodology it shouldn\'t) then it is usually\n> considered as a confirmation of the mainstream theory.\n> Which is, in this case, QM.\n\nI am not talking just of the passive passage of time, Ilja, but of time\nduring which repeated attempts have been made to find a loophole-free scrap\nof evidence. Entanglement has been accepted on inadequate grounds.\n\n>> (b) those same loopholes mean that there *are* other theories\n>> that can predict the same results. [See\n>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory\n>> Similar theory can, incidentally, explain a great many other\n>> experiments in quantum optics.]\n>\n> Loopholes alone do not mean that there are other theories. It means\n> that we cannot prove that no other theories exist.\n\nQuite, which is why I recommended the wikipedia page.\n\nI am currently working in as much detail as I can a local hidden variable\ntheory modelling the latest proposals for loophole-free experiments, such\nas:\n\nR. García-Patrón Sánchez, J. Fiurácek , N. J. Cerf , J. Wenger , R.\nTualle-Brouri , and Ph. Grangier, "Proposal for a Loophole-Free Bell Test\nUsing Homodyne Detection", Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 130409 (2004)\nhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0403191\n\nI can model all stages but will not be able to complete the prediction until\nthe final details of the experimental parameters are known. Some parts of\nthe model will inevitably require input of empirical data. This,\nincidentally, is a feature of most scientific predictions. The fact that\nthe QM prediction does *not* require the same empirical input is not, in my\nview, a point in its favour! It is merely a consequence of the fact that\nthe QM model does not have enough parameters.\n\nIn any event I can predict that the Bell test will *not* be infringed. They\npropose using the CHSH test in conditions in which there are no missing\nvalues. They are using pulsed lasers and so have no excuse for\nsynchronisation problems. They will not (I presume!) be subtracting any\naccidentals. About the only flaw I can predict is that they may well find\nthey have not got rotational invariance, but this should not invalidate the\nBell test -- it will merely mean that published graphs might be misleading.\n[For more on loopholes in actual Bell tests see:\nhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BellTestLoopholes\nor various articles on my web site.]\n\nI fear the experiment will not end the conflict, though, since they intend\nusing evidence for negative Wigner functions to prove they started with a\n"nonclassical state", and both the use of such a function and its proposed\nmethod of estimation can be challenged.\n\n>> ... Everything we have ever encountered in our\n>> lives refutes the possibility of nonlocal effects.\n>\n> No. There is a large body of experiments which support\n> quantum theory.\n\nAhem! I was talking about "we" in the sense of us ordinary mortals, not\ngurus who have lost sight of reality long ago. In our everyday lives, and\nin all other lab experiments in other fields, locality is taken for granted\nand has never let us down.\n\n> BTW, Newtonian mechanics is, as well, a nonlocal theory.\n\nBut it has never claimed to be a complete or final one. Newton himself did\nnot assume his force of gravity in fact simply happened without a definite\ncause.\n\nCaroline\n\nch.thompson1@virgi n.net\nhttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message
news:cnhpb7$ltp$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...
>
> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
Santos wrote:
>> "the validity of local realism may be either refuted by a single
>> loophole-free experiment or increasingly confirmed by the passage
>> of time without [a successful loophole-free] experiment. "
>> http://arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410193 ,
>
> The passage of time alone does not refute or confirm any theory.
> If the passage of time alone has some consequences at all (in
> pure scientific methodology it shouldn't) then it is usually
> considered as a confirmation of the mainstream theory.
> Which is, in this case, QM.
I am not talking just of the passive passage of time, Ilja, but of time
during which repeated attempts have been made to find a loophole-free scrap
of evidence. Entanglement has been accepted on inadequate grounds.
>> (b) those same loopholes mean that there *are* other theories
>> that can predict the same results. [See
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory
>> Similar theory can, incidentally, explain a great many other
>> experiments in quantum optics.]
>
> Loopholes alone do not mean that there are other theories. It means
> that we cannot prove that no other theories exist.
Quite, which is why I recommended the wikipedia page.
I am currently working in as much detail as I can a local hidden variable
theory modelling the latest proposals for loophole-free experiments, such
as:
R. García-Patrón Sánchez, J. Fiurácek , N. J. Cerf , J. Wenger , R.
Tualle-Brouri , and Ph. Grangier, "Proposal for a Loophole-Free Bell Test
Using Homodyne Detection", Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 130409 (2004)
http://arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0403191
I can model all stages but will not be able to complete the prediction until
the final details of the experimental parameters are known. Some parts of
the model will inevitably require input of empirical data. This,
incidentally, is a feature of most scientific predictions. The fact that
the QM prediction does *not* require the same empirical input is not, in my
view, a point in its favour! It is merely a consequence of the fact that
the QM model does not have enough parameters.
In any event I can predict that the Bell test will *not* be infringed. They
propose using the CHSH test in conditions in which there are no missing
values. They are using pulsed lasers and so have no excuse for
synchronisation problems. They will not (I presume!) be subtracting any
accidentals. About the only flaw I can predict is that they may well find
they have not got rotational invariance, but this should not invalidate the
Bell test -- it will merely mean that published graphs might be misleading.
[For more on loopholes in actual Bell tests see:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BellTestLoopholes
or various articles on my web site.]
I fear the experiment will not end the conflict, though, since they intend
using evidence for negative Wigner functions to prove they started with a
"nonclassical state", and both the use of such a function and its proposed
method of estimation can be challenged.
>> ... Everything we have ever encountered in our
>> lives refutes the possibility of nonlocal effects.
>
> No. There is a large body of experiments which support
> quantum theory.
Ahem! I was talking about "we" in the sense of us ordinary mortals, not
gurus who have lost sight of reality long ago. In our everyday lives, and
in all other lab experiments in other fields, locality is taken for granted
and has never let us down.
> BTW, Newtonian mechanics is, as well, a nonlocal theory.
But it has never claimed to be a complete or final one. Newton himself did
not assume his force of gravity in fact simply happened without a definite
cause.
Caroline
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n> BTW, Newtonian mechanics is, as well, a nonlocal theory.\n> Ilja\n\nYes, I thought the same. But now, after reading this\n(below), I\'m not so sure.\ns.\n\n"That one body may act upon another at a distance\nthrough a vacuum without the mediation of anything else,\nby and through which their action and force may be\nconveyed from one another, is to me so great an absurdity\nthat, I believe, no man who has in philosophic matters\na competent faculty of thinking could ever fall into it.\nGravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly\naccording to certain laws, but whether this agent be material\nor immaterial is a question I have left to the consideration\nof my readers."\n- Newton to Bentley, February 25, 1692/3\nhttp://vms.cc.wmich.edu/~mcgrew/Bent4.htm\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>BTW, Newtonian mechanics is, as well, a nonlocal theory.
> Ilja
Yes, I thought the same. But now, after reading this
(below), I'm not so sure.
s.
"That one body may act upon another at a distance
through a vacuum without the mediation of anything else,
by and through which their action and force may be
conveyed from one another, is to me so great an absurdity
that, I believe, no man who has in philosophic matters
a competent faculty of thinking could ever fall into it.
Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly
according to certain laws, but whether this agent be material
or immaterial is a question I have left to the consideration
of my readers."
- Newton to Bentley, February 25, 1692/3
http://vms.cc.wmich.edu/~mcgrew/Bent4.htm
Caroline Thompson
Nov19-04, 01:26 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message\nnews:cncub3\\$cp5\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...\n> "Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> schrieb\n\n>> I still don\'t see what the whole FTL phone business is\n>> supposed to prove. (Almost) everyone knows that\n>> your strong realism, together with Einstein\n>> causality, rule out violations of BI, which are observed.\n\nSorry to go on about this, but I consider the statement that violations of\nBI have been observed to be false. The presence of loopholes in the\nexperiments means that the inequalities that are violated in them do not\ndeserve to be called Bell inequalities. A true Bell inequality cannot be\nviolated without infringing either local realism or some other fundamental\nrule, such as the one that says that "probability" cannot ever be negative.\nThe inequalities infringed in the real experiments don\'t meet this\ncriterion. See for instance:\nhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory\n\n> There is a large class of something you would name\n> "weak realism", I would prefer to name it "hand-waving\n> without giving any explanation".\n\nI assert that the local realist theories I and others have come up with\nsupport strong realism and are not mere handwaving.\n\n> My problem is how to make it obvious that all this alternative\n> hand-waving is nonsense which should be rejected. For this\n> purpose I use a simple test: If it is possible to explain away a\n> working FTL phone using the same type of argumentation,\n> it is nonsense.\n\nI\'m not sure which way you are arguing here, but think I agree. If a\ncertain train of reasoning is used to justify a falsehood then that train of\nreasoning has an error somewhere in it.\n\n> At least, I think, this should be an argument for people who\n> believe that Einstein causality is a theory which predicts that\n> there exist no FTL phones, ...\n\nI wouldn\'t rule out FTL effects in principle, but would merely say that you\ncan\'t use the supposed evidence for quantum entanglement to support the\nidea.\n\nCaroline\n\nch.thompson1@virgin.net\ nhttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message
news:cncub3$cp5$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...
> "Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> schrieb
>> I still don't see what the whole FTL phone business is
>> supposed to prove. (Almost) everyone knows that
>> your strong realism, together with Einstein
>> causality, rule out violations of BI, which are observed.
Sorry to go on about this, but I consider the statement that violations of
BI have been observed to be false. The presence of loopholes in the
experiments means that the inequalities that are violated in them do not
deserve to be called Bell inequalities. A true Bell inequality cannot be
violated without infringing either local realism or some other fundamental
rule, such as the one that says that "probability" cannot ever be negative.
The inequalities infringed in the real experiments don't meet this
criterion. See for instance:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_hidden_variable_theory
> There is a large class of something you would name
> "weak realism", I would prefer to name it "hand-waving
> without giving any explanation".
I assert that the local realist theories I and others have come up with
support strong realism and are not mere handwaving.
> My problem is how to make it obvious that all this alternative
> hand-waving is nonsense which should be rejected. For this
> purpose I use a simple test: If it is possible to explain away a
> working FTL phone using the same type of argumentation,
> it is nonsense.
I'm not sure which way you are arguing here, but think I agree. If a
certain train of reasoning is used to justify a falsehood then that train of
reasoning has an error somewhere in it.
> At least, I think, this should be an argument for people who
> believe that Einstein causality is a theory which predicts that
> there exist no FTL phones, ...
I wouldn't rule out FTL effects in principle, but would merely say that you
can't use the supposed evidence for quantum entanglement to support the
idea.
Caroline
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
Thomas Trotter
Nov19-04, 01:29 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message news:<cnd10a\\$fnq\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de>...\n> Given that you don\'t like instantaneous things, I would\n> formulate it in another way. Bell has proven that, whenever\n> we observe a violation of Bells inequality between events\n> A and B (in real experiments this means some time intervals\n> around A and B containing decisions of experimenters and\n> observation) then A->B or B->A.\n\nHow can it be that the transmission axis of the polarizer\nassociated with the first detection (say at A) in a given correlation\ninterval is taken as a common polarization component of the\nincident light for that interval? A<-C->B denotes this.\n\nIt\'s easy to see how a cos^2theta angular dependence between A\nand B for the probability of coincidental detection follows\nfrom that.\n\nBut what if the polarization component of the light incident\non the polarizer at A wasn\'t parallel to the transmission axis\nof the polarizer at A? It doesn\'t matter. The emission-produced\npolarization is never known. All that\'s known is that the\npolarizer at A transmitted a wavetrain of sufficient intensity\nto cause A to register a detection. The probability of detection\nat A for that interval is, thus, 1. It\'s assumed that the\nlight incident on B for that interval was emitted during the\nsame atomic transition as the light incident on A for that\ninterval and is therefore polarized the same due to conservation\nof angular momentum -- and, the accurate calculation of coincidental\nresults follows from that with no need for a signal A->B.\n\nWhat have I forgotten, or missed?\n\n>\n> Thus, there is enough place for theories with higher limiting\n> speeds.\n\nWhen someone measures a higher limiting speed, then I\'ll\nbelieve that it exists. I don\'t have any belief about it\none way or the other at the moment. It would be exciting\nif it is a fact of nature -- but, I think you\'ll need more\nthan Bell\'s theorem to establish that.\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message news:<cnd10a$fnq$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de>...
> Given that you don't like instantaneous things, I would
> formulate it in another way. Bell has proven that, whenever
> we observe a violation of Bells inequality between events
> A and B (in real experiments this means some time intervals
> around A and B containing decisions of experimenters and
> observation) then A->B or B->A.
How can it be that the transmission axis of the polarizer
associated with the first detection (say at A) in a given correlation
interval is taken as a common polarization component of the
incident light for that interval? A<-C->B denotes this.
It's easy to see how a cos^2theta angular dependence between A
and B for the probability of coincidental detection follows
from that.
But what if the polarization component of the light incident
on the polarizer at A wasn't parallel to the transmission axis
of the polarizer at A? It doesn't matter. The emission-produced
polarization is never known. All that's known is that the
polarizer at A transmitted a wavetrain of sufficient intensity
to cause A to register a detection. The probability of detection
at A for that interval is, thus, 1. It's assumed that the
light incident on B for that interval was emitted during the
same atomic transition as the light incident on A for that
interval and is therefore polarized the same due to conservation
of angular momentum -- and, the accurate calculation of coincidental
results follows from that with no need for a signal A->B.
What have I forgotten, or missed?
>
> Thus, there is enough place for theories with higher limiting
> speeds.
When someone measures a higher limiting speed, then I'll
believe that it exists. I don't have any belief about it
one way or the other at the moment. It would be exciting
if it is a fact of nature -- but, I think you'll need more
than Bell's theorem to establish that.
Ralph Hartley
Nov19-04, 01:31 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>Ilja Schmelzer wrote:\n> "Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> schrieb\n\n>> Perhaps, many would prefer a definition of "explanation" that excludes\n>> those things, at least unless there is evidence for them, but\n>> includes Quantum Mechanics (without the ontological baggage).\n>\n> These people are in error.\n\nHow can a *preference* be an error?\n\nDo you claim that is *incorrect* to *prefer* ontological non commitment to\nghosts? Suppose there were no BM, there would *still* be a realistic\ninterpretation of QM, for instance that the rules of QM are enforced by the\nspirits of our departed ancestors (which are presumably unobservable).\nWould you conclude that it is irrational not to believe in ghosts?\n\n(from a different post)\n>>> But (any non BM interpretation of) QM is a counter example! Even\n>>> after giving up strong realism, if you showed me an FTL phone, it\n>>> *would* falsify Einstein causality.\n>\n> The FTL phone argument is not a universal argument. It is a\n> counter-argument against a large class of quite typical arguments used\n> in the discussion.\n\nPerhaps you should be careful to only use it against arguments for which it\nis applicable. Using it any other time just confuses people. I see how it\nworks against the "no free will" type arguments, but I don\'t take them\nseriously anyway.\n\n> But there is absolutely no reason to give up realism in the form I have\n> given. Last not least, with BM where exists a quite simple theory which\n> does the job.\n\n*Too* many such theories, infinitely many, all experimentally\nindistinguishable.\n\nWhen you use BM, you get answers about how the universe "really is", but\nthose answers are almost certainly *wrong*.\n\nIf I understand correctly, the construction of a BM theory requires making\narbitrary choices, some of which are continuous. You insist that *exactly*\none such choice is correct, and the rest are "simply wrong".\n\nSo any one you pick is very unlikely (probability 0) to be the one true theory.\n\nIn science we usually accept that our current theory will turn out to be\nwrong, but we assume it will some day be replaced by better one. But the\nchoices in BM are not of that sort, because they are not falsifiable.\n\nNewton said:\n\n> \'I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena\n> (observational data) is to be called an hypothesis and\n> hypotheses.........have no place in experimental philosophy. In this\n> philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the data and\n> afterwards rendered general by induction. Thus it was that ............\n> (my) laws of motion and gravitation were........discovered.\n\nHe was right.\n\nThat describes the dominant view of quantum mechanics. When someone says\n"shut up and calculate" they don\'t mean "there is no underlying reality".\nThey mean "Interpretations? I don\'t need no %^#*^%\\$ interpretations!\nHypotheses non fingo!"\n\nI use whichever interpretation of QM I think will help me find the solution\nto the problem I am working on right now. Are there real problems, with\nreal observable answers, which can be found more easily using BM? If so,\nI\'ll use it when I have one of those problems. If not ...\n\nIn other words, what can I *do* with an unobservable preferred frame? Would\nit not be a hypotheses in Newton\'s prejorative sense?\n\nYou prefer a theory that is realistic (in your sense), but both certainly\nwrong and unfalsifiable, to a theory that makes no ontological commitment\nat all.\n\nI do not claim that you are irrational to have this preference, but you\nclaim that it is the *only* rational preference!\n\nYou don\'t just frame hypotheses, you claim that it is irrational to refrain\nfrom doing so.\n\nDid you ever wonder why scientists don\'t take philosophical arguments\nseriously?\n\nRalph Hartley\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Ilja Schmelzer wrote:
> "Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> schrieb
>> Perhaps, many would prefer a definition of "explanation" that excludes
>> those things, at least unless there is evidence for them, but
>> includes Quantum Mechanics (without the ontological baggage).
>
> These people are in error.
How can a *preference* be an error?
Do you claim that is *incorrect* to *prefer* ontological non commitment to
ghosts? Suppose there were no BM, there would *still* be a realistic
interpretation of QM, for instance that the rules of QM are enforced by the
spirits of our departed ancestors (which are presumably unobservable).
Would you conclude that it is irrational not to believe in ghosts?
(from a different post)
>>> But (any non BM interpretation of) QM is a counter example! Even
>>> after giving up strong realism, if you showed me an FTL phone, it
>>> *would* falsify Einstein causality.
>
> The FTL phone argument is not a universal argument. It is a
> counter-argument against a large class of quite typical arguments used
> in the discussion.
Perhaps you should be careful to only use it against arguments for which it
is applicable. Using it any other time just confuses people. I see how it
works against the "no free will" type arguments, but I don't take them
seriously anyway.
> But there is absolutely no reason to give up realism in the form I have
> given. Last not least, with BM where exists a quite simple theory which
> does the job.
*Too* many such theories, infinitely many, all experimentally
indistinguishable.
When you use BM, you get answers about how the universe "really is", but
those answers are almost certainly *wrong*.
If I understand correctly, the construction of a BM theory requires making
arbitrary choices, some of which are continuous. You insist that *exactly*
one such choice is correct, and the rest are "simply wrong".
So any one you pick is very unlikely (probability 0) to be the one true theory.
In science we usually accept that our current theory will turn out to be
wrong, but we assume it will some day be replaced by better one. But the
choices in BM are not of that sort, because they are not falsifiable.
Newton said:
> 'I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena
> (observational data) is to be called an hypothesis and
> hypotheses.........have no place in experimental philosophy. In this
> philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the data and
> afterwards rendered general by induction. Thus it was that ............
> (my) laws of motion and gravitation were........discovered.
He was right.
That describes the dominant view of quantum mechanics. When someone says
"shut up and calculate" they don't mean "there is no underlying reality".
They mean "Interpretations? I don't need no %^#*^%$ interpretations!
Hypotheses non fingo!"
I use whichever interpretation of QM I think will help me find the solution
to the problem I am working on right now. Are there real problems, with
real observable answers, which can be found more easily using BM? If so,
I'll use it when I have one of those problems. If not ...
In other words, what can I *do* with an unobservable preferred frame? Would
it not be a hypotheses in Newton's prejorative sense?
You prefer a theory that is realistic (in your sense), but both certainly
wrong and unfalsifiable, to a theory that makes no ontological commitment
at all.
I do not claim that you are irrational to have this preference, but you
claim that it is the *only* rational preference!
You don't just frame hypotheses, you claim that it is irrational to refrain
from doing so.
Did you ever wonder why scientists don't take philosophical arguments
seriously?
Ralph Hartley
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>Caroline Thompson:\n>\n>\n>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message\n>news:cnhpb7\\$ltp\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...\n>>\n>> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n>Santos wrote:\n>>> "the validity of local realism may be either refuted by a single\n>>> loophole-free experiment or increasingly confirmed by the passage\n>>> of time without [a successful loophole-free] experiment. "\n>>> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410193 ,\n>>\n>> The passage of time alone does not refute or confirm any theory.\n>> If the passage of time alone has some consequences at all (in\n>> pure scientific methodology it shouldn\'t) then it is usually\n>> considered as a confirmation of the mainstream theory.\n>> Which is, in this case, QM.\n>\n>I am not talking just of the passive passage of time, Ilja, but of time\n>during which repeated attempts have been made to find a loophole-free scrap\n>of evidence.\n\nFor which theory out of all the theories ever proposed does your\nobjection not apply? After you figure out that the number is zero, you can\ntell me which theory of mechanics best agrees with all experiments\nperformed to date? That is obviously quantum theory, or else quantum\ntheory wouldn\'t be used. Now, what kind of rationale exists in arguing\nthat a theory which works is fundamentally flawed?\n\n>Entanglement has been accepted on inadequate grounds.\n\nThat isn\'t true. The word ``entanglement\'\' is simply an extraneous\nterm that gets applied to a particular tye of experiment to describe\na feature of quantum mechanics found in all sorts of quantum systems.\nIt\'s just that no one generally uses the word ``entanglement\'\' when\nreferring to the coupling of spins or spin and angular momentum in an\natom or nucleus as ``entanglement\'\'. One usually just calls those\nstates of good angular momentum and the experimental data from some\nof those experiments is reason quantum mechanics exists.\n\n>> Loopholes alone do not mean that there are other theories. It means\n>> that we cannot prove that no other theories exist.\n>\n>Quite, which is why I recommended the wikipedia page.\n>\n>I am currently working in as much detail as I can a local hidden variable\n>theory modelling the latest proposals for loophole-free experiments, such\n>as:\n>\n>R. García-Patrón Sánchez, J. Fiurácek , N. J. Cerf , J. Wenger , R.\n>Tualle-Brouri , and Ph. Grangier, "Proposal for a Loophole-Free Bell Test\n>Using Homodyne Detection", Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 130409 (2004)\n>http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0403191\n>\n>I can model all stages but will not be able to complete the prediction until\n>the final details of the experimental parameters are known. Some parts of\n>the model will inevitably require input of empirical data.\n\nIn that case, there isn\'t much point in the model unless it has some\nvalue as a phenomenological model in cases where using quantum mechanics\ndirectly would be intractable. That isn\'t very likely.\n\n>This, incidentally, is a feature of most scientific predictions.\n\nThat is most certainly _not_ correct. I can\'t think of any scientific\ntheories which contain more parameters than the bare minimum needed\nto explain the phenomena they describe. The standard model, for example,\ncontains a number of parameters, but the reason for that is no one knows\nhow to eliminate some of them using a theoretical relationship that\nshows several are redundant. Adding parameters where none are needed\nis not an option.\n\nThere exist phenomenological models, like atomic theory or the\nnuclear shell model, which use phenomenological parameters, but\nthose exist because it\'s convenient, not because the underlying\ntheory isn\'t taken seriously.\n\n>The fact that the QM prediction does *not* require the same empirical\n>input is not, in my view, a point in its favour!\n\nActually, it\'s more than a plus. That makes quantum mechanics infinitely\npreferable to a model that requires even a single free parameter to describe\nthe same data.\n\n>It is merely a consequence of the fact that the QM model does not have\n>enough parameters.\n\nUh, the only possible way that a theory can not have ``enough parameters\'\'\nis if it doesn\'t give the correct result without those parameters.\n\n[...]\n\n>> No. There is a large body of experiments which support\n>> quantum theory.\n>\n>Ahem! I was talking about "we" in the sense of us ordinary mortals, not\n>gurus who have lost sight of reality long ago.\n\nI take it that ``gurus\'\' means ``those who require theory and experiment\nto agree and let nature decide what reality means?\'\'\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Caroline Thompson:
>
>
>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message
>news:cnhpb7$ltp$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...
>>
>> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
>Santos wrote:
>>> "the validity of local realism may be either refuted by a single
>>> loophole-free experiment or increasingly confirmed by the passage
>>> of time without [a successful loophole-free] experiment. "
>>> http://arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0410193 ,
>>
>> The passage of time alone does not refute or confirm any theory.
>> If the passage of time alone has some consequences at all (in
>> pure scientific methodology it shouldn't) then it is usually
>> considered as a confirmation of the mainstream theory.
>> Which is, in this case, QM.
>
>I am not talking just of the passive passage of time, Ilja, but of time
>during which repeated attempts have been made to find a loophole-free scrap
>of evidence.
For which theory out of all the theories ever proposed does your
objection not apply? After you figure out that the number is zero, you can
tell me which theory of mechanics best agrees with all experiments
performed to date? That is obviously quantum theory, or else quantum
theory wouldn't be used. Now, what kind of rationale exists in arguing
that a theory which works is fundamentally flawed?
>Entanglement has been accepted on inadequate grounds.
That isn't true. The word ``entanglement'' is simply an extraneous
term that gets applied to a particular tye of experiment to describe
a feature of quantum mechanics found in all sorts of quantum systems.
It's just that no one generally uses the word ``entanglement'' when
referring to the coupling of spins or spin and angular momentum in an
atom or nucleus as ``entanglement''. One usually just calls those
states of good angular momentum and the experimental data from some
of those experiments is reason quantum mechanics exists.
>> Loopholes alone do not mean that there are other theories. It means
>> that we cannot prove that no other theories exist.
>
>Quite, which is why I recommended the wikipedia page.
>
>I am currently working in as much detail as I can a local hidden variable
>theory modelling the latest proposals for loophole-free experiments, such
>as:
>
>R. García-Patrón Sánchez, J. Fiurácek , N. J. Cerf , J. Wenger , R.
>Tualle-Brouri , and Ph. Grangier, "Proposal for a Loophole-Free Bell Test
>Using Homodyne Detection", Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 130409 (2004)
>http://arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0403191
>
>I can model all stages but will not be able to complete the prediction until
>the final details of the experimental parameters are known. Some parts of
>the model will inevitably require input of empirical data.
In that case, there isn't much point in the model unless it has some
value as a phenomenological model in cases where using quantum mechanics
directly would be intractable. That isn't very likely.
>This, incidentally, is a feature of most scientific predictions.
That is most certainly _not_ correct. I can't think of any scientific
theories which contain more parameters than the bare minimum needed
to explain the phenomena they describe. The standard model, for example,
contains a number of parameters, but the reason for that is no one knows
how to eliminate some of them using a theoretical relationship that
shows several are redundant. Adding parameters where none are needed
is not an option.
There exist phenomenological models, like atomic theory or the
nuclear shell model, which use phenomenological parameters, but
those exist because it's convenient, not because the underlying
theory isn't taken seriously.
>The fact that the QM prediction does *not* require the same empirical
>input is not, in my view, a point in its favour!
Actually, it's more than a plus. That makes quantum mechanics infinitely
preferable to a model that requires even a single free parameter to describe
the same data.
>It is merely a consequence of the fact that the QM model does not have
>enough parameters.
Uh, the only possible way that a theory can not have ``enough parameters''
is if it doesn't give the correct result without those parameters.
[...]
>> No. There is a large body of experiments which support
>> quantum theory.
>
>Ahem! I was talking about "we" in the sense of us ordinary mortals, not
>gurus who have lost sight of reality long ago.
I take it that ``gurus'' means ``those who require theory and experiment
to agree and let nature decide what reality means?''
Caroline Thompson
Nov21-04, 02:53 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>[Moderator\'s note: This thread has been going on for a while. New\nposts should provide something new, otherwise they will have to be\nrejected as being "overly repetitive". This criticism isn\'t addressed\nat this post in particular, but at the thread in general (which doesn\'t\nmean, however, that ALL recent posts have been close to being too\nrepetitive). -P.H.]\n\n"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> wrote in message\nnews:21970122.0411180216.2999689d@posting .google.com...\n\n> ... But what if the polarization component of the light incident\n> on the polarizer at A wasn\'t parallel to the transmission axis\n> of the polarizer at A? It doesn\'t matter. The emission-produced\n> polarization is never known. All that\'s known is that the\n> polarizer at A transmitted a wavetrain of sufficient intensity\n> to cause A to register a detection.\n\nExactly!\n\n> The probability of detection\n> at A for that interval is, thus, 1. It\'s assumed that the\n> light incident on B for that interval was emitted during the\n> same atomic transition as the light incident on A for that\n> interval and is therefore polarized the same due to conservation\n> of angular momentum -- and, the accurate calculation of coincidental\n> results follows from that with no need for a signal A->B.\n>\n> What have I forgotten, or missed?\n\nSo long as all polarisation directions are equally likely, you\'ve accounted\nfor dependency on the angle between A and B settings, but the exact formula\nwill not be the one predicted by QM unless you make other assumptions than\nthe standard Malus\' Law cos^2 one. The "visibility" of the coincidence\ncurve will, on your recipe, be only 0.5 and we want 1.0. It is not possible\nto achieve this in a perfect experiment. It *is* possible in one with some\nnon-detections or with other "loopholes".\n\nFor the details of why we arrive at the 0.5 visibility, see an appendix to\nhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9903066\n\n>> Thus, there is enough place for theories with higher limiting\n>> speeds.\n\nEven if we do allow higher limiting speeds, as far as I know nobody has come\nup with a physically plausible mechanism that could actually do the trick.\nWe have to resort to absurd assumptions, such as Aerts\' rigid or hydraulic\nlinks . [Even these don\'t solve the problem in principle, since even\nthese would have some finite velocity of response to change. They couldn\'t\nwork for the Geneva long-distance Bell tests.]\n\n> When someone measures a higher limiting speed, then I\'ll\n> believe that it exists. I don\'t have any belief about it\n> one way or the other at the moment. It would be exciting\n> if it is a fact of nature -- but, I think you\'ll need more\n> than Bell\'s theorem to establish that.\n\nDefinitely!\n\n \nDiederik Aerts, Sven Aerts, Jan Broekaert and Liane Gabora, "The Violation\nof Bell Inequalities in the Macroworld", quant-ph/0007044\nand (rather easier):\nAerts\' original (1982) paper on his linked vessels, item 11 at:\nhttp://www.vub.ac.be/CLEA/aerts/publications/chronological.html\n\nCaroline\n\nCaroline H Thompson\nch.thompson1@virgin.net\nhttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>[Moderator's note: This thread has been going on for a while. New
posts should provide something new, otherwise they will have to be
rejected as being "overly repetitive". This criticism isn't addressed
at this post in particular, but at the thread in general (which doesn't
mean, however, that ALL recent posts have been close to being too
repetitive). -P.H.]
"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> wrote in message
news:21970122.0411180216.2999689d@posting.google.c om...
> ... But what if the polarization component of the light incident
> on the polarizer at A wasn't parallel to the transmission axis
> of the polarizer at A? It doesn't matter. The emission-produced
> polarization is never known. All that's known is that the
> polarizer at A transmitted a wavetrain of sufficient intensity
> to cause A to register a detection.
Exactly!
> The probability of detection
> at A for that interval is, thus, 1. It's assumed that the
> light incident on B for that interval was emitted during the
> same atomic transition as the light incident on A for that
> interval and is therefore polarized the same due to conservation
> of angular momentum -- and, the accurate calculation of coincidental
> results follows from that with no need for a signal A->B.
>
> What have I forgotten, or missed?
So long as all polarisation directions are equally likely, you've accounted
for dependency on the angle between A and B settings, but the exact formula
will not be the one predicted by QM unless you make other assumptions than
the standard Malus' Law cos^2 one. The "visibility" of the coincidence
curve will, on your recipe, be only .5 and we want 1.. It is not possible
to achieve this in a perfect experiment. It *is* possible in one with some
non-detections or with other "loopholes".
For the details of why we arrive at the .5 visibility, see an appendix to
http://arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9903066
>> Thus, there is enough place for theories with higher limiting
>> speeds.
Even if we do allow higher limiting speeds, as far as I know nobody has come
up with a physically plausible mechanism that could actually do the trick.
We have to resort to absurd assumptions, such as Aerts' rigid or hydraulic
links . [Even these don't solve the problem in principle, since even
these would have some finite velocity of response to change. They couldn't
work for the Geneva long-distance Bell tests.]
> When someone measures a higher limiting speed, then I'll
> believe that it exists. I don't have any belief about it
> one way or the other at the moment. It would be exciting
> if it is a fact of nature -- but, I think you'll need more
> than Bell's theorem to establish that.
Definitely!
Diederik Aerts, Sven Aerts, Jan Broekaert and Liane Gabora, "The Violation
of Bell Inequalities in the Macroworld", http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0007044
and (rather easier):
Aerts' original (1982) paper on his linked vessels, item 11 at:
http://www.vub.ac.be/CLEA/aerts/publications/chronological.html
Caroline
Caroline H Thompson
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
Caroline Thompson
Nov22-04, 05:14 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message\nnews:<cnhonc\\$l9l\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de>...\n\n>\n\n> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n\n> > "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n\n> > > "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n\n> > >> We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what\'s\n\n> > >> the point of the experiments? Are we simply to accept\n\n> > >> something impossible because we happen to believe QM to\n\n> > >> be correct?\n\n> > [snip]\n\n> > > I would recommend you not to bed on Einstein-causal\n\n> > > realism. There is realism, combined with the preferred\n\n> > > frame hypothesis. A much simpler alternative.\n\n> >\n\n> > But I can have both! I too believe there are preferred\n\n> > frames.\n\n>\n\n> What means both?\n\n\n\nI mean I can have Einstein causality and a preferred frame. Why can\'t you?\n\n\n\n> If you believe there are preferred frames,\n\n> you need arguments in favour of them. That means, you have\n\n> to search for arguments against Einstein causality. Instead,\n\n> you try to defend Einstein causality. Thus, if you believe\n\n> in preferred frames you argue against your own beliefs.\n\n\n\nNo, Ilja, you must have misunderstood me somewhere. I have never had any\nreason to argue against Einstein causality.\n\n\n\n> If BI is really violated, then this is the best argument\n\n> in favour of a preferred frame, not?\n\n\n\nI doubt if even a preferred frame would provide a physically plausible\nexplanation of a violation of BI in a loophole-free experiment. Let\'s face\nthis if and when it happens though.\n\n\n\n> Note what you have to do if you want to win: Present not\n\n> only a particular explanation of the existing experiments,\n\n> but a general theory - a theory as general as QM - which\n\n> predicts all things predicted by QM in the domain where QM\n\n> has been tested, but is fundamentally different from QM in\n\n> the domain of the BI tests. That\'s a hard job. Very hard.\n\n> And I\'m sure it cannot be done.\n\n\n\nDon\'t give up so easily! Yes, it\'s hard, but I\'ve made a start. We have to\nbe very careful in defining our aims, though. For instance, quantum optics\nis based on the assumption that the photon cannot be split. Are we supposed\nto explain this in our new theory? Those who believe it quote a number of\nreasons, ranging from the photoelectric effect and Compton scattering to\nexperiments such as Grangier et al\'s of 1986 (Europhysics Letters 1,\n173-179) designed to directly test it. I think that various alternative,\npurely wave, explanations deserve re-consideration.\n\n\n\n\n> In comparison, my program to justify the preferred frame\n\n> is much much simpler: I use existing theories and give\n\n> them realistic interpretations. Ether interpretations.\n\n\n\nThis sounds reasonable.\n\n\n\nCaroline\n\n\n\nCaroline H Thompson\n\nch.thompson1@virgin.net\nhttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message
news:<cnhonc$l9l$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de>...
>
> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> > "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > > "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> > >> We *have* to take account of loopholes, otherwise what's
> > >> the point of the experiments? Are we simply to accept
> > >> something impossible because we happen to believe QM to
> > >> be correct?
> > [snip]
> > > I would recommend you not to bed on Einstein-causal
> > > realism. There is realism, combined with the preferred
> > > frame hypothesis. A much simpler alternative.
> >
> > But I can have both! I too believe there are preferred
> > frames.
>
> What means both?
I mean I can have Einstein causality and a preferred frame. Why can't you?
> If you believe there are preferred frames,
> you need arguments in favour of them. That means, you have
> to search for arguments against Einstein causality. Instead,
> you try to defend Einstein causality. Thus, if you believe
> in preferred frames you argue against your own beliefs.
No, Ilja, you must have misunderstood me somewhere. I have never had any
reason to argue against Einstein causality.
> If BI is really violated, then this is the best argument
> in favour of a preferred frame, not?
I doubt if even a preferred frame would provide a physically plausible
explanation of a violation of BI in a loophole-free experiment. Let's face
this if and when it happens though.
> Note what you have to do if you want to win: Present not
> only a particular explanation of the existing experiments,
> but a general theory - a theory as general as QM - which
> predicts all things predicted by QM in the domain where QM
> has been tested, but is fundamentally different from QM in
> the domain of the BI tests. That's a hard job. Very hard.
> And I'm sure it cannot be done.
Don't give up so easily! Yes, it's hard, but I've made a start. We have to
be very careful in defining our aims, though. For instance, quantum optics
is based on the assumption that the photon cannot be split. Are we supposed
to explain this in our new theory? Those who believe it quote a number of
reasons, ranging from the photoelectric effect and Compton scattering to
experiments such as Grangier et al's of 1986 (Europhysics Letters 1,
173-179) designed to directly test it. I think that various alternative,
purely wave, explanations deserve re-consideration.
> In comparison, my program to justify the preferred frame
> is much much simpler: I use existing theories and give
> them realistic interpretations. Ether interpretations.
This sounds reasonable.
Caroline
Caroline H Thompson
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov22-04, 05:41 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb\n> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > Given that you don\'t like instantaneous things, I would\n> > formulate it in another way. Bell has proven that, whenever\n> > we observe a violation of Bells inequality between events\n> > A and B (in real experiments this means some time intervals\n> > around A and B containing decisions of experimenters and\n> > observation) then A->B or B->A.\n\n> How can it be that the transmission axis of the polarizer\n> associated with the first detection (say at A) in a given correlation\n> interval is taken as a common polarization component of the\n> incident light for that interval? A<-C->B denotes this.\n\nI don\'t understand this. In Bell\'s theorem I have not found\nany occurrence of "transmission axis", "correlation interval"\n"incident light".\n\nAll this sounds like you try to propose some local hidden\nvariable theory, something which is not possible. Because\nit cannot give a violation of Bell\'s inequality.\n\n> What have I forgotten, or missed?\n\nBell\'s theorem. It seems.\n\nIf you want to see in detail why your hidden variable theory\ndoes not work, you have to work out the details. It helps\nto present them in a form comparable to Bell\'s theorem.\n\nIlja\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Thomas Trotter" <thomastrotter2005@juno.com> schrieb
> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > Given that you don't like instantaneous things, I would
> > formulate it in another way. Bell has proven that, whenever
> > we observe a violation of Bells inequality between events
> > A and B (in real experiments this means some time intervals
> > around A and B containing decisions of experimenters and
> > observation) then A->B or B->A.
> How can it be that the transmission axis of the polarizer
> associated with the first detection (say at A) in a given correlation
> interval is taken as a common polarization component of the
> incident light for that interval? A<-C->B denotes this.
I don't understand this. In Bell's theorem I have not found
any occurrence of "transmission axis", "correlation interval"
"incident light".
All this sounds like you try to propose some local hidden
variable theory, something which is not possible. Because
it cannot give a violation of Bell's inequality.
> What have I forgotten, or missed?
Bell's theorem. It seems.
If you want to see in detail why your hidden variable theory
does not work, you have to work out the details. It helps
to present them in a form comparable to Bell's theorem.
Ilja
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov22-04, 05:41 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n> > What means both?\n>\n> I mean I can have Einstein causality and a preferred frame.\n> Why can\'t you?\n\nI prefer realism.\n\n> > If BI is really violated, then this is the best argument\n> > in favour of a preferred frame, not?\n>\n> I doubt if even a preferred frame would provide a physically plausible\n> explanation of a violation of BI in a loophole-free experiment.\n\nBM gives one. I believe improvement is possible (along the lines\nof Nelsonian stochastics, for example).\n\n> > Note what you have to do if you want to win: Present not\n> > only a particular explanation of the existing experiments,\n> > but a general theory - a theory as general as QM - which\n> > predicts all things predicted by QM in the domain where QM\n> > has been tested, but is fundamentally different from QM in\n> > the domain of the BI tests. That\'s a hard job. Very hard.\n> > And I\'m sure it cannot be done.\n>\n> Don\'t give up so easily!\n\nI have a better choice:\n\n> > In comparison, my program to justify the preferred frame\n> > is much much simpler: I use existing theories and give\n> > them realistic interpretations. Ether interpretations.\n>\n> This sounds reasonable.\n\nIlja\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> > What means both?
>
> I mean I can have Einstein causality and a preferred frame.
> Why can't you?
I prefer realism.
> > If BI is really violated, then this is the best argument
> > in favour of a preferred frame, not?
>
> I doubt if even a preferred frame would provide a physically plausible
> explanation of a violation of BI in a loophole-free experiment.
BM gives one. I believe improvement is possible (along the lines
of Nelsonian stochastics, for example).
> > Note what you have to do if you want to win: Present not
> > only a particular explanation of the existing experiments,
> > but a general theory - a theory as general as QM - which
> > predicts all things predicted by QM in the domain where QM
> > has been tested, but is fundamentally different from QM in
> > the domain of the BI tests. That's a hard job. Very hard.
> > And I'm sure it cannot be done.
>
> Don't give up so easily!
I have a better choice:
> > In comparison, my program to justify the preferred frame
> > is much much simpler: I use existing theories and give
> > them realistic interpretations. Ether interpretations.
>
> This sounds reasonable.
Ilja
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov22-04, 05:41 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n> Entanglement has been accepted on inadequate grounds.\n\nNo. Entanglement is part of QM, and QM has not been accepted\non inadequate grounds. It explains far to much.\n\n> I am currently working in as much detail as I can a local hidden variable\n> theory modelling the latest proposals for loophole-free experiments, such\n> as:\n> R. García-Patrón Sánchez, J. Fiurácek , N. J. Cerf , J. Wenger , R.\n> Tualle-Brouri , and Ph. Grangier, "Proposal for a Loophole-Free Bell Test\n> Using Homodyne Detection", Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 130409 (2004)\n> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0403191\n\nThe point is that to compete with QM you have to propose a general\ntheory - a theory which predicts not only some particular experiment\nbut all imaginable experiments. QM is such a general theory.\n\n> >> ... Everything we have ever encountered in our\n> >> lives refutes the possibility of nonlocal effects.\n> >\n> > No. There is a large body of experiments which support\n> > quantum theory.\n>\n> Ahem! I was talking about "we" in the sense of us ordinary mortals, not\n> gurus who have lost sight of reality long ago.\n\nSorry, but quantum effects are very real effects.\n\n> > BTW, Newtonian mechanics is, as well, a nonlocal theory.\n\n> But it has never claimed to be a complete or final one.\n\nEven if true (I doubt) so what? I also don\'t claim that\nQM is complete or final.\n\nIlja\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> Entanglement has been accepted on inadequate grounds.
No. Entanglement is part of QM, and QM has not been accepted
on inadequate grounds. It explains far to much.
> I am currently working in as much detail as I can a local hidden variable
> theory modelling the latest proposals for loophole-free experiments, such
> as:
> R. García-Patrón Sánchez, J. Fiurácek , N. J. Cerf , J. Wenger , R.
> Tualle-Brouri , and Ph. Grangier, "Proposal for a Loophole-Free Bell Test
> Using Homodyne Detection", Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 130409 (2004)
> http://arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0403191
The point is that to compete with QM you have to propose a general
theory - a theory which predicts not only some particular experiment
but all imaginable experiments. QM is such a general theory.
> >> ... Everything we have ever encountered in our
> >> lives refutes the possibility of nonlocal effects.
> >
> > No. There is a large body of experiments which support
> > quantum theory.
>
> Ahem! I was talking about "we" in the sense of us ordinary mortals, not
> gurus who have lost sight of reality long ago.
Sorry, but quantum effects are very real effects.
> > BTW, Newtonian mechanics is, as well, a nonlocal theory.
> But it has never claimed to be a complete or final one.
Even if true (I doubt) so what? I also don't claim that
QM is complete or final.
Ilja
Ilja Schmelzer
Nov23-04, 03:08 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n\n\n"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > "Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> schrieb\n> > There is a large class of something you would name\n> > "weak realism", I would prefer to name it "hand-waving\n> > without giving any explanation".\n>\n> I assert that the local realist theories I and others have come up with\n> support strong realism and are not mere handwaving.\n\nWith "weak realism" I do not describe theories which predict that\nBell\'s inequality holds and rely on loopholes in Bell tests.\n\nI simply bet that a loophole-free test will show that Bell\'s\ninequality is violated in reality. Therefore I do not consider such\ntheories.\n\nIlja\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > "Ralph Hartley" <hartley@aic.nrl.navy.mil> schrieb
> > There is a large class of something you would name
> > "weak realism", I would prefer to name it "hand-waving
> > without giving any explanation".
>
> I assert that the local realist theories I and others have come up with
> support strong realism and are not mere handwaving.
With "weak realism" I do not describe theories which predict that
Bell's inequality holds and rely on loopholes in Bell tests.
I simply bet that a loophole-free test will show that Bell's
inequality is violated in reality. Therefore I do not consider such
theories.
Ilja
Caroline Thompson
Nov30-04, 12:47 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>Hi Ilja\n"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message\nnews:cnsq25\\$ckv\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...\n> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n>> Entanglement has been accepted on inadequate grounds.\n>\n> No. Entanglement is part of QM, and QM has not been accepted\n> on inadequate grounds. It explains far to much.\n\nAh, well, time will tell!\n\n>> I am currently working in as much detail as I can a local hidden variable\n>> theory modelling the latest proposals for loophole-free experiments, such\n>> as:\n>> R. García-Patrón Sánchez, J. Fiurácek , N. J. Cerf , J. Wenger , R.\n>> Tualle-Brouri , and Ph. Grangier, "Proposal for a Loophole-Free Bell Test\n>> Using Homodyne Detection", Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 130409 (2004)\n>> http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0403191\n\nWait till I tell the world my ideas on this! The QM story involves the\nassumption that when you split a beam at an unbalanced beamsplitter the\nshape of the spectrum of the undetected part changes when you detect one\npart. They go on to make various predictions that imply that the\ntransmittance of the beamsplitter will have a crucial influence on the Bell\ntest statistic. Anyway, as I say, time will tell.\n\n> The point is that to compete with QM you have to propose a general\n> theory - a theory which predicts not only some particular experiment\n> but all imaginable experiments. QM is such a general theory.\n\nBut if it gives *wrong* predictions in the above experiment, surely that\nwill be a definite point against it! A theory that claims to be general but\nwhich is not logical might turn out to be of less lasting value than an\nincomplete and fuzzy but logical theory that does not make so many claims.\n\nCheers\nCaroline\n\nch.thompson1@virgin .net\nhttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>Hi Ilja
"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message
news:cnsq25$ckv$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...
> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
>> Entanglement has been accepted on inadequate grounds.
>
> No. Entanglement is part of QM, and QM has not been accepted
> on inadequate grounds. It explains far to much.
Ah, well, time will tell!
>> I am currently working in as much detail as I can a local hidden variable
>> theory modelling the latest proposals for loophole-free experiments, such
>> as:
>> R. García-Patrón Sánchez, J. Fiurácek , N. J. Cerf , J. Wenger , R.
>> Tualle-Brouri , and Ph. Grangier, "Proposal for a Loophole-Free Bell Test
>> Using Homodyne Detection", Phys. Rev. Lett. 93, 130409 (2004)
>> http://arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0403191
Wait till I tell the world my ideas on this! The QM story involves the
assumption that when you split a beam at an unbalanced beamsplitter the
shape of the spectrum of the undetected part changes when you detect one
part. They go on to make various predictions that imply that the
transmittance of the beamsplitter will have a crucial influence on the Bell
test statistic. Anyway, as I say, time will tell.
> The point is that to compete with QM you have to propose a general
> theory - a theory which predicts not only some particular experiment
> but all imaginable experiments. QM is such a general theory.
But if it gives *wrong* predictions in the above experiment, surely that
will be a definite point against it! A theory that claims to be general but
which is not logical might turn out to be of less lasting value than an
incomplete and fuzzy but logical theory that does not make so many claims.
Cheers
Caroline
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
Ilja Schmelzer
Dec3-04, 04:46 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > The point is that to compete with QM you have to propose a general\n> > theory - a theory which predicts not only some particular experiment\n> > but all imaginable experiments. QM is such a general theory.\n>\n> But if it gives *wrong* predictions in the above experiment, surely that\n> will be a definite point against it!\n\nOf course. Time will tell.\n\n> A theory that claims to be general but\n> which is not logical might turn out to be of less lasting value than an\n> incomplete and fuzzy but logical theory that does not make so many claims.\n\nQM does not have any logical problems.\nIt is compatible with a classical realistic theory (BM).\nYou may not like BM, but thats not a question of logic.\n\nIlja\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > The point is that to compete with QM you have to propose a general
> > theory - a theory which predicts not only some particular experiment
> > but all imaginable experiments. QM is such a general theory.
>
> But if it gives *wrong* predictions in the above experiment, surely that
> will be a definite point against it!
Of course. Time will tell.
> A theory that claims to be general but
> which is not logical might turn out to be of less lasting value than an
> incomplete and fuzzy but logical theory that does not make so many claims.
QM does not have any logical problems.
It is compatible with a classical realistic theory (BM).
You may not like BM, but thats not a question of logic.
Ilja
Caroline Thompson
Dec4-04, 03:21 PM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message\nnews:comvmr\\$pp8\\$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...\n> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n>> A theory that claims to be general but which is not logical\n>> might turn out to be of less lasting value than an\n>> incomplete and fuzzy but logical theory that does not make\n>> so many claims.\n>\n> QM does not have any logical problems.\n> It is compatible with a classical realistic theory (BM).\n> You may not like BM, but thats not a question of logic.\n\nI\'m afraid we\'ll have to agree to differ. In my opinion QM does have\nlogical problems -- it conflicts with what I call "physical logic", Bell\'s\ntheorem being partial evidence of this -- and my opinion BM fails to give a\n"physically logical" explanation of any real Bell test experiment. Perhaps\nmy "physical logic" is not quite the same thing as "mathematical logic", but\nI think it is what matters. My definition of the term would be roughly\nequivalent to local realism.\n\nWe shall never convince each other, though, so let\'s call it a day!\n\n[Moderator\'s note: I agree. I think that all has been said which can\nbe said within this thread; any more and it will become too repetitive.\n-P.H.]\n\nCheers\nCaroline\n\nch.thompson1@virgin.net\nh ttp://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/\n\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote in message
news:comvmr$pp8$1@beech.fernuni-hagen.de...
> "Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
>> A theory that claims to be general but which is not logical
>> might turn out to be of less lasting value than an
>> incomplete and fuzzy but logical theory that does not make
>> so many claims.
>
> QM does not have any logical problems.
> It is compatible with a classical realistic theory (BM).
> You may not like BM, but thats not a question of logic.
I'm afraid we'll have to agree to differ. In my opinion QM does have
logical problems -- it conflicts with what I call "physical logic", Bell's
theorem being partial evidence of this -- and my opinion BM fails to give a
"physically logical" explanation of any real Bell test experiment. Perhaps
my "physical logic" is not quite the same thing as "mathematical logic", but
I think it is what matters. My definition of the term would be roughly
equivalent to local realism.
We shall never convince each other, though, so let's call it a day!
[Moderator's note: I agree. I think that all has been said which can
be said within this thread; any more and it will become too repetitive.
-P.H.]
Cheers
Caroline
ch.thompson1@virgin.net
http://freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/
Ilja Schmelzer
Dec6-04, 07:18 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\n"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb\n> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote\n> > QM does not have any logical problems.\n> > It is compatible with a classical realistic theory (BM).\n> > You may not like BM, but thats not a question of logic.\n>\n> I\'m afraid we\'ll have to agree to differ. In my opinion QM does have\n> logical problems -- it conflicts with what I call "physical logic", Bell\'s\n> theorem being partial evidence of this -- and my opinion BM fails to givea\n> "physically logical" explanation of any real Bell test experiment. Perhaps\n> my "physical logic" is not quite the same thing as "mathematical logic", but\n> I think it is what matters. My definition of the term would be roughly\n> equivalent to local realism.\n\nIn this case, Newtonian mechanics is logically inconsistent?\n(It is nonlocal)\n\nIlja\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>"Caroline Thompson" <ch.thompson1@virgin.net> schrieb
> "Ilja Schmelzer" <Ilja.Schmelzer@FernUni-Hagen.de> wrote
> > QM does not have any logical problems.
> > It is compatible with a classical realistic theory (BM).
> > You may not like BM, but thats not a question of logic.
>
> I'm afraid we'll have to agree to differ. In my opinion QM does have
> logical problems -- it conflicts with what I call "physical logic", Bell's
> theorem being partial evidence of this -- and my opinion BM fails to givea
> "physically logical" explanation of any real Bell test experiment. Perhaps
> my "physical logic" is not quite the same thing as "mathematical logic", but
> I think it is what matters. My definition of the term would be roughly
> equivalent to local realism.
In this case, Newtonian mechanics is logically inconsistent?
(It is nonlocal)
Ilja
worda1@wordassociation1.net
Dec7-04, 11:11 AM
<jabberwocky><div class="vbmenu_control"><a href="jabberwocky:;" onClick="newWindow=window.open('','usenetCode','toolbar=no, location=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes,status=no ,width=650,height=400'); newWindow.document.write('<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Usenet ASCII</TITLE></HEAD><BODY topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 BGCOLOR=#F1F1F1><table border=0 width=625><td bgcolor=midnightblue><font color=#F1F1F1>This Usenet message\'s original ASCII form: </font></td></tr><tr><td width=449><br><br><font face=courier><UL><PRE>\'t Hooft on the determinism beneath QM\n\nhttp://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212095\n\n_______________________________\n\nCont rary to common belief, it is not difficult to construct\ndeterministic models where stochastic behavior is correctly described\nby quantum mechanical amplitudes, in precise accordance with the\nCopenhagen-Bohr-Bohm doctrine. What is difficult however is to obtain a\nHamiltonian that is bounded from below, and whose ground state is a\nvacuum that exhibits complicated vacuum fluctuations, as in the real\nworld.\nBeneath Quantum Mechanics, there may be a deterministic theory with\n(local) information loss. This may lead to a sufficiently complex\nvacuum state, and to an apparent non-locality in the relation between\nthe deterministic ("ontological") states and the quantum states, of the\nkind needed to explain away the Bell inequalities.\n\n[...]\n\n8. Conclusions.\nOur view towards the quantum mechanical nature of our world can be\nsummarized as\nfollows.\n\nNature\'s fundamental laws are defined at the Planck scale. At\nthat scale, all we\nhave is bits of information.\n\nA large fraction of this information gets lost very quickly, but it\nis being replenished\nby information entering from the boundaries.\n\nA quantum state is defined to be an equivalence class of states\nwhich all have the\nsame distant future. This definition is non-local and acausal, which\nimplies that,\nif we would attempt to describe everything that happens purely in\nconventional\nquantum mechanical terms, such as what is done in superstring theories,\nlocality\nand even causality will seem to be absent at the Planck scale. Only in\nterms of a\ndeterministic theory this demand of internal logic can be met.\n\nThese equivalence classes are described by observables that we call\n\'beables\'. In\nquantum terminology, beables are a complete set of operators that\ncommute at all\ntimes, see Eq,(5.1). A beable describes what a Planckian observer would\nbe able to\nregister about a system - information that did not get lost.\n\n</UL></PRE></font></td></tr></table></BODY><HTML>');"> <IMG SRC=/images/buttons/ip.gif BORDER=0 ALIGN=CENTER ALT="View this Usenet post in original ASCII form"> View this Usenet post in original ASCII form </a></div><P></jabberwocky>'t Hooft on the determinism beneath QM
http://arxiv.org/abs/http://www.arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0212095
__{_____________________________}
Contrary to common belief, it is not difficult to construct
deterministic models where stochastic behavior is correctly described
by quantum mechanical amplitudes, in precise accordance with the
Copenhagen-Bohr-Bohm doctrine. What is difficult however is to obtain a
Hamiltonian that is bounded from below, and whose ground state is a
vacuum that exhibits complicated vacuum fluctuations, as in the real
world.
Beneath Quantum Mechanics, there may be a deterministic theory with
(local) information loss. This may lead to a sufficiently complex
vacuum state, and to an apparent non-locality in the relation between
the deterministic ("ontological") states and the quantum states, of the
kind needed to explain away the Bell inequalities.
[...]
8. Conclusions.
Our view towards the quantum mechanical nature of our world can be
summarized as
follows.
Nature's fundamental laws are defined at the Planck scale. At
that scale, all we
have is bits of information.
A large fraction of this information gets lost very quickly, but it
is being replenished
by information entering from the boundaries.
A quantum state is defined to be an equivalence class of states
which all have the
same distant future. This definition is non-local and acausal, which
implies that,
if we would attempt to describe everything that happens purely in
conventional
quantum mechanical terms, such as what is done in superstring theories,
locality
and even causality will seem to be absent at the Planck scale. Only in
terms of a
deterministic theory this demand of internal logic can be met.
These equivalence classes are described by observables that we call
'beables'. In
quantum terminology, beables are a complete set of operators that
commute at all
times, see Eq,(5.1). A beable describes what a Planckian observer would
be able to
register about a system - information that did not get lost.
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