View Single Post
Jun14-11, 07:02 AM
PF Gold
P: 1,220
Quote Quote by clancy688 View Post
But second you need more than a tsunami to kill a NPP. It's often overseen, but Fukushima Daiichi didn't lose cooling capability because of the tsunami. The station blackout happened because offsite power was lost due to collapsing electricity lines which were damaged by the earthquake.
If those towers would've withstood the earthquake, perhaps emergency cooling could've been sustained.
To the difference with the nuclear systems which require to wait years until a camera can enter the reactor and tell us what happened, we don't need to wait that much to learn the lessons from this accident concerning the power transmission systems :

For example, sufficient consideration was not given to the following actions required for improving reliability of off-site power supply and auxiliary power system.
* Assessment to assure reliability of supplying power to nuclear power stations if a main substation stops supply
* Measures to improve reliability by connecting external power transmission lines to units at the site
* Seismic measures for external power lines (power transmission lines)
* Tsunami countermeasures for power receiving equipment in switching stations

I am a bit disappointed that the specific "lessons learnt" chapter (chapter XII) fails from restating the above, insisting mostly on "failures derived from a common cause " and "preparing various emergency power supply sources" under "(2) Ensure power supplies" page XII-3 ). Is it because "Seismic measures for external power lines (power transmission lines)" is too expensive ? Is it feasible ?