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Nebraska nuclear plant thread.

by HowlerMonkey
Tags: nebraska, nuclear, plant
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swl
#55
Jun28-11, 06:30 AM
P: 108
From the link above:
"Fort Calhoun was designed for floods up to 1014 feet above sea level, and the current flood stands at 1006 feet."

If it was designed for floods up to 1014 feet, why is it already flooding at 1006 feet?
Is this an example of failure within design basis?
zapperzero
#56
Jun28-11, 06:38 AM
P: 1,042
Quote Quote by Joe Neubarth View Post
That incident was embarrassing to the Air Force but not THAT dangerous unless the plane carrying the weapon system crashed. Of course that can happen any time you transport a weapon via air in cargo planes. Weapons being returned are supposed to be separated from their delivery vehicle. In this case the young men involved did not understand that and just shipped the whole assembly on the wing of a plane back to the facility where they had the capacity to remove the weapon.
I don't know... I can see some overeager young'uns loading them on a pylon. I don't see how they got them out of their bunker in the first place and I don't see how come the pilots did not have any indication of what they were carrying.

Plus, Minot AFB was certainly qualified and equipped to offload weapons. Plus, they were supposed to be shipping just shapes that day, not weapons. Lots of things wrong with the story, such as it got out. Enough to give one pause.
zapperzero
#57
Jun28-11, 07:56 AM
P: 1,042
Meanwhile, at Fort Calhoun, they are pumping water out of the turbine building basement.
robinson
#58
Jun28-11, 08:14 AM
P: 201
Not according to their reports. Everything is just fine.
Joe Neubarth
#59
Jun28-11, 08:20 AM
P: 238
Quote Quote by swl View Post
From the link above:
"Fort Calhoun was designed for floods up to 1014 feet above sea level, and the current flood stands at 1006 feet."

If it was designed for floods up to 1014 feet, why is it already flooding at 1006 feet?
Is this an example of failure within design basis?
I live out in Southern California where we think a sprinkle is rain. Most people who have lived out here do not understand real rain or swollen rivers. There is a rumor that back in 1905 the San Diego River (For the past 106 years, essentially a creek) flooded from bank to bank (a half mile or more across.). Most of the young people here do not have a clue what could happen if we received a hundred year flood. San Diego Stadium (Where the Super Bowl has been played) would be out of sight under the water. Not only that, but thousands of apartments, business offices, Condos, my favorite restaurant and twenty hotels would all be gone. Yep, all of that new development was built on the 100 year flood plain.

Now, that is a perfect example of a lack of preparation for what happens in 100 year floods. When the waters rise in the midwest, the ground becomes saturated and seepage can go into basements. If the plant was designed for a 100 year flood, they have pumps in the basement that can easily handle the seepage. It looks like they are working. Thank God!
robinson
#60
Jun28-11, 08:25 AM
P: 201
Why would the turbine rooms be below flood level? Or critical electrical rooms. Sounds like Fukushima.
zapperzero
#61
Jun28-11, 08:32 AM
P: 1,042
Quote Quote by robinson View Post
Not according to their reports. Everything is just fine.
I got this off AP.
Joe Neubarth
#62
Jun28-11, 09:06 AM
P: 238
Quote Quote by robinson View Post
Why would the turbine rooms be below flood level? Or critical electrical rooms. Sounds like Fukushima.
Robinson, that is an insult to American Engineering. It might be valid, but BOY was that a nasty thing to say!

Seepage in saturated ground is expected. The degree of seepage may be in debate but not the actual process.
robinson
#63
Jun28-11, 09:21 AM
P: 201
Missouri River floodwater seeped into the turbine building at a nuclear power plant near Omaha on Monday, but plant officials said the seepage was expected and posed no safety risk because the building contains no nuclear material.

Jaczko said the Army Corps of Engineers doesn't expect the river to rise enough to cause additional significant problems at either of the nuclear plants in Nebraska.

"Bottom line, it looks like the levels are going to be at a place where the plant should be able to deal with it," Jaczko said.

Flooding remains a concern all along the Missouri because of massive amounts of water the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has released from upstream reservoirs. The river is expected to rise as much as 5 to 7 feet above flood stage in much of Nebraska and Iowa and as much as 10 feet over flood stage in parts of Missouri.
http://old.news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110...nuclear_safety

Clearly critical areas are low enough to be effected long before it reaches the level they claim the plant was designed for.
nikkkom
#64
Jun28-11, 12:58 PM
P: 595
Quote Quote by Joe Neubarth View Post
Robinson, that is an insult to American Engineering. It might be valid, but BOY was that a nasty thing to say!
Sure, American Engineering is way superior to Japanese. (Pay no attention to the fact that Japanese said about the same thing about them and Russian engineering - before 2011-03-11)

A story about American Engineering prowess:

http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/700...r-power-plants

Fission Stories #46: Powerless Nuclear Power Plants

Did the station blackout event at Vogtle described in Fission Stories #45 shock the nuclear industry into taking actions to prevent recurrence? Hardly. Almost exactly one year later, on March 7, 1991, the boom of a mobile crane neared, but did not touch, a 500,000 volt overhead power line connecting the main transformer at Diablo Canyon Unit 1in California to the offsite electrical power grid. Plant procedures required mobile cranes to be kept at least 27 feet away from overhead power lines. The boom of the mobile crane in question ventured to within 2 or 3 feet of the 500,000 volt power lines. Electrical arcing (i.e., nuclear-sized sparks) between the boom and the transmission lines caused an electrical fluctuation that tripped the main transformer. Since the backup transformer was out of service for maintenance at the time, Unit 1 lost all offsite power. The three emergency diesel generators automatical1y started and supplied power to essential equipment. Power to the rest of Unit 1’s electrical equipment was restored about five hours later by cross-tying connections to a Unit 2 transformer (i.e., putting all the eggs in one basket).

Okay, some snoozed through the Vogtle wakeup call. But surely the Diablo Canyon event triggered actions to prevent power plants from becoming powerless. Guess again.

On March 13, 1991, six days after the Diablo Canyon miscue, the Unit 4 reactor at the Turkey Point nuclear plant south of Miami, Florida experienced a loss of offsite power at a time when all its emergency diesel generators were unavailable.

Turkey Point Unit 4 along with Unit 3 (Units 1 and 2 are fossil-fired generators), had been shut down the previous November for a lengthy outage to fix safety problems. All the irradiated fuel had been transferred from the reactor core to the spent fue1 pools. As long as one irradiated fuel assembly resides in the reactor core, at least one emergency diesel generator (EDG) must be available. But when that last irradiated fuel assembly is relocated to the spent fuel pool (which now contains ALL the irradiated fuel assemblies), none of the EDGs is required to be available—despite the fact that they supply backup power to the spent fuel pools.

When the event began, the startup transformer was connected to the offsite electrical grid. It was supplying power from the grid to equipment throughout the plant. Due to an electrical disturbance, the startup transformer was automatically disconnected from the grid and prevented from reconnecting.

Workers inspected the startup transformer and associated circuit breakers and found no electrical fault indications. About an hour after the incident began, the operators re-energized the startup transformer. In the next hour, power was restored to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps and forced cooling to the spent fuel pool was resumed.

Did the Turkey Point event finally deliver the safety warning that the Vogtle and Diablo Canyon events failed to send? Maybe, but apparently not to folks in Arizona. On November 15, 1991, workers at Palo Verde Unit 3 were replacing the “A” phase bushing on the main transformer.

(read the rest by following the URL)

Do you still think American engineering is immune to Fukushimosis?
BobG
#65
Jun28-11, 04:02 PM
Sci Advisor
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P: 2,278
Quote Quote by swl View Post
From the link above:
"Fort Calhoun was designed for floods up to 1014 feet above sea level, and the current flood stands at 1006 feet."

If it was designed for floods up to 1014 feet, why is it already flooding at 1006 feet?
Is this an example of failure within design basis?
It's flooding outside the buildings, not inside. The floodgates keep the water from entering the buildings, not from entering the general area.

In fact, that was just one of the problems the NRC noted when looking at Ft Calhoun's initial plan for increasing flood protection by 5 feet. Besides stacking sandbags on top of floodgates, there were also some modifications that would have required some welding. The NRC didn't believe crews could actually maneuver around in the rising flood waters well enough to accomplish the welding and stacking.

While the failed AcquaDam isn't essential to protect the critical parts of the plant, it certainly did fulfill a very useful function in keeping the area surrounding the buildings free enough of water that work could be done outside the buildings.

I wouldn't say the exterior water was an example of design failure, but it isn't an example of a great plan, either.

Pumping water out of a basement isn't anything special, either. One of the best ways to prevent leaky basements in houses is to let the water accumulating outside the basement pass from outside drain tiles to inside drain tiles (underneath the basement floor) where it's pumped into your normal waste water lines. In fact, when I worked with a masonry crew for a couple years, we used to punch holes in every few bottom blocks of the basement and run small plastic PVC pipes to the interior drain tiles just in case water seeped into the blocks higher up. (We built some rather exotic houses, including one in which the basement was built in the natural creek bed with the creek diverted around the house - cool looking as could be when it was finished and never leaked - the first year anyway - I didn't work with them long enough to know if the creek eventually reverted back to its natural path.)
Drakkith
#66
Jun28-11, 04:09 PM
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P: 11,630
Quote Quote by zapperzero View Post
I don't know... I can see some overeager young'uns loading them on a pylon. I don't see how they got them out of their bunker in the first place and I don't see how come the pilots did not have any indication of what they were carrying.

Plus, Minot AFB was certainly qualified and equipped to offload weapons. Plus, they were supposed to be shipping just shapes that day, not weapons. Lots of things wrong with the story, such as it got out. Enough to give one pause.
I don't want to derail the thread, so if you want to know why send me a message.
Joe Neubarth
#67
Jun28-11, 05:06 PM
P: 238
Quote Quote by nikkkom View Post
Sure, American Engineering is way superior to Japanese. (Pay no attention to the fact that Japanese said about the same thing about them and Russian engineering - before 2011-03-11)

A story about American Engineering prowess:

http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/700...r-power-plants

Fission Stories #46: Powerless Nuclear Power Plants

Did the station blackout event at Vogtle described in Fission Stories #45 shock the nuclear industry into taking actions to prevent recurrence? Hardly. Almost exactly one year later, on March 7, 1991, the boom of a mobile crane neared, but did not touch, a 500,000 volt overhead power line connecting the main transformer at Diablo Canyon Unit 1in California to the offsite electrical power grid. Plant procedures required mobile cranes to be kept at least 27 feet away from overhead power lines. The boom of the mobile crane in question ventured to within 2 or 3 feet of the 500,000 volt power lines. Electrical arcing (i.e., nuclear-sized sparks) between the boom and the transmission lines caused an electrical fluctuation that tripped the main transformer. Since the backup transformer was out of service for maintenance at the time, Unit 1 lost all offsite power. The three emergency diesel generators automatical1y started and supplied power to essential equipment. Power to the rest of Unit 1ís electrical equipment was restored about five hours later by cross-tying connections to a Unit 2 transformer (i.e., putting all the eggs in one basket).

Okay, some snoozed through the Vogtle wakeup call. But surely the Diablo Canyon event triggered actions to prevent power plants from becoming powerless. Guess again.

On March 13, 1991, six days after the Diablo Canyon miscue, the Unit 4 reactor at the Turkey Point nuclear plant south of Miami, Florida experienced a loss of offsite power at a time when all its emergency diesel generators were unavailable.

Turkey Point Unit 4 along with Unit 3 (Units 1 and 2 are fossil-fired generators), had been shut down the previous November for a lengthy outage to fix safety problems. All the irradiated fuel had been transferred from the reactor core to the spent fue1 pools. As long as one irradiated fuel assembly resides in the reactor core, at least one emergency diesel generator (EDG) must be available. But when that last irradiated fuel assembly is relocated to the spent fuel pool (which now contains ALL the irradiated fuel assemblies), none of the EDGs is required to be availableódespite the fact that they supply backup power to the spent fuel pools.

When the event began, the startup transformer was connected to the offsite electrical grid. It was supplying power from the grid to equipment throughout the plant. Due to an electrical disturbance, the startup transformer was automatically disconnected from the grid and prevented from reconnecting.

Workers inspected the startup transformer and associated circuit breakers and found no electrical fault indications. About an hour after the incident began, the operators re-energized the startup transformer. In the next hour, power was restored to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps and forced cooling to the spent fuel pool was resumed.

Did the Turkey Point event finally deliver the safety warning that the Vogtle and Diablo Canyon events failed to send? Maybe, but apparently not to folks in Arizona. On November 15, 1991, workers at Palo Verde Unit 3 were replacing the ďAĒ phase bushing on the main transformer.

(read the rest by following the URL)

Do you still think American engineering is immune to Fukushimosis?
The initial statement was tongue in cheek, but so obvious that I did not put a smiling face at the end of the text.

Now, on a more serious point, your examples of loss of American reported power incidents at times when systems are down and there is less concern for total continuity of power are in no way comparable to the outright insanity that is Fukushima.

Fukushima was and is an engineering disaster from beginning to end. It should never have been allowed to start up with the site engineering so totally Fuk'd up as it was. It amazes me that nobody caught those outrageous engineering gaffs in the past 40 years.
jim hardy
#68
Jun29-11, 12:12 AM
Sci Advisor
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P: 3,524
Nikkom, That "All Things Nuclear" article is another example of how to lie with facts.
It lies about the incident at Turkey Point.
"Lie" means 'to deceive by intent' and that's what that article does.

I was working at that plant then and don't even remember the day it happened so had to find the NRC report on it..
The report is here: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-co...1/in91068.html

First lie: "..the Unit 4 reactor at the Turkey Point nuclear plant south of Miami, Florida experienced a loss of offsite power at a time when all its emergency diesel generators were unavailable."
Wow, you'd think we were in same shape as Fukushima and that's what the author wants you to think..
In fact,
we had years earlier installed an emergency feed from the adjoining fossil unit's blackstart diesels for just such a situation where our emergency diesels were unavailable due to maintenance work or disaster. The blackstarts were same type, twenty cylinder GM locomotive engines.
So the author infers the falsehood that no diesel power was available; and that's deceit by intent and that's lying.
Here's from the NRC report:
""An alternate source of power supply to the CCW, ICW, and spent fuel pool cooling pumps was available from four, non-safety-related (black start) diesel generators. ""
Indeed we could have got power from them if we'd needed it, they did start and stand by but weren't needed.
Again from NRC report: "The licensee manually started, but did not load, two of the black start diesel generators."
That's why we put that feed from the blackstarts there, as backup for our emergency diesels.

Furthermore we had other backup in- house power sources from other transformers,
from NRC report : "Other backup sources of power to the pumps included interconnection with the Unit 3 startup transformer and transfer to another Unit 4 transformer (after defeating circuit breaker interlocks)."

Furthermore we had a THIRD backup to both those other backups, again from NRC report:
" An alternate method of spent fuel pool cooling, which was available, involved the use of a trailer-mounted diesel generator and a diesel powered fire pump or a non-safety grade screen wash pump. Detailed procedures for use of the alternative cooling methods were available."

So the author's intentionally deceitful allegation that the fuel was left without a means of cooling is at least three lies(count 'em we had 3 backups in place) but i'll only count it as one.

Second lie: "..a lengthy outage to fix safety problems." Sounds as if the place was falling apart, eh?
In fact the outage was to install more diesel generators. I remember THAT fact very well.
Here's from NRC report:
""In November 1990, the licensee for the Turkey Point Plant began an 11-month dual unit outage to conduct a major electrical system upgrade including installing two additional emergency diesel generators (EDGs)."
Author lied by asserting a falsehood as to reason for outage. We put in two more emergency diesels.
We had executives who understood the seriousness of a station blackout and were willing to spend the money to "do it right".

Third lie :"...none of the EDGs is required to be available—despite the fact that they supply backup power to the spent fuel pools." suggests there's something wrong with that idea.
WELL DUHHHH , meathead, that's why we defuel BEFORE we take out both diesels, because there's tons of heat capacity in the fuel pool and you could get along fine with NO cooling for many days.. and OF COURSE we get multiple backups in place before we do that!! Wouldn't you ?
So his suggestion of wrong-doing is deceit by intent.

Fourth lie: Now this statement is true: "About an hour after the incident began, the operators re-energized the startup transformer. In the next hour, power was restored to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps and forced cooling to the spent fuel pool was resumed.."
...
Having baited his hook with that little bit of truth he tries to set it with:
..."Did the Turkey Point event finally deliver the safety warning..."" inferring it was a near miss
Don't take the bait it's a bald faced lie.. Again from NRC report: "The temperature of the spent fuel pool had increased from 84(degrees)F to 87(degrees)F during the 2-hour duration of the event."

Now i cant speak to the other reactors he wrote about.
Mine was put into the safest possible configuration, work was in progress to improve electrical system reliability, multiple layers of backup were in place and operable, and the event was a yawn.

That 'intellectual' ATN author is exercising his first amendment right to be incredibly asinine.
I'd wager he repeats the performance.


old jim
jim hardy
#69
Jun29-11, 12:18 AM
Sci Advisor
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BTW when i try to access NRC READING ROOM via Google i get a security warning that a site named "akamaihd.net" may be attempting monkey business.

I went straight in through NRC.gov and it worked okay.

I dont know it there's internet hijinks afoot or maybe i have a virus. Be careful.

Am going to bed now, will let virus scan chew on it overnight.

Over and out for day

old jim
zapperzero
#70
Jun29-11, 06:05 AM
P: 1,042
Quote Quote by jim hardy View Post
BTW when i try to access NRC READING ROOM via Google i get a security warning that a site named "akamaihd.net" may be attempting monkey business.
old jim
You get a redirect to akamai - which is a caching service. Dunno why that would happen. Maybe your ISP is being clever.
minerva
#71
Jun30-11, 12:46 AM
P: 82
There's so much "omg, that's just lies, it's all a coverup, Big Nuclear Industry Conspiracy!!!" ******** out there around the internet about Fort Calhoun, it's absolutely driving me nuts.
URob
#72
Jul2-11, 10:07 PM
P: 11
Is there any news on this? I saw a clip saying that there is a 10 mile evacuation zone around the plant. Any weather forecasts? Is the water level still rising?


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