Ultimate question: Why anything at all?

apeiron

Again, we know there is a something - our reality - and so that is a strong constraint on any speculation. Whatever gave rise to our somethingness, or stands in some other way as its contextual other, has to be able to satisfy this constraint.

Somethingness has no coherent connection to nothingness. Well, you can subtract away a lot of things, but you are still going to be left with something (the world that has been made empty). And you can't do any better trying to come the other way either - imagining a nothingness suddenly bursting forth with a somethingness (even a QM fluctuation needs to take place in something).

Vagueness on the other hand has a natural connection to the crisp. As things become less crisply developed, they become more vague. And out of a vague potential, something could always crisply develop.

So two ontologies. Only one of which can carry the causal relationship which we seek, already knowing that something does indeed exist.

Perhaps it is not an ultimate answer. There still seems to be the possible question of why anything - even a vagueness? But then can we really wish away naked possibility, the "existence" of raw potential, in the final analysis? Is it not in fact the limit on not existing? If there is nothing else, there is still always possibility.

So the fact that things exist, logically implies that things were always possible. It also logically implies that things were never impossible.

So we can say a generalised state of possibility must have existed. And a generalised state of impossibility - an actual state of nothingness - cannot exist.

Then vagueness is our label for that generalised state of possibility. We no longer have to worry about nothingness as a rival ontic primitive.

Impossibilities - the definite absence of things - can only arise as a later development, the emergence of crisp constraints on what is otherwise rawly possible.

Albuquerque

I believe your last approach clarify´s the problem in a more tangible way regarding what you meant with vagueness...

My perspective upon the very meaning on a why, concerning any matter to which we can remark a final why, brings me to think that absolute why´s never ask what they seam to ask...they are a projection ad infinitum towards complexity but not a projection to a final justification, as a final justification cannot itself be justified...
Thus asking for the purpose of a spatio temporal process where time itself cannot come out of nothingness once time is the justification on any transition renders the question invalid of any meaning...
In that light my best answer to a final Why it is very simply a just Because...and Reality as the LAW ends up being very much about that...it strikes me as the profound meaning of Truth itself...That, which is the case, and that cannot be put into question.

bohm2

Some physicists have argued that entaglement, non-locality, etc. may be interpreted in this way. Gisin argues:

From Appendix A:

Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space-time? Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds"
http://lanl.arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv...011.3440v1.pdf

Video summary (this French guy has a really good sense of humour):



But I'm not sure if this non-locality and its implications really solves anything with respect to this question of "Why something rather than nothing". Even a purely Tegmarkian position (Platonic view) that stuff like mathematical objects are "real" (even though they don't exist in space-time) and are necessarily true and that's what our science is actually discovering, seems incapable of solving this problem, I think?

Albuquerque

Even if true, I don´t think our "angular" description of reality is exclusive once what reality objectively refers to in the first place is to the very relation itself between subject and object, observer and observed, and not to the thing "per si", which on its own is not only devoid of any potential but equally devoid of any justification and meaning...that said my position is no more in favour of "minds" as complex (maybe complicated) observers then it is on atoms as more linear "observers", as interacting agents, who process information around them on their own particular and limited way, say through electromagnetism and so on...as I see it to "observe" stands for getting affected by something more then "aware" of something which strikes me as a very obscure term...in resume, as long as I keep believing in causality for all its convenience, I am not particularly inclined to make minds a special and unique miraculous form of relation, although I believe its entertaining to have one...
Being is not about observers about time or about Why, and thus not even about reason...if anything, LAW which is the expression of Being, is the very prime condition of what "reason" stands for in its being there...Why ? Because !

bohm2

Now, I'm confused as I always thought that with respect to the ontolgy of space-time there were only two options:

1. Relationist: space and time could not exist without matter.
2. Dualist substantivalist ("container/bucket"): spacetime is the container/bucket and material objects are the contained (objects in the container).

With (1), if you remove matter there's "nothing" left. With (2), if you remove the objects the bucket/container/empty set still remains. But apparently there's a third option:

3. Monist substantivalist: There is no need for the dualism of the container and the contained (or for fundamental containment relations):

Spacetime the one substance
http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/spacetime.pdf

So I'm guessing that in this third ontology, if one removes that "one" stuff, nothing should remain? But what about stuff that may not be described as propagating in space-time like quantum correlations? Gisin has argued that:

Quantum nonlocality based on finite-speed causal influences leads to superluminal signaling
http://lanl.arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv...110.3795v1.pdf

Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space-time? Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds"
http://lanl.arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv...011.3440v1.pdf

I mean, if stuff like these quantum correlations defy spatio-temporal descriptions, it seems that all 3 views are somehow flawed? Although I'm guessing the relationist view would still be safe?

Maui

Classical concepts like matter, space and time are linked together by motion. DO you understand what motion is? I don't. I don't think anybody does(i haven't seen anyone who does and certainly haven't seen anyone who understands quantum motion). We have a description, classical in nature that is deeply flawed. It implies that objects cease to exist at point X and reappear at Y a moment later. A quantum description would imply that we don't know what happens to object when in transition from X to Y, or if it moved at all. It would appear to require a measurement(a specific conscious inquiry), thus a strong point can be made for Wheeler's participatory universe, which imo is a better and more consistent ontology than the ones you listed.

apeiron

To motivate his arguments, Schaffer presumes substance as irreducible, fundamental, non-derivative, etc. So already many other possible ontologies are ruled out. He then is examining whether substantivism itself is monistic or dual.

In the context of the "why anything" question, Schaffer would still face the challenge of why substance and not an absence of substance.

A broader view of possible ontologies would be this....

And I would then add the third ontic possibility of holism - space is a result of the hierarchical interaction of these two directions of causality, of local construction and global constraint.

With the further developmental ontology that adds then a notion of time, the gradient of change made available as the vague becomes crisp.

So broadly speaking, I would agree with Schaffer that fundamentally all would be one, and duality would arise out of this. But the fundamental is not the one-ness of substance but the one-ness of naked potentiality.

So QM is incompatible with substantivism? Yes, it is amusing Schaffer employs QFT to argue for monistic substance, yet fails to mention the little issue of non-locality. Locality is of course built into the substance view axiomatically.

The relational view, by constrast, is based on an ontology of form, or global, downward acting, constraints. And clearly, non-locality fits quite nicely with the idea of global constraints.

But again, a complete view would have to marry both aspects of causality, the substantial and the formal. It is not a case of either/or, but the interactionist story of both. Then to unite these two things under one monism, we have to step back to somewhere. So both must emerge from something like raw potential via a process of mutal development.

bohm2

I agree. I'm not sure what to call it though but it seems to have some properties similar to the same "stuff" that gave birth to our universe, in that it defies spatio-temporal explanation. I mean there must be some remnant of this pre big-bang stuff somewhere? Maybe it's this quantum correlations that seem to defy space-time descriptions? I've always felt the same about our mental/phenomenal stuff/qualia (as per McGinn's argument) but I'm sure I will be accused of being a mystic and I really hate being associated with anything like that. I still like Kastner's paper I posted previously. I just realized he's posted on this forum and I didn't even know about it until today. Interestingly, Schaffer does try to bring forth a complete monist model in a later paper:

Monism: The Priority of the Whole
http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/monism.pdf

I'm actually sympathetic to his "priority monist" view. It seems more reasonable than "existence monism" and also more in line with relationism than substantivalist ontology but maybe I'm confused. I'm guessing you would argue that neither has priority and both the macro and micro should be equal?

apeiron

Yes, and note how Schaffer again waves away the issue of possiblia. So this is not a "complete" approach, or only complete within a carefully chosen reference frame that is based on the crisply existing and excludes the vaguely possible.

Yes. At least neither would have causal priority, even though one might be granted temporal or developmental priority.

Among philosophers who take vagueness/potential seriously, like Anaximander, Aristotle and Peirce, you do have something perhaps coming first - some kind of "substantial" act, a spontaneous fluctuation, that gets things going. And then after this comes the revealed possibility of substantial action being met by the countering force of emergent constraints.

With Peirce, this is his doctrine of firstness, secondness and thirdness - the spontaneous acts, the possibility thence of dyadic interactions, followed by the "taking of habits" or regularisation of physical laws, which is the emergence of form/constraints.

But while a temporal progression can be projected on to the issue of development, at the level of causality, neither the local nor the global would be prior, in the sense of being more important, more fundamental, carrying more weight in the scheme of things.

Albuquerque

...how come speaking on potential can be related with not having constrains ? How come increasing the spectrum from set to power set is said to be related with vagueness ? Either there is causality in place and mechanic relation from the beginning or the whole foundation goes down the drain as magic, no matter what direction you choose to approach the problem be it holistic or not...
...as for time, one can easily extend the concept from the "classical" relativist perspective of space time and apply it to any kind of change process who proves to be more fundamental...motion does n´t appeal to me either, but such is beside the point of what time ends up standing for in practical terms which again is change...one must be careful on how one stacks words together or we end up creating words to address the same phenomena needlessly...as I see it time cannot be removed out of the equation nor some sort of meta space call it what you will...there must exist an axis of order for whatever meta substance there is with a simple rule as simple as present not present relating the discrete bits of such axis...("not present" would stand for null rather then absent...meaning null as being countered by an opposite direction of a mirrored nature or something similar...absence is more a matter of ilusion then a matter of fact the way I see it...)

Albuquerque

If you find the time and the appeal, I would like you to clarify as most as possible your notion of "vagueness" as I may be missing some fundamental idea in your view which would be unfortunate...maybe you could start by defining some model for freedom at large....my dull imagination cannot wrap my head around any concept of pure freedom no matter how much I try...in that sense your wise input would be greatly appreciated !

apeiron

I collected some grounding ideas and literature references in this thread....

http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=301514

Maui

Space, matter(chairs, cars, etc.), time and motion are classical concepts, they are derivative(and secondary) and comprized of the momentary excitation of the respective field(this - the field ontology - is by far the single and only ontology that stands all evidence thrown at it). There is no other ontology and there are no particles('particles' are the classical momentary state of the field - sorry, language fails me here). Matter is a state of the field, why reality is like that, would be a very good question for philosophers to answer. Perhaps fields have a mind of their own(joking ).

If quantum mechanics hasn't profoundly shocked you, you haven't understood it yet - N. Bohr

apeiron

Fields are just another modelling concept. They have the advantage in that they are both local and global, so do offer a holistic approach.

A field can define a space by filling it, while locally specifying its material content. Local particles can be described as excitations and so given a contextual definition. Etc.

So if reality is holistic and systematic in its causality, we should expect a field ontology to be good at capturing that essential local~global organisation.

Of course, like any analogy, there are then shortcomings. Fields have no memory, no persistence. All is flux. So it is hard to represent history or gradients.

So classical wave mechanics has been a useful mental concept for modelling material reality. But note that soliton modelling and superconductor modelling from condensed matter physics are now also common mental concepts being employed in fundamental physics, along with network theory (as in loop quantum gravity).

And also, the essence of a "field" in any of these descriptions is that it preserves locality. Whereas QM creates a problem in that regard.

Maui

They are the only consistent model of reality there is.





No, a field doesn't fill space, space is relative and e.g. the gravitational field defines space-time as per GR. Fields define and make up spacetime



My long standing gripe with causality has always been that it's a secondary(derivative) concept(like matter, space and time). You are looking for the organizing principles where they don't exist.



Memory is a secondary, emergent concept as well(a property of the field?). Classical realism of objects as a fundamental characteristic of reality has been dead for a while.


QFT doesn't pressupose realism, so no problem in that respect with QM.

apeiron

But what is a "relativistic quantum field" then? We have various formal descriptions for making calculations, but no single mental image of what we are talking about.

If you are talking classically, then you can claim that particles are just local excitations. But what you are talking about with QFT is precisely what people complain they cannot imagine in terms of "just waves", or "just particles" either.

So your use of the word "field" here is a placeholder for that hoped-for deeper appreciation of what may be the ontological reality. And as such, it does not actually rule out a more particle-based approach as you want to claim.

For example this is a good discussion of the problems for both camps: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qu...ld-theory/#Ont

So even quantum field theory is not with any certainty a "field theory".

And then there is the issue of what a quantum gravity theory would be. Would it look even less like a classical notion of a field (as with a spin foam, or a string condensate, or whatever)?

So OK, you can call the ultimate concept of reality "a field". But how are you actually now defining a field? What does the word mean concretely here?

If we cannot spell this out, then the concept is simply a placeholder and carries no ontological weight. It becomes another way of saying "we don't know". Or perhaps, we don't know, but we are sure it means particles are not real, locality isn't fundamental, etc.

Maui

If we leave physics and return to philosophy - fields would be the Ultimate Reality as far as we know(and probably can know). That which exists and is real in the sense that it's the substrate of being.



That is a good article and it very well portraits why a particle explnation of QFT is untenable.




To my knowledge - all appraoches of QG involve a variant of emergence/symmetry breaking.



I won't let you push me off the cliff on this (there's literature about Wheeler's beliefs, Bohm's beliefs, etc. on this issue in particular, they wrote extensively and would be more appropriate for a forum with more relaxed rules, i'd rather keep my points at their maximum). Otherwise, the field ontology is the triumph of human thought over reality(don\t ask if they are different, i don't know)