Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[Doctordick]

The point was that the connection between qualia and reality is not a determinable issue

Why is that ?

Probably because I was not paying attention to what you were saying. I am beginning to think qualia is a very important issue and am almost ready to define reality as the collection of all qualia.

I would like your response to that suggestion.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Tournesol]

That being the case, how would you respond to the idea that "qualia" constitute the only true reality?

It's extremely anthropocentric and contradicts most of science.
Which is not to say there are no qualia.

Think about that for a while before you respond.

no!

 

[Tournesol]

Probably because I was not paying attention to what you were saying. I am beginning to think qualia is a very important issue and am almost ready to define reality as the collection of all qualia.

Define what you like , FWIW. The question is what you can prove.

 

[Tournesol]

FYI, 'qualia' does not even cover everything mental -- abstract concepts such as numbers are generally considered not to be qulia.

 

[Doctordick]

You didn't ask me, but my answer would be that qualia have nothing to do with "constituting" reality outside being part of the constitution of consciousness. They might truly represent aspects of reality to consciousness, but if anything other than consciousness exists, then I can't see how qualia are any more "true reality" than anything else.

But what else do you have to go by when you think about reality? From my understanding, the term "qualia" stands for some fundamental thing which we experience and qualia themselves cannot "represent" anything. Lastly, I have no idea what you mean by the term "true reality". Please explain to me how one is to determine if something is a member of the set "true reality".

Think about that for a while before you respond.

no!

Well, I guess that is a response which leads to little room for discussion. :rofl: I really don't understand your adamant refusal to think about anything I say. I have been reading your posts and you seem to be quite rational in dealing with others. Does my perspective upset you that much?

Define what you like , FWIW. The question is what you can prove.

You apparently like being vague when you talk to me. I have utterly no idea what "FWIW" is supposed to stand for. And finally, "what you can prove" depends very much on where you start. No one can prove anything in the absence of a starting point. That is exactly the fundamental problem behind any philosophical position; what defense is there for the starting point itself?

I merely proposed "qualia" as a start point seeing that there seemed to be a strong consensus that "qualia" existed. Most people here would probably agree that a "brain in a vat" if conscious, would experience "qualia". It seems even Canute would agree that "qualia" are the one thing he "knows" for certainty.

FYI, 'qualia' does not even cover everything mental -- abstract concepts such as numbers are generally considered not to be qulia.

Did I say "qualia"was to cover everything mental? I suggested that I would accept "qualia" as the definition of what "really exists" and would exist in the absence of a brain. The brain merely becomes a mechanism capable of developing "mental constructs" based on the qualia available to it. Under that perspective abstract concepts need not be "qualia", they are mere mental constructs of exceedingly great value.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Les Sleeth]

But what else do you have to go by when you think about reality?

I think about reality plenty, and I don't trust what I think much unless I have experienced what I am thinking about. So if you are saying that qualia gives us the best information with which to think, then we might for once be in agreement! :tongue2:

I have no idea what you mean by the term "true reality". Please explain to me how one is to determine if something is a member of the set "true reality".

Well that's funny because you were the one who used it above. You said: ". . . how would you respond to the idea that "qualia" constitute the only true reality?"

By "true reality" I was trying to interpret what you meant. To me reality is that which exists (and I usually include -- that which has the potential to exist). When I added "true" to reality, I was trying to distinquish what exists from what we only imagine to exist, and to say that qualia in particular might be linked to what truly exists (I'll explain below).

From my understanding, the term "qualia" stands for some fundamental thing which we experience and qualia themselves cannot "represent" anything.

As consciousness, qualia give a sense of quality of something we perceive, that's why it is purely experiential. Different things produce different qualia. The quale of a delicious peach could be considered reflecting something about the peach itself, and therefore it doesn't seem improper to say qualia can represent aspects of reality in consciousness.

However, that is a different idea altogether than qualia constituting reality, which is what you said in the post I responded to. I hate nitpicking, so if all you meant was that in consciousness qualia represent reality best to us, then I suspect you are right. But if you meant that qualia somehow are actually the make up (constitution) of all reality, then I can't see that at all.

 

[Tournesol]

Well, I guess that is a response which leads to little room for discussion. :rofl: I really don't understand your adamant refusal to think about anything I say. I have been reading your posts and you seem to be quite rational in dealing with others. Does my perspective upset you that much?

well, I don't like your style, for the usual reasons, and I don't like your content (solipsism) either.


and I don't refuse to think about certain subjects so much as refuse to waste any more time on them.

You apparently like being vague when you talk to me. I have utterly no idea what "FWIW" is supposed to stand for.

http://www.livinginternet.com/i/ia_text_abbr.htm

And finally, "what you can prove" depends very much on where you start. No one can prove anything in the absence of a starting point. That is exactly the fundamental problem behind any philosophical position; what defense is there for the starting point itself?

the point is that you were doing something you criticize others for --making unsupported claims.

I merely proposed "qualia" as a start point seeing that there seemed to be a strong consensus that "qualia" existed. Most people here would probably agree that a "brain in a vat" if conscious, would experience "qualia". It seems even Canute would agree that "qualia" are the one thing he "knows" for certainty.
Did I say "qualia"was to cover everything mental? I suggested that I would accept "qualia" as the definition of what "really exists" and would exist in the absence of a brain.

that is *much* more than a "starting point", and very contentious.

The brain merely becomes a mechanism capable of developing "mental constructs" based on the qualia available to it. Under that perspective abstract concepts need not be "qualia", they are mere mental constructs of exceedingly great value.

I mean there is stuff going on mentally which is arguably not constituted bt qualia. If they are not adequate to found mentallity, they are not adequate to found the whole of reality.

 

[Faust]

there is stuff going on mentally which is arguably not constituted bt qualia

I seem to be one of those people who have trouble understanding exactly what "qualia" means. I see all those discussions about qualia and I'm often left with the feeling that my perception of the world is different, that there's no room in it for whatever it is the word qualia refers to.

I understand qualia is supposed to be the sensations we consciously experience, such as images and sounds, but for the life of me I can't understand why the concept "sensation" isn't enough, or in what way qualia is different from sensation. For instance, I'm currently looking at a notebook, and I think of the notebook as an object existing outside my mind, and its image existing inside my mind. I suppose qualia would refer to the image in the mind's eye, but can anyone explain why we can't talk about "image" in the particular case of vision, or "sensation" in the general case of any sensory input?

I think this is an important question; it seems to me philosophers have introduce the notion of qualia as a novel way to think about the mind, when in truth it's really the old notion of sensation, and any perception of a difference would be artificial and therefore misleading.

I may, of course, be mistaken as I admitted right at the beginning.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Faust, some philosophers make a distinction between the sensation, which can be studied objectively (perhaps by EEGs or fMRIs) and described, and the "feeling of what it is like" to have that sensation, which is not observable. If you don't think there is anything solod in that distinction, then you are on the same page with me, and those philosophers will try to back you into a corner and prove you must believe all sorts of nasty things you don't, since you don't accept their teaching.

 

[Faust]

Faust, some philosophers make a distinction between the sensation, which can be studied objectively (perhaps by EEGs or fMRIs) and described, and the "feeling of what it is like" to have that sensation, which is not observable.

I think I get it. So, for instance, the image of an object in my mind's eye is an image, but "the feeling of seeing an image of an object in my mind's eye" is qualia. Is that correct? If it is, then I'm back to square one, for I have no idea what that feeling is, apart from the image itself. But perhaps I'm still missing something

 

[Doctordick]

I think about reality plenty, and I don't trust what I think much unless I have experienced what I am thinking about. So if you are saying that qualia gives us the best information with which to think, then we might for once be in agreement! :tongue2:

Les, I don't think we have ever not been in agreement on much of anything. What I think has been going on is that you are misunderstanding what I am trying to communicate: i.e., I have a major communication problem because there are no words with which to refer to what I am thinking.

Well that's funny because you were the one who used it above. You said: ". . . how would you respond to the idea that "qualia" constitute the only true reality?"

That is because you misunderstood what I was saying. You used the term "true reality" without informing me what you meant; so I asked you to explain to me how one is to determine if something is a member of the set "true reality". So far, the term is, between you and I, undefined. I was merely proposing a possiblity.

By "true reality" I was trying to interpret what you meant. To me reality is that which exists (and I usually include -- that which has the potential to exist). When I added "true" to reality, I was trying to distinquish what exists from what we only imagine to exist, and to say that qualia in particular might be linked to what truly exists (I'll explain below).

I think we are struggling with exactly the same problem: trying to get an exact definition of reality.

As consciousness, qualia give a sense of quality of something we perceive, that's why it is purely experiential. Different things produce different qualia. The quale of a delicious peach could be considered reflecting something about the peach itself, and therefore it doesn't seem improper to say qualia can represent aspects of reality in consciousness.

However, that is a different idea altogether than qualia constituting reality, which is what you said in the post I responded to. I hate nitpicking, so if all you meant was that in consciousness qualia represent reality best to us, then I suspect you are right.

We may be getting close to what I am trying to express. Let's see if the following makes any sense to you.

We all have a very strong feeling that we know what reality is; however, none of us can really make what I would call an exact specification which cannot be misinterpreted. Any words you come up with to lay out exactly what you mean by reality must have their meaning established before what you mean can be communicated and that process itself is so extensive that an exact logical analysis is impossible. Let us look at the statement, "if all you meant was that, in consciousness, qualia represent reality best to us, then I suspect you are right". Essentially, I think that's it; but, before I make a commitment, let me lay out to you why I want to use that term (which I had never heard of before running into it on this forum). As used, it apparently embodies some very important aspects of what we know and how we know them which are central to my presentation.

It has been said, several times in this thread and elsewhere, that the quale is not the sensation itself but is something else only perceived by the perceiver. For example "red" is a label attached to a particular quale for communication purposes and does not communicate the actual quale the perceiver perceived. The issue here is that the fact that we both use the same label can not be taken to prove we both experience the same quale. Being uncommunicable allows it to exist in the absence of communication and thus gives me a tag name for the phenomena on which the communication tags are built.

When it comes to the general set of words we use to communicate, we all think (on an emotional level) that we know what the words mean and the idea that we might be wrong is an unacceptable logical proposition (unacceptable because, on a logical level, we don't know how to handle that circumstance). However, when I put the same idea in the form of qualia, people don't seem to be bothered at all (at least that is the impression I get): i.e., people here appear to be very ready to accept the idea that the label (the word we attach to a specific quale) does not imply that another using the same label is experiencing the same quale. In a manner of speaking, they are willing to admit of a possibility of an extant communication problem (if "impossible to communicate" can be thought of as a communication difficulty).

Let me put it another way. Your experience of reality consists of the collection of all qualia you have ever experienced. From those experiences, you have constructed a set of labels or references which make those experiences make sense to you. The presumption is that your neighbor has done the same thing. Through the use of those labels your neighbor and you have done a very good job of eliminating inconsistencies in your descriptions of reality. However, you seem to agree that the success cannot be taken to mean you are experiencing exactly the same qualia. In fact, if you think about it for a moment, you should be willing to admit that, as you gain experiences, you yourself might change the labels on what you before considered to be the same quale. Different peaches might generate different quale. On the other hand, no matter how you change your world view or your understanding of reality, it cannot discard quale you have experienced.

But if you meant that qualia somehow are actually the make up (constitution) of all reality, then I can't see that at all.

Why not? From your understanding of qualia, what other contact with reality do you have? Exactly why do you feel that the qualia themselves do not constitute reality? If you know they exist and your experience of them (or at least the relationships you recognize between them) is what you are trying to communicate, why can't you consider them the fundamental foundation of reality?

Qualia have a second significant characteristic in common with reality: we know what we are talking about but we certainly cannot refer to it as well understood. Finally, what is more real, a peach or the profound collection of qualia you have come think indicate a peach: the quale of it's image, the quale of it's feel, the quale of it's taste, the quale of it's texture as you swallow...

Let me know what you really think -- Dick

 

[Les Sleeth]

What I think has been going on is that you are misunderstanding what I am trying to communicate: i.e., I have a major communication problem because there are no words with which to refer to what I am thinking.

Well, I have to say I followed and enjoyed your analysis this time. I’ll focus on the points where either I think I have something to add, or where I disagree.

Let me know what you really think

Okay, you asked for it!

It has been said, several times in this thread and elsewhere, that the quale is not the sensation itself but is something else only perceived by the perceiver. For example "red" is a label attached to a particular quale for communication purposes and does not communicate the actual quale the perceiver perceived.

I would just make a small distinction here to ensure we are talking about the same things. Red, as a label, can be attached in two different ways. One could be the mere recognition of red as a particular wave length of EM. That’s something a computer or the hypothetical zombie could do. In other words, the ability to label something red doesn’t have to mean a quale has occurred.

Then there is my personal experience, what red “is like” to me. A computer or zombie doesn’t have this second level of awareness, it only has the first.

I have often stated that I don’t like the qualia method of defining consciousness. It is awkward and difficult for people to grasp. I think a better way to describe consciousness is to say some more central part of us is aware of sensations that take place in a more peripheral part of us. As far as I can tell, the main reason for the qualia approach was to avoid the philosopher’s paranoia of being attacked for homuncular regress. That is, if there is something aware of being aware, then there must be something more central to that which is aware of being aware of being aware . . . ad infinitum.

But that fear of philosophers stems from not understanding their own consciousness very well, IMO. It’s too bad they don’t take Socrates’ advice. A little reflection on oneself reveals there is a part of us that’s “integrated.” Experience is like that. It is a sort of conscious singularity which cannot be disintegrated without losing it. That’s why, IMO, we have difficulty communicating our experiences.

Communication is a thing of the intellect, which is compound, multifaceted, complex, and works best with “parts.” But all experience is whole, singular in nature, and doesn’t lend itself to the complex operations of mentality. So what we end up doing is searching for ways to give “impressions” of our experiences (unless one is talking purely conceptually/mathematically) to others to see if they can find memories of their own experiences which will help them relate to what we are trying to say.

Anyway, my point is that this singular, integrating aspect to us solves the homuncular regress problem. Part of us is multifaceted, like sensation and intellect, and part of us integrates all of that into the “me” that feels (i.e., experiences) what “it’s like” to detect or think things. So if you ask me, the better definition of consciousness is that is the awareness of being aware.

Your experience of reality consists of the collection of all qualia you have ever experienced. From those experiences, you have constructed a set of labels or references which make those experiences make sense to you. The presumption is that your neighbor has done the same thing. Through the use of those labels your neighbor and you have done a very good job of eliminating inconsistencies in your descriptions of reality. However, you seem to agree that the success cannot be taken to mean you are experiencing exactly the same qualia. In fact, if you think about it for a moment, you should be willing to admit that, as you gain experiences, you yourself might change the labels on what you before considered to be the same quale. Different peaches might generate different quale. On the other hand, no matter how you change your world view or your understanding of reality, it cannot discard quale you have experienced.

Yes, that is pretty much what most qualia advocates are saying. There is a personal, inner realm to consciousness. The accumulation of each of our experiences is what creates the “me” of consciousness.

Why not? From your understanding of qualia, what other contact with reality do you have? Exactly why do you feel that the qualia themselves do not constitute reality? If you know they exist and your experience of them (or at least the relationships you recognize between them) is what you are trying to communicate, why can't you consider them the fundamental foundation of reality?

Yes, but just because qualia are the means for my contact with reality doesn’t mean they are all of reality, except for me.

Some of my friends and I have had that old debate about if there is one reality or many realities. My opinion of anyone who says there are many realities is that they are being too subjective. Reality is what is real, and what is real is what exists or can exist. It has nothing to do with me except I am one small part of the whole of existence.

Now if you were to say qualia are the means by which I, as consciousness, know reality, and therefore to ME qualia “constitute” my sole link to reality . . . then yes, I could agree to that.

… what is more real, a peach or the profound collection of qualia you have come think indicate a peach: the quale of it's image, the quale of it's feel, the quale of it's taste, the quale of it's texture as you swallow...

Being objective I’d say neither is more real. A peach is as real as my experience of a peach. Being subjective I’d say, as consciousness, that qualia are everything and a peach is nothing (unless I'm starving).

 

[Fliption]

I think I get it. So, for instance, the image of an object in my mind's eye is an image, but "the feeling of seeing an image of an object in my mind's eye" is qualia. Is that correct? If it is, then I'm back to square one, for I have no idea what that feeling is, apart from the image itself. But perhaps I'm still missing something

I'm not sure what you mean by 'sensation'. But for now let's accept Selfadjoint's point that sensation is all the objective and measurable aspects of seeing the color blue, for example.

Are you saying that you believe a scientist could hook you up to a machine and actually "see" the same color you are seeing? Could a scientist ever feel what you are feeling when a needle gets stuck in your arm? These are not the sensations. These are what it "feels like" to have the sensations.

Now, if you are lumping all of these things into the term "sensations", then we will have to reject selfadjoint's definition. If this is the route you're going, just know that when philosophers use the term qualia, they are referring to the subjective, unmeasurable aspects of "sensations".

 

[Faust]

I'm not sure what you mean by 'sensation'. But for now let's accept Selfadjoint's point that sensation is all the objective and measurable aspects of seeing the color blue, for example.

That is not what I meant by "sensation"; I thought the standard dictionary definition was commonly understood and accepted. Here's one from answers.com:

Sensation:

a) A perception associated with stimulation of a sense organ or with a specific body condition: the sensation of heat; a visual sensation.

b) The faculty to feel or perceive; physical sensibility: The patient has very little sensation left in the right leg.

c) An indefinite generalized body feeling: a sensation of lightness.

I fail to see how "qualia" is not synonymous with that standard definition of sensation. Can anyone explain it to me?

 

[Les Sleeth]

That is not what I meant by "sensation"; I thought the standard dictionary definition was commonly understood and accepted. Here's one from answers.com:


I fail to see how "qualia" is not synonymous with that standard definition of sensation. Can anyone explain it to me?

I elaborated on it somewhat to DoctorDick in my last post. Qualia are qualities associated with subjectivity. You could stick a device into an orange, for example, and have it measure temperature, acidity, sweetness, etc. But would that measuring device say "I liked that orange"? It does not appreciate, one way or another, any of the qualities it detects -- it just senses them.

Similarly, we detect or sense information (that's what's being defined as a sensation), AND we have a subjective experience of that sensation, which some thinkers have characterized as what "it's like" for a particular person (that's qualia experience).

There are things we sense but don't pay attention to, such as ambient noise while we are working. If I try really hard, I can recall some of that, the fact that birds were chirping all morning, for example. So it seems to me sensation can occur to my being without associated qualia, and that my attentiveness to sensation is required for the subjective experience.

The functionalist claim that there is no subjective experience in human beings, that we are just a collection of sensations and thoughts, doesn't make sense. I've pointed out many times that I know it's possible to completely still the mind through meditation (even it only temporarily). If subjectivity is nothing but collections of sensations and thoughts, then what is it that remains conscious in that stillness?

 

[Fliption]

I fail to see how "qualia" is not synonymous with that standard definition of
sensation. Can anyone explain it to me?

Well I could accept that the word sensation means the same thing but I think to many, sensation also implies the objective aspect of sensing. It can be said that the device Les refers to is "sensing" acidity of the orange. But this device isn't really experiencing subjective aspects of the orange the way you and I do. It is this subjective aspect of sensing that philosophers reserve the word "qualia" for.

 

[Tournesol]

I understand qualia is supposed to be the sensations we consciously experience, such as images and sounds, but for the life of me I can't understand why the concept "sensation" isn't enough, or in what way qualia is different from sensation. For instance, I'm currently looking at a notebook, and I think of the notebook as an object existing outside my mind, and its image existing inside my mind. I suppose qualia would refer to the image in the mind's eye, but can anyone explain why we can't talk about "image" in the particular case of vision, or "sensation" in the general case of any sensory input?

Because a lot of people will take "sensation" to mean "neural processing"
and thereby bypass the subjective aspect.

 

[Faust]

Because a lot of people will take "sensation" to mean "neural processing" and thereby bypass the subjective aspect.

That's interesting. So I guess it's only a matter of time until they do the same with qualia, after all they don't believe there's more to qualia than neural processing.

But then, all philosophers have to do is come up with yet another word. A better-sounding one, hopefully

 

[Fliption]

That's interesting. So I guess it's only a matter of time until they do the same with qualia, after all they don't believe there's more to qualia than neural processing.

But then, all philosophers have to do is come up with yet another word. A better-sounding one, hopefully

Unlike the word sensation, qualia is specifically designed to refer to an aspect that cannot be attributed to neural processing. That really is the whole point of the philosophical topic. Sensation is a word that is used outside of philosophy so it's easy to see why it would have multiple meanings.

 

[Faust]

Unlike the word sensation, qualia is specifically designed to refer to an aspect that cannot be attributed to neural processing.

Sure enough, but still one has to accept such a thing exists. If one believes the mind can be reduced to neural processes, then qualia thus defined cannot possibly exist. Indeed, notice how functionalists will often argue that the perception of qualia is an illusion. (which usually raises eyebrows from people who don't understand exactly what is meant by "illusion" in that context - but that is another subject)

 

[Faust]

Sorry, I hadn't seen this post until Fliption mentioned it.

I elaborated on it somewhat to DoctorDick in my last post. Qualia are qualities associated with subjectivity. You could stick a device into an orange, for example, and have it measure temperature, acidity, sweetness, etc. But would that measuring device say "I liked that orange"? It does not appreciate, one way or another, any of the qualities it detects -- it just senses them.

Well, for one thing it's possible to program the sensor to say "I like it" when it senses a certain combination of parameters. I know what you're saying, I just wanted to point out that if verbal descriptions have nothing to do with consciousness, then the fact that we can report on conscious experiences has nothing to do with consciousness either. But you probably knew that already.

There are things we sense but don't pay attention to, such as ambient noise while we are working. If I try really hard, I can recall some of that, the fact that birds were chirping all morning, for example. So it seems to me sensation can occur to my being without associated qualia, and that my attentiveness to sensation is required for the subjective experience.

That seems like a good reason to think of qualia as different from sensation, but then a question pops in my mind: can we have unconscious qualia? It would seem so, because there is something it's like to be someone not paying attention to a sensory experience. Notice that not paying attention to an experience is not the same thing as not having it. Many times during the winter I feel immense relief when the fan in my furnace shuts off, even though I wasn't aware of its annoying hum in the first place. So there's definitely something it's like to be "me not listening to the sound of a fan" when the sound is there. Doesn't that complicate things?

The functionalist claim that there is no subjective experience in human beings, that we are just a collection of sensations and thoughts, doesn't make sense. I've pointed out many times that I know it's possible to completely still the mind through meditation (even it only temporarily). If subjectivity is nothing but collections of sensations and thoughts, then what is it that remains conscious in that stillness?

Have you considered the possibility that you were actually conscious of something but you can't find words for it? It wouldn't be different from the furnace fan: there is a state in which I don't hear any sound even though the sound is there. My perception that there was no sound was, so to speak, an illusion. Couldn't the perception of an empty mind likewise be an illusion?

 

[Fliption]

Sure enough, but still one has to accept such a thing exists. If one believes the mind can be reduced to neural processes, then qualia thus defined cannot possibly exist. Indeed, notice how functionalists will often argue that the perception of qualia is an illusion. (which usually raises eyebrows from people who don't understand exactly what is meant by "illusion" in that context - but that is another subject)

I'm not entirely sure I understand this post. Perhaps I am one of those people who don't understand exactly what is meant by "illusion" because claiming qualia is an illusion doesn't make the problem go away. What does it mean to say that qualia don't really exists but the illusion of them do?

 

[Faust]

Perhaps I am one of those people who don't understand exactly what is meant by "illusion" because claiming qualia is an illusion doesn't make the problem go away.

It doesn't make the problem go away only for people who believe there is a problem to start with. If you don't believe qualia exists, then you don't have to explain why it exists, you only have to explain why people claim it does.

As an example, if you don't believe in ghosts, do you feel you need to explain why ghosts don't exist, otherwise you can't sustain your point of view? The whole issue would be nonsense to you, wouldn't it? And the fact that the world is full of people who claim to have seen ghosts wouldn't impress you in the least. I think that's how functionalists see this whole qualia thing: nonsense not worth their time.

What does it mean to say that qualia don't really exists but the illusion of them do?

Similar to saying that ghosts don't exist but people can still see them. In fact, there are many similarities between ghosts and subjective perception.

By the way, I happen to believe that ghosts are not an illusion. Just to make my position clear.

 

[Fliption]

It doesn't make the problem go away only for people who believe there is a problem to start with. If you don't believe qualia exists, then you don't have to explain why it exists, you only have to explain why people claim it does.

And this relates right back to my question "What does it mean to say qualia doesn't exists yet the illusion of them does?" The problem of explaining the illusion of qualia is as problematic as the problem of qualia itself. In fact, it is the exact same problem because the illusion that we are trying to explain is presented to us through qualia. So we have an illusion of an illusion. And who is it that is experiencing the illusion? Another Illusion? This is very much not analogous to ghosts.

Also, I don't think that too many people deny the existence of qualia. People who deny the problem of qualia don't deny its existence. They simply think that qualia can eventually be explained by neurology. Not many good reasons are given as to why this is the case except to appeal to faith and claim "we will figure it out one day".

 

[selfAdjoint]

Also, I don't think that too many people deny the existence of qualia. People who deny the problem of qualia don't deny its existence. They simply think that qualia can eventually be explained by neurology. Not many good reasons are given as to why this is the case except to appeal to faith and claim "we will figure it out one day".

Well I don't believe in qualia. I don't agree that as defined they constitute an illusion; I think they are merely a word game.

 

[Fliption]

Well I don't believe in qualia. I don't agree that as defined they constitute an illusion; I think they are merely a word game.

That's why I said "not too many people" believe that. I realize their are some extremist.

Word games can only be played when there are two or more people trying to communicate with one another. I don't require a conversation with anyone to know what I observe. I observe something that I cannot reconcile with what I understand to be physicalism. Call it whatever you want.

However, my understanding of physicalism does indeed come from others. So this is the only area where word games may lie. It is entirely possible that what you and I understand physicalism to be is entirely different. Not likely, but possible.

 

[Tournesol]

Some word games are deadly serious...

 

[selfAdjoint]

Some word games are deadly serious...

Only to those who take them seriously. History is littered with
word games that smart people took so seriously they killed each other over them. Those ideas and causes are now one with Ozymandias. Who now cares about the difference between homousian and homoiusian?

 

[Faust]

And this relates right back to my question "What does it mean to say qualia doesn't exists yet the illusion of them does?"

I can't tell you what the sentence means, I can only give you more sentences. Figuring out the meaning is entirely up to you. The best I can do is tell you there are perspectives from which the sentence seems true, and there are perspectives from which the sentence seems false. Now what would you call a proposition whose truth value cannot be established?

The problem of explaining the illusion of qualia is as problematic as the problem of qualia itself. In fact, it is the exact same problem because the illusion that we are trying to explain is presented to us through qualia. So we have an illusion of an illusion. And who is it that is experiencing the illusion? Another Illusion?

I can tell you this much: your reasoning above is not valid. David Chalmers has a paper on his website that deals with the fact that zombies also have a "problem of qualia", even though they don't have qualia. You don't need qualia to have the illusion that you do.

Now you may raise the objection that when zombies talk about qualia they don't know what they are talking about, whereas we do. The only answer I have for that objection is that I myself don't know what qualia is (that is, I don't know what the word means), and I'm talking about it here, therefore I must be a zombie.

This is very much not analogous to ghosts.

It is far more analogous to ghosts than you might realize. When someone claims there's a "perceiver" inside their body which is not the body itself, aren't they saying there's a ghost in the machine? The machine can be explained by physical laws, the ghost cannot. I see no difference whatsoever, which is why I said I believe in ghosts. I don't agree with the functionalists, but I know my position cannot be intellectually defended.

Also, I don't think that too many people deny the existence of qualia. People who deny the problem of qualia don't deny its existence.

I deny the existence of qualia, and I think the "problem of qualia" is a problem of semantics, nothing more. Seems I'm not alone.

They simply think that qualia can eventually be explained by neurology.

That is not my position, and I don't even think it's the position of the functionalists, as the only problem from a functionalist perspective is to find out the neurological mechanisms that cause a person to believe they have qualia. For a functionalist, explaining qualia is as trivial as explaining why people believe in false ideas. But I must point out I'm not a functionalist so I may be misrepresenting their position.

Not many good reasons are given as to why this is the case except to appeal to faith and claim "we will figure it out one day".

It seems everyone who fails to understand an antagonic position feels tempted to claim the antagonists are acting out of faith. That is rather ironic, as you can't really know what the antagonist is thinking; it is an appeal to faith to claim that people can only disagree with you by being irrational. So I think anyway.

 

[Faust]

History is littered with word games that smart people took so seriously they killed each other over them. Those ideas and causes are now one with Ozymandias. Who now cares about the difference between homousian and homoiousian?

Great post! It's funny to see how, throughout history, those debates don't settle as much as they slowly slide into eternal oblivion. Which is quite ironic considering the passions they stir.

 

[Tournesol]

Some word games are deadly serious...

Only to those who take them seriously. History is littered with
word games that smart people took so seriously they killed each other over them. Those ideas and causes are now one with Ozymandias. Who now cares about the difference between homousian and homoiusian?

An example of a word game that is still serious is the procedings in a court-case. Wittgenstein's term "language game" was never meant to be sweepingly dismissive. As such, the burden is on you to explain why
"qualia" is a silly language-game, and (eg) "string" a sensible one.

 

[Tournesol]

Great post! It's funny to see how, throughout history, those debates don't settle as much as they slowly slide into eternal oblivion. Which is quite ironic considering the passions they stir.

People have never stopped debating "where did it all come from" and "how should I live my life"

 

[Tournesol]

I can't tell you what the sentence means, I can only give you more sentences.

No-one can ever offer an explanation which is not itself another bunch of words. False dichotomy.

Figuring out the meaning is entirely up to you. The best I can do is tell you there are perspectives from which the sentence seems true, and there are perspectives from which the sentence seems false.

maybe some of those perspectives are just plain wrong.

Now what would you call a proposition whose truth value cannot be established?

there is no inference from "there is more than 1 opinion on this topic" to "no-one could ppssibly answer this question".

I can tell you this much: your reasoning above is not valid. David Chalmers has a paper on his website that deals with the fact that zombies also have a "problem of qualia", even though they don't have qualia. You don't need qualia to have the illusion that you do.

You don't need to have qualia to have a problem of qualia -- which, in the case of zombies, is purely a matter of belief, and not of perception or sensation , and not therefore of *illusion*. And the fact that we could have a mistaken belief in qualia does not shot that we actually do -- Chalmers would certainly not draw that conclusion.

Now you may raise the objection that when zombies talk about qualia they don't know what they are talking about, whereas we do. The only answer I have for that objection is that I myself don't know what qualia is (that is, I don't know what the word means), and I'm talking about it here, therefore I must be a zombie.

You "know" qualia are illusions, don't you ?

It is far more analogous to ghosts than you might realize. When someone claims there's a "perceiver" inside their body which is not the body itself, aren't they saying there's a ghost in the machine? The machine can be explained by physical laws, the ghost cannot. I see no difference whatsoever, which is why I said I believe in ghosts. I don't agree with the functionalists, but I know my position cannot be intellectually defended.

Qualia do not require homunculi.

I deny the existence of qualia, and I think the "problem of qualia" is a problem of semantics, nothing more. Seems I'm not alone.

How can you deny their existence when yo don't know what the word means ITFP? make your mind up!

That is not my position, and I don't even think it's the position of the functionalists, as the only problem from a functionalist perspective is to find out the neurological mechanisms that cause a person to believe they have qualia.

There's a neurological mechanism that makes people believe in giraffes...

 

[selfAdjoint]

An example of a word game that is still serious is the procedings in a court-case. Wittgenstein's term "language game" was never meant to be sweepingly dismissive. As such, the burden is on you to explain why
"qualia" is a silly language-game, and (eg) "string" a sensible one.

i.e. I'm constrained to play your word game by your rules? No thanks.

The power of legal argument in court comes from an agreed upon authority that sanctions the form and enforces the consequences. You have no authority for your word game except your ability to persuade suck... er, students to accept yours.

 

[Faust]

No-one can ever offer an explanation which is not itself another bunch of words

Huh? What about pictures, diagrams, animations?

maybe some of those perspectives are just plain wrong.

This is a bit misleading. Perspectives cannot be right or wrong; the most you can expect from a perspective is a degree of consistency.

there is no inference from "there is more than 1 opinion on this topic" to "no-one could ppssibly answer this question".

If the question can only be answered by opinions, then it cannot be answered to everyone's satisfaction. That is clearly the case here.

You don't need to have qualia to have a problem of qualia -- which, in the case of zombies, is purely a matter of belief, and not of perception or sensation , and not therefore of *illusion*.

According to any dictionary definition, "illusion" can also mean "false beliefs".

Now does anyone think functionalists are foolish enough to argue that people have the subjective illusion that they have subjectivity? That would be foolish beyond belief. Surely they must mean something else.

You "know" qualia are illusions, don't you ?

I know nothing, I just happen to look at things from a perspective in which subjectivity and objectivity are the same thing, and the notion that they are different is a false belief (that is, an illusion). I'm one of the few people I know of who disagree with both Chalmers and Dennett at the same time, while also agreeing with both to a limited extent.

How can you deny their existence when yo don't know what the word means ITFP? make your mind up!

I deny its existence based on the fact that I don't need to know what the concept means to understand my own mind. That is because I have a personal account of my own mind which has no room for more concepts, whatever name they happen to have.

There's a neurological mechanism that makes people believe in giraffes...

Surely. That mechanism is called "seeing a giraffe". Has anyone seen qualia yet?