Arguments against materialism - how to refute?

[Can'tThinkOfOne]

Our philosophy prof is an idealist (panpsychist). His main argument against materialism goes something like this: materialism states that everything can be reduced to physical concepts, such as mass and energy, and intercations between elementary particles. But pain is not a physical concept and can not be reduced to physical concepts. Granted, pain corresponds to physical processes, but the the feeling, the sensation of pain itself is not physical, a concept such as pain would never be found in a physics book. Therefore, either I do not really feel pain, or materialism is false.

He argues that an amoeba is also conscious (sentient) at some lower level, but an amoeba's consciousness is not the lowest level of consciousness. Atoms have a mind and are sentient too at some very low level, as are elementary particles. The simplest form of consciousness (sentience, mind) is a state of constant well being, which is experienced by indestructible elementary particles.

Here are some exerts form his online book:

Panpsychism cannot be empirically refuted by direct observation of the inner nature of inanimate matter... [some sentences omitted] When a theory is not empirically refutable and is simpler than an alternative theory... [parts omitted] Dualism multiplies types of reality beyond necessity: panpsychism does not.

One problem which most students quickly point out with this argument is this: if your mind is identical with a portion of your brain, that portion cannot be plausibly identified with a single elementary particle or even brain cell. It is presumably identical with a large mass of brain cells. But this makes us wonder how an elementary physical particle can - as panpsychism argues - itself be an elementary soul or mind. Either a brain mass is a single mind or it is an aggregate of independent minds. But it cannot be both at the same time. A solution to this problem may begin with the distinction between a dead or decomposed brain and a live one. Let us assume that a dead brain is but an aggregate of low-level minds (souls, individual centers of feeling). In a live brain mass, independent minds are merged into a single high-level mind. The merger of low-level minds, as they attain a threshold level of organized interaction (e.g., in coming out of a coma or dreamless sleep), is perhaps the emergence of a high-level mind.

The Main Heuristic Thesis of Chapter Two:

"Primitive animism," the cosmology of pre-historical humanity, is largely true. It holds that all nature is pervaded by souls or spirits. It can be defended by first showing that the human mind is expressed materially in the human brain. Either humans radically diverge from the rest of nature, which expressed an inner nature quite mysterious to us, or the inner essence of everything material is mind or soul on some level of development. The theory of evolution holds that more highly organized physiology evolved from less organized physiology. More complicated mentality then evolves from simpler mentality. Even the simplest biological mentality distinguishes pain and well-being. An organism shows stimulus-response behavior. Pain links stimulus and response. Response reduces pain and restores the sense of well-being. The simplest starting point for mental evolution is a sensation of well being uninterrupted by pain. Such mentality is a pre-biological mentality of inanimate matter.

What are your thoughts on this? I myself lean towards materialism. I don't see much logic behind assigning minds to electrons just because humans have minds. True, electrons do share some properties with humans, they both have mass for example. But then there are some properties which humans have, but electrons don't, such as color and size. As he himself admits, "Panpsychism cannot be empirically refuted by direct observation of the inner nature of inanimate matter," and I don't think things which can't be refuted have a place in any kind of theory. Even if there is something else besides presently known physical concepts such as energy, couldn't this "something else" be described by mathematics and intergrated into physics? He also states that mystery is simply what hasn't been explained by science yet. So it seems to me that he doesn't ascribe anything particularly mysterious to his panpsychism. From what I can tell, he merely claims that concepts such as energy and mass aren't enough to explain everything. But how does this refute materialism? He claims that the whole is not merely a sum of its parts, but is this contrary to materialism? Seems like another play on words to me. You can arrange a bunch of circles in the shape of a triangle. Is this triangle greater than the sum of its parts? Well, I don't know, I don't think the question makes much sense anyway. I need to argue either for dualism, materialism, or idealism (this isn't directly for a grade, we're supposed to submit synopses by eMail, and later use these synopses and the prof's comments on them to write a term paper, this synopsis should have been submitted a while ago, but I'm a procrastinator, so...). But I find it pretty hard to do when many arguments for idealism seem like a play on words and our concepts of things to me. As far as the argument about having emotions and feeling pain goes, I realize that physics can't explain this, but I don't really see how it supports panpsychism. It just seem pretty ridiculous to me to attribute human qualities such as sentience to other objects. Even if electrons have some properties foregin to modern physics, calling these properties "mind" and "sentience" seems like a huge oversimplification bordering on plain nonsense. All we're doing at that point is calling something completely different from actual sentience, which we know, by the same name. So, to say that an electron is sentient at some lower level is like saying that a ribosome is just a low-level-human being. It doesn't make a lot of sense. After all, the universe is not only stranger than we imagine, it is stranger than we canimagine. I'd like to hear your thoughts on whether materialism is correct and how I can defend it. Or maybe I should subscribe to panpsychism? (Both the prof and I reject dualism on the basis of Occam's razor.)

 

[PIT2]

It just seem pretty ridiculous to me to attribute human qualities such as sentience to other objects. Even if electrons have some properties foregin to modern physics, calling these properties "mind" and "sentience" seems like a huge oversimplification bordering on plain nonsense.

Panpsychism actually does make sense, even though it may seem ridiculous at first, and can result in misunderstandings (such as thinking that electrons think like humans). The basic idea is that human brains are composed of the same matter and forces as the rest of the universe is. So the rest of the universe can have an experiental aspect to it just like the slab of matter that is our brain. But it may be impossible for us to imagine what an electron or something else experiences (just like we can't imagine what a bat 'sees' with his sonar). It may be as 'simple' as experiencing the difference between light and darkness, or as complex as experiencing the entire universe, or something else altogether. (btw perhaps I am confusing panpsychism and panexperientalism here)

So, to say that an electron is sentient at some lower level is like saying that a ribosome is just a low-level-human being. It doesn't make a lot of sense.

Id rather say that it is like saying a human (including its mind) is the product of its single celled ancestors, and the single celled ancestors also have their lifeless ancestors. This does make sense. Moreso even than thinking our minds suddenly arose out of no-mind somewhere in the course of evolution, don't u think? Also, individual electrons may not have individual minds. They could form some kind of unity, just like our human mind encompasses multiple electrons in the brain.

Even if there is something else besides presently known physical concepts such as energy, couldn't this "something else" be described by mathematics and intergrated into physics?

But why would that be so? Do u really think the experience of pain can be described by an equation, or that it has mass (how much does the number 9 weigh)? If so, what caused that belief and is it justified?

The apparent differences between matter and consciousness do not in any way make it obvious that consciousness is physical or can ever be explained by a physical theory. Even though physics is very popular in this day and age, there is no reason to believe it is omni-explanatory.

Also, suppose the "something else" is integrated into physics, wouldn't this in fact quickly result in a panpsychical model of reality?

But how does this refute materialism?

It doesnt, its just an alternative to materialism.

 

[Rade]

...But pain is not a physical concept and can not be reduced to physical concepts. Granted, pain corresponds to physical processes, but the the feeling, the sensation of pain itself is not physical, a concept such as pain would never be found in a physics book...

The "physics" of pain is well studied as action potential within neurons (true in biology textbooks not physics), and as seen here, the sensation of pain can be controlled by a gene, and since genes do not regulate non-physical attributes, "pain itself" is a physical entity:http://www.brightsurf.com/news/headlines/22766/Master_genetic_switch_found_for_chronic_pain.html. The argument of your professor is falsified.

 

[NickJ]

A popular way to accommodate pain within a materialist framework is to say that pain is a mental property: even if mental properties are not reducible to physical/materialistic properties, mental properties can be had by material objects. So materialism is unthreatened, so long as one understands materialism about a thesis about what kinds of objects (as opposed to properties of objects) there are.

 

[octelcogopod]

Rade I hope you are joking..

"the sensation of pain can be controlled by a gene, and since genes do not regulate non-physical attributes, "pain itself" is a physical entity"

Of course this gene only controls the physical attributes, but not the phenomenal sensation the organism feels.
If you think you can falsify this by merely pointing out the existence of a gene I suggest you think some more about this problem.

 

[Office_Shredder]

can'tthinkofone, if elementary particles are in a constant state of well being, surely your professor would not object to being reduced to them? Suggest the ultimate state of happiness would then be stepping into a particle accelerator and being obliterated.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Rade I hope you are joking..

"the sensation of pain can be controlled by a gene, and since genes do not regulate non-physical attributes, "pain itself" is a physical entity"

Of course this gene only controls the physical attributes, but not the phenomenal sensation the organism feels.
If you think you can falsify this by merely pointing out the existence of a gene I suggest you think some more about this problem.

All of us here have thought about this problem a lot more, in my opinion, than it deserves. It appears to me that this insistance that feeling is a "thing" whose existence must be accounted for, and that the failure to do so is a challenge to the materialist world view, is just whistling in the dark by people who, for whatever reason, cannot bring themselves to accept that they are machines.

"Feeling" is what happens when your brain systems operate. We are animals who are conscious of most of these feelings, but that doesn't make them any more than what they are. Consciousness itself is of the same nature as these feelings, a product of brain operation. There is not one scrap of objective evidence otherwise.

 

[nannoh]

The "physics" of pain is well studied as action potential within neurons (true in biology textbooks not physics), and as seen here, the sensation of pain can be controlled by a gene, and since genes do not regulate non-physical attributes, "pain itself" is a physical entity:http://www.brightsurf.com/news/headlines/22766/Master_genetic_switch_found_for_chronic_pain.html. The argument of your professor is falsified.

I agree. Pain is the alarm bell that says something in the body is being compromised by physical damage. We are aware of pain because pain is the result of certain physical actions (neurological) causing other neurological reactions to take place in our brain (painful ones). All neurological sequences are physical. Therefore pain is physical.

Then there is "mind over matter" which is another psychicist thing altogether. Although the mind is physical or "matter" too, it can be used to modify our response to stimulus which is also another physical chain of events.

 

[octelcogopod]

selfAdjoint,

And what are they?

 

[octelcogopod]

We are aware of pain because pain is the result of certain physical actions (neurological) causing other neurological reactions to take place in our brain (painful ones). All neurological sequences are physical. Therefore pain is physical.

Once again, this is not logical.
Just because all neurological sequences are physical, does not make the pain itself physical. There's a step there you are jumping over.
That step has torn billions of people up for centuries also.

 

[selfAdjoint]

selfAdjoint,

And what are they?

You mean feelings? Qualia? Consciousness? Here's a a possibility. They are processes by which our short term and long term memories are maintained. "Red" is a cloud of references to our previous encounters with red things.

Maybe that's wrong in detail, but something of that general character is likely to be what is going on. Psychologists and neurologists with their fMRIs can light up our brains in real time as we experience and see how the activity moves and changes. Trying to make my experience of red into a chunk of reality - especially a chunk of reality "out there" is just misguided.

 

[RAD4921]

The problem I have with materialism is that in theory, matter can be divided up infinitely.
The idea that the universe gets smaller and smaller in one direction and bigger and bigger in the other, smells foul to me. I believe in wholeness in the universe and if the universe is conscious in part, it must be conscious as a whole. In that respect, your professor and I agree.
There is also the issue of matter being a different manifestation of energy. There really is no “substance” to energy and one might think the same about matter.

 

[selfAdjoint]

The problem I have with materialism is that in theory, matter can be divided up infinitely.
The idea that the universe gets smaller and smaller in one direction and bigger and bigger in the other, smells foul to me. I believe in wholeness in the universe and if the universe is conscious in part, it must be conscious as a whole. In that respect, your professor and I agree.
There is also the issue of matter being a different manifestation of energy. There really is no “substance” to energy and one might think the same about matter.

First, your preferred belief system is nice for you but why on Earth should it constrain anybody else?

Second, your understanding of what science says is seriously defective. You need to spec up on quantum mechanics a little. There is a finite probability (but truly, truly eeny-weeny) that an electron at the far end of the universe has a correlation with some electron in your brain.

 

[PIT2]

Once again, this is not logical.
Just because all neurological sequences are physical, does not make the pain itself physical. There's a step there you are jumping over.
That step has torn billions of people up for centuries also.

I agree. The pain example only demonstrates interaction between something which we call physical, and something else which bears no resemblance to what we call physical.

pain can be controlled by a gene, and since genes do not regulate non-physical attributes, "pain itself" is a physical entity:http://www.brightsurf.com/news/headlines/22766/Master_genetic_switch_found_for_chronic_pain.html. The argument of your professor is falsified.

Even IF so (which is not the case, since ur example only demonstrates interaction between pain and genes), i don't think it would falsify panpsychism. Why? Because it doesn't explain how physical genes are different from the rest of physical reality, and why that difference would cause physical genes to produce pain, and not cause the rest of physical reality to produce some other experience.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Once again, this is not logical.
Just because all neurological sequences are physical, does not make the pain itself physical. There's a step there you are jumping over.
That step has torn billions of people up for centuries also.

I agree. The pain example only demonstrates interaction between something which we call physical, and something else which bears no resemblance to what we call physical.

Neither one of you has given anything but a bald assertion that there is "another step" or that how our brain interacts with pain "bears no resemblance to what we call physical". Many complex things are going on in our brains in this interaction, and our consciousness of the pain is only a subset of those processes. At least that is what the increasingly accurate and fine grained fMRI studies clearly imply. To deny them just because of some traditional belief is not rational. And philosophy, in distinction to religion, does seek to be rational.

pain can be controlled by a gene, and since genes do not regulate non-physical attributes, "pain itself" is a physical entity:http://www.brightsurf.com/news/headlines/22766/Master_genetic_switch_found_for_chronic_pain.html. The argument of your professor is falsified.

Even IF so (which is not the case, since ur example only demonstrates interaction between pain and genes), i don't think it would falsify panpsychism. Why? Because it doesn't explain how physical genes are different from the rest of physical reality, and why that difference would cause physical genes to produce pain, and not cause the rest of physical reality to produce some other experience.

I can't make head or tail out of this argument. Genes are specific agents; a gene from my body might be inserted into some other organism - a mouse or even a yeast for example - to get more detailed information about how it functions. Obviously in the yeast, a gene that supports my bodiy's pain response wouldn't be expected to have the same action, but in a mouse a reaction closely analogous to my own would be expected and measurable. What has that got to do with panpsychism? My only gripe against panspsychism is that it's either an unsupposrted folk belief or else a conclusion from a false premise.

 

[Gelsamel Epsilon]

Feelings like pain, hunger, lust etc. are stimulus that the body uses in order to get things it needs (hunger) to survive (pain) and reproduce (lust). Effectively, feelings are "Tricks" that the body plays on your consciousness in order so that you can 'work' for it.

 

[octelcogopod]

Gelsamel,

Yet we still don't have the faintest idea what consciousness is.

selfAdjoint,

When you pinch your arm, you feel a sensation right?
If we could calculate and predict everything that happens in your head, brain and body when you pinch your arm, we still wouldn't be able to capture the sensation itself.
The sensation itself seems to be an abstracted sensation, one that emerges when a bunch of physical things happen, but you need YOUR consciousness to even comprehend that it is a sensation.

In theory, the sensation doesn't even exist, it's the brain that 'makes it happen' somehow.
And here's another kicker.. Even if we didn't feel pain if we had no memory of it, then the sensation would STILL be 'phenomenal'.
This is because regardless of how something achieves consciousness, once it does, and it may all be physical, the subjective world it creates, especially in regards to external stimuli, does not exist in nature.

That's why we can't read minds, or download our brain data to our computers.
Like I've said before, who could deny that there is a piece missing, and who can say that he can explain all of conscious experience with the knowledge and technology we have now?
Obviously there is a piece missing.

 

[Silverbackman]

Our minds are the product of our brains. With that said, our emotions, beliefs, memory, ect. are all results of the physical. If our brain was wired differently we wouldn't be ourselves.

Science cannot however explain what causes conscious self awareness. What causes distinctions between the minds of organisms? We all know our own brains and our consciousness, but do we really know for sure whether other beings or lifeforms have the same conscious self awareness you have? We often never question the assumption that all beings with brains can think. Yes, they can think in the physical sense but all your consciousness is concentrated in your brain making it seem like you are the only one that is conscious.

We often assume that other forms of life are more conscious than lifeless matter. But is this really true? Think about it; is there really any evidence that other people have a conscious self awareness with subjective experiences the way you do? If they are how come you don't share consciousness in this monistic universe? Or perhaps there is some illusion that you are some separate consciousness or that you are the only consciousness. The Hindu Advaita Vedanta called this Maya (illusion) arguing that all individual atman's are equivalent to jivatman or the universal soul. But there isn't any proof for this as this can only be proved consciously.

From my subjective experience I have noticed that only my brain seems conscious because reality is derived centrally from my mind. So in reality the mind of a fellow man is no different than the mind of an inanimate form of matter. They exist but only physically. This may mean that you yourself are the only one that is conscious in the universe, and thus panpsychism doesn't hold a whole lot of evidence from the point of view of subjective experience. Is there really more proof that a fellow human mind is any more conscious than an electron or a rock? The only way to prove the consciousness of others is to directly experience other assumed forms of consciousness. Knowing I don't share consciousness with other people, it must mean that maybe I am the only one that is conscious thus disproving panpsychism altogether.

Please note I am not necessarily saying none of you aren't conscious. In fact if you really think about from your point of view you are the only one that is consciously self existence thus disproving my subjective experience. Meaning you are the only true mind in non-physical sense that experiances the various "emotions" of the mind.

 

[Silverbackman]

Sorry if that last post seemed a bit complicated and confusing. It is hard to explain what I am trying to say because the concept I am referring to can only be experienced. Everyone that is truly conscious has the experience I am talking about ;).

 

[octelcogopod]

Silver, great post.

I've been thinking about it, and I don't want to drag in extra 'material' for discussion, but really, this ties in with determinism.
If everything is playing itself out since the beginning(big bang), then how can consciousness exist as we see it, and free will and that yada.

In a deterministic universe there's really no reason for anything to be aware of itself, seeing as it doesn't make a difference in what happens.
That doesn't sit quite well with me.
Being aware of oneself and seeing choices that one can make, and thus acting upon them, as opposed to being some sort of organic machine, that's just acting out whatever the physical objects do, aka atoms and particles.

Then again, nothing in the universe can escape the physical restraints that are in place.
Your brain and body are both physical, so your brain and body will only be capable of doing what it is designed to do, or at least, what the physical restraints allow them to do.

My point is that, you are right, we cannot prove that anyone else are self aware.
All actions and little details done by humans, can might as well just be physical objects playing themselves out in a logical and deterministic manner.

That theory doesn't sit quite well with me though..

Also, I'd like to give an example to selfAdjoint of qualia that is very much present, but cannot be directly studied.

Namely, vision.
To compress the problem I'm having with everything we're discussing, I will show an example of what I mean.

A human can perceive the world around him, and what he sees is in effect, an image(or many many images in order). This image doesn't really exist anywhere except in the conscious mind.
Photons hit the retina from all over the place, it goes up the nerve and into the brain, and the brain then assembles the image from all the information, which then the consciousness sees.

In physical reality, all we see are the photons, the electrical impulses, the brain matter, the eyes, the world, but the composed image, even though very much a real thing as we all know, is nowhere to be found.
We can compose such an image ourselves by using a photo camera, but then the image is at least physical when shot.

So I ask all of you who say everything is physical, where is this image that we all see?
Maybe there are some ubersmall 'consciousness' particle clouds in the brain though. That'd at least explain it.

 

[PIT2]

Neither one of you has given anything but a bald assertion that there is "another step"

The 'other step' (as u call it, those are not my words) is called consciousness.

or that how our brain interacts with pain "bears no resemblance to what we call physical".

Its not my job to show that consciousness is physical because i am highly skeptical of it. The people who believe it to be true, should demonstrate that it is the case.

At least that is what the increasingly accurate and fine grained fMRI studies clearly imply. To deny them just because of some traditional belief is not rational. And philosophy, in distinction to religion, does seek to be rational.

Utter nonsense. Tell the people in this topic (aswell as the author of the book being discussed) that they are being irrational and religious. I will just quote a little bit from the first post:

Rosenberg regards the theory of consciousness he will develop in the second half of the book to meet the criteria of simplicity, clarity, objectivity, and elegenace, even though it has panexperientialist consequences. Rejecting this theory in favor of a cognitive theory of experience just to avoid panexperientialist consequences, then, would be in violation of accepted standards of good theory construction.

Also, i don't know where u got the idea from, but fMRI scans do not give us to answer to the good old physicalism/dualism/panpsychism question.

Obviously in the yeast, a gene that supports my bodiy's pain response wouldn't be expected to have the same action, but in a mouse a reaction closely analogous to my own would be expected and measurable. What has that got to do with panpsychism?

It has do do with panpsychism because genes are physical, just like rocks and stars are. Saying that a gene in the human body produces pain doesn't explain why a rock or a star (or the entire universe) wouldn't produce pain.

My only gripe against panspsychism is that it's either an unsupposrted folk belief or else a conclusion from a false premise.

What premise and how has it been demonstrated to be false?

 

[selfAdjoint]

You can't really believe that Rosenberg's mere opinions, and that's all they are at bottom, how ever carefully he reasons from them, outweigh actual empirical observations! And I don't have to prove anything to you, you are the one with no evidence, just a lot of talk.

Notice that fMRI experiments are done with conscious subjects. Why don't YOU talk to THEM?

 

[ValenceE]

Hello to all !,

Seems to me that the pansychism concept could very well hold if applied to the world in a ‘relativistic’ way. What I mean is that if there’s an agent that permeates all of the physical creation, it has to permeate all ‘matter’ alike, from elementary particles to complex organisms. But the manifestation of this agent is relative to the matter it interacts with.

Now, in a physical sense, we can clearly state that all matter is not organised in the same way. Of course, everything that is not elementary is made of neutrons, protons and electrons, but that doesn’t make the constituents equal to the organised matter. It would be highly improbable that the permeating agent would come in existence in the same manner for all.

Lifeless entities behave in a ‘given’ way, according to processes that occur during all interactions they are subjected to in the course of time. There is a preset way for how these interactions occur, without any consciousness or awareness being at work. Matter reacts to matter the way it does (which, I might add, works just perfectly), that’s all. There is no need to find a higher cause or purpose than that simple fact. None of these elementary particles will ever come together and present a rebellious claim to exist in some other way. Could we then say that they are all very content and exist in a state of well being ? Why not…if it makes you happy. But then we could say that even if that were to be true, it wouldn’t change anything… so why mention it ?

For the proton, one of this agent’s manifestation is to bind to a neutron, one of the photon’s is to carry information, a star exists to radiate EM energy, etc., you can go up the complexity ladder and find that this agent acquires the expression of ‘mentality’ when it comes to life forms, manifesting itself as awareness, culminating in the human form, in which it emerges as consciousness.

As Theillard de Chardin wrote, ‘Man is evolution that has become aware of itself’ or something to that effect…

Imo, the sole purpose of this common agent would be to promote itself through all universal interactions, bringing the Whole to life, from quantic oscillations to species reproduction, each participating in its own adapted very special way.

VE

 

[PIT2]

You can't really believe that Rosenberg's mere opinions, and that's all they are at bottom, how ever carefully he reasons from them, outweigh actual empirical observations! And I don't have to prove anything to you, you are the one with no evidence, just a lot of talk.

What are u talking about, what empirical observations?

 

[selfAdjoint]

What are u talking about, what empirical observations?

Didn't you read this?

Notice that fMRI experiments are done with conscious subjects. Why don't YOU talk to THEM?

The fMRI studies on conscious subjects enable us to have first person accounts of conscious experience correlated with moving pictures of brain activity. I might also mention the experiments with monkey visual systems; they were actually able to reproduce artificially what the monkey's brain did and feed it to the monkey which was able to use their input to guide a joystick correctly to a target. Against this rising tide of experiment, panspsychists have nothing to offer except old predjudices and sophistry. Or so I conclude.

 

[Pythagorean]

What exactly is so bad about consciousness being a physical phenomena? Do you all think that takes away the 'magic' of it?

Electrons, photons and the rest of matter all interact in really mind-boggling and amazing ways. Saying that our consciousness is a physical phenomena does not have to take away your pride and uniqueness as a human being. Physical systems are unique and dynamic enough to pull of all kinds of amazing things, there's even speculation that some sort of quantum action takes place in our microtubials, (Roger Penrose Interview:)

http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2000/06/11/stories/13111291.htm


All the wild and crazy thing you can imagine have traces in the physical world. You belittle the 'capabilities' of the universe by claiming that it can't bare the weight of our tiny consciousnesses without the help of some intangible (and therefore safely infinite) plane.

Whether the proces is physical or not seems such a petty argument anyway. It's a matter of being able to detect them that's important, because we don't understand very much of how our universe works at all. Everything you imagine could be possible, could be a physical reality.

People who claim to know how the universe works in its entirety will probably die happy if they really believe themselves. Let them die happy.

 

[PIT2]

The fMRI studies on conscious subjects enable us to have first person accounts of conscious experience correlated with moving pictures of brain activity. I might also mention the experiments with monkey visual systems; they were actually able to reproduce artificially what the monkey's brain did and feed it to the monkey which was able to use their input to guide a joystick correctly to a target. Against this rising tide of experiment, panspsychists have nothing to offer except old predjudices and sophistry. Or so I conclude.

How does this in any way show that brain produces consciousness? Ur claim is equal to saying that vulcanism and tectonism indicate that the origin of matter is on earth.

 

[PIT2]

What exactly is so bad about consciousness being a physical phenomena?

Its not so much bad, its just that physical reality doesn't stop where our brains end. In other words, if consciousness is physical, then why wouldn't the physical be conscious? What is so bad about that?

Do you all think that takes away the 'magic' of it?

No, i don't think it takes the magic away at all. What is the difference between embellishing the brain with special powers and embellishing jesus with water-walking powers?

 

[Pythagorean]

[1]Its not so much bad, its just that physical reality doesn't stop where our brains end. In other words, if consciousness is physical, then why wouldn't the physical be conscious? What is so bad about that?[2]No, i don't think it takes the magic away at all. What is the difference between embellishing the brain with special powers and embellishing jesus with water-walking powers?

(bold number headings added)

I don't think I disagree with your [1], in fact, I think you accepted that consciousness is a physical procress there. The physical could very well be conscious, but it's a consistant property of our experience, it's measurable and repeatable, some of us like that, so we study it. If anyone thinks that they're doing something important and special, they're wrong. We study science (physically provable things) because we enjoy it.

You may use the assumption that all physical events are conscious, but it makes the model harder to apply and predict physical events with (which is usually what we're concerned with in the stud of physical sciences) because it's too arbritrary in most cases

I prefer the assumption that i am part of the physical world and interact with it as part of it. I sometimes wonder if my consciousness is a helpless string of events like any other in the universe, but I don't assert either way. It's an arbitrary point for my purposes.

as for [2] I'm not meaning to embellish the brain with 'special powers'. I'm saying the things you may consider 'special powers' may have physically understandandable processes behind them. Do I believe Jesus walked on water? no, not particularly, but I wouldn't argue about it because I don't know, I did not bare witness.

Do I believe my experience in life so far is much more dynamic and complicated than our current vocabulary can express? Yes. I don't take that so far as to say it's beyond physical processes though. I just think our preconceived ideas of the of the physical world are very limited (which is what limits my vocabulary from describing them physically)cliff notes: You can look at it either way, as long as you recognize your assumption and keep it consistant. Much like particle-wave duality. Does matter exist as particles or waves? You can take it to be one or the other (depending on what you want) but it will fall apart and contradict itself if you take it to be both. I'm not saying your assumption is wrong, I'm just saying it doesn't fit with my assumption, and I've never needed your assumption in science. Whether or not your assumption will bring me peace of mind when I start studying Quantum physics is a different story.

I do switch over to your assumption for plenty of social matters, like "Are my friends avoiding me or am I avoiding them?" or "Do I have control or freedom or are these illusions?" But these would be VERY complex questions to solve with math, chemistry, and neuron potentials... in fact, I doubt there's a method for it in neuroscience today. It's much simpler to take your assumption and do thought experiments. It's will eventually sovalbe both ways, though, I'm sure.

 

[selfAdjoint]

How does this in any way show that brain produces consciousness? Ur claim is equal to saying that vulcanism and tectonism indicate that the origin of matter is on earth.

Matter is a tangible substance; its origin therefore has to be sought beyond the processes it participates in. Consciousness is a process "its own self", and no prior origin need be adduced.

 

[Gelsamel Epsilon]

Its not so much bad, its just that physical reality doesn't stop where our brains end. In other words, if consciousness is physical, then why wouldn't the physical be conscious? What is so bad about that?

All Xs are Ys, but not all Ys are Xs.

 

[selfAdjoint]

All Xs are Ys, but not all Ys are Xs.

Well said. There is nothing wrong in somebody believing in the invisible flying spaghetti monster, but when they try to assert that belief to others, they are bound by the customs of civilized discourse, and logic is one of them.

The thing is most of these arguments are really petitio principi; their advocates already believe that consciousness is a thing, but not a physical thing, and they make up ontologies to support that belief.

 

[PIT2]

Matter is a tangible substance; its origin therefore has to be sought beyond the processes it participates in. Consciousness is a process "its own self", and no prior origin need be adduced.

Even IF it is a proces, the falling of a rock is also a process, but that doesn't limit gravity to the boundaries of the rock.

All Xs are Ys, but not all Ys are Xs.

And Y is consciousness right?

Well said. There is nothing wrong in somebody believing in the invisible flying spaghetti monster, but when they try to assert that belief to others, they are bound by the customs of civilized discourse, and logic is one of them.

Luckily, there is plenty of logic to the idea of panpsychism/panexperientalism, perhaps even more than to brain-does-it-physicalism (which doesn't really explain anything anyway, because whether u attribute consciousness to a rock or a brain, the problem remains). I think the whole flying spaghetti monster idea is mainly the result of a failure to realize or accept that consciousness is a part of nature (just like spaghetti is too).

The thing is most of these arguments are really petitio principi; their advocates already believe that consciousness is a thing, but not a physical thing, and they make up ontologies to support that belief.

The funny thing is that this may be exactly what physicalism is based on. Let me explain: it would be incredibly convenient for science if consciousness turned out to be physical, since science can only measure the physical. However, as of yet, consciousness can not be detected by any scientific instruments, and perhaps never can be. It remains frustratingly elusive, but this doesn't stop scientists from trying and hoping, so far without succes. The point here is, that these scientists have decided up front that consciousness must be physical, so that one day science will be able to explain it. But think about it, why would reality care about what is convenient for science? If i want a giant golden meteor to fly through space and softly fall into my garden, would reality make it happen?

 

[selfAdjoint]

The funny thing is that this may be exactly what physicalism is based on. Let me explain: it would be incredibly convenient for science if consciousness turned out to be physical, since science can only measure the physical. However, as of yet, consciousness can not be detected by any scientific instruments, and perhaps never can be. It remains frustratingly elusive, but this doesn't stop scientists from trying and hoping, so far without succes. The point here is, that these scientists have decided up front that consciousness must be physical, so that one day science will be able to explain it. But think about it, why would reality care about what is convenient for science? If i want a giant golden meteor to fly through space and softly fall into my garden, would reality make it happen?

I don't think most neuroscientists have any investment in any particular view of consciousness. Unless it can guide their research they aren't interested in high falutin' theorizing. But they continue to narrow the range in with the IFSM can fly, and the wishful thinkers continue to get more and more far-out. You never would have heard of panpsychism from the old idealistic philosophers, but it's needed for the "conciousness is a thing - but not a physical thing" parlay. Part of this also is the "death of god" in philosophy. In the ninetenth century anybody with magical consciousness views could just glom onto some religion or other, but now they have to declare themselves "naturalists" and deny human particularism, so if we have magical consciousness then so must the whole world.

 

[Pythagorean]

...consciousness can not be detected by any scientific instruments, and perhaps never can be. It remains frustratingly elusive, but this doesn't stop scientists from trying and hoping, so far without succes. The point here is, that these scientists have decided up front that consciousness must be physical, so that one day science will be able to explain it. But think about it, why would reality care about what is convenient for science? If i want a giant golden meteor to fly through space and softly fall into my garden, would reality make it happen?

Whether or not consciousness can be detected can be disputed. Here's an interesting definition I found using google "define: consciousness"

a philosophical explanation of what consciousness is or how it might be explained eludes us. If we stick to what it is like to be a conscious human being, we have no explanation; if we try to explain consciousness in terms of what goes on in our brains, the sheer feel of consciousness itself is left aside.

In this view, consciousness can be detected, it just loses the personal (and perhaps emotional) relationship that you feel for it as one of your experiences. You can't make the connection between your experience and the scientific explanation of it.

This isn't much different from seeing. We can explain, pretty well in my opinion, how sight works, but does it do the experience of seeing justice?