Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

In summary: RCIC consists of a series of pumps, valves, and manifolds that allow coolant to be circulated around the reactor pressure vessel in the event of a loss of the main feedwater supply.In summary, the earthquake and tsunami may have caused a loss of coolant at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, which could lead to a meltdown. The system for cooling the reactor core is designed to kick in in the event of a loss of feedwater, and fortunately this appears not to have happened yet.
  • #6,231
MadderDoc said:
Yes. We appear to have seen enough fuel racks to hold the recorded number of assemblies in the pool. Here is a rough lineout of the stacking in the pool, as much as can be gleaned from the two released videos.

Your diagram is very good. The similarity to the Oyster Creek SFP blueprint drawings is amazing, right down to the circular "fuel cask drop" in the corner. At least that's what I think it is.

The 2-level spent fuel rack stacking theory is also dead now, thank goodness.
 
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  • #6,232
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station First Floor of Turbine Building of Unit 1, May 6th, 2011)

 
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  • #6,233
Jorge Stolfi said:
How do you get the distance to the back wall? Could there be a wider gap there?

I have not made any real attempt to assess the distance from the racks to the walls at the far end and to the sides. There might well be a wider gap.

I cannot make out the far edge of the racks (beyond the fallen stair). Shouldn't there be a broader metal "lip" all around the rack (as there is on the near side)?

Some close ups of racks show very clearly that a broad lip (with the stamped numbers) is affixed to only one side of the rack.

Perhaps there is some large dark piece of debris over the fuel, just beyond the stairs?
Is the water in that part of the pool murkier than the rest (as if there were more bubbles there)? Or is it just that things are farther away in that direction?

The water is somewhat murky, but working through the videos, my impression was that the murkiness is well-mixed. Naturally, it'll affect the most distant views the most. Some debris might well be hiding there, but no more fuel racks, I think.
 
  • #6,234
MiceAndMen said:
named so far by the Japanese nuclear industry on their "internet enemies list". ../...A Japanese news story from 27 April says TEPCO doesn't like what Nancy has on her website.
You may be putting word into the article "TEPCO suspects the blueprint is one of its internal documents, if proven to be genuine,the document is subject to the restrictions imposed under its regulations on nuclear materials protection."
 
  • #6,235
clancy688 said:
One question regarding the SFP #4 video:

There are bubbles rising in the water... where do they come from? Or rather, what's in a SFP that could produce air bubbles?

If there is a leak in the SFP , bubbles could be formed by cracks in the pool where water leaves and air enters.

My assumption is that the SFP has a leak , and the bubbles could be the symptom
 
  • #6,236
MadderDoc said:
I have not made any real attempt to assess the distance from the racks to the walls at the far end and to the sides. There might well be a wider gap.



Some close ups of racks show very clearly that a broad lip (with the stamped numbers) is affixed to only one side of the rack.



The water is somewhat murky, but working through the videos, my impression was that the murkiness is well-mixed. Naturally, it'll affect the most distant views the most. Some debris might well be hiding there, but no more fuel racks, I think.

I get 1480 based on your drawing (including the 4x10 rack) so there would be 2 sets of 30 missing - the ones that would fit in the lower right of your drawing below the control blades. There are two smaller cylindrical objects standing near the large cylinder to its right. What is up with the empty slots shown at the end of the video to the right of the rack of 40?
 
  • #6,237
Dmytry said:
what is quite interesting, is that the melted-looking hole in the roof grid, severely bent/twisted / heat-damaged looking beams, etc are right over spent fuel pool. It is undeniable that beams next to spent fuel pool have some very specific look not replicated anywhere else.

Gundersen made an update to his previous hypothesis about SFP #3.

(1) The orange flash in the video was the Stored Fuel Pool in Unit 3 exploding, because is so localized to the area of the SFP, and because its shape is channeled vertically upward
(2) The fact that the explosion expands outward somewhat to the right, but not to the left, also supports that hypothesis based on the structure of the plant
(3) If the contents of the fuel pool were lifted upward, this cannot have been only an external hydrogen explosion, something exploded in the pool itself
(4) Some other people (not Gundersen himself) suggested that since plutonium melts at a higher temperature than uranium, plutonium could have accumulated in a mass at the bottom of the pool
(5) This could cause a prompt, but "moderated" criticality

Contentions 1, 2, and 3 seem correct on the basis of the evidence. New question is: do hypotheses (4) and (5) make any sense?

Previously it was hard to imagine how an explosion could compress damaged fuel rods into a configuration resulting in criticality. Is the above any more plausible? In any case, something complex must have happened inside Unit 3 to account for what is seen in the videos.
 
  • #6,238
coolin'_down said:
Tepco just annouced that they will be putting Hydrazine into the spent fuel pool (I think in #1) to counter corrosion, but I read on wikipedia that Hydrazine is also used as rocket fuel! Is Hydrozine usually used in NPP?

Yes, this sounds odd. But hydrazine is used to prevent corrosion of steel parts in steam circuits - it removes oxygen molecules. Concentrations are very low, less than 1 ppm.

Even stranger: vitamin C is recommended as a substitute!
http://pubs.rsc.org/en/Content/Database/HAZ1307001305
 
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  • #6,239
PietKuip said:
Yes, this sounds odd. But hydrazine is used to prevent corrosion of steel parts in steam circuits - it removes oxygen molecules. Concentrations are very low, less than 1 ppm.

About the only good thing you can say about hydrazine is that it's not radioactive. Some formulations are incredibly toxic. One good whiff and your liver is history.
 
  • #6,240
Curium said:
Gundersen made an update to his previous hypothesis about SFP #3.

(1) The orange flash in the video was the Stored Fuel Pool in Unit 3 exploding, because is so localized to the area of the SFP, and because its shape is channeled vertically upward
(2) The fact that the explosion expands outward somewhat to the right, but not to the left, also supports that hypothesis based on the structure of the plant
(3) If the contents of the fuel pool were lifted upward, this cannot have been only an external hydrogen explosion, something exploded in the pool itself
(4) Some other people (not Gundersen himself) suggested that since plutonium melts at a higher temperature than uranium, plutonium could have accumulated in a mass at the bottom of the pool
(5) This could cause a prompt, but "moderated" criticality

Contentions 1, 2, and 3 seem correct on the basis of the evidence. New question is: do hypotheses (4) and (5) make any sense?

Previously it was hard to imagine how an explosion could compress damaged fuel rods into a configuration resulting in criticality. Is the above any more plausible? In any case, something complex must have happened inside Unit 3 to account for what is seen in the videos.

I just had this idea:

a) hydrogen-oxygen mixture ingited in north of building causing deflagration, possibly detonation and shock wave resulting in explosion just as in unit 1

b) for some reason there is an plume of mostly hydrogen sitting above the SFP (i.e. not enough oxygen in the mixture), for example accumumulated under the fuel handling machine.

c) flame front of first explosion a) reaches plume b) which then ignites but burns off rather slow (just deflagration), causing the visible "orange flash" and subsequent smokey mushroom.

That's of course just some speculation by a not-at-all-expert. (But it also includes a possible explanation why fhm3 probably is in orbit :wink:.) Would this be plausible?
 
  • #6,241
|Fred said:
You may be putting word into the article "TEPCO suspects the blueprint is one of its internal documents, if proven to be genuine,the document is subject to the restrictions imposed under its regulations on nuclear materials protection."

Perhaps they don't have a literal list of enemies, but it's obvious they're not happy about it. If one drawing escaped their control there might be others. One would hope that they are more concerned about the source of the leak than websites that publish it. That they are concerned about the release of a 45 year old drawing at all is mystifying. There is no competitive advantage to be gained by keeping the drawings secret at this point.
 
  • #6,242
Curium said:
Gundersen
...
(3) If the contents of the fuel pool were lifted upward, this cannot have been only an external hydrogen explosion, something exploded in the pool itself...
The main problem with this idea is that now any worker can take a walk around the site without much hurry.

Any explosion IN the SFP would shatter fuel pieces around the unit. But only possible traces of particles were found, not pieces.
 
  • #6,243
Tepco knew a lot more than is openly or willingly given to public. I have come across below documents, these published ten minute logs of water level and pressure parameters at the most critical time after the tsunami and before explosions, and temperature after 20/3 and depicting were actual temperature sensors are placed.

There are some interesting data like unit 3 the fuel was uncovered 3/4 (-3metres) for more than two hours on the 19th March (does anyone remeber this event?)

[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/ilnQ3E.JPG

Here are all the files:

http://k.min.us/ilnOrs.pdf" Water levels and pressure
http://k.min.us/ilskVG.pdf" temperature

http://k.min.us/ilrLwi.pdf" Water levels and pressure
http://k.min.us/ilrN4q.pdf" temperature

http://k.min.us/ilnMjk.pdf" Water levels and pressure
032_1F3_04181300.pdf sorry cannot find this document can you find it?
unfortunately original documents cannot be found - they have been pulled from the Tepco site, these were google cached - the net does not forget (but it forgot one)

For May you can download these values
www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/images/0[/URL][COLOR="Magenta"]x[/COLOR][COLOR="Blue"]y[/COLOR]_1Fx_[COLOR="blue"]mm[/COLOR][COLOR="Magenta"]dd[/COLOR]0600.pdf

were [COLOR="Magenta"]x[/COLOR] is 1,2,or 3
[COLOR="blue"]y[/COLOR] is 1 for water levels, pressure and CAMS, 2 temperatures
[COLOR="blue"]mm[/COLOR] is month ie 05
[COLOR="Magenta"]dd[/COLOR] is day ie 09

example http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/images/032_1F3_05090600.pdf

Nice images of temperature graphs and temperature sensor locations
[PLAIN][PLAIN]http://k.min.us/in4JQ0.JPG
[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/in9ewE.JPG
 
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  • #6,244
MadderDoc said:
Here is another stab of it (a higher resolution image is attached):
http://gyldengrisgaard.dk/fuku_docs/20110324_down_3thumb.jpg
...
3) Signature of heat on the winch, and possibly a burn through of the southern boom in this location
4) Missing rails on the top of this section of the southern boom.
5) Areas in which the booms have sunk into the concrete deck of the service floor, extending the NW broken region of the floor.
Excellent work.
3) IMO the crane is not 'burn through', here the crane directed the steam to the release path.
4) there everything covered with that gray dust.
5) On one of the T-Hawk videos it can be seen that the service floor is broken only under the north crane boom.

MadderDoc said:
Yes. We appear to have seen enough fuel racks to hold the recorded number of assemblies in the pool. Here is a rough lineout of the stacking in the pool, as much as can be gleaned from the two released videos.
http://gyldengrisgaard.dk/fuku_docs/P5080106thumb.JPG
That was fast :-)

IMO the 'cooling equipment' is partly the new fuel storage racks (with some black cover on the top, whick makes them look like damaged) and the fuel inspection machine - so there is one more rack. And that's all, we have seen everything.
 
  • #6,245
OMFG did you saw CAMS data 3/14 for unit 3 ? It is error or 100% of unit 1 core is damaged
 
  • #6,246
Jorge Stolfi said:
Your sketch shows 30*(7+7+12+12+10)+40 = 1480 slots for fuel assemblies; perhaps there are another 60 in the blind corner at right. On the other hand, some slots seem to be empty.

Yet a previous post claims that there were (548 in-use + 1331 spent + 202 new) = 2081 assemblies in the pool. If that number is correct, then we are missing 500 to 600 assemblies. Seems a bit too much for roundoff error...
At 2010 Dec. there were 783 spent assemblies. Plus the core (548) gives the 1331 for 2011 March. Plus the 202 new -> 1533. According to the various sources the maximal capacity of that pool was 1590.
 
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  • #6,247
NancyNancy said:
You see that the SFP is tied into the outside of the containment concrete. It hangs sort of like a window box off of the containment structure. There is a very thin piece of concrete that ties the bottom of the SFP to the outer frame of the building. There is nothing supporting the SFP from below.

From looking back at that GE cut-out drawing of a mark I containment, there seem to be at least a bunch of pillars unders the SFP. Well, but for my personal taste there could be a bit more structural support down there.

NancyNancy said:
I have a couple of new images on my website. One of the crane being moved and inserted into the side of the building at the work floor level. Not sure why. Move due to structural worries? Moved so work to shore up the SFP could begin? Needed to inject water directly in the pool?

Also some new images of the leaning reactor 4 along with vertical landmarks to try to figure out the leaning. I mentioned in another post that I received confirmation from the TBS tech crew that it is not an optical illusion of the camera and also from workers at the plant that 4 is leaning over.

That's fair enough, but like for the previous posters, that's not sufficient evidence for me that it really is leaning. But there is also no evidence that it definitely is not leaning. So, let's see how the situation develops.

They have poured in tons of water, the soil around the building could be becoming unstable adding to the sinking. There were previous concerns about the groundwater levels making the NPP buoyant. [...] So you have a reactor building that is floating to an extent, lots of water added to the situation, constant earthquakes and two confirmations that this isn't a camera trick.

Asahi Shimbun article about the floating buildings http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201104010166.html

Manichi article about bedrock being 46 meters down http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110427p2g00m0dm091000c.html

Study confirming the NPP is on floating mudstone base not bedrock http://www.iitk.ac.in/nicee/wcee/article/9_vol3_733.pdf

info and photos of r4 sinking and the moved crane http://www.houseoffoust.com/fukushima/r4sinking.html

images of yesterday's steam and smoke show http://www.houseoffoust.com/fukushima/May8smoking.html

  • First article: Only relevant part is this sentence: "The pumps are located around the reactor building and designed to prevent the building from moving due to the buoyancy of the groundwater."
  • Only relevant part in second article: "There is bedrock 46 meters underground."
  • Third one: The study itself is not about confirming that it floats on mudstone. The study is about testing if FEM simulations correctly predict the measured responses of unit 6 to some earlier earthquakes. They conclude it does. That unit 6 is founded on mudstone is stated only in a few sentences describing the input parameters to their model: "The reactor building is partially embedded and is founded on mudstone at an elevation 17m below ground surface."
  • Fourth: See above, not enough evidence to decide whether it is leaning or not for me.
  • Fifth: Might be interesting but it's a different topic.

Overall still some interesting bits and pieces in my view. I don't know enough about geology to draw any qualified conclusions, but probably mudstone should be considered more stone than mud. Does anyone know how much that weakens if it soaks up enough water? And how much would be enough water?
 
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  • #6,248
I think one reason TEPCO is not so worried about the unit 3 is the CAMS readings.
On March 14th 7:00 they had quite high reading (167,0 Sv/h) but after that it has been going steadily down. On March 18th it was still 105,0 Sv/h but after a month it was only 15,8 Sv/h.

CAMS D/W(A)
March 14th 7:00 167,0 Sv/h
March 18th 11:50 105,0 Sv/h
April 18th 15,8 Sv/h

http://i.min.us/ilnMjk.pdf

On May the levels have also been going down. On May 1st it was 13,7 Sv/h and on May 9th it was 12,1 Sv/h.

CAMS D/W(A)
May 1st 5:00 13,7 Sv/h
May 9th 5:00 12,1 Sv/h

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/images/031_1F3_05090600.pdf

I think what they are more interested in each reactor is the radiation readings and only if they see both temperatures rising and radiation rising will there be a "strong" reaction but if there is only temperature rising the reaction is subtler.
 
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  • #6,249
elektrownik said:
OMFG did you saw CAMS data 3/14 for unit 3 ? It is error or 100% of unit 1 core is damaged

You mean unit 1? Did you see D/W value for 4/8 ?

added: Does anyone have an idea at what level those sensors saturate or get damaged?
 
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  • #6,250
|Fred said:
You may be putting word into the article "TEPCO suspects the blueprint is one of its internal documents, if proven to be genuine,the document is subject to the restrictions imposed under its regulations on nuclear materials protection."

I agree with Fred, and fear this is, again, a matter of overparsing a translated statement.

MiceAndMen said:
Perhaps they don't have a literal list of enemies, but it's obvious they're not happy about it. If one drawing escaped their control there might be others. One would hope that they are more concerned about the source of the leak than websites that publish it.

If you read the original Japanese version of the article, that is exactly the impression given:

http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0425/TKY201104250626.html

"東電側は24日夜の記者会見で、「基本的には内部資料として持たせていただいているもののはずなんですが、それがどういった経緯で、というのは確認していない」と説明した。"

I can't translate the tone exactly, but my reading is that this is a somewhat whiny (or offended) way of saying, "Those are our internal documents, and we don't know how they leaked out."

"また、問題の図面が東電のものだとすれば「核物質防護上の規制がかかっている」対象と認めた。"

TEPCO "admitted" (認めた) that if these diagrams are theirs, they would be subject to regulations on the protection of nuclear materials.

"これまでも設計図について、東電は「メーカーのノウハウがある」などの理由で公表を拒否している。 "

They have also previously refused to release blueprints, because they include "the maker's [GE's] knowhow."My reading is that TEPCO is concerned about getting into trouble for leaking documents that they had a responsibility to safeguard -- both for public safety legal reasons (protection from terrorists, for example), and for reasons of contractual obligation to GE. I don't see an implied threat to foreign bloggers, and indeed, don't see jurisdictionally how they could even make a credible one if they wanted to.

As far as the rules themselves, don't know exactly what TEPCO is referring to, but searching turns up stuff like this:
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S32/S32HO166.html
which, at admittedly just a glance, seems to apply to nuclear materials materials handlers -- like TEPCO.

I stress the above is all my reading only, and I am not an expert at Japanese law, or Japanese language, for that matter. Opinions and corrections would be welcome from ernal_student, Susudake, and whoever else may be able weigh in.
 
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  • #6,251
Rive said:
And that's all, we have seen everything.

Shall we conclude that the fuel in SFP #4 is fine and dandy, no H2 was generated, and the building did not explode? :smile:

*IF* there is damaged fuel in the #4 SFP, my guess would be the last row of 3x10 racks in the back, beyond the fallen staircase. There, the outline of the racks is fuzzy; maybe damage, maybe just bad imaging...

I fancy I see another area of damage on the right side of the main group of racks, two racks above the fallen rectangular plate, to the right of the staircase and slightly closer than it.

Bubbles seem to be rising from the bottom of the tank, in the free spaces adjacent to those two areas.

Just my imagination?

I suppose that the sort of damage we are looking for would leave the ends of the assemblies reasonably intact while the rest corrodes/melts. Is that correct?
 
  • #6,252
pdObq, it's better to look the overall trend, not some big values every here and now.
For the unit 1 it mostly makes sense until April 7th 18:00 (31,1 Sv/h), then you suddenly get these mega values after which CAMS D/W(A) stops working.
I wouldn't trust the values between April 8th 0:00 - April 8th 13:00 for the unit 1.
 
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  • #6,253
Curium said:
Gundersen made an update to his previous hypothesis about SFP #3.

(4) Some other people (not Gundersen himself) suggested that since plutonium melts at a higher temperature than uranium, plutonium could have accumulated in a mass at the bottom of the pool
(5) This could cause a prompt, but "moderated" criticality

Contentions 1, 2, and 3 seem correct on the basis of the evidence. New question is: do hypotheses (4) and (5) make any sense?

Previously it was hard to imagine how an explosion could compress damaged fuel rods into a configuration resulting in criticality. Is the above any more plausible? In any case, something complex must have happened inside Unit 3 to account for what is seen in the videos.
The plutonium hypothesis is just because one needs something that might sustain a chain reaction. It is hard to imagine that in old fuel. But it is even more difficult to imagine how plutonium could have purified itself under water...

A prompt criticality would more likely involve the fresh fuel that was also stored in the pond. If the boral plates desintegrated in the alkaline water of a boiling SFP, one might expect big trouble.
 
  • #6,254
~kujala~ said:
I think one reason TEPCO is not so worried about the unit 3 is the CAMS readings.
On March 14th 7:00 they had quite high reading (167,0 Sv/h) but after that it has been going steadily down. On March 18th it was still 105,0 Sv/h but after a month it was only 15,8 Sv/h.

CAMS D/W(A)
March 14th 7:00 167,0 Sv/h
March 18th 11:50 105,0 Sv/h
April 18th 15,8 Sv/h

http://i.min.us/ilnMjk.pdf

On May the levels have also been going down. On May 1st it was 13,7 Sv/h and on May 9th it was 12,1 Sv/h.

CAMS D/W(A)
May 1st 5:00 13,7 Sv/h
May 9th 5:00 12,1 Sv/h

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/images/031_1F3_05090600.pdf

I think what they are more interested in each reactor is the radiation readings and only if they see both temperatures rising and radiation rising will there be a "strong" reaction but if there is only temperature rising the reaction is subtler.

Or is the contaminated water just being flushed out into the basement and groundwater and the radioactive water being replaced by fresh water in the unit thus diluting radioactivity which could explain the gradual and continues fall in D/W radioactivity
 
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  • #6,255
~kujala~ said:
pdObq, it's better to look the overall trend, not some big values every here and now.
For the unit 1 it mostly makes sense until April 7th 18:00 (31,1 Sv/h), then you suddenly get these mega values after which CAMS D/W(A) stops working.
I wouldn't trust the values between April 8th 0:00 - April 8th 13:00 for the unit 1.
Hmmm, the sudden high readings at 4/8 coincide with the sudden temperature rise of that N4B sensor (sorry, too lazy to put the japanese label into google translate). The other temp. sensors seem not to see that.
 
  • #6,256
Average of 9 frames from the TEPCO video of SFP #4, manually aligned and with very low frequencies removed::

avg-001--009.png
 
  • #6,257
AntonL said:
Or is the contaminated water just being flushed out into the basement and groundwater and the radioactive water being replaced by fresh water in the unit thus diluting radioactivity which could explain the gradual and continues fall in D/W radioactivity

The maximum from the unit 3 turbine building has been 750 mSv/h so far from the surface of the stagnant water.

Also IAES states: "In addition the water in the turbine building floor does not show high contaminations level."
http://www.slideshare.net/iaea/technical-briefing-11-0505

(I think they think 750 mSv/h is not "high". :smile:)

If water would leak wouldn't the contamination level in the turbine building be much higher?

(Of course there is a possibility of the water leaking into the basement on the reactor building and only a small part of it leaking into the basement of the turbine building. The radiation in the basement of the reactor building is still unknown.)
 
  • #6,258
AntonL said:
Here are all the files:

http://k.min.us/ilnOrs.pdf" Water levels and pressure
http://k.min.us/ilskVG.pdf" temperature

http://k.min.us/ilrLwi.pdf" Water levels and pressure
http://k.min.us/ilrN4q.pdf" temperature

http://k.min.us/ilnMjk.pdf" Water levels and pressure
032_1F3_04181300.pdf sorry cannot find this document can you find it?
unfortunately original documents cannot be found - they have been pulled from the Tepco site, these were google cached - the net does not forget (but it forgot one)

For May you can download these values
www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/images/0[/URL][COLOR="Magenta"]x[/COLOR][COLOR="Blue"]y[/COLOR]_1Fx_[COLOR="blue"]mm[/COLOR][COLOR="Magenta"]dd[/COLOR]0600.pdf

were [COLOR="Magenta"]x[/COLOR] is 1,2,or 3
[COLOR="blue"]y[/COLOR] is 1 for water levels, pressure and CAMS, 2 temperatures
[COLOR="blue"]mm[/COLOR] is month ie 05
[COLOR="Magenta"]dd[/COLOR] is day ie 09

example http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/images/032_1F3_05090600.pdf
][/QUOTE]
I have found this document for a couple days later and is attached
[ATTACH=full]142709[/ATTACH]
 

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  • #6,259
I found the missing file..
http://doc-0o-94-docsviewer.googleusercontent.com/viewer/securedownload/dsn1aovipa7l846lsfcf94nedj8q2p4u/8c5thse5v9cd2meshc5cl2qr6f934scr/1304931600000/Ymw=/AGZ5hq8BgbJY1gwaOYx83cPOdNw6/QURHRUVTZ0ZFcXF2dWt0OGRCUm9ueUdCMkk3MzdTR3l5bHBxLXRCVEJXdURxYk9XeTdQcElpTldzcTdGdXdQTjAteXBxekN2TFRCWGZ1MHRVbGNWQUEzV1pvSzRRT1Fyb1I2cTNwTnZlUTkzTlh5bVVBX0NXUy03Wkc3N0NQcTZjd0RFOTBvZGFyZVc=?a=gp&filename=032_1F3.pdf&chan=EgAAAD6vI5/VRlCU5i4pgUzPU9Km4tn1JD8a0Jzc20%2BGFwbX&docid=6345a1e68d72ae09aae9bdedb1337358&sec=AHSqidaieXcDccdYhypxj0jsUp_XglLAWR4WCIYyJHrL0-F4fzZsO-yLoIuXoaM4FfNGF4VdNGO8&nonce=11ec8voqipgke&user=AGZ5hq8BgbJY1gwaOYx83cPOdNw6&hash=9bnuup18t2abh38mqss9o0iu6u9rkmq2"
 
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  • #6,260
Jorge Stolfi said:
Shall we conclude that the fuel in SFP #4 is fine and dandy, no H2 was generated, and the building did not explode? :smile:
Why not? It's even ready for a hot bath :-p

What I'm telling is that there was no explosion or fire in SFP#4. That's all I'm saying :smile:

Jorge Stolfi said:
Average of 9 frames from the TEPCO video of SFP #4, manually aligned and with very low frequencies removed:

http://www.ic.unicamp.br/~stolfi/EXPORT/projects/fukushima/videos/110508_2/frames-b/avg-001--009.png
May I ask that what kind of software did you used for that? I have some more candidates for such trickery.
 
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  • #6,261
rowmag said:
I agree with Fred, and fear this is, again, a matter of overparsing a translated statement.
Well I guess it could be that. I don't read Japanese.
rowmag said:
They have also previously refused to release blueprints, because they include "the maker's [GE's] knowhow."

My reading is that TEPCO is concerned about getting into trouble for leaking documents that they had a responsibility to safeguard -- both for public safety legal reasons (protection from terrorists, for example), and for reasons of contractual obligation to GE. I don't see an implied threat to foreign bloggers, and indeed, don't see jurisdictionally how they could even make a credible one if they wanted to.
Yes, the connection to GE was discussed here previously and that could have a bearing on it, although one could make a pretty solid argument that the damage caused by the release of the drawing is immeasurably small. A desire to avoid shame could be a key factor as well.

As it turns out they had nothing to fear from terrorists that they couldn't accomplish all by themselves.

Maybe someone would be so kind as to translate this:
http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/01kiban08_01000023.html
Google does an OK job, but I'd like to hear what others think.

It wouldn't take much to move "unauthorized release of nuclear blueprints" into the "illegal" category IMO, and receiving cooperation from other nations in an effort to eradicate said illegal information is probably a good bet. See the current CEO of General Electric, for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey_R._Immelt
 
  • #6,262
TEPCO discovers NEW PHYSICS

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/08_18.html
T
TEPCO releases footage of No.4 reactor pool
The operator of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant has released footage of the spent fuel pool in the Number 4 reactor.

The video was taken on Saturday by a camera on the tip of a mechanical arm used to pour water to cool the reactor.

The footage shows 1,535 spent fuel rods stored in racks and covered by water. It also shows debris and ladders damaged by an explosion that occurred after the March 11th earthquake and tsunami. The shelves on the side wall have been destroyed.

Bubbles are occasionally visible, as the water is boiling at a temperature of 84 degrees Celsius.

After analyzing the amount of radioactive materials in the water, Tokyo Electric Power Company has concluded that the spent fuel rods are not seriously damaged.

The Number 4 reactor was not operating at the time of the quake. The reactor building was severely damaged by a hydrogen explosion on March 15th.
Sunday, May 08, 2011 23:00 +0900 (JST)

boiling at 84oC : :rofl:
 
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  • #6,263
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/society.html - ,,Tokyo Electric Power Company released 2 photos taken inside the No.1 reactor building early on Monday."
TEPCO says that pictures posted http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/ are pictured on May 9th, 2011.
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110506_Northwest_1.jpg
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110506_North_2.jpgThe pictures name are 110506_Northwest_1.jpg and 110506_North_2.jpg. I think that pictures are made on May 6th, 2011.
 
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  • #6,264
Jorge Stolfi said:
Average of 9 frames from the TEPCO video of SFP #4, manually aligned and with very low frequencies removed::

avg-001--009.png

The water is murky and the focus is fuzzy at that distance. Averaging 9 fuzzy frames results in another fuzzy frame, and I don't think 2D Fourier transforms help all that much unless you know the point spread function of the lens, and even then no amount of convolution filtering will extract information that isn't there to begin with. Image enhancement processing is a valid tool under the right circumstances, but this is trying to extract information from data that just isn't there IMO. For instance, we know the back rail of the stairs is there from the video after the 13 second mark, yet your processing fails to bring it into focus. I just don't see how anyone can draw any valid conclusions about the condition of fuel bundles back there.
 
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  • #6,265
From The Physics arXiv Blog at MIT's Technology Review website -

(05/09/2011) Chain Reactions Reignited At Fukushima After Tsunami, Says New Study

Radioactive byproducts indicate that nuclear chain reactions must have been burning at the damaged nuclear reactors long after the disaster unfolded

http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/26738/

The source paper is -
Matsui, T. Deciphering the measured ratios of Iodine-131 to Cesium-137 at the Fukushima reactors. arXiv:1105.0242v1.
abstract: http://arxiv.org/abs/1105.0242
full text (pdf): http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1105/1105.0242v1.pdf
 
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