Natural Laws and their domain of validity

[madness]

"Natural Laws" and their domain of validity

What is the philosophical justification for extending observed phenomena to "laws of nature". For example, Galileo dropped massive objects and saw that they fall at the same rate, but to then say that all massive objects fall at the same rate requires a leap of faith. Similarly, we used to believe that the laws of nature here on Earth had nothing to say about the workings of the heavens, but now we think differently.
Clearly we need to be careful not to overly generalise our observations outwith their range of validity. On the other hand, if we reject inductive reasoning altogether then we can't even accept the most limited laws of nature. It seems some kind of middle ground is necessary, presumably there is no clear demarcation here.

 

[zomgwtf]

What is the philosophical justification for extending observed phenomena to "laws of nature". For example, Galileo dropped massive objects and saw that they fall at the same rate, but to then say that all massive objects fall at the same rate requires a leap of faith. Similarly, we used to believe that the laws of nature here on Earth had nothing to say about the workings of the heavens, but now we think differently.
Clearly we need to be careful not to overly generalise our observations outwith their range of validity. On the other hand, if we reject inductive reasoning altogether then we can't even accept the most limited laws of nature. It seems some kind of middle ground is necessary, presumably there is no clear demarcation here.

Uh, no... it wouldn't require a leap of faith to say that objects fall at the same rate. A leap of faith means specifically 'believing or accepting as true something that is intangible or unprovable'. AKA Without empirical evidence.

Objects falling at the same rate can be concluded in a very simple experiment. (Dropping things with different mass from the same height... go right ahead try it!)

Indeed we might have believed that laws of nature were different from the laws of the sky or whatever 'heavens' implies. THAT is a leap of faith, because it was unprovable at the time. However as time went on and on a paradigm shift occurs. Science has come to terms with this and most scientists do NOT give opinions or 'theories' of things which are 'unprovable' (requiring a leap of faith). A main component of scientific theories is falsifiability...

So in conclusion: Scientist don't need to 'seek a middle ground' they need to go all out scientifically only on those things which they can apply scientific method to. (Which, in my opinion, they do.)

 

[madness]

Uh, no... it wouldn't require a leap of faith to say that objects fall at the same rate. A leap of faith means specifically 'believing or accepting as true something that is intangible or unprovable'. AKA Without empirical evidence.

Objects falling at the same rate can be concluded in a very simple experiment. (Dropping things with different mass from the same height... go right ahead try it!)

Indeed we might have believed that laws of nature were different from the laws of the sky or whatever 'heavens' implies. THAT is a leap of faith, because it was unprovable at the time. However as time went on and on a paradigm shift occurs. Science has come to terms with this and most scientists do NOT give opinions or 'theories' of things which are 'unprovable' (requiring a leap of faith). A main component of scientific theories is falsifiability...

So in conclusion: Scientist don't need to 'seek a middle ground' they need to go all out scientifically only on those things which they can apply scientific method to. (Which, in my opinion, they do.)

No. Unless you test every possible mass comprised of every possible type of material at every possible location etc. you can't say for sure that it will generalise. Even then, you can't prove that a past experiment (no matter how many times you repeated it) will behave the same way in future unless you use inductive reasoning. Please don't respond if you don't at least have some basic understanding of the philosophy of science.

 

[zomgwtf]

No. Unless you test every possible mass comprised of every possible type of material at every possible location etc. you can't say for sure that it will generalise. Even then, you can't prove that a past experiment (no matter how many times you repeated it) will behave the same way in future unless you use inductive reasoning. Please don't respond if you don't at least have some basic understanding of the philosophy of science.

The point of science is not to 'prove' anything for exactly the reason you stated. Science does not deal in the realm of proofs.

The fact that science uses inductive reason does not mean it invokes a 'leap of faith'. The change of scientific views of the world is known as a paradigm shift (funny how you respond with the snark remark of me not understanding basic philosophy of science :rofl:)

What a leap of faith means is this:

When there is something that is 'unbelievable' yet a person 'wants to believe' in it they make a decision in their mind to put FAITH in its validity. This means it goes from non-belief ---> belief through FAITH that it is true.

In my previous example I should have stated that the person who knows we shouldn't make opinions on the nature of the 'heavens' will have to make a leap of faith. Because they 'don't believe we should comment on the nature of heaven' but they would claim as truth 'the natural laws of Earth do not apply in heaven'. This requires a leap of faith.

There is no need to limit inductive reasoning in the scope of science, that's rediculous. (If my reading of what you wrote is correct) Instead we should limit the scope of science to deal with only things that are able to fall within the scope of science! That's a given though.
So again, inductive reasoning =/= leap of faith. For two reasons:
A. It's not assigning an objective truth value to anything
and
B. It is based on emperical evidence AND logic, both of which are not present for a leap of faith.

 

[madness]

The point of science is not to 'prove' anything for exactly the reason you stated. Science does not deal in the realm of proofs.

The fact that science uses inductive reason does not mean it invokes a 'leap of faith'. The change of scientific views of the world is known as a paradigm shift (funny how you respond with the snark remark of me not understanding basic philosophy of science :rofl:)

What a leap of faith means is this:

When there is something that is 'unbelievable' yet a person 'wants to believe' in it they make a decision in their mind to put FAITH in its validity. This means it goes from non-belief ---> belief through FAITH that it is true.

Why does inductive reasoning not fall into this category? And my comment was referring to the fact that you seem to have no knowledge of Hume's problem of induction - which is basically what this thread is about.

In my previous example I should have stated that the person who knows we shouldn't make opinions on the nature of the 'heavens' will have to make a leap of faith. Because they 'don't believe we should comment on the nature of heaven' but they would claim as truth 'the natural laws of Earth do not apply in heaven'. This requires a leap of faith.

There is no need to limit inductive reasoning in the scope of science, that's rediculous. (If my reading of what you wrote is correct) Instead we should limit the scope of science to deal with only things that are able to fall within the scope of science! That's a given though.
So again, inductive reasoning =/= leap of faith. For two reasons:
A. It's not assigning an objective truth value to anything
and
B. It is based on emperical evidence AND logic, both of which are not present for a leap of faith.

Inductive reasoning is not based on empirical (spelling) evidence or logic and assigning a truth value is exactly what it does. I already gave the need to limit inductive reasoning, i.e. that we don't want to extend a law outside its range of validity.

 

[zomgwtf]

Why does inductive reasoning not fall into this category? And my comment was referring to the fact that you seem to have no knowledge of Hume's problem of induction - which is basically what this thread is about.

The problem of induction does not talk about any such leaps of faith. It talks about KNOWLEDGE (objective truth value) of inductive claims.

Can knowledge be attained through an inductive statement? No, not if you use an objective truth value standard. That's a given and is accepted in science.

Someone like Popper would argue however that it does lead to knowledge however I don't believe that to be true. Induction, in my opinion, is not a problem since no scientist, or person with understanding of science, in their right mind would argue that science has an objective truth value. The term knowledge however can be debated to determine if scientific reasoning can lead to knowledge.

There is no doubt in my mind that science is an extremely usefull tool for humans without which we would still be living in caves hunting with our bare hands.

Inductive reasoning is not based on empirical (spelling) evidence or logic and assigning a truth value is exactly what it does. I already gave the need to limit inductive reasoning, i.e. that we don't want to extend a law outside its range of validity.

Please go and look up inductive reasoning, this is the very reason it is a different word from 'deductive reasoning'.

 

[madness]

The problem of induction does not talk about any such leaps of faith. It talks about KNOWLEDGE (objective truth value) of inductive claims.

Can knowledge be attained through an inductive statement? No, not if you use an objective truth value standard. That's a given and is accepted in science.

Someone like Popper would argue however that it does lead to knowledge however I don't believe that to be true. Induction, in my opinion, is not a problem since no scientist, or person with understanding of science, in their right mind would argue that science has an objective truth value. The term knowledge however can be debated to determine if scientific reasoning can lead to knowledge.

You are aware that inductive reasoning is ubiquitous in science, right? The problem of induction states that knowledge cannot be obtained by inductive claims - this is why it's a problem. Therefore the problem of induction does talk about leaps of faith. And Popper didn't believe induction leads to knowledge that's why he tried to get rid of it in his philosophy of science. The point is we want to use science as a means to obtaining knowledge.

There is no doubt in my mind that science is an extremely usefull tool for humans without which we would still be living in caves hunting with our bare hands.

I don't doubt that it is. The problem is defining science and being precise about what types of reasoning are acceptable within the scientific method.

Please go and look up inductive reasoning, this is the very reason it is a different word from 'deductive reasoning'.

"Inductive reasoning, also known as induction or inductive logic, is a kind of reasoning that allows for the possibility that the conclusion is false even where all of the premises are true.[1] The premises of an inductive logical argument indicate some degree of support (inductive probability) for the conclusion but do not entail it; i.e. they do not ensure its truth. Induction is employed, for example, in the following argument:

All of the ice we have examined so far is cold.
Therefore, all ice is cold." from wiki.

What's your point? This is just further evidence that we need a middle ground for inductive reasoning in science.

 

[apeiron]

This is just further evidence that we need a middle ground for inductive reasoning in science.

Zomgwtf has it right. Science is about modelling - formal statements that make predictions that can be measured. And those formal statements are developed first by abduction (a smart guess), then refined via the dual and mutual process of induction~deduction.

Induction is the move from particulars to generals - from observations of specific or local instances to the generalisation of universal "truths". And deduction is about going the other way, from the assumption of some global or universal truth to a prediction about what we are likely to find at a specific location.

This is how minds themselves work. Our perceptions of the world are formed by the interaction of ideas and impressions. Generals and particulars. If I see a cat, I am both aware of its general cat-ness (and would be surprised if it barked or squeaked) and also its specific cat features, whether it is a black cat, a skinny cat, etc.

As children, many individual experiences of cats (and other animals) builds up (induces) a crisp idea of cat-ness. Then this context, this generalisation, is the framework for perceptual deduction - I am probably seeing a cat because of this arrangement of light and shade (whoops, it was just a quirky shadow on a twilight wall).

The middle ground for induction~deduction is the zone of productive interaction. It is where the top-down and the bottom-up actions are mixing in a fruitful, adaptive, fashion. The more cats (and non-cats) I see, the more I fine-tune by knowledge (internal model) of cats.

Science too depends on the exact same fruitful balance. The more detailed instances we can observe, the more extensively we can generalise.

Of course, you are talking about how far can we safely go when we are trying to get beyond the easily measurable.

This would be like saying, well, we have a pretty good mental model of cats. But what about "cats" on other planets? What can we say about alien lifeforms?

Here we cannot (yet) make any measurements. We cannot employ the inductive path. We instead have to rely on deduction or generalisation. And actually, when it comes to attempts to imagine alien alternatives, we do a pretty poor job (although perhaps that is just because carbon, water and something like DNA are the only realistic ways to go).

Anyway, science is not "all induction" and so suffers a problem about its demarcation. Science (like all modelling, including neurological) is about the interaction between bottom-up impressions and top-down ideas. Induction and deduction are synergistic partners.

Progress is achieved by moving the two scales of action ever further apart.

In the beginning, when our notions are vague, as in the infant brain, we have to make abductive guesses about the world. The inductions and the deductions, the ideas and the impressions, are all still lumped together at the same scale. Babies will point at a cat and say confidently "doggie". A sort of correct beginner's generalisation.

But once our models become well developed, the generalisations become as broad as our measurements of the world are fine. The bigger our ideas, the smaller the details, the fine discriminations, we must be noticing.

Which is why science depends on refinements in experimental technique. The zone of knowledge is built out of the interaction of ideas and impressions. To increase the size of this zone, we must push out in both directions equally - towards more sweeping theories based on more precise measurements. The two ends must be in active touch with each other to be able to continue to expand.

 

[madness]

The middle ground for induction~deduction is the zone of productive interaction. It is where the top-down and the bottom-up actions are mixing in a fruitful, adaptive, fashion.

Sounds a bit vague. Too much induction and you will make erroneous assertions, not enough and you can't make any progress. How do you define the zone of productive interaction? In any case, using induction based on it's productivity requires inductive reasoning- you use induction because it "works". You can't justify induction using induction.

Of course, you are talking about how far can we safely go when we are trying to get beyond the easily measurable.

This would be like saying, well, we have a pretty good mental model of cats. But what about "cats" on other planets? What can we say about alien lifeforms?

I don't see a clear demarcation between the induction we use say to extend Galileo's experiments to all masses and the stronger inductions like aliens. I see a continuum. The original point in the thread was to ask how much induction should be used in science and how its use is justified.

 

[apeiron]

Sounds a bit vague. Too much induction and you will make erroneous assertions, not enough and you can't make any progress. How do you define the zone of productive interaction?

More "induction" would be not measuring more of the same but more of the different. Confirmation does not change the state of your knowledge much. We would model this fact concretely as the law of diminishing returns - asymptotic approach to certainty. If I've measure the same thing five times and got the same result, then I have increased my knowledge arguably. But if I measure it 10 times, I have not doubled my confidence.

Where real change happens is when something novel or unexpected (unmodelled) is observed. Then we repeat observations to try to get more data points.

We then know we have hit the zone of productive interaction when models and measurements are in good statistical agreement. When novelty in measurements can be safely explained away as just measurement error. Of course, we cannot know all outlier measurements to be just flukes, but we can have a pragmatic confidence.

I don't see a clear demarcation between the induction we use say to extend Galileo's experiments to all masses and the stronger inductions like aliens. I see a continuum. The original point in the thread was to ask how much induction should be used in science and how its use is justified.

We can measure all masses within our reach and the relation seems firm. But yes, things could be different over the observational event horizon and we would never "know".

So our deductions cannot outpace our inductions if we are being "scientific" - insisting on the importance of a working interaction between the two aspects of modelling.

The story on mass and on aliens are a little different. For mass, our natural expectation is that mass would be the same elsewhere (though are there theories of g varying with scale, or time). With aliens, our expectation is in fact the opposite - that it would not be like life on earth. And the surprise would be if it was.

Both would be the consequence of deductions based on inductions. A rule about mass has been built up locally by induction and is extended to places beyond our reach by deduction (from the rule, we predict the measurements that would be observed).

The same with the evolution of life - except because life is presumed to be accidental in the paths it takes, the general rule would we should expect aliens to follow some different path. However this is still a rule developed by local observation then extended to other out of reach places via deduction.

 

[JoeDawg]

Induction is the move from particulars to generals - from observations of specific or local instances to the generalisation of universal "truths".

This is incorrect.

Induction moves from the known to the unknown, it does NOT require that one move from particulars to generals.

And, madness, is also incorrect:

problem of induction states that knowledge cannot be obtained by inductive claims - this is why it's a problem

The problem of induction is about justification, not about whether we can derive knowledge through induction. David Hume who defined the problem of induction was an empiricist, that is, he believed that ALL knowledge is derived from observation. The problem is not whether you can derive knowledge from induction, you can, the problem is that we have no justification for using induction, which is very different.

 

[apeiron]

This is incorrect.
Induction moves from the known to the unknown, it does NOT require that one move from particulars to generals.

Time to buy a dictionary Dr Dawg.

in·duc·tion (n-dkshn) n.

3. Logic
a. The process of deriving general principles from particular facts or instances.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/induction

 

[madness]

More "induction" would be not measuring more of the same but more of the different.

I would consider this to be less induction. By "more induction" I meant making stronger assertions and generalisations based on the limited empiricial knowledge we have. This is what I am getting at with this thread - we need to make some unjustified generalisations, but shouldn't make too many.

Confirmation does not change the state of your knowledge much. We would model this fact concretely as the law of diminishing returns - asymptotic approach to certainty. If I've measure the same thing five times and got the same result, then I have increased my knowledge arguably. But if I measure it 10 times, I have not doubled my confidence.

This relies heavily on induction.

Where real change happens is when something novel or unexpected (unmodelled) is observed. Then we repeat observations to try to get more data points.

We then know we have hit the zone of productive interaction when models and measurements are in good statistical agreement. When novelty in measurements can be safely explained away as just measurement error. Of course, we cannot know all outlier measurements to be just flukes, but we can have a pragmatic confidence.

So basically we try all different amounts of induction until one gives a good fit? Of course there is no reason to think this amount of induction will work in a different setting. Again we need induction to justify the use (and amount) of induction here.

 

[Mkorr]

One could view "natural laws" as descriptions of reality that becomes more reliable as more scientific evidence accumulates.

 

[JoeDawg]

Time to buy a dictionary Dr Dawg.

Hahah. While, I'm sure everyone here is as impressed as I am, with your ability to do a google search, and come up with a 'free dictionary' definition, this is not quite the level of understanding I was going for.

Dictionaries are designed to give a general understanding of a word, to a general audience.
As such, they are NOT often referenced in high level philosophical discussions, but more often when the discussion has degraded to the level of a 'definition war'.
While this happens quite frequently... on the internet... it's never that productive, and usually implies stubborn ignorance on the part of the person providing the definition.

Inductive reasoning can be as simple as:
My apple is red, therefore your apple is red.

Or... more complex...
These ten apples are red, therefore all apples are red.

Or...
I have 20 apples in a bag, I have removed 19 red apples, therefore the next apple I remove is red.

It actually can involve going from:

particular -> general
particular -> general -> particular
general -> particular
particular -> particular

The important part therefore, is NOT general/particular. It is making an inference from a known sample to an unknown sample. This is one of the problems with constantly trying to fit everything into overly simple dichotomies, you end up losing more complex ideas.

In case you were wondering, some people get confused when it comes to inductive inferences from general to particular, as this seems more like deduction.

But there is an important difference. Deduction starts with defined quantities, induction starts with observed quantities.

 

[apeiron]

Impress us by providing an inductive argument that actually proceeds from the general to the particular then.

Your apples example relies on tacit generalisations and hence deductions by way of abductive reasoning. ie: If we both have the same thing (an apple) then our best guess is that the apples share the same properties (like red).

Turn it round and ask the question: you have a red apple in your hand, someone else also has something red in their hands. How secure are you in generalising to argue that it too is going to be an apple?

You can see how your example invokes a tacit knowledge of the world, a knowledge of apples and their properties, and is not a step from the known to the unknown but instead a pincer movement making use of the available information - some of it local (what you hold in your hand), some of it global (apples are restricted in colour, colours are not so restricted in the hand-held objects they may represent).

This pincer movement is what abduction is all about. And the reason why the proper definition of induction and deduction (as held to be basic in any dictionary much to your discomfort) is about the dichotomy of particular~general.

I can understand what you mean in saying that deduction starts from defined quantities, I just don't accept it as a psychological reality. It is a hangover statement from the rationalist tradition and so a self-delusion about how knowledge is actually derived about the world.

I stick with the psychological realism of Peirce. He got it right. But maybe that is the subject for a "higher" level philosophical discussion once you've had a chance to read up on Peirce and abduction, vagueness, etc.

 

[JoeDawg]

Impress us by providing an inductive argument that actually proceeds from the general to the particular then.

Can I use google?

Your apples example relies on tacit generalisations and hence deductions by way of abductive reasoning. ie: If we both have the same thing (an apple) then our best guess is that the apples share the same properties (like red).

Wrong. Abduction is just inverted Deduction. They both rely on premises and necessity, they just move in different directions. They are definitional, not observational.

With induction, I don't have to know what an apple is. With induction all I'm doing is making an assumption that the unobserved apple will resemble the observed one. Its not a guess, its an assumption. We then base probability on this assumption.

One can use any criteria one chooses to make a best guess.
Abduction can be used together with both Deduction and Induction, but the fact remains Induction works differently.

Turn it round and ask the question: you have a red apple in your hand, someone else also has something red in their hands. How secure are you in generalising to argue that it too is going to be an apple?

If you are using Induction, there is no 'security', the problem of induction makes it clear, there is no justification for induction. With Abduction, you can use induction to help justify your guess.

I can understand what you mean in saying that deduction starts from defined quantities, I just don't accept it as a psychological reality.

This, invariably is where you run into problems.

I stick with the psychological realism of Peirce. He got it right. But maybe that is the subject for a "higher" level philosophical discussion once you've had a chance to read up on Peirce and abduction, vagueness, etc.

Oh, I googled him, but I'm not sure what that James Bond guy has to do with philosophy... maybe your talent for google searches is just superior to mine.

 

[apeiron]

Can I use google?

It shouldn't be beyond your capability.

But I get the feeling you haven't yet found an example of an inductive argument that actually proceeds from the general to the particular. Funny that.

Wrong. Abduction is just inverted Deduction. They both rely on premises and necessity, they just move in different directions. They are definitional, not observational.

Can you rustle up a cite for "Abduction is just inverted Deduction"?

In the meantime, it is probably safer to stick to more reputable statements of how these things are viewed...

Scientific method begins with abduction: a conjecture or hypothesis about what actually is going on. Then, by means of deductive inference, conclusions are drawn from the hypothesis about other things that must obtain if the hypothesis is assumed to be true. These other things, it is hoped, can be experimentally tested-for. Finally, hypothesis-testing is performed by seeking experimentally to detect something that has been deduced to obtain from the hypothesis.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce/

Or Wiki...

In 1903 he presented the following logical form for abductive inference:[65]

The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.

Note that the logical form does not also cover induction, since induction does not depend on surprise and does not propose a new idea for its conclusion. Induction seeks facts to test a hypothesis; abduction seeks a hypothesis to account for facts. Peirce now regarded abduction as essentially an initiative toward further inference and study.

In his methodeutic or theory of inquiry (see below), Peirce regards the three modes as clarified by their coordination in essential roles in inquiry and science, with abduction generating a possible hypothesis to account for a surprising phenomenon, deduction clarifying the relevant necessary predictive consequences of the hypothesis, and induction testing the predictions against the data to show something actually in operation.[66]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Sanders_Peirce

Oh, I googled him, but I'm not sure what that James Bond guy has to do with philosophy... maybe your talent for google searches is just superior to mine.

Oh how my sides ache from laughter.

Yet I suspect it may also be true. You really had never heard of Peirce - "By all who are familiar with his work he is considered one of the greatest logicians who ever lived." Stanford - before.

 

[JoeDawg]

But I get the feeling you haven't yet found an example of an inductive argument that actually proceeds from the general to the particular. Funny that.

Funny how I already explained this, but you chose to ignore it.

Can you rustle up a cite for "Abduction is just inverted Deduction"?

Didn't even need google for this one.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abductive_reasoning

Abduction
allows inferring a as an explanation of b. Because of this, abduction allows the precondition a to be inferred from the consequence b. Deduction and abduction thus differ in the direction in which a rule like "a entails b" is used for inference. As such abduction is formally equivalent to the logical fallacy affirming the consequent or Post hoc ergo propter hoc, because there are multiple possible explanations for b.

You know, you're like the Energizer bunny of Abduction. Still going...

 

[apeiron]

Funny how I already explained this, but you chose to ignore it.

Explanation? I was asking you to provide an example.

You say that it is possible to set up an inductive argument that goes from the general to the particular. I agree. Some do try to do so. But the results don't ever actually seem convincingly "logical". And so prove that it this just isn't the natural way things go.

So you provide an example of what you think is a robust inductive argument that goes from general to particular, and we can see if you really know what you're talking about.

Didn't even need google for this one.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abductive_reasoning

You missed/ignored the emphasis on "just". The point I made at the outset of the thread is that real-life logical thinking involves a pincer movement of induction and deduction. And abduction, as the vague grounds for getting started, also mixes these two directions of analysis.

You know, you're like the Energizer bunny of Abduction. Still going...

Whereas you are the rival brand that never lasts the distance? What are you trying to say?

 

[JoeDawg]

Some do try to do so. But the results don't ever actually seem convincingly "logical". And so prove that it this just isn't the natural way things go.

That is nonesense. Just because something is counter-intuitive doesn't mean it is incorrect. In fact, this is the way it works, and since it is counter-intuitive, it is something an intelligent person would pay attention to.

You missed/ignored the emphasis on "just". The point I made at the outset of the thread is that real-life logical thinking involves a pincer movement of induction and deduction.

That doesn't change anything, you're just playing at semantics to try and extricate yourself from the monstrous load of crap you just stepped in.

The way people use formal logic doesn't change the nature of that logic.

You asked for a reference and you got it. Now you are backpedalling, as always.

And abduction, as the vague grounds for getting started, also mixes these two directions of analysis.

You don't read, you don't think, you just repeat, like a broken record...

 

[apeiron]

Still no actual example to illustrate your big claim that there are inductive arguments that successfully run from generals to particulars.

How many posts in a row have you dodged that reasonable request to back up what you say with some evidence?

That is nonesense. Just because something is counter-intuitive doesn't mean it is incorrect. In fact, this is the way it works, and since it is counter-intuitive, it is something an intelligent person would pay attention to.

What? If something seems unbelievable, we ought to believe it?

This is why you need to present a concrete example as proof of what you argue. I've have seen attempts to claim induction from the general case to the particular case, and it just doesn't pan out.

If you are saying that counter-intuitively it does, then show us your example.

That doesn't change anything, you're just playing at semantics to try and extricate yourself from the monstrous load of crap you just stepped in.

Mmm, the actual meaning of a sentence is more than just playing with semantics. And the only crap I'm having to wade through is your ducking and dodging when you start arguments you cannot finish.

The reference you supplied (and which I originally supplied to you) quite clearly shows the mixed nature of abduction. It is proto induction~deduction, not inverse deduction.

And I'm genuinely interested in counter-arguments to standard wisdom that induction is the move from the particular to the general. But so far, we only have the claim and none of the evidence.

You don't read, you don't think, you just repeat, like a broken record...

Why resort all the time to the lamest insults? You come barging into threads trumpeting "wrong", "incorrect", and then have nothing to back up the charges.

Sure, I keep repeating show us the evidence, we've already understood the claim. But you keep trying to dodge the simple fact your bluff is being called.

 

[JoeDawg]

The reference you supplied (and which I originally supplied to you) quite clearly shows the mixed nature of abduction. It is proto induction~deduction, not inverse deduction.

Sorry, I guess english isn't your mother tongue. Here is the quote again.

Deduction and abduction thus differ in the direction in which a rule like "a entails b" is used for inference.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/inverse
1. Reversed in order, nature, or effect.

When you ignore the references provided, or I guess in your case, completely fail to understand even the ones you provide, its hardly surprising when others give up on you.

You can't even understand the basic argument I'm making... that's unfortunate, but I'm not paid to be your teacher. Willful ignorance doesn't impress me, nor does it make me disposed to help you figure this out.

Once again, Induction is about moving logically from observed to unobserved. Its the basis of empirical science. What you describe is one type of inductive argument. Its really a pity, all you can do is parrot one philosopher.

 

[apeiron]

Still no actual example of an inductive argument that successfully runs from generals to particulars :rofl:.

You are firing blanks.

Sorry, I guess english isn't your mother tongue. Here is the quote again.
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/inverse
1. Reversed in order, nature, or effect.

As it happens, I picked up a national writing award just last night .

But anyway, "just" is wrong because abduction mixes induction and deduction. And "inverse" is wrong as it is not formally an inverse operation in this case.

Deduction goes directly from generals to particulars. Abduction hazards a guess at a general from an observation of a particular. Yes, I have no problem with the idea that it is looking back from a "what if" general rule. But it is the circularity that I am attempting to draw your attention to. If a, then perhaps b, which would mean a. Nothing is yet certain or crisp. It is just a vague start.

You can't even understand the basic argument I'm making... that's unfortunate, but I'm not paid to be your teacher. Willful ignorance doesn't impress me, nor does it make me disposed to help you figure this out.

Once again, Induction is about moving logically from observed to unobserved. Its the basis of empirical science. What you describe is one type of inductive argument. Its really a pity, all you can do is parrot one philosopher.

You are sounding a little crazy in the head now. Teacher? Are you qualified? Really?

The fact that you keep going on about empiricism shows you are stuck at epistemology 101 where you begin with Bacon, Hume. Certainly a good place to start, but that is a few centuries back.

Peirce was the founder of pragmatism, which gets us to early 20th century epistemology.

Once you've caught up to there, learned about abduction and vagueness and semiotics, then you would be ready for modern epistemology.

That is when we would be able to get into Robert Rosen's modelling relations, Howard Pattee's epistemic cut, Soren Brier's biosemiotics.

But for the moment, just focus on your continuing inability to back up a wild claim about the nature of inductive reasoning.

I fully agree that some people have tried to argue that induction is not limited to particulars => generals. I just say they are mistaken. And the most foolish claim is when they say induction can run from generals to particulars.

The observed~unobserved dichotomy is of course part of all this, as modelling relations states explicitly. But it boils down again to the matter of scale. We are local observers and what we see is mostly going to be of the same scale as a natural consequence. So we then make the mental leap to the "unobserved" - the global scale. How things must be in general, as a universal rule, etc.

But as you will see from googling dictionaries, the starting definition of induction stresses the habit of deriving generals from particulars. If you were "teaching" epistemology 101, that is what you would be telling your class.

 

[JoeDawg]

As it happens, I picked up a national writing award just last night .

I've never said you were a bad writer, its your reading comprehension that is your downfall. Quite funny how you confuse the two... but it shows how correct I am. You love to expound endlessly, but you don't take the time to actually read.

But anyway, "just" is wrong because abduction mixes induction and deduction. And "inverse" is wrong as it is not formally an inverse operation in this case.

And yet, the FREE DICTIONARY you love, and Wikipedia, both agree with me. Not you.

Deduction goes directly from generals to particulars. Abduction hazards a guess at a general from an observation of a particular. Yes, I have no problem with the idea that it is looking back from a "what if" general rule.

Finally. You just can't stand being wrong can you. LOL.

But it is the circularity that I am attempting to draw your attention to.

Abduction is the weakest of the three, no doubt. I said this from the beginning. Don't much care though. This has nothing to do with the point I was making.

Teacher?

Again with the lack of reading comprehension.

Peirce was the founder of pragmatism, which gets us to early 20th century epistemology

There are plenty of problems with pragmatism... but you're a preacher, not a philosopher.

But for the moment, just focus on your continuing inability to back up a wild claim about the nature of inductive reasoning.

I fully agree that some people have tried to argue that induction is not limited to particulars => generals. I just say they are mistaken.

So you admit there are others who agree with me, but its still my WILD claim.
Try googling 'cognitive dissonance', you're quite a good example.

the starting definition of induction stresses the habit of deriving generals from particulars.

Yes, and then, if you're a good student, you move beyond a dictionary level understanding of Induction. Know-it-alls like yourself, however, don't make good students.

Teaching you is like pulling teeth... but finally you are making some progress. Good job.

 

[apeiron]

Teaching you is like pulling teeth... but finally you are making some progress. Good job.

Still no example of an inductive argument that successfully runs from generals to particulars.

Why don't you just admit it was a slip of the tongue and you regret it. Or I guess your next dodge may be to claim that I just mis-read that you ever made such a rash statement.:uhh:

Anyway, you've got me feeling so sorry for you now that here is a claimed example of induction from the general to the particular.

All the great Greek philosophers wrote treatises on science.
All philosophers named Aristotle wrote treatises on science.
Therefore Aristotle was a great Greek philosopher.

http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/ded_ind.html

You can of course appreciate that this is an abductive argument in reality, mixing particulars and generals in order to arrive at a hypothesis. So as an example, it fails.

So now let's see you provide an example that does work in sound fashion.

BTW, the award was not for prose writing but my ability to understand and explain difficult concepts.

 

[JoeDawg]

Why don't you just admit it was a slip of the tongue and you regret it.

LOL, You are such a hypocrite.

I don't, and I've explained my position.
And I stand by it.

You won't even admit you are wrong about Abduction/Deduction, when I pointed to the evidence, repeatedly. Instead of just admitting you were wrong, you fall back on semantics.

If you can't even be honest about that, why would I go to the trouble of once again explain Induction to you. It's actually the more difficult concept.

Its clear, all you care about it your own award-winning self importance...

 

[apeiron]

LOL, You are such a hypocrite.
I don't, and I've explained my position.
And I stand by it.

This is just another dishonest reply. Your claim was that induction can follow from generals to particulars. This - just from set theoretic considerations - is so patently nonsense that anyone who would claim such a thing clearly has no real understanding of what makes logic work. I labour the point because it is right at the heart of the deluded positions you take.

So again, if you still believe what you said, then bring forth an example. Or even try to defend the example I have furnished you with.

The fact that you keep replying, keep insulting, and yet keep failing to engage with the concrete challenge is proof enough you don't have a leg to stand on.

It is pathetic, but it is hardly the first time you have been caught out like this. Why do you persist in demonstrating you have no answer?

 

[JoeDawg]

It is pathetic, but it is hardly the first time you have been caught out like this. Why do you persist in demonstrating you have no answer?

Good question. Have you ever heard the phrase: giving someone enough rope to hang themselves?

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/#ConNotInd

1.2 The contemporary notion of induction

A few simple counterexamples to the OED definition may suggest the increased breadth of the contemporary notion:

1. There are (good) inductions with general premises and particular conclusions:

All observed emeralds have been green.
Therefore, the next emerald to be observed will be green.

2. There are valid deductions with particular premises and general conclusions:

New York is east of the Mississippi.
Delaware is east of the Mississippi.
Therefore, everything that is either New York or Delaware is east of the Mississippi.

Further, on at least one serious view, due in differing variations to Mill and Carnap, induction has not to do with generality at all; its primary form is the singular predictive inference—the second form of enumerative induction mentioned above—which leads from particular premises to a particular conclusion. The inference to generality is a dispensable middle step.

Although inductive inference is not easily characterized, we do have a clear mark of induction. Inductive inferences are contingent, deductive inferences are necessary. (But see the entry Formal Learning Theory where this distinction is elaborated.) Deductive inference can never support contingent judgments such as meteorological forecasts, nor can deduction alone explain the breakdown of one's car, discover the genotype of a new virus, or reconstruct fourteenth century trade routes. Inductive inference can do these things more or less successfully because, in Peirce's phrase, inductions are ampliative. Induction can amplify and generalize our experience, broaden and deepen our empirical knowledge. Deduction on the other hand is explicative. Deduction orders and rearranges our knowledge without adding to its content.

Of course, the contingent power of induction brings with it the risk of error. Even the best inductive methods applied to all available evidence may get it wrong; good inductions may lead from true premises to false conclusions. (A competent but erroneous diagnosis of a rare disease, a sound but false forecast of summer sunshine in the desert.) An appreciation of this principle is a signal feature of the shift from the traditional to the contemporary problem of induction. (See sections 3.2 and 3.3 below.)

How to tell good inductions from bad deductions? That question is a simple formulation of the problem of induction. In its general form it clearly has no substantive answer, but its instances can yield modest and useful questions. Some of these questions, and proposed answers to them, are surveyed in what follows.

Some authorities, Carnap in the opening paragraph of (Carnap 1952) is an example, take inductive inference to include all non-deductive inference. That may be a bit too inclusive; perception and memory are clearly ampliative but their exercise seems not to be congruent with what we know of induction, and the present article is not concerned with them. (See the entries on epistemological problems of perception and epistemological problems of memory.)

Now... let the semantic gymnastics begin.

 

[apeiron]

Good question. Have you ever heard the phrase: giving someone enough rope to hang themselves?
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/#ConNotInd

Right, let's go then.

Until about the middle of the previous century induction was treated as a quite specific method of inference: inference of a universal affirmative proposition (All swans are white) from its instances (a is a white swan, b is a white swan, etc.).

So quite correctly, it is affirmed that the classical conception of induction is as the move from particular to generals. And deduction is the reverse path.

The reliance on hierarchical scale is basic to the definition. We are talking about swans as a class of objects defined by their properties. A relationship between global forms or constraints and the local substances or potentials out of which things are constructed. Our global idea of a swan-like form allows us to deduce certain local properties or materials that must be observationally true of some instance of "a swan".

And so we can see the dichotomy, the necessary mutality, involved in epistemology.

Neither the global, nor the local, scale of modelling can yield certain knowledge. Instead we must be pragmatic internalists. Our degree of belief depends on the extent to which induction and deduction marry, reinforcing each others “truth”.

The cited article of course acknowleges this psychological reality.

Hume himself takes the edge off this argument later in the Treatise. “In every judgment,” he writes, “…we ought always to correct the first judgment, deriv'd from the nature of the object, by another judgment, deriv'd from the nature of the understanding”

Or as I frequently put it, the interaction of impressions and ideas.

The argument should be seen against the background of Hume's project as he announces it in the introduction to the Treatise: This project is the development of the empirical science of human nature. The epistemological sector of this science involves describing the operations of the mind, the interactions of impressions and ideas and the function of the liveliness that constitutes belief.

Now what about the idea that there can be induction from generals to particulars?

A few simple counterexamples to the OED definition may suggest the increased breadth of the contemporary notion:

There are (good) inductions with general premises and particular conclusions:
All observed emeralds have been green.
Therefore, the next emerald to be observed will be green.

There is a good reason why this kind of argument is called weak induction (and why I wouldn’t call it induction at all).

In this claimed example of general => particular, it is clear that a global meta-rule has been established and from it are being deduced local consequences.

After a few emeralds have been experienced as green, we develop the general idea that all emeralds are green (via induction). Then from this general idea comes the specific prediction – any further emerald will also be green (because green is a putatively necessary property of emeralds).

Now the actual deductive step here is strictly speaking a negative one. ie: Where there is no reason to expect a change, then there is no rational cause to predict a change.

A sequence of observed regularity has allowed us to generalise in a weak fashion. We have induced from a number of particular instances the general rule that this is a situation (green emeralds) which lacks causes of variation. We have a (modestly) justified premise. And we can deduce entirely correctly that where there are no causes, there can be no effects.

Of course this is a weak argument (but in fact deductively, rather than inductively) because strong deductive arguments are of the positive kind, They start from some actual statement of a global constraint. They say there is some global cause which positively necessitates some local effect (rather than that the situation is apparently unconstrained in this regard).

But anyway, it is clear that the full arc of the reasoning involved goes from particulars to generals and back to particulars. And certainty would have to develop by going through the loop enough times that there is a positive feedback relationship between the induction and deductions. A proper dichotomy or broken symmetry.

Again, going back to my original point to the OP, there is nothing controversial in this interactive view, as for example shown by this later quote in the context of Armstrong's theory of universals.

“[T]he argument goes from the observed constant conjunction of characteristics to the existence of a strong law, and thence to a testable prediction that the conjunction will extend to all cases” (Armstrong 1991, 507).

Or the mention of Hume's original solution.

Hume's resolution of this puzzle is in terms of general rules, rules for judging (Hume THN, 150). These are of two sorts. Rules of the first sort lead to singular predictive inferences when triggered by the experience of successive instances. These when unchecked may tempt us to wider and more varied predictions than the evidence supports (to grue-type inferences, for example). Rules of the second sort are corrective, these lead us to correct and limit the application of rules of the first sort on the basis of evidence of their unreliability. It is only by following general rules, says Hume, that we can correct their errors.

 

[JoeDawg]

Right, let's go then.

So, let me get this straight.

You claim the position I took on induction is

so patently nonsense that anyone who would claim such a thing clearly has no real understanding of what makes logic work

You demand, ad nauseum, that I supply a reference for my position.
I reference the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy supports what I have been saying all along.

Your reference was from a free online dictionary.
And you still won't admit you are wrong.

Goodbye troll.

 

[apeiron]

You demand, ad nauseum, that I supply a reference for my position.

Err, something wrong with having to back up your claims?

I reference the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy supports what I have been saying all along.

And which also supports what I said even more clearly. Amusing how often it cited Peirce too.

But I still take issue with that article's passing reference to induction from generals which I demonstrated smuggles in a derivation from a global rule.

And you have failed to counter my argument on that score. Not that actually engaging in substantive ways has ever been your style.

Your reference was from a free online dictionary.
And you still won't admit you are wrong.

The same basic definition of induction and deduction was in the Stanford entry. You were shouting "wrong", "incorrect", yet that just is the standard understanding.

Then if you want to move the discussion to more contemporary and nuanced views, well then you have to make an argument as there are a variety of approaches being taken.

To me, it is still quite clear that the idea of induction from generals is just not that at all. I have said why. I doubt you will ever counter it with some argument of your own. Debate is just not your forte it appears. Even your playground insults could do with sharpening.

Goodbye troll.

See what I mean.