Is time an illusion? Exploring the concept of time as a constant state of change

[AnssiH]

But, your but conclusion is not necessarily a truth statement, for to say that a metaphysical entity has "identity" can be nothing more than saying that "identity" evolves from dialectic union of axioms of "existence" and "consciousness". To put it simply (as put by Ayn Rand):

Existence is Identity
Consciousness is Identification​

To hold that "identity as a concept bears no meaning to reality", is to say you hold that a metaphysical entity can exist apart from its characteristics,

No, I'm rather saying that a "metaphysical entity" is a concept that exists due to the way the brain is structuring reality (by recognizing characteristics). There is no reason to assume metaphysical identity to the brain to say this, but there is a reason to assume the existence of reality in some stable manner. Just that the idea of identity to anything at all can still be just a method for prediction. In a sense, the real nature of reality becomes inherently unintelligible, while reality does exist.

Can we say that existence is identity; subjective experience certainly exists, but to what extent it has got identity? We have our memories certainly, but consider the adult mitosis thought experiment in the previous post.

This is very difficult subject to communicate though, I can't be sure about anyones opinion even when they try to communicate it to me... :( (Wonder what Ayn Rand means specifically...)

-Anssi

 

[mosassam]

This is exactly where we should divorce from the intuitive idea where some thing must be "observing this state of affairs" (or we quickly end up to dualism and/or homunculus argument and/or naive realism).

This, for me, is the point of interest. Let's forget dualism or the 'little man inside', that's just Thought trying to have its way. Genuine creativity occurs in the absence of "the observer" (be it baking, athletics, maths, music, etc.), but what is creating? (this is actually a stupid question but I don't know another way to phrase what I'm trying to say)

This is intuitive idea precisely because the brain builds a worldview by classifying it into "things"; one of these things is "self". By inventing such an object as "self", the "rational" interpretation of the sensory data turns into a form of "self is perceiving". In a purely materialistic stance, this must be enough for a subjective experience to occur, i.e. we assume that reality is such a place where this kind of process causes subjective experience (albeit our understanding of that very process is quite shaky since it is based on us classifying that process into "sensible things", while reality is not quite like that -> our own ontological nature is still shrouded from our thoughts)

I can see how "self" is unlike other 'things' in that it is a conduit through which everything else passes (for me), but the 'thing' that "sees" this must be another aspect of "self", so I don't know where that leaves me.

Let me offer you some material for wrestling that idea of "being no one" properly into your system. Consider a thought experiment where you undergo an adult mitosis. That is, every cell in your body is copied and you split into two; both into the exact same physical state. Which one is the one where the "old you" will go? (Whose "point of view" your current self will assume?) To up the ante, ask yourself if you would agree to undergo an adult mitosis, and have another one of the copies killed, and have the other given a million dollars.

The only thing I can glean from this thought experiment is that Thought is not mine. Thought is like an 'unseen river' that both me and my copy dip our heads in, believing that we have our "own" thoughts because we are physically separated, whereas we actually 'share' Thought, only circumstances, and our physical nature, give the 'illusion' of separate thoughts.

If you find yourself baffled by this thought experiment, it can only be because you have traces of "non-physical self" ideas left in your thinking. In a materialistic stance, the contents of your subjective experience are caused by certain configuration of the brain. With two configurations in the exact same state, there will be two subjective experiences both having the same memories, and both being convinced they are the same self that existed before the split. From this you can derive how there is no metaphysical identity to yourself from one moment to the next either.

They are both the "same self that existed before the split", but to each other they are strangers, due to the physical nature of the separating process of thought.

After many iterations, the nervous systems become able to do just that; to predict reality. For some system to predict some scene, it must model it, by classifying it into "sensible components" to which it assumes certain behaviour, and consequently it can "simulate" how those components behave together (Much like we perform weather simulations by modeling the weather system). In a sense, this is what the brain is; a machine that runs a simulation of reality, so to be able to make rational predictions.

I disagree with this situation completely. I view the nervous system as an interface between the 'internal' and 'external' "realities". Changes in the environment trigger physical changes the neural structure of the nervous system, leading to changes (or affirmations) of mind patterns. Conversely, changes in mind patterns trigger changes in the neural structure of the nervous system, leading to changes (or not) of the environment. I certainly don't view the brain as some isolated entity running programs. (check out Mantura/Verala - (Wiki) Autopoiesis)

Anssi - I have to bail out right now but I will return

 

[AnssiH]

I can see how "self" is unlike other 'things' in that it is a conduit through which everything else passes (for me), but the 'thing' that "sees" this must be another aspect of "self", so I don't know where that leaves me.

Well, think about all those rational reasons that lead you to believe that "the thing that sees is another aspect of self" (like an entity on its own, right?). I.e. think about what other beliefs this belief is based on. To what extent can you trust all the assumptions that must have been made about reality before you can even begin to believe there is some kind of a metaphysical observer somehow connected to the brain?

And to open another line of thought, think about all the functions that this "observer" would have to be capable of metaphysically (without any internal mechanism) Like object recognition (observation is object recognition). If you imagine it does have some internal mechanism to perform this function, well then it's not a metaphysical entity anymore but a system, and it also happens to be just the kind of system that the brain appears to be. An unobservable brain inside the observable brain. Little bit tricky idea.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

I spoke earlier of presenting an unrealistic example for the purpose of illustrating some of the important aspects of treating the ontology as an unknown. The following is the presentation of that "unrealistic" example I had in mind.

I have defined "reality" to be the valid ontology underlying any explanation of the universe. What is very clear is that we have no way of knowing which part of those ontologies which underly our epistemological solutions are valid and which are merely mental constructs required by those solutions themselves. For this reason, I will first consider the quite unrealistic hypothetical problem where the known past (what is to be explained) consists only of valid ontological elements. What these ontological elements actually are is undefined so all we have to work with are references to those elements. In this picture, the "past", that which is to be explained, consists of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. As I commented earlier, that "past" can be seen as a sequence of changes (I defined "changes" in what is known as "presents") which are themselves part of what is to be explained. To put it simply, what is to be explained is a specific sequence of collections of ontological elements which are known only by specific references to those elements (any definitions are embedded in that structure of those references themselves and, if the specific epistemological construct which explains that sequence is understood, the definitions will be presumed to be understood).

Reality itself is the complete set of valid ontological elements (I will call this the set A). Clearly, the set A must be regarded as infinite as, no matter how many elements are contained in the "past" which is to be explained, we must include the possibility that there exists a valid element of which we are ignorant (i.e., that a future exists). This is the very definition of the concept "infinite". On the other hand, "the past" which is to be explained must be finite as, if it were infinite, we could not have knowledge of it (we couldn't finish "knowing the information"). Thus it is that the past can be seen as a finite sequence of presents, each of which consist of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. The past, the set C, consists of an ordered collection of sets B_t<a₁,a₂, ... , a_n>. The terms "a_j" are simply references to those individual ontological elements which go to make up this "past" which is to be explained.

In most logical examples, those references mentioned above would be given via English words or phrases; however, this is certainly not a necessary requirement. We can, in fact, use numerical labels to play this role. The great advantage of using numerical labels is the simple fact that there exist an infinite number available to be used as specific labels. The other advantage is that "numerical labels" contain no information in and of themselves: i.e., it is easy to comprehend that the meanings are not carried in the symbols themselves, something very difficult to comprehend when the labels are given in a specified language. People find it very difficult to comprehend the possibility of error in their understanding of English labels.

Under this perspective, what is to be explained is a finite sequence of finite collections of numbers (our references to the known past). Since no flaw free explanation can be expected to explain anything beyond that "known collection", the only expectations which that explanation can be presumed to provide consists of the validity of any specific "present": i.e., the validity of the set of numbers B_t where "t" is an index on that sequence.

Since the number of collections is finite and the number of reference labels in any collection is also finite, the explanation can be put in the form of a table (in some ways analogous to a truth table common to any logical analysis). As I defined "an explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from "known information", this table fulfills the definition of an explanation. Given any set of numbers, all one need do is look at the table. If the set is in the table, it is a valid set; if not, it isn't a valid set. What you must consider when you think about that issue is the fact that, though what might be considered an explanation under common concepts may be quite different from that table (the method might very well be some logical procedure), the procedure must yield exactly the same result as examining the table just defined. And second, that logical procedure, no matter what it may be, can be seen as manipulation of those numerical labels.

What is important about that last point is that, the explanation (the tabular solution), as given has no capability of yielding expectations outside the actual given past; however, it can be seen as a mathematical table of expectations for specific known "presents" which could be created by some logical manipulation of those numerical labels. That logical manipulation of numerical labels has the capability of yielding expectations outside the known information. So what we are talking about here are methods of interpolation which agree perfectly with the known information.

I'll see if anyone can get their head around that before I go any farther. I am sure your reactions are going to be far from what I expect and am quite curious as to how you will interpret what I have just said.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

...subjective experience certainly exists, but to what extent has it got identity?...

Before I can respond I need to understand what you mean by "subjective"--do you mean a mental thought that is unrelated to facts of reality and assigned arbitrary groupings (say into sets of VOEs).

Consider two options:
Option A. subjective experience derives from subjective mind (Kant)

Option B. subjective experience derives from objective reality (Rand)

Which Option is it for you, A, B, or neither ?

 

[Rade]

...I have defined "reality" to be the valid ontology underlying any explanation of the universe...

I thought your philosophy was the one derived from "UNDEFINED ONTOLOGY"--now here you go starting a very long thread with "A DEFINITION" of ontology itself Or, are you now saying, since you want to begin your argument with a "definition of reality", that you no longer hold a philosophy of "undefined ontology" ? Am I the only one having a problem with this ?

 

[Rade]

...What is very clear is that we have no way of knowing which part of those ontologies which underly our epistemological solutions are valid and which are merely mental constructs required by those solutions themselves. For this reason, ...

NO, this is NOT VERY CLEAR--NOTHING IS CLEAR ABOUT HOW HUMANS "KNOW" ANY"THING". So, let us start with discussion of these options and then all agree that #1 (the one used by Dr.D. to derive his philosophy) is the only one that is "very clear" to all.

1. Humans have "no way of knowing which part...are valid...are mental constructs" [Dr.D. option]
2. Humans have "only one way of knowing which part...are valid..."
3. Humans have "more than one way of knowing which part...are valid..."

Note added in edit: Dr. D., a question for you. Why do you distinguish between parts of ontology that (1) are "valid" vs those that are (2) "mental constructs" ? I see no good reason why ...parts of ontology cannot be both "valid" AND "mental constructs" as a dialectic union...

 

[AnssiH]

I spoke earlier of presenting an unrealistic example for the purpose of illustrating some of the important aspects of treating the ontology as an unknown. The following is the presentation of that "unrealistic" example I had in mind.

I have defined "reality" to be the valid ontology underlying any explanation of the universe. What is very clear is that we have no way of knowing which part of those ontologies which underly our epistemological solutions are valid and which are merely mental constructs required by those solutions themselves. For this reason, I will first consider the quite unrealistic hypothetical problem where the known past (what is to be explained) consists only of valid ontological elements. What these ontological elements actually are is undefined so all we have to work with are references to those elements. In this picture, the "past", that which is to be explained, consists of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. As I commented earlier, that "past" can be seen as a sequence of changes (I defined "changes" in what is known as "presents") which are themselves part of what is to be explained. To put it simply, what is to be explained is a specific sequence of collections of ontological elements which are known only by specific references to those elements (any definitions are embedded in that structure of those references themselves and, if the specific epistemological construct which explains that sequence is understood, the definitions will be presumed to be understood).

Reality itself is the complete set of valid ontological elements (I will call this the set A). Clearly, the set A must be regarded as infinite as, no matter how many elements are contained in the "past" which is to be explained, we must include the possibility that there exists a valid element of which we are ignorant (i.e., that a future exists). This is the very definition of the concept "infinite". On the other hand, "the past" which is to be explained must be finite as, if it were infinite, we could not have knowledge of it (we couldn't finish "knowing the information"). Thus it is that the past can be seen as a finite sequence of presents, each of which consist of a finite collection of valid ontological elements. The past, the set C, consists of an ordered collection of sets B_t<a₁,a₂, ... , a_n>. The terms "a_j" are simply references to those individual ontological elements which go to make up this "past" which is to be explained.

In most logical examples, those references mentioned above would be given via English words or phrases; however, this is certainly not a necessary requirement. We can, in fact, use numerical labels to play this role. The great advantage of using numerical labels is the simple fact that there exist an infinite number available to be used as specific labels. The other advantage is that "numerical labels" contain no information in and of themselves: i.e., it is easy to comprehend that the meanings are not carried in the symbols themselves, something very difficult to comprehend when the labels are given in a specified language. People find it very difficult to comprehend the possibility of error in their understanding of English labels.

Under this perspective, what is to be explained is a finite sequence of finite collections of numbers (our references to the known past). Since no flaw free explanation can be expected to explain anything beyond that "known collection", the only expectations which that explanation can be presumed to provide consists of the validity of any specific "present": i.e., the validity of the set of numbers B_t where "t" is an index on that sequence.

Since the number of collections is finite and the number of reference labels in any collection is also finite, the explanation can be put in the form of a table (in some ways analogous to a truth table common to any logical analysis). As I defined "an explanation" to be a method of obtaining expectations from "known information", this table fulfills the definition of an explanation. Given any set of numbers, all one need do is look at the table. If the set is in the table, it is a valid set; if not, it isn't a valid set. What you must consider when you think about that issue is the fact that, though what might be considered an explanation under common concepts may be quite different from that table (the method might very well be some logical procedure), the procedure must yield exactly the same result as examining the table just defined. And second, that logical procedure, no matter what it may be, can be seen as manipulation of those numerical labels.

What is important about that last point is that, the explanation (the tabular solution), as given has no capability of yielding expectations outside the actual given past; however, it can be seen as a mathematical table of expectations for specific known "presents" which could be created by some logical manipulation of those numerical labels. That logical manipulation of numerical labels has the capability of yielding expectations outside the known information. So what we are talking about here are methods of interpolation which agree perfectly with the known information.

I'll see if anyone can get their head around that before I go any farther. I am sure your reactions are going to be far from what I expect and am quite curious as to how you will interpret what I have just said.

Well, it certainly is little bit tricky to interpret unambiguously.

I picked up that you presented a hypothetical example where you don't yet tackle the complications that arise due to the fact that we don't know which elements of an ontology are "valid" and which are mental constructs?

Then you propose marking down all the elements (which are all valid in this example) onto a table, but how that is useful I didn't yet get...

Hmm, also, perhaps you can clarify another thing which I've wondered before. You have chosen to handle ontology as a set of "presents" (set of moments?), this I reckon is like defining "what exists at each moment"? This is one of the most difficult things to remember when reading your text, since we are (or at least I am) so used to handle ontological elements as a set of "stable functions", i.e. instead of defining everything that ever existed in each moment, I would rather attempt to define how reality behaves.

Would this approach be incompatible to what you are presenting (I'm not quite sure where you presentation is heading), and/or do you feel it would be presupposing too much to think it's valid to define ontology as a set of stable functions(behaviours)?

I hope you can understand what I'm asking because it is pretty hard to even think of meaningful questions... :I

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Before I can respond I need to understand what you mean by "subjective"--do you mean a mental thought that is unrelated to facts of reality and assigned arbitrary groupings (say into sets of VOEs).

When I said "subjective experience certainly exists", I was referring to that all-familiar experience that we are having. That which consists of all sorts of "things" that we recognize around us, whatever their underlying nature (causes) might be.

But it is not a naive realistic experience; the aspects it consists of don't exist in reality the way we experience them, but according to our best physical models the particular subjective experience is caused by a specific way our brain/sensory systems recognizes wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation (colour) or air pressure fluctuations => differences in air molecule density (sound) etc... I.e. the subjective experience is not "like" objective reality exists, but it is rather just a particular way to "handle" that reality.

Consider two options:
Option A. subjective experience derives from subjective mind (Kant)

Option B. subjective experience derives from objective reality (Rand)

Which Option is it for you, A, B, or neither ?

I could agree with both, depending on how you mean them. I would say that which could be called "objectve reality" exists, and by "subjective mind" I would refer to the specific high-level process (portion of that reality) that is causing the subjective experience.

Even reading the wikipedia page about Rand and her view she calls Objectivism, I could still agree with both depending on how I should interpret these views.

I am not proposing that reality does not exist, but I am proposing that when we point our finger at some particular stable pattern of it and call it by name, it doesn't mean an entity like that actually exists in ontological sense (that reality is made of such entities).

You could choose to understand the word "identity" as just a reference to certain stable property or characteristic of something, and in that sense point your finger at a wave on a pond and say it has got identity, while also those water molecules that are just going up and down are also having an identity of their own.

With a different definition to "identity" you could say that wave does not have identity but the molecules do, or at least the elementary particles that the molecules are composed of have got identity to themselves (i.e. if the water molecules were swapping those elemantary particles with each others all the time, they would not have a persisting identity).

This is probably the most common definition people assume to "identity", and in this view you would not say that the hole of a doughnut has got identity to itself (while it stably exists), but the doughnut itself does (since its made of elementary particles that are usually thought to possesses identity).

Note that with this definition already, when joined with materialism, the identity of "self" disappears. You are a learning machine and your knowledge and memories (and consequently the way you react to stimulus) exists only in the specific configuration of neurons that keeps changing all the time. You think there is a self with identity, but that is only because your experience and your memories persist, and it would persist even if all the material particles of your brain were switched to different particles; as long as that specific configuration remained that holds/is your memories.

But let's push it little bit further still. Why suppose those elementary particles have got identity to themselves; perhaps they are just a specific configuration of energy in constant flux (after all, matter can be turned into energy and vice versa). Checking out Milo Wolff's model where everything is made of spherical standing waves of space is a good excercise here, regardless of what you might think of the validity of that model.

Next we need to also question the identity of "energy". And we run into trouble, much like we ran into trouble with the identity of space when Newtonian relativity was introduced (there was no longer reason to assume space has got metaphysical "locations" (rest frame) in it, and yet objects are moving "through it". Instead space should be seen either as a relativistic spacetime construction, or as something that matter gives rise to... our conception of "space" turn out to be rather full of questions)

So we can see that it is an extra assumption to assume identity to any elementary particles that exist in any model, be it photons, electrons or quarks. While all these things "exist" in the same sense that that hole in the doughnut exists.

Let me still tell you that it can be quite illuminating to look at the quantum mechanics while keeping in mind that these little particles that move in such an odd manner, probably do not have an identity to themselves. It doesn't resolve the mystery, but it certainly seems to be few steps forward as long as you remember all the measuring devices are similarly "stable things without identity", and that we indeed do tend to find the particles from locations that would hold a highest "energy density" at any given moment. (The timewise evolution of quantum systems is seriously shrouded in mystery still, but then, time is also a semantical concept we hold in our minds... :I)

Oh, and some people at this point cannot find much sense to the idea that nothing would have an identity... ...this would be the case already due to the way our brain appears to be modeling a reality (building a worldview). To model something, you have got to describe it in terms of certain objects and their associated behaviour, regardless of how it really exists. To think of reality, we absolutely must classify it into "sensible objects".

I am not sure if Rand or Kant would disagree, and if so, at which points.

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

When I said "subjective experience certainly exists", I was referring to that all-familiar experience that we are having. That which consists of all sorts of "things" that we recognize around us, whatever their underlying nature (causes) might be.

Thank you for the clarity of your response.

Following this quote from your post:
"I am not proposing that reality does not exist"--that is, you propose that reality does exist, therefore as a Premise #1 let us agree:

Reality Exists​

[Note: here you will find agreement with Rand, although she states it as]:

"Existence Exists"​

And then your quote:
"To think of reality, we absolutely must classify it into "sensible objects"."

Now, suppose a "sensible object" {X} that is real before you and you point your finger at it. Would you then agree that ?:

your experience of {X}= dialectic union of your subjective mind + objective reality of {X}​

If so, can we not conclude that the terms "subjective experience" and "objective experience" of {X} are of no value, but offer a false dichotomy--that is, when we refer to the term "experience of {X}" we mean a dialectic union of the subjective (the classifier = you) + objective (that which is classified = {X}) ?

Next your comments about "identity"...

This is probably the most common definition people assume to "identity", and in this view you would not say that the hole of a doughnut has got identity to itself (while it stably exists), but the doughnut itself does (since its made of elementary particles that are usually thought to possesses identity).

Here I would say the the hole of a doughnut is an attribute of the doughnut and as such the hole as attribute has identity (that is, the hole is what the hole is), however, the hole as existent does not have "identity", for while it is possible to have a doughnut without a hole, it is not possible in this example to have a hole without a doughnut.

So we can see that it is an extra assumption to assume identity to any elementary particles that exist in any model, be it photons, electrons or quarks. While all these things "exist" in the same sense that that hole in the doughnut exists.

Here I would not agree--to attach same level of existence to "hole of doughnut" as to "photons, electrons, quarks" is a form of concept stealing, what has been called a Reification of the Zero. Physicists can cause photons to hit other photons, or electrons, or quarks and observe cause-effect events. But it is nonsense to even consider that we remove hole from donut and use it (the hole) to cause an effect on some other thing with identity. Now, concerning energy--it comes in many different forms so I see no good reason why different forms of potential energy and kinetic energy cannot have their specific identity(see http://www.need.org/needpdf/FormsofEnergy.pdf)--not sure I am grasping your concern about energy having identity ? Finally, I find no problem with quantum mechanics and identity--so, it goes for me... existence exists and what exists must exist as some metaphysical entity with identity and the nature (dynamics) of that identity is explained by quantum mechanics. I do not know if Rand would agree or not with this (I think she would), but Kant most surely would not.

 

[AnssiH]

Thank you for the clarity of your response.

Following this quote from your post:
"I am not proposing that reality does not exist"--that is, you propose that reality does exist, therefore as a Premise #1 let us agree:

Reality Exists​

[Note: here you will find agreement with Rand, although she states it as]:

"Existence Exists"​

And then your quote:
"To think of reality, we absolutely must classify it into "sensible objects"."

Now, suppose a "sensible object" {X} that is real before you and you point your finger at it. Would you then agree that ?:

your experience of {X}= dialectic union of your subjective mind + objective reality of {X}​

Yes you could say that, unless it implied to someone that subjective mind & objective reality are ontologically separated things. That is why I tend to just say "subjective experience" rather than refer to a "mind".

And also to say that you must have first assumed there are fundamental "real" building blocks to reality in ontological sense also, as oppose to only in our ways of thinking about that reality.

If so, can we not conclude that the terms "subjective experience" and "objective experience" of {X} are of no value, but offer a false dichotomy--that is, when we refer to the term "experience of {X}" we mean a dialectic union of the subjective (the classifier = you) + objective (that which is classified = {X}) ?

Well sure. I mean, I tend to see "experience" as something that could only refer to a subjective experience (since "objective experience" would be an oxymoron), although I still use the phrase "subjective experience" just to clarify what I am talking about. In any case the proper way to understand this would be that objective reality is the underlying cause of that subjective experience. "We are in reality and reality is in us"

Next your comments about "identity"...

Here I would say the the hole of a doughnut is an attribute of the doughnut and as such the hole as attribute has identity (that is, the hole is what the hole is), however, the hole as existent does not have "identity"

Yeah, the hole is identified by a certain pattern, that is caused by the doughnut. Now most people tack that doughnut with "real identity", that is, assume that the doughnut is ontologically the "same entity" from one moment to the next. Another option, which I suggest you try out for a fit, is that the doughnut is a "stable energy concentration". I cannot make any ontologically accurate assertions here (you should not take these as a claims as to how reality IS), but I can refer to different sorts of paradigms for matter to loosen some contraints that exist in almost everyones worldviews.

For example, in that spherical standing wave idea that was mentioned, fundamental particle (electron) is seen as a standing wave, much like standing waves form in, say, acoustics.

For example, look at the first three pictures:
http://www.glafreniere.com/sa_spherical.htm

The third is what happens when the first two interfere. Note how differently you assume identity to waves in each picture. In the last one you would be inclined to say there is a real persistent entity in the middle and bouncing waves around it that don't move in space. The underlying reality of such a perception could be very much different.

Here I would not agree--to attach same level of existence to "hole of doughnut" as to "photons, electrons, quarks" is a form of concept stealing, what has been called a Reification of the Zero. Physicists can cause photons to hit other photons, or electrons, or quarks and observe cause-effect events. But it is nonsense to even consider that we remove hole from donut and use it (the hole) to cause an effect on some other thing with identity.

Well, on a stable platform with a hole in the middle, the hole does have an observable effect; things fall through it. Incidentally, there are views where some particles exist as holes in space (and when we see two particles colliding and disappearing, it is in fact a case of a particle falling into that hole, filling it) I cannot remember the details, and I hope I had references but I cannot find them now. In any case, this would be just a way to handle the same system in semantically different way in ones own mind.

As of the identity of photons and electrons and quarks, no one has ever seen a photon, electron or quark per se. We measure certain behaviour, and explain that with a model where photons, electrons and quarks exist (and everyone imagine these little bit differently). With these experiments we have found many different sorts of quarks; some require higher energy levels to exist in stable manner. Andrew Pickering and many others have suggested, quite succesfully in my opinion, that quarks are not real things but artificial abstractions. One of the main motivations for this is that quarks cannot exist alone according to the models that suggest their existence. It rather looks like quarks are descriptions of certain characteristics of higher order "stable things", if you know what I mean. (Like describing a top half and the bottom half of a wave as separate entities)

This could be revealing:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0226667995/?tag=pfamazon01-20

What must not be forgotten about matter is that in experiments in particle accelerators, we can form sufficiently high energy densities to form matter, and likewise we can turn matter into energy. I think this is a good indications towards the idea that matter is a case of stable energy configuration...

...which leads us straight into what I mentioned about the identity of energy. Again, we always think of "things" with assumed identity, and likewise when you think about energy, you think about something that flows from one place to the next, much like a naive realistic fluid (i.e. if you drew dots onto the energy, you could see those dots moving). A good next step is to ask yourself, what constraints you to assume this kind of nature to energy?

http://www.need.org/needpdf/FormsofEnergy.pdf)--not[/URL] sure I am grasping your concern about energy having identity ? Finally, I find no problem with quantum mechanics and identity--so, it goes for me... existence exists and what exists must exist as some metaphysical entity with identity and the nature (dynamics) of that identity is explained by quantum mechanics.

Here you are faced with that difficult question that was one motivator for dropping identity from things in the first place. What is the identity that quantum mechanics "explain"? What does QM behaviour suggest here in your opinion? (And which interpretation is your choice, if any)

btw, I found this quote from Wikipedia entry about "Dialectic Materialism" to still be quite fitting to the present situation of quantum mechanics:

[With quantum mechanics, matter seems to disapper] 'Matter disappears' means that the limit within which we have hitherto known matter disappears and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter are disappearing that formerly seemed absolute, immutable and primary, and which are now revealed to be relative and characteristic only of certain states of matter.

One of those properties of matter that seem to be disappearing, is its identity. At least, dropping it as a real property explains a whole lot. Not everything, but a lot.

-Anssi

 

[verdigris]

What is an illusion?What is time?
First we need to define both accurately and see if they are the same.

 

[Doctordick]

I picked up that you presented a hypothetical example where you don't yet tackle the complications that arise due to the fact that we don't know which elements of an ontology are "valid" and which are mental constructs?

You are right on the money.

Then you propose marking down all the elements (which are all valid in this example) onto a table, but how that is useful I didn't yet get...

It is useful because it allowed me to define something which fulfilled the definition of an explanation without actually defining any of the ontological elements. That turns out to be an extremely powerful construct.

Hmm, also, perhaps you can clarify another thing which I've wondered before. You have chosen to handle ontology as a set of "presents" (set of moments?), this I reckon is like defining "what exists at each moment"?

Yes, that is exactly what it "is like". Basically it says, "what is", is "what is" and nothing further is necessary to solve the problem: i.e., I have been able to construct "an explanation" which says no more than that. I am quite impressed that you managed to pick up on the underlying nature of the issue; I don't think anyone else has. There are a number of issues which I do not delineate explicitly though they are quite important. However, with regard to that very issue, you must comprehend that it provides not the first clew as to what should be expected of the future; it provides only "an explanation" for the known past. I should also point out that, from a "usefulness" perspective it is a rather worthless explanation as, being no more than a table of what to expect, it is actually far too complex and unwieldy to be useful; however, from the perspective of logical analysis, it is quite simple.

What I was trying to point out was the fact that "any explanation" is bound by exactly the same constraint: i.e., you can only prove it works for the known past; that it is to be depended upon for the future is an inductive hypothesis the analysis of which needs to be postponed until we get all our ducks in a row (so to speak). For the moment, the "explanation" I have provided has absolutely nothing to say about future events.

This is one of the most difficult things to remember when reading your text, since we are (or at least I am) so used to handle ontological elements as a set of "stable functions", i.e. instead of defining everything that ever existed in each moment, I would rather attempt to define how reality behaves.

So would we all and that is the very essence of of acceptable explanations; however, in deciding that an explanation is acceptable, we must make assumptions and it is these assumption which generally close our eyes to alternated possibilities. What I want to do is keep those alternate possibilities explicitly open. No doors are to be closed without proof that they are indeed impossible.

Would this approach be incompatible to what you are presenting (I'm not quite sure where you presentation is heading), and/or do you feel it would be presupposing too much to think it's valid to define ontology as a set of stable functions (behaviors)?

At the moment, yes; it is exactly "presupposing" too much. But what I want you to understand is that it is exactly those suppositions which can be seen as included in the view that the valid ontology consists of "what exists at each moment".

What the view you are promulgating requires is that one identify a particular ontological element at a specific "moment" (a member of an identified "present") with an ontological element at a different specific "moment" (a member of a second identified "present"). What that identification requires is that the "reference label" attached to those two (possibly different ontological elements -- different in time anyway) must be the same. What I am getting at is the fact that handling ontological elements as a set of "stable functions" is essentially exactly the same as handling everything that ever existed in each moment as different; the only difference between these two seemingly very different perspectives actually amounts to no more than establishing a specific set of numerical labels.

That is to say, any explanation of the past under examination can be mapped into the table I have specified; it just requires that the numerical labels be established (or defined). That is exactly why I make so much noise about the fact that the information defining those ontological elements must be embedded in the epistemology itself (these all important definitions arise from correlations in the set of specific labels use to express that epistemological solution).

What is really important here is that your understanding of any given specific epistemological solution consists of a finite number of specific labels (symbols for supposed valid ontological elements of the past) together with underlying presumed ontological elements not actually contained in that specific finite set (these are the presumptions in your understanding itself). The basis of your understanding is in the correlations you see in some finite set of specific labels. What I want to do is carefully examine the possibilities without closing out any alternate possibilities.

I hope you understand that I am slowly defining things that are characteristics of that numerical table which represents that generalized explanation of the past ("what is", is "what is" and nothing further). Normally I would put off the following definition until later but, at the moment, it seems you might understand the rational for such a thing right now. I define "an object" to be any collection of ontological elements held by a specific epistemological solution, to be referring to the same thing. An "acceptable" explanation of "reality" will provide expected behavior of these objects. The point of my attack is that we must carefully examine the foundation of those "acceptable" explanations before presuming existence of those objects; we need to examine the characteristics of that table which expresses the "what is", is "what is" explanation.

I hope you can understand what I'm asking because it is pretty hard to even think of meaningful questions... :I

As soon as you begin to understand what I am saying well enough to ask "meaningful questions", you will understand it well enough to answer those questions yourself. (I am sure you have heard that old adage, "the trick to discovering good answers is asking the right question".) Actually, we are at this moment not very far from seeing the big picture. There are only a few more subtle things you need to be aware off.

Before we can really go on, you need to be able to see your own world view as a, "what is", is "what is" tabular explanation consisting of valid ontological elements together with presumed ontological elements (which go to make up your personal past: i.e., what you know or think you know) and not concern yourself with entries to that table which are not actually specific examples of that known past. Though there is utterly no way to tell the difference between a valid ontological element and a presumed ontological element (so long as that world view is a flaw free epistemological construct) there are, nonetheless, vast differences between the two. The "valid ontological elements" must be explained by every flaw free epistemological construct, whereas the presumed ontological elements are part and parcel of the epistemological constructs themselves and are fundamentally free variables open to be anything you wish (so long as they are perfectly consistent with that flaw free epistemological construct).

Though you can not tell the difference, in the logical analysis of that "what is", is "what is" tabular explanation, they must be handled in a very different way. It is a common flaw in philosophical analysis to assume that, if you cannot tell the difference between two things, they cannot be handled differently. That idea is embedded in analysis of epistemological constructs and, so long as we concern ourselves with any specific epistemological construct, it is an utterly valid constraint; however, it is not true of the logical analysis of that, "what is", is "what is" tabular explanation itself.

I hope what I said doesn't confuse you too much. Tell me what you find confusing and I will try and straighten it out for you.

To the rest of you, I think you are wasting your time building epistemological constructs which can not be defended (what Kant referred to as "mock battles") so I apologize for ignoring you.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

["what is", is "what is"] is the same as saying [A] = [A], which has been known since Aristotle first defined the term as the "Law of Identity". Thus, any philosophy of ontology that begins from the premise of "what is, is what is" correctly recognizes the fundamental importance of the Law of Identity to any valid explanation of epistemology.

But, very important to realize--[A] = [A] is not the starting point of a valid explanation of ontology, what must be priori is what can be called the "Primacy of Existence"--that is, first the [A] as an ontological element must exist, but its existence does not need to be "explained" or "defined". Thus we see that while the [A] as an ontological element is outside explanation, any "set" of [A]s most clearly does need to be defined and explained. Note, as mentioned by AnssiH, the individual quark as an ontological element, a type of [A], cannot be defined or explained or even measured--only after a dialectic union of two opposite quarks, one matter and another antimatter (such as meson), can we offer a definition or explanation or measurement of the entity called "quark" (eg., that it has asymptotic freedom, always found as matter + antimatter, etc.)

About "explanation"--what does it mean ? Suppose you are asked to "explain" to a child how to put together a 10 piece puzzle. Where do you start ? You start with existence--you point to 10 ontological elements on the table but you have no need at all to "define" or "explain" any of them--they are, what they are, elements of the puzzle that exist. The child understands this. What you define is the "set of elements" and the "state" they are in--call it "disorder" on the table. The child understands this also--for does anyone know disorder better than a child ? Next you show how any 2 of the 10 elements can be joined together--that is, you show how to remove disorder from the system. Most children will understand this. You then have the child at it, you tell them to keep removing disorder until a final state of complete order is reached (all 10 elements are together). Not all children will reach the final state--but note that reaching the final state of order is also outside the explanation. Thus a priori to any "explanation" is "existence" of valid elements in disorder, and a posteriori to any explanation is existence again, but now either as elements continued in some degree of disorder or in complete order.

So I say, to "explain" any"thing" is to tell another person (or yourself) symbolically how to obtain order from disorder.​

 

[Rade]

...What must not be forgotten about matter is that in experiments in particle accelerators, we can form sufficiently high energy densities to form matter, and likewise we can turn matter into energy. I think this is a good indications towards the idea that matter is a case of stable energy configuration...which leads us straight into what I mentioned about the identity of energy. Again, we always think of "things" with assumed identity, and likewise when you think about energy, you think about something that flows from one place to the next, much like a naive realistic fluid (i.e. if you drew dots onto the energy, you could see those dots moving). A good next step is to ask yourself, what constraints you to assume this kind of nature to energy?

I find the thoughts here to be of interest to the question on the relation of matter and energy:

There is no energy in matter other than that received from the environment." — Nikola Tesla

...Here you are faced with that difficult question that was one motivator for dropping identity from things in the first place. What is the identity that quantum mechanics "explain"? What does QM behavior suggest here in your opinion? (And which interpretation is your choice, if any)...

imo, it is not a concern for philosophic discussion what is the "identity" of reality--that is up to the physicists to determine. It is, what it is--as we have been informed by good Dr.D., eg, reality has identity, A = A. The reason I now hold to QM is because it meshes well with my view that whatever the identity of reality is, it will be found to be a simple yet beautiful dialectic union on opposites--and here then I find union with the principle of complementarity of Bohr where he suggested that existence can be understood only in terms of "concepts" that come in complementary pairs of opposites that are inextricably connected by a Heisenberg-like uncertainty principle--which leads to the QM view of the superposition--this is for me what "QM suggests" about identity of reality--the reality of the Dialectic.

...One of those properties of matter that seem to be disappearing, is its identity. At least, dropping it as a real property explains a whole lot. Not everything, but a lot...

But if we do decide to drop identity from matter and move philosophy forward, we end with a philosophy where [A] does NOT = [A], where "what is, is NOT what is", where what exists does NOT exist as a some"thing" but only as a no"thing", and then poor Dr.D. left with no philosophy at all for then there be no"thing" to explain.

 

[Doctordick]

You apparently don't wish to work with my definition! That's fine with me; I just wonder why you are bothering to read my posts.

So I say, to "explain" any"thing" is to tell another person (or yourself) symbolically how to obtain order from disorder.​

If that is your position, then why don't you go ahead and use it to show the world what interesting consequences can be deduced from that definition?

Oh, I'm sorry; that's right, you're not interested in deducing anything, you are exactly the person Kant was talking about:

... as seen by Kant ... "for those who wish to exercise themselves in mock fights, and where no combatant has, as yet, succeeded in gaining an inch of ground that he could call permanently his own. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the method of metaphysic has hitherto consisted in groping only, and, what is the worst, in groping among mere concepts."

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

You just want to build a mock battle for the fun of it don't you. It would be nice if you would rather think about things a little.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

...If that is your position, then why don't you go ahead and use it to show the world what interesting consequences can be deduced from that definition? ...

But Dear Dr., I just did, and what a very interesting and entertaining consequence it was indeed.

 

[Rade]

Let me use comments from Dr. D post #354 to show how Dr. D. philosophy of "explanation" is falsified from what I will call Allegory of Puzzle--see my post # 364.

1. We start with premise that the problem to be solved is understanding how to explain to a child how to put together a 10 piece puzzle (post #364).

2. From Dr. D. (post #354) we are informed...the "past", that which is to be explained, consists of a finite collection of valid ontological elements (VOE)...so clearly the 10 puzzle pieces represent the finite set of VOEs that he talks about.

3. But next we read from Dr. D. what I will call logical error #1 that...I will first consider the quite unrealistic hypothetical problem where the known past (what is to be explained) consists only of valid ontological elements... :yuck: But, then, clearly, what Dr. D. is considering (that is, all text in post # 354 after this statement) is null and void of any meaning for the simple reason that the problem to be solved here (eg., understanding how to explain to a child the process of putting together a 10 piece puzzle) is neither "unrealistic" nor "hypothetical". What this informs, is that, whatever philosophy Dr.D. has put together, it cannot be applied to what is both realistic and non-hypothetical such as the simplistic puzzle problem discussed here.

4. Next from Dr. D. we are informed...no matter how many elements are contained in the "past" which is to be explained, we must include the possibility that there exists a valid element of which we are ignorant (i.e., that a future exists)...So, here we find logical error of Dr. D. #2 for clearly there is 0.0 % possibility that there exists an VOE puzzle piece of which we are ignorant in the problem here to be solved.

In conclusion, I find that the philosophy of Dr. D. is thus falsified by the fact that it cannot be applied to solve the realistic and non-hypothetical problem of understanding how to explain to a child the process of putting together a 10 piece puzzle.

 

[Rade]

Originally Posted by Rade:
So I say, to "explain" any"thing" is to tell another person (or yourself) symbolically how to obtain order from disorder.

But I now find that what I say above is incomplete, for it does not apply to the situation (using the 10 piece puzzle example) of dissociation of the whole puzzle into the 10 pieces. So, let me revise and now say:

To "explain" any"thing" is to tell another person (or yourself) symbolically how a passing-away of a "this" is a coming-to-be of a "that" (something other than a "this"), AND a coming-to-be of a "this" is a passing-away of a "that".

All laws of physics are a solution to this definition of explanation itself.

 

[AnssiH]

So would we all and that is the very essence of of acceptable explanations; however, in deciding that an explanation is acceptable, we must make assumptions and it is these assumption which generally close our eyes to alternated possibilities. What I want to do is keep those alternate possibilities explicitly open. No doors are to be closed without proof that they are indeed impossible.

Okay. Will we find it possible to close any doors at all?

At the moment, yes; it is exactly "presupposing" too much. But what I want you to understand is that it is exactly those suppositions which can be seen as included in the view that the valid ontology consists of "what exists at each moment".

What the view you are promulgating requires is that one identify a particular ontological element at a specific "moment" (a member of an identified "present") with an ontological element at a different specific "moment" (a member of a second identified "present"). What that identification requires is that the "reference label" attached to those two (possibly different ontological elements -- different in time anyway) must be the same. What I am getting at is the fact that handling ontological elements as a set of "stable functions" is essentially exactly the same as handling everything that ever existed in each moment as different; the only difference between these two seemingly very different perspectives actually amounts to no more than establishing a specific set of numerical labels.

Okay, yeah, this actually reminds me a lot about what I've said about the fallacy of identity, about how it is inherent to our worldviews to handle things by identifying some "patterns" as the "same thing" through time. That is to say, I can easily imagine one might simply choose to view reality in terms of each moment being defined separately, if that seems to be useful for whatever purpose (like for the purpose of the analysis you are describing :)

That is to say, any explanation of the past under examination can be mapped into the table I have specified; it just requires that the numerical labels be established (or defined). That is exactly why I make so much noise about the fact that the information defining those ontological elements must be embedded in the epistemology itself (these all important definitions arise from correlations in the set of specific labels use to express that epistemological solution).

What is really important here is that your understanding of any given specific epistemological solution consists of a finite number of specific labels (symbols for supposed valid ontological elements of the past) together with underlying presumed ontological elements not actually contained in that specific finite set (these are the presumptions in your understanding itself). The basis of your understanding is in the correlations you see in some finite set of specific labels. What I want to do is carefully examine the possibilities without closing out any alternate possibilities.

I hope you understand that I am slowly defining things that are characteristics of that numerical table which represents that generalized explanation of the past ("what is", is "what is" and nothing further). Normally I would put off the following definition until later but, at the moment, it seems you might understand the rational for such a thing right now. I define "an object" to be any collection of ontological elements held by a specific epistemological solution, to be referring to the same thing. An "acceptable" explanation of "reality" will provide expected behavior of these objects. The point of my attack is that we must carefully examine the foundation of those "acceptable" explanations before presuming existence of those objects;

Again we are in luck; I can indeed understand the rationale behind this view, since it happens to correspond closely to how I tend to see all that business regaring what our worldviews are like and what their consequent limitations are.

One thing though, just to be sure, when you say "...collection of ontological elements referring to the same thing...", you refer to the way we understand "objects" or "entities" according to a set of (its) properties (functions/characteristics/behaviour). Be it a "ball" or "space"?

Before we can really go on, you need to be able to see your own world view as a, "what is", is "what is" tabular explanation consisting of valid ontological elements together with presumed ontological elements (which go to make up your personal past: i.e., what you know or think you know) and not concern yourself with entries to that table which are not actually specific examples of that known past. Though there is utterly no way to tell the difference between a valid ontological element and a presumed ontological element (so long as that world view is a flaw free epistemological construct) there are, nonetheless, vast differences between the two. The "valid ontological elements" must be explained by every flaw free epistemological construct, whereas the presumed ontological elements are part and parcel of the epistemological constructs themselves and are fundamentally free variables open to be anything you wish (so long as they are perfectly consistent with that flaw free epistemological construct).

Yes this sounds very reasonable again.

Though you can not tell the difference, in the logical analysis of that "what is", is "what is" tabular explanation, they must be handled in a very different way. It is a common flaw in philosophical analysis to assume that, if you cannot tell the difference between two things, they cannot be handled differently. That idea is embedded in analysis of epistemological constructs and, so long as we concern ourselves with any specific epistemological construct, it is an utterly valid constraint; however, it is not true of the logical analysis of that, "what is", is "what is" tabular explanation itself.

Hmmm, ok, is this leading to a way to analyze a number of different flawless solutions together to come up with further conclusions than any single one could produce alone?

I hope what I said doesn't confuse you too much. Tell me what you find confusing and I will try and straighten it out for you.

Well obviously there are few things that I cannot be quite sure about, but I think we can proceed further and things will get straighten out.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

I find the thoughts here to be of interest to the question on the relation of matter and energy:

There is no energy in matter other than that received from the environment." — Nikola Tesla

I am not familiar with the quote and don't know what Nikola had in mind when he said that. Nevertheless sounds like a reasonable assertion :)

imo, it is not a concern for philosophic discussion what is the "identity" of reality--that is up to the physicists to determine. It is, what it is--as we have been informed by good Dr.D., eg, reality has identity, A = A. The reason I now hold to QM is because it meshes well with my view that whatever the identity of reality is, it will be found to be a simple yet beautiful dialectic union on opposites--and here then I find union with the principle of complementarity of Bohr where he suggested that existence can be understood only in terms of "concepts" that come in complementary pairs of opposites that are inextricably connected by a Heisenberg-like uncertainty principle--which leads to the QM view of the superposition--this is for me what "QM suggests" about identity of reality--the reality of the Dialectic.

Well, one thing that seems to follow from the fact that our worldview begins with assumptions is that we must invent concepts in juxtapositions with each others before they can make any sense. A single concept cannot make sense alone, but its meaning is wholly defined by other concepts and vice versa. That is to say, when you form a concept about "solid things", that also entails you form a conception of things that are not solid. You cannot know what some conception means without also knowing what it doesn't mean; you cannot know what something is without also knowing what it isn't.

I've wondered before whether this has got a connections to our inability to understand QM in an explicit sense, but it doesn't seem so. For example, the concepts used in Copenhagen interpretation are fairly standard concepts that most everyone understands; just they are arranged in a very surprising way. It can be quite revealing to realize that we must always use "everyday concepts" in any explanation about quantum realm. We don't really have any other concepts; new concepts like "superposition", are concepts that are synthesized from everyday concepts (of position and time)

At any rate, I have two serious objections to what you said.

1. You are referring to just one very specific interpretation of QM when you talk about superpositions and complementary. There are other interpretations, and Copenhagen is receiving way too much attention in my opinion, just because it was the first proper interpretation (and because Bohr pushed it so strongly that it became an intimate part of QM culture)

2. You don't necessarily even need to say that Bohr's views point at the "reality of a dialectic". To me they seem to point at epistemology rather than to ontology. You must at least accept it is wholly possible it is only the limitation of our "intelligence" that things come in complementary pairs, not an actual limitation of reality.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hi AnssiH, I only have time for a quick and dirty response as my wife and I are leaving for the East Coast this afternoon. My brother in law died (old age – congestive heart failure) this last weekend and I need to attend the funeral. Beginning to feel a bit mortal.

I am actually quite astonished as too how well you have picked up on my presentation. Looking back over some of my older posts (all my posts have to do with exactly the same issue) I think I may have learned a little about how to present these ideas; however, to date you seem to understand what I am saying a lot better than anyone else.

Okay. Will we find it possible to close any doors at all?

Oh yes, we are going to close a whole slew of them not far down the line.

One thing though, just to be sure, when you say "...collection of ontological elements referring to the same thing...", you refer to the way we understand "objects" or "entities" according to a set of (its) properties (functions/characteristics/behaviour). Be it a "ball" or "space"?

The "collection of ontological elements" consists of whatever those ontological elements happen to be. If the epistemological construct is built upon ontological elements which you would prefer to label "conventional objects" that is fine. If you want to include "properties" as a fundamental ontological concept then my definition of an object would include that. I define an object to be any collection of ontological elements which are going to be considered to exist at different times. That is a pure outcome of a defined epistemological construct.

Hmmm, ok, is this leading to a way to analyze a number of different flawless solutions together to come up with further conclusions than any single one could produce alone?

I want you to consider the set of all possible flawless epistemological solutions to your known past: the set of all possible world views consistent with what you know. What is important here is that every one of those solutions must also be consistent with the "what is" is "what is" tabular explanation I have already discussed. Just as you cannot prove the "brain in a vat" explanation of reality is wrong, you cannot prove the, "what is" is "what is" is the wrong explanation. It should be clear to you that every conceivable explanation of reality can be seen as no more than a specific example of that, "what is" is "what is" explanation together with a collection of mental fabrications necessary to create the rules that allows that particular explanation to explain your experiences (essentially fulfilling the need for cause).

But there is one great advantage to that "what is" is "what is" explanation. That advantage is that it requires no more than a set of reference labels for each and every ontological element going to make up each and every present going to make up your past (note that time has become a very personal thing here, having almost nothing to do with objective reality and everything to do with your interpretation of objective reality -- a mere mental tool for handling the issue of changing knowledge). Note that absolutely every flaw free epistemological construct must explain those "valid ontological elements": i.e., the rules deduced from those mental fabrications must allow those mental fabrications to constrain "what exists" to "what exists" without allowing alternate possibilities.

It is that final comment which should make it quite clear to you that no explanation actually explains anything beyond the known past (how the leopard got its spots), a clearly finite number of questions. That any specific explanation answers any questions outside the known past is an unprovable assumption. In the, "what is" is "what is" explanation, these answers are no more than a finite table of answers. We have the answer "yes it exists" for every specific collection of valid ontological elements going to make up a specific "present". Since we can use numerical labels for those elements and the number "one" for "it exists", the, "what is" is "what is" explanation can be seen as a simple tabular representation of a mathematical function. That is why I defined "an explanation" to be "a method" for obtaining "expectations" from "known information". Under that definition, the tabular representation of the explanation yields exactly that "known information", plus some additional table entries for those fabricated elements which can, for the moment, be ignored as they are pure illusions required by that specific epistemological solution. What classical explanations yield which the "what is" is "what is" explanation does not yield, is one's expectations for the future (what we do not know).

From the perspective of the "what is" is "what is" explanation, the future is no more than an additional present being added to the known past: another collection of "valid ontological elements" or (from the perspective of undefined ontological elements) another set of numerical labels. What I am getting at is the fact that all explanation may be seen as mathematical functions which, besides reproducing that "what is" is "what is" tabular solution, also yield answers for configurations outside the known past.

If you can understand that, I will start doing some manipulation on those numerical labels and prove some very surprising constraints which must exist on any flaw free epistemological solution.

I should be back next week -- Dick

 

[tehno]

What would left of our physical theories without concept of time?If illusion ,that would be very useful one.
It's another thing that the concept of time needs better understanding.
What one doesn't understand enough shouldn't be called an illusion.
Is energy also illusion?I don't care if it is as long as it is very useful one.

 

[Doctordick]

What would left of our physical theories without concept of time?If illusion ,that would be very useful one.
It's another thing that the concept of time needs better understanding.
What one doesn't understand enough shouldn't be called an illusion.
Is energy also illusion?I don't care if it is as long as it is very useful one.

What would you call a mental construct which has no basis in reality? And I agree with you; I also care not a whit if it is useful. My point is that you certainly can't prove it is not an illusion. That being the case, we certainly have a conundrum on our hands: if it is indeed an illusion, why is it that all theories regard it as necessary?

Have fun -- Dick

 

[baywax]

if it (time) is indeed an illusion, why is it that all theories regard it as necessary?

Have fun -- Dick

The same reason a carpenter finds a measuring system necessary. Measurements are illusionary increments that only exist as mental constructs. The actual natural environment has no inch or yard or cubit measuring markers on it. We devised a measuring system to coordinate the actions of explorers, traders and builders. Measurement was conceived for trading fairness, so that scale drawings could become structures and relative distances calculated. But, the actual systems of measurement remain a simple mental construct. They are all an illusion that grew in importance until they became tools.

That's what's happened with time measurement. I wouldn't be surprised if the many theories that depend on the construct of time exist soley to justify the mental construct of time.

But what I'd ask is this: If an illusion becomes useful (in the manner of a tool) and is used by a majority of the people is it still an illusion? Or has it become a tangible tool that yields tangible results?

 

[Rade]

While we wait for Dr. D. to return (and Dr. D. I am truly sorry to hear about loss of your family member) let me put forward my problem about the "definition" of "explanation itself" being used by Dr. D.

He informs that his definition is:

explanation itself = "a method" for obtaining "expectations" from "known information".​

But I ask three questions...

1. Is explanation itself always "a method" ?

For example, the word "method" has the meaning of being a "regular" "orderly" "logical" [way of doing something]. But I ask, cannot at least some explanation be non-regular, non-orderly, non-logical ? I think the answer to be yes, thus I find that Dr. D. errors when he claims that explanation itself is always "a method".

2. Must the goal of explanation itself always be to "obtain expectations" ?

For example, even if we we want "expectation" to be the outcome of explanation itself--why "must" it always be "obtained" ? Second, why must "expectation" always be the outcome of explanation, why cannot my explanation of some thing (X) be given to person (Y) with no thought of "expectation" at all ?

3. Must explanation itself only derive from "known information"

For example, why cannot the human mind obtain expectations from intuition--which is information not known but open to possibility of communication ?

I think one must allow for the possibility that the answers to any or all of the three questions above is NO. And, if I am correct, then Dr. D. does not have a valid definition of explanation itself from which to derive his philosophy.

Also while we wait, some may find this review of "explanation itself" to be of use as we attempt to understand the philosophy being presented by Dr. D.:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/explanat.htm

 

[Doctordick]

I am very sorry Rade, but in my opinion, you are a complete idiot. You strike me as giving utterly no thought at all to any of your complaints.

1. Is explanation itself always "a method" ?

Does not every explanation you are aware of explicitly tell you how to arrive at answers to your questions? And are not those answers a statement of your expectations?

... thus I find that Dr. D. errors when he claims that explanation itself is always "a method".

Can you provide an explanation of something which does not provide a "method" of obtaining answers?

2. Must the goal of explanation itself always be to "obtain expectations" ?

And what would you propose to be the purpose of "an explanation"?

... why cannot my explanation of some thing (X) be given to person (Y) with no thought of "expectation" at all ?

And what purpose would such an explanation serve?

3. Must explanation itself only derive from "known information"

If it is not derived from something you know, what else would it be derived from?

For example, why cannot the human mind obtain expectations from intuition--which is information not known but open to possibility of communication ?

And exactly where does this "intuition" come from?

Also while we wait, some may find this review of "explanation itself" to be of use as we attempt to understand the philosophy being presented by Dr. D.:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/explanat.htm

Rade, I sincerely doubt your ability to comprehend anything deeper than "boy that feels good".

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

Does not every explanation you are aware of explicitly tell you how to arrive at answers to your questions? And are not those answers a statement of your expectations?

Of course the answers to these simple minded questions are no. I provide one example--you tell me how the explanation given in the example "explicitly" tells you how to arrive at the answer to the question:

Question: Was Smith invited ?
Explanation: Everybody was invited.

 

[Rade]

...And exactly where does this "intuition" come from?

Are you saying you do not know, or that you hold that "intuition" must come from "known information" ? If the latter, you would be incorrect, for philosophic "intuitivism" comes in many different forms--see as one example "intrinsicism":http://www.ismbook.com/intrinsicism.html

 

[AnssiH]

Hi AnssiH, I only have time for a quick and dirty response as my wife and I are leaving for the East Coast this afternoon. My brother in law died (old age – congestive heart failure) this last weekend and I need to attend the funeral. Beginning to feel a bit mortal.

I'm 26 and I've been feeling little bit too mortal for the last 10 years :P I can't imagine what's it going to be some 50 years from now... Or perhaps I can, I just don't want to :/

Anyway, I was away for a while too, but back now...

I am actually quite astonished as too how well you have picked up on my presentation. Looking back over some of my older posts (all my posts have to do with exactly the same issue) I think I may have learned a little about how to present these ideas; however, to date you seem to understand what I am saying a lot better than anyone else.

It's propably largely because of similarities in our worldviews. Although we are using little bit different language to discuss these issues.

And yeah, communicating your ideas to others can always be little bit tricky, especially if you've become so accustomed to your very personal terminology and definitions that every sentence that seems simple and straightforward to you is anything but to the others. This often hapens and it is obviously a very serious issue hindering communication. It is not trivial to overcome it though. Perhaps it's sometimes helpful to try and explain the issue from a completely different angle to people?

I want you to consider the set of all possible flawless epistemological solutions to your known past: the set of all possible world views consistent with what you know. What is important here is that every one of those solutions must also be consistent with the "what is" is "what is" tabular explanation I have already discussed. Just as you cannot prove the "brain in a vat" explanation of reality is wrong, you cannot prove the, "what is" is "what is" is the wrong explanation. It should be clear to you that every conceivable explanation of reality can be seen as no more than a specific example of that, "what is" is "what is" explanation together with a collection of mental fabrications necessary to create the rules that allows that particular explanation to explain your experiences (essentially fulfilling the need for cause).

But there is one great advantage to that "what is" is "what is" explanation. That advantage is that it requires no more than a set of reference labels for each and every ontological element going to make up each and every present going to make up your past (note that time has become a very personal thing here, having almost nothing to do with objective reality and everything to do with your interpretation of objective reality -- a mere mental tool for handling the issue of changing knowledge). Note that absolutely every flaw free epistemological construct must explain those "valid ontological elements": i.e., the rules deduced from those mental fabrications must allow those mental fabrications to constrain "what exists" to "what exists" without allowing alternate possibilities.

It is that final comment which should make it quite clear to you that no explanation actually explains anything beyond the known past (how the leopard got its spots), a clearly finite number of questions. That any specific explanation answers any questions outside the known past is an unprovable assumption. In the, "what is" is "what is" explanation, these answers are no more than a finite table of answers. We have the answer "yes it exists" for every specific collection of valid ontological elements going to make up a specific "present". Since we can use numerical labels for those elements and the number "one" for "it exists", the, "what is" is "what is" explanation can be seen as a simple tabular representation of a mathematical function. That is why I defined "an explanation" to be "a method" for obtaining "expectations" from "known information". Under that definition, the tabular representation of the explanation yields exactly that "known information", plus some additional table entries for those fabricated elements which can, for the moment, be ignored as they are pure illusions required by that specific epistemological solution. What classical explanations yield which the "what is" is "what is" explanation does not yield, is one's expectations for the future (what we do not know).

From the perspective of the "what is" is "what is" explanation, the future is no more than an additional present being added to the known past: another collection of "valid ontological elements" or (from the perspective of undefined ontological elements) another set of numerical labels. What I am getting at is the fact that all explanation may be seen as mathematical functions which, besides reproducing that "what is" is "what is" tabular solution, also yield answers for configurations outside the known past.

If you can understand that, I will start doing some manipulation on those numerical labels and prove some very surprising constraints which must exist on any flaw free epistemological solution.

Well I can't see anything wrong in the text, but I'm not sure if I understand everything correctly either. Let's get to the manipulation and we'll see if I can understand any of that.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

I'm 26 and I've been feeling little bit too mortal for the last 10 years :P I can't imagine what's it going to be some 50 years from now... Or perhaps I can, I just don't want to :/

The biggest difference is that time goes by a lot quicker. They say time flies when your having fun so I guess I am having fun.

It's propably largely because of similarities in our worldviews. Although we are using little bit different language to discuss these issues.

At least you seem to have thought about the same issues which bothered me when I was young. It's nice to know you are only 26 as, if I can reach you, you'll have a long time to present it to others. Paul seems to understand a lot of it but he is almost as old as I am and teaching what I have discovered to him is pretty much a waste of time (other than teaching me how not to express my ideas).

Perhaps it's sometimes helpful to try and explain the issue from a completely different angle to people?

I have tried a number of different attacks and achieved mostly failure, but I am certainly willing to put things in a different perspective if it will help.

Well I can't see anything wrong in the text, but I'm not sure if I understand everything correctly either. Let's get to the manipulation and we'll see if I can understand any of that.

The single most important part of the post you quote is my comment that "all explanations may be seen as mathematical functions".

What I am getting at is the fact that all explanation may be seen as mathematical functions which, besides reproducing that "what is" is "what is" tabular solution, also yield answers for configurations outside the known past.

(My use of a "singular" for "explanation" in the post was a typing error.) Since the "reference labels" being used are taken from the set of numbers (their definitions being deduced from the structure of the explanation itself) and the expectations are to be (true/false) specifications on a particular set of numbers as an entry in that tabular representation, the method can be seen as a mathematical function: i.e., the method of obtaining expectations (an explanation) is a mathematical function (it converts a set of numbers into a specific number). What you should remember here is that these numbers are mere references and that their mathematical nature has nothing at all to do with the problem other than allowing us to define specific manipulations of those labels.

Other than that, before we go on, you need to understand the nature of symmetries and the power of what is called "symmetry arguments". I tried several times to introduce that issue on this forum with little success. My first attempt was a post almost three years ago on the "Theory Development" thread (used to be referred to by the mentors as the "Nuts Are Us" thread). I think I was the major reason the thread was removed from the forum.

What I would like you to do is to read a portion of the "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" thread. About two years ago, it seemed that I had the interest of a one "saviormachine". I started make a serious presentation of my ideas but saviormachine apparently lost interest shortly before I finished and the exchange went nowhere. Nonetheless, I would like you to read a few posts from that thread (it's easier than reposting the same information again).

Since there are a large number of intervening posts, I will give you a list of of the specific posts I am referring to:
02/10/05 --- My opening mention of symmetry to saviormachine:

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=458593#post458593[/URL][/center]
Followed immediately with a comment by selfAdjoint.

02/10/05 --- My response to selfAdjoint on the difference between ignorance and indifference:
[center][PLAIN] https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=459227#post459227[/URL][/center]

02/20/05 --- An attempt to explain to saviormachine how undefined elements (which I have come to call "ontological" elements) are used to define important entities (which I now call "objects"). I personally feel this is a very important post and you should try to think about it seriously.
[center][PLAIN] https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=467528#post467528[/URL][/center]
Most important point, "Remember, my sole purpose is to establish the parameters on my thoughts which will assure me that I am not inadvertently presuming information I do not have."

Just take a look at those posts and see if what I say makes sense to you. It is my opinion that it is only symmetry issue which is of paramount insterest at this moment; however, they do bring up some important concepts. I know you don't know much math but symmetry is a very important issue and it would be quite valuable to take a look at [URL=http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/noether.html][URL='https://www.physicsforums.com/insights/author/john-baez/']John Baez[/URL]'s web site[/URL].

If you have any questions about the sense of those posts I will do my best to clarify my position.

Looking forward to further discussion on the issue of symmetry -- Dick​

 

[Rade]

Good Dr. D.--a question. On one of the threads you mention I note this definition you provide for "explanation"

...So I define an explanation as a defined method of yielding expectations of events not yet experienced based on information presently available to us...

So clearly, your concept of "explanation" is constrained--that is, you hold that "explanation itself" must be silent about "events experienced". Thus, you hold that if you experience the event (A), based on your definition above, it is logically impossible for you to "explain" (A).

Now, of course, from the many posts you have made in this present thread it is clear that you now offer a contradictory definition of explanation than the one above:

.. explanation itself = "a method" for obtaining "expectations" from "known information"...

So, my question, what happened to the "events not yet experienced" constraint ? Why have you done a flip flop so that you now hold that if you experience (A) you logically can explain (A) ?

Now, my explanation for this observation of your sloppy use of "definition itself" is that (1) you flip flop your definition of "explanation itself" to fit the needs of your argument; (2) either the first (in blue) or second (in red) definition above is a false statement--if so, kindly inform all of us which one is false and the reason why you once (in the past) attempted to develop a philosophy of undefined ontology from a false definition of "explanation itself".

 

[Doctordick]

Now, my explanation for this observation of your sloppy use of "definition itself" is that (1) you flip flop your definition of "explanation itself" to fit the needs of your argument; (2) either the first (in blue) or second (in red) definition above is a false statement--if so, kindly inform all of us which one is false and the reason why you once (in the past) attempted to develop a philosophy of undefined ontology from a false definition of "explanation itself".

No, that is not at all the correct explanation of my so called "sloppy use". Your problem is no more than a total inability to comprehend what I a talking about and I am quite confident that this post will do little to alleviate that problem as I am, at this point, pretty well convinced that understanding what I say is simply beyond your mental abilities; however, for the sake of those who cannot see that fact, I will point out the difference between the two issues you bring up.

I have defined an explanation to be a method of obtaining expectations from known information. I have defined the past to be "what is known", the future to be "what is not known" and the present to be "a change in what is known". Having done that, it should be clear that "the past" can be seen as a collection of presents. Since "the past" is (by definition) known, my expectations for the past are known; however, in analyzing an explanation of that past every present going to make up that past must be in agreement with that explanation under the view that all subsequent "presents" lie in the future. The "what is" is "what is" explanation of the past satisfies this perspective perfectly. It makes no predictions whatsoever for the next present but yields an exact yes/no answer for every "known past" in that analysis. That is a fact.

The difficulty with the "what is" is "what is" explanation which makes it unacceptable is that it yields no expectations whatsoever for the future and it thus has very little value; however, what must be recognized is that every acceptable explanation can be seen as a specific "what is" is "what is" explanation where the labels have all been defined.

What is important is to comprehend here is that absolutely any explanation must yield the correct expectations for what is already known before we even begin to worry about expectations for the future. The only apparent problem (with regard to this issue) here is that, in my original solution, I began with the simplified case where all ontological elements in that past (what is known) were "valid ontological elements" and it is quite clear to anyone that, what we think we know, probably includes a great number of "invalid ontological elements". In the, "what is" is "what is" explanation of the past, this is actually a rather trivial issue as it really amounts to no more than a number of invalid entries in that collection of labels going to make of the past (what is known). That is to say, any acceptable explanation must still yield the correct expectation for those valid ontological elements. It just must also yield acceptable expectations for those invalid ontological elements the explanation presumed were valid. This fact does not allow any additional acceptable explanations, it instead only reduces the number of possibilities being considered in that "by guess and by golly" procedure used by everyone.

What we want to know is a way of introducing the simplest set of "invalid ontological elements" which will constrain the "valid ontological" elements to what we know without eliminating any possibilities for the future (what we do not know).

That is really quite a simple problem once you begin to understand what you are trying to do.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Ivan Seeking]

This exchange is in violation of the forum's posting guidelines. Please refrain from making personal insults.

 

[Doctordick]

This exchange is in violation of the forum's posting guidelines. Please refrain from making personal insults.

I am sorry, sometimes I get a little emotional. I was very disappointed by your post. I will put Rade on my ignore list so I won't be driven to such improprieties again.