Is time an illusion? Exploring the concept of time as a constant state of change

[AnssiH]

I thought I'd drop in a sign of life since I've been silent for so long and didn't get the chance to drop a line last weekend.

At least you seem to have thought about the same issues which bothered me when I was young.

Yeah, for me, all the stuff about how we don't really know much but merely assume a self-coherent worldview, is something that really got crystallized when I was considering some aspects of AI systems. You are really forced to ask what knowledge is, and where it comes from when you think about something like AI. And there appears to be quite a few people in the AI field who are kind of having similar ideas, although there also are a lot of people whose philosophy tends to lean towards "absolute knowledge" of some sort (if I got a penny every time I hear "but of course photons exist; we can objectively measure them!").

btw, I have also used the "words defined in dictionaries by other words" as an analogy when trying to explain how our worldviews are internally coherent but completely circular constructions... ...without much success I guess :)

Anyway, that kind of "relative knowledge"-philosophy turned out to be incredibly powerful not only in explaining various problems regarding intelligence (creativity) and subjective experience (getting rid of naive realism completely), but also in giving better idea about what physical models are and how they should be viewed if one wishes to stay objective at all.

I have tried a number of different attacks and achieved mostly failure, but I am certainly willing to put things in a different perspective if it will help.

Yeah, it's just that the difficult part is to know what that good perspective would be... It kind of differs from person to person a bit, depening on what kind of worldview each individual might have...

Also a tiny bit of psychology can help, for example if there's any way to interpret someone's comments in a way that I could agree with them, I usually do just that. Often times people concentrate on their presentation of their own view so fully that they can't hear anything you are saying. But once you say you agree, they actually start paying attention to what you are saying. Then I tell them in what way I agree with them, and maybe, just maybe they understand what I'm saying.

Of course that doesn't always help since sometimes it's just impossible to agree with some painfully incoherent ideas no matter which way I choose to look at them...

The single most important part of the post you quote is my comment that "all explanations may be seen as mathematical functions".
(My use of a "singular" for "explanation" in the post was a typing error.) Since the "reference labels" being used are taken from the set of numbers (their definitions being deduced from the structure of the explanation itself) and the expectations are to be (true/false) specifications on a particular set of numbers as an entry in that tabular representation, the method can be seen as a mathematical function: i.e., the method of obtaining expectations (an explanation) is a mathematical function (it converts a set of numbers into a specific number). What you should remember here is that these numbers are mere references and that their mathematical nature has nothing at all to do with the problem other than allowing us to define specific manipulations of those labels.

Other than that, before we go on, you need to understand the nature of symmetries and the power of what is called "symmetry arguments". I tried several times to introduce that issue on this forum with little success. My first attempt was a post almost three years ago on the "Theory Development" thread8

Well I understand what you mean by the symmetries in physical models being cases of some information missing; not being able to differentiate between some things.

I don't know where this is leading, but I'll just briefly explain how I view it, since I would choose to state the epistemological side of the issue little bit differently than you did in the old post (although I don't think this really has any relevant effect to the method you are proposing, but I think it is such fundamental aspect of our "knowledge" that I'll state it anyway). You said; "there exists only one thing which can produce knowledge from nothing; the comprehension of symmetry".

One of the problems regarding AI systems (and brain) was; when it builds a worldview, how could it build one if it begins with nothing? Somehow it ends up to classify reality into "sensible objects" (assume identity to objects in its model of reality), but it cannot just state (internally) that something is "a ball", unless it has assumed some definition about what a "ball" is. And it cannot make such a defninition unless it defines other things, telling, for example, what a ball is not. I.e. ball is not a cube.

Likewise, the cube can defined by what it is not (a ball). There are more complex associations than just "juxtapositioned pairs", but this is one way to start with nothing and the end result is that completely self-supporting worldview where no knowledge exists independently (=no knowledge is really "objective"), and of course nothing constraints you to use such concepts as "balls" and "cubes" at all.

So, one pair of concepts that arises in this sort of "concept development" would be "symmetry" & "difference". That is to say, the comprehension of symmetry doesn't seem to be "the only way to produce knowledge" in an epistemological sense. I would rather say "symmetry" is just one (low-level) concept that can be used as a tool in our logic.

Given Noether's theorem (which I didn't know about), perhaps you rather meant to say something like, the comprehension of symmetry is what makes it possible to build physical models, i.e. to describe physical systems/laws mathematically? I can kind of superficially understand what the theorem is saying.

What I would like you to do is to read a portion of the "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?" thread. About two years ago, it seemed that I had the interest of a one "saviormachine". I started make a serious presentation of my ideas but saviormachine apparently lost interest shortly before I finished and the exchange went nowhere. Nonetheless, I would like you to read a few posts from that thread (it's easier than reposting the same information again).

Since there are a large number of intervening posts, I will give you a list of of the specific posts I am referring to:
02/10/05 --- My opening mention of symmetry to saviormachine:

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=458593#post458593[/URL][/center]
Followed immediately with a comment by selfAdjoint.

02/10/05 --- My response to selfAdjoint on the difference between ignorance and indifference:
[center][PLAIN] https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=459227#post459227[/URL][/center]

02/20/05 --- An attempt to explain to saviormachine how undefined elements (which I have come to call "ontological" elements) are used to define important entities (which I now call "objects"). I personally feel this is a very important post and you should try to think about it seriously.
[center][PLAIN] https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=467528#post467528[/URL][/center]
Most important point, "Remember, my sole purpose is to establish the parameters on my thoughts which will assure me that I am not inadvertently presuming information I do not have."[/QUOTE]

Yeah it makes sense and it kind of makes me want to ask your opinion on one particular way to model inertia as non-fundamental (which obviously would have rather far reaching consequences), especially since you have studied physics AND can understand models are models... But we'll get to that later I guess.

[QUOTE]Just take a look at those posts and see if what I say makes sense to you. It is my opinion that it is only symmetry issue which is of paramount insterest at this moment; however, they do bring up some important concepts. I know you don't know much math but symmetry is a very important issue and it would be quite valuable to take a look at [URL=http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/noether.html][URL='https://www.physicsforums.com/insights/author/john-baez/']John Baez[/URL]'s web site[/URL]. [/QUOTE]

After viewing it once, I can kind of superficially understand it. I don't really have a clear picture but I can kind of understand how an idea of something being symmetrical should yield something being conserved as well... Hmmm... Well let me just state where I'm at:

1. Symmetry can be seen as a case of not knowing the differences
2. Symmetry can be and has been used to get conserved quantities
3. Since a particular symmetry may have been a case of unobservable but real differences... this has got obvious (ontological) implications to the those conserved quantities that were derived from that symmetry.

Something like that?

-Anssi​

 

[Doctordick]

I thought I'd drop in a sign of life since I've been silent for so long and didn't get the chance to drop a line last weekend.

Thank you, I needed that. Believe me I very much appreciate that "sign of life". You are truly astonishing in that you seem to be exactly what I expected everyone to be forty years ago and, except for Paul (who is almost as old as I am) I have failed to find anywhere. Most disappointing was that I couldn't find any professional physicists who were open to my thoughts. And you are young yet. What more could a man ask. I was 26 when I entered graduate school (that was after I got out of the army -- GI bill thing). You have absolutely no idea how young you are! As I often say, "youth is wasted on the young they have no appreciation of it at all!"

All I can really say about your post is that you seem to be thinking along the same lines I am.

... although there also are a lot of people whose philosophy tends to lean towards "absolute knowledge" of some sort (if I got a penny every time I hear "but of course photons exist; we can objectively measure them!").

I know exactly what you are talking about.

Anyway, that kind of "relative knowledge"-philosophy turned out to be incredibly powerful not only in explaining various problems regarding intelligence (creativity) and subjective experience (getting rid of naive realism completely), but also in giving better idea about what physical models are and how they should be viewed if one wishes to stay objective at all.

In my head, you sound a lot like me. I am curious as to the problems regarding intelligence you have in mind (in the explanation you refer to).

Of course that doesn't always help since sometimes it's just impossible to agree with some painfully incoherent ideas no matter which way I choose to look at them...

It's either that very issue or the obvious fact that one is wasting one's time to get their interest.

Well I understand what you mean by the symmetries in physical models being cases of some information missing; not being able to differentiate between some things.

What is important there is that the representation of the circumstance in your world view requires the differentiation and that requirement must be met. Since you cannot meet it, you must include a constraint which eliminates that requirement. I call it "conservation of ignorance".

You said; "there exists only one thing which can produce knowledge from nothing; the comprehension of symmetry".

At this point, I would really like to adjust that statement to something more rational: "there exists only one thing which can produce the appearance of knowledge from nothing ..." .

I would rather say "symmetry" is just one (low-level) concept that can be used as a tool in our logic.

You are absolutely correct!

But we'll get to that later I guess.

Actually, it is not far away at all!

3. Since a particular symmetry may have been a case of unobservable but real differences... this has got obvious (ontological) implications to the those conserved quantities that were derived from that symmetry.

Close but not quite. The problem is that the difference does not exist (if it did exist, it would present itself as some kind of observable). But our world view requires the difference so there must be a rule which dispenses with that difference (either that or we must throw our world view out). A subtle but very important difference.

Please let me know if you have any difficulty with my comments. I hold your opinion in quite high regard.

Looking to hear from you -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Well I understand what you mean by the symmetries in physical models being cases of some information missing; not being able to differentiate between some things.

What is important there is that the representation of the circumstance in your world view requires the differentiation and that requirement must be met. Since you cannot meet it, you must include a constraint which eliminates that requirement.

Hmm, let me munch on this one little bit to make sure I understand what you mean... Perhaps we can consider some simple practical example, like a spherical shape that is symmetric under rotation. My worldview requires differentiation, does this refer to me having to imagine some orientation to that spherical shape? Or perhaps there is a better example?

The problem is that the difference does not exist (if it did exist, it would present itself as some kind of observable). But our world view requires the difference so there must be a rule which dispenses with that difference (either that or we must throw our world view out). A subtle but very important difference.

Hmmm, interesting. But I'm not sure if I'm quite getting it. Or perhaps I just can't figure out where this is heading... In the absence of some difference that our worldview requires for the situation (so it'd be logical), we must shape that worldview into some direction that explains this scheme of things... is a new "conservation law" of some sort always the only way through? I think I should try and get a better understanding about that Noether's theorem...

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hmm, let me munch on this one little bit to make sure I understand what you mean... Perhaps we can consider some simple practical example, like a spherical shape that is symmetric under rotation.

Sure! The problem is that "a spherical shape that is symmetric under rotation" is a mental construct which explains why nothing (associated withs an object so described) changes under a "rotation", a phenomena which is defined in any space with more than two orthogonal dimensions (independent variables required to specify the "position" of the object -- which is, of course, another mental construct). People are so convinced that "a three dimensional space" is the only way of describing reality that they think the space itself is real and not a mental construct. (Perhaps it is real, but I am afraid such a thing can not be proved; what is important is that it need not be proved.)

My worldview requires differentiation, does this refer to me having to imagine some orientation to that spherical shape? Or perhaps there is a better example?

Exactly correct, your world view does require you to concieve of that sphere as having an orientation. I think the issue will become clearer when I show you how to use the concept of dimensionality to represent that collection of undefined ontological elements which constitute the past (under my definition of "the past") that we are all trying to understand.

I think I should try and get a better understanding about that Noether's theorem...

I would say yes, in the sense that it is always better to understand physics, as Noether's theorem is a mathematically exact proof of the requirement in a large collection of circumstances useful to physical representation of phenomena. However, I think it is very valuable to comprehend the necessity of these conservation laws from a slightly different perspective which you will not discover in any presentation of Noether's theorem.

What is really important to comprehend is that all mathematical proofs are actually tautologies (based upon some set of axioms) in that, what is proved, is already embedded in the axioms: i.e., the axioms themselves require the result. I have actually had professors tell me that symmetry arguments are the most powerful arguments which can be made because they are the only arguments which can generate "knowledge" from "ignorance". That statement is false on the face of it as no proof can yield anything not embedded in the axioms used in that proof.

It is interesting to look at the first "symmetry" argument I ever heard. When I was a child, someone (it might have been my grandfather or maybe it was my father) asked me if I knew why quarter sawed lumber didn't warp as much as plane sawed lumber. In case you don't know it, a quarter sawed board is one who's width is as close as possible to being a radial cut in the original tree and the commonest type of warp is for the board to dish out on one side.

Perform the following thought experiment. Give someone a drawing of the cross section of a hypothetical tree with an outline of a board cross section drawn on it where the width of the board is centered exactly on a radial line and ask him which way the board will warp. Then give him a mirror image of that same drawing and ask the same question. It should be clear that, if the information necessary to predict the warp is there, the answer must be exactly the same (the mirror image of the drawing is the same as the original). On the other hand, the direction of the dish must be opposite (since it is a mirror image). The only answer is, the board cannot warp.

Of course, in most real cases, there is a flaw in the symmetry of a actual tree but the real result will be related to the actual extent of the symmetry error. Even an all knowing god would have to agree that, if mirror symmetry is actually present, the board cannot warp. This is the characteristic that makes "symmetry arguments" so powerful.

Now, let's go back to that "what is", is "what is" explanation of the known universe with an undefined ontology. Note that, even any explanation (which constitutes a epistemological solution based on a defined ontology) constitutes a case of an undefined ontology to a new student until they manage to deduce the meanings of the reference labels from their usage. What I am getting at is the fact that the only difference between the "what is", is "what is" explanation and the conventional explanation is the fact that the ontological elements of the "what is", is "what is" explanation have been assigned specific labels (i.e., certain instances of those ontological elements have been identified as being the same element).

The only other difference (between the ideal puzzle I put up earlier and some other explanation) is the fact that some of the ontological elements may not be valid ontological elements. That issue is actually of no consequence (in that the tabular representation expressing my knowledge of that explanation of the past) as it simply amounts to some entries which don't actually need to be there. (The "what is", is "what is" explanation is, by definition, based on the "valid ontological elements). If the explanation yields that tabular result including those additional "invalid ontological elements" (and it would be flawed if it didn't) then it must also yield all of the known "valid ontological elements" as they are clearly a subset of the explanations ontological elements.

So the explanation (that would be any flaw free explanation possible) only differs from the "what is", is "what is" explanation by virtue of the fact that the elements are given defined labels. Notice that, in our logical analysis, it is not necessary to know the definitions all one needs are the labels themselves (their definitions are to be deduced from the explanation). Now, these labels will indicate that the explanation considers certain occurrences of specific ontological elements to be "the same element". Consider how can one have two occurrences of the same element unless there is some specific difference between the two occurrences. That difference can only be embedded in the explanation itself. and will be part of one's world view when the explanation is understood.

Just as I earlier introduced my concept of time ("the past" is what is known, "the future" is what is not known and "the present" is a change in what is known) as no more than an index on that change, I will introduce my definition of "position" as no more than an index on those ontological elements in a given change represented by the labels going to make up a specific B(t). If I am using numerical labels for these entities, I can simply use the index numbers as positions on the x-axis without losing any information contained in that explanation.

There is one subtle error in the last paragraph above. Although the "what is", is "what is" explanation explanation considers every occurrence to be a different ontological element, there is no expectation of such a thing in any clearly defined explanation. A specific B may clearly contain two instances of the same ontological element (the difference and the need for them to be there being part of that explanation -- once that explanation is understood). If such a thing occurs, those two entries in that tabular representation would be the same. If the numerical label is going to be represented by a position on that x axis, the fact of the existence of multiple instances of the same label is lost as there is but one such "position" on the x axis.

That problem is easily fixed by introducing another orthogonal axis. which I have chosen to call "tau" (for reasons which will become evident further on down the line). By the way, the fundamental significance of "orthogonal" is that associated values on one axis are totally independent of associated values on another. Having introduced that tau axis, one can easily represent multiple occurrences of a given x label by simply attaching a different tau index to each of those multiple ontological elements with the same x index.

Thus it is that, it is always possible to display the past as a finite set of discrete points in an (x,tau) plane where the plane itself is indexed on a third orthogonal axis referred to as time. The complete representation consists of a finite set of discreet points in a three dimensional space. (Paul, if you are reading this, you should note that the representation is wholly discreet and makes no use of either continuity or infinity.) It should be clear that such a representation can represent any possible explanation of any possible "past". This is the key issue which must be comprehended before we go on.

I'll stop there and see if you have any questions about such a representation.

Looking to hear from you again -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Sure! The problem is that "a spherical shape that is symmetric under rotation" is a mental construct which explains why nothing (associated withs an object so described) changes under a "rotation", a phenomena which is defined in any space with more than two orthogonal dimensions (independent variables required to specify the "position" of the object -- which is, of course, another mental construct).

Right, so looks like I picked it up correctly.

People are so convinced that "a three dimensional space" is the only way of describing reality that they think the space itself is real and not a mental construct. (Perhaps it is real, but I am afraid such a thing can not be proved; what is important is that it need not be proved.)

Yeah, well it certainly turns out that very careful definition for so-called "space" is in order anyway. I think right after GR it was already completely fair to say the reality of space hinges on definition, just like the reality of anything else. And now with this issue it is of course more important than ever to realize this.

Perform the following thought experiment. Give someone a drawing of the cross section of a hypothetical tree with an outline of a board cross section drawn on it where the width of the board is centered exactly on a radial line and ask him which way the board will warp. Then give him a mirror image of that same drawing and ask the same question. It should be clear that, if the information necessary to predict the warp is there, the answer must be exactly the same (the mirror image of the drawing is the same as the original). On the other hand, the direction of the dish must be opposite (since it is a mirror image). The only answer is, the board cannot warp.

Of course, in most real cases, there is a flaw in the symmetry of a actual tree but the real result will be related to the actual extent of the symmetry error. Even an all knowing god would have to agree that, if mirror symmetry is actually present, the board cannot warp. This is the characteristic that makes "symmetry arguments" so powerful.

Right. If that beforementioned spherical shape really is "symmetric under rotation", it is the same as saying "it cannot rotate". That's true. And it seems to show that tautology as well.

This also kind of reminds me of someone who held such a philosophy that our explanations of reality are all basically made of "differences".

Now, let's go back to that "what is", is "what is" explanation of the known universe with an undefined ontology. Note that, even any explanation (which constitutes a epistemological solution based on a defined ontology) constitutes a case of an undefined ontology to a new student until they manage to deduce the meanings of the reference labels from their usage. What I am getting at is the fact that the only difference between the "what is", is "what is" explanation and the conventional explanation is the fact that the ontological elements of the "what is", is "what is" explanation have been assigned specific labels (i.e., certain instances of those ontological elements have been identified as being the same element).

The only other difference (between the ideal puzzle I put up earlier and some other explanation) is the fact that some of the ontological elements may not be valid ontological elements. That issue is actually of no consequence (in that the tabular representation expressing my knowledge of that explanation of the past) as it simply amounts to some entries which don't actually need to be there. (The "what is", is "what is" explanation is, by definition, based on the "valid ontological elements). If the explanation yields that tabular result including those additional "invalid ontological elements" (and it would be flawed if it didn't) then it must also yield all of the known "valid ontological elements" as they are clearly a subset of the explanations ontological elements.

So the explanation (that would be any flaw free explanation possible) only differs from the "what is", is "what is" explanation by virtue of the fact that the elements are given defined labels. Notice that, in our logical analysis, it is not necessary to know the definitions all one needs are the labels themselves (their definitions are to be deduced from the explanation).

Okay, yeah, I can kind of understand where you are getting at with this. Since the meaning of a certain ontological element is going to be defined by how it associates to other elements, it should be possible (and reasonable) to explicitly keep the meanings loose while working with the associations. I don't understand yet how you do this but it seems this should be possible to some extent anyway.

Now, these labels will indicate that the explanation considers certain occurrences of specific ontological elements to be "the same element". Consider how can one have two occurrences of the same element unless there is some specific difference between the two occurrences. That difference can only be embedded in the explanation itself. and will be part of one's world view when the explanation is understood.

Just as I earlier introduced my concept of time ("the past" is what is known, "the future" is what is not known and "the present" is a change in what is known) as no more than an index on that change, I will introduce my definition of "position" as no more than an index on those ontological elements in a given change represented by the labels going to make up a specific B(t). If I am using numerical labels for these entities, I can simply use the index numbers as positions on the x-axis without losing any information contained in that explanation.

There is one subtle error in the last paragraph above. Although the "what is", is "what is" explanation explanation considers every occurrence to be a different ontological element, there is no expectation of such a thing in any clearly defined explanation. A specific B may clearly contain two instances of the same ontological element (the difference and the need for them to be there being part of that explanation -- once that explanation is understood). If such a thing occurs, those two entries in that tabular representation would be the same. If the numerical label is going to be represented by a position on that x axis, the fact of the existence of multiple instances of the same label is lost as there is but one such "position" on the x axis.

That problem is easily fixed by introducing another orthogonal axis. which I have chosen to call "tau" (for reasons which will become evident further on down the line).

Ok so above you are explaining simply how you choose to mark it down when and how a specifiic explanation tacks "identity" on things (through time)?

By the way, the fundamental significance of "orthogonal" is that associated values on one axis are totally independent of associated values on another. Having introduced that tau axis, one can easily represent multiple occurrences of a given x label by simply attaching a different tau index to each of those multiple ontological elements with the same x index.

Thus it is that, it is always possible to display the past as a finite set of discrete points in an (x,tau) plane where the plane itself is indexed on a third orthogonal axis referred to as time. The complete representation consists of a finite set of discreet points in a three dimensional space. (Paul, if you are reading this, you should note that the representation is wholly discreet and makes no use of either continuity or infinity.) It should be clear that such a representation can represent any possible explanation of any possible "past". This is the key issue which must be comprehended before we go on.

I'll stop there and see if you have any questions about such a representation.

Well, I think I can understand what you are saying. First of all mark down what exists at one moment onto an X-axis, then mark a value to "tau-axis" which will say which elements are the same from one moment to the next(?) once you have a third dimension to represent time. Is this correct?

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Well, I think I can understand what you are saying. First of all mark down what exists at one moment onto an X-axis, then mark a value to "tau-axis" which will say which elements are the same from one moment to the next(?) once you have a third dimension to represent time. Is this correct?

You are very close but I think you are making a subtle error. We have a finite number of ontological elements, each associated with a specific t index. These references (which are going to be represented by numerical labels) are explicitly displayed as points on the x axis. The only purpose for which the tau axis was created was to allow us to display multiple occurrences of the same x label. You should understand that actual specific labels only occur with a specific epistemological solution to the problem of explaining those "valid ontological elements": i.e., an explanation of reality other than the what is, is what is explanation where every element is presumed to be unique.

I repeat, "it should be clear that such a representation can represent any possible explanation of any possible 'past'". This is the key issue which must be comprehended before we go on.

How do you feel about that? -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

You are very close but I think you are making a subtle error. We have a finite number of ontological elements, each associated with a specific t index. These references (which are going to be represented by numerical labels) are explicitly displayed as points on the x axis. The only purpose for which the tau axis was created was to allow us to display multiple occurrences of the same x label.

Multiple occurrences at different moments, right? Well, the same thing cannot be said to exist twice at the same moment so I'm guessing this is what you are saying... That this is a question of how we assume identity of things in specific solutions?

You should understand that actual specific labels only occur with a specific epistemological solution to the problem of explaining those "valid ontological elements": i.e., an explanation of reality other than the what is, is what is explanation where every element is presumed to be unique.

Yeah so what I'm assuming you are saying in other words is:
The "what is, is what is" explanation defines what exists at each moment without assuming any identity to something in that it could be said to exist as the "same thing" from one moment to the next. Such an identity is to be defined by some specific solution, and you are marking this down with the tau-dimension?

Am I getting it wrong?

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Ah, Anssi, you are very close to understanding what I am saying but are making a subtle error.

Multiple occurrences at different moments, right? Well, the same thing cannot be said to exist twice at the same moment so I'm guessing this is what you are saying... That this is a question of how we assume identity of things in specific solutions?

We are not talking about identity of things yet. That is a bit down the road. Remember, these labels are for "ontological elements". Certainly, in the "what is" is "what is" explanation no real ontological elements cannot occur twice at any moment unless they are truly the same ontological element. But we are ignorant and wouldn't "know" it if it happened. Thus it is that we require that additional axis in order to represent the fact that, what we think is new information is, in fact, mere repetition of some ontological element we were already aware of. A flaw free epistemological solution might certainly label two instances in our "what is" is "what is" explanation to be, in fact, the same ontological element.

As an example, the common current explanation of reality considers "electrons" to be fundamental ontological elements and it should be quite clear to you that any representation (under that epistemological construct) would require a great number of "electrons". Since our space is an ontological space, we need to provide a dimension to denote whatever differences that epistemological solution might bestow on those "electrons".

What I am getting at is the fact occurrences at different moments has already been handled by the introduction of the time index.

The "what is, is what is" explanation defines ...

I think what you have missed is that the "what is" is "what is" explanation defines absolutely nothing1 It openly regards every case as possibly totally different from any other case. It is the actual assignment of specific labels for those events which yields the patterns from which the epistemological solutions are built. In the common work of science, those assignments are made via what I call the "guess and by golly" approach. Over hundreds of millions of years we have managed to find some assignments (specific labels for those valid ontological elements which have become our past). The problem is that the assignment directly prevents us from seeing other possibilities. What I am presenting to you is a way of representing those ontological elements which creates no constraint upon our epistemological solutions.

I hope I have cleared this up a little. Actually, what I am presenting is a way of representing the situation which makes utterly no presumptions as to what that situation is. As I have said, the key issue here is that this representation can "represent any possible explanation of any possible 'past'" without making any assumptions about the nature of reality.

Looking to hear from you -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Ah, Anssi, you are very close to understanding what I am saying but are making a subtle error.
We are not talking about identity of things yet. That is a bit down the road. Remember, these labels are for "ontological elements". Certainly, in the "what is" is "what is" explanation no real ontological elements cannot occur twice at any moment unless they are truly the same ontological element. But we are ignorant and wouldn't "know" it if it happened. Thus it is that we require that additional axis in order to represent the fact that, what we think is new information is, in fact, mere repetition of some ontological element we were already aware of. A flaw free epistemological solution might certainly label two instances in our "what is" is "what is" explanation to be, in fact, the same ontological element.

As an example, the common current explanation of reality considers "electrons" to be fundamental ontological elements and it should be quite clear to you that any representation (under that epistemological construct) would require a great number of "electrons". Since our space is an ontological space, we need to provide a dimension to denote whatever differences that epistemological solution might bestow on those "electrons".

Ah! Practical examples are helpful even if they can sometimes be little bit misleading too for this subject :)

So this is simply about being able to represent a number of... um... "identical things" (differentiated perhaps only by their location in "space") exisiting at a given moment? If so the error wasn't very subtle at all :)

The "what is, is what is" explanation defines ...

I think what you have missed is that the "what is" is "what is" explanation defines absolutely nothing1

I haven't missed that bit, I just should have phrased myself more clearly that's all. But it is irrelevant now, if the tau is just enabling us to say there exists a number of "electrons" or whatever we would end up defining as ontological elements?

-Ansi

 

[Rade]

...We have a finite number of ontological elements...

This is false. There are an infinite number of ontological elements (the metaphysical given) when you take into account the sum total of "valid ontological elements" and "fabricated ontological elements" (your terms Dr.D. not mine). At best you can argue that we may have a finite number of "valid ontological elements"--yet evolutionary theory suggests this is false given that new valid ontological elements called species continue to be formed over time, and there is no finite limit to the information provided within the DNA molecule. Clearly the human mind can imagine an endless and infinite number of fabricated ontological elements as well as fabricated philosophies.

 

[Doctordick]

Ah! Practical examples are helpful even if they can sometimes be little bit misleading too for this subject :)

Please let me know what you find misleading about my "electron" example so I might better understand your confusion.

So this is simply about being able to represent a number of... um... "identical things" (differentiated perhaps only by their location in "space") existing at a given moment? If so the error wasn't very subtle at all :)

This is, very simply, about how to handle undefined information. What I am doing is setting up a way of representing the undefined valid information which underlies all of our epistemological solutions solutions. Paul has always held that what I have done is proved a theorem. I can see how that interpretation could be made of my work; but it isn't really how I see it. Would anyone ever suggest that the Dewy Decimal System is a theorem? It is no more than a way of indexing books which can be applied to any library collection.

Likewise, what I am doing at this point is setting up a system which will allow me to talk about any collection of information without putting any constraints on the interpretation of that information at all. I like to think of it as a way of indexing the fundamental elements expressing that information. That is why I often refer to to these "valid ontological elements" (which I have defined to be "reality") as "references".

My first problem was that the collection of knowledge changes: and that would be the valid ontological elements which actually form the basis of our epistemological constructs. Our knowledge changes "from time to time". That is why I call the index representing such a change "t" or time.

I define "the past" to be what we know, "the future" to be what we do not know, and "the present" to be a change in what we know.

Time (or "t") is no more or less than an index on that collection of fundamental elements which underlie our world view. And any past you can conceive of can be seen as a collection of such "presents". You can see your "past" as being coherent collection of "presents" identified by this thing called time can't you?

So the next step is to come up with a way of indexing the collection of valid elements underlying a specific "present". Again, I simply attach a label to each and every one of those elements. Since I don't know what those elements are (if I did know, I would be working with an epistemological solution and not with "undefined references") I will simply attach a number "i" to each reference. If I ever have to apply this indexing system to an actual epistemological solution, I will have to understand that solution and correlate each of those indexes to the proper reference. But, I am not concerned with the problem of understanding any epistemological solution (that would be theorizing and, for the moment, I want simply to make sure that I am not ignoring any information).

My next step was to define "position". All I did was decide to see that index "i" as a position on the x axis. There is nothing deep and profound about such a step; it is actually quite common in quite a lot of scientific representations. Take for example, the family tree of primates. You will see it laid out on a sheet of paper with forks leading to various different species. They are using the concept of position (different horizontal placement on a sheet of paper) to represent branching to these different species. Now they simply draw a line on the paper; one could just as well attach some index "i" to each branch. In fact, if one were to create a computer model of that picture of lines, one would attach some specific x displacement for the same phenomena.

The problem, since we are working with a finite number of "references" here, is that the picture loses information if two or more of those "fundamental elements" happen to be assigned the same label (by some specific epistemological solution). How does one manage to maintain that information in such a representation? Clearly one can not. That is exactly why I introduced the tau axis. One can then give any element both an x coordinate and a tau coordinate. Remember, they are actually mere indices and the actual values are of no concern. No more than the family tree of the primates would lose meaning if the branches were drawn farther apart or in a different horizontal order. If I ever have to apply this indexing system to an actual epistemological solution, I will have to understand that solution and correlate each of those indexes to the proper reference.

None of this is any more or less than an indexing procedure. What I have done is transformed the original problem into a collection of points in a three dimensional space. If those points are constrained to be "valid ontological elements" which are known by person generating the epistemological solution, then any flaw free epistemological solution must yield those points.

An explanation is a method of obtaining one's expectations from known information!

If your epistemological solution does not yield expectations consistent with your own past, then you should certainly regard it as flawed.

What is really important here is that your understanding of any given specific epistemological solution consists of a finite number of specific labels (symbols for supposed valid ontological elements of the past) together with underlying presumed ontological elements not actually contained in that specific finite set (these are the presumptions in your understanding itself). The basis of your understanding is in the correlations you see in some finite set of specific labels.

I began with the simplified case where all ontological elements in that past (what is known) were "valid ontological elements" and it is quite clear to anyone that, what we think we know, probably includes a great number of "invalid ontological elements". In the, "what is" is "what is" explanation of the past, this is actually a rather trivial issue as it really amounts to no more than a number of invalid entries in that collection of labels going to make of the past (what is known). That is to say, any acceptable explanation must still yield the correct expectation for those valid ontological elements. It just must also yield acceptable expectations for those invalid ontological elements the explanation presumed were valid. This fact does not allow any additional acceptable explanations, it instead only reduces the number of possibilities being considered in that "by guess and by golly" procedure used by everyone.

What we would like to do is to introduce the simplest set of "invalid ontological elements" which will constrain the "valid ontological" elements to what we know without eliminating any possibilities for the future (what we do not know).

The fundamental insight here is that the fabricated ontological elements are part and parcel of the epistemological construct and are free variables unconstrained by "reality". It follows that one must handle ontological elements as two different types of "unknowns"; one collection which is set and immutable and another which is free to anything at all: i.e., the rules are different for the two sets and that difference must be embedded in the logic of the representation.

Once again, I repeat, "it should be clear that such a representation can represent any possible explanation of any possible 'past'". This is the central key issue which must be comprehended before we can possibly go on.

But it is irrelevant now, if the tau is just enabling us to say there exists a number of "electrons" or whatever we would end up defining as ontological elements?

Irrelevant isn't a word I would use here. The tau axis is not just allowing us to say, "there exists a number of 'electrons' or whatever we would end up defining as ontological elements"; it is allowing us to specify exactly how many occurrences exist in that epistemological solution.

I should comment that, the ability to express such a thing is not a requirement that we do so. No more than the Dewy decimal system requires us to specify every possible book which could exist, the only requirement is that every book we have in our library can be given a specific label: i.e., a counter example can not be found.

Have fun -- Dick

PS I am sorry I write so much. I wish I could be clearer.

 

[AnssiH]

Ah! Practical examples are helpful even if they can sometimes be little bit misleading too for this subject :)

Please let me know what you find misleading about my "electron" example

Nothing! :)
I was just saying practical examples are helpful in general, and thought you usually try to avoid them (since you seldom use them) because they are cases of defining some ontological elements, and people can be misled to think you are suggesting such a defined ontology.

This is, very simply, about how to handle undefined information. What I am doing is setting up a way of representing the undefined valid information which underlies all of our epistemological solutions solutions. Paul has always held that what I have done is proved a theorem. I can see how that interpretation could be made of my work; but it isn't really how I see it. Would anyone ever suggest that the Dewy Decimal System is a theorem? It is no more than a way of indexing books which can be applied to any library collection.

Likewise, what I am doing at this point is setting up a system which will allow me to talk about any collection of information without putting any constraints on the interpretation of that information at all. I like to think of it as a way of indexing the fundamental elements expressing that information. That is why I often refer to to these "valid ontological elements" (which I have defined to be "reality") as "references".

My first problem was that the collection of knowledge changes: and that would be the valid ontological elements which actually form the basis of our epistemological constructs. Our knowledge changes "from time to time". That is why I call the index representing such a change "t" or time.

Right, this seems pretty clear.

Time (or "t") is no more or less than an index on that collection of fundamental elements which underlie our world view. And any past you can conceive of can be seen as a collection of such "presents". You can see your "past" as being coherent collection of "presents" identified by this thing called time can't you?

Sure.

So the next step is to come up with a way of indexing the collection of valid elements underlying a specific "present". Again, I simply attach a label to each and every one of those elements. Since I don't know what those elements are (if I did know, I would be working with an epistemological solution and not with "undefined references") I will simply attach a number "i" to each reference. If I ever have to apply this indexing system to an actual epistemological solution, I will have to understand that solution and correlate each of those indexes to the proper reference. But, I am not concerned with the problem of understanding any epistemological solution (that would be theorizing and, for the moment, I want simply to make sure that I am not ignoring any information).

Yup.

My next step was to define "position". All I did was decide to see that index "i" as a position on the x axis. There is nothing deep and profound about such a step; it is actually quite common in quite a lot of scientific representations. Take for example, the family tree of primates. You will see it laid out on a sheet of paper with forks leading to various different species. They are using the concept of position (different horizontal placement on a sheet of paper) to represent branching to these different species. Now they simply draw a line on the paper; one could just as well attach some index "i" to each branch. In fact, if one were to create a computer model of that picture of lines, one would attach some specific x displacement for the same phenomena.

Yeah, so this step of the indexing process doesn't imply any specific ontology either?

The problem, since we are working with a finite number of "references" here, is that the picture loses information if two or more of those "fundamental elements" happen to be assigned the same label (by some specific epistemological solution). How does one manage to maintain that information in such a representation? Clearly one can not. That is exactly why I introduced the tau axis.

Yeah, and so one example of assigning the same label to a number of fundamental elements would be when one ends up defining that many electrons exist at a specific "present"?

Hmmm, I think at this point it would be helpful for me if you could explain how you end up manipulating this representation for some useful end. I think it might clear up some things that might be little bit blurry to me right now.

None of this is any more or less than an indexing procedure. What I have done is transformed the original problem into a collection of points in a three dimensional space. If those points are constrained to be "valid ontological elements" which are known by person generating the epistemological solution, then any flaw free epistemological solution must yield those points.
If your epistemological solution does not yield expectations consistent with your own past, then you should certainly regard it as flawed.

i.e. if it cannot explain your past?

What we would like to do is to introduce the simplest set of "invalid ontological elements" which will constrain the "valid ontological" elements to what we know without eliminating any possibilities for the future (what we do not know).

The fundamental insight here is that the fabricated ontological elements are part and parcel of the epistemological construct and are free variables unconstrained by "reality". It follows that one must handle ontological elements as two different types of "unknowns"; one collection which is set and immutable and another which is free to anything at all: i.e., the rules are different for the two sets and that difference must be embedded in the logic of the representation.

Once again, I repeat, "it should be clear that such a representation can represent any possible explanation of any possible 'past'". This is the central key issue which must be comprehended before we can possibly go on.

Well at least I cannot think of how it could fail to represent some kind of past, so this seems quite valid.

I just should have phrased myself more clearly that's all. But it is irrelevant now, if the tau is just enabling us to say there exists a number of "electrons" or whatever we would end up defining as ontological elements?

Irrelevant isn't a word I would use here.

Heh, you know how sometimes when you try to sort out a misunderstanding, it just turns into more misunderstandings like a snowball-effect? This is one of those moments :)
What "irrelevant" was referring to was "I should have phrased myself more clearly before" (which I included in my quote).
What that was referring to was when I said something in the effect of your solution being used to define things... it was the "method of defining" things that were under discussion, not the actual definitions that one might end up to... Anyway, this was irrelevant because I had understood the use of "tau-dimension" incorrectly.

PS I am sorry I write so much. I wish I could be clearer.

Don't worry about it :)

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Anssi,

Your posts are delightful. You make it quite clear that you think deeply about what I say; something I wish some of the other people reading this forum would do. (Who knows, maybe there are others who have a grasp of what I am saying, If they are out there, I wish they would comment.)

Yeah, so this step of the indexing process doesn't imply any specific ontology either?

Of course not. You cannot have an epistemological solution to any problem without an ontology to build that solution on. And, you certainly cannot explain that solution to anyone without communicating the required ontology; so, if we can find a valid epistemological solution, we can certainly refer to the required ontological elements. That is what language is all about: mere symbolic representation of concepts we feel are important so we can communicate those thoughts with others.

An Aside: (you can skip this if you want!) There is a short column in the April 14, 2007 issue of "Science News" ("Rats take fast route to remembering") where the authors say,

Prior studies, which have focused on task learning unrelated to preexisting knowledge, indicate that a brain region called the hippocampus incorporates new facts and events into memory. The hippocampus gradually yields to another structure, the neocortex, as new memories become stronger. [And correlated into preexisting knowledge.] This process typically takes at least 1 month in rodents and a few years in people.

The blue comment is mine. As I told my wife, that sort of means rats are pretty smart. I guess we should be thankful their life span is short and they haven't come up with language yet or they would take the world over!

But really, I think the difference might very well be that the rats are hard wired for specific types of memories and don't waste any time trying to think of alternate explanations whereas the essence of human success is that they spend a lot of time (as a species, not as individuals) considering alternate possibilities before new information is correlated into preexisting knowledge. Of course I could be wrong. :rofl:

Just a comment on the importance of learning a language.

Yeah, and so one example of assigning the same label to a number of fundamental elements would be when one ends up defining that many electrons exist at a specific "present"?

Yes, exactly. Another good example would be that family tree of the primates I brought up. How would you show multiple entries for the same species? You already use horizontal displacement to indicate different species and vertical displacement to indicate time and you would have to include another axis if you wanted to show the time change in populations.

Hmmm, I think at this point it would be helpful for me if you could explain how you end up manipulating this representation for some useful end. I think it might clear up some things that might be little bit blurry to me right now.

The useful end is the organization of your thoughts and that organization yields results almost beyond belief. That is exactly where I want to lead you.

i.e. if it cannot explain your past?

If any explanation turns out to be counter to my past (i.e., inconsistent with what I know to have happened beyond doubt) I certainly wouldn't accept it as valid. Would you?

As far as "a useful end" is concerned, we need an exact definition of "an explanation" (otherwise, we don't know how to go about explaining things). That is why I defined an explanation to be a method of obtaining one's expectations from known information.

Under that definition, the structure of the "what is", is "what is" explanation is quite simple in that it is no more than a table of "undefined ontological elements" going to make up every discrete present going to make up that "past" which constitutes "what one thinks one knows". Since "what one thinks one knows" is undefined we can represent each element with a number. One's expectation are no more than a "true/false" decision on any given present. In the "what is", is "what is" explanation, the method is no more than "look in the table". If a particular list is in the table the answer to your expectations is, "true". If it is not there, the answer is false.

If we could really contain, in our minds, a complete collection of all "presents" going to make up our past, then that might be a useful view but that feat is somewhat beyond our mental capabilities. What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element. In such a case, we need comprehend only that element in our logic, taking the rest as "understood": i.e., as established by that rule. So I will show you a way of accomplishing such a result by including intentionally invalid ontological elements, an extremely powerful procedure. After all, if you can't prove that your explanations of reality include no "invalid ontological elements" how can you constrain me to a presentation which excludes such things? Particularly if I explicitly declare these additions to be "invalid".

The first "invalid ontological elements" I would like to add, is a very simple set. As defined, all real presents consist of specific changes in my knowledge of valid ontological elements. I have already eluded to the fact that I am using numerical labels because I can then talk about that "method of obtaining one's expectations" as a mathematical function. The "true/false" can be seen as a "one/zero" dichotomy and I am using numerical labels for that "known knowledge" (those specific "valid ontological elements" which constitute the "reality" of any given "present") so the method is a mathematical function: i.e., it transforms one set of numbers into a second set (you give me a set of numbers which could possibly be a real "present" and that "mathematical function" returns either a one or a zero (depending upon whether or not that collection of numbers is in that table of my "what is", is "what is" explanation.

But this is a very strange "mathematical function". The number of arguments for any particular "real" present is neither fixed or known.

In order to simplify the situation (given that I have a specific epistemological solution to represent), I will simply add a sufficient number of "invalid ontological elements" (additional numbers) to each "valid present" until all cases have exactly the same number of arguments. Now you have to understand that, after I add these "invalid ontological elements" there need be no method within my finished explanation (where I am going) to tell the difference between the valid and invalid elements; in fact there cannot be such a method for if there were, it would constitute a flaw in the epistemological solution (invalidating that ontological element). Notice that the numbers I have added to the collection are totally arbitrary; counter to the valid ontological elements which are immutable. (This fact will become extremely important down the line a ways.)

So, after that agumentation, it is not a very strange function at all, it has a clear set of arguments (that total number of ontological elements that flaw free epistemological solution presumes makes up all presents, some of which are valid and some invalid). My flaw free epistemological construct must yield a one or zero for each and every such possible collection.

At this point, I would like to add a second set of invalid ontological elements. Again, I add these elements for my own convenience as they will make that explanation I am looking for (that mathematical function which constitutes the "fundamental rule") simpler. As that mathematical function (which is a direct explicit expression of our explanation) now stands (per what I have laid out above) there could exist identical "presents". That issue is the source of some conceptual difficulties. All of my presents are supposed to have a unique index on them and that unique index can not be established by my proposed epistemological solution unless the value of that index is embedded in the collection of presents themselves. If two presents are identical, the index can not be embedded in the collection: i.e., no epistemological solution based on that collection of ontological elements can yield a different index for those two "presents".

The solution to this difficulty is very simple. All one need do is find all identical entries in that table of our "what is", is "what is" explanation (where we have already added the entries which made all presents have the same number of arguments). We can now add another entry (just another invalid ontological element) to every present, making sure that the entry is different in every case where the earlier table had identical entries. Now every "present" going to make up our "what is", is "what is" explanation is an identifiably different case. This provides us a direct procedure for obtaining that embedded index. You give me any hypothetical entry for that table and I can examine the table and tell you not only if it is a member (give you the true/false answer) but I can also give you the "t" index for every true case. By the way, I am not suggesting this as a reasonable way of explaining reality, I am simply saying that it must work as the collection of table entries is finite so the job can be completed.

So, let's extend this idea of adding invalid ontological elements to simplify the problem one more very subtle step. Let us make a new table consisting of a list of all entries in the table we now have but omitting one number (that's one of those reference labels) from each specific present. To make what I am proposing very clear: if every present in the current list (that is both the additions above have been done) consists of n numbers, this new table will have n entries for every specific "t" index: each one being the entry for the "t" present with a different specific numerical reference removed. We can call this subsidiary table, "table number two".

Again, after removing one number, we introduce the possibility that this second table will have some identical entries. We can once again get rid of identical entries by adding more "invalid ontological elements" (using the same method described above) until table number two consists of totally different entries (please note that, since nothing has been said about order in those arguments, the same set of numbers listed in a different order will be considered to be identical lists). This step may be quite extensive but it is nonetheless finite and can thus be accomplished.

Now this augmented table number two can also be seen as a tabular representation of a function (which I will call function number two). A function which yields a one/zero result for each of all possible collections of arguments (including that "t" index): one for "true" (that set of numbers is in the table or) zero for false (that set of numbers is not in the table). These two tables (the table yielding probabilities and table number two), taken together provide the definition of a new function with a very interesting property. Given that the original table upon which table number two is based (that primary table being augmented with those new "invalid ontological elements") has n entries; given any possible set of (n-1) arguments, one can find first if that set is an entry in table number two (in which case there is either one or zero entries). Since that entry includes the "t" index, the associated entry in the primary table can be examined. That entry will have exactly the same arguments as the set which was given plus one more additional argument: the entry which was removed to create table number two.

What I have just described is a method of finding the missing number given all the labels except the missing label. That means that, if I have a flaw free epistemological solution to this uniquely augmented "what is", is "what is" explanation, there must exist a mathematical function of all but one argument which will yield the missing argument (I have just explained how to construct such a table). Now, it may be true that I only have given the mechanism for constructing a table of the results which corresponds to my presumed past (what I think I know, including those invalid ontological element) but it should be clear to you that the procedure must also yield all of the known "valid ontological elements". What I have just proved is that, if I have a flaw free epistemological solution, I can use that solution to build a tabular function which will yield the missing argument for every valid set of arguments where one argument is missing. That function can be written as

$$x_n(t) = f(x_1, x_2, x_3, \cdots, x_{n-1}, t)$$

or,

$$F(x_1, x_2, x_3, \cdots, x_n, t) = x_n(t) - f(x_1, x_2, x_3, \cdots, x_{n-1}, t) = 0.$$
​

Note that, since order of arguments is of no significance, x sub n can be any element in the set. To clarify what I have just proved: Given a flaw free epistemological construct based on the collection of valid ontological elements plus a designed set of invalid ontological elements, there always exists a function (which I will refer to as the function F( B(t) ) of those numerical labels which will yield exactly that "what is", is "what is" table under the very simple rule, F=0. Likewise, given that table, there exists a function (which I will call P( B, t) ) which yields the probability the collection of arguments B exist in the particular present indexed by t: i.e., that function will yield either one or zero to indicate that B(t) is or is not an entry on the table.

Now, not only must such a functions exist, but anyone with a little mathematics training must realize that an infinite set of functions satisfying that constraint exists for every possible set of valid ontological elements. These numbers constitute a finite set of points in that (x, tau, t) space and there are an infinite number of functions which will fit that set of points exactly so no constraint whatsoever has actually been placed on the future (which is, by definition, what I do not know). In other words, there exists no epistemological solution based upon any set of valid ontological elements which can not be expressed by a specific P( B[/b), t) under the simple rule that the only constraint on the numerical references is that they satisfy a relationship which can be written: F( B(t) ) = zero.

The only difference between this mathematical representation and the specific explanation it represents is the fact that I have added one hell of a lot of "invalid ontological elements": i.e., an epistemological construct invented by a theorist could possibly contain fewer "invalid ontological elements" but it certainly could not depend on a simpler rule ( F=0 is a pretty simple rule).

I think I have given you enough to think about for the moment. Check out what I have said carefully and if you find any part of it confusing, I will do my best to clear things up. When this all makes sense to you, I will take you to the next step. Let's see if you can get your head around the above exposition.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[RVBuckeye]

You make it quite clear that you think deeply about what I say; something I wish some of the other people reading this forum would do. (Who knows, maybe there are others who have a grasp of what I am saying, If they are out there, I wish they would comment.)

Hello DD,
Actually, I have been following this thread since the beginning and have read most of your posts on this forum. I've hesitated to comment to this because, well, you were a little mean to people in the beginning (and used waaay too many emoticons:rofl: ) Anyway, I'm here just trying to learn something, so please proceed.
Having fun
RV

 

[Rade]

...If any explanation turns out to be counter to my past (i.e., inconsistent with what I know to have happened beyond doubt) I certainly wouldn't accept it as valid. Would you?

Well yes, because I realize that it is impossible for any human to "know" what happened in the past "beyond doubt". By definition, science (= search for knowledge) always provides uncertain (= with doubt) knowledge.

ps/ Sorry for the interruption--please continue.

edit example: Let A = the birth doctor explanation for an event [E] that occurred to you when you were born (say 30 seconds after birth from womb). Let B = your explanation of "what you know to have happened" at that exact past time. Now, which explanation is "valid", A or B ? The criterion of being "counter to my past" is of no value in this example to understanding why any explanation of past events is valid for the simple reason that "your past" provides uncertain knowledge of the present.

 

[Rade]

...Since "what one thinks one knows" is undefined we can represent each element with a number...

Well no, Dr.D. just defined it, that is, "what one thinks one knows" is defined by Dr.D. as being "undefined". Thus, it not possible for Dr.D. to represent each element with only a single number (1,2,3,...n), he must represent each element to show the dialectic union of the "undefined" ontological essence of the element (let me call it the set O1, O2, O3, ...On) with some token representation for epistemic uncertain knowledge of each element (let us use the 1,2,3...n of Dr.D.). Thus, each element must be represented by the dialectic set (O1-1, O2-2, O3-3...On-n)--and now Dr.D. can continue with his equation once so modified. If someone other than Dr.D. finds error in my argument, please explain.

 

[Doctordick]

Actually, I have been following this thread since the beginning and have read most of your posts on this forum.

I presume you mean the "Philosophy" forum and not the "Physics Forums" per say. I would be totally astonished if you had read a significant number of those 600 posts I have managed to stick out there.

I've hesitated to comment to this because, well, you were a little mean to people in the beginning (and used waaay too many emoticons:rofl: )

I'm not a "mean" person; all I was doing is trying to get a rise out of the readers. And I only use a lot of "emoticons" when I feel I am getting no feedback. What I am trying to say is actually quite simple but I don't seem to be able to reach very many people. My real problem is that I have no idea as to what part of what I am saying is not being understood, but I am learning.

Anyway, I'm here just trying to learn something, so please proceed.

Now see, you haven't given me any indication of what you do or do not understand of my presentation. You could understand every point or you could be missing the whole issue, like Rade. Now you see I have nothing against Rade; it's just that he doesn't seem to comprehend any of what I am talking about. If you think his posts are relevant, I would say you are not following my thoughts. If you do have some understanding of what I have said, maybe you could explain it to Rade in a way he could understand. It would help me a lot to know where others are going astray of what I am saying. I am beginning to comprehend that they are missing the very essence of my thoughts.

Since "what one thinks one knows" is undefined we can represent each element with a number.

Only Anssi seems to understand that these numbers are no more than labels for those undefined ontological elements in exactly the same sense that words are nothing more than labels for whatever we think the words mean. When we understand (have decided we know what we are talking about), then and only then can we replace the numbers with defined words.

The interesting issue at that point is that, replacing those numbers with words is no more than relabeling; the only thing which is really important is the correlation evident in multiple appearances of the same collections of words (or letters or even hieroglyphics of any kind). Those various correlations are exactly what we mean by definition. A dictionary is no more than a supposedly complete collection of the most important such correlations in a given specific language. What collection of symbols is used for labels is of utterly no significance. In fact, it can be a hindrance as people tend to believe they understand the language they learned before they learned to think.

A long time ago, I asked the question, "How do you tell the difference between an electron and a Volkswagen?" Take a look at that and tell me what you think. You will find my answer a few posts down from there.

The example is clearly silly but what it points out is that the identification of an event is a constraint on acceptable surrounding events. When we define an event to be an electron (or a Volkswagen) we are actually using the tag to constrain surrounding events to a known collection of expectations of already defined events. In fact, it is usually a very vast collection and generally impossible to delineate by any mechanism other than by presuming the listener is familiar with the general nature of the associated events indicated by the very act of naming the event of interest.

i.e., if you don't know the difference between an electron and a Volkswagen, you just don't know what they are, the're different things!

Glad you are having fun -- Dick

 

[nabuco]

I'm not a "mean" person; all I was doing is trying to get a rise out of the readers.

For someone making the arguments you are making, that sentence is very strange. "What you really are" is as unknowable as "what the universe really is", even to yourself. You cannot know what you really are, you can only have a model of yourself based on your self-perception. As to everyone else reading this forum, all they have are your words, and when you tell them "who you really are", all you are doing is give them more words.

I believe the hypothesis that you are mean is consistent with everything else you wrote so far, since calling people idiots is part of what defines a person as being mean.

But I'm probably just another idiot :)

 

[AnssiH]

Hey, sorry it has taken a while for me to reply. I've read this post a few times, trying to digest it, and I can kind of sort of get what you are getting at, but it's a bit tricky to grasp. But first the rats :)

The blue comment is mine. As I told my wife, that sort of means rats are pretty smart. I guess we should be thankful their life span is short and they haven't come up with language yet or they would take the world over!

But really, I think the difference might very well be that the rats are hard wired for specific types of memories and don't waste any time trying to think of alternate explanations whereas the essence of human success is that they spend a lot of time (as a species, not as individuals) considering alternate possibilities before new information is correlated into preexisting knowledge. Of course I could be wrong. :rofl:

Well, yeah, seems to me that the more sophisticated (large & complex) a worldview is, the more work it is to incorporate new information into it in a coherent manner. I.e. anything we see needs to make sense with everything we know, and when it doesn't, a small worldview is "refined" faster into a new coherent whole than a large one (since this refinement would require you to redefine many things in that worldview, until it is internally coherent again)

Also there is another factor that is probably contributing to this, which is that animals seem to have more hardwired functions in their brain whereas our brain seems to have more freedom in the ways to interpret information, and this freedom entails longer learning periods, especially right after birth. And that would explain why it takes so long for a human infant to start functioning in the world in any reasonable manner at all...

The useful end is the organization of your thoughts and that organization yields results almost beyond belief. That is exactly where I want to lead you.
If any explanation turns out to be counter to my past (i.e., inconsistent with what I know to have happened beyond doubt) I certainly wouldn't accept it as valid. Would you?

No I wouldn't, that's when we are forced to try and refine that worldview.

Okay, onto the topic;

As far as "a useful end" is concerned, we need an exact definition of "an explanation" (otherwise, we don't know how to go about explaining things). That is why I defined an explanation to be a method of obtaining one's expectations from known information.

Under that definition, the structure of the "what is", is "what is" explanation is quite simple in that it is no more than a table of "undefined ontological elements" going to make up every discrete present going to make up that "past" which constitutes "what one thinks one knows". Since "what one thinks one knows" is undefined we can represent each element with a number.

Here I need some clarification... When we lay down these numbers onto the "x, tau, t" -table, that is an attempt at a specific solution, right? I.e. we have made some definitions to be able to do that at all?

Whether this is correct or not, I think it would be helpful if we could actually try and describe some simple system in this manner?

One's expectation are no more than a "true/false" decision on any given present. In the "what is", is "what is" explanation, the method is no more than "look in the table". If a particular list is in the table the answer to your expectations is, "true". If it is not there, the answer is false.

This I don't quite get either. I have some expectation (for the future?), and I make a list (of ontological elements?)... Is this like a description of a specific state (a specific present)? Probably not because then I don't know how I would find it from the table, or what it being "true" (being found) would entail...

If we could really contain, in our minds, a complete collection of all "presents" going to make up our past, then that might be a useful view but that feat is somewhat beyond our mental capabilities. What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.

I.e. which would tell us if some specific single ontological element is "valid"? Or if it exists in reality as has been defined? No?

I hope you can clarify these issues to me before I reply to the rest of the post. Of which I'm sure I'll have more questions :)

What I am trying to say is actually quite simple but I don't seem to be able to reach very many people. My real problem is that I have no idea as to what part of what I am saying is not being understood, but I am learning.

This reminds me, one thing that I find particularly useful when I'm trying to grasp some new model or a concept, is that I look at the history of that model; how the idea was developed one step at a time. Usually when you find a new outlook at something that causes you to look at everything from a different angle than most others, in the end you are so deep in your own paradigm that it is going to be very hard to communicate even the simplest of things to anyone else (since they understand too many concepts differently).

But people get the new concepts (and new ways to understand old concepts) better if you can explain what lead you to that idea step by step, i.e. what is the problem you were trying to solve that lead you to the first tiny step, and how things followed from there.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Well yes, because I realize that it is impossible for any human to "know" what happened in the past "beyond doubt". By definition, science (= search for knowledge) always provides uncertain (= with doubt) knowledge.

But you would not consider a worldview (or a physical model) to be valid if it fails to explain your past, would you?

edit example: Let A = the birth doctor explanation for an event [E] that occurred to you when you were born (say 30 seconds after birth from womb). Let B = your explanation of "what you know to have happened" at that exact past time. Now, which explanation is "valid", A or B ? The criterion of being "counter to my past" is of no value in this example to understanding why any explanation of past events is valid for the simple reason that "your past" provides uncertain knowledge of the present.

Of course part of the explanation is your idea about how your memories exist etc, and likewise part of the explanation is about why your memories would be uncertain. Even then each aspect of your worldview is something that has been extracted from your experiences; that is all you have to work with.

Here we get to that unfortunate complication that is under discussion. Perhaps a good way to express it is that there is no way to "interpret our experiences" correctly* until we have built a worldview, and we have no way to build a worldview until we can interpret our experiences correctly.

(*That's a bit misleading because there is no such thing as an experience without interpretation; it turns out it is the result of interpretation that is the experience itself)

This is analogous to the problem of understanding language. You cannot explain what words mean to someone who doesn't know any words. Yet we all learn the language around us.

So that's the problem, and the solutions to the both problems are also similar; we make certain assumptions about meanings of things (~patterns), and we arrive at a coherent set of definitions. Be that defined words, or defined things. (We are not intelligent because we understand language. Instead, we understand language because we are intelligent)

After some learning (few years of "pasts") our worldview is an internally coherent association network (some things and properties and other such concepts defined by other things and vice versa) that can explain our past, at least in so far that we consider any parts of it to be valid.

Scientific models are likewise internally coherent explanations for the phenomena around us, and likewise they are a set of things defined by other things. For instance, to be able to define a "photon", i.e. to explain what a photon is, you need to refer to great many other things, that you must also defined properly. Imagine trying to explain what a photon is and how it behaves to someone who doesn't know what does matter and space mean, or what is energy, frequency, motion, time, or any other concept that we use to understand everyday situations.

So the only reason we can talk about photons with each others is that we can refer to such concepts as "space" and "motion" and "time", and be fairly certain that the other person understands them in a similar manner as we do.

You can see the "internal coherence" at work when you look at just about any case of us having made scientific advances, as we have defined something very differently from before, and that has affected many other things in our worldview, so to keep it internally coherent. For instance, after defining simultaneity as relative to so-called "inertial frame" (a very carefully defined concept in itself), we were led to quite a few additional changes in our models/worldviews.

And now, for instance, if you look at quantum behaviour, we have many ways to explain it, just by defining some things differently. Each different QM interpretation is a case of having chosen to define different "ontological elements" differently (and having transformed the rest of the worldview accordingly).

Wouldn't it be nice to have a method for structuring these sorts of attempts?

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

But you would not consider a worldview (or a physical model) to be valid if it fails to explain your past, would you?

Yes I would. Many physical models "fail" to "completely" explain past events. I assume you know about the various models on the structure of the atomic nucleus--thus you will know that the Schrödinger wave-equation is the essence of the independent-particle model--it provides the unique quanta state of each nucleon plus the spins of all known isotopes--very impressive indeed. However, this model is of no help to explain nuclear density, binding energies, radii--we need the liquid-drop model for this "explanation" of reality of atomic nucleus. So you see, yes, I do consider both wave-equation model and liquid-drop model to be "valid" (in a narrow sense) yet they do not "explain past events" completely.

Also, from reading your post to Dr.D. I see that you agree with him that it is possible to attain scientific knowledge without doubt--well, all I can say is I do not agree with either of you--convince me with logical argument how this is possible--to have scientific knowledge without doubt.

Here we get to that unfortunate complication that is under discussion. Perhaps a good way to express it is that there is no way to "interpret our experiences" correctly* until we have built a worldview, and we have no way to build a worldview until we can interpret our experiences correctly. (*That's a bit misleading because there is no such thing as an experience without interpretation; it turns out it is the result of interpretation that is the experience itself)

Well, I do not agree here. Many people "build a worldview" without correct interpretation of experiences. Did not President Bush build in his mind a worldview on Irag without correct interpretation of his experiences ? Also, it is not true that "there is no such thing as experience without interpretation"--it is called "perception", yet even before "sensation"--both are types of "experience" that humans have without "interpretation".

Wouldn't it be nice to have a method for structuring these sorts of attempts?-Anssih

Yes, but do we not already have a method for structuring the various interpretations of QM--is it not called the Scientific Method ? Are any interpretations of QM held to be valid that have been falsified by experimentation via the Scientific Method ?

Sorry for the interruption between you and Dr.D.--I am learning from the exchange--but be sure he answers all your questions about logical premises, for a deductive argument such as being presented based on false premise is no argument at all--on this I think we all agree.

 

[AnssiH]

Yes I would. Many physical models "fail" to "completely" explain past events. I assume you know about the various models on the structure of the atomic nucleus--thus you will know that the Schrödinger wave-equation is the essence of the independent-particle model--it provides the unique quanta state of each nucleon plus the spins of all known isotopes--very impressive indeed. However, this model is of no help to explain nuclear density, binding energies, radii--we need the liquid-drop model for this "explanation" of reality of atomic nucleus. So you see, yes, I do consider both wave-equation model and liquid-drop model to be "valid" (in a narrow sense) yet they do not "explain past events" completely.

Oh that is what you meant. I see what the misconception was. A model can certainly be (and usually is) considered "valid" prediction-wise even if it doesn't cover everything.

What Dr Dick was referring to as a "failure to explain your past" was if a model produces expectations that turn out to be false. That is not different from saying that if a physical model makes predictions that turn out to be false, it is not considered valid.

Also, from reading your post to Dr.D. I see that you agree with him that it is possible to attain scientific knowledge without doubt--well, all I can say is I do not agree with either of you--convince me with logical argument how this is possible--to have scientific knowledge without doubt.

I don't think it is possible either, and I am not sure if Dr.D is saying that, and even if he is, I am certainly interested to figure out how he is manipulating ontological elements, because it seems to be something that should be useful for a number of things.

there is no way to "interpret our experiences" correctly* until we have built a worldview, and we have no way to build a worldview until we can interpret our experiences correctly.

Well, I do not agree here. Many people "build a worldview" without correct interpretation of experiences.

Yeah I worder that very badly. Amazingly badly! :)
I shouldn't use the word "correct" when I'm just trying to say, "until you can interpret your experiences at all". Interpretation of any sort entails you know the meaning of some pattern, and that entails you have built a worldview, and that entails you have information about reality, and that entails you have interpreted some patterns... That is probably better way to put the problem.

Anyway, important aspect of this problem is that...

Also, it is not true that "there is no such thing as experience without interpretation"--it is called "perception", yet even before "sensation"--both are types of "experience" that humans have without "interpretation".

...the view you paint in the above quote about "pure perception" above seems to be false, unless we abide to naive realistic view (i.e. reality is as we perceive it).

Perhaps the misconception here is that I use the word "interpretation" which people usually take as something we'd do consciously. But what I am referring to is that the cortex takes in spatial/temporal patterns, and infers meaning from it (recognizes things), and what is being recognized is what the subjective experience is.

That is what I meant with "there is no such thing as an experience without interpretation; it turns out it is the result of interpretation that is the experience itself". So instead of saying "we interpret our experiences" a more proper way to put it would be brain interprets sensory data, and the result of that is what we call our "experience"

But of course, before the brain can recognize any single thing at all, it must have built a worldview where definitions for these "things" exist (so any sort of interpretation on the data can be performed at all). So you see how this is kind of an egg-chicken problem in a sense.

What I describe is a "specific epistemological solution" though (something that most materialists should agree on), and what is important from ontological perspective is simply that we cannot consider our conscious perception to be objective information, since the real nature of that perception is unkown (unless you assume a specific epistemological solution called idealism)

Yes, but do we not already have a method for structuring the various interpretations of QM--is it not called the Scientific Method ? Are any interpretations of QM held to be valid that have been falsified by experimentation via the Scientific Method ?

Of course not. But then falsification is little bit tricky at this time since each interpretation is a model that has been built to explain the exactly same observations. As long as any given interpretation is "valid" (it can explain the said observation in a coherent manner), it cannot be falsified by anything we have observed so far. Yet we can be pretty sure not all of the can be ontologically valid (and almost as sure that none is completely true)

I see scientific method as an attempt to produce valid models in that they produce valid predictions, but not something that directly produces ontological answers. When it's used correctly, it produces important constraints that any valid "ontological explanation" must meet. The reason why I see them as pure models is exactly that they are a set of things we have defined, and nothing says nature is built the way we end up defining it.

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

Thank you AnssiH, I have a comment about this comment you make:

...But of course, before the brain can recognize any single thing at all, it must have built a worldview where definitions for these "things" exist (so any sort of interpretation on the data can be performed at all). So you see how this is kind of an egg-chicken problem in a sense...

Here I would argue you put "definition" (the label) of a thing priori to "perception" (the existence) of a thing. Let me explain my thoughts. As I see it, when a human first encounters some new "thing" that exists (some valid ontological element) they do not have some file folder in the mind where exists a priori definition (label) of this new thing. In my view, before we define (label) we form a "concept" of the thing perceived (that is, we form the file folder of the valid ontological element)--and that the process of forming a concept (of making the folder) is prior to the process of forming a definition (of putting a label on the folder). So I cannot agree that we have in mind a priori labels (definitions) of things never before perceived. First comes perception (which I take to be an automatic process--not conscious), then we form the concept of what is perceived (we make a mental file folder via consciousness), then we define (we put a label on the folder in order to communicate with both self and other).

 

[AnssiH]

Thank you AnssiH, I have a comment about this comment you make:

Here I would argue you put "definition" (the label) of a thing priori to "perception" (the existence) of a thing.

I didn't suggest that. On the contrary. I said it is an egg-chicken problem. You cannot have an experience of perceiving something without having defined something (having some conception of reality). But you cannot have any definitions unless you have perceived something. But it is possible to form an internally coherent worldview that yields useful perceptions. Just like it is possible to assume meanings on words that yield useful interpretation of what someone is saying.

Let me explain my thoughts. As I see it, when a human first encounters some new "thing" that exists (some valid ontological element) they do not have some file folder in the mind where exists a priori definition (label) of this new thing. In my view, before we define (label) we form a "concept" of the thing perceived (that is, we form the file folder of the valid ontological element)--and that the process of forming a concept (of making the folder) is prior to the process of forming a definition (of putting a label on the folder).

That is pretty much what I said, except I don't know how you differentiate between "forming concepts" and "forming definitions"; to me this is essentially the same thing.

EDIT: Let me reiterate little bit, since there seems to be fair amount of confusion from us using some words differently. The actual difference in our views is here:

First comes perception (which I take to be an automatic process--not conscious), then we form the concept of what is perceived (we make a mental file folder via consciousness), then we define (we put a label on the folder in order to communicate with both self and other).

It is kind of intuitive (and common) to assume perception comes first, and that it is then used to make sense of the world. But it is very difficult (probably impossible) to avoid homunculus ideas or some type of naive realism when you assume this. Whether one considers homunculus ideas to be problematic or not depends on quite a few things, but let it be said that I definitely do consider them to be extremely problematic.

Instead everything falls in place when you see any conscious perception as a case of something having been defined (conceptualized) & recognized. This requires the brain to build some sort of conception (a model) of reality, and everything that exists in that model (anything that you can recognize, be it a specific shape or a colour or anything at all), are things that allow for a useful interpretation of the spatial/temporal patterns coming in from different sensory systems. I.e. conscious experience as a result of sensory data intepretation.

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

Thank you Anssih...it seems we will have to disagree on the essence of "perception"--you view it as a process that includes "definition" (as interaction with some"thing" pre defined), I view it as a process priori to "definition" (but perhaps here I still do not grasp what you are saying). Whatever, let us have Dr.D. continue with his explanation of "explanation".

 

[Doctordick]

Hey, sorry it has taken a while for me to reply.

You are forgiven. I also have been slow to answer. Life has been quite busy lately and I have had little free time to "surf".

And that would explain why it takes so long for a human infant to start functioning in the world in any reasonable manner at all...

Yeah, I tend to agree with that.

No I wouldn't, that's when we are forced to try and refine that worldview.

Most people are not "forced to try and refine their world-view. There is another option: you can deny the new information. Sometimes that is easier than trying to incorporate it into one's world view. Denial tends to lead to what I call compartmentalization: some people, even respected exact scientists, can hold two conflicting theories as both being correct by simply never bringing the conflict to mind. But that's not what I am interested in. It seems to me that any rational person, when confronted with such a circumstance, would indeed "try and refine that world-view".

The problem is that success is quite difficult and, if we are to survive, we have to compartmentalize, most people just don't admit it. I began to consciously compartmentalize before I started grade school. When I was about four, my father told me that "anyone who believes more than ten percent of what he hears, or fifty percent of what he reads, or ninety percent of what he sees with his own eyes is gullible!" and I certainly didn't want to be "gullible". I had a very difficult time trying to figure out what I was supposed to believe and I soon developed a very major compartmentalized view: "what I thought I knew" (what I used to decide my actions; which I later began to refer to as "intuition") and "what I believed" (a category which did nothing but shrink as I got older). That's how I got into math and physics: they were the only subjects where I could figure out what I was supposed to believe (computer studies didn't exist then or I would probably have gone that way). I still hold "pure logic" (the fundamentals of mathematics) as a believable area but graduate school moved a lot of physics out of that realm (luckily I had already learned some important mathematics quite relevant to that physics).

As an aside, when it comes to "everyday life", I leave it all to "intuition" and make no attempt to make sense of it at all, it isn't worth the effort. If the decision is important, your gut is a more dependable asset than your logic (logic won't work because too many variables are generally omitted). My favorite comment is, "god save me from the guy who thinks he knows what ought to be done"; he is the most dangerous man in the universe. (I am not trying to convince you of anything; I am just trying to clarify to you how I think.)

But, as you said, "Okay, onto the topic;"

Here I need some clarification... When we lay down these numbers onto the "x, tau, t" -table, that is an attempt at a specific solution, right? I.e. we have made some definitions to be able to do that at all?

Absolutely correct; the moment you actually assign a label, any label at all, you have defined what you are referring to. My point is very simple, "you can do that" and, without doing such a thing (assigning a label to something) you cannot fabricate a epistemological construct of any kind.

Whether this is correct or not, I think it would be helpful if we could actually try and describe some simple system in this manner?

The mistake you are making is that you are trying to understand what I am saying on an intuitive level. You are trying to comprehend how this is going to help you understand the universe you find yourself in; it won't, not in any way at all. What it will do is provide a simple structure which has no component too complex to analyze completely. What that structure can represent (or display) is so complex that real analysis of such a structure is beyond our mental capabilities. But it does yield some awfully interesting constraints.

What I am saying is that keeping the kind of example you want, both simple and not completely meaningless, is probably the most difficult issue you could bring up (see my earlier comments on Rade's "three element" universe). What you need to keep in mind is the fact that I am setting up an abstract scenario, what logically could be done (if you had all the time and notational resources to logically examine all the information available to you; essentially equivalent to a infinitely fast mind). The process, as I define it, probably cannot be done in a linear manner (as is common logic). In any decent problem, the amount of data to be correlated is probably many many terabytes of information. The issue is, how would you attack the problem if you had sufficient time or could think fast enough. The first thing is to have a clear idea of where you want to go (ergo, my definition of "an explanation") and second, how can you analytically lay out the information such that no possibility has been eliminated by the structure of that representation itself. But, there are a few examples which can be (and are) directly examinable and perhaps it is worth while to look at one.

The best example I can think of would be an attempt to decipher messages from an alien civilization on another star system: i.e., our only contact is via some messaging system. Let us say this message system delivers messages in the form of, of apparently meaningless, glyphs displayed on a video screen (idea taken from the movie "Contact").

Just for the fun of it, to open your mind a little, these glyphs represent smells which the aliens use to communicate. Our inability to differentiate these smells, if we could produce them electronically, completely bars direct communication as does their complete indifference to sounds. It is only their use of EM waves which allows communication at all.

For the sake of argument, the time it takes to send and/or receive messages is insignificant (after all, we can use all the time we get between messages to analyzing and develop new hypotheses as to what they mean). What I am looking at is representing the general problem which faces us, not actual solution of the problem (I will leave that to others).

From the perspective of the "what is", is "what is" explanation, we can list the glyphs as we receive them (i.e., attach a numerical label to each one we get). The order with which we get examples of these glyphs may or may not be significant to our eventual understanding, but our understanding will probably change as new epistemological solutions are proposed and some of those theories may include "order" information which might or might not be important (our expectations could be a function of what glyph makes up the previous "present" in our analysis). Particularly in view of the fact that "our understanding" is supported by our expectations being consistent with the messages already received, it behooves us to have a method of keeping track of order itself. So we attach another label to indicate the "order" parameter (which I call "time").

As an aside, elements within the glyphs will probably be the basic things on our list (both with regard to identification and order". Certainly you could use bit mapped pictures of the glyphs on your computer (which can very definitely be seen as a list of pixels, "color numbers" and "order" number). What I am saying is that these (x, t) coordinates in my abstract picture can handle absolutely any communicable information.

Now, within that abstract structure (we actually have nothing to work with but "arbitrary numbers" on a two dimensional "space": identity and time), we might have identical glyphs received at the same time and we need a way of indicating that fact. That is the sole purpose of the additional tau space: a further attachment of a label indicating that these are different glyphs even though they have exactly the same (x,t) labels.

You should note that this additional label only becomes necessary when you begin to fabricate a solution: when you say, "ah, these are the same glyph". So long as you deal entirely with entirely undefined ontology (in which case it is impossible to specify that two glyphs are the same), the tau dimension will not required in the "what is", is "what is" explanation. The problem with the "what is", is "what is" explanation is that it isn't very useful; the only prediction it makes is, "if you go and look at what we know, this is what you will find". This is what everyone has to work with in their attempts to find an explanation of those glyphs. And that is all I am talking about.

I suspect that it is the overwhelming simplicity of the problem I want to discuss which drives people to bring in all that extraneous stuff. They simply cannot comprehend looking at things from this perspective having any value at all; I must have something else in mind and they are trying to figure out what that could possibly be. Their problem is the very fact that there IS nothing else for them to consider; absolutely anything else constitutes an epistemological problem.

What I am saying is that absolutely 'any explanation' of those glyphs would have to be consistent with the information contained in the three dimensional table of labels (x, tau, t) which has been described above (using any specific of labels consistent with that explanation). The labels for the glyphs are what your explanation chooses to use and are free to be whatever you wish them to be (as are the "order" labels). It may be that your explanation may give no credence at all to that order of receipt (give the same "t" label to all glyphs) or you might want to give meaning to some aspect of order and not to others. The point being here that we are merely allowing an aspect other than "identity" to have impact on the meaning our understanding is going to presume.

The issue of the tau dimension is that I want to be able to represent all possible epistemological solutions (all possible explanations) with that same "what is", is "what is" structure and that requires a way of expressing multiple occurrences of identical ontological elements at the same (x,t) coordinate of my representation. I am merely constructing a method of laying out these abstract numerical labels such that no information is lost in the representation of what might be known. That is, every possible explanation can be seen as a specifically labeled "what is", is "what is" explanation. What you must comprehend is that your understanding of that explanation is based on making sense of a communicable representation of that explanation which, prior to your understanding the communication, is itself a specific collection elements, we have labeled for our convenience (that is what language is all about).

This I don't quite get either. I have some expectation (for the future?), and I make a list (of ontological elements?)... Is this like a description of a specific state (a specific present)? Probably not because then I don't know how I would find it from the table, or what it being "true" (being found) would entail...

In order to understand this, you have to understand the fundamental nature of the "what is", is "what is" explanation. The "what is", is "what is" explanation has utterly nothing to say about the future. But it does describe the past! Since it does have a temporal element (the "t" index I introduced) it can be examined as a collection of "presents". It follows that any "valid" explanation of that information must yield expectations consistent with that structure: i.e., what actually happened at "t".

That would be the collection of ontological labels called B(t) (specifically labeled consistently with that explanation: i.e., identical elements have the same label). The fundamental question then becomes, if the only information available to you were to consist of the "pasts" for the "t" index less than some given "t", would that explanation yield expectations consistent with what actually happened. If the answer is "false" you would certainly reject the explanation. What a lot of people do is to presume "yields you expectations" means "give you the specific answer". Such a presumption is a logical error.

The "what is", is "what is" explanation is quite unique because it yields expectations consistent with whatever happens: i.e., it only tells you what the past was and says nothing about the future. It follows that under the "what is", is "what is" explanation, any B(t) satisfies the expectation for that given "t". You should be able to comprehend that, "this explanation does not yield a specific result for that observation", is a specific description of your expectations: i.e., your expectations are your expectations, what ever they happen to be, and are not necessarily a specific B. However, they can always be expressed in terms of a specific B: i.e., if I ask you about a specific B, your explanation, no matter what that explanation might be, will yield the probability you attribute to the expectation that that B is the correct answer. That is what explanations are all about: they yield some structure to your logical expectations.

If we could really contain, in our minds, a complete collection of all "presents" going to make up our past, then that might be a useful view but that feat is somewhat beyond our mental capabilities. What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.

I.e. which would tell us if some specific single ontological element is "valid"? Or if it exists in reality as has been defined? No?

In a word, NO! If we had the mental capability to hold, in our conscious mind, a complete collection of all the "presents" going to make up our personal pasts, then, we could think about "what we think we know" logically; however, that feat is well beyond our capabilities: i.e., we can't even comprehend "what we think we know"! Somehow, our brains (you understand that, in referring to "our brains", I am speaking to you in intuitive terms: i.e., the common world view we use in everyday communications) manage to deal with an extremely large component of "what we think we know" (yielding answers in terms of intuitive gut instinct). But we certainly can not, logically, proceed on the presumption that our intuition is correct; that is almost the definition of idiocy.

Idiocy is a word, by the way, which comes down to us from the same source as idiom which means "in a particular style": i.e., originally an idiot was someone who didn't think about things but rather went with the style of the times. I have noticed that the common vernacular meaning of that word has shifted quite a bit since I was young. Actually, the history of words is a hilarious story if you ever get into it. For example, if you go back to the source meanings, "A buxom wench with a thick French accent!" could be, a good child who genetically inherited an indistinct Frankish finger (what ever that might be). :rofl: :rofl:

I hope you can clarify these issues to me before I reply to the rest of the post. Of which I'm sure I'll have more questions :)

I hope I have made myself a little clearer.

Usually when you find a new outlook at something that causes you to look at everything from a different angle than most others, in the end you are so deep in your own paradigm that it is going to be very hard to communicate even the simplest of things to anyone else (since they understand too many concepts differently).

Yeah, I know. But, I think the real problem here is that people bring too much to the table and they can't see what I am saying for all the junk in the way.

... i.e. what is the problem you were trying to solve that lead you to the first tiny step, and how things followed from there.

When I was four years old, I began to seriously worry about how to avoid being gullible: i.e., how to determine what I should and should not believe. The real problem is that no one else even thinks about such a problem; they never even consider it and can't seem to comprehend the worth of thinking about it. You are very definately an exception; you seem to at least have some grasp of the fact that there is a problem here.

Looking forward to your next post -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Down to the "nub"!

Anssi, I have been thinking this afternoon and perhaps I can make my position a little clearer. The issue is the chicken and egg nature of ontology and epistemology. Each and every epistemology (without exception) requires an ontology. There is but one path out of the dilemma and it lies with the definition of "an explanation". If one defines "an explanation" to be "a method of obtaining one's expectations from the known information", there exists but one explanation which requires no epistemological structure: that is the "what is", is "what is" explanation. Thus, if one can come up with a notation capable of expressing the ontology behind the "what is", is "what is" explanation, one has created a representation of the ontology behind any explanation.

The issue behind the above statement is the fact that any epistemology needs to be understood and, in order to understand that epistemology, one must be able to first deduce the implied ontology. Before it is understood, any explanation is a "what is", is "what is" structure, the only issue being that the underlying ontology is defined by the implied structure of the ontology. From the perspective of the "what is", is "what is" explanation, that means that the ontological elements are actually labeled. The important fact is that exactly what symbols are used to perform that labeling is unimportant.

The nub of the observation is that the structure of the "what is", is "what is" explanation is the only structure which provides a basis for thinking about ontology in the absence of an epistemology. If we are interested in an exact scientific examination of the field of ontology, the "what is", is "what is" explanation is the only explanation of use to us. Anytime any element of that ontology is actually labeled, you are discussing epistemology, not ontology. It follows that, though one is free to discuss the problems which arise when one goes to actually label those ontological element, one can not actually label them without exiting the field of ontology.

This is the mistake made by everyone: they exit the field at the first opportunity.

Does that make any sense to you?

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

Let " what is" = A, then the claim {"what is" is "what is"} is in notation form A = A.

Now, the A = A explanation is called the Law of Identity. So, what Dr.D. is saying is that the Law of Identity (A = A) "requires no epistemolgical structure", (that is, that Identity itself is axiomatic--prior to explanation).

Therefore, the notation (A = A) is the representation of the ontology behind any explanation that Dr. D. looks for. That is, we take it that A = "what is" is a metaphysical given and that Existence (the sum of all "what is" elements) itself IS Identity.

 

[Doctordick]

So, what Dr.D. is saying is that the Law of Identity (A = A) "requires no epistemological structure", (that is, that Identity itself is axiomatic--prior to explanation).

No, you have it exactly backwards! I am pointing out that every epistemological structure requires the Law of Identity. The moment you attach "identity" you are already discussing epistemological structures: i.e., you are no longer studying the subject of ontological constraints, you are already in the process of establishing a specific ontology. The law of identity (A=A) only exists if you can actually produce a label for whatever it is you are talking about. Identity itself is the opening axiom to any epistemological structure.

The nub of the observation is that the structure of the "what is", is "what is" explanation is the only structure which provides a basis for thinking about ontology in the absence of an epistemology.

The critical issue in that statement is, "thinking about". The point being that, the moment you open any epistemological structure, you have labeled your ontology and that set of labels constitute exactly, the ONLY requirement of the "what is", is "what is" explanation.

This means that the "what is", is "what is" explanation underlies every conceivable epistemological solution and it behooves us to conceive of a representation of these labels which is applicable to any "what is", is "what is" explanation and which makes utterly no constraints on the labeling (as it is the epistemological constructs which constrain that labeling to specific labels: i.e., they require those labels be defined).

Essentially you miss the entire point of my presentation.

This is the mistake made by everyone: they exit the field at the first opportunity.

It is quite evident that your only interest has always been in exiting the field of ontological analysis as quickly as possible so you can get over to epistemological analysis which you clearly find much more comfortable.

I have no interest in discussing any epistemology. I leave that to the scientists. My interest is understanding the boundaries on ontology itself. The common belief is that there are none and this turns out to be wrong.

 

[AnssiH]

Most people are not "forced to try and refine their world-view. There is another option: you can deny the new information. Sometimes that is easier than trying to incorporate it into one's world view. Denial tends to lead to what I call compartmentalization: some people, even respected exact scientists, can hold two conflicting theories as both being correct by simply never bringing the conflict to mind.

Yeah that's true, I guess we all do that to an extent. I know I do. But then I think there is kind of a rationale behind such behaviour too. We find ourselves thinking "there must be a perfectly good explanation to that new information if I just spent the time to really check it out, and my time is better spent elsewhere".

That is what we do because we hear so much silly stuff all the time. Say, when you hear that someone saw a ghost or whatever. That same thought kept many scientists on denial when they heard it doesn't look like planets go around the Earth after all etc...

The problem is that success is quite difficult and, if we are to survive, we have to compartmentalize, most people just don't admit it. I began to consciously compartmentalize before I started grade school. When I was about four, my father told me that "anyone who believes more than ten percent of what he hears, or fifty percent of what he reads, or ninety percent of what he sees with his own eyes is gullible!"

Heh, when I was a kid, my father said something to the effect of "the more people there are believing something, the more likely it is they are believing a lie". I realized that people's values and beliefs are strongly a cultural thing, and so I disregarded "everyone thinks so" as a criteria for figuring out what to believe. I kind of started seeing dumb behaviour all around me. I guess it went on from there.

Anyway, onto the topic again.

In order to understand this, you have to understand the fundamental nature of the "what is", is "what is" explanation. The "what is", is "what is" explanation has utterly nothing to say about the future. But it does describe the past! Since it does have a temporal element (the "t" index I introduced) it can be examined as a collection of "presents". It follows that any "valid" explanation of that information must yield expectations consistent with that structure: i.e., what actually happened at "t".

So when you say "expectations" here, it always means expectations about something in the past? Hmmm, this was confusing because I hadn't figured out you were talking about a method of handling this sort of information without actually having to mark down every single element in every single "present" (and if we could mark everythign down, indeed we wouldn't need any fancy functions, since we could just look at a specific t)

Okay, if this is correct, I think I can go back to that earlier post (tomorrow, it's late :)

Anssi, I have been thinking this afternoon and perhaps I can make my position a little clearer. The issue is the chicken and egg nature of ontology and epistemology. Each and every epistemology (without exception) requires an ontology. There is but one path out of the dilemma and it lies with the definition of "an explanation". If one defines "an explanation" to be "a method of obtaining one's expectations from the known information", there exists but one explanation which requires no epistemological structure: that is the "what is", is "what is" explanation. Thus, if one can come up with a notation capable of expressing the ontology behind the "what is", is "what is" explanation, one has created a representation of the ontology behind any explanation.

The issue behind the above statement is the fact that any epistemology needs to be understood and, in order to understand that epistemology, one must be able to first deduce the implied ontology. Before it is understood, any explanation is a "what is", is "what is" structure, the only issue being that the underlying ontology is defined by the implied structure of the ontology. From the perspective of the "what is", is "what is" explanation, that means that the ontological elements are actually labeled. The important fact is that exactly what symbols are used to perform that labeling is unimportant.

The nub of the observation is that the structure of the "what is", is "what is" explanation is the only structure which provides a basis for thinking about ontology in the absence of an epistemology. If we are interested in an exact scientific examination of the field of ontology, the "what is", is "what is" explanation is the only explanation of use to us. Anytime any element of that ontology is actually labeled, you are discussing epistemology, not ontology. It follows that, though one is free to discuss the problems which arise when one goes to actually label those ontological element, one can not actually label them without exiting the field of ontology.

This is the mistake made by everyone: they exit the field at the first opportunity.

Does that make any sense to you?

Well yeah, I think I know what you are saying. Us "exiting the field" is the same moment as when we think we now understand reality. For a child that idea is quite natural; we all thought we knew what reality was like (and it was exactly "like" how we perceived it) before we had recognized any serious problems in our worldview. Of course when you start realizing there are problems, there's still long way to go before you can appreciate how deep those problems really are...

And then you are faced with the problem that is; to discuss or to think about those problems you need to be thinking in terms of some "defined things" even when you understand these things are so merely because you have defined them so. (e.g. I am talking about the problem in terms of the cortex and other familiar naturalistic concepts)

And even when this is understood, whenever you are trying to figure out what someone else is trying to say, and especially when they are proposing a new paradigm, you are trying to figure out how to understand the concepts they are using. Since trying to understand someone is a case of trying to define (or refine) an epistemological solution, it is kind of the same as "trying to exit the field of ontology". Since this is naturally what we do all the time, I guess it's to be expected it is an issue when trying to explain a method for keeping one foot "in the field" of ontology.

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

Clearly above you say:

...there exists but one explanation which requires no epistemological structure: that is the "what is", is "what is" [A=A, Law of Identity] explanation...

Then you say:

...I am pointing out that every epistemological structure requires the Law of Identity [A=A] explanation...

So, you claim that while the [A=A, aka your "what is" is "what is"] explanation requires no epistemological structure (in fact, it is the only such explanation), all other possible explanations do have epistemological structure that require the [A=A] explanation...correct ?

You also say this:

Identity itself is the opening axiom to any epistemological structure.

I do not agree. EXISTENCE ITSELF is the opening axiom to any epistemological structure. Identity comes latter in the presentation. A non-existent cannot have Identity.

 

[Doctordick]

EXISTENCE ITSELF is the opening axiom to any epistemological structure. Identity comes latter in the presentation. A non-existent cannot have Identity.

Ah then, you must hold that Super Man exists! I will never comprehend you; you seem to have this compulsion to post before you think. How can you possibly discuss the existence of something which you can't identify? :yuck: I am personally aware of a great many "epistemological structures" which do not require existence; what do you think the plot of a SF film is? :rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

 

[AnssiH]

Okay, back to that earlier post.

So first of all I understood we have established that "x, tau, t"-structure so to be able to represent reality. And had we made an attempt to define ontological elements, we could lay down some "presents" on that table accordingly.

One's expectation are no more than a "true/false" decision on any given present. In the "what is", is "what is" explanation, the method is no more than "look in the table". If a particular list is in the table the answer to your expectations is, "true". If it is not there, the answer is false.

If we could really contain, in our minds, a complete collection of all "presents" going to make up our past, then that might be a useful view but that feat is somewhat beyond our mental capabilities. What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.

And here we are looking at a method of "seeing what existed in the past" without having all the information about each and every moment we ever experienced? The "result" is simply, whether or not a single ontological element existed in a particular t?

The first "invalid ontological elements" I would like to add, is a very simple set. As defined, all real presents consist of specific changes in my knowledge of valid ontological elements.

I have to proceed very carefully here so I can be sure I get the right idea.

"All real presents consists of specific changes in my knowledge of valid ontological elements", what does this mean? I thought we represented presents in terms of "what exists in each present", as oppose to what has changed (since previous present?). Or are you just saying that because we can see what has changed between presents if we have information about what existed at each moment?

I have already eluded to the fact that I am using numerical labels because I can then talk about that "method of obtaining one's expectations" as a mathematical function. The "true/false" can be seen as a "one/zero" dichotomy and I am using numerical labels for that "known knowledge" (those specific "valid ontological elements" which constitute the "reality" of any given "present") so the method is a mathematical function: i.e., it transforms one set of numbers into a second set (you give me a set of numbers which could possibly be a real "present" and that "mathematical function" returns either a one or a zero (depending upon whether or not that collection of numbers is in that table of my "what is", is "what is" explanation.

"It transforms one set of numbers into a second set of numbers"; what does this second set represent? Or do you refer to that "1" or "0" (true or false) as the "second set"?
And so does this function return "1" if the specific set is found in any "present" in the past?

I'm getting really confused when reading the rest of the post... I'm trying to proceed through your post without understanding the reason for almost any manipulation of those ontological elements, hoping things would clear up, but my head is filled with questions. What I'm wondering now is; if we first have some kind of partially filled "x, tau, t"-table, how could it contain knowledge about the un-filled parts? I must be too far off the mark again to be able to make any sense out of this...

I figured you said there exists a function that would yield the complete table, if we just give it... what? Partial table?

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

Ah then, you must hold that Super Man exists! ...I am personally aware of a great many "epistemological structures" which do not require existence; what do you think the plot of a SF film is?

Well, let's see, the "plot" of a SF film is a thing that exists.
And Super Man is of course nothing more than the imagination of the human mind forming union of two concepts "man", (the reality that humans do exist) and "super" (implied as supernatural which may exist somewhere but by definition is outside science). It seems clear Dr.D., when you claim ... Ah then, you must hold that Super Man exists !...that you do not agree with logical conclusion that man's imagination is nothing more than the ability to rearrange the things (your valid ontological elements) he has observed in reality. If this claim is false, then provide examples of things you imagine that are not a rearrangement of some aspect of reality. There are no epistemological structures that do not require first some existence that you wish to acquire knowledge of--to claim as you do is the same as saying you have the ability to acquire knowledge of no"thing". When your imagine Super Man, you "know" he does not exist, imagination is a sense of the "what if ?"--speculation, not a road to knowledge.

 

[nabuco]

Well, let's see, the "plot" of a SF film is a thing that exists.

I think Doctordick was saying that even things that do not exist can have explanations, therefore not every "epistemological structure" must necessarily refer to some ontology.

There are no epistemological structures that do not require first some existence that you wish to acquire knowledge of--to claim as you do is the same as saying you have the ability to acquire knowledge of no"thing"

This is obviously wrong, but it might be difficult for me to explain why. Self-consistent logical structures do not need to refer to any"thing" but themselves. For instance:

a = b
b = c
c = d

That is an epistemological structure, on which we can even do "science" to discover that a = d.