Is time an illusion? Exploring the concept of time as a constant state of change

[mosassam]

I will analyze the ontological elements of a epistemological solution which is based on a totally valid ontological set

A change in knowledge can only occur in the present after which it becomes part of the past.
With regards to the "flawless Solution" presented above:
The "past of interest" = the collection of specific presents that relate to the part of reality the Solution has been created to explain.
The "past of interest" contains the collection/set of valid ontological elements specifically concerned with the Solution. (not sure about 'contains')
The ontological elements are undefined.
The definition for every element is 'embedded' in the Solution.
Given that we fully understand the Solution it is now possible to define the ontological elements upon which the Solution is based.
(please tell me I'm getting a handle on this )

 

[AnssiH]

Thanks! You are a rare bird to be so accommodating; most people give me a very hard time with that definition.

Well it's perhaps not too much a case of accommodation, but more of a co-incident in that it is very similar with the way I view "models" & "predictions" (= explanations & expectations)

But, back to AnssiH's post:
The first step is to have a specific epistemological solution (in analogy to Paul's quadratic equation, you can consider it a given fact; we are not concerned with what it is, we are merely concerned with the ontology on which it is based) . This specific epistemological solution (this speculative edifice) is based upon some undefined collection of valid ontological elements which are provided in a sequence of "presents" (i.e., a sequence of changes in the "known" collection of valid ontological elements). The problem is that the definition of these "valid ontological elements" is embedded in that specific epistemological solution.

Essentially, the specific epistemological solution is based on some set of ontological elements which we are required to deduce from our comprehension of that solution itself. Now, in any real case, that epistemological solution is based upon an ontology which may or may not be valid. The existence of invalid ontological elements in the foundation of the solution brings on some complex problems; however, the very complexity introduced by these allusions (these unreal or false ontological elements) is actually part of the speculative edifice itself and not part of the reality (that valid ontology) the epistemological solution was created to explain. Thus my first step is to postpone considering these complexities by looking at a simplified (and admittedly unreal) problem; I will analyze the ontological elements of a epistemological solution which is based on a totally valid ontological set (consider it a pure abstract problem).

The speculative edifice (that given specific epistemological solution) is the source of the definition of each and every ontological element upon which it is based and our understanding of the solution is based upon a collection of valid ontological element provided in a sequence of "presents". Since the definitions of those valid ontological elements is embedded in our understanding of the solution, the problem is quite analogous to a decoding problem. Somehow, starting with a sequence of "presents" (each one a collection of changes in our "past" set of valid ontological elements) we have arrived a our current state: that of being aware of a past consisting of the set of valid ontological elements on which the speculative edifice rests. I will of course presume the edifice is without flaw as, if flaws exist in the specific epistemological solution, it does not qualify as a solution (the flaws themselves destroy it as a solution).

The stuff about the specific epistemological solutions being the source of all defined ontological elements sounds all very valid to me (since it again coincides with my views). By "flaws in the specific epistemological solution" you mean it's considered flawed if it produces wrong expectations? I.e. if its predictions are not valid.

Since it is taken as given that we understand that speculative edifice (i.e., know all the implied definitions of those ontological elements) it should be clear that we can refer to any specific element in the relevant set. It is that set of references I wish to analyze.

In analogy with Paul's comparison with the general solution to a quadratic equation, in place of the coefficients of the terms in the quadratic equation, we will instead work with reference labels for the ontological elements which go to make up that "past" (actually the sequence of presents) which lead to the final "past" upon which the epistemological solution is based. Rade has proposed an excellent notation for these "undefined references":
But the number of letters available is somewhat limited, so let me instead propose using numbers as reference labels as there is no limit to the quantity of discrete numbers available. If you can get your head around what I have just proposed, I will show you my attack on analyzing that sequence of number sets.

Well this latter part I'm not quite getting. What do you mean with "set of references" (of specific ontological elements)? I.e what does it mean to "refer to a specific element", is it not the same as "defining an ontological element"?

Similarly I'm not grasping what does it mean to "work with reference labels of ontological elements"... is that something you were supposed to clarify in the next step?

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Finally seeing this, I can now respond to AnssiH from another thread.

"Rational Mind" is referring to "subjective experience", not to a physical "thing" having an experience.

Yes, I understand that and I agree. But I think you would also agree that you are simply refining definitions of terms that have no intrinsic meaning. They have meaning only in the context of a conversation. And all of this -- the definitions, the conversation, the ideas and concepts -- is nothing but a speculative edifice.

Yes I agree with that, and it is in fact precisely the conclusion of the particular worldview (specific solution) that I hold, that "we have nothing but semantical structures of the "If...then" variety"

This is what I've been referring to by "semantical worldview" which is at root only a self-supporting "circle of beliefs". I.e. devoid of real "empirical grounding". This view is obviously also based on a "specific epistemological solution", and it does not escape its own conclusion about all worldviews being circles of beliefs.

It seems that Dr. Dick and I have arrived to very similar conclusions but via wildly different routes.

-Anssi

 

[Paul Martin]

(I do find it really disturbing that more than one kind of Logic exists, this doesn't seem ... well ... logical).

Yes, it has made me uneasy ever since my first serious math class. It has always been a puzzle to me how we know what the rules of logic are, and how we know we can trust them. I fully intend to go back and take a course or two in Foundations of Mathematics just to try to come to grips with this problem. (I'm just too busy right now, though.)

Can communication itself be viewed as an assumption?

Yes, I think so. I think we assume that the communicants have a mutually consistent world-view or context which gives communicated ideas consistent meaning between the communicants. I think we have to assume that because we have no way, other than more communication, of verifying that two communicants really have the same idea in mind.

Surely there must be some kind of "consensus" somewhere along the line?

Yes, in spades. As Quine pointed out, the consensus occurs everywhere along the entire line of the communication among the entire communicating population. And, it is more complex than that. The consensus changes continually throughout the process finally producing whatever level of consensus exists between two communicants at the time of a specific communication act. In the best case of natural language, the consensus is only approximate. It is better in mathematics, but you still have examples like Lobachevsky overturning a millennium old consensus of opinion about geometry.

Or am I yet again a victim of my own 'speculative baggage'?

No more than any of the rest of us.

I feel that my limitations end at the word "undefined".

Well, I think you are bumping into the same limitation the rest of us are. Let me try to push against it a little by referring to one of Rade's comments:

Yes, and if no"thing" be assumed, yet some"thing" exists that we discuss, then what exists must be a given--e.g., a metaphysical entity that exists

With this as a starting point, we have that some"thing" exists as a given, and we want to discuss it without any assumptions. In order to discuss it, we give it a name, or a tag, simply to be able to refer to it when we discuss it. This tag is not the "thing", and it says nothing about the "thing". That is, it carries no implied assumptions with it. The tag simply allows us to discuss the "thing". But just like 'x' being a tag denoting a number in mathematics where 'x' says nothing about the number, the tag is nothing but a variable used in discussion denoting the "thing" without implying anything whatsoever about the nature of the "thing". We can say that the thing is a metaphysical entity without making any claims about the nature of the "thing". We only mean by "metaphysical entity" that the "thing" exists. We have made no assumptions -- only definitions.

e.g., a metaphysical entity that exists as an axiom without being taken for granted.

Here I must leap to my feet and object. It's probably only because I bring a slightly different "consensus" to the conversation than does Rade. But to me, the term 'axiom' is defined only in a mathematical context. And even in mathematics, the term has evolved in meaning. It used to mean a statement that was obviously true. It has long since been agreed by mathematicians that there is no such statement. Now, the term is taken to mean a statement that is assumed to be true. An axiom is a deliberately chosen assumption.

So, back to our discussion of a "thing" that exists and to which we have assigned a tag for the purposes of referring to it in a discussion. There is no axiom. We can talk about the "thing", using the tag, without ever making a statement that we assume to be true about the "thing".

e.g., a metaphysical entity that exists as an axiom without being taken for granted.

I'm not sure what you are getting at when you say "without being taken for granted."

This is the nice property of the axiom, it is "outside" the mental process of explanation, it is never brought to the table of analysis, it is never reduced to a set with parts that meet the solution to some equation, it is never taken for granted--the axiom is priori to all explanation, it is the concept on which all proofs and explanation rests.

You and I obviously have very different notions for the term 'axiom'. I don't understand what you said here at all.

And if this is all that Dr. D is saying, is he really saying anything new under the sun ?

That is not all Dr. D is saying. He has proved a theorem of mathematics (which I think belongs in the subject of statistics or probability theory) which describes constraints on any communicable universe. I think it has powerful implications and that somebody qualified should take a look at it and exploit it. It may even turn out to be something new under the sun.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

What consequences arise when the 'some"thing"' you refer to in your post remains undefined? In no way am I going to second guess DoctorDick, but it seems that from 'out of the undefined' springs the axioms that we both feel must exist.

Sorry to butt in here, but to continue with what I said earlier, I think you are using the term axiom in a non-mathematical way. I could agree with you by interpreting what you said as follows: 'Out of the undefined' springs the axioms of logic and from those spring mathematics and within that springs Dick's theorem. Dick's theorem says that 'out of the undefined' springs a set of constraints on communicable universes.

(I should point out that Dick in earlier years referred to his undefined set of numbers as a 'universe', much like they do in statistics and probability theory, and as I did in the previous paragraph. This seemed to cause no end of consternation among philosophers he talked to. It really got in the way of communication. Dick finally gave up calling it a 'universe' and simply started calling it 'A' instead. This seems to be easier for people to accept. It's too bad that people have such trouble seeing a mere symbol as simply a mere symbol.)

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

It seems that Dr. Dick and I have arrived to very similar conclusions but via wildly different routes.

Make that three of us.

Yes I agree with that, and it is in fact precisely the conclusion of the particular worldview (specific solution) that I hold, that "we have nothing but semantical structures of the "If...then" variety"

I think that's the same as saying that we have nothing but logic.

That also seems to be closer to my worldview than to yours. Some time ago, you and I expressed different views of what might be ultimately fundamental. You thought it might be motion; I think it is the ability to know.

Of course we know that we are both guessing and that neither of us can prove our hunch. But we can still talk about it and try to make sense of our guesses.

To interpret your statement, I think we should change "We have nothing but" to "Nothing exists but". That way we don't have to define 'We', which gets all bogged down in identity, self, consciousness, etc., and we don't have to define 'have', which must be some kind of process which again only adds complexity. By saying "Nothing exists but" we are reduced to the notion of existence itself and a quantifier of zero. I think that is a simpler way to get to the essence, which is what I want to do.

So, if "Nothing exists but semantical structures of the "If...then" variety", what can we conclude? Well, I say we can conclude that there must exist some sort of "mind" (if that word is too loaded, call it "thing", or "X", or whatever you like) which knows of those semantic structures. And so it seems to me that an ability to know is essential.

It also seems to me that semantical structures could exist, along with a "mind", without motion existing. So motion doesn't seem to be essential to me.

But given a "mind" and a semantical structure, the notion of motion could be derived and thus be made to exist as a derivative.

What do you think?

(Dick, please forgive us for indulging in the fun of discussing our speculative edifices. You give me comfort in knowing that however wild my speculations get, you have found the constraints that limit them.)

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Rade]

.. how difficult will it be to have to accept something you intuitively disagree with. (Personally speaking - very difficult as it goes against my fundamental nature, or should I say "speculative baggage")...

Thank you for your post about my posts on this thread--you are correct, I view my role in interaction with Dr. D. to be the devil advocate--to be the pure skeptic--to attack and attempt to falsify all that he says. It is the way of science. And to the benefit of Dr. D., if after such attacks his ideas hold true, then so much the better for him. Now, as to your question, it will be of no difficulty for me to accept any"thing" I disagree with intuitively, but great difficulty for me to accept anything I disagree with via pure reason. Let us see where Dr. D. will take us next.

 

[mosassam]

'Out of the undefined' springs the axioms of logic and from those spring mathematics and within that springs Dick's theorem. Dick's theorem says that 'out of the undefined' springs a set of constraints on communicable universes.

l

Thanks Paul, I was trying to express that, using my own brand of logic, that there must always be some kind of starting point and that this starting point has to be definable. Dr.D's theorem seems to be emerging "from the mists of the undefined" which eradicates the definable starting point I was grasping for.

 

[mosassam]

I view my role in interaction with Dr. D. to be the devil advocate--to be the pure skeptic--to attack and attempt to falsify all that he says.

Respect Rade. I think your stance has forced Dr.D to clarify certain issues which has played a big part in leading to, what I believe, may be a converging consensus. I would warn against being 'only' devil's advocate though. As for the being able to accept counter-intuitive things, that was a personal statement that obviously applies to me only. (I'm still working on that detatched logical vibe )

 

[Paul Martin]

Thanks Paul, I was trying to express that, using my own brand of logic, that there must always be some kind of starting point and that this starting point has to be definable. Dr.D's theorem seems to be emerging "from the mists of the undefined" which eradicates the definable starting point I was grasping for.

You're welcome, mosassam. I think you have an excellent brand of logic. You seem to get right to the point using English without the difficult and cryptic symbolism of mathematics or symbolic logic.

Let me try to interpret what you said here using your own brand of logic:

There must always be some kind of starting point -- for anything. In particular, there must be some kind of starting point for existence, which we could call the essence, or the ontologically fundamental stuff. There must also be some kind of starting point for any explanation, or for any other language structure for that matter.

The starting point has to be definable in both cases. In the language case, it is straightforward. Langauge structures, such as explanations, or novels, must have a set of defined words to begin with or they will make no sense. In the ontological case, it is a little more subtle.

The starting point for existence has to be definable, i.e. in the situation (universe, world) in which we find ourselves we must assign tags to things we think exist simply in order to talk about them. The assignment of tags constitutes definition, so anything we can assign a tag to is definable.

But, ... the starting point for existence does not necessarily have to be defined. At least not for the early stages of existence. Definable, yes; defined, not necessarily.

So what, exactly, constitutes a definition? Here's my proposal. If we consider 'information' to mean a difference that makes a difference, then an undefined set of "things", which make up existence or reality, may contain differences among the "things". And those differences could make a difference to other "things". So a rudimentary or primordial "universe" could contain information without any definitions.

If we consider 'definition' to mean the assignment of a symbolic tag to some existing "thing", then in order for there to be a definition, there would have to be some kind of assignment. That is, there would have to be a correspondence between some symbolic tag and some existing "thing".

But what does that correspondence require? We could probably conceive of several sufficient conditions for a correspondence.

One of those conditions might be a physical connection or relationship between a physical, or extant, "thing" and a symbol which is also constructed from physical, or extant, "things". For example, a particular amino acid group, which is a physical, extant, "thing", could have a relationship to a specific sequence, called a codon, (or set of specific sequences) of three nucleotides taken from the set {A, C, T, G}. The relationship between a codon and a particular amino acid group would be specified by another physical, extant, "thing", viz. tRNA. In this example, and in this case, we have a correspondence which involves nothing but physical, extant, "things".

Another condition for correspondence might be between a physically, extant, "thing" and a concept in the "mind" of a "knower". I won't define 'mind' or 'knower' just yet because those refer to the profound mystery of consciousness that we are at work exploring. We have an idea of what we mean by 'knowing', and 'idea', or 'concept', so using your brand of logic, let's just go with our own notions of what we mean by these terms.

So, in this case, and using the previous example, we could imagine a correspondence between an amino acid group and a sequence of three of the letters A, C, T, and G. The triad of letters is the tag. The letters are merely linguistic concepts -- an agreement among users of some languages to use them to refer to some "things" with the expectation that most of the people using them mean the same "things" by each letter.

Now, are those linguistic concepts extant "things"? Well, yes they exist so they must be.

Are they physical things? Well, that is debatable. You could say that the letters are made of ink molecules arranged in a specific pattern on paper. That would make them physical. Similarly, an uttered phoneme, called 'A', would be made of a pattern of vibrating air molecules which is also physical. But if we try to pin down the nature of the idea or the concept of a letter, like 'A', we enter the controversial domain of whether concepts are nothing more than, or are something beyond, mere patterns of physical brain states.

I think we can sidestep this issue for the moment. Just as we can dodge the problem of defining terms like 'I', 'you', 'we', etc., I think we can dodge the question of exactly what constitutes a concept. We know what concepts are so I think it is fair for us to talk about them. (You will notice that the previous sentence is rife with terms that are vague, if not undefined, if not undefinable, but we understand it nonetheless.)

So, to finally get to my point, I think that there are two fundamentally different kinds of relationships that can connect symbols to "things", i.e. there are two fundamentally different ways of defining a "thing". The first way is strictly through physical connections. The second is a conceptual connection of a conceptual symbol and a physical "thing".

If you agree with me so far, the next move I would make would be to define the second of those types to be 'knowing'. That is, given that a conceptual symbol is related to a physical "thing", 'knowing' is defined as the existence of that relationship in whatever it is that constitutes a concept. Without knowing what that is, it will be convenient to assign the tag 'mind' to it so we can talk about it. This yields the claim that a "thing" can be defined by the process of a mind making an assignment of some conceptual symbol to the "thing". When such an assignment has been made, we can say that the mind knows the definition. Or we can say that the mind knows the meaning of the symbol: the symbol means the "thing".

Now, if this makes sense to anyone, I think it can be a starting point for speculating on what the nature of the origin of reality might have been like. I think it would be fun to engage in that kind of speculation. We might even be able to get a glimpse of how reality emerged "from the mists of the undefined" and how the definable starting point was necessarily eradicated.

If, on the other hand, what I said does not make sense, please tell me about it.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Doctordick]

Well, there certainly has been a lot of posting on this thread since I last looked at it.

Mosassam, I would say you are definitely "getting a handle on this". I only have a few simple comments to make on your post.

With regards to the "flawless Solution" presented above:
The "past of interest" = the collection of specific presents that relate to the part of reality the Solution has been created to explain.
The "past of interest" contains the collection/set of valid ontological elements specifically concerned with the Solution. (not sure about 'contains')

I would have said, "the past of interest consists of the collection of 'presents' which consists of the valid ontological elements being added" (you can think of that as "additional knowledge of reality learned" since I have defined the "valid ontology" to be "reality"). Remember, we are working with an ideal case where there are no invalid ontological elements to confuse us and the Solution is, by definition, without flaw: i.e., it provides a perfect description of the known past for each and every present going to make up that past. Notice that, at every past (the knowledge available to you prior to "learning a specific present") conforms to that flawless solution: i.e., the solution includes explanation of that additional knowledge. This is the crux of being flawless.

You should understand (and I think you do) that the predictions made by this "flawless" speculative edifice are confirmed by the past. The future is still "totally unknown" (the future is unknown by definition) and it is an assumption that the specific solution referred to will still be flawless at the next step. That is to say, the flawless solution can only be flawless with respect to the past. I am setting up this problem the way I am because this approach gets out of the "thought to be flawless" difficulty.

Given that we fully understand the Solution it is now possible to define the ontological elements upon which the Solution is based.

The only comment I would make here is that your comment seems to flow from the common concept that there exists but one flawless solution. That is an assumption made by almost everyone and an assumption to be avoided. It is entirely possible that there are a multitude of flawless solutions. For that reason, it is important that our notation not constrain our analysis to the assumption that any given solution will remain flawless. I suspect that might be hard for you to get your head around: i.e., how we can establish that our notation is not bounded by any specific solution.

What do you mean with "set of references" (of specific ontological elements)? I.e what does it mean to "refer to a specific element", is it not the same as "defining an ontological element"?

No it isn't. Consider the issue of defining a specific concept. One can cast that problem as an issue between two people (one who knows what he means and the other for whom the concept is still undefined) but you should be aware that even when you are trying to define something to yourself you are very much in the same boat. The process usually starts with a description of what is meant and, when further discussion reveals misunderstanding (or inconsistent conclusions), further communication us used to clarify things. During this period, one can not consider the second party as understanding the definition so, to him (or her), the concept is still undefined though they may very well have agreed upon a reference tag for what they are discussing (I won't comment on the whether the first party really understands their own definition or not; that is a subtle issue). But what you must remember, if you are going to be open minded and objective, is that, even after you have reach what seems to be a consensus, the possibility exists that there is still a misunderstanding there which just hasn't yet become an issue. You must always hold the idea (that you understand something) to be an assumption.

Similarly I'm not grasping what does it mean to "work with reference labels of ontological elements"... is that something you were supposed to clarify in the next step?

Hopefully, yes!

(Paul, I do indeed forgive you for indulging in the fun of discussing our speculative edifices; however I have this driving need to point out exactly where you are speculating. Sorry about that; I just want to be sure you aren't confused by what I am saying.

There must always be some kind of starting point -- for anything. In particular, there must be some kind of starting point for existence, which we could call the essence, or the ontologically fundamental stuff. There must also be some kind of starting point for any explanation, or for any other language structure for that matter.

Yes there does, but it is very important that we don't convince ourselves that we know what that starting point "IS".

The starting point has to be definable in both cases. In the language case, it is straightforward. Langauge structures, such as explanations, or novels, must have a set of defined words to begin with or they will make no sense.

You should understand that it is the very nature of understanding anything which requires a speculative edifice. Even that "set of defined words" you just mentioned is a speculative edifice. For most it is a fairly flaw free speculative edifice but I am sure you have had experience with people whose "speculative edifice" contained a word meaning different from yours (jokes are often built on that very issue).

The assignment of tags constitutes definition, so anything we can assign a tag to is definable.

I think that is a little facile; see my comment to AnssiH above.

But, ... the starting point for existence does not necessarily have to be defined. At least not for the early stages of existence. Definable, yes; defined, not necessarily.

Any definition is a component of a speculative edifice, unless you consider the reference tag itself to be a definition (a somewhat different matter and not at all what is commonly meant as a definition). Existence is the very issue of ontology.

So a rudimentary or primordial "universe" could contain information without any definitions.

Let us say that we need an ontology in order to talk about it and we ought to look very carefully at exactly how we come to define that ontology.

The notation I will use will be quite close to Rade's notation. I will refer to a specific "present" as a specific set B where the actual elements of that specific set B will be references to the ontological elements going to make up that B: i.e.,

$$B_t \;\;=\;\; <a_1,a_2,a_3,\cdots,a_n>$$
​

where the $a_i$ are reference labels to the undefined ontological elements which go to make up the specific "present" being referred to and the subscript "t" identifies the specific "present" of interest. I suspect it might benefit anyone interested in understanding me to read a post I made almost two years ago to the thread, "Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics". There are a few minor differences between the notation and references I am going to use but the issue is very much the same. (Before pointing to it, I wanted to look at it myself and found the following quote quite to the point of Rade's complaints.)

To put it another way, knowing is having facts available to you (the facts come from the past, not the future) and understanding allows discrimination between good and bad answers (facts you might expect to become available to you in the future). Now the human race has become quite good at this discrimination since all we living things first crawled out of the sea. We are the undoubted leaders in the realm of "understanding" the world around us. And yet no one has come up with a good argument to dismiss the Solipsist position. The fact that we have come so far without being able to prove what is and what is not real should make it clear to you that understanding reality can not possibly require knowing what is real. This is why every serious scientist (I except myself of course) has vociferously argued against any rational consideration of the question. Their position is: if we don't know what's real, how can we possibly dream of understanding reality. They hold that we must assume we know what's real. You can see that position promulgated all over this forum! Why do you think they label me a crackpot? :rofl:

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

...Their position is: if we don't know what's real, how can we possibly dream of understanding reality. They hold that we must assume we know what's real...

Well, I would not agree with your conclusion--I would say that [if we do not know what is real, how can we understand] is the same as saying [if we do know what is real, how can we not understand], and then conclude "they hold that we must know we know what's real". There is no"thing" to be "assumed" in your argument, for to say you "know" some"thing" is real is nothing more than to say you have a mental grasp of a fact(s) of what is real. I hold your argument from "assumption" here is misplaced.

Another comment. Why do you use "reference labels" <a1,a2,a3> to map the "undefined ontological elements" of reality <A1,A2,A3> ? Why do you "assume" that you need to refer to a "specific present" Bt indirectly ? Much better it seems to me to start your argument of a specific present with:

Bt = <A1,A2,A3,...An>​

That is, start your argument directly from understanding that you can mentally grasp the facts of the ontological elements that exist directly without requirement of explanation or any assumption that they first be mapped to reference labels. Better yet, let me suggest this:

Bt = <(a1A1),(a2A2),(a3A3)...(anAn)>​

for here we see that when we say we know any specific undefined ontological element in a specific present (say A1) we understand that our knowledge is always a dialectic union of that which exists (A1) and the reference label (a1) that we are required to place on it in order to move it from preception to conception.

So, Dr. D. I do agree with your statement ...understanding reality can not possibly require knowing what is real...for we can never know the (A1) directly, thus, understanding reality requires knowing that what we know can only be the dialectic of what is to be known (A1) and the reference label (a1) placed on it by the knower.

 

[Rade]

...So, if "Nothing exists but semantical structures of the "If...then" variety", what can we conclude? Well, I say we can conclude that there must exist some sort of "mind" (if that word is too loaded, call it "thing", or "X", or whatever you like) which knows of those semantic structures. And so it seems to me that an ability to know is essential...What do you think?

I think I completely disagree with your philosophy. I think your X-factor is "derived" from the metaphysical given, let us call it the E-factor (after existence). It is the age old question, starting a philosophy from the "primacy of existence" vs the "primacy of consciousness".

 

[mosassam]

The only comment I would make here is that your comment seems to flow from the common concept that there exists but one flawless solution. That is an assumption made by almost everyone and an assumption to be avoided. It is entirely possible that there are a multitude of flawless solutions. For that reason, it is important that our notation not constrain our analysis to the assumption that any given solution will remain flawless. I suspect that might be hard for you to get your head around: i.e., how we can establish that our notation is not bounded by any specific solution.

This has thrown me a bit. Do you mean that the set of valid ontological elements may possibly produce numerous flawless solutions? (Up to this point I've understood that the set of VOE's relates to the specific flawless epistemological solution you had proposed above). Or do you mean that there possibly exists a multitude of flawless solutions but they are based on different (yet possibly overlapping) sets of VOE's, as they explain different aspects of reality?
Am I right in thinking that reference tags are labels used for each undefined ontological element so that we can communicate about them (ie: although they are labelled they are still undefined.)
Does each present (change in knowledge) relate to learning a 'new' ontological element?

 

[Paul Martin]

I think I completely disagree with your philosophy. I think your X-factor is "derived" from the metaphysical given, let us call it the E-factor (after existence). It is the age old question, starting a philosophy from the "primacy of existence" vs the "primacy of consciousness".

Yes. I think you have put your finger squarely on the difference betwen our respective philosophies.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Doctordick]

Well, mosassam, you threw me for a moment there; I couldn't figure out what a "VOE" was. After reading over the thread, I decided that the only reference which made sense was that "VOE" stood for "valid ontological element" so I will presume that is what you meant and (for the moment at least) I will use that shorthand.

Yes indeedy do; the set of "VOE's" relates directly to every possible "flawless epistemological solution" and, no, they are not based on "different" sets. Every solution is explaining exactly the same set of elements, but those elements are not at all necessarily defined the same in different solutions. Remember, their definitions are deduced from the specific solutions.

Am I right in thinking that reference tags are labels used for each undefined ontological element so that we can communicate about them (i.e.: although they are labeled they are still undefined.)

Absolutely correct, the sole purpose of the labels a_i(t) is so that we can refer to a specific "VOE" which has not been defined.

Does each present (change in knowledge) relate to learning a 'new' ontological element?

If an ontological element is "what exists" and every "epistemological solution" has at its base "what exists" then, so long as those elements are undefined, each present (or change in knowledge) must be something new; so, with regard to our analysis, we must regard it as something new. On the other hand, once you have a "specific epistemological solution" and can use that solution to define those "VOE's" (to use your notation). At that point, your speculative edifice may very well have the same defined element in two different presents.

*** "Ah, you have seen the same thing twice!" ***​

But you certainly cannot prove it; you have to remember, it may be flawless but it is still a speculative edifice.

In fact, the next step is intimately related to that very fact. Having an understood specific flawless epistemological solution, (in this simplified case where all ontological elements are valid) one can place a specific label on every a_i(t) for every "present" going to make up the past upon which the solution is based. At this point, the problem can be seen as totally equivalent to interpreting a collection of statements in a language. Every "B(t)" can be seen as a statement in this symbolic language (those specific numerical labels you have placed upon the elements). It is a pure decoding problem; in fact, since you have used your specific epistemological solution to apply those labels, if you understood the solution, you will certainly also understand the meanings of the labels. "Knowing these definitions (which are part and parcel of the solution) makes it a complete expression of that speculative edifice.

Now, tell me how that hits you. If you have any problems with it, we can discuss them.

I'll be back -- Dick

 

[mosassam]

Yes, VOE = Valid Ontological Element.
I understand that the set of VOEs can possibly produce numerous flawless Solutions and that for each Solution, the definition for each VOE may change, as the definition is 'embedded' in that particular Solution.
Are there numerous flawless Solutions to this set because we are using different combinations of VOE's, or are there numerous Solutions because we still use the complete set but the definitions for each VOE changes with any given Solution?
I still have a problem with the "presents". The Solution has different 'aspects' (the different part of the Solution each VOE relates to). I may be overcomplicating things here (or more likely barking up the wrong tree) but I imagine that each "present" (change in knowledge) can relate to a complete VOE or PART OF A VOE. What I mean by this is that some changes in knowledge may lead onto other changes in knowledge and so on. This way, a VOE (which describes a certain aspect of the Solution) may consist of a collection of "presents" or, sometimes a change in knowledge may contain a complete VOE.
I'm not explaining this correctly, but the Solution is based on the collection of VOE's, and each VOE can either be a single 'present' or a collection of 'presents'.
If you can understand any of the above questions, let alone answer them, then cool.
PS: I don't understand why the "speculative edifice may very well have the same defined element in two different presents" .

 

[Rade]

I would like to jump in here, to continue my thoughts posted above, and the information about VOEs from the last two posts (I will use the notation of Dr. D so that he can correct my errors in thinking). I will start with a number of "let" type premises (in blue)

1. Let VOE = a single valid ontological element, call it A1
[not sure what a non-valid OE would be, but let us not go there now]

2. Let the set of all possible VOEs in existence = <A1,A2,A3,...An>
[I take it that Dr. D. holds that the individual VOE of existence are "undefined", more importantly they are "outside" the process called "explanation" or "assumption"--I call this the axiom that "existence exists"--he apparently calls it "starting from undefined ontology". Thus I hold that it is not possible for humans to "know" directly any VOE (I think Dr. D also ?, which leads to...]

3. Let a1 = a "reference label" for the VOE A1
[This is a mental process mapping perception to concept formation]

4. Let knowledge of VOE A1 = the dialectic union set (aiA1)
[Here I think I differ from Dr.D--but not yet sure. That is, I hold that because it not possible for humans (or any material thing) to "know" any VOE directly, all knowledge of any VOE is a veiled reality of placing a reference label on a metaphysical given VOE]

5. Let Bt1 = any specific present (t1) from the set of all possible presents B
[This from Dr.D but I modify to clarify that there are an infinite number of specific presents (e.g., <t1,t2,t3...tn>)--here we deal with only one Bt1].

6. Let a set of "known" VOEs in present be: Bt1 = <(a1A1),(a2A2),(a3A3)>
[Here, to save space, I only let three VOEs be known in present, of course this could be any number, but can never be "all possible VOEs". The notation follows from my argument of veiled aspect of reality (the metaphysical given) as known by humans (our undefined epistemology or study of the metaphysical given. Thus we see here how there exists dialectic union between metaphysics and epistemology, but note (very important imo), that the "essence" of any VOE derives from epistemology and not metaphysics.

7. Let Bu, the set of unknown VOE in any solution to explanation of a "specific present" = <A4,A5,A6,...An>
[We see here that, from the set of all possible VOEs in #1 above, there must exist a set of VOEs that have never been mentally transformed in the specific present (Bt1) to form a reference label, that is, they are not "known" in specific present, but do "exist" in specific present]

8. Let the set <Bt1,Bt2,Bt3...Bt7> = (sum of all "specific presents"), which I will condense to the notation (Bt-all).
[This derives from facts of research on knowledge that it is possible for any single human to know more than one specific present at exactly the same time--from research the limit for most humans is ~ 7, that is, you can know at any time (t0) as many as 7 different "sets of VOEs" (what Dr. D is calling his Bt).

Thus, we see that, if from above the specific present Bt1 = <a1A1, a2A2, a3A3>, then specific present Bt2 could be notation of <a4A4, a5A5, a6A6...anAn>, and so on for Bt3...Bt7 (with a limit due to physiology of human brain of 7 specific presents at any single time (t0)).

So, this is where the notation (and philosophy) of Dr.D has taken my thinking in such a way that I see it forming union with my philosophy--perhaps this all just incorrect. (I do hope Dr.D not view this as another attempt to mock--it no such thing--it my attempt to find common ground between two philosophies held).

therefore, I conclude, and I will end here to see if there are any comments by anyone with an interest in such abstract thinking:

The present (t0) = {Bt-all + Bu} ​

or in words: The present is the sum total of all the specific sets of VOEs we know at time (t0) derived from past plus what we have yet to learn of VOEs in future time (t0+1).

 

[Doctordick]

Hi mosassam, your response was wonderful as it clarifies your difficulties quite well and I will do my best to clarify my position on each issue you seem to be having trouble with. And yes, you are over complicating things but that is a difficult thing to avoid as most all of us bring way too much baggage to the station (so to speak). It is quite difficult for people to lay aside their beliefs; after all, their very lives depend upon having viable beliefs.

Are there numerous flawless Solutions to this set because we are using different combinations of VOE's, or are there numerous Solutions because we still use the complete set but the definitions for each VOE changes with any given Solution?

The various solutions I am talking about are all based on exactly the same set of VOE's but I think I should first make something clear. I am not actually claiming there are numerous flawless solutions. It may very well be that, with a sufficiently large set of VOE's, there exists but one flawless solution but one certainly cannot make such an assumption (it implies that solution is truth). In analyzing the problem of finding explanations (that is, of understanding reality, that collection of VOE's one is trying to understand) one must allow for the possibility that there exist more than one unique flawless solution. By the way, is it clear to you that a "flawless solution" need not be a correct solution? The only constraint on a "flawless solution" is that no contradiction to it exists in the available information (the past upon which it is based). The future may very well invalidate any specific solution.

That comment, "but the definitions ... change", kind of puts the emphasis in the wrong place. The point is that a specific "past" can be explained in more than one way given that the "past" consists of a finite number of elements. It is pretty clear that there are an infinite number of ways of explaining a finite set as infinite merely means "no matter how many you have, you are not yet finished enumerating them". It follows that the "past" upon which your solution is base is finite (you cannot acquire an infinite set of VOE's) and no matter how many explanations you have, it is possible another exists. But that's not an issue we should be getting into now. You can simply relate it to your world view as, "there is more than one way to skin a cat".

I still have a problem with the "presents". The Solution has different 'aspects' (the different part of the Solution each VOE relates to). I may be overcomplicating things here (or more likely barking up the wrong tree) but I imagine that each "present" (change in knowledge) can relate to a complete VOE or PART OF A VOE.

The VOE has no parts. You have lost sight of the definition "valid ontological element" (that's one reason I really don't like "VOE" even though it saves a lot of typing). An "element" cannot be divided by definition; if division is possible, we are not talking about an element. That is the very central issue of the problem of "infinite regress".

There is that word infinite again! People simply seem to lose sight of the fact that "infinite" means you are not finished, no matter how much you have done. Any solution involving infinite regress cannot be flaw free as you cannot finish the job: i.e., it fails to provide an explanation. The "past" upon which your solution (that flaw free solution) is based cannot be infinite or you couldn't acquire the knowledge of it; your solution must be based upon a finite set of ontological elements (which cannot be divided).

Note that reality, the complete set of valid ontological elements, may very well be infinite. In fact, it should be clear that our only option is to presume it is infinite as to do otherwise is to presume one could reach the state of "knowing everything" with no possibility of error. So long as one includes the possibility of error in your knowledge of reality, you are not finished and that is the very definition of infinity.

What I mean by this is that some changes in knowledge may lead onto other changes in knowledge and so on.

You should recognize that the moment you use the term, "may", you are discussing a speculative edifice. We are discussing a nature of a "flaw free solution" and how that "flaw free solution" is constrained by the fact that it is based upon a finite set of valid ontological elements. What I am getting at here is that, except for specific logical constraints on that "flaw free solution" which can be proved, we have utterly no interest in speculating as to the nature of that solution. I am quite confident that there are many possibilities which will never occur to us in a million years and we must be careful not to exclude one of them. Our solution explains the known past and the known past only. That is to say, there are no changes in knowledge here; the only changes which exist are expressed in that order of presents which define the structure of change in our past. Our solution must provide that structure, including those changes. Essentially, that past includes "changes in knowledge" which "lead onto other changes in knowledge and so on": i.e., you are talking about what you expect of that solution in terms of your current world view -- this is that baggage you are hauling with you.

I'm not explaining this correctly, but the Solution is based on the collection of VOE's, and each VOE can either be a single 'present' or a collection of 'presents'.

A valid ontological "element" cannot be a collection of anything. It is "an element" and can not be divided. The "past" consists of a collection of "presents" and every "present" consists of a specific set of valid ontological elements (remember, we are working with an ideal problem not necessarily a real problem).

PS: I don't understand why the "speculative edifice may very well have the same defined element in two different presents" .

Because the definition of those ontological elements is part of the speculative edifice. Let me put it this way (in terms of the speculative edifice most of us carry around as our personal world view) the other day, when you responded to my last post, you were typing in front of a monitor. Today, as you read this post, you are the same entity which read that earlier post. That entity is defined in terms of a number of ontological elements. It is part of your world view (your speculative edifice) that at least some of those ontological elements are the same ontological elements seen in two different "presents". But you certainly cannot prove that as all you have to go on is your memory; you cannot go back to that earlier past (in your understanding of the past) and check it. It is a presumption and very much a part of that speculative edifice called your world view! But it certainly explains your experiences (your past) so it might well be a flaw free solution and might even be a "true" solution; however, there is some difference between that element "then" and that element "now" so, to contend that they are the "same" ontological element is false on the face of it (it can be divided into that element "then" and that element "now").

I am sorry if my thoughts seem complex; I am only trying to express the problem in a manner which covers all the bases.

Back to you -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

I am sure this is a total waste of time as I don't believe Rade has any interest in understanding what I say; but I will do it anyway! :yuck:

1. Let VOE = a single valid ontological element, call it A1
[not sure what a non-valid OE would be, but let us not go there now]

Fine, we can call it A1 :uhh:

2. Let the set of all possible VOEs in existence = <A1,A2,A3,...An>
[I take it that Dr. D. holds that the individual VOE of existence are "undefined", more importantly they are "outside" the process called "explanation" or "assumption"--I call this the axiom that "existence exists"--he apparently calls it "starting from undefined ontology". Thus I hold that it is not possible for humans to "know" directly any VOE (I think Dr. D also ?, which leads to...]

The definition is part and parcel of a speculative edifice!

3. Let a1 = a "reference label" for the VOE A1
[This is a mental process mapping perception to concept formation]

Why do you want two labels for the same VOE?

4. Let knowledge of VOE A1 = the dialectic union set (aiA1)
[Here I think I differ from Dr.D--but not yet sure. That is, I hold that because it not possible for humans (or any material thing) to "know" any VOE directly, all knowledge of any VOE is a veiled reality of placing a reference label on a metaphysical given VOE]

What purpose does it serve to define the union of one reference label with another reference lable for the same thing. Apparently you want to speculate about something ("I hold" seems to be a belief and not a fact!)

5. Let Bt1 = any specific present (t1) from the set of all possible presents B
[This from Dr.D but I modify to clarify that there are an infinite number of specific presents (e.g., <t1,t2,t3...tn>)--here we deal with only one Bt1].

I would say that to contend that any speculative edifice is based upon "an infinite number of specific presents" is patently false. :grumpy: It is a presumption of your personal speculative edifice (your world view). Intellectual baggage you insist on hauling around. Talk to Paul about it! :zzz:

6. Let a set of "known" VOEs in present be: Bt1 = <(a1A1),(a2A2),(a3A3)>
[Here, to save space, I only let three VOEs be known in present, of course this could be any number, but can never be "all possible VOEs". The notation follows from my argument of veiled aspect of reality (the metaphysical given) as known by humans (our undefined epistemology or study of the metaphysical given. Thus we see here how there exists dialectic union between metaphysics and epistemology, but note (very important imo), that the "essence" of any VOE derives from epistemology and not metaphysics.

Is not the "essence" of a VOE its meaning? Can you give me an epistemological solution without an ontology? Or are you just trying to avoid discussing ontology? I think you just like "mock battles" with speculative edifices. :rofl: :rofl:

7. Let Bu, the set of unknown VOE in any solution to explanation of a "specific present" = <A4,A5,A6,...An>
[We see here that, from the set of all possible VOEs in #1 above, there must exist a set of VOEs that have never been mentally transformed in the specific present (Bt1) to form a reference label, that is, they are not "known" in specific present, but do "exist" in specific present]

That seems to be an element of your personal speculative edifice (your world view)! A pure presumption and you certainly cannot prove it. You apparently cannot see around all that baggage you carry with you.

8. Let the set <Bt1,Bt2,Bt3...Bt7> = (sum of all "specific presents"), which I will condense to the notation (Bt-all).
[This derives from facts of research on knowledge that it is possible for any single human to know more than one specific present at exactly the same time--from research the limit for most humans is ~ 7, that is, you can know at any time (t0) as many as 7 different "sets of VOEs" (what Dr. D is calling his Bt).

This again is part and parcel of your personal speculative edifice and has utterly no bearing upon what I am talking about. It is no more than intellectual baggage serving no purpose at all. :yuck:

I will end here ...

I wish you would.

... to see if there are any comments by anyone with an interest in such abstract thinking:

You mean, interested in charging off towards some speculative edifice with no thought as to the ontological foundations? There are plenty of people who just love to do that but I regard it as a major waste of time. :tongue:

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

Excellent--I see that Dr. D and I finally reach common understand on a fundamental "speculative edifice" from which both of our respective philosophies are derived--thus

Originally Posted by Rade:
1. Let VOE = a single valid ontological element, call it A1

Comment of Dr. D:
"Fine, we can call it A1"

And I find in communication with Dr. D. that one must be very happy indeed with just these small areas of common understanding.

Now, logic demands that if, as stated by Dr. D., A1 = a VOE of a specific type, then A2 must = a VOE of a second type, and A3 a VOE of a third type and so on, thus the set of all VOEs must be the sum total of all such VOEs.

Now, since Dr. D has already made it very clear that he does not agree with this logic--since he at the very thought of it--I will request that he not waste mine time (nor his) in any second response here--but I would be very interested to see if others that read this thread either (1) do agree or (2) do not agree with the statement below, and their reasons:

Let the set of all possible VOEs in existence = <A1,A2,A3,...An>​

Given that we start with the speculative edifice of Dr. D:

Let VOE = a single valid ontological element, call it A1---Fine, we can call it A1​

 

[baywax]

Is there such thing as illusion? Or is it just a misconstrued, neuronal event? I mean, just because a concept like time doesn't exist outside of the horizon of our neuronal awareness doesn't mean it is an illusion.

 

[Doctordick]

Hi again,

The other day, someone (not on this forum) asked me for clarification on an issue I thought was quite obvious (it certainly wasn't obvious to him and I suspect it might not be obvious to those on this forum). He was talking about the foundations of arguments and I had said to him that an assertion of his was a violation of the limitations which he should be imposing on the problem of understanding "foundations". He said he didn't understand what I meant and my answer to him was as follows:

With regard to the limitations which should be imposed on the problem of understanding "foundations", my position is quite simple. If one looks at the fundamental issue of "foundations", foundations are what the arguments are based upon. If those arguments are based on anything at all, the arguments themselves are not foundations (the foundations are what they are based upon).

This is the very source of "infinite regress". As infinite means that (no matter what you have done) you are not finished, "infinite regress" is clearly not a solution. The only rational answer to the question is that philosophical foundations must be based on nothing! Now most people immediately jump to the conclusion that such a position is equivalent to solipsism and presume the only possible result is either infinite regress or solipsism, neither of which is really acceptable. What they miss is that there is another possibility: foundations might exist but they can not be known: i.e., they can not be defined and must be handled as "unknowns", a mathematical concept. Philosophers seem to have a very difficult time understanding the concept of working with unknowns.

I hope you guys can understand what I just said.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Just a quick reply...

That also seems to be closer to my worldview than to yours.

That's probably because I was quoting you from post #303 :)

Some time ago, you and I expressed different views of what might be ultimately fundamental. You thought it might be motion; I think it is the ability to know.

Actually I said, in discussion about the nature of time, that it is often useful to think of motion as more fundamental than time (i.e. to assume that time is a concept with which we handle reality in our mind), and I have clarified that this is just another semantical take on this particular aspect of subjective experience that it is "changing". (Of course I understand that any words, including "changing", is implying one particular sort of worldview that is based on assumptions...)

In other words, and I quote you again:
"Of course we know that we are both guessing and that neither of us can prove our hunch. But we can still talk about it and try to make sense of our guesses."

:)

To interpret your statement, I think we should change "We have nothing but" to "Nothing exists but". That way we don't have to define 'We', which gets all bogged down in identity, self, consciousness, etc., and we don't have to define 'have', which must be some kind of process which again only adds complexity.

Well yeah. I mean, it was your statement, but I know what you mean of course, and actually the way I usually see and word it is that it is the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of reality. I.e. that reality is not actually made of semantical structures, but the subjective experience cannot be about reality "the way it exists". There are many reasons why I have chosen to see it this way, and it doesn't seem to me to be too hard to figure out. Yet too many people cling onto empirical evidence as a proof that our models - the way we think about systems or reality - is really the way reality exists. It seems absolutely crazy to me to assume it to be so once you look at how we know anything at all.

-Anssi

 

[Paul Martin]

Well yeah. I mean, it was your statement,

Touche. How careless of me. (Years ago Dr. Dick told me I needed to be more careful when I talk to smart people. He was right; and you are among the smartest people I have ever talked to. Sorry.)

but I know what you mean of course, and actually the way I usually see and word it is that it is the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of reality. I.e. that reality is not actually made of semantical structures, but the subjective experience cannot be about reality "the way it exists".

I agree. I like the way you expressed it.

There are many reasons why I have chosen to see it this way, and it doesn't seem to me to be too hard to figure out.

I also have a few reasons for choosing to see it this way. I am curious about how much overlap there is between your reasons and mine.

Yet too many people cling onto empirical evidence as a proof that our models - the way we think about systems or reality - is really the way reality exists. It seems absolutely crazy to me to assume it to be so once you look at how we know anything at all.

I agree.

But we can still talk about it and try to make sense of our guesses.

When I think about the ultimate origin of reality, here's what makes sense to me. I'll parse your statement: "it is the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of reality."

First, I assume that "it is the subjective experience that exists" at the outset. I.e., the subjective experience is ontologically fundamental. It seems reasonable to suppose that that subjective experience has the ability to know. That is, it doesn't make much sense to talk about experience if the experience isn't, or can't be, known.

At the very beginning, nothing would be known because there was nothing to know. But, there really would be something to know, viz. the fact that nothing was known. If, somehow, this fact did indeed become known, i.e. the subjective experience experienced, or realized, that fact, then that event, or process of changing state from "not knowing" to "knowing" would constitute what we could call a "system".

The change of state I mentioned would provide a new experience for the subjective experience which would increase the set of facts, or "things" available to the subjective experience.

So, at this stage, it seems that there would be a chicken-egg relationship between the subjective experience and the set of facts, or information that have been (were, are) experienced. They would grow together. And, this would obviously introduce change and time into reality.

At some point, it seems reasonable that the subjective experience would experience something akin to pattern recognition, particularly in some repetitive part of the "system". And the experience of any pattern, would be a different "kind" of experience from that of mere information. The relationship between a pattern and the underlying information could be seen as a semantical relationship. That is, the identification of a pattern could be seen as a symbol standing for the experience of the pattern in the underlying information.

So, by this point, reality would consist of "the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models".

Now, the models are modeling some subset of the information that has been (is, was) experienced by the subjective experience, so, to make a slight modification to your statement, I would say that "it is the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of some subset of reality."

I.e. that reality is not actually made of semantical structures,

...because reality includes more than semantical structures; it also includes the primordial subjective experience.

but the subjective experience cannot be about reality "the way it exists".

...because the subjective experience cannot experience itself.

What do you think?

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[mosassam]

First, I assume that "it is the subjective experience that exists" at the outset. I.e., the subjective experience is ontologically fundamental. It seems reasonable to suppose that that subjective experience has the ability to know. That is, it doesn't make much sense to talk about experience if the experience isn't, or can't be, known.

I would disagree with this point. The subjective experience does not know anything. Knowing requires a knower, which must be the "I" of subjective experience. Can one have an experience in which the "I" ceases to be? I know from personal experience the answer to be Yes! My favourite part of being a musician is jamming, which involves getting together with other people and making music up from scratch. Instantaneous creativity. During a successful jam the "I" has disappeared, the only reason I know this is because I am well aware of the "I" returning to say "This is great" or some such thing, which kills the moment. I don't have any memory of any jam I've ever done while it was happening because, I suppose, there was no "I" present to remember it. However, when listening back to a recording I am often amazed by my own heightened technical ability and the patterns or lines I've chosen to play which otherwise would never have occurred to me.The same thing happens when contemplating something of immense beauty, having a Eureka moment, and so on.
Two important points I would like to make:
1) The experience cannot be considered an experience until it has ended. Whilst happening it can be described as a state of being. Once over, the "I" comes rushing into claim it. The "I" smashes what has happened into thousands of pieces it can then analyse. The smashing up creates information. The "I" really doesn't like being left out of things, after all, Death can be seen as an "I"less state of being.
2) The state of being cannot be communicated. This can only happen once the "I" has smashed it up and, obviously, this is not the same thing.
If the rational mind can be said to be a crystallisation of the "I", and Science a crystallisation of the rational mind, I think we can see the limitation that science will always have in describing reality - namely, that it is a description.
I would venture reality as a state of being, open to all humans but one that cannot be communicated.
I am not sure, when you talk about subjective experience, whether it incorporates this "I"less state of being or whether you are beginning with the "I". If the latter, I'm not sure how subjective experience can then be considered 'fundamental'.
At the moment I am intrigued by Dr.D's notion of things "emerging from the undefined" as "I" must be considered an assumption.

 

[Rade]

...With regard to the limitations which should be imposed on the problem of understanding "foundations", my position is quite simple. If one looks at the fundamental issue of "foundations", foundations are what the arguments are based upon. If those arguments are based on anything at all, the arguments themselves are not foundations (the foundations are what they are based upon). This is the very source of "infinite regress". As infinite means that (no matter what you have done) you are not finished, "infinite regress" is clearly not a solution. The only rational answer to the question is that philosophical foundations must be based on nothing! Now most people immediately jump to the conclusion that such a position is equivalent to solipsism and presume the only possible result is either infinite regress or solipsism, neither of which is really acceptable. What they miss is that there is another possibility: foundations might exist but they can not be known: i.e., they can not be defined and must be handled as "unknowns", a mathematical concept. Philosophers seem to have a very difficult time understanding the concept of working with unknowns.

Let me try to understand. First I sort the key points.

1. foundations are what the arguments are based upon. [this informs us we assume that foundations exist]
2. foundations must be based on nothing [yes, this is why they are called foundations--another term used is axiom--the axiom is based on nothing--it is from which all arguments are based upon]
therefore:
3. foundations might exist but they can not be known

But clearly we then have these additional logical possibilities to add to the argument:

4. foundations might exist but they can be known to be based on nothing [in which case the above argument is falsified]
5. foundations might exist but they can not be known directly only indirectly [in which case the above argument is clarified]

 

[AnssiH]

I've been too busy these past days to even read the posts on this thread properly. Hopefully I'll be little bit faster in the future... but then what's the hurry, the world is not going anywhere (I assume :)

The starting point for existence has to be definable, i.e. in the situation (universe, world) in which we find ourselves we must assign tags to things we think exist simply in order to talk about them.

Or to even think about reality.

Little bit later in the same post you said something that struck me as a bit odd:

Are they physical things? Well, that is debatable. You could say that the letters are made of ink molecules arranged in a specific pattern on paper. That would make them physical. Similarly, an uttered phoneme, called 'A', would be made of a pattern of vibrating air molecules which is also physical.

Perhaps it struck me as odd just because I'm interpreting you wrong, but I thought I'd comment just in case.

What do we mean when we say something (like an ink molecule) is "physical"? I thought in your philosophy too, ink molecules and all the smaller particles, including the so-called "fundamental particles" posited by any physical model, are still those "semantical things" that we have classified reality into. I.e. while there is reality behind them, it is an extra assumption to say they are "fundamental", i.e. possesses an identity to themselves.

To say they do have metaphysical identity to themselves is to confuse a physical model with ontology.. It shouldn't be too controversial in this day and age to say something like this, since there exists many alternative (and at this time valid) models where the fundamentals of the Standard Model are thought to be the "side effects" of some different fundamentals. In my opinion the large number of alternative models (that may or may not merge together) is accentuating beautifully this method of "understanding through semantical classification" that we are doing.

So, something being a "physical object" doesn't make it "more real" than any other semantical object, like a rainbow or any other interference pattern, or something like a pattern we have classified as letter "T". This is NOT to be confused with idealism. It is an epistemological assertion made from a completely materialistic framework.

Originally Posted by AnssiH
What do you mean with "set of references" (of specific ontological elements)? I.e what does it mean to "refer to a specific element", is it not the same as "defining an ontological element"?

No it isn't. Consider the issue of defining a specific concept. One can cast that problem as an issue between two people (one who knows what he means and the other for whom the concept is still undefined) but you should be aware that even when you are trying to define something to yourself you are very much in the same boat. The process usually starts with a description of what is meant and, when further discussion reveals misunderstanding (or inconsistent conclusions), further communication us used to clarify things. During this period, one can not consider the second party as understanding the definition so, to him (or her), the concept is still undefined though they may very well have agreed upon a reference tag for what they are discussing (I won't comment on the whether the first party really understands their own definition or not; that is a subtle issue). But what you must remember, if you are going to be open minded and objective, is that, even after you have reach what seems to be a consensus, the possibility exists that there is still a misunderstanding there which just hasn't yet become an issue. You must always hold the idea (that you understand something) to be an assumption.

Yeah I very much agree with the above (I'm sure we have all experienced that first hand many times on forums like these :)

And what you describe is exactly the case right now... After reading the above, I *think* in your conception "referring to an ontological element" is the same as "referring to an concept of an ontological element" (like referring to a concept of "photons")?

Before I was thinking that referring to an ontological element was done BY defining an entity that corresponds to certain phenomena (i.e. the entity that is thought to be responsible for certain phenomena, like thinking of "photon" or "mind" as a reference to some real phenomena that is nevertheless not really an "object with identity")

I hope you can pickup what I'm trying to say. It's reeeaallly seriously hard to try and communicate this unambiguously, exactly because of the problem you describe...

[This derives from facts of research on knowledge that it is possible for any single human to know more than one specific present at exactly the same time--from research the limit for most humans is ~ 7, that is, you can know at any time (t0) as many as 7 different "sets of VOEs"

What? :uhh:

Touche. How careless of me. (Years ago Dr. Dick told me I needed to be more careful when I talk to smart people. He was right; and you are among the smartest people I have ever talked to. Sorry.)

Wow, thanks. You're not too shabby yourself.

When I think about the ultimate origin of reality, here's what makes sense to me. I'll parse your statement: "it is the subjective experience that exists by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of reality."

First, I assume that "it is the subjective experience that exists" at the outset. I.e., the subjective experience is ontologically fundamental.

That's not what I was saying. I just refer to "subjective experience" instead of "mind" because the former implies less about the nature of our existence. "Thought happens", but we don't know how, and we don't know what "thoughts" are fundamentally. To assume that subjective experience is ontologically fundamental phenomenon seems to be very shaky assumption; not something I feel like building on (but that's just me :)

The latter part of the sentence should be revealing; "...exist by the virtue of some "system" making semantic models of reality". That is, subjective experience is a phenomenon that exist WHEN some "system" (system is also a semantical concept) models its environment by building semantical models of it. I.e. Subjective experience is NOT ontologicall fundamental (even if it is the starting point of our ontological considerations).

This is just one of the most succint ways to put it and it leaves out some very important requirements, one being what mosassam is describing in post #341. That is, that the system is modeling reality in such a sense that there exists a self. This "self" is a semantical concept that the system makes ABOUT REALITY and can express a situation in form of "self is perceiving" or "self is choosing" or "self is running" by its logical configuration. I.e. we could say it is only an assumption that there exists a "self" with identity (something that persists over time instead of that there only exists memories about a past of semantical "self"), and this assumption appears to be wrong in many ways.

(To continue on what Mosassam is talking about, many athletes have reported that after a peak performance they don't have any recollection of the performance itself... ...this is to be expected since if you have familiarized yourself with a certain pattern well enough, during the performance semantical ideas of "self" would only complicate the situation. You cannot think about the motions associated with playing a guitar too consciously or you will only mess things up. And when there doesn't exists semantics about "self performing" something, there can be no recollection or subjective experience of this at all... Same thing with infant amnesia where no semantical concept of "self" has been formed yet)

Likewise, when I say "reality is not actually made of semantical structures", I mean reality is not actually made of "fundamental entities with identity". That is to say, what we call a photon, is a phenomenon of some sort in reality, but when we are thinking about a system where there exists photons, we are thinking of "things with identity", while in reality no such identity can be claimed. Photon turns out to be just a handy way to model the situation.

It is still merely an assumption that subjective experience springs from some "system" performing such and such semantical classification of reality, and I certainly cannot explain WHY it would be so. But when you think about something like, how electrochemical patterns flow around in the brain, you are still only conscious of that semantical MODEL of reality where there exists such things as "electrochemical patterns" (or "electrons" and "chemicals" that you tack with identity) and consequently you could not hope for understanding properly the relationship between the models of reality that you hold, and the true reality of your "mind" (in so far that we can refer to it as a "mind")

At first this can seem little bit odd, not least because we certainly feel like we have identity to ourselves. But then it is not really possible to pin down what constitutes the identity of self, other than defining ourselves in some semantical form, like "our memories define ourselves". But it is possible to see ourself as a case of certain memories being expressed in a stable manner by certain configuration of reality.

In the end, any words I might use to describe this situation is a case of referring to semantical elements. It is not possible to have thoughts about systems without assuming identity of some sort, and for this reason it seems to us like there must exist some fundamentals with identity (something "to start with").

But if "identity" indeed is completely artificial (semantical) concept that bears NO MEANING TO REALITY WHATSOEVER, then all our thoughts about reality are always to some extent confused from the actual ontological nature of reality. This is pretty serious limitation to our thoughts :) (But not to our predictive capabilities, which is where all the advances in science exist)

-Anssi

 

[triverse]

Who really knows?

I think on a much larger scale than our own existence we can treat ourselves as one single atom.We say things change but never came to the fact that things can repeat as well.Could this mean that when my life ends it will repeat in a shadow form with no difference.If someone says there was no start or no end,this means we are stuck in a continues repeat.In othere words I am here and have always been here,I also will be here.I am talking about what we see as present.We are our own universe, we were never put here, that would need a start.Energy has no start nor stop.All there is is an instant.I think awareness slows down time to us.Who really knows?

 

[mosassam]

This "self" is a semantical concept that the system makes ABOUT REALITY

Once again, your clarity shines through. The Self is not 'central', it is just another 'semantical concept ABOUT reality'. OOOOUUUUCH! But what observes this state of affairs. Thought? Simple awareness? (When I use the word 'observe' I literally mean it. Some things are reasoned constructs and some things can be just "seen". A problem I'm having with Dr.D's stuff is that I'm having to build an understanding using reason, I've not yet had the insight that allows me to "see" what he is driving at)
The System (you mention) that makes the semantical concept of the Self needs some clarification (I certainly don't want to be getting into some meta-self. Or do I?).
Thought seems to be the greatest obstacle in experiencing reality but when used correctly can provide the flash of insight that can almost allow one to glimpse the "fabric of reality" (perhaps). Physical reality is, to a certain extent, created by Thought. What is the nature of reality without Thought? Quantum Theory seems very close to reaching this point, but there doesn't seem to be a way it can 'cross the line'. (Warning - oversimplification:) an electron has properties "only when we're looking" (ie: only when thought is used). What is happening when we're not looking because I'm betting THAT is reality
In a previous post I'm sure you said you were dubious about consciousness having an effect at a quantum level (ie: effecting certain experiments). From the little I understand, I still have the lingering feeling it does, somehow. If you can, please clarify.

 

[Rade]

...But if "identity" indeed is completely artificial (semantical) concept that bears NO MEANING TO REALITY WHATSOEVER, then all our thoughts about reality are always to some extent confused from the actual ontological nature of reality...

But, your but conclusion is not necessarily a truth statement, for to say that a metaphysical entity has "identity" can be nothing more than saying that "identity" evolves from dialectic union of axioms of "existence" and "consciousness". To put it simply (as put by Ayn Rand):

Existence is Identity
Consciousness is Identification​

To hold that "identity as a concept bears no meaning to reality", is to say you hold that a metaphysical entity can exist apart from its characteristics, which is a completely artificial (semantical) concept because it leads to a contradictory conclusion that a metaphysical entity is a non-existent, which is a logical impossibility. I find that you attempt to force the concept of "identity" into a false dichotomy--to force it into either the camp of existence OR consciousness when it is nothing of the sort--it is a concept formed from the dialectic union of the two.

 

[mosassam]

To hold that "identity as a concept bears no meaning to reality"

The statement you are analysing is an If/Then statement. You have presented it as if some law is being laid down, which obviously it isn't.
My interpretation of what Anssi is saying is that thought fragments reality into different categories, classifications - identities. We divide reality into a list of contents which we label. This way we can communicate with each other. More importantly, it seems that thought must fragment reality so that it can think about reality (which, I believe, demonstrates the fundamental nature of thought - if it did not divide, thought would not exist).
However, IF this dividing process (allotting identities) has nothing to do with what reality actually is, THEN thought (the source and product of the dividing process) will never be able to grasp the true nature of reality.
If this is a correct interpretation I would say this - the reality I have just been referring to I have previously labelled the unified whole and have been viewing this as the "true" underlying reality that thought has separated us from. However, the "true" underlying reality may be the Yin/Yang interplay of thought (the particle) and unified whole (the wave). The balance of these complementary 'forces' (the wavicle?? (D'oh! )) may be fundamental reality.
(IJMTU)
PS: Any chance of getting back to Dr.D's stuff)

 

[Rade]

.. the "true" underlying reality may be the Yin/Yang interplay of thought (the particle) and unified whole (the wave). The balance of these complementary 'forces' (the wavicle?? (D'oh! )) may be fundamental reality...

Yes, I agree with this logic that there is a dialectic (Yin/Yang) interplay that form a balance (or synthesis) to explan what you call the "underlying reality", that is, the ONLY reality that any human can "explain"--it is what I was trying to explain to Dr.D. with no success when I presented this modification to his first equation concerning the "present" in a previous post:

Let a set of "known" VOEs in present be: Bt1 = <(a1A1),(a2A2),(a3A3)...anAn>​

So given that VOEs are "valid ontological elements" in the present, the "true underlying reality of the specific present for you at a specific space and time" (Bt1) is the interplay of "thought" about three specific VOEs, what I symbolize as (a1,a2,a3) and the three specific undefined axiomatic VOEs (A1,A2,A3), and so, what you refer to as being the "balance" (or synthesis) is the right side of the equation for a "specific present"--it is for me the equation of your "wavicle":

<(a1A1),(a2A2),(a3A3)...anAn>​

Thus for me the balance of the Yin/Yang derives from the dialectic of onotology (the study of what exists as VOEs--the A1,A2,A3) and epistemology (the study of the "thought" of what exists as VOEs--the a1,a2,a3). The underlying reality is a quantum superposition based on use of mathematics to first differentiate "perception" of VOEs and then to integrate via thought to "concept" of VOEs. Perhaps we can say that the:

"explanation of underlying reality" = process of the calculus​

Let me know where this does not make sense.

 

[mosassam]

to explan what you call the "underlying reality", that is, the ONLY reality that any human can "explain"

This doesn't tally with what I was saying. Before explaining why, I must confess that my last post (like so many of mine) can be viewed as bulls#*t, because they are my groping attempts to get to a 'model' of reality that feels right to me, one that makes maximum sense (to me) logically but also intuitively. (hardly scientific)
In the post I refer to three elements -
1) Thought (the Many, Divider, the Particle)
2) Unified Whole (the One, Unifier, the Wave)
3) and the balance of these two complementary "forces", Fundamental Reality
The only thing that can be explained of these three is Thought, and that hasn't even been accomplished with much success at the moment. The Unified Whole may be detectable but it cannot be communicated, and thus cannot be explained. As for Fundamental Reality, that fact of the matter is I've got a cheek even mentioning it, but for me there is a deep beauty to this simple explanation of affairs and that's all its got going for it.
As for the rest of your post - I'm using every ounce of brain power I have trying to get a handle on what Dr.D is going on about but (I think) you seem to have misunderstood what present actually means which, I believe, is - a change in knowledge. Once this change has occurred, the knowledge becomes 'known' and, thus, becomes the past. So, when you write
"...given that VOE's are "valid ontological elements" in the present...", you seems to be using present in a different way than Dr.D is.
PS: I would like to retract the word "wavicle" as it seems so bloody stupid!

 

[AnssiH]

I'll be speaking entirely through my particular worldview (acknowledge these are just my beliefs, although I haven't laid them on too shaky grounds I can assure you)

Once again, your clarity shines through. The Self is not 'central', it is just another 'semantical concept ABOUT reality'. OOOOUUUUCH! But what observes this state of affairs. Thought? Simple awareness?

This is exactly where we should divorce from the intuitive idea where some thing must be "observing this state of affairs" (or we quickly end up to dualism and/or homunculus argument and/or naive realism). This is intuitive idea precisely because the brain builds a worldview by classifying it into "things"; one of these things is "self". By inventing such an object as "self", the "rational" interpretation of the sensory data turns into a form of "self is perceiving". In a purely materialistic stance, this must be enough for a subjective experience to occur, i.e. we assume that reality is such a place where this kind of process causes subjective experience (albeit our understanding of that very process is quite shaky since it is based on us classifying that process into "sensible things", while reality is not quite like that -> our own ontological nature is still shrouded from our thoughts)

Let me offer you some material for wrestling that idea of "being no one" properly into your system. Consider a thought experiment where you undergo an adult mitosis. That is, every cell in your body is copied and you split into two; both into the exact same physical state. Which one is the one where the "old you" will go? (Whose "point of view" your current self will assume?) To up the ante, ask yourself if you would agree to undergo an adult mitosis, and have another one of the copies killed, and have the other given a million dollars.

If you find yourself baffled by this thought experiment, it can only be because you have traces of "non-physical self" ideas left in your thinking. In a materialistic stance, the contents of your subjective experience are caused by certain configuration of the brain. With two configurations in the exact same state, there will be two subjective experiences both having the same memories, and both being convinced they are the same self that existed before the split. From this you can derive how there is no metaphysical identity to yourself from one moment to the next either.

For further clarity, let's view this matter from the point of view of natural evolution.

Dawkins describes nicely in "The Selfish Gene" how intelligence as a survival method came to be. Rather than reacting to the changes in the environment merely by the natural selection of the genes, the animal branch of the survival machines begun reacting to their environment by learning meaningful reactions to certain stimulus. That is, mobile organisms became able to react to dangers immediately; this obviously improves their changes in the gene pool. In other words, first iterations of simple sensory systems & nervous systems turned up into the scene. These are basically relatively simple systems, with simple reactions to certain stimulus; hardly a case of something having a subjective experience.

We can see that it would be extremely beneficial for an organism to be able to predict events in its environment rather than to just react in a straightforward manner to certain stimulus. I.e. to be able to recognize a rock that is rolling towards it, and to be able to predict it is going to get hit unless it does something.

After many iterations, the nervous systems become able to do just that; to predict reality. For some system to predict some scene, it must model it, by classifying it into "sensible components" to which it assumes certain behaviour, and consequently it can "simulate" how those components behave together (Much like we perform weather simulations by modeling the weather system). In a sense, this is what the brain is; a machine that runs a simulation of reality, so to be able to make rational predictions.

The point to stress here is precisely that idea about the brain classifying reality into sensible components. I suspect this sounds very familiar to you, but it has to be understood precisely. When you are looking at a ball that flies through your field of view, the brain is basically receiving bunch of spatial/temporal patterns flowing into different parts of the cortex as the ball moves in your view. For the system to be able to interpret this avalanche of patterns as a "single ball in motion", quite a few things have to happen. At a sufficiently high abstraction level we can say simply refer to this processas a case of spatial/temporal patterns being interpreted against a worldview. It is that worldview which contains the information about what sorts of "things" exist and how they behave.

Note that at all times, this whole recognition process is done for predictive purposes. If the brain recognizes that avalance of patterns as a case of a ball in flight, and it has assumed certain behaviour to balls, it can immediately draw a meaningful prediction about where that ball is going to land. Basically any activity you do can be seen as a case of prediction through semantical model of reality.

Now, as the nervous systems kept improving and became capable of forming more and more sophisticated worldviews, the resulting behaviour of the organisms became "more intelligent". I.e. they could figure things out with greater accuracy, and use more complex reasoning and form more and more abstract concepts to their advantage. At some point when such a system becomes capable enough, and it forms concepts like "existence" and "reality", it cannot help but draw such an assumption about its sensory data, that it exists itself! This is basically a case of "self" becoming a semantical concept of that worldview (It requires quite a few assumptions about reality before assumptions about self come to exist). And this is basically how we all become aware of ourselves during the first years of our lives. Helen Keller has said that the first time she realized there is a reality out there, was the first time she also realized "she existed", and she says "that was the first time consciousness existed in me" (or something akin to that).

And like you noted, we regularly lose subjective experience for moments, when the brain just doesn't happen to interpret the situation in the form of "self experiencing" (or "self-reflection" might exist in very weak sense)

I suspect if you now take a look at the book description and the first pages of:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0262633086/?tag=pfamazon01-20
it will make a lot of sense to you.

(When I use the word 'observe' I literally mean it. Some things are reasoned constructs and some things can be just "seen".

You have gotten over naive realism though? There must exist an interpretation of the sensory data (that avalance of patterns) before it turns into a subjective experience. That interpretation is done against a worldview that is a semantical construction, in that it is built out of certain assumptions about reality.

The System (you mention) that makes the semantical concept of the Self needs some clarification (I certainly don't want to be getting into some meta-self. Or do I?).

Not really. The explanation can be as mundane as to just look at the physical functions of the brain and understanding them in an appropriate logical level. The reason I say "a system" rather than "a brain" is that the former implies less about the nature of ourselves. The brain is what we understand through our worldview. It is completely circular reasoning to say what I'm saying, since I am basing my arguments on the worldview whose existence I am trying to describe. Little bit tricky state of affairs :)

Thought seems to be the greatest obstacle in experiencing reality but when used correctly can provide the flash of insight that can almost allow one to glimpse the "fabric of reality" (perhaps).

Yeah. In that we can tell how some of our tacit ideas may be dead wrong.

Physical reality is, to a certain extent, created by Thought. What is the nature of reality without Thought? Quantum Theory seems very close to reaching this point, but there doesn't seem to be a way it can 'cross the line'. (Warning - oversimplification:) an electron has properties "only when we're looking" (ie: only when thought is used). What is happening when we're not looking because I'm betting THAT is reality
In a previous post I'm sure you said you were dubious about consciousness having an effect at a quantum level (ie: effecting certain experiments). From the little I understand, I still have the lingering feeling it does, somehow. If you can, please clarify.

This idea about subjective experience "collapsing" reality places some very specific constraints on the nature of that subjective experience (and reality). What I'm describing above for example, is directly contradicting such idealistic ideas.

A coherent idealistic worldview can be built, but the findings of quantum mechanics don't point at that direction very strongly, although these kinds of ideas are often spread to the general public (Probably because we are naturally drawn to mysteries). Copenhagen interpretation did not directly try to suggest that consciousness collapses wave function, but some people interpreted Copenhagen that way. This is because Copenhagen remained completely vague about what it means to observe something (so it is easy to interpret the idea as if only subjective experience is considered observation).

Anyway, in reality we don't have any observations that suggest that strongly towards idealistic schemes. There are mysterious observations, but it is by far more likely that they are mysterious because our model of reality is not the way reality really is; that some particularly sticky assumptions about reality are in fact dead wrong.

Which ones, who knows? Dr Dick is proposing a method for structuring our attempts.

Apologies for length

-Anssi