Against Realism: Examining the Meaning of Local Realism

[selfAdjoint]

My main challenge to materialists is: tell me, from a strictly materialist viewpoint, under what conditions a physical system devellops conscious experience. Now, I know that I can get "answers" to that, but they are totally arbitrary (and depend strongly on the field of activity: from neurologists, computer scientists, zoologists... you get widely different answers which just redefine the word "consciousness" into one or other arbitrary physical property, often strongly antropologically centered).

1) God of the gaps. Arguing from the incomplete state of current research to deny the relevance of any research.

2) For goodness sake do this kind of arguing on a philosophy forum, not a physics one! A moderator would have perfect justification in deleting your post, and with your green badge, you're supposed to be one of the good guys!.

 

[vanesch]

2) For goodness sake do this kind of arguing on a philosophy forum, not a physics one! A moderator would have perfect justification in deleting your post, and with your green badge, you're supposed to be one of the good guys!.

I know that some moderators would like to delete my post , but I really do not agree with that, for the following reason. The entire argument about (local) realism (which was the original topic) requirement is a subtle philosophical argument, *and* is relevant to quantum theory - especially "weird" versions of it like MWI. I don't think I've drifted into any mysticism or anything else.

The two fundamental questions, which are central to any form of understanding of quantum theory, its critique by local realists, and proposed answers by MWI proponents, are:

- what is "reality" ?

- what is "observation" ? (very close to: what is perception, and from there "subjective perception")

Now, it is not my fault that these are highly philosophical topics, but they are nevertheless relevant to quantum theory. They are not particularly relevant to, say, optics, or stellar structure, or calculations of 4th order corrections to electroweak interactions, but they ARE entirely relevant to the foundations of quantum theory, as can testify the many ponderings of a kind that have been generated over the 80 years of its existence, by many of its prominent contributors as well as detractors. You cannot seriously propose to have discussions about quantum theory without touching upon the subject from time to time.

That doesn't mean that we allow crackpottery under the guise of "quantum philosophy", but I don't think that there was much of that in this thread. Instead, the metaphysical requirements of what a physical theory should satisfy have been touched upon, as this is the main discussion point between realists and others (and the original topic).

Also the concept of what exactly is an observation, and how is it related to any potential reality, is touched upon. Personally, I really don't see the utility of any discussion about quantum theory if these issues, which are central to its foundations, cannot be talked about.

I haven't seen, in this thread, any derivations into lala land, any shouting contests, and I had the impression that its participants (me included) found the discussion interesting and thought-provoking. We've remained close to the original topic, and - as I tried to say - it *is* relevant to quantum theory. What more could you ask ?

Now, if you want to displace this thread to the "philosophy of science" forum, be my guest ! It's clearly an interdisciplinary topic, touching upon the philosophical questions raised by the formalism of quantum theory, so it belongs, IMO, to both. It's specific relevance to quantum theory in particular, however, make me believe it can stay here without problem.

 

[Careful]

If one understands under physics :
(a) development and discussion of well known theories
(b) construction of and debate about no-go theorems as long as no scientific counterexample is given how to bypass the latter

then let me recall that I have said in one of my first posts about Bell inequalities that such discussion belongs in the philosophy forum. If on the other hand, physics is also about expressing consistent world views or to present such possible candidates (which I believe is essential for science), then I share the opinion of Vanesch (even if I think MWI is nuts ).

One cannot feel neither understand these deep conflicts in our understanding without going through this kind of ``crackpottery''; quantum gravity is full of this kind of conflicts.

Careful

 

[vanesch]

If on the other hand, physics is also about expressing consistent world views or to present such possible candidates (which I believe is essential for science), then I share the opinion of Vanesch (even if I think MWI is nuts ).

I think the human mind is such that it needs some kind of "consistent world view" in order to be able to make judgements on how to extend/modify/understand it, and as such, I would be of the opinion that anyone trying to do some fundamental theoretical research in physics without having thought about these issues at least once, is totally misguided. It's different for people simply wanting to *apply* known theories to solve practical problems (which is, no matter how boring it may sound, the main activity of an overwhelming lot of physicists, me included), but that's not how you get young minds interested into the topic!

If you look at the threads here, *a large part* of it touches upon half-philosophical issues, so I really don't see what's wrong with talking about that now and then.

As MWI is concerned, I said several times too that intuitively, I also find it "nuts". Nevertheless, I think it has its place because at least, "it bites the bullet". Given the strangeness of the linear quantum formalism, it pushes the consistency of the view to the extreme and pushes your nose in the dirt you'd have liked to whipe under the carpet (as do many other interpretations). So I like it from the purely logical PoV. It is, strictly logically (and not intuitively) speaking, the most consistent view on quantum theory. So IMO, which is of course entirely personal, I think MWI is the next best thing after giving up on linear quantum theory all together or finding out how to modify the formalism in such a way that it becomes "naive realist" again (and that's then no quantum theory anymore).
I'm not the only one taking on that view - Penrose is with me here (and you can't call him a local realist, nor an MWI proponent) for instance.

One cannot feel neither understand these deep conflicts in our understanding without going through this kind of ``crackpottery''; quantum gravity is full of this kind of conflicts.

Indeed, I see this as a kind of brainstorming on the foundational level. Trying to put all the "evident and intuitive truths" as much aside as possible, and trying to find out what are still the logical requirements.

This is of course a totally different activity than trying to calculate some correction to one or other spectroscopic transition. I think one needs to be able to do both.

 

[Careful]

** I think the human mind is such that it needs some kind of "consistent world view" in order to be able to make judgements on how to extend/modify/understand it, and as such, I would be of the opinion that anyone trying to do some fundamental theoretical research in physics without having thought about these issues at least once, is totally misguided **

Correct, there is much less physics around than mathematics.

**
As MWI is concerned, I said several times too that intuitively, I also find it "nuts". **

Hehe, don't take it personally :rofl: just teasing a bit.

** Nevertheless, I think it has its place because at least, "it bites the bullet". Given the strangeness of the linear quantum formalism, it pushes the consistency of the view to the extreme and pushes your nose in the dirt you'd have liked to whipe under the carpet (as do many other interpretations). **

Right, it was the MWI type of nonsense which was the drop too much for me, in that sense it works perfect.

** I think MWI is the next best thing after giving up on linear quantum theory all together or finding out how to modify the formalism in such a way that it becomes "naive realist" again (and that's then no quantum theory anymore). **

How revolutionary.

**
I'm not the only one taking on that view - Penrose is with me here (and you can't call him a local realist, nor an MWI proponent) for instance. **

Hmm, I am not sure about your first statement, but true Penrose is not a LOCAL realist, but a realist nevertheless.

**This is of course a totally different activity than trying to calculate some correction to one or other spectroscopic transition. I think one needs to be able to do both.**

I agree, there is a very useful interplay between them moreover. Making a difficult calculation is 1, making a difficult useful calculation is 2. Funny enough, many useful calculations are usually relatively ``easy''.

Careful

 

[DrChinese]

From Bell's original "On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox":

Circa Formula (15)...

In my opinion, this is where Bell introduces realism mathematically. Previous to this point, he had setting a for Particle 1 and setting b for Particle 2. By introducing setting c, he is explicitly adding the assumption that there is a third setting c to discuss even though there are only 2 particles. By extension, there could also be hypothetical settings d, e, f, etc.

So Bell is saying that a local realistic theory (if it exists) would be more complete than quantum theory because of this hypothetical c vector. Do you agree with my characterization of Bell in this regard? If not, is there another spot in which the assumption of realism is expressed?

 

[AnssiH]

As a dualist, I'm going to challenge a few of the statements you make here. I know that it is not fashionable amongst scientists to fight materialism, but I take the challenge.

Sweet :) I can understand it is hard to be a dualist in this materialistic world.

My main challenge to materialists is: tell me, from a strictly materialist viewpoint, under what conditions a physical system devellops conscious experience. Now, I know that I can get "answers" to that, but they are totally arbitrary (and depend strongly on the field of activity: from neurologists, computer scientists, zoologists... you get widely different answers which just redefine the word "consciousness" into one or other arbitrary physical property, often strongly antropologically centered). For instance, if you take a neurologist's viewpoint (memory, sensory perception and associative circuitry that has access to both, constructing a self-perception), then a PC with a web cam looking at its motherboard and running something like Photoshop is a conscious being...

Yeah, my experience too is that most materialists don't really even understand the problem of consciousness, and some of them slip into panpsychism and such things. The materialistic paradigm, when taken to its ultimate conclusion, says quite clearly that we cannot actually get the answer; we cannot exhaustively understand why there is a conscious experience. I often have a lot of trouble explaining my ideas even to other materialists, because usually they haven't really taken their view far enough to realize that if materialism is true, we are physically limited to comprehend our comprehension processes!

"But if there is only physical things, why wouldn't we understand it" they say. Every word in the following is painfully inaccurate to describe the reality or even my view, but you can grasp the reason why my assertion must be true in materialistic paradigm;

If it is true in any sense, that it is the spatial/temporal patterns in the brain that express the concepts we are consciously aware of, these patterns themselves cannot possibly bend into the shape that is expressing how the very same expressions are our comprehension. A snake that is expressing a box by bending into a square shape, cannot bend into a shape that is expressing how the snake itself is expressing the box. This must be understood absolutely. Our ideas are not "unlimited", there are physical limitations to them, and those limitations are the way we merely express reality in some arbitrary ways (Philosophical pondering also reveals that reality looks, sounds and feels quite a bit different than it seems to us).

Most materialists just don't get this. Instead they claim that we understand what happens in the brain if we just look at a high-resolution real-time brainscan and look how poking the brain causes some sorts of conscious sensations. They don't understand, that in a strict materialistic paradigm, any understanding of neurons or the electro-chemical patterns that occur in them must literally be arbitrary expressions about reality. Concepts like neurons, electrons and chemicals are semantical concepts.

We can still imitate nature and build conscious machines (if we only believe they are conscious when they claim they are), and we can understand that there is a correlation between the spatial/temporal patterns, but we must understand there is no identity between them; we are not aware of the spatial/temporal patterns, but merely of our semantical expressions that we understand as "spatial/temporal patterns".

So really the only answer I can give you is the mere hypothesis that says a conscious experience exists when a system builds such and such worldview where there exists a semantical assumption about the existence of one self (did people grasp what I mean with semantical worldview btw?). There are many indications to base this hypothesis on, but still it cannot be lifted up to be more than hypothesis by the very principles upon which it exists. Also one must understand that I am using semantical concepts to describe this process, and as such I am painting a view that is very much inaccurate from reality. With a little thought one can easily see which parts are clearly inaccurate, but it is hard to think of better concepts to describe the process.

Let me say something totally crazy at first sight to illustrate my problem with it:
The question of course being what physical processes are being "methods". Is a crystal moving defects around building any worldview of which we might not have understood the significance under its sensory experience of sounds and vibrations ? Are the velocity fields in a turbulent flow of sufficient complexity in fact some form of "thinking" ?
To us, these seem like totally random events, but maybe to a thinking water flow, the electrochemical processes in a human brain seem totally arbitary.

How is a materialist going to define strictly what physical processes give rise to some subjective experience, and what not ?

Yeah, this is exactly where materialistic view starts to shake if one hasn't really thought it through. Most materialists haven't. My answer lies in how I suppose the worldview exists physically. Let's say you see an apple which causes such and such pattern of activity in your brain. Obviously this very pattern does not possesses a metaphysical "meaning" of apple in any form. It doesn't mean that if you cause the same exact pattern into a rock, it has an experience of an apple, or indeed, even if you cause the very same pattern to a "fresh brain" it has an experience of apple. The only reason why the pattern means anything at all is that your brain has built such a worldview against which the pattern has any meaning at all. Your worldview has certain assumptions about reality, one of which is a certain pattern that has been classified as "apples". There are more specific ideas about the physical details of how such worldview and patterns might exist (Like at "On Intelligence" by Jeff Hawkins).

And btw, in this framework not only the system needs to recognize an apple in this sense, but it actually has to interpret the whole experience of seeing an apple in form of "I saw an apple", for which your worldview must contain some assumptions about your own existence. If you don't understand you exist, in what form do you have a memory of any of your past experiences? This is why there is infant amnesia; babies haven't assumed yet that they indeed do exist and there is such a concept as existence etc. How could you remember your infant experience when you possibly could not even store any memories in the form of something having happened to you? Infants don't actually have a conscious experience in this view. I think we all have had the experience of becoming progressively more conscious of our own self as a kid. The very first memories are the first experiences we started to interpret in the form of something happening to our self.

So is a storm conscious? No, there is no basis for stability and learning the way there needs to be. Most animals are not conscious. They cannot learn enough to make assumptions about existence. Remember, the only reason our brain builds such a worldview is so that the organism can make predictions; it's a survival method. Computers are not conscious, they just follow explicit rules. There is no sense of reality being expressed inside them the way there is in brain.

I also understand this does not actually exhaustively explain consciousness, there is a leap of faith that one must take to believe this.

Well, recently I got into a discussion with someone who had to write a manager degree thesis in the medical sector. He's in the sector of the highly mentally handicapped, and the his subject is, how to motivate the low level staff by explaining them that these patients are really conscious human beings which can suffer as well as them. Indeed there's sometimes a serious problem of demotivation, often leading to mis treatment of the patients (not serious mistreatment, but daily rough handling and lack of care). To give you an idea: the average mental age of the patients is between 6 months and 1 year (although they are 30 - 50 year olds).

According to your definition, it is hard to say whether these are really "conscious beings": they almost make no predictions ! At best, they roll themselves in their excrements in as far as they have any controlled motricity.

They probably are not conscious. To be conscious would require them to form memories in the sense of something happening to them. Have they learned that they exist? Probably not. Maybe some have in some limited sense? Who knows.

Yes, I agree with the free will thing. But that's not the discussion. The discussion is about the emergence of a subjective experience.
So the point is: when is there, and when is there not, within a physical structure, an 'awareness' ?
When does a physical process lead to an awareness, and when not ? Imagine you think up a definition which places your body outside of it. So according to your definition, you are not conscious, after all. Does that make sense ? So in what way are you then allowed to think up criteria which make up your definition of "consciousness" ?
In fact, you intuitively "know" that people are conscious, and you try to think up a set of conditions so that they all fall in the category of "conscious beings" while keeping out obvious counter examples, like PC's, robots, and ants. In other words, you try to fit humans "after the fact".
I'm sure that in the 16th century, a thing playing a strong chess game would be considered as a conscious thing. Simply because at that time, one could not think it possible for something else but a human to do so.

Or an amoeba, or an ant colony. Ant colony btw is a fascinating thing because we classify the ants as individuals, but in many senses it is the colony that is the organism. And like it is with the colony of cells that is our brain, we have to think about how could it be that the ant colony was conscious instead of the individual ants (it is not the individual neurons that are conscious; one definition of consciousness is a single subjective experience out of large amount of objects, or out of some spatial area). So like it is in my hypothesis, conscious experience would be literally caused by the ants of the ant colony falling into certain patterns (due to "outside" pressure) in order to produce other patterns that is the prediction of future, causing the organism to react to the outside pressure in a predictive manner. And it would not be exactly correct way to see it as if it is the ants or the hive that is conscious, but that conscious experience is a process. A process is different from the platform that causes it. This is still a materialistic view, because the process that the physical system causes cannot be detached from the physical system. Consciousness to brain is like combustion to wood.

More thoughts about phenomenal self here:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0262633086/?tag=pfamazon01-20

I don't think this is the only issue possible (I'm not religious for instance). I think materialists try to deny an aspect of the world, which is the existence of subjective experience.

I actually get that feeling a lot from fellow materialists... I think there are couple of reason to it. First is that it is actually pretty hard for some people to see the problems associated with consciousness, because consciousness is too obvious or a natural thing in their worldview to even seem odd at all. It takes quite a bit of thought to see the problems. The second reason is that it is very hard to build a mechanical model which would explain the subjective experience, for the reasons I mentioned before. Also one must banish many invalid ideas about reality before they can even begin to build mechanical models. Yet they choose to be materialists because it feel simply too arbitrary to assume consciousness is like some sort of magic sauce poured onto the brain. That view is not very easy to come in terms with either, unless one happens to have a very religious upbringing I suppose.

So people choose to be materialists on the basis of certain principles, and assume that "somehow" subjective experience emerges, "nevermind that we don't know how yet".

I think you're thinking of only specific forms of dualism here. As I said, dualism essentially says that reductionist physical laws are not sufficient to explain the emergence of subjective experiences, simply because those physical laws would do fine all by themselves without such emergence. As such it becomes fundamentally impossible to *derive* from those physical laws, when subjective experiences emerge, and when not, and it is not because you arbitrarily decree that something of the kind happens for certain systems, that this is so. There are dualist visions with souls, deities and all the panoply you like, but this is, IMO, not the essence. The essence for me is that there is no a priori way to *derive* exactly when subjective experience emerges, and when not, from reductionist laws.

Then our views are quite close to each others, with the main difference being that I describe on mechanical terms why there can be no way to derive exactly when (or rather why) a subjective experience emerges. Best we can do is find the correct components, put them together, and hope for the best. We cannot actually know if our artificial intelligence system then is conscious or not, just like we cannot know if the world is solipsistic or not.

I don't see, for instance, how an MWI view (which, I think, satisfies all of the above criteria), can be called a form of naive realism...

It can because it too is necessarily based on arbitrary assumptions about what things are fundamentally real. You cannot comprehend reality without invoking the idea of things. You cannot comprehend reality without using concepts of some sort. But reality itself does not work on concepts. And if relativity is real, even time is arbitrary concept that does not metaphysically exist.

... or a state in statespace ?

Well, with "moment" being an arbitrary assumption I was referring to relativity saying that there is no universal "now"-moment, instead there is only one for each inertial frame. (Where of course inertial frames are arbitrary assumptions or concepts)

 

[Careful]

***
Yeah, my experience too is that most materialists don't really even understand the problem of consciousness, and some of them slip into panpsychism and such things. The materialistic paradigm, when taken to its ultimate conclusion, says quite clearly that we cannot actually get the answer; we cannot exhaustively understand why there is a conscious experience. ***

Hmmm, you will have to explain yourself here. You might start by defining a conscious experience, even Vanesch agrees that in his world, it would be impossible to distinguish the ``zombies'' from himself.

Careful

 

[DrChinese]

...even Vanesch agrees that in his world, it would be impossible to distinguish the ``zombies'' from himself.

Careful

None of the zombies in my neck of the woods possesses the intellect of Vanesch. On the other hand, there are a lot of MWIers in the lot... :tongue:

 

[AnssiH]

***
Yeah, my experience too is that most materialists don't really even understand the problem of consciousness, and some of them slip into panpsychism and such things. The materialistic paradigm, when taken to its ultimate conclusion, says quite clearly that we cannot actually get the answer; we cannot exhaustively understand why there is a conscious experience. ***

Hmmm, you will have to explain yourself here. You might start by defining a conscious experience

Well, it is notoriously difficult to define conscious experience. I think one of the more meaningful definitions is that there exists a singular experience over some system consisting of many parts. Like, panpsychisms assert that everything is conscious, that there is consciousness simply because reality "hits the brain", and every physical reaction is a case of conscious experience to the object that is doing the reacting.

The obvious problem with this is that we cannot define what is an object. Naive realist could say that a neuron too, has a subjective experience, but that would just mean a colony of molecules is having a subjective experience. A brain having a subjective experience is not trivial to explain because here too an arbitrary collection of atoms is having the experience. Why?

So that's why consciousness could be defined as a "singular experience that occurs to a colony of things", and for that reason it should be seen as the emergent function of the colony; a function that the whole system has while none of its parts have it. Just like ice is not slippery because it is made of slippery atoms, but because friction is an emergent function of colonies of atoms. (IF that's the way your semantical mind chooses to see it)

Anyway, the reason why we cannot expect to exhaustively understand why this emergent feature exists under certain conditions, is what I said about the nature of our comprehension. It is pretty obvious that when we have a conscious experience of anything (or rather "when there exists a conscious experience)", we don't actually experience reality itself, but we experience the artificial model of reality built by our brain. We can literally only understand an artificial model about these artificial models; this understanding too is based on huge amount of completely semantical concepts and arbitrary assumptions. There is an infinite regress here that we cannot get around.

Or think about the difference between looking at your brain activity from a brain scan and actually understanding the reality of that brain activity without using any arbitrary concepts. While you can find a correlation between certain pattern and thinking about an apple, this comprehension is just a semantical concept about correlation between certain visual pattern and apples. It says nothing about why there exists a correlation.

Another way to put it, when we try to pin down the metaphysical reasons of conscious experience, we must do so using many many many concepts and assumptions about reality, some of which lead to idealism, some to (naive) materialism, some to dualism, some to panpsychism and so on, but all of them are fundamentally about sensible objects and their relationships, and this is not because world would be fundamentally made out of "objects", but merely because in order for a physical system to make predictions about physical reality around it, it needs to classify reality into sensible objects, so to make assumptions about their relationships. The way we understand the world in objects such as particles and waves and what have you, is probably not the way the world metaphysically is at all. Yet that's the only kind of understanding we are capable of!

There are in fact many other ways to come to conclude that this so-called mind-body gap cannot be crossed even in principle.

 

[RandallB]

In my opinion, this is where Bell introduces realism mathematically. Previous to this point, he had setting a for Particle 1 and setting b for Particle 2. By introducing setting c, he is explicitly adding the assumption that there is a third setting c to discuss even though there are only 2 particles.

So Bell is saying that a local realistic theory (if it exists) would be more complete than quantum theory because of this hypothetical c vector. Do you agree with my characterization of Bell in this regard? If not, is there another spot in which the assumption of realism is expressed?

I think I understand what you’re saying; but I don’t I agree with the premise that Bell was establishing a “mathematical” assumption of naive local realism.
Or if you allow me to avoid calling it “naive”, can I call it common realism or common local realism to distinguish that HVT version from non-local theories like MWI, BM, SED etc. that have their own version of local within a non-common reality.

I see Bell Theorem as based on applying logic mathematically to provide a test for theories to show themselves as logically viable or not. Bell intended to give the simplest theory (the Common Local Realist) the chance to prove itself viable, with the idea that the simplest and more complete explanation is correct.
Thus, Common Local Reality would not rise from the Bell Theorem or any assumptions in it, but from the proof, a Local Realist might use to pass the logic of the theorem – which the LR has been unable to do for the Common Local case.
QM of course passes the test based on Uncertainty Principle not requiring common local realism. Other theories technically pass the test within their own non-common version of local.
In fact if[\b] Common Local Reality were to provide an answer, I don’t think Bell alone would declare QM and others as “wrong” (even though accurate) and Common Locality as “right”, but our preference to accept Occam's point that the simplest and most complete theory is preferred would.
In addition, I do not see where Bell can (nor was ever intended to) select between those theories that do pass its logic. My guess is Occam would tip his hat to QM, if not hang it there till some better proof came from one of the non-common local theories.

By the way, with the intent of “naive” so easily misinterpreted, do you think my use of “common” is a fair and common sense way to distinguish between naive locality and other forms of locality without being confusing?

 

[DrChinese]

I think I understand what you’re saying; but I don’t I agree with the premise that Bell was establishing a “mathematical” assumption of naive local realism.
Or if you allow me to avoid calling it “naive”, can I call it common realism or common local realism to distinguish that HVT version from non-local theories like MWI, BM, SED etc. that have their own version of local within a non-common reality.

I see Bell Theorem as based on applying logic mathematically to provide a test for theories to show themselves as logically viable or not. Bell intended to give the simplest theory (the Common Local Realist) the chance to prove itself viable, with the idea that the simplest and more complete explanation is correct.
Thus, Common Local Reality would not rise from the Bell Theorem or any assumptions in it, but from the proof, a Local Realist might use to pass the logic of the theorem – which the LR has been unable to do for the Common Local case.
QM of course passes the test based on Uncertainty Principle not requiring common local realism. Other theories technically pass the test within their own non-common version of local.
In fact if[\b] Common Local Reality were to provide an answer, I don’t think Bell alone would declare QM and others as “wrong” (even though accurate) and Common Locality as “right”, but our preference to accept Occam's point that the simplest and most complete theory is preferred would.
In addition, I do not see where Bell can (nor was ever intended to) select between those theories that do pass its logic. My guess is Occam would tip his hat to QM, if not hang it there till some better proof came from one of the non-common local theories.

By the way, with the intent of “naive” so easily misinterpreted, do you think my use of “common” is a fair and common sense way to distinguish between naive locality and other forms of locality without being confusing?

Well, I don't think there is an issue of "naive" or not present. I think that any local realistic theory MUST acknowledge that there are definite, specific values for all observables at all times; but more specifically, that there are specific spin values independent of the act of observation. So either you agree with this view, or show what a realistic theory looks like that DOES NOT have these characteristics. (We already know that Bohmian Mechanics, by this definition, is non-local realistic.)

So again, I return to the mathematical formalism of Bell to serve as a specific definition.

 

[Chaos' lil bro Order]

And what tells you with certainty that what your 5 senses tell you is any more "knowable" than what comes from "extensions" ? This is the kind of question philosophers have given a lot of thought to.


I think that all conversations seeking "truth" are starting off badly.

Please define 'extensions' for me, I am not quite sure what you mean by this. Also, please keep your posts briefer and succincter if you can. Pack a lot of information into a smaller package. I struggle to read 1000 word posts for fun in my free time.

Any coversation seeking the truth is the most valid conversation you could possibly have, so I see no reason to say it starts off badly.




I don't see what the whole debate about 'reality' is... We must assume there is nothing beyond our 5 senses, because to suggest otherwise leads us to hypotheticals that cannot be known. And unless posing such hypotheticals leads to developing a physical technique that uses our senses to delve into them and pull out probabilistic results, such speculation is irrelevant to the pursute of truth. QM is very valid as physics because it makes probabilistic predictions. Even if its various models are completely wrong about the true 'physical' nature of the processes it tries to describe, it is irrelevant to humans, because the predictions match the physical phenomena so precisely. For example, if I place a frog on my desk and hide it from my view with a bristleboard and then set up a mirror so i can see the hidden frog in a reflection, I can observe the frog's movements and make predictions about how it can and cannot move. As long as I understand the physics of the mirror, I can perform the necessary operations on the mirrored data and transform it into the same data I would see if I removed the bristleboard and looked straight at the frog. Both observations of the frog, mirrored and strightforward are equally valid and equally true, regardless of whether I can actually perform the correct operations. No point of reference holds water over another point of reference. But what good would it do me to speculate that there is a rabbit beside the frog if I cannot sense it through my vision by either the mirrored or straightforward view? None. Absolutely none.

Therefore, there is only one 'reality', the reality that we can perceive with our senses. If we gain a 6th sense, or our 5 senses improve in sensitivity and scope, then, reality will expand to us. If I had a 6th sense that could perceive the hidden rabbit, I will then admit it into reality, but until this point, there is ABSOLUTELY no point in speculating and discussing whether a rabbit exists behind the bristleboard.

The only purpose in discussing things we cannot know is to collectively work out methods by which to know them. All else is speculative madness and does nothing to improve the human knowledge pool. Which, after all, is the true goal of humanity. No more, no less.

 

[Careful]

**
I think one of the more meaningful definitions is that there exists a singular experience over some system consisting of many parts. Like, panpsychisms assert that everything is conscious, that there is consciousness simply because reality "hits the brain", and every physical reaction is a case of conscious experience to the object that is doing the reacting. **

Ok, a coarse grained thing. Fine, why don't you just put in some central information processing system in, like in a computer ?

**
The obvious problem with this is that we cannot define what is an object. Naive realist could say that a neuron too, has a subjective experience, but that would just mean a colony of molecules is having a subjective experience. A brain having a subjective experience is not trivial to explain because here too an arbitrary collection of atoms is having the experience. Why? **

Euh, I am not sure wheter each part of the brain or the colony has the *same* experience. Suppose I take a photosensitve plate which I subdivide in small isolated cells and all cells are connected to a central computer. Now if I fire some classical light to it, each cell has different experiences depending upon the intensity of the light hitting it, none of them sees the pulse, but the computer can if it recognizes the pattern.

**So that's why consciousness could be defined as a "singular experience that occurs to a colony of things", and for that reason it should be seen as the emergent function of the colony; a function that the whole system has while none of its parts have it. Just like ice is not slippery because it is made of slippery atoms, but because friction is an emergent function of colonies of atoms. (IF that's the way your semantical mind chooses to see it)**

But I am sure that ice has not the experience of slipperyness.


Careful

 

[Careful]

** Well, I don't think there is an issue of "naive" or not present. I think that any local realistic theory MUST acknowledge that there are definite, specific values for all observables at all times; but more specifically, that there are specific spin values independent of the act of observation. So either you agree with this view, or show what a realistic theory looks like that DOES NOT have these characteristics. (We already know that Bohmian Mechanics, by this definition, is non-local realistic.) **

I don't see why, an observable could just be a coarse grained property and those are not necessarily all well defined at each moment in time (like temperature in a non equilibrium situation). But that is not the point I guess, you basically refuse to accept an extension of reality (way less crazier than string theory) to solve the paradox.

Careful

 

[AnssiH]

**
I think one of the more meaningful definitions is that there exists a singular experience over some system consisting of many parts. Like, panpsychisms assert that everything is conscious, that there is consciousness simply because reality "hits the brain", and every physical reaction is a case of conscious experience to the object that is doing the reacting. **

Ok, a coarse grained thing. Fine, why don't you just put in some central information processing system in, like in a computer ?

Because even if we have labeled something as "central system", it doesn't mean this system experiences whatever occurs to one of its parts. Calling something central is literelly just a label we put on an object, it doesn't mean it is an object in a metaphysical sense any more than any 1000 randomly selected atoms are. It is just a collection of logic gates, which are collections of other things, etc... It's not different from a sewer system then. This whole idea about a "CPU" knowing what happens to one of its ports is just as non-sensical as saying a city knows what is happening in one of its parking lots. We are just tossing around semantical concepts, and in particular our way of seeing world as objects is the problem here.

**
The obvious problem with this is that we cannot define what is an object. Naive realist could say that a neuron too, has a subjective experience, but that would just mean a colony of molecules is having a subjective experience. A brain having a subjective experience is not trivial to explain because here too an arbitrary collection of atoms is having the experience. Why? **

Euh, I am not sure wheter each part of the brain or the colony has the *same* experience.

Yeah they don't, but there is a singular experience that the whole colony is having, which is not the experience of any single part of the colony. Plainly put, stimulating one part of the brain causes us a conscious experience of something, and stimulating a completely different part of the same brain also causes a conscious experience of something. Neither of the parts need to know about each others, yet there is a subjective experience of both stimulations.

Obviously there is connection between these areas, but it doesn't mean we are some sort of special neuron somewhere where everything is ultimately focused (and even if you supposed we are, neuron too has many parts, and in the end you start thinking we are some sort of special atom or some infinitely small area inside the atom or something). It just means it is wrong to understand the reality of consciousness in the form of something happening to some "object", for the whole idea about objects is arbitrary. I.e. there is a phenomenal self. There is no object that is conscious, but more properly conscious experience is occurring as a process or interaction between the so-called objects.

And conscious experience is really the only case where we could say there is a singular experience about the activity happening to a large collection of so-called "things".

It can be hard to see this at first because we are so used to seeing the world as objects. We use that language every day, "my car broke down" when something goes loose in the engine. The engine doesn't have a singular expeirence about something going loose in it, just like the car doesn't have a singular experience about something going wrong in the engine, just like the traffic system doesn't have a singular experience about one car breaking down. A logic gate doesn't have a singular experience of the neurons flowing around it, and the CPU doesn't have such experience of one of its gates going up, a computer doesn't experience what the CPU is doing, and the internet doesn't experience what your computer is doing. This whole business of classifying "objects" into a hierarchical structure is just not getting us anywhere with consciousness, it's just panpsychism. Incoherent and meaningless.

Panpsychism gets into immediate trouble in defining what is the granularity in what sense "objects" metaphysically exist, for you do not have a conscious experience of what is happening to an individual neuron in your brain.

**So that's why consciousness could be defined as a "singular experience that occurs to a colony of things", and for that reason it should be seen as the emergent function of the colony; a function that the whole system has while none of its parts have it. Just like ice is not slippery because it is made of slippery atoms, but because friction is an emergent function of colonies of atoms. (IF that's the way your semantical mind chooses to see it)**

But I am sure that ice has not the experience of slipperyness.

Certainly not. Consciousness is just one instance of "emergent functions". Not all emergent functions are consciousness. Emergent function too is not something that metaphysically exists, but merely a method to classify/comprehend reality.

The important thing to understand is that world is full of systems that have a function which none of its parts have. The problem that especially panpsychists have is that they suppose if the brain is conscious, so then must all of its parts be. It is just like thinking atoms are metaphysically made of "matter" instead of understanding what we call matter is an emergent function of the elements of an atom. A large pile of electrons is not like sand, and fire is not made out of fire (contrary to the old belief :)

 

[Careful]

** Because even if we have labeled something as "central system", it doesn't mean this system experiences whatever occurs to one of its parts.**

Of course, but now you reason from your wish about what consciousness should be without showing that any reasonable theory explaining conscious experience needs to satisfy this criterion.

***
Calling something central is literelly just a label we put on an object, it doesn't mean it is an object in a metaphysical sense any more than any 1000 randomly selected atoms are. It is just a collection of logic gates, which are collections of other things, etc... It's not different from a sewer system then. This whole idea about a "CPU" knowing what happens to one of its ports is just as non-sensical as saying a city knows what is happening in one of its parking lots. We are just tossing around semantical concepts, and in particular our way of seeing world as objects is the problem here. ***

There is no problem for me as far as I am aware of. Why would a self learning machine (and such things are being developped) not be an adequate substitute for a human being in a physical theory ? Pay attention: I am not saying a human being is a self learning machine, I just say that the difference (if any) is not important for physics.

***
Yeah they don't, but there is a singular experience that the whole colony is having, which is not the experience of any single part of the colony. Plainly put, stimulating one part of the brain causes us a conscious experience of something, and stimulating a completely different part of the same brain also causes a conscious experience of something. Neither of the parts need to know about each others, yet there is a subjective experience of both stimulations. ***

Right, because the central unit = our awareness process here.

*** Obviously there is connection between these areas, but it doesn't mean we are some sort of special neuron somewhere where everything is ultimately focused (and even if you supposed we are, neuron too has many parts, and in the end you start thinking we are some sort of special atom or some infinitely small area inside the atom or something). ***

Well, you know, nobody has ever *tested* that right ?! It is the same with quantum mechanics, since as far as we know, it works on such and such scale for a collection of particles, it suddenly needs to hold for all individual entities separately at all scales. And if I am allowed to guess, yes I think that the ultimate central unit is going to be very, very small.

This conversation is going the wrong way : I guess you should define what consciousness *is*.

Careful

 

[DrChinese]

I don't see why, an observable could just be a coarse grained property and those are not necessarily all well defined at each moment in time (like temperature in a non equilibrium situation). But that is not the point I guess, you basically refuse to accept an extension of reality (way less crazier than string theory) to solve the paradox.

Careful

What extension are you proposing? Bell gave a specific definition, and it seems pretty reasonable to me. His definition seems like it could be a "course" grained property, at least the way I see it. For example: spin could be an emergent property rather than an intrinsic property, and still have a specific measurable value.

 

[Careful]

What extension are you proposing? Bell gave a specific definition, and it seems pretty reasonable to me. His definition seems like it could be a "course" grained property, at least the way I see it. For example: spin could be an emergent property rather than an intrinsic property, and still have a specific measurable value.

Yes, that was the first part of my previous message (which was a reaction to your post 47), the second part of my message said that you might want to conceive that reality is more than what we straightforwardly deduce from measurement. I have given at least four examples how to do this on this thread, in post number 2 to be precise and there I still did not include the possibility that the future might influence the present (since it is not a strictly local theory).

Careful

 

[AnssiH]

** Because even if we have labeled something as "central system", it doesn't mean this system experiences whatever occurs to one of its parts.**

Of course, but now you reason from your wish about what consciousness should be without showing that any reasonable theory explaining conscious experience needs to satisfy this criterion.

Satisfy the criterion of there existing a singular subjective experience over some system?

Only thing we know about consciousness is that we are experiencing something subjectively. Is it not completely incoherent to point to an arbitrary direction and say "surely that object is also experiencing whatever it is experiencing", already for the simple reason that every person will see a different object there. One will see a car, another one a tire, and yet another one a scratch on the side of the car.

To make it clearer how this object-oriented thinking is completely arbitrary is that we are only pointing at stable patterns. If you assert that a doughnut is conscious, you must understand that the hole of the doughnut is just as much a stable pattern and one might simply choose to see it as an object. Is the hole experiencing too just by the virtue of naming this stable pattern as a hole?

Is a wave of the ocean experiencing something, or is it the water-molecules that are bouncing up and down that are experiencing something? Or rather is a lake experiencing something, or is the north-end of the lake having a different experience from the south-end? What about the rivers connected to the lakes, or the whole lake-river system?

How can we every say that some object is metaphysically experiencing something? Is it not more proper to say there are only stable patterns, instead of metaphysical objects? Bear in mind, when I say it is wrong to see the world as if there are objects, I am not saying that the apple you are throwing up and down in your hand does not actually exist, I am merely saying that to comprehend the situation in form of "apple", "hand", "matter" and space", and their associated behaviours, is just the way we understand reality, but not actually the way the structure of the reality exists.

Object-oriented thinking has led us astray so many times before btw. Like the idea that space is something with identity where objects move and electromagnetism proagates (=aether). Right now spacetime too is an idea about something where every location has an identity and objects move from one location to next. But as long as we talk about, say, matter and space, how can we really say where the matter ends and space begins? There is no wall to an atom, there are only physical functions which keep herds of atoms stable. We could just as well choose to see it as if atoms are extended, and as such the size of their whole influence, not the size as derived from, say, the observed distance between two atoms of certain type, or the distance from where other particles seem to be deflected (for the deflection is caused by an emergent function of an atom). The matter of the fact is that atomic models are just arbitrary ways to understand how things work at that scale, they don't necessarily say what exists metaphysically.

(Apologies for my posts tending to be a bit long... Things keep coming into my mind at increasing pace... Like I said, I've thought about these things for quite a while now... I hope I can at least raise interesting thoughts on the issue :P )

There is no problem for me as far as I am aware of. Why would a self learning machine (and such things are being developped) not be an adequate substitute for a human being in a physical theory ? Pay attention: I am not saying a human being is a self learning machine, I just say that the difference (if any) is not important for physics.

Well I am saying a human being is a self-learning machine, or at least I approve of using that label completely (which doesn't mean all learning machines are conscious).

I haven't asserted at any point that we couldn't build a conscious machine, I've merely said we cannot understand the reason why it is conscious while we can tell what are the appropriate parts that need to be to put together. Like cavemen could create fire without understand what it was. I have outlined myself a broad outline of what to pay attention to when building a conscious machine, and I believe "On Intelligence" describes completely valid framework for conscious machine as well.

Well, you know, nobody has ever *tested* that right ?! It is the same with quantum mechanics, since as far as we know, it works on such and such scale for a collection of particles, it suddenly needs to hold for all individual entities separately at all scales. And if I am allowed to guess, yes I think that the ultimate central unit is going to be very, very small.

The problem with asserting that the ultimate central unit is very very small (and incidentally very very simple) is that it would just mean we'd find a tiny dot inside the brain and by stimulating ONLY that we could cause all the sensations that we currently cause by stimulating some other parts of the brain. Basically it makes the whole complexity of the brain moot, as all the parts that seem to actually do the object recognition wouldn't actually do **** :) Maybe just modulate some signal at most, for some completely arbitrary reason.

Sure, it is possible that we will find it to be this way, but it is very very unlikely. Consciousness does not reside in the simplest of elements of the universe I don't think, it must be a product of cumulated complexity.

Plus, it seems apparent that to learn enough to become consciously aware (to assume such concepts as existence and self), it needs relatively large learning network. There just needs to be enough "storage space". Human neo-cortex is this kind of space, and we need large portions of it to store such a huge worldview as all of us do.

This conversation is going the wrong way : I guess you should define what consciousness *is*.

Well, I could probably think of tens of definitions, but all of them would be bound to be strongly colored by some particular way to view the world. I think the definition of singular experience over collection of "things" is still valid. I'm not the only one defining it this way btw, for example at "Being No One":
"...It is a wonderfully efficient two-way window that allows an organism to conceive of itself as a whole, and thereby to causally interact with its inner and outer environment in an entirely new, integrated and intelligent manner..."

What this means is basically that a colony becomes to behave as a coherent whole, and in doing so there is a new kind of evolutionary stability found for this colony (and we call such colonies "organisms" or "animals". Richard Dawkins talks a lot about how organisms actually are colonies having "come together" at some point during the evolution in Selfish Gene")

Of course this also has to be understood in completely darwinistic way. It doesn't mean that evolution has stroke some magic structure which suddenly made "free will" or something like that possible. It just means that things fell into such stable structures where the whole structure behaves for the stability of the whole structure (and in doing so finds itself from the future "gene pool"), instead of all of its parts behaving for the stability of themselves.

It is not in any way "given" that you experience everything that comes in from your senses, and that you experiencing making the decisions of moving your limbs and whatnot. This occurs only if there really exists a learning/prediction mechanism that sorts the reality out into semantical concepts in some sense.

As an interesting side note, by severing the corpus callum we can create a situation where each hemisphere of the brain is conceiving itself as one, basically creating two conscious experiences inside one person. That is why these person complain about their other half doing things on its own(Alien hand syndrome). It is the "linguistic hemisphere" of course that is doing the complaining. There are many interesting experiments related to this, such as the person being able to make simple logical decision, but not being able to *say* why he did the decision. :)

 

[DrChinese]

Yes, that was the first part of my previous message (which was a reaction to your post 47), the second part of my message said that you might want to conceive that reality is more than what we straightforwardly deduce from measurement. I have given at least four examples how to do this on this thread, in post number 2 to be precise and there I still did not include the possibility that the future might influence the present (since it is not a strictly local theory).

Careful

You said in #2: "There are at least four well known local mechanisms which violate the ``logic'' in this paper : holography, polarizable media, negative ``probabilities'', predeterminsim. "

I am not sure what you mean about the others, but I think I understand your point about negative probabilities. I.e. that if one does not rule out negative probabilities, then realism is not violated. Is that an accurate summary of your comment?

If so, I would still say that most folks would not agree with that position... even if it is technically accurate. (Because that would be equivalent to throwing the baby out with the bathwater.) The point of the exercise was to exclude all of the local realistic scenarios - the local hidden variable scenarios anyway - in which a more complete "classical" specification of the system is possible. Clearly, a negative probability scenario wouldn't meet that criterion; nor would a scenario in which the future influences the past. Don't get me wrong: These may be viable scenarios, but they are not "realistic" per Bell.

 

[AnssiH]

Hope I'm not boring anyone but...

...another lethal objection against panpsychism is that the only case of subjective experience that we know of - our own - is not a case of us experiencing "the reality hitting our brain" at all. We are not aware of the electro-chemical activity inside the brain or nothing of that sort. We are merely aware of some pattern having been recognized as "X". In other words, we are not aware of the physical activity inside the brain, but rather of the "logical" conclusions that are made about reality (by to that physical activity in some logical sense).

When you are reading this, you are recognizing patterns as letters or full words or even multiple words at once. To the brain these are just electric patterns hitting different parts of the cortex as you move your eyes. When you listen someone talk, you become aware of what word was said, but not necessarily of the actual wave patterns that hit your ears or the pitch (unless you concentrate on these), or the electric patterns that hit your cortex. We have found single cells to fire in the brain when a person sees the face of Bill Clinton or Halle Berry, which just means that the high levels of cortical hierarchy has recognized some pattern as such and such object. This object is what we are conscious of, we are never conscious of the electric activity.

And when I talked about semantical worldview, that talk is all about how the concept of grandmother cells has to be understood not as if there are cells that metaphysically have some meaning when they are fired, but as the brain itself assuming the meanings of everything into a logical structure that is completely self-supporting.

Now if a panpsychists starts claiming that any case of any reaction of anything is a case of the object in question having a subjective experience, they should also explain why is it that we are not aware of the reality hitting our brain, but only of the semantical concepts that exist due to specific learning processes our brain goes through? (here you can also see justification to my claim that no learning system has a conscious experience unless it has made certain assumptions about its own existence)

"But when I'm just looking at the room around me, am I not aware of reality as it is?". Of course you are not. Things, or different waves of light don't have colour to themselves metaphysically. This is naive realism. When you are looking at the room around you, you are still only aware of the semantical concepts that you recognize, such as various shapes or objects like shadows or spots of light or whatnot. Even the sensation of colour is, as I explained earlier, a fully semantical concept. Recognizing your room visually is not different from recognizing a melody from a sound pressure pattern. In fact the cortex is largely plastic in that all the spatial/temporal patterns from all the senses are processed in similar fashion. The only reason they are subjectively experienced so differently is because of certain assumptions that exist in the worldview.

Now, a dualist or idealist would object at this point saying that I am still describing something that is basically an arbitrary physical process, albeit we could call it "learning process", so why should we expect a subjective experience to exist on such type of physical process all of a sudden? As a materialist I make the assumption that when there exists such logical recognition system which interprets sensory data with its open-ended worldview where the concept of "self" exists in certain logical sense (but to an extent in arbitrary physical sense), a conscious experience exists. Otherwise we could indeed imagine a society of zombies who don't have a conscious experience but who would nevertheless spend countless hours at messageboards arguing about consciousness and how their "selves" exists. Is this possible? I don't think so. At least it would be completely absurd. But funny.

I still cannot really pin down WHY is it that recognizing certain patterns as such and such logical concepts, and consequently recognizing some experience logically as "I experienced this and that" causes a subjective experience. And I assume this is because of what I said about our comprehension always being just an artificial expression of reality. And by comprehension I mean anything you can have an experience of. ANYTHING.

 

[setAI]

from hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy- on replacing Arthur Dent's biological brain with an electronic one:

Zaphod Beeblebrox: "you'd just have to program it to say What? and I don't understand and Where's the tea? — who'd know the difference?"

Arthur Dent: "I'd notice the difference!"

Frankie Mouse: "No you wouldn't, you'd be programmed not to."

 

[Careful]

***
I am not sure what you mean about the others, but I think I understand your point about negative probabilities. I.e. that if one does not rule out negative probabilities, then realism is not violated. Is that an accurate summary of your comment? ***

Read F SELLERI, chapter 5 ! How many times do I have to repeat that. :grumpy:

**
If so, I would still say that most folks would not agree with that position... even if it is technically accurate. (Because that would be equivalent to throwing the baby out with the bathwater.) ***

No, it is not, there is no baby. The only thing Bell is useful for, is to point out to local realists that they will have to come up with a nontrivial notion of reality.

**
The point of the exercise was to exclude all of the local realistic scenarios - the local hidden variable scenarios anyway - in which a more complete "classical" specification of the system is possible. **

Right, in that sense Bell's exercise was very limited and has no severe implications whatsoever for local realism as pointed out before.

Careful

 

[DrChinese]

Read F SELLERI, chapter 5 ! How many times do I have to repeat that. :grumpy:

Do you mean:

Selleri, F., Quantum Mechanics Versus Local Realism: The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox (Plenum Press, New York, 1998).

If something he said is identical to your opinion, I might be interested in the quote if it relevant. (I do not have this particular material.)

As best I can determine, you are saying that Bell's realism is not meaningful; and therefore his theorem is of limited applicability.

P.S. Might I kindly suggest that you consider using the quote function when replying? It would make it easier to distinguish your comments...

 

[wm]

So again, I return to the mathematical formalism of Bell to serve as a specific definition.

In my view: The cited ''mathematical formalism'' provides a specific definition of the realism assumption used by Bell.

Therefore: Experiments which breach Bell's formalism involve realistic entities which are outside Bell's purview.

Then: In that many experiments breach Bell's inequality, Bell's ''realism'' is of a limited kind [... one that might be termed ''naive realism'' ... one commonly associated with the ''doctrine of faithful measurement'' ... ie, the doctrine that a ''measurement'' always reveals a ''pre-existing pre-measurement property''].

Conclusion: Many real objects (eg, photons and electrons) breach Bell's realism assumption. That is: Bellian inequalities are breached by both classical and quantum experiments because these objects lie outside the set of objects embraced by the limited realism in the cited formalism. wm

 

[Chaos' lil bro Order]

'It is pretty obvious that when we have a conscious experience of anything (or rather "when there exists a conscious experience)", we don't actually experience reality itself, but we experience the artificial model of reality built by our brain. We can literally only understand an artificial model about these artificial models; this understanding too is based on huge amount of completely semantical concepts and arbitrary assumptions.'


This 'artificial reality' as you call it, is not really artificial at all. Its the tiny slice of the Universe than we can biologically sense. As our senses improve over time due to technological advancements, we start to see a larger and larger piece of the pie you may call the Universe or 'reality' if you prefer. If an alien civilization exists that has 8 senses, our 5 and 3 additional exotic senses, would its perception of reality also be called 'artificial' simply because its viewing reality through consciousness? Or perhaps you would call it less artificial because it sees a bigger slice of reality with its extra 3 exotic senses.

I suspect your view may be that consciousness is some kind of filter that disallows the true reality to be perceived. If this is the case, I think it is a good idea to ponder about where the disconnect between 'the true reality' and 'artificial reality' lies. To my mind the pathway between the true reality and artificial reality has 3 components, the senses, the consciousness and the 'true reality particles', for lack of a better word. So then, is the problem that our senses don't take a correct snapshot of the 'true reality particles', or is it that our consciousness cannot correctly grasp the information that our senses gather from the 'true reality particles'? Perhaps both right, who knows.

In a nutshell my view is that no description of 'true reality' is 'artificial' because no lifeform with the gift of consciousness has a preferred frame of referrence with which to act as the de facto standard. So sure, our description of the 'true reality' is incomplete (and thank god or else we'd have nothing else to learn!), yet I think the slice of reality pie that we have managed to cleave off so far is 100% natural, with no 'artificial' ingredients. And quite frankly it is delicious.

 

[AnssiH]

This 'artificial reality' as you call it, is not really artificial at all. Its the tiny slice of the Universe than we can biologically sense. As our senses improve over time due to technological advancements, we start to see a larger and larger piece of the pie you may call the Universe or 'reality' if you prefer. If an alien civilization exists that has 8 senses, our 5 and 3 additional exotic senses, would its perception of reality also be called 'artificial' simply because its viewing reality through consciousness? Or perhaps you would call it less artificial because it sees a bigger slice of reality with its extra 3 exotic senses.

I suspect your view may be that consciousness is some kind of filter that disallows the true reality to be perceived. If this is the case, I think it is a good idea to ponder about where the disconnect between 'the true reality' and 'artificial reality' lies.

No it's not the case :)
It's not about what we can sense with our natural senses, but about how we classify/understand the sensory data. We could plug any arbitrary number of artificial sensory systems into the cortex and so have a qualia experience of, say, X-rays or thermal camera or anything like that, and yet the comprehension of any sensory data would not be the metaphysical reality of that data, but some logical conclusions about what "objects" exists and how they behave with each others.

Let's say you are feeling a coin in your hand (and you actually have to move it around in your hand to recognize it; brain needs not only spatial but also the temporal aspect of a pattern to recognize anything) . The sensory data pouring into your brain is in constant flux in the cortex. As the coin moves in your hand it causes different nerve cells of your hand to fire, and they connect to different parts of cortex. Yet there is at all the times a subjective sense of "you" experiencing the coin, not a sense of electricity rushing around in the cortex.

The pattern recognition that occurs in the cortex is able to judge all this against something you've experienced before, and assume simply that it is "a coin" in your hand (i.e. if only in your worldview there exists some assumptions about coins and such things). And not only that, there exists other concepts about reality in your worldview, such as the roundness and the flatness, and the texture, weight and temperature of the object, all semantical assumptions about "things" or "concepts" that exist.

The only difference between so-called naive realism and "accurate" realism is that the latter one breaks the world down into simpler functions or concepts, but there is no fundamental difference in how we understand things.

Note especially how at all times you can only be aware of the logical side of things, not so much about the reality of things flowing in your brain or how the coin could be in reality. Note how even classifying this experience in the form of objects and their relationships is just our method of "understanding". It is probably the only method with which subjective experience can come to exist, but it is by no means a way to understand how reality really is. I struggle to explain in detail why this is so because I can only use semantical concepts to talk about it. The understanding of why this is so comes from understanding how this method of understanding is merely an arbitrary way to predict the environment (to avoid dangers in novel situations).

Note how even the experience of just seeing your room is about understanding many many concepts about reality around you. Your brain can recognize such high-level concepts as "my room" from the sensory data, or it can recognize many many low-level concepts from within the room. But all of these are just concepts, i.e. assumptions or ideas about reality. In other words, you are merely aware of the mental model or the "simulation of reality" running in your head, which is necessarily expressed in form of certain concepts, instead of in the form of how reality is. Much like in a computer simulation a physical storm is expressed not in the form of how the real storm is, but in form of numbers or bits.

And at last, consider the reality of colours. If the whole world was red, there would be no such concept as "colours" in our understanding. It would be impossible to understand what are colours, until we saw for the first time something that is "NOT red". For the first time there would be a juxtaposition for red, so to understand what does red mean. However, to assume that red things really look "red" in reality is naive realism; they don't. Things don't have colours per se, the only difference between red and green is the difference in the electric signal that is coming into the cortex. With this difference the brain classifies red and green as different things into the worldview, and the subjective experience of how they look like can be arbitrary, as long as they are experienced differently

These logical conclusions about reality can be extrapolated to all senses and all things we have any understanding of, including "self", and if you spend some time thinking about it, I think it will blow your mind to realize how different reality really can be from how we understand it to exist.

 

[Careful]

Do you mean:

Selleri, F., Quantum Mechanics Versus Local Realism: The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox (Plenum Press, New York, 1998).

If something he said is identical to your opinion, I might be interested in the quote if it relevant. (I do not have this particular material.)

As best I can determine, you are saying that Bell's realism is not meaningful; and therefore his theorem is of limited applicability.

P.S. Might I kindly suggest that you consider using the quote function when replying? It would make it easier to distinguish your comments...

Why would I point you to an irrelevant source ? It is not that I say my opinion is identical to Selleri's, just that I see possibilities in the solutions presented in this chapter. Science is not about opinions but facts, and we don't have unfortunately enough of them, even for pretty basic things. That is why there are so many ``opinions''.

Careful

 

[Chaos' lil bro Order]

And at last, consider the reality of colours. If the whole world was red, there would be no such concept as "colours" in our understanding. It would be impossible to understand what are colours, until we saw for the first time something that is "NOT red". For the first time there would be a juxtaposition for red, so to understand what does red mean. However, to assume that red things really look "red" in reality is naive realism; they don't. Things don't have colours per se, the only difference between red and green is the difference in the electric signal that is coming into the cortex. With this difference the brain classifies red and green as different things into the worldview, and the subjective experience of how they look like can be arbitrary, as long as they are experienced differently

.

Well certainly I agree with this paragraph of your post. I see no reason to argue about which words we use to give semantic meaning to specific concepts such as 'red' colors. Any word will do fine, so long as it confines our observation of this 'red' color to a singular experience. By singular experience I mean that we can define a ~1eV photon as 'red' and a
~1.5eV photon as 'blue'. Of course we can change the names around, but so long as both names identify two separate experiences, they suffice perfectly. I think this sensed version of reality is identical to any observer independent reality. In both cases two photons exist, period. The properties of the photons do not change.

There is only one reality. Many perspectives. But ONE reality. Our sensory perspective is incomplete in its full detailing of this reality, yet still there is only one reality. You see, we cannot know how full our picture of reality is at any given point because history has taught us that we make new discoveries everyday. Thus our picture is constantly increasing, but never complete. Its like the observable horizon of the Universe, every day as the light cone from the region on the fringes of our Universe reaches our telescopes, new Quasars seem to 'pop' into reality. But in reality, these Quasars always existed, its just that now we can perceive them.

From your post, I gathered that you think the disconnect is between the brain and the sensory input... I really cannot be convinced of this so far, can you prove this to me somehow?

P.S. How might a creature who knew every phenomena of space and time describe the universe? Would he give an inaccurate picture of the universe simply because he defined it in words?

 

[MeJennifer]

There is only one reality. Many perspectives. But ONE reality.

I disagree that this statement must be unquestionably true.

For example in the theory of relativity we cannot determine one reality, there are only perspectives. So how can we assert there is one reality?

I am not saying you are wrong, but it seems you state something you can not possibly prove and appears to be a statement of belief.

 

[AnssiH]

Well certainly I agree with this paragraph of your post. I see no reason to argue about which words we use to give semantic meaning to specific concepts such as 'red' colors. Any word will do fine, so long as it confines our observation of this 'red' color to a singular experience. By singular experience I mean that we can define a ~1eV photon as 'red' and a
~1.5eV photon as 'blue'. Of course we can change the names around, but so long as both names identify two separate experiences, they suffice perfectly. I think this sensed version of reality is identical to any observer independent reality. In both cases two photons exist, period. The properties of the photons do not change.

Yeah, the observation of photons is caused by something that exists, but the metaphysical reality of the photons is based on certain semantical assumptions about reality, and we don't know what the metaphysical reality of photons is. So I'm not saying that when we observe photons there is in fact "nothing there and our observation is just an illusion" or anything of that sort. I'm merely saying that we can never find out what are "the things that metaphysically exist", we can only postulate certain fundamentals so to come up with a description of a system that produces everything we observe, but there are bound to be an arbitrary number of radically different postulates about what exists. There already are many such postulates, albeit we can say some of them explain much less than the others. Like fundamentally expanding spacetime or electrons as spherical standing waves and what have you. Regardless of if you find these ideas moronic or not, they are good excercises in thinking about the philosophical aspects of metaphysics. For example:
http://www.estfound.org/philosophical.htm
Einstein's commentary at the page, about the completeness of general relativity is a sign of very healthy philosophy, and it applies to any scientific model.

There is only one reality. Many perspectives. But ONE reality.

Exactly. This is the fundamental notion of materialism. And I'm a materialist too. (And that's right Jennifer, it only applies to materialistic paradigm. Which is, after all is said and done, a statement of belief. In fact it is because of the way we understand reality that we can only make statements of belief; any statement is true only in so far that certain other statements in our worldview are true, but all of them are also assumptions. A self-supporting worldview is how we work, like I said before)

From your post, I gathered that you think the disconnect is between the brain and the sensory input... I really cannot be convinced of this so far, can you prove this to me somehow?

That's not what I'm trying to say. What I'm saying is referring to the way we understand, not to the way our senses measure reality.

Perhaps I better try this by asking a question; What is an object? The world seems to contain many individual things, like "apples". We recognize an apple by their familiar pattern hitting the cortex. Furthermore, apples are made of many other objects, like the peel and seeds, which are furthermore made of even simpler parts, etc... Also the apple is a part of larger objects, like an apple tree, or an apple farm.

But what really is in a metaphysical sense, an object? Is an apple a single entity? Or the apple farm? Is the water in a bowl an object? What about a shadow? What constitutes an identity of an object? What does it even mean to say that there exists objects? Is photon an object?

Thinking about these issues, it should become apparent that we classify reality into objects by the properties of some stable patterns that exist, but there is no sense in postulating that world really exists in forms of entities that have relationships between each others. What we call "identity" is more accurately just a case of "stability". World just is one big dynamic "thing" where some patterns are stable for longer periods of time than others, but this whole business of classifying such patterns into "objects" for the purpose of being able to assume certain persistent behaviour to such "objects", is simply the way reality is necessarily expressed in the brain. This is a physical necessity because this is the only way to actually predict something that has not yet happened. And this is why comprehending reality "as it is" is beyond thought.

P.S. How might a creature who knew every phenomena of space and time describe the universe? Would he give an inaccurate picture of the universe simply because he defined it in words?

Well, the whole assertion of "world is made of individual entities" is meaningless. Which doesn't mean "we are all the same" is correct either. We can probably one day make arbitrary number of arbitrarily accurate descriptions of reality, but there will be no way of choosing which one must be right, because they are necessarily descriptions of what "things" exist. So also the creature describing everything that ever happened would necessarily describe it in terms of entities and their relationships.

Even the assertion "I ate breakfast this morning" is wrong because I am asserting I am something with identity, that there is a magical "self" inside me that was there this morning and is still there now. There is no such identity to self, I am only a stable pattern and since I can be defined only by my cumulated worldview - which has changed since this morning - I am in fact a different being now than I was this morning. I could say that I am "changing into different being from every moment to the next", only this too is an assertion about what exists ("one being" and "moments"), and it is basically also incorrect assertion.

It is very important to understand these issues with QM, so to start looking at the world in form of "stable patterns" or "stable systems" instead of "objects". This is important when asking "what is a photon" or if the idea of particle-like existence of energy in the space between atoms is given at all. When someone asks "how do we know there are photons?", it is remarkably unthoughtful to say "because we have measured them". We have not measured a photon, we have just observed a stable pattern or behaviour in some system, and made certain assumptions about the metaphysical reality of that behaviour (assumed that it was caused by a photon). No one has ever seen a photon, and no one ever will. One can only make certain measurements and believe the results were caused by something we call "a photon". (And this says nothing about how accurate or inaccurate our concept of photons is, or how much it explains)

We make certain assumptions about what things exist (and how), and if our ideas about what exists are too inaccurate, we will "observe obscure behaviour". This is true for any system. I'm merely taking this one step further and saying that we can never know for sure which things "truly" exist. (I think we can make deterministic interpretations. In fact we can probably make quite a few different sorts of deterministic interpretations, just by postulating different fundamentals to exist. As a materialist I also believe world really is deterministic, btw)

 

[Chaos' lil bro Order]

I disagree that this statement must be unquestionably true.

For example in the theory of relativity we cannot determine one reality, there are only perspectives. So how can we assert there is one reality?

I am not saying you are wrong, but it seems you state something you can not possibly prove and appears to be a statement of belief.

Don't you see what I am getting at here in this post? There is only one underlying reality. This reality, very fortunately for us, can be objectively examined and its properties solved for by Math. Math is the universal language. Even if there were a dozen alien civilizations in the universe with a completely different set of senses from one another and their brains interpreted the underlying reality completely differently. These dozen alien civilizations could communicate what mathematical laws in the universe they have solved for so far.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Don't you see what I am getting at here in this post? There is only one underlying reality. This reality, very fortunately for us, can be objectively examined and its properties solved for by Math. Math is the universal language. Even if there were a dozen alien civilizations in the universe with a completely different set of senses from one another and their brains interpreted the underlying reality completely differently. These dozen alien civilizations could communicate what mathematical laws in the universe they have solved for so far.

Whatyou are getting at is that you ASSERT there is "one underlying reality". Where did you get this? What is your EVIDENCE for it? Is it your religion?

 

[Chaos' lil bro Order]

Do you know of any others selfAdjoint?