So equilibrium is the big picture in a very real sense.

[apeiron]

Many of the debates on this forum boil down to the relation between the possible and the actual. Are they the same size or is the realm of the possible larger than the realm of the actual?

We see this in arguments over whether maths (taken as a map of all possible worlds) is larger than all actual worlds. So does math = reality or is math > reality?

The same fundamental question arises with the many world interpretations of quantum theory, with multiverse approaches to cosmology, and with information theoretic approaches generally (as in Turing and Tegmark).

1) So is anything that is possible, also going to be actual? Why?

2) Or is there always going to be more that is possible than can be actual? Why.

3) The third choice of course is more things are actual than are possible. That at least seems a safe one to reject.

 

[vectorcube]

You need to be more clear:


Definitions:

Actual things := things that exist. Examples are tables, cars, plants etc.

Possible things := Things that are logically possible: Examples are "golden mountain", tables, chairs, plants etc.

Observations:
Note that actual things actually form a subset of all possible things.

Classical debate( you can read the link i provided below):

Non-actualist: The claim is that there are non-actual, possible things.

actualist : The claim is that there are only actual things. There are no possible things.

David Lewis on the classical debate:

Any many others( robert nozick, tagmark, lewis) say the following: All possible things are actual.


read: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism/

 

[vectorcube]

1) So is anything that is possible, also going to be actual? Why?

2) Or is there always going to be more that is possible than can be actual? Why.

3) The third choice of course is more things are actual than are possible. That at least seems a safe one to reject.

To your question:

1) you are asking if lewis ` s thesis is right( see post 2). Lewis gave the reason that it is more fruthful to accept his thesis becuase of the reduction of modal notions( necessities, and possibilities).

2) This is just the non-actualist view( see post 2). It is completely not relevant to lewis ` s thesis.

3) sure.

 

[apeiron]

Definitions:

Actual things := things that exist. Examples are tables, cars, plants etc.

Possible things := Things that are logically possible: Examples are "golden mountain", tables, chairs, plants etc.
Observations:

Note that actual things actually form a subset of all possible things.

So possible > actual according to this view.

And possibility then seems to be aligned with the idea of generality. The familiar dichotomy of particulars and universals. The universal harbours more possibility.

Agreed this feels the right way to go. But then we get into the difficulty of what is the set of all possible *general things*? Or Plato's realm of form in which there is one perfect example of every possible thing.

So is a particular table a subset of the general notion of tableness? And is tableness really a "general entity" or instead a "general organisation"? Is it in fact really a particular example of the even more abstract category of "furniture". And if we can keep on generalising our generals to move ever further up this chain, where will we arrive? Some single all encompassing form? If not, why not?

So your attempts here to define the question in terms of a process of generalisation, and being about thingness, are already running into serious problems.

You need now to define what you mean by things and by the process of generalisation.

Classical debate( you can read at link provided below):

Non-actualist: The claim is that there are non-actual, possible things.

actualist : The claim is that there are only actual things. There are no possible things.
David Lewis:

Any many others( robert nozick, tagmark, lewis) say the following: All possible things are actual.

read: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism/

Thanks for the link but was there some particular position you want to draw attention to here? Which variety of actualism for a start?

Anyway, the general actualist position would be possible = actual. And it founded on the (mis)assumption that the actual is all about substance. Only that which is concrete and material can claim existence. So aliens in other possible worlds are non-concrete particulars and so not actually possible. The immaterial idea does not qualify as being part of what gets counted.

Again this raises the status of forms and generalisations. Aliens are a generalisation (a generalised notion of lifeforms). So why would we not keep generalising further? How can we resolve this debate using aliens in other worlds as our substantive argument?

In fact, even "possible worlds" is smuggling in a substance based ontology. It appeals to material existence rather than formal.

The actualist camp is attempting to define possibilia in terms of particular objects (or lightly generalised objects). But have we yet ruled out form - organisation, relationships, pattern, purpose, meanings - as what is at least also potential, also a content of possibilia.

This connects with the INUS approach and others that stress the role of context in causality. Could Winston Churchill have been a german? Well, his parents could have moved there and given birth. But would he really have been "Winston Churchill"? Clearly, much of what we think of as the human that exists is really the locus of a particular historical context, a context with particular constraints.

So we do then have to be able to generalise the notion of context to answer questions about what is part of the possible. Is the space of possible contexts > or = to the space of actual contexts?

Difficulties proliferate. And the actualist vs non-actualist reference frame of discussion does not properly define the process of generalisation (how it is done, where it leads), nor does it pay enough attention to the issue of contexts (global constraints) or the putative actual existence of form.

 

[apeiron]

1) you are asking if lewis ` s thesis is right( see post 2). Lewis gave the reason that it is more fruthful to accept his thesis becuase of the reduction of modal notions( necessities, and possibilities).

If your choice is to defend Lewis, then you will have to supply arguments about how contexts and forms can also be reduced.

And are you thinking that reduction = generalisation? Do you view the terms synonymously?

 

[vectorcube]

So possible > actual according to this view.

what is > mean?

And possibility then seems to be aligned with the idea of generality. The familiar dichotomy of particulars and universals. The universal harbours more possibility.

I will not comment about universals, because this outside the topic.

Agreed this feels the right way to go. But then we get into the difficulty of what is the set of all possible *general things*? Or Plato's realm of form in which there is one perfect example of every possible thing.

No comment( outside topic).

So is a particular table a subset of the general notion of tableness? And is tableness really a "general entity" or instead a "general organisation"? Is it in fact really a particular example of the even more abstract category of "furniture". And if we can keep on generalising our generals to move ever further up this chain, where will we arrive? Some single all encompassing form? If not, why not?

So your attempts here to define the question in terms of a process of generalisation, and being about thingness, are already running into serious problems.

You need now to define what you mean by things and by the process of generalisation.

Nothing i said said here are controversial. They are a list of definitions you can find at the stanford link. I have no idea why you start talking about universal, particular, and "general things". You need to focus, or i cannot talk to you.

Thanks for the link but was there some particular position you want to draw attention to here? Which variety of actualism for a start?

No. They are just a list of definitions & classical positions from the stanford link.

Anyway, the general actualist position would be possible = actual. And it founded on the (mis)assumption that the actual is all about substance. Only that which is concrete and material can claim existence. So aliens in other possible worlds are non-concrete particulars and so not actually possible. The immaterial idea does not qualify as being part of what gets counted.

How is aliens in other possible world not concrete if those are concrete possible worlds?

Again this raises the status of forms and generalisations. Aliens are a generalisation (a generalised notion of lifeforms). So why would we not keep generalising further? How can we resolve this debate using aliens in other worlds as our substantive argument?

Why is aliens a generalization? If tomorrow, people found life on mars, then we would say these life-form are aliens. Why would we called them generalization?

In fact, even "possible worlds" is smuggling in a substance based ontology. It appeals to material existence rather than formal.

What is your definition of possible worlds? Are they concrete, or abstract?

The actualist camp is attempting to define possibilia in terms of particular objects (or lightly generalised objects). But have we yet ruled out form - organisation, relationships, pattern, purpose, meanings - as what is at least also potential, also a content of possibilia.

Give me an example for "meaning".

This connects with the INUS approach and others that stress the role of context in causality. Could Winston Churchill have been a german? Well, his parents could have moved there and given birth. But would he really have been "Winston Churchill"? Clearly, much of what we think of as the human that exists is really the locus of a particular historical context, a context with particular constraints.

What is this "INUS approach"?

So we do then have to be able to generalise the notion of context to answer questions about what is part of the possible. Is the space of possible contexts > or = to the space of actual contexts?

I have no idea what you mean by " space of possible contexts".

I will say that what is actual is a subset of what is possible, where possible and actual is defined in post 2.

Difficulties proliferate. And the actualist vs non-actualist reference frame of discussion does not properly define the process of generalisation (how it is done, where it leads), nor does it pay enough attention to the issue of contexts (global constraints) or the putative actual existence of form.

What do you mean by "process of generalization", and "putative actual existence of form"?

 

[vectorcube]

If your choice is to defend Lewis, then you will have to supply arguments about how contexts and forms can also be reduced.

And are you thinking that reduction = generalisation? Do you view the terms synonymously?

Lewis say that by accepting concrete possible worlds into are ontology, we can explain "possiblities", and "necessities" in terms of quantifications over possible worlds.

Do you know anything about modal logic?

Reduction, or reductive is just a fancy way of saying " explain away"

 

[apeiron]

Vectorcube, clearly you have no interest in serious discussion so perhaps just leave it to others.

 

[vectorcube]

Vectorcube, clearly you have no interest in serious discussion so perhaps just leave it to others.

In fact i am serious all along. I keep technical language to a minimum just so that i can have a decent discussion with a non-specialist.

As you can see. In all my replies to you, I have only asked for you to be clear, focus, and give examples. I am not used to unfocus discussions. Think of how you would write a book in analytic philosophy, or math. That is the amount of rigor i expect from you, or else, you cannot benefit me in anyway.

If i wrong you in anyway, then i apologize.

 

[apeiron]

I forgot to mention the superstring landscape as another possible vs actual issue in physics. So this is a very live problem.

People are polarised as to whether to expect the space of the possible to be immensely larger than the space of the actual, or whether to think all that is possible will actually, somewhere, have to happen.

In QM, this leads to rival interpretations like decoherence vs many worlds. In cosmology. it becomes multiverses vs the big bang as a single creation event.

Modal logic was a recent rather narrow discourse on the dichotomy of possibility~necessity and instructive mainly in its failures.

So, again, does the space of the possible = that of the actual, or is it >? Arguments rather than links please.

(Note the mysterious symbol > stands for "greater than" - as any handy eight-year-old math scholar will be able to tell you).

 

[Fra]

Many of the debates on this forum boil down to the relation between the possible and the actual. Are they the same size or is the realm of the possible larger than the realm of the actual?

I agree with this characteriztion of most discussions so far. I'll back later with my personal views on this, I have a particular view to this, that introduces a notion of "actual possibility" and this is the tools that should have shave off non-physical possibilities from physical models.

I'll try to explain later.

Like you mention already with string theory, there seems to be something pathological about the situation when we basically drown in the set of possibilities. This also connects to computability, inferrability and representation capacity.

The thing that isn't distinguished between in physics, in particular string theory to take an example is that what's possible is RELATIVE. What possible to imagine for a human is quite different that what's physically inferrable between say two subatomic systems. Once this is acknowledged, I think a lot of the mathematical redundancy we have can be reduced, and this makes our navigation in hypothesis space far more rational.

/Fredrik

 

[vectorcube]

I forgot to mention the superstring landscape as another possible vs actual issue in physics. So this is a very live problem.

People are polarised as to whether to expect the space of the possible to be immensely larger than the space of the actual, or whether to think all that is possible will actually, somewhere, have to happen.

In QM, this leads to rival interpretations like decoherence vs many worlds. In cosmology. it becomes multiverses vs the big bang as a single creation event.

Modal logic was a recent rather narrow discourse on the dichotomy of possibility~necessity and instructive mainly in its failures.

There are many errors here that i would not want to comment. Just want to say that the string landscape, QM worlds are not at all non-actual possible worlds. If they are true, then they are part of the actual world.

So, again, does the space of the possible = that of the actual, or is it >? Arguments rather than links please.

Well, that is lewis ` s thesis, and i gave you one of his reason. Namely, you can have a reductive explanation for primitive modality.

If don` t know, then you merely need to ask.

(Note the mysterious symbol > stands for "greater than" - as any handy eight-year-old math scholar will be able to tell you).

Are you sure it does not mean material implication?

 

[Fra]

Great to know, but what is the relevance?

Mmm... I wonder if we are misunderstanding each other here. We are in the philosophy forum, but the philosophy forum in the physicsfourms - so at least I am under the impression that we aren't discussing some pure philosophy or history of philosohpy in general, I thought we were discussing how this can be constructive specifically in the philosophy of science, and physics in particular.

Ie. the fundamental problem is that of learning about our world, a strategy for finding the best predictive engine for inferring the future based on the present, etc.

There are open questions here, this is why to a certain extent the discussion unavoidably are somewhat fuzzy. Different research programs can often be characterized by somewhat different positions on the questions we are discussing here. The string landscape is a good, relevant example IMHO.

/Fredrik

 

[vectorcube]

Mmm... I wonder if we are misunderstanding each other here. We are in the philosophy forum, but the philosophy forum in the physicsfourms - so at least I am under the impression that we aren't discussing some pure philosophy or history of philosohpy in general, I thought we were discussing how this can be constructive specifically in the philosophy of science, and physics in particular.

Ie. the fundamental problem is that of learning about our world, a strategy for finding the best predictive engine for inferring the future based on the present, etc.

There are open questions here, this is why to a certain extent the discussion unavoidably are somewhat fuzzy. Different research programs can often be characterized by somewhat different positions on the questions we are discussing here. The string landscape is a good, relevant example IMHO.

/Fredrik

Well, i made comments for that. The multiverse if true are not possible, non-actual things, but an actual thing.

 

[apeiron]

Well, i made comments for that. The multiverse if true are not possible, non-actual things, but an actual thing.

Statements are not arguments.

 

[vectorcube]

Statements are not arguments.

Ok.

1) If multiverse is real, then the multiverse is actual( by definition).

2) If multiverse is real, then it is logically possible, thus Possible( definition).


3) By 1 & 2, if the multiverse is real, then it is possible, and actual.

4) But anything is both actual and possible are part of the actual world.

5) 3 and 4 suggest that the multiverse is part of the actual world.

 

[apeiron]

Ok.

1) If multiverse is real, then the multiverse is actual( by definition).

2) If multiverse is real, then it is logically possible, thus Possible( definition).


3) By 1 & 2, if the multiverse is real, then it is possible, and actual.

4) But anything is both actual and possible are part of the actual world.

5) 3 and 4 suggest that the multiverse is part of the actual world.

Now what happens when you run string landscapes in this argument?

 

[vectorcube]

Now what happens when you run string landscapes in this argument?

The string landscapes is a multiverse if it is real. It would also part of the actual world. Many people that do not know **** about the matter often confuse multiverse in physics with the possible worlds in modal realism. They think it is the same thing. It is interesting, because if the string landscape is true, then it would only be part of the actual world. Modal realism is a much more general thesis than the multiverse think up by physicists.

 

[ConradDJ]

Definitions: Actual things := things that exist. Examples are tables, cars, plants etc.

Possible things := Things that are logically possible: Examples are golden mountain , tables, chairs, plants etc.

Observations: Note that actual things actually form a subset of all possible things.

Anyway, the general actualist position ... is founded on the (mis)assumption that the actual is all about substance. Only that which is concrete and material can claim existence...

In fact, even possible worlds is smuggling in a substance based ontology. It appeals to material existence rather than formal.

The actualist camp is attempting to define possibilia in terms of particular objects (or lightly generalised objects). But have we yet ruled out form - organisation, relationships, pattern, purpose, meanings...

Apeiron – I don’t think you’ve gotten to the basic ontological issue here. The problem here isn’t form vs substance – it’s whether possibility should be conceived from the beginning in terms of what’s actual.

“Actual” essentially means, what’s given – i.e. what we can take for granted in the world. And from this we can develop various notions of possibility, i.e. what’s not actually given, in reality, but might in some sense be given... logically, or in the future, or in a realm of pure mathematical form, or an alternative cosmos, etc.

There’s nothing wrong with that, but I don’t think we’ll find much that’s interesting to explore down this well-trodden path... because the key issue is not being considered. It’s already been implicitly resolved in favor of what’s given... whether "givenness" is conceived as form or material substance, etc.

We only get to the real issue of possibility when we ask how things are “given” – where does “what’s actual” come from? As you know, the traditional idea – “causality” in its many forms – is that what’s given comes from something that was given previously (“initial conditions”), and on what’s ultimately given (e.g. “laws of physics” or “principles of logic”). The given actuality is taken as fundamental, and possibility as merely a derivative notion.

Now it’s easy to assume that something must just be “given” at the bottom of things – i.e. there must be something we just have to take for granted. Back to the earliest philosophers, the goal of philosophy and science has always been to identify this ultimately given reality. But going almost as far back, in our tradition, is the sense that there’s something else going on, in the dynamics of how things come into being, that shouldn’t be taken for granted.

I know you are very alive to this undercurrent in the intellectual tradition – at least, that’s how I understand your going back to Anaximander’s apeiron and your description of what’s ultimately given as “vagueness” or “pure potentiality”, in other threads. To me, this kind of language points to a deep challenge that philosophy has yet to meet. Essentially, we want to describe a world in which how things become possible is at least as fundamental as what they actually are, as given fact.

Now we already have, in evolutionary biology, a well-established science that works in these terms. Practically speaking, in biology “causation” has been entirely replaced by the notion of the conditions under which random accident can give rise to complex structure. And there are many indications that a similar approach is needed in physics and cosmology. But IMHO, philosophy has lagged behind. Heidegger made a strong beginning in Being and Time, but since then there’s been little or no progress toward an ontology in which the structure of possibility plays a fundamental role.

You’ve been eloquent in other threads on the “anticipatory” nature of conscious awareness – which was also a central theme in Being and Time. We can be conscious of “what’s actually there” in the world around us, because our brains are constantly projecting “what might be there” in advance. So in a sense, our deepest layer of experience is “made of” possibility – as opposed to the traditional data-processing model of awareness.

I think of existence as a dialectic between possibility and actuality, each with their own distinct structures. Things can only become actual in a context of relationships that makes that actuality possible; and then what they actually become makes new relationship-contexts possible. “Possibility” in this sense is very different from “logical” possibility – it’s a fundamental aspect of the complex concreteness of what happens in this world as it evolves.

 

[vectorcube]

We only get to the real issue of possibility when we ask how things are “given” – where does “what’s actual” come from? As you know, the traditional idea – “causality” in its many forms – is that what’s given comes from something that was given previously (“initial conditions”), and on what’s ultimately given (e.g. “laws of physics” or “principles of logic”). The given actuality is taken as fundamental, and possibility as merely a derivative notion.

What has this to do with logical possibilities?

You’ve been eloquent in other threads on the “anticipatory” nature of conscious awareness – which was also a central theme in Being and Time. We can be conscious of “what’s actually there” in the world around us, because our brains are constantly projecting “what might be there” in advance. So in a sense, our deepest layer of experience is “made of” possibility – as opposed to the traditional data-processing model of awareness.

Not ture. Something might be a priori, but false, because it is a posteriori necessary true.
If you don` t understand, then you merely need to ask.

 

[apeiron]

Apeiron – I don’t think you’ve gotten to the basic ontological issue here. The problem here isn’t form vs substance – it’s whether possibility should be conceived from the beginning in terms of what’s actual.
.

I agree with pretty much everything you say. I would indeed redefine the possible (usually taken to mean logically crisp variety) in terms of a vagueness, a pure potential.

But substance and form are useful to focus on here as they are both generalisations - in complementary directions - which emerge together out of vagueness. As you say, we want to look at what comes out, what is real around us, then infer something about the initial conditions of reality. And if we find a world sharply divided by the dichotomy, the asymmetry of substance and form, then working backwards to the vague beginnings, substance and form will eventually blur back into the same foggy state of nothingness/everythingness that is just a simple potential.

So this is the modern reductionist story vs the vagueness-based alternative.

1) crisp local variety (a collection of atomistic microstates) => emergent macrostates

2) vagueness (a symmetric mix of micro and macro potential) => the dichotomised reality of local substance~global form.

Modal logic would be an example of a discourse which adopts the first formula and so cannot "see" the second.

So how does 2) fit with the question I originally posed?

Is the space of the possible larger than, or equal to, the space of the actual?

You can see that with 1), we are trying to answer things by counting microstates (even if in many worlds and multiverses and stringscapes, we seem to be treating whole worlds as microstates). Which is where things really start to get illogical. In what way can worlds be countable microstates? The premise basic to the modal logic argument is philosophically flawed.

But with 2), the space of the possible is both unbounded (limiteless) and also smaller in some useful sense. The vague is just one kind of thing (so less than the two kinds of things - like substance and form which can separate off from it). Yet it is still larger in the sense that all is still possible (which is no longer true once some dichotomised state becomes crisply actual).

In biology, a seed could grow into a tree with an infinite variety of branching patterns. But once a tree has grown, it is stuck with its history of branching. So were those microstates actually "in" the seed as countable variety. Or were they just a smear of vague potential?

These are frontier questions in philosophy - for philosophers who are responding to the advances in physics, biology and branches of math like chaos theory and dissipative systems.

Anyway, you are very correct in saying this is an anthropic and observer-including approach to possibility and initial conditions thinking.

We have to look at what exists/persists around us - deal with what seems actual - and then project back, generalise, to gain some model of reality's causal origins. This is actually a constraint on our philosophising.

We should imagine no more possibility than what is required to generate our perceptible reality!

So we want to make the actual = the possible. We want a conservation of what exists. A first law of causality. Yet we also need to leave room for the fact of development, a second law of causality in which there is an arrow of time, a direction things go.

So we also want fundamentally to be able to say that possible > actual. That there is an "entropic" slope down which things can run so that change is also natural to the world.

This is the kind of subtlety of thought that is quite beyond academic philosophers still stuck in Newtonian modes of modelling. They have yet to catch up with the second law of thermodynamics. But it has been an issue for decades among my friends who are theoretical biologists for example.

Anyway, we now have a more complex view emerging.

We want the actual to equal the possible in the sense that whatever emerges must be quantitatively a match for what was originally there. If our theory of existence exhibits a principle of conservation, then we know that it is "good". There is a deep reason for requiring our notions of causal origination to show a conservation in some fashion.

But we also must require that our fundamental model has the possibility for change, for development, for qualitative difference. So there must also be some version of a second law, and entropic slope, wired into the causal model, the logic that we think underpins reality as a whole.

The space of the possible is then neither really large nor smaller than the space of the actual. It is larger in having more that is potential. And smaller in being undiffentiated and so not yet separated in at least two directions. Which is where we can see that neither > nor < are symbols that really serve our purpose here. Instead, we may begin to see more deeply what a vagueness actually is. A realm where both larger and smaller have lost their difference, lost their distinction. A realm which is both, and thus neither.

I think of existence as a dialectic between possibility and actuality, each with their own distinct structures. Things can only become actual in a context of relationships that makes that actuality possible; and then what they actually become makes new relationship-contexts possible. “Possibility” in this sense is very different from “logical” possibility – it’s a fundamental aspect of the complex concreteness of what happens in this world as it evolves.

Logical possibility is about the atomisation of form. Seeing reality reduced to information or microstates. This is a useful way to model things because it is simpler. But it relies on us humans filling in the background with our own understandings about observers, contexts, histories, anticipations, etc. The equally crucial stuff that gets left out of the formal model based on crisp local variety - atoms, information, events, possibilities, trajectories.

So ultimately, what gets left out of the conventional modelling becomes mysterious to people.

We have to go back and fix things by including both the local and the global, the substance and the form, the stasis and the change, in the modelling - even the modelling of logic or causality. Or rather, especially in our logic/causal models.

 

[Fra]

To the original topic here is my personal take on it.

After some thought I decided to skip writing a lenghty lineout of my own general reasoning and instead do a simplified comment and just jump right at the point and project my own thinking onto the terms you are discussing, although it might not be my own choice of terms.

This is how I see it:

- To me, both actuals and possibilities are observer dependent.
- The distinguishable actuals for one observer is the things this observer thinks are facts, or limiting cases of distinguishable possibilities where a highly probable possibility is simly indisitinguishable from a fact (note that this doesn't mean the it's universally or eternally true)
- The observers action follows from a rational action conjecture, from the observers facts and possibilities. So the facts and possibilities then get predictable consequences, it's not only metaphysical notions, the physical action is constructed from this fact/possibilitie system (I call this system the observers system of microstructures).

So in my view, in a certain sense all possibilities are actual, BUT the key points are:

Both actuals and possibilities are constrained by the observers complexity, this is why there is no such thing as a mathematical infinity of possibilities. Or rather THIS "mathematical possibility" is not something that influences the ACTION. Only the distinguishable actual possibilities influence a systems action. This is the way I envision that this idea is going to make a difference to real modelling.

There is always and observer, and it's environment. The observers own structure are the actuals, and the unknown environment are only "possibilities" in the observers microstructure. This is what I mean with "actual possibilities". The difference between a possibility and an actuality, is like the difference (in my view) between a possibility and a fact. And when the uncertainty of a possibility is indistinguishable, it's indistinguishable from a fact, form the inside view. But even a fact can later need to be revised, because there are no timeless facts for the reason that there is no physical infernece system, that can make a certain timeless 100% inference (deduction).

This is why "logical possibilities" to me doesn't refer to deductive logic, the refer to a more geneeral inference, the closes choice is inductive inference/logic.

So the notion of ACTION is what connects actuality and possibility in my view.

/Fredrik

 

[vectorcube]

I agree with pretty much everything you say. I would indeed redefine the possible (usually taken to mean logically crisp variety) in terms of a vagueness, a pure potential.

That is confusing for me, because "possible" means "logically possible". I have no what "vagueness, a pure potential" mean.

To me, both actuals and possibilities are observer dependent

How about some examples?

 

[Fra]

To me, both actuals and possibilities are observer dependent

How about some examples?

To take a human example, the actuals are the facts that this human has inferred from interaction with it's own environment throughout it's history. Ie. it is from experience we have come to the conclusion that there are regularities and not yet questionable facts about nature. For example one could think that knowledge of the laws of nature are such actuals. But konwledge of this law is implicitly encoded in the state of this human.

Thus the actuals for a human is what this human has inferred to be pretty much correct. It's somehow part of this humans rational beleifs.

It's not hard to imagine that two humans that have totally different experience, that has grown up/evolved in different environments, would come to completely different sets of actuals.

So the actuals are dependent.

However, these actuals insufficient to deduce the future perfectly, they only provide a basis for guessing the future, and acting as a guide. So the possibilities are induced from the encoded actuals, inductively determines the observers actions.

Also another prediction is that when two observers that are in disagreement upon actuals are put in contact, an interaction force appears that forces them to negotiate and equilibrate. This conceptually explains why the world is coherent and everyone (effectively) agrees upon actuals at some level (physical law), although at the more basal level there is not consistency hardcoded. It's an emergent consistency simply because the non-consistent version is not stable, it would self-decompose into consistency, and it's just a matter of timescales.

To take anothre simplified human example, consider a poker game. The rational player conjecture assumes that each player makes his moves (action) as per his own optimal inference. So the action of the othre players depend on what they know, or what they think they know about what the othre players know. Part of the game becomes not only to choose your own cards, rather an important part of the game is to try to guess what you think the actions of all other players are. This gets predictable consqeuences for such a game. Similar idea are used to mode economical systems.

Of course, it's not possible to tell exactly what the optimal inference to the inside observer is, but it's enough to CONSTRAIN the probable options, and to place your own bets more wisely.

A physical example would be two subatomic systems interaction. When you evaluation the feymann path integral for the action, the choice of the structure of paths to be summed are quite important. By simply postulating the structure of possibilities at will, you can pretty much get any result you like. It's also the common problem in physics that these integrals leads to absurdities, like infinites. Apparently this is a sign of the fact that the space of possibilities used in the evaluation of the action contains non-physical redundancies, and this is the core of the problem.

This is work in progress so don't expect me to solve all the open problems of physics in this thread but the idea is that once you acknowledge tht the action is relative, this constrains the set of PHYSICAL paths in the feymann integral. My idea is that these constrains come from the complexity of the observing system (realising the action), and this is expected to loosely related to it's mass. This means tha the proper "normalisation" must be implemented properly from start. Once you let the redundancies in, you loose track of how to remove them since there is a large ambigouity in renormalisation. There are different mathematical ways to renormalize away infinites but they all give different reuslts. The question is of course, which results that correspond to reality.

So the phsyical example still says that the actuals are system dependent, because it is subject to inferrability or observability, and the context - the inference system / the observer - obviously matters here. Moreover a given set of information, yields different distinguishable set of possibilities, also constrained by the observers complexity.

In particle physics the action, is usually formulated relative to a very specific context. It's the laboratory frame, where the particle accelerator etc are all included. Basically the entire environment of the collision domain, including preparation phases.

What I'm suggesting that we should look for, is the inside view of these things. This will I think lead to new insights of the makeup and hierarchies of interactions and particles.

I don't have all the answers but this suggest a direction for further research. A direction that is previously neglected. There are some various new ideas coming up. Smolin is tangenting this, this is why I think some things he says should be taken seriously. But there are also others, working on inside views (Olaf Dreyer) and also physics from inference (Ariel Caticha).

I am working on a combination of physics from inference + evolving law + inside views

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

That is confusing for me, because "possible" means "logically possible".

I can buy this phrasing.

But then what I mean with them beeing observer-dependent or relative. Ie. the possibilities are RELATIVE to the choice of logical inference system. Moreover do I suggest that the logical system iteself evolves.

I think you think of logic as some external universally valid mathematics, that can always be applied. This is where we differ I think. I think this eternal reference is the root of several problems.

The alternative is evolving logic systems. and nature then consists of several interacting logical systems, and the question of physical law then becomes that of the population of inference systems in nature. The common DNA of these inference systems then correspond to an effective laws. The variation of the inference systems implies a specific set of interactions.

/Fredrik

 

[apeiron]

Also another prediction is that when two observers that are in disagreement upon actuals are put in contact, an interaction force appears that forces them to negotiate and equilibrate.
/Fredrik

But when has this ever happened on physics forums? :rofl:

Anyway, I think it is right to generalise the idea of observation with that of constraint. Observers impose constraints on a situation. So with a wavefunction, it represents a range of possibilities. Then observation collapses the wavefunction. Constraints are imposed which reduce the degrees of freedom. And the same is happening in a poker game. The space of what is possibly going to happen becomes constrained during play.

Though that still leaves the possibility of local constructive actions. By definition, the remaining avenues of action that cannot be observed are then left free to happen. It is like inertia. If nothing is stopping the motion, then it keeps going. This is the element of chance or indeterminism in QM, poker, etc. Possibility gets constrained. Then the unobserved becomes the free actions which can be expressed locally.

But I think this then conflicts with your view as it puts the observer always outside, always more global. From the outside, you can exert constraint. And then by definition, there is an unobserved interior which acts freely and unconstrained. It constructs some further action out of that interior potential.

 

[Fra]

But when has this ever happened on physics forums? :rofl:

Good point :) Anyway, to take that objection seriously, there are cases where the equilibration doesn't take place, but then usually a consensus of the disagreement should take place - ie we agree to disagree, resulting in a "stable inconsistency". And this level of agreement then corresponds to the symmetry that restores objectivity in despite of the subjective views.

This is how I envision the explanation of the interactions of the standard model. They arise due to the systems interacting have different views (broken symmetry).

What I think we need to work on understanding is why certain symmetries are maintained as "locally" broken in nature. Somehow symmetries are only interesting to the exten that are in fact broken, otherwise they become "trivial". I think this framework suggest possible interesting ways to attack that problem.

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

I think some of our disagreements here are because this is only brief discussions. It's extremely tedious to write in detail everything. Also this is still in progress so bare with me.

But I think this then conflicts with your view as it puts the observer always outside, always more global. From the outside, you can exert constraint. And then by definition, there is an unobserved interior which acts freely and unconstrained. It constructs some further action out of that interior potential.

I claim there is no real conflict, my exposition here is unavoidably limited. But you have a poitn that there is no stable fixed deductive logical system here. But this observation is not a flaw, it defines the flow of the evolving inference system in my view. It's where time comes in.

The constraints I talk about are not external constraints, they are constraints attached to a particular inside view (an observer). This observer does not konw any external constraints, however it would respond to them, but evolving his own inference system. But this evolution is not something the inside observer can predict. So here are a source of "randomness".

/Fredirk

 

[Fra]

Apeiron, if it's just between me and you, I think we concluded before that we are reasonably tuned. The remaining lack of clarity is I think because we have have to take this to the next level and suggest a new mathematical framework for physics and see that it is superior that the old one.

Exactly how it will look we will see, but I *think* that we both more or less seek something similar.

My main arguments here aren't against you. It's to try to motivate the evolutionary reasoning to others and show that there is a coherent line of thought behind it, it's not just a "anything goes" attitude.

/Fredrik

 

[apeiron]

Modal realism is a much more general thesis than the multiverse think up by physicists.

The question here is whether possibilities have constrained or unconstrained existence. Is everything that is possible also actual, or is reality a selection process that reduces the space of the possible to a smaller space of what is actual.

Examples of selection processes here would be Feynman integrals, Darwinian evolution, phase transitions. A self-organisation is imposed on prior freedoms.

Lewis's modal realism is one of those crank ideas that is impossible to refute in its own terms and dazzles impressionable kids. It is not a philosophically useful notion in this discussion.

An essential aspect of the multiverse hypothesis is that it posits a realm of universes which are all in causal connection - even if it is just the tiny initial branching instant of the big bang. Even the many worlds approach of QM has connection between the worlds, before they branch.

But Lewis just suggests an infinite collection of unconnected logically possible, so therefore separately actual, worlds.

There are no connections between worlds so constraint does not come into it. Though Lewis would be mute about why the same, or even similar, laws would prevail across his infinite collection.

The multiverse is a thesis. Even if tests of the thesis may be physically impractical for us.

Lewis's contrived version of modal logic is not a thesis as it explains nothing. It is untestable by definition.

 

[apeiron]

My main arguments here aren't against you. It's to try to motivate the evolutionary reasoning to others and show that there is a coherent line of thought behind it, it's not just a "anything goes" attitude.
/Fredrik

You correctly argue the ideas rather than the person. That is obvious.

I still feel a flaw in your approach is this strong urge to locate observers.

It seems the natural thing to do as humans are supposed to be the cannonical observers and meaning makers. And we are pretty located as minds. We look outwards to the wide world.

But to generalise the notion of observation as a physical one, I think we have to expand the local in the direction of the maximally global.

This is the semiotic approach. Observation becomes something happening "everywhere" in the system, in the universe (and now only the most local, or the supra-global, can escape this constraining gaze).

Your approach is Peircean in moving from vague possibility to concrete dyadic interactions. But then there is the third step of a sum over a whole space of such dyads, such acts of information equilibration.

 

[Fra]

I still feel a flaw in your approach is this strong urge to locate observers.

Ok I think I see what you mean, but I think you are assuming something that I don't do.

I have not really explained my position here in detail. Sometimes you have to use some words, like local. But in my view space is emergent relative to the observer. And to a given observer "local" pretty much conincides with what is "actual". Ie. the distance measure we are talking about here is rather defined in terms of deviation from what's known. The space construction in my view by construction puts the priors of one observers at the center in the sense that any observers sees himself as "the center of the universe". The possibilities defines a kind of hypothesis space, where the distances are defined by means of information divergence, a bit like information geometry, but not quite.

So the localisation of OTHER observers relative to the self, is sort of a measure of the expected disagreement. The distance between two observer, is a measure of the amount of information that needs to be changed to bring them in agreement.

I am not assuming the existence of a 4D spacetime. So the entire notion of locality and location is of course much more complex. I didn't attempt to explain any of this in this thread. It's probably a topic on it's own.

The fact that different observers, sees their own spacetime, can also be reformulated by a third observer so that they exist in a common spacetime, but where forcing their views relative to a common spacetime, instead implies physical interactions like distorsions of spacetime.

/Fredrik

 

[ConradDJ]

As to “logical possibility” – I’m not sure what to make of that. Does it just refer to what a certain person is capable of imagining? – like “golden mountain”. You take certain aspects of your actual experience and rearrange them to produce something counterfactual? Anyhow that’s what I meant by calling it “derivative”. Usually, I think, to say something is “logically possible” implies that it is not in fact possible, at least not here and now.

In any case, to me the significant issue is what’s really possible, in some given situation. In this sense, possibility is something that changes, as the actual situation changes. What is possible at one moment may not be remotely possible in the next.

We’re used to thinking about the world as a set of facts, and thinking about how the facts change, over time – in classical physics, for example. We don’t have well-developed concepts for describing possibility-structures or understanding how they change. But quantum physics gives us at least an example of a description that includes both possibility (wave-function) and actuality (preparation, measurement) as distinct components.

I think the basic picture is – in a given situation, there is a certain structure of possibilities; and then, through some sort of interaction, a subset of these possibilities gets selected as “actually happening”. That narrows down the scope of possibility – many events that might have happened, may now have become forever impossible. At the same time, the narrowing of possibility makes what can happen in the future more specific – new information has been added, new facts have been established, once and for all. On the basis of these facts, this new situation, new possibilities can arise that may never have been possible before.

So I agree –

The space of the possible is then neither really large nor smaller than the space of the actual. It is larger in having more that is potential. And smaller in being undiffentiated...

And as to this question –

In biology, a seed could grow into a tree with an infinite variety of branching patterns. But once a tree has grown, it is stuck with its history of branching. So were those microstates actually "in" the seed as countable variety. Or were they just a smear of vague potential?

I don’t necessarily think of possibility-structures as consisting of well-defined “microstates” – but in any case, counting alternative states is generally not sufficient to describe how the possibilities relate to each other. Depending on the situation, some may be more probable than others, and some may be more or less compatible with others. In QM, for example, the wave function describes a complex mathematical “shape” of possibilities that changes over time in predictable ways. And when a measurement “collapses” the wave function, it never produces a single, factual state, but rather changes the shape of the possibility-structure. If you measure the position of a particle, you narrow down the range of possible positions, at a certain moment, and at the same time broaden the range of its possible momentum-states.

Likewise in evolutionary biology, gene frequency is a significant measure, but certainly not a complete description of the possibility-structure represented by a species' gene-pool in a specific environment.

 

[ConradDJ]

I still feel a flaw in your approach is this strong urge to locate observers.

It seems the natural thing to do as humans are supposed to be the cannonical observers and meaning makers. And we are pretty located as minds. We look outwards to the wide world.

But to generalise the notion of observation as a physical one, I think we have to expand the local in the direction of the maximally global.

This is the semiotic approach. Observation becomes something happening "everywhere" in the system, in the universe (and now only the most local, or the supra-global, can escape this constraining gaze).

Your approach is Peircean in moving from vague possibility to concrete dyadic interactions. But then there is the third step of a sum over a whole space of such dyads, such acts of information equilibration.

I think I'm more on Fredrik's side in this respect. I’m not yet clear about what his scenario of “inference” and “action” might eventually look like in connection with physics... but I think he’s very much on the right track in trying to conceptualize physics from a local standpoint, inside the web of ongoing real-time relationships.

It’s true that another perspective is also needed. Even though the only world anyone or anything can actually “experience” is its own local world, from its own point of view in the moment, what “experience” does is to connect us with other beings, in interaction that goes both ways. So in some sense we do need to “transcend” our own perspective, to conceptualize the world beyond the here and now of our experience.

But I think the traditional way of doing this – leaping to a “global” perspective, “seeing” the world from no point of view – fails to illuminate what’s really going on. On the contrary, I think it has a built-in tendency to objectify the world, to treat it as something that exists in itself over time. Not that this “objective” view is wrong, but I don’t think it gets to what’s fundamental in the relationship-structure of the world.

I tend to think of the“Peircean” approach you describe as neo-Hegelian – in that it interprets the world in terms of dynamic relationships between ideas (e.g. “form” / “substance”). I’m trying to find the right language to understand what happens in dynamic relationships between individual things, between people, or between atoms... physical and communicative relationships, rather than what seem to me metaphysical ones. So I trust your philosophical intuition, and I think you have a very clear notion of the conceptual challenges we face, at this point -- and you’re developing this kind of language to respond to it. But I’m having a hard time buying into the language itself.

I think the way to go here is maybe not from the “local” to the “supra-global”... maybe instead, from the standpoint of an isolated observer looking out at the universe, to the concept of one point of view participating in communicative relationships with other points of view. Moving from “subjective” to “inter-subjective”, rather than to a viewpoint that stands outside the world altogether.

 

[apeiron]

So the localisation of OTHER observers relative to the self, is sort of a measure of the expected disagreement. The distance between two observer, is a measure of the amount of information that needs to be changed to bring them in agreement. /Fredrik

OK, sounds more like my kind of thinking again. We could say the world, following the second law, wants to be "flat" - equilibrating its information, its differences, its geometric wrinkles through cooling/expansion.

So particles, which are hot to various degrees, are observers. When they "catch sight of each other", there is a change of energy exchange/deflection/attraction. On average, the differences are constrained or smoothed away.

The vacuum itself becomes the unobserved. It is too flat, too cool, for interactions. There is virtual activity of course. But this is sub-threshold, inside the Planckian limit for an approach to thermal and geometric flatness.

It is a way of thinking that seems to remove the need for inflation - the universe through mutual constraint becomes self-flattening.

It also seems to lead to dark energy. Inside the Planckian limit, there is still a residual free (because unobserved) action, a cosmological creep.

Is this part of your scheme too?