Evaluating Scientific Experiments: Has the Standard of Proof Shifted?

[WaveJumper]

But that's the question I'm asking. Is it a limit of our ability to know, or is it simply the case physically. I don't think the two are necessarily mutually exclusive. There could very well be a physical explanation for why we we can or can't know things, such as:

"Does the uncertainty principle say that we can't know a particles position and velocity with precision or does it say the particle doesn't have position or velocity in the way we think of position and velocity?"

Would you rather believe that as you were typing that post, there existed another you that would later fall asleep on the computer, plus another you whose computer would catch fire fire, plus another you who would make 23 typos in the above post, plus another you who would type some stupidity and get banned, etc. etc...? If you insist on realism, this is what you get(electrons spinning left and right at the same time, dead and alive cats, etc.). Then you have to make clear what happened with the 'you' who got banned, who fell asleep, etc.
Or perhaps, another assumption of ours is wrong - that our reasoning can describe reality. I cannot prove that we are not reaching the limit of our abilities to imagine(to get the 'picture' behind the event, as Einstein liked to say; maybe there is simply no picture). It's no coincidence philosophers are being invited on physics gatherings discussing similar foundational issues.

 

[JoeDawg]

I'm not part of the epistemology vs. ontological argument. I'm not familiar with the terms.

Ontology is the study of what exists and how it exists.
What is gravity?

When Newton described gravity with an equation, he simply formulated a description of what gravity does. Einstein went further, beyond a simple formula description, and defined it as the 'curvature of space'. The former is an ontological description of gravity, the latter is an ontological explanation of gravity.
Scientists often prefer to stick with description and data, because 'explanation' is equated with interpretation which can be very subjective. Interpretations can be useful too though.

I don't see how questioning an idea like inherent resolution is removed from this...

I guess it depends what you mean by inherent, its a loaded word. If its a property of an external thing, part of the object, like what atomic number describes, rather than color, then you are talking about ontology. Color would be an example of phenomenology, or 'perception of the world'.

Epistemology, is the study of knowledge, or what is True.
In classical times, True, with emphasis on the capital T was about what was absolutely True, as in the god-defined essense of something. But since we don't usually get access to gods, finding out what was True had to be done another way. The ancients believed that geometry and logic could show us Truth. Math was regular, precise, and predictable, while real life was chaotic. So they used the best tool they had.

Science makes no such claims to Truth in the absolute sense. Its about belief founded on evidence (inductive logic). So science deals with truth of a sort, but its not absolute or certain, it is probable.

Descartes was looking for certainty, something deductive, to refute the skeptics who doubted everything. Cogito Ergo Sum was that logical solution. The more modern way of looking for truth is using inductive and deductive logic, science and math together.

Certainty, can be attained through logical/mathematical proof, but deductive logic is limited by its premises. And deductive logic is derived from human understanding of causation.

This becomes problematic on the quantum level, because causation appears to work differently there, as in non-locality. A different kind of logic must be invented to deal with it.

But that's the question I'm asking. Is it a limit of our ability to know, or is it simply the case physically. I don't think the two are necessarily mutually exclusive. There could very well be a physical explanation for why we we can or can't know things, such as:

That's really a different usage of the word 'know'. Are we capable of knowing the position and velocity of a particle. In terms of scientific epistemology both are 'knowable' as an approximation, but not absolutely. The problem is we can't measure one without affecting the other.

"Does the uncertainty principle say that we can't know a particles position and velocity with precision or does it say the particle doesn't have position or velocity in the way we think of position and velocity?"

This is not a question of knowledge, its a question of how particles exist. Replace 'know' with 'measure' and I think it removes the confusion.

A question about knowledge would be: Does measuring a particle's velocity tell us something true about the particle?

 

[Pythagorean]

I guess it depends what you mean by inherent, its a loaded word. If its a property of an external thing, part of the object, like what atomic number describes, rather than color, then you are talking about ontology. Color would be an example of phenomenology, or 'perception of the world'.

Inherent, as in, there's no way around it. I assume our a model of physical reality is a result of our interactions with what is "True". Because we interact with this base reality (even when we observe) there is a limit to what we can ever possibly know because we always somehow "disturb the experiment" when we make observations. To me, the epistemological question is answered with the help of ontology. I don't see how they're mutually exclusive.

That's really a different usage of the word 'know'. Are we capable of knowing the position and velocity of a particle. In terms of scientific epistemology both are 'knowable' as an approximation, but not absolutely. The problem is we can't measure one without affecting the other.

I don't know of any observation we can make without affecting the experiment. We may not affect it significantly for our ontological question in every case (where we can approximate) but we seem to be effecting it significantly for the epistemological question, since (it seems) approximations won't do. (Note: this is not the case with the uncertainty principle. The uncertainty principle affects both the ontological and epistemological question imo).

A question about knowledge would be: Does measuring a particle's velocity tell us something true about the particle?

That question can be answered by the answer to my question. But I'm not sure of your definition of true. I've presented mine as the thing we interact with that leads us to our physical observations. I usually call it reality. And I think we have a very skewed perception of it: we are limited to knowing only how it interacts with us, which we discover in an ontological way).

 

[apeiron]

To me, the epistemological question is answered with the help of ontology. I don't see how they're mutually exclusive.

Of course, they are not. Which is why we are pragmatic scientists rather than rationalist philosophers at the end of the day. Best knowledge in each should inform the other. Which is why modern epistemology has to be up to date with modern mind science. Among other things, like QM and systems theory.

Ultimately, I think the goal ought to be to reduce epistemology to ontology. So the way humans know worlds ought to be generalised to observers and the observed generally.

Which is what Peircean semiotics, Rosen's modelling relations and Pattee's epistemic cut are all about, for instance.

 

[apeiron]

for example...

For Peirce, perceptual facts at their very primordial core emerge neither from mind alone nor from the dynamic reality of the universe alone, but rather from the interaction of the two which constitutes experience.

http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/perros.htm

 

[JoeDawg]

Inherent, as in, there's no way around it. I assume our a model of physical reality is a result of our interactions with what is "True".

Truth describes what exists. A scientific 'theory of knowledge' goes something like this...

There exists a world external to me, and through my interactions with it, I can create a model that accurately describes it.

But what if that 'assumption' is wrong. What if everything I experience is a virtual reality that is a complete lie, perpetrated on me by some evil intelligence? Now, that is somewhat paranoid, but if it is the case, everything I think I know about the 'external world' is a lie. So that model I have created is based on a world that does not exist. So how could that model tell me anything that is true?

You are correct, if the world exists, and if I can interact with it in a way that allows me to model it, then I can call what I learn about it... approximately true. But if the world is a lie, and/or I don't have the ability to model it, then science is a waste of time, it won't tell me anything that is even close to true.

So, before you can start talking about what exists, you have to have a theory of how you can know anything.

That question can be answered by the answer to my question. But I'm not sure of your definition of true. I've presented mine as the thing we interact with that leads us to our physical observations.

Truth is descriptive. Its a value judgement, it is part of epistemology.
What you describe as true is what Kant called the 'thinginitself', or what exists.
It would be the 'source of truth'.

I usually call it reality.

That can get confusing. Many philosophers refer to 'reality' as what is 'experienced', as opposed to what exists.

we are limited to knowing only how it interacts with us, which we discover in an ontological way.

Yes, once you assume you can gain knowledge of what exists by interaction with existense, then you can modify, or enhance, your theory of knowledge accordingly. But first you must have a theory of knowledge that includes the idea that you can gain knowledge in this way.

Modern science is based on a combination of rational (knowledge gained through logic) and empirical(knowledge gained through observation) 'theories of knowledge' (epistemologies.)

 

[Pythagorean]

But what if that 'assumption' is wrong. What if everything I experience is a virtual reality that is a complete lie, perpetrated on me by some evil intelligence?

But "everything you experience", "virtual reality", "complete lie", and "perpetrated on you by some evil intelligence" are all things that you learned from your allegedly fake experience. If your "experience" is a "complete lie" those terms wouldn't have meaning either. What would your lie be modeled off of?

 

[JoeDawg]

What would your lie be modeled off of?

The whim or plan of a evil demon...

You have to understand, I'm not claiming this is true. The universe seems nominally consistent, but faulty premises lead to faulty results. Its a thought experiment designed to define the 'starting point', the foundation for all knowledge.

Knowledge has a very different meaning in science, than it does both generally, and historically, so its a non-trivial question. Its fine to say that a naturalistic view of the world is useful, but one can have a theory that is useful in a given situation, but not actually accurately descriptive of that situation.

So ideally, with regards to knowledge, one starts with what one is most certain of... and builds from there.