A Really Good Discussion of the Zombie Argument

[selfAdjoint]

Here is a careful discussion of fiction, imagination, and what it would take to make Chalmer's zombie argument valid.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Here is a careful discussion of fiction, imagination, and what it would take to make Chalmer's zombie argument valid.

Before commenting on any other aspect of the paper, I wonder if you (or anyone) can explain why the author said that if zombies were possible, then physicalism is false. To my mind, just the opposite is true.

 

[selfAdjoint]

You have to understand Chalmer's idea of a zombie. It is something that has every characteristic of a human being, except qualia. It can, for example obey the red and green of a stoplight correctly, but it doesn't FEEL red and green. It can carry on every kind of conversation, but anything it states about feeling is a lie. You can't tell whether anyone you might meet is a zombie. But evey physical property of a normal human is also a physical property of a zombie, since they differ from us only in the unphysical qualia.

So if zombies are possible then there must be something we have that they don't. Hence physical properties per se can't completely define human beings. This contradicts the assumption of physicalism.

 

[Les Sleeth]

You have to understand Chalmer's idea of a zombie. It is something that has every characteristic of a human being, except qualia. It can, for example obey the red and green of a stoplight correctly, but it doesn't FEEL red and green. It can carry on every kind of conversation, but anything it states about feeling is a lie. You can't tell whether anyone you might meet is a zombie. But evey physical property of a normal human is also a physical property of a zombie, since they differ from us only in the unphysical qualia.

So if zombies are possible then there must be something we have that they don't. Hence physical properties per se can't completely define human beings. This contradicts the assumption of physicalism.

Yes, reflecting on it later I realized what the author meant. I came back to edit my post but you are too fast SA! I will reread the link.

 

[Rader]

You have to understand Chalmer's idea of a zombie. It is something that has every characteristic of a human being, except qualia. It can, for example obey the red and green of a stoplight correctly, but it doesn't FEEL red and green. It can carry on every kind of conversation, but anything it states about feeling is a lie. You can't tell whether anyone you might meet is a zombie. But evey physical property of a normal human is also a physical property of a zombie, since they differ from us only in the unphysical qualia.

So if zombies are possible then there must be something we have that they don't. Hence physical properties per se can't completely define human beings. This contradicts the assumption of physicalism.

Would it be a correct assumption to say¨, that if I through a pie at a Zombie, it would not be angry or happy or express any emotion? It might react by logic only, thinking to itself, I should not have pie on my face, in this situation, I think I will go washup.

Zombies, by definition, are physical duplicates of actual people with no qualia. Zombie Paul is just like actual Paul, but even if I threw the pie in his face, he wouldn't feel a thing. (Quick moral question: would it be OK to throw the pie in Zombie Paul's face? He isn't conscious, so he might not have moral standing.) It's agreed on many sides, and I'm going to accept it here, that if zombies are possible, physicalism is false.

This quote from the paper does not make it clear to me, if the author sees, consciousness and subjuntive exprerience, as the same thing. What does he mean when he says the Zombie will not feel a thing. Is he meaning the physical feel or the emotional fell? A Zombie hit with a pie in the face would be full conscious of the impact, he would just react totally different, than I would, If I had a pie flung in my face.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Would it be a correct assumption to say¨, that if I through a pie at a Zombie, it would not be angry or happy or express any emotion? It might react by logic only, thinking to itself, I should not have pie on my face, in this situation, I think I will go washup.

Until SA answers, I'd like to offer my opinion. A zombie would not actually be angry or happy, but he would physically be able to appear angry or happy. In other words, a zombie can behave exactly like a human (including mimicing emotional behavior), but has no conscious counterpart to that behavior.

This quote from the paper does not make it clear to me, if the author sees, consciousness and subjuntive exprerience, as the same thing. What does he mean when he says the Zombie will not feel a thing. Is he meaning the physical feel or the emotional fell? A Zombie hit with a pie in the face would be full conscious of the impact, he would just react totally different, than I would, If I had a pie flung in my face.

It depends on how we define consciousness. There are those things that happen to us, and then there is our personal knowledge of that. The way I see a zombie is that it has things happen to it, but it has no personal knowledge anything happened; it simply reacts based on its programming.

 

[Les Sleeth]

After a second read, I think the author makes his case that a zombie is not "ideally positively strongly conceivable" and therefore Chalmers zombie argument is weak. However, the author also says:

So in summary, there doesn't look like being a good way to define 'ideal' to make both premises of the zombie argument turn out true, unless one is prepared to either take on faith that opinions on matters philosophical will converge, and then use a convergence definition of ideal rationality, or one is prepared to argue that although there are normally many rational responses to arguments, for every true philosophical claim there is an argument for it to which the only one rational response is acceptance, or one is prepared to say that although logical, moral and semantic claims can be indeterminate, phenomenal claims cannot be. Given a choice between those options and physicalism, I'm still happy with physicalism.

While he is happy with physicalism, I'd point out that so far all physicalistic efforts have ever produced in the category of consciousness is zombie-like stuff. Unless and until we can demonstrate the emergence of consciousness from physical factors alone, I don't know why anyone would be ready now to choose physicalism as the likely explanation of consciousness.

 

[selfAdjoint]

We can differ on whether qualia are real, and unaccounted for by physicalism, or whether they are a figment of philosophers' imagination. But it does seem that the narrower issue of Chalmers' argument has been much reduced in force.

 

[Les Sleeth]

We can differ on whether qualia are real, and unaccounted for by physicalism, or whether they are a figment of philosophers' imagination. But it does seem that the narrower issue of Chalmers' argument has been much reduced in force.

Well, I wrote and then deleted my thoughts about rationalistic justification of qualia because I didn't want to seem too obsessed about my new obsession . But lately I've become very aware of just how hopeless the effort is to prove or justify something with too little experience backing up one's reasoning. Personally, even though I am more or less on Chalmer's side in terms of what he believes consciousness is, I strongly disagree with making such "positive" logic assertions, sans observational experience, as was quoted in the article you referenced. Instead, I think those of us who believe the way we do should jump on physicalist assertions because if they are wrong, then they cannot possibly get enough evidence to properly make their case scientifically.

To make the case scientifically, the roots of consciousness have be observed. But when I want to know about qualia, I look for it the only place I can observe it, which is within my own consciousness. I don't see how one can look for it within someone else's consciousness, which if true is going to be a continuing problem for "consciousness studies" that attempts empirical investigation. But the same is true for the functionalists, who (it seems to me anyway) must do nothing short of reproducing consciousness physically before we can be sure of physicalist emergent theory. Dennett and others who want to prematurely "dismiss" aspects of consciousness, such as the "knowing self" or qualia, so the functionalist model makes more sense are undertaking a foolish strategy in my opinion. That's because if those things really exist, we are going to have to come back to them to generate a realistic model of consciousness.

 

[Fliption]

Most criticisms I've seen of the zombie argument always seem to miss the point to me. The point is that "physicalism" cannot conceive of a reason that zombies cannot exists. If it could then there is no hard problem of consciousness. It isn't about whether zombies are really possible or not. Or whether we can logically put together an a'prior argument as to why zombies can't exists. Those things don't change the main point of the argument. There is no physicalists explanation for why I am not a zombie. This to me is the crucial point of the thought exercise and it illustrates the hard problem perfectly. This exercise is not meant so much to make a statement about reality (such as zombies are possible) as much as it's making a statement of our ability to explain or know about consciousness under the current paradigm.

 

[metacristi]

I think we should make a clear distinction between the actual lack of a scientific theory which to provide a broad,'holistic',picture of how consciousness work and the principial impossibility to find one.The actual situation proves nothing for we can expect that a broad theory will be found later (there is no good reason against this,currently at least) filling in a compelling way,with sufficient reasons,the 'qualia gap' also.Simply wondering of why we are not zombies and that science does not have yet a broad theory never count as a sufficient argument against...

From my understanding of the zombies argument it is the latter approach [there will always be a gap in our understanding of consciousness,qualia at least] which is at the heart of the argument;unfortunately,as of now at least,there is no such logical argument which to be both valid and sound.Moreover,since there is no reason to believe that logic must apply with necessity to reality,even if such an argument would be both valid and sound this woudn't be enough.At most some people would have a strong reason to believe that it's impossible for science to give an accurate account of consciousness but in any case have we the right to consider the conclusion of the argument as being part of the standard of knowledge compelling all would be rational people to believe the same.Only sufficient reasons that zombies are physically possible (in our universe) can promote the conclusion of the argument (counting as a prediction of the premises,considered true) to the level of standard of knowledge.

 

[Canute]

I read the article carefully and have no idea what the author is on about. Maybe I'm being stupid but it seemed to be simply confusing the issues. But then I find the zombie arguments confusing anyway.

If we need to wonder whether zombies exist or not then clearly we are not zombies. If we were we would know that they can exist. However we know we have qualia (I do anyway), and as Chalmer's points out, it's difficult to imagine a zombie doing research into consciousness. If they would not do this then zombies cannot exist.

However if zombies can theoretically exist then although we have to admit that we are not zombies it is at least possible to argue that consciousness is non-causal. The Behaviourists tried this and failed, but perhaps there's another way of doing it.

Mind you, exactly why a zombie would care whether it lived or died I don't know, so if they could exist I don't suppose they'd survive very long.

Also, if one assumes that zombie behaviour is strictly phsyically determined and yet mimics human behaviour then how can we explain why they would invent pain killers? What could cause this strange and pointless behaviour?

It is also very hard to imagine zombies discussing in an internet forum and in the professional literature whether zombies can exist or not. Yet if zombies can exist they must do this regularly, even though they don't care a damn what the answer is.

 

[Rader]

Until SA answers, I'd like to offer my opinion. A zombie would not actually be angry or happy, but he would physically be able to appear angry or happy. In other words, a zombie can behave exactly like a human (including mimicing emotional behavior), but has no conscious counterpart to that behavior..

Maybe my definition of qualia is different than yours. The only way I can understand this is, that consciousness is the physcial feel and subjuntive experience is the mental feel. If what you mean is, that a Zombie, would physically be able to appear angry or happy but not have emotions, I would agree. But you confuse me when you use consciousness as if it was subjuntive emotional experience. Now understand me, as far as you or I or for that matter animals go, the physcial feel and the mental feel is the consciousness and subjuntive experience but in the Zombie exercise, the Zombie lacks the latter while acting and reacting on logical decisions only. If a Zombie could exist, we should pick up on it. I observe in me, other humans and also in animals, through behavior patterns, what appears to be "qualia".

It depends on how we define consciousness. There are those things that happen to us, and then there is our personal knowledge of that. The way I see a zombie is that it has things happen to it, but it has no personal knowledge anything happened; it simply reacts based on its programming.

Now this is again interesting, how you explain this, because I can not understand it that way. For a Zombie to react to a situation the same as we would, it would have to use its intellect based on logic, for it would not have any emotions to play a factor in its decisions. How can it not know what it is doing and make decisions, if it does not use its intellect, based on logic instead of emotions. All programs are based on logic. A program knows its basic function, which is to find the most suitable answer. A program knows what it is capable of, simply by the results it gives. Now I think I went off the deep end trying to explain what I think you meant. Are you comparing a Zombie to a computer?

 

[loseyourname]

A program doesn't know anything. It just performs a function, completely unaware that it's doing anything. A zombie would do exactly the same thing. They wouldn't be plotting to fool us into believing that they are conscious. They wouldn't be capable of plotting. All they would be capable of doing is reacting to a given stimulus in a way that made them appear conscious. Really, they would have to all behave in exactly the same manner. Given the degree of diversity we see in human problem solving capabilities and reactions, both emotional and reasoned, it is safe to say that there aren't any zombies out there. Anyone with the slightest knowledge of evolutionary theory would also know that the very concept is the height of obsurdity from a biological standpoint. I don't know why this is so frequently discussed. It just seems to distract from the heart of the matter.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Given the degree of diversity we see in human problem solving capabilities and reactions, both emotional and reasoned, it is safe to say that there aren't any zombies out there. Anyone with the slightest knowledge of evolutionary theory would also know that the very concept is the height of obsurdity from a biological standpoint. I don't know why this is so frequently discussed. It just seems to distract from the heart of the matter.

I've never heard anyone seriously contend there are actual zombies. The zombie was/is simply an illustrative tool Chalmers employed to make a point. I think Fliption summed it up well above.

But if you read the link selfAdjoint posted, the author claims Chalmers also tried to derive a bit of a logical proof from his zombie allegory (I wasn't aware of this, so I can't say if Chalmers really attempted the proof). SelfAdjoint claims the author of the paper has cast serious logical doubt on that alleged proof, and I agree. But I also say that there is no such thing as a logical proof in regard to actual reality in the absense of verifying experience a so-called "proof" says is true, so I don't believe the paper's author is saying much.

 

[Les Sleeth]

If what you mean is, that a Zombie, would physically be able to appear angry or happy but not have emotions, I would agree. But you confuse me when you use consciousness as if it was subjuntive emotional experience. Now understand me, as far as you or I or for that matter animals go, the physcial feel and the mental feel is the consciousness and subjuntive experience but in the Zombie exercise, the Zombie lacks the latter while acting and reacting on logical decisions only. If a Zombie could exist, we should pick up on it. I observe in me, other humans and also in animals, through behavior patterns, what appears to be "qualia".

Try this. A Geiger counter "feels" radioactivity, and if it detects a lot of it, the Geiger counter will get very excited, which is analogous to emotion. Yet the Geiger counter doesn't know it feels or is excited. If those talking about a zombie want to single out feeling as the defining factor of consciousness, then I can't see it because lots of things "feel" (or detect) but are not conscious.

Or, you might look at this way. Say someone gives you an electric shock and your senses detects that. If you were in a coma, for instance, the body might jump, or recoil, or otherwise indicate it felt the shock. But, if YOU (whatever that is) were not aware of the shock, then you are like a zombie. A zombie can react, and can behave like some being in there knows what is happening to it, but in reality it is just behaving like it knows without really knowing.

The idea of "qualia" is that same idea expressed another way. There is the detection of, for example, the color red, and then there is our unique experience of "redness." Redness is not just a particular wavelength registering in our nervous system, it is also some essence or quality of redness we feel.

Now this is again interesting, how you explain this, because I can not understand it that way. For a Zombie to react to a situation the same as we would, it would have to use its intellect based on logic, for it would not have any emotions to play a factor in its decisions. How can it not know what it is doing and make decisions, if it does not use its intellect, based on logic instead of emotions. All programs are based on logic. A program knows its basic function, which is to find the most suitable answer. A program knows what it is capable of, simply by the results it gives. Now I think I went off the deep end trying to explain what I think you meant. Are you comparing a Zombie to a computer?

I think loseyourname explains it pretty well. Think about a robot which when it detects someone crying, starts going "waaaaaaaaaaaaa" and droplets of water run down its face. It doesn't need the intellect or logic to detect information, and then react to that according to how it's been programmed.

You are wrong to say a program "knows" its functions or what it is capable of. Consider a computer. It performs functions and behaves according to what it is capable of, but it is utterly clueless that it is doing so.

 

[metacristi]

I have never really understood why this term,used by the supporters of the zombies argument,namely the so called 'metaphysical' possibility of zombies,really put a pressure on physicalism.I accept that the concept of 'zombies' is logically possible but I do not think we are also entitled to leap directly to their physical possibility in 'other physical worlds'.Basically there are no reasons to think they are such possibilities,there is no proof that logic must apply with necessity to reality (not to mention that we can always create new logics).Even if they are possible in other physical worlds we must provide first some compeling experimental evidence for their existence.

 

[Canute]

I have never really understood why this term,used by the supporters of the zombies argument,namely the so called 'metaphysical' possibility of zombies,really put a pressure on physicalism.

I think that may be back to front. The possibility of zombies is usually used to support physicalism, and their impossibility to deny physicalism.

I accept that the concept of 'zombies' is logically possible but I do not think we are also entitled to leap directly to their physical possibility in 'other physical worlds'.

Chalmer's argues that you should not just accept that the concept of zombies is possible. The idea of zombies was introduced in order to support the idea of epiphenominalism, the idea that consciousness is a waste product of the brain, and that it has no purpose. Chalmer's and others have argued that in fcat they are logically impossible, because there is more to human behaviour than can be explained computationally.

You may not agree with him but I wouldn't be too quick to decide. If you accept the possibility of zombies then you also accept the idea that consciousness is purposeless and that it evolved by accident. That's quite a difficult position to defend, although I must admit you have Daniel Dennett on your side.

The argument over zombies looks a bit stupid in a way, but in fact it is an argument over whether we are zombies or not, so it's quite important to know whether or not they are logically possible. If they are not possible then we are not zombies, if they are then we probably are.

 

[hypnagogue]

definition of Chalmers' zombies

I sense there is some confusion in the discussion here. There are different notions of 'zombies' depending on the argument in which they are implemented. The article this thread is based on addresses Chalmers' notion of a zombie, so let's rigorously define exactly what that is.

Chalmers' zombie (or, C-zombie) is a creature in a metaphysical world that is physically identical to a normally functioning human being, but which does not have subjective experience. Another way of saying this is that a C-zombie is identical to a normal human being from an objective standpoint, but is quite different from its own subjective standpoint. A C-zombie walks, talks, and behaves the same as a normal human, even has a brain that functions identically to a normal human, but there is nothing it is like to be a C-zombie. Therefore a C-zombie acts as if it has subjectively experienced perceptions and emotions and so on, but in fact it has no subjective experience at all. The implication here is that some contributing factor to subjective experience is not physical, and hence we can have physical duplicates with different subjective experiences if those non-physical contributing factors to subjective experience are not themselves duplicated.

Thus it is wrong to say that a C-zombie should have no motivation to act, should not ponder problems about subjective experience, or should not seek to take an aspirin when it complains of a headache. To say any of these is to contradict the defining characteristic that a C-zombie is objectively indistinguishable from a normal human.

 

[hypnagogue]

I accept that the concept of 'zombies' is logically possible but I do not think we are also entitled to leap directly to their physical possibility in 'other physical worlds'

If you accept that a C-zombie is logically possible, it automatically follows that they can exist in a metaphysical world physically identical to our own. These are two equivalent statements.

 

[hypnagogue]

I think that may be back to front. The possibility of zombies is usually used to support physicalism, and their impossibility to deny physicalism.

No, it's the other way around. If we can have two creatures that are physically identical (but not identical in the relevant non-physical respects), such that they behave in an indistinguishable manner but have different internal experiences, this implies that physical factors alone are not enough to determine the state of one's subjective experience. Thus, we have a contradiction of physicalism.

On the other hand, if C-zombies are impossible, this implies that any two creatures that are physically identical must have identical subjective experiences. From this it follows that subjective experience is completely determined by physical causes, and thus that physicalism is true.

Chalmer's argues that you should not just accept that the concept of zombies is possible. The idea of zombies was introduced in order to support the idea of epiphenominalism, the idea that consciousness is a waste product of the brain, and that it has no purpose. Chalmer's and others have argued that in fcat they are logically impossible, because there is more to human behaviour than can be explained computationally.

You may not agree with him but I wouldn't be too quick to decide. If you accept the possibility of zombies then you also accept the idea that consciousness is purposeless and that it evolved by accident. That's quite a difficult position to defend, although I must admit you have Daniel Dennett on your side.

Chalmers introduced C-zombies to argue against reductionist explanations of subjective experience, not to argue for epiphenomenalism.

In fact, we can suppose that C-zombies are logically possible and still hold that epiphenomenalism in our world is false. If we suppose that subjective experience plays some causal role C in human behavior, all we need to do is replace C with a surrogate causal agent C* in zombies, such that C* duplicates C's causal role while not instantiating C's phenomenal properties.

The argument over zombies looks a bit stupid in a way, but in fact it is an argument over whether we are zombies or not, so it's quite important to know whether or not they are logically possible. If they are not possible then we are not zombies, if they are then we probably are.

The zombie argument has no implications as to whether or not we ourselves are zombies. If you are a Dennett enthusiast (ie if you deny that subjective experience exists), then the question of whether C-zombies are possible or not is meaningless, since there really is no difference between humans and C-zombies in the first place.

On the other hand, if you believe that subjective experience exists, then you can hold that humans have subjective experience even if C-zombies are possible. Chalmers himself has no problems holding both positions. The reason for this is that C-zombies exist in metaphysical worlds, not our world. It is only important for Chalmers' argument that a C-zombie be logically possible, even if it is nomologically impossible (impossible in our universe).

The notion of logical possibility is a much broader one than that of nomological possibility. Nomological possibility is a subset of logical possibility; it has all the restrictions of logical possibility, plus the added constraints of contingent properties. Contingent properties are properties that obtain in our universe but could have been otherwise, eg, they are true in virtue of circumstance rather than logical necessity.

For instance, it may be the case that the speed of light in vacuum in our world, c, is a contingent property of our universe. Perhaps there could be some metaphysical world that formed differently from our own, such that the value of c in this world, c', is greater than it is in ours. Even if this were the case, it would not implyt that the speed of light in vacuum in our world is not c.

Likewise, if there is some contingent non-physical property P that is responsible for our subjective experiences, perhaps there could be some metaphysical world that formed differently from our own, such that P does not exist. In this world there could be C-zombies since there is no P, but that does not imply that there could be C-zombies in our world, since our world does have P.

 

[hypnagogue]

The force of the argument made in this article seems to turn mainly on the following two paragraphs:

Can zombies be strongly conceived, i.e. imagined? It seems not. I can't imagine something as complex as Paul's brain. I can't even imagine a 1000-game baseball season, and that's way less complicated than Paul's brain. Zombies can be weakly conceived. We can imagine a creature that looks and acts like Paul, and has no conscious states, and then make it fictional that the creature we are imagining is a physical duplicate of Paul. But we don't thereby imagine a physical duplicate of Paul - that would be too complex for our weak imagination.

So premise 1 of the zombie argument can say at most that zombies are ideally positively weakly conceivable. So premise 2 has to say that whatever is ideally positively weakly conceivable is possible. And that will be much harder than arguing that whatever is ideally positively strongly conceivable is possible for at least two reasons. First, we saw in Sylvan's Box that fictions are much more weakly constrained by possibility than are imaginings. Second, it seems at least plausible that there are no constraints whatsoever on what can be true in a fiction, because it's also a strong default assumption about stories that if p is crucial to the story being told, then p is true in the story. It's crucial to the zombie story that there are zombies, so in that story there are zombies. But that reasoning obviously tells us nothing about what is actually possible.

If zombies are only weakly conceivable, then the claim is that we can sort of stipulate their possibility without really encountering the teeth of the problem. In the case of Sylvan's Box, we can stipulate the possibility of an empty box that contains a statue, and likewise, we can stipulate the possibility of a C-zombie without fully considering all the complexities of the brain. In the former, the stipulated truth is obviously false, and so the argument goes that the stipulated truth in the latter may also be false.

So what this argument really boils down to is an argument from complexity. The author's physicalist stance here seems to be that somewhere, from all this tangled mess of complexity in the physical brain, subjective experience arises. That complexity is too intractable for us to imagine, and thus we fail to see how the myriad minute details of a physical brain can account for subjective experience.

Chalmers has already addressed such arguments head on. He proposes a serious problem in principle with the argument from physical complexity. This argument is not hindered by the intractable complexities of the physically functioning brain. Even if we could understand all the minute details and all their myriad interactions, we would be left with the familiar problems.

From http://jamaica.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/nature.html :

There is no question that experience is closely associated with physical processes in systems such as brains. It seems that physical processes give rise to experience, at least in the sense that producing a physical system (such as a brain) with the right physical properties inevitably yields corresponding states of experience. But how and why do physical processes give rise to experience? Why do not these processes take place "in the dark," without any accompanying states of experience? This is the central mystery of consciousness.

What makes the easy problems easy? For these problems, the task is to explain certain behavioral or cognitive functions: that is, to explain how some causal role is played in the cognitive system, ultimately in the production of behavior. To explain the performance of such a function, one need only specify a mechanism that plays the relevant role. And there is good reason to believe that neural or computational mechanisms can play those roles.

What makes the hard problem hard? Here, the task is not to explain behavioral and cognitive functions: even once one has an explanation of all the relevant functions in the vicinity of consciousness — discrimination, integration, access, report, control — there may still remain a further question: why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? Because of this, the hard problem seems to be a different sort of problem, requiring a different sort of solution.

A solution to the hard problem would involve an account of the relation between physical processes and consciousness, explaining on the basis of natural principles how and why it is that physical processes are associated with states of experience. A reductive explanation of consciousness will explain this wholly on the basis of physical principles that do not themselves make any appeal to consciousness.[*] A materialist (or physicalist) solution will be a solution on which consciousness is itself seen as a physical process. A nonmaterialist (or nonphysicalist) solution will be a solution on which consciousness is seen as nonphysical (even if closely associated with physical processes). A nonreductive solution will be one on which consciousness (or principles involving consciousness) is admitted as a basic part of the explanation.

It is natural to hope that there will be a materialist solution to the hard problem and a reductive explanation of consciousness, just as there have been reductive explanations of many other phenomena in many other domains. But consciousness seems to resist materialist explanation in a way that other phenomena do not. This resistance can be encapsulated in three related arguments against materialism, summarized in what follows.

3 Arguments against Materialism

3.1 The Explanatory Argument

The first argument is grounded in the difference between the easy problems and the hard problem, as characterized above: the easy problems concern the explanation of behavioral and cognitive functions, but the hard problem does not. One can argue that by the character of physical explanation, physical accounts explain only structure and function, where the relevant structures are spatiotemporal structures, and the relevant functions are causal roles in the production of a system's behavior. And one can argue as above that explaining structures and functions does not suffice to explain consciousness. If so, no physical account can explain consciousness.

We can call this the explanatory argument:

(1) Physical accounts explain at most structure and function.

(2) Explaining structure and function does not suffice to explain consciousness; so

—

(3) No physical account can explain consciousness.

If this is right, then while physical accounts can solve the easy problems (which involve only explaining functions), something more is needed to solve the hard problem. It would seem that no reductive explanation of consciousness could succeed. And if we add the premise that what cannot be physically explained is not itself physical (this can be considered an additional final step of the explanatory argument), then materialism about consciousness is false, and the natural world contains more than the physical world.

The explanatory argument is intimately related with the zombie argument (as Chalmers goes on to discuss in the paper). Thus while it may appear as if the zombie argument has been trumped, in fact it hasn't; the author must still contend with the explanatory argument, and in this respect he begs the question by assuming a complete understanding of the brain would entail a complete understanding of subjective experience.

 

[Fliption]

From my understanding of the zombies argument it is the latter approach [there will always be a gap in our understanding of consciousness,qualia at least] which is at the heart of the argument;

Yes there is a distinction between these two things but I think Chalmers deals with both in his 3 separate arguments.

I'll quote from Chalmers:

These three sorts of argument are closely related. They all start by establishing an epistemic gap between the physical and phenomenal domains. Each denies a certain sort of close epistemic relation between the domains: a relation involving what we can know, or conceive, or explain. In particular, each of them denies a certain sort of epistemic entailment from physical truths P to the phenomenal truths Q: deducibility of Q from P, or explainability of Q in terms of P, or conceiving of Q upon reflective conceiving of P.

Perhaps the most basic sort of epistemic entailment is a priori entailment, or implication. On this notion, P implies Q when the material conditional 'P⊃Q' is a priori; that is, when a subject can know that if P is the case then Q is the case, with justification independent of experience. All of the three arguments above can be seen as making a case against an a priori entailment of Q by P. If a subject who knows only P cannot deduce that Q (as the knowledge argument suggests), or if one can rationally conceive of P without Q (as the conceivability argument suggests), then it seems that P does not imply Q. The explanatory argument can be seen as turning on the claim that an implication from P to Q would require a functional analysis of consciousness, and that the concept of consciousness is not a functional concept.

After establishing an epistemic gap, these arguments proceed by inferring an ontological gap, where ontology concerns the nature of things in the world. The conceivability argument infers from conceivability to metaphysical possibility; the knowledge argument infers from failure of deducibility to difference in facts; and the explanatory argument infers from failure of physical explanation to nonphysicality. One might say that these arguments infer from a failure of epistemic entailment to a failure of ontological entailment. The paradigmatic sort of ontological entailment is necessitation: P necessitates Q when the material conditional 'P⊃Q' is metaphysically necessary, or when it is metaphysically impossible for P to hold without Q holding. It is widely agreed that materialism requires that P necessitates all truths (perhaps with minor qualifications). So if there are phenomenal truths Q that P does not necessitate, then materialism is false.

We might call of these arguments epistemic arguments against materialism. Epistemic arguments arguably descend from Descartes' arguments against materialism (although these have a slightly different form), and are given their first thorough airing in Broad's book, which contains elements of all three arguments above.[*] The general form of an epistemic argument against materialism is as follows:

The zombie argument does indeed begin with a knowledge gap. This is what makes zombies conceivable! This is the whole point to me. Now, as to whether this gap can ever be closed, the explanatory argument goes on to build the case that this cannot happen because the nature of a materialists explanation (functions) cannot explain something that isn't functional in nature.

My only point is that what makes a zombie conceivable is a lack of knowledge as to why it is not conceivable. Whether that knowledge can ever be gained is a different issue. Chalmers deals with both issues but I think the point of zombie conceivability is one of epistemology, not ontology. I'll try to confer this with Hypnagogue's points.

 

[Fliption]

The notion of logical possibility is a much broader one than that of nomological possibility. Nomological possibility is a subset of logical possibility; it has all the restrictions of logical possibility, plus the added constraints of contingent properties. Contingent properties are properties that obtain in our universe but could have been otherwise, eg, they are true in virtue of circumstance rather than logical necessity.

Hypnagogue,

What is it that makes a property contingent to you? You used the speed of light as an example of a possible contingent property. What is an example of a non-contingent property and what do you see as the dividing line?

 

[confutatis]

what makes a zombie conceivable is a lack of knowledge as to why it is not conceivable

There's another, more mundane reason: what makes zombies conceivable is the fact that you can conceive of them. But not everyone can. I can't, and I don't seem to be alone.

Whether that knowledge can ever be gained is a different issue.

It's not a matter of knowledge. I can't conceive of an empty box with a statue of an elephant inside, and I think anyone who claims to be able to conceive of such a thing is confused, or simply lying. The situation with Chalmers zombies is not different; no matter how well-constructed those arguments might seem to be from a semantical pointo f view, to me and to a lot of other people they sound like arguments for the existence of an empty box that has something inside.

Trouble is, just because people can say "it's possible for an empty box with something inside to exist", they think the statement of the possibility alone bears any significance. It doesn't. Anyone can say whatever they want, but that doesn't mean everything they say must have meaning. Most of the time, it's just empty words.

 

[Fliption]

There's another, more mundane reason: what makes zombies conceivable is the fact that you can conceive of them. But not everyone can. I can't, and I don't seem to be alone.

I'm talking about what is conceivable according to Chalmers. I'm simply trying to clarify the point of Chalmers thought exercise. Whether you agree with Chalmers or not is irrelevant to my point.

It's not a matter of knowledge. I can't conceive of an empty box with a statue of an elephant inside, and I think anyone who claims to be able to conceive of such a thing is confused, or simply lying. The situation with Chalmers zombies is not different; no matter how well-constructed those arguments might seem to be from a semantical pointo f view, to me and to a lot of other people they sound like arguments for the existence of an empty box that has something inside.

Trouble is, just because people can say "it's possible for an empty box with something inside to exist", they think the statement of the possibility alone bears any significance. It doesn't. Anyone can say whatever they want, but that doesn't mean everything they say must have meaning. Most of the time, it's just empty words.

And this is why I was trying to clarify it.

You continue to make these statemernts because you haven't yet grasped the point of the thought exercise. You still seem to think it is saying something about reality as opposed to our knowledge of it. An empty box with something inside is hardly a good analogy. Explain to everyone reading here why it was absolutely impossible for you to have evolved processing the external world like cameras and microphones do, as opposed to processing it with qualia. I'd love to hear it.

 

[confutatis]

I'm talking about what is conceivable according to Chalmers.

What is conceivable according to Chalmers could just be nonsense.

You continue to make these statemernts because you haven't yet grasped the point of the thought exercise.

That is rubbish and I won't comment on it.

You still seem to think it is saying something about reality as opposed to our knowledge of it.

I "seem to think" Chalmers' argument is inconsistent with facts about reality. But who knows, maybe Chalmers is right and reality is wrong.

An empty box with something inside is hardly a good analogy.

A zombie is just like an empty box filled with lots of things. You look outside and the box seems full; you look inside and the box is empty. The analogy is perfect.

Explain to everyone reading here why it was absolutely impossible for you to have evolved processing the external world like cameras and microphones do, as opposed to processing it with qualia

I don't know what you are talking about. When you explain to me what you mean by "qualia" and why you are so sure cameras and microphones don't have it, then I'll give you my explanation.

 

[Rader]

You are wrong to say a program "knows" its functions or what it is capable of. Consider a computer. It performs functions and behaves according to what it is capable of, but it is utterly clueless that it is doing so.

I am trying to understand this Zombie problems as per quote on Chalmers ideas.

The point is that "physicalism" cannot conceive of a reason that zombies cannot exists.

Using the word knows not "knows", in the sence, that a 16mm wrench knows that it fits a 16mm nut. A computer program knows how its function works, cause its results compute. A Zombie knows the same things as a non-Zombie cause, he works the same, we can not tell the difference. But there is nothing that has been found yet, in physical properties, that substantiate, the existence of subjuntive experiences in a wrench, computer programs or Zombies. Now this Zombie analogy is an exercise to try and understand a specific point of view.To me this physicality exercise neither negates nor substanciates, what can have a subjuntive experience.

 

[metacristi]

Originally Posted by metacristi
I accept that the concept of 'zombies' is logically possible but I do not think we are also entitled to leap directly to their physical possibility in 'other physical worlds'

If you accept that a C-zombie is logically possible, it automatically follows that they can exist in a metaphysical world physically identical to our own. These are two equivalent statements.

Maybe the difficulty arise from my acception of what is conceptually,logically and physically possible.In my view something is conceptually possible,if can be assigned for it a 'truth value' different of 0 with reference to a certain language (all attributes assigned to it,even 'invented',must be defined inside that language) with no logical or experential data involved.Thus all objects defined in such a way are conceptually possible,they are valid linguistically concepts.

The next level is given by the logical possibility of meaningful (linguistically) concepts.A meaningful concept (linguistically) is logically possible if it can be assigned a logical truth value different from 0 irrespective of the experential data.That is it must be an internally coherent concept.Thus incoherent concepts are logically impossible.

The third level concern valid linguistically concepts which are also logically possible.If we can assign,with reference to experential data,a value of truth greater than 0 then such concepts are empirically possible.No need of having sufficient (scientific) reasons for their existence.Concepts that aspire at the status of empirical possibility (in our world or in another one) must be first linguistically (meaningful) and logically possible but this does not automatically mean we are entitled to say a priori that all of them are also physically possible or existent (in our world or in other ones).Thus P-zombies (or C-zombies) are conceptually and logically possible (exactly as the concept of unicorn for example) but in any case are we entitled to say that they are automatically physically possible or exist (here or in another physical world identical with ours) when resorting to experential data (accepted knowledge) also.Indeed otherwise we should equally assume,a priori,that there exist physical worlds,identical with ours,where unicorns or leprichauns are (meta)physically existing...On the other hand,based on the actual knowledge,we are fully entitled to assign a probability greater than zero for the existence of alien life in our world or in other worlds identical with ours (though it might not exist).[Even the possibility of existence of universes where c has another value-or the laws of nature are different-is acceptable if we were to take into account the 'infinite bubbles' metaverse scientific tentative theory.Or the existence of a creator of the universe,which has a way greater degree of coherence with the observed facts than zombies,leprichauns and so on even if we were to use only the teleological,inductive but based on observed facts,argument].

PS Thanks for your above excellent clarifications.And a further question:What is your opinion about property dualism,a widely encountered stance amongst those who opposes the main physicalist approach?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Using the word knows not "knows", in the sence, that a 16mm wrench knows that it fits a 16mm nut. A computer program knows how its function works, cause its results compute. A Zombie knows the same things as a non-Zombie cause, he works the same, we can not tell the difference. But there is nothing that has been found yet, in physical properties, that substantiate, the existence of subjuntive experiences in a wrench, computer programs or Zombies. Now this Zombie analogy is an exercise to try and understand a specific point of view.To me this physicality exercise neither negates nor substanciates, what can have a subjuntive experience.

Well, Hypnagogue, who is more of a Chalmer's expert than I, has labelled the distinguishing characteristic in Chalmer's thought exercise "subjectivity." I like to think of it as "knowing what one experiences" because I think self-knowing is the heart subjectivity.

So except if one is being fully metaphorical, a wrench does not know it fits a 16mm nut. If it did know, it would be conscious.

 

[Fliption]

What is conceivable according to Chalmers could just be nonsense.

Could be. I'm just clarifying what his meaning is so that this can be decided intelligently.

I "seem to think" Chalmers' argument is inconsistent with facts about reality. But who knows, maybe Chalmers is right and reality is wrong.

And my clarification was that the zombie exercise has much less to say about reality as it does our knowledge of it. I was trying to explain that this was the main point of the exercise. It's easier to claim it as nonsense when you don't understand it. I had the same compulsion you do until I understood it.

A zombie is just like an empty box filled with lots of things. You look outside and the box seems full; you look inside and the box is empty. The analogy is perfect.

What sorts of things is a zombie full of?

I don't know what you are talking about. When you explain to me what you mean by "qualia" and why you are so sure cameras and microphones don't have it, then I'll give you my explanation.

I don't understand how you can claim that zombies are not conceivable when you don't know what qualia is. How can you possibly make a determination about the conceivability of a being with no qualia if you don't know what it is that is being referred to by qualia?

And cameras and microphones having qualia is not really relevant. I say fine. Let's assume that cameras and microphones do have qualia. Now explain to me why it is inconceivable that they could not have an existence without qualia. Zombie cameras aren't conceivable?

 

[confutatis]

It's easier to claim it as nonsense when you don't understand it.

So what?

I don't understand how you can claim that zombies are not conceivable when you don't know what qualia is.

It's not that simple. To the best of my understanding, "qualia" is perfectly equivalent with "nothing". So a zombie is a person who has everything you and I have, except "nothing". And that is nonsense.

How can you possibly make a determination about the conceivability of a being with no qualia if you don't know what it is that is being referred to by qualia?

I can conceive of a being who's only different from me because I have "nothing" and he doesn't. I just don't see what's the use of such an exercise.

And cameras and microphones having qualia is not really relevant.

Actually, even people having "qualia" is not really relevant. You don't need to know if other people have "qualia" to know that they are conscious. You don't need to know that camcorders don't have "qualia" to know that they are unconscious.

Let's assume that cameras and microphones do have qualia. Now explain to me why it is inconceivable that they could not have an existence without qualia. Zombie cameras aren't conceivable?

It's not conceivable that two things which have everything in common except "nothing" could possibly be different. That's the bit you don't get.

 

[Fliption]

It's not conceivable that two things which have everything in common except "nothing" could possibly be different. That's the bit you don't get.

Ok, then you don't have an issue with the zombie argument. You have an issue with the hard problem itself. As Hypnagogue said in one of his last posts, if you don't believe in subjective experience to begin with then you already think we are zombies and there's nothing to talk about. The zombie argument isn't designed to convince you there is something that needs explaining. If you don't see that before then you won't see it after. I'd say this thread isn't for people like you.

I do "get it". I just don't agree with you.

 

[confutatis]

Ok, then you don't have an issue with the zombie argument. You have an issue with the hard problem itself.

I can't remember how many times I said I think this hard problem is nonsense - there is no hard problem.

As Hypnagogue said in one of his last posts, if you don't believe in subjective experience to begin with then you already think we are zombies and there's nothing to talk about.

I don't think we are zombies!

The zombie argument isn't designed to convince you there is something that needs explaining.

The zombie argument is designed to convince people of whatever it is they are already sure about. Like yourself. You are sure you have "qualia"; no argument can possibly convince you that the definition of "qualia" is nonsense. The hard problem is the problem of convincing a stubborn person that "qualia" is nonsense. Come to think of it, it's really a hard problem.

If you don't see that before then you won't see it after. I'd say this thread isn't for people like you.

How old are you anyway? From stuff like that, I'd give you no more than sixteen. A brilliant teenager, but still a teenager.

 

[Fliption]

I can't remember how many times I said I think this hard problem is nonsense - there is no hard problem.

Yes I know you've said this. All I'm saying is that it's very difficult for you to enter into an argument of whether a car is red or green if you don't believe in cars.

I don't think we are zombies!

If you think qualia is nonsense then we are zombies since they are defined as beings with no qualia.

The zombie argument is designed to convince people of whatever it is they are already sure about. Like yourself. You are sure you have "qualia"; no argument can possibly convince you that the definition of "qualia" is nonsense. The hard problem is the problem of convincing a stubborn person that "qualia" is nonsense. Come to think of it, it's really a hard problem.

No I don't think this is what it's designed to do at all. It is not designed to convince anyone of qualia. That's what I was saying in my last post. It is designed to illustrate the epistemic problem that exists regarding the explanation for qualia. The qualia is a given. So if someone doesn't believe in qualia then a discussion of the zombie argument is meaningless to them. This is all I meant when I suggested that this discussion wasn't for people like you. It is a meaningless topic so why discuss it?

How old are you anyway? From stuff like that, I'd give you no more than sixteen. A brilliant teenager, but still a teenager.

I'm being insulted now? I'm not real sure why unless you've misinterpreted something I said. I was only implying that this discussion is meaningless to someone who doesn't believe in qualia. The car analogy I used above is the perfect example.

BTW, I'm no where near 16.