Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[Tournesol]

There definitely exists a very important circumstance where they cannot disagree. That particular circumstance is the case when they agree on the axioms behind the logical proposition.

grandmother.

egg.

suck.

Under it, what is real is no more than an opinion the speaker has squinked up:

Which now means we have another way of saying "personal opinion" ...
and no way of saying "really real". Great.

As I said, I am very willing to listen to any arguments against that perspective, but I certainly won't pay any attention to someone who says they know what is really "real".

Does that mean we should't pay any attention to you when you claim
to know what is really real ? Well, yes, it does.

What you seem to be missing is the idea that "qualia" is being put forth as an answer

Nope. I have already explained that they are not: "The point of 'qualia' is to put a problem on the table."

Gee guys, when I look at a rainbow, I see it as stripes of various colors. When I measure the wave lengths of the light, I get a smooth continuous transition. Now how do I explain that? Is it reasonable to suggest that associations with certain colors are important to our survival: red with blood and berries, green with vegetables, yellow with heat. And that our interest and concern with different colors has evolutionarily produced a striking awareness of specific colors? (I point out that, decision wise, that donkey halfway between two bales is an exceedingly rare event: the brain is an organ devoted to making decisions on whatever information it has.) Or perhaps this should be taken as evidence of the "reality" of "qualia".

That is the Easy Problem. Now: what about the relationship of of those
"strinking" colours to brain-states ?

Again, what I am preaching against is naming something in order to acquire the emotional feeling that you understand it, a very dangerous anti scientific illusion.

No one is doing that.

 

[loseyourname]

I was saying that this stand on qualia is too indecisive, because believing in them is believing that whatever we might find out about physical brain states, they can't completely account for qualia (of course, that renders the second option in the poll inconsistent, but this is just my understanding of qualia).

This sounds to me like you're advocating a leap of faith. On what basis can you firmly believe that any physical explanation of consciousness cannot explain the sensations associated with brain events? You needn't repost all of the arguments that have convinced you, seeing as how we've gone over them many times, but I think I (and others) have demonstrated that none of these arguments is particularly conclusive. They all rely on at least one premise that can only be believed due to intuition, an intuition that is not even shared amongst all of the posters here.

Maybe I should have said that if you are open to the possibility that brain states could explain all there is to qualia, then you really don't believe in qualia as defined above.

Well, heck, I guess I don't believe in qualia then. I never realized that the term necessarily excluded the possibility of a physical basis. I figured a physical explanation would be a case of reduction rather than elimination.

 

[Tournesol]

Well, heck, I guess I don't believe in qualia then. I never realized that the term necessarily excluded the possibility of a physical basis

As originally (and IMO authentically defined), it doesn't:-

C.I Lewis's original definition of qualia:-

"There *are* recognizable qualitative characters of the
given, which may be repeated in different experiences,
and are thus a sort of universals; I call these "qualia."
But although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being
recognized from one to another experience, they must
be distinguished from the properties of objects. Confusion
of these two is characteristic of many historical
conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories.
The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the
subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective."


The way not to argue for qulia is to load the ontological dice at the outset.

 

[Canute]

Speaking of the intrinsic base of the physical, it has a couple of properties in common with qualia that I think should be explored. First, if we take the view that rules cannot exist by themselves, but must act on something, then we know that there is an intrinsic basis, even though we can't observe it. However, we can't say exactly what it is. Similarly, we know qualia exist, but we can't describe them. Does anyone see any significance to this parallel?

Yes, very much so. I feel it should be treated as a highly significant fact. But it seems to be generally overlooked.

As solipsism is unfalsifiable we know that although we can be certain that our conscious sensations/qualia exist we can never show that anything else exists. Under the circumstances it seems a bit unlikely that anybody will ever manage to show that qualia do not exist but brains do. In fact it is logically impossible.

What is intrinsic to both mental phenomena and corporeal phenomena is, going strictly on the available evidence, meta-physical. While we are forced to accept that what is intrinsic to matter is 'beyond science', it seems that few yet accept that what is intrinsic to consciousness is likewise metaphysical. I suspect that we will all have to face this as a fact sooner or later.

Always there will be two things beyond science. The first is what is fundamental to the 'objective' physical universe, the second is what is fundamental to the 'subjective' mental universe. Perhaps this is a coincidence, or perhaps it is not two things.

 

[StatusX]

This sounds to me like you're advocating a leap of faith. On what basis can you firmly believe that any physical explanation of consciousness cannot explain the sensations associated with brain events? You needn't repost all of the arguments that have convinced you, seeing as how we've gone over them many times, but I think I (and others) have demonstrated that none of these arguments is particularly conclusive. They all rely on at least one premise that can only be believed due to intuition, an intuition that is not even shared amongst all of the posters here.

It isn't just intuition. The problem is that physics can only explain functions and structure. So if you are a physicalist, you believe that's all there is to the universe. The vast majority of the world is covered by physics, but consciousness is a little different.

First, what aspects of the human brain can physics explain? It seems likely that anything we say or do can be attributed to atoms interacting in our heads, since these are just functions. Qualia is the name given to those mental phenomena that can't be explained by physics, if they exist. So what are they?

When you look at a pumpkin, photons hit your retina which gives rise to electro-chemical signals that travel through your brain. All kinds of processing is done on these signals, and any number of possible actions can result. You can say "That is orange" or "I am experiencing an orange qualia, and I am certain it cannot be explained by physics" or you can throw the pumpkin out the window. All of this can, in fact, be explained by physics. So the question you have to ask yourself is "Is that all?"

Or is there also an experience? I'm not talking about sound waves corresponding to talk about experience, or even brain waves corresponding to thought about it. I'm talking about that inner, subjective experience. It exists, so what is it? Can it be identified with the physics of firing neurons? Not a priori, certainly, but empirically? No, because all this will cover is causal relationships between physical structures. Qualia is not just relationships, it is absolute. Orange looks like something. What we say or think about orange is one thing, but the experience of it is something different. You can know everything we say and think about orange , but you can't know what it looks like until you experience it yourself. It is intrinsic, in that the experience of orange is what it is, regardless of the particular context it is presented.

I don't think anyone claims there is no inner subjective world, many just feel that this is nothing more than neurons, somehow. But neurons are defined entirely by structure and function. There is no intrinsic "neuron." There is a structure made of protein and other biological chemicals which performs certain roles, like metabolism and passing on of electric signals. This is all a neuron is. But qualia aren't defined this way. They do not have functions, and they do not have to have structure. These can't possibly be the same thing.

 

[loseyourname]

It isn't just intuition. The problem is that physics can only explain functions and structure.

You've just made a variation on the same argument. Physical facts are facts about structure and function. Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function. Therefore, facts about experience are not physical facts. Can you really not see how question begging that is? 'Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function.' Says who? If it is so evident that this is the case, then why is there still any debate? It seems to me that this is what the antiphysicalist camp is seeking to prove. You can't just presuppose it as revealed truth and then use your revelation to divorce experience from science. It isn't that easy.

You say that because orange is "like something," that it cannot be the result of anything physical? Why? How do you make the leap? Who says that physical things can't be "like something?" This just goes to the question of whether qualitative content can be entailed by physicality alone. I brought up in another thread the question of whether novels written and read only by zombies could have themes and tones and such. The answer seemed to be yes. But these are all "like something." They are all qualities that cannot be expressed in scientific language. This just means that there are multiple ways to explain things. Take this quotation from Roger Scruton from a discussion of Spinoza:

• What I look at a picture I see physical objects: patches of pigments smeared on a canvas. And I can describe these objects so thoroughly as to account for the entire picture. In doing so, I do not mention the other thing that I see: a stag hunt passing before a country house. This too I could describe so thoroughly as to give a complete account of the picture. But the two accounts are incommensurable: I cannot cross from one to the other in midstream, so to speak. I cannot describe the lead hound as frantically pursuing a patch of ochre, or the area of yellow fused with oxydised lindseed oil as resting on a huntman's knee. In some such way, Spinoza is saying, the complete description of the body described the very same thing as the complete description of the mind . . .

No one ever seems to grant that this is even possible. Why can't mental states be described in either physical or qualitative terms, with both giving complete accounts? Why do simply assume that a physical account that doesn't talk about qualia is incomplete, or vice versa? Given that Spinoza wrote his major works several hundred years ago, it's not like this is a new idea.

 

[StatusX]

You've just made a variation on the same argument. Physical facts are facts about structure and function. Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function. Therefore, facts about experience are not physical facts. Can you really not see how question begging that is?

To be fair, it isn't question begging. I really think that experiences are more than structure and function, and it is because of this that I think they are unphysical, not the other way around.

'Facts about experience are not facts about structure and function.' Says who? If it is so evident that this is the case, then why is there still any debate?

Because it means giving up physicalism, something many people don't want to do.

You say that because orange is "like something," that it cannot be the result of anything physical? Why? How do you make the leap? Who says that physical things can't be "like something?" This just goes to the question of whether qualitative content can be entailed by physicality alone. I brought up in another thread the question of whether novels written and read only by zombies could have themes and tones and such. The answer seemed to be yes. But these are all "like something." They are all qualities that cannot be expressed in scientific language. This just means that there are multiple ways to explain things. Take this quotation from Roger Scruton from a discussion of Spinoza:

• What I look at a picture I see physical objects: patches of pigments smeared on a canvas. And I can describe these objects so thoroughly as to account for the entire picture. In doing so, I do not mention the other thing that I see: a stag hunt passing before a country house. This too I could describe so thoroughly as to give a complete account of the picture. But the two accounts are incommensurable: I cannot cross from one to the other in midstream, so to speak. I cannot describe the lead hound as frantically pursuing a patch of ochre, or the area of yellow fused with oxydised lindseed oil as resting on a huntman's knee. In some such way, Spinoza is saying, the complete description of the body described the very same thing as the complete description of the mind . . .

No one ever seems to grant that this is even possible. Why can't mental states be described in either physical or qualitative terms, with both giving complete accounts? Why do simply assume that a physical account that doesn't talk about qualia is incomplete, or vice versa? Given that Spinoza wrote his major works several hundred years ago, it's not like this is a new idea.

There is a big difference between the qualitative content of a novel and that of an experience. The former can be phrased in the language of structure/function, while the latter cannot. The tones and themes of a novel can be completely described by referring to how they affect our physical brain. The way an author's words affect our emotions are quantifiable, albeit well beyond any current methods. The reason is that the whole chain of events, from photons bouncing off ink to neural signals, is physical. Once we have accounted for every possible effect a tone or theme can have on us, we have exhaustively accounted for it.

Experiences, on the other hand, are not just difficult to describe. The best poets in the world, or the best neuroscientists in the world, can only give a functional account. They can describe how an experience affects our mood, what it causes us to do or say, or relate it to other experiences to evoke similar feelings. But this does not exhaust what that experience is, because there is still something it is like to be having it.

 

[loseyourname]

To be fair, it isn't question begging. I really think that experiences are more than structure and function, and it is because of this that I think they are unphysical, not the other way around.

Thinking that experiences are more than structure and function and thinking that experiences are more than physical are exactly the same thought! "Structure and function" is just another way of saying "physical." That is exactly why it is question-begging to prove one by presupposing the other.

Because it means giving up physicalism, something many people don't want to do.

Why is it that you think this? What exactly does a physicalist give up by giving up physicalism? His science will be just as effective and useful, and still just as dictatorially in control of its realms, as it was when he was a physicalist. The reason there is debate isn't because one side or the other is being obstinate in not wanting to let go of a cherished world-view. To suggest that is simplistic and bordering on insulting. The reason there is debate is because the matter isn't as cut-and-dry obvious as you want to think.

There is a big difference between the qualitative content of a novel and that of an experience. The former can be phrased in the language of structure/function, while the latter cannot.

I disagree. A description of the qualities of a novel in neuroscientific language isn't going to do it for me, just as a neuroscientific description of the qualities of experience won't do it for you.

Experiences, on the other hand, are not just difficult to describe. The best poets in the world, or the best neuroscientists in the world, can only give a functional account. They can describe how an experience affects our mood, what it causes us to do or say, or relate it to other experiences to evoke similar feelings. But this does not exhaust what that experience is, because there is still something it is like to be having it.

Now you seem to be saying that no qualitative or physical description will do it for you, that experience is simply inexplicable by any means.

 

[StatusX]

I disagree. A description of the qualities of a novel in neuroscientific language isn't going to do it for me, just as a neuroscientific description of the qualities of experience won't do it for you.

But don't you see, that really is all there is to it. What could there possibly be to the theme or tone besides every possible reaction we might have to it? The only thing that can't be accounted for is the subjective experience of the emotions and thougts the novel gives rise to.

Now you seem to be saying that no qualitative or physical description will do it for you, that experience is simply inexplicable by any means.

That may be, but it should at least be acknowledged. The reason I think many physicalists are so stubborn is that we want to believe we can understand every facet of nautre, and consciousness is at least one area where it's not so obvious this can be done, so they deny the hard problem.

 

[Canute]

Status X

I agree with most of what you've said here. In particular I agree that it is only stubbornness or wishful thinking that keeps alive the idea that qualia can be explained scientifically.

Still, what seems obvious to you and me does not appear at all obvious to many others. Perhaps it's worth coming at this from another angle by trying to imagine what a scientific explanation of qualia would look like.

How would the explanation make the leap from physical and observable brain process to non-physical and unobservable qualia? Anyone who tries to sketch out such an explanation must soon discover, whatever form their explanation takes, that there is in principle no way to leap across the explanatory gap between brain functions and processes to subjective experiences. There just isn't a scientific way of doing it, however much we learn about the brain. If there was a way then by now we'd at least expect to have one or two acceptable working hypotheses as to how brain and mind are related.

Even if we knew everything there is to know about the brain states that correlate to the appearance of various qualia we would be no closer to explaining why these states give rise to qualia as opposed to just further brain functions and processes.

 

[Tournesol]

I don't think anyone claims there is no inner subjective world, many just feel that this is nothing more than neurons, somehow. But neurons are defined entirely by structure and function.

Nothing that concretely exists is 'just' structure and function...S & F are abstractions. They are a way of talking about things, not stuff tht things can be made of.

Qualia do not have functions,

Subjectively, they do have causal roles. Note that a 'causal role' is on
the concrete side of the abstract/concrete divide.

 

[loseyourname]

But don't you see, that really is all there is to it. What could there possibly be to the theme or tone besides every possible reaction we might have to it? The only thing that can't be accounted for is the subjective experience of the emotions and thougts the novel gives rise to.

Does a novel then cease to have any qualities if there aren't any people around to read it? Does the painting only contain pigments, and no hunt scene, if no person is there to view it?

That may be, but it should at least be acknowledged. The reason I think many physicalists are so stubborn is that we want to believe we can understand every facet of nautre, and consciousness is at least one area where it's not so obvious this can be done, so they deny the hard problem.

And you give no creedence whatsoever to the possibility presented by Spinoza that both descriptions are complete descriptions that are simply looking at the same thing in different ways?

 

[Tournesol]

No one ever seems to grant that this is even possible. Why can't mental states be described in either physical or qualitative terms, with both giving complete accounts?

Well, it happens to be the case that physical accounts don't capture the
what-it-seems-like aspects of experience, and if we suppose that
physical accounts are inherently extrinsic and quantative, and that
subjectivity is inhernetly intrinsic and qualiative, both of which seem
reasonable in their own right, we can see why the explanatory gap should arise. OTOH, both descriptions can account for the production of behaviour, so in that sense they overlap, and there is no danger of epiphenomenalism.

 

[StatusX]

Nothing that concretely exists is 'just' structure and function...S & F are abstractions. They are a way of talking about things, not stuff tht things can be made of.

That's true, but physics is just structure and function. Basically, physics is a very specific kind of math, with the extra axiom that "this is all real." In fact, maybe qualia is what makes physics real. The difference between a universe where the fine structure constant is 1/731 and one where it is 1/137 is that we experience the latter but not the former.

Subjectively, they do have causal roles. Note that a 'causal role' is on
the concrete side of the abstract/concrete divide.

The subjective feeling of a causal role is not a causal role. But I do agree, they must have some kind of causing power because we can talk about them. What I'm talking about when I say "non-functional" is the specifc nature of the qualia. Exactly what it is that red looks like is not related to its functional role, or at the very least, not exhaustively described by it.

 

[StatusX]

Does a novel then cease to have any qualities if there aren't any people around to read it? Does the painting only contain pigments, and no hunt scene, if no person is there to view it?

It isn't important to the general definition whether a specific instance of a painting or novel is being observed. If you're asking whether theme would still be a meaningful concept if there were no humans in the universe, yes it would. It would be described in terms of hypothetical creatures called humans and the way they would express their thoughts and emotions with language, if they existed. On the other hand, "qualia" is not a meaningful conept in a universe without experiencers, because to know what a qualia is is to experience it.

And you give no creedence whatsoever to the possibility presented by Spinoza that both descriptions are complete descriptions that are simply looking at the same thing in different ways?

Well of course they are. We experience what is in our brain. The question is how are they aspects of that thing, and what it is. The claim physicalists make is that they are the same thing looked at the same way, and that to explain how neurons work is to explain experience.

 

[Tournesol]

Exactly what it is that red looks like is not related to its functional role, or at the very least, not exhaustively described by it.

Of course not. A functional (computational functionalism) role is just an abstract description, and as
such abstracts away the concrete properties of whatever system
implements it. The 'explanatory gap' is just a special case of not
being able to get back from the abstract to the concrete, because in
going from the concrete to the abstract a certain amount is left out.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Anyone see the irony in trying to rationally justify what by definition can only be experienced? One doesn't "think" the taste of a pizza, and one doesn't "feel" logic. So how is one going to prove or logically justify the existence of qualia?

 

[loseyourname]

One doesn't "think" the taste of a pizza, and one doesn't "feel" logic. So how is one going to prove or logically justify the existence of qualia?

That's fine, but experience alone doesn't lead us to the conclusion that what we experience is non-physical in nature. Experience only leads us to the conclusion that what we experience is yellow, or hot, or painful or whatever. It tells us nothing about the origin and/or nature of these experiences. Theory is required to make the leap to the definition that Status posted, which overtly stated that, in order to qualify as qualia, the content of an experience must not have any physical explanation. We can, of course, reason about our experiences and come to these conclusions in light of the theoretical framework that we develop. Most here think that they've reasoned to the conclusion that the contents of their experiences must be non-physical qualia. I think that their reasoning is not sound, and furthermore that there is absolutely nothing in my experience itself to lead me in either direction. I experience yellow, hot, and pain, not physical or non-physical.

 

[Canute]

Are you arguing that pain is physical? That doesn't make much sense to me. The causes of pain can be physical and can be invetigated by theorising, but how can the pain itself, without which any theory of its cause cannot get off the ground, be physical? If it is then I'd want to ask what you mean by 'physical'?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Theory is required to make the leap to the definition that Status posted, which overtly stated that, in order to qualify as qualia, the content of an experience must not have any physical explanation.

I believe he's correct, that's always how I've understood qualia.

We can, of course, reason about our experiences and come to these conclusions in light of the theoretical framework that we develop. Most here think that they've reasoned to the conclusion that the contents of their experiences must be non-physical qualia. I think that their reasoning is not sound, and furthermore that there is absolutely nothing in my experience itself to lead me in either direction. I experience yellow, hot, and pain, not physical or non-physical.

I understand the argument, I just don't agree that reason is going to provide the final answer on this question. Rather, it is through deepening one's experience of consciousness that one understands the mysterious character we're labeling "qualia." I say you will never get it by thinking because you are missing information about the nature of consciousness which you can only acquire through experience itself. And the irony is, the more one tries to figure it out, the further away from knowing anything about it one becomes.

 

[Billy T]

a third choice

I voted yes, not physical. Read the thread back to post 40 and was impressed by its quality. It may not be completely accurate, but in this and the question of consciousness etc. there seem to be two camps. The physicalists (mind is brain etc.) and the idealists (no it is not). Few non-religious idealists now days want to go as far as to claim the existence of a soul, thinking non-material matter (Descarte et al), but only that no machine/ computer could be conscious, have qualia, or for those of you familiar with the term, "intentionality."

Several of the posters here have participated in thread I started (What Price Free Will) but as some have not, I will attach here the "third way" - Namely in the physical brain, specifficly the parietal cortex, a real-time simulation of the physical world is running when we are awake or dreaming. In my view we are only information, nothing physical, in that simulation. We expereince only the things created in that simulation. Most of the things relate to (model) objects in the physical world, but not all. The often cited example of "red experience" being one. (If not familiar with Frank Jackson's "knowledge argument" - Mary knows everything possible (factual) about red, but has never seen it, then does. - Is persuasive to me that qualia are something over and above facts / physical states.)

As I believe everything I experience is only non-physical information, I have no problem with qualia being non physical, but real. In fact, the things I experience are the only reason I can (perhaps erroneously, but I think not) infer there is a physical world. That is, for me, qualia, have a better claim to being "real" than the inferred physical world. I experience them directly, I do not infer their existence.

Read attachment, if you have not already done so, for more details, and three proofs that the current view of cognitive scientists about perception is wrong.

 

[Tournesol]

I believe he's correct, that's always how I've understood qualia. [as inherently nn-physical]

But the term was coined by C.I Lewis, and he does not require them to
be non-physical in his definition.

Rather, it is through deepening one's experience of consciousness that one understands the mysterious character we're labeling "qualia."

The only mystery about qualia is their relation to the physical , which is an
issue that arises with reason and must presumably be resolved by it. People
in ancient times never bothered about qualia becuase they just vaguely assumed that colours and so-on were just 'out there'. Qualia, as a concept,
arose in response to the scientific world-view.

 

[Les Sleeth]

But the term was coined by C.I Lewis, and he does not require them to be non-physical in his definition.

True. I suppose I meant what the term has come to stand for in two main divisions of the consciousness studies debate.

The only mystery about qualia is their relation to the physical , which is an issue that arises with reason and must presumably be resolved by it. People in ancient times never bothered about qualia becuase they just vaguely assumed that colours and so-on were just 'out there'. Qualia, as a concept, arose in response to the scientific world-view.

I see it as two different issues: 1) the relationship of consciousness to the physical, and 2) the fact that subjective experience exists at all. I agree the first issue is solvable by reason (most effectively, IMO, in the context of empirical research), but I don't believe the basis of subjective experience can be understood through reason or any objective discipline alone.

I don't know how you can say there is no mystery when we all have subjective experience, but we don't know what it is. How can that possibly be? It is a constant presence, the heart of consciousness, there is no "I" without it. It IS us, yet we are mystified as to how it came about or even what its nature is.

Apart from subjectivity is reason. I say it is apart because one needn't think anything to exist subjectively, and no thinking machine produces subjectivity (not yet anyway). So while intertwined, they are existentially independent as well, and consequently each has different rules for realization. If we want to know the taste of pizza, can we realize that by reason? We might be able to figure out how to make a more stretchy dough, or if we should go to one pizzeria or another, but there is no possible way to realize the taste of pizza through reason.

My overall point, then, is that the attempt to know the nature of qualia through reason employs the wrong method of realization. To realize the source of subjective experience, to really understand its nature, first one must learn to directly experience it (i.e., not reason about it sans that direct experience).

 

[Les Sleeth]

In fact, the things I experience are the only reason I can (perhaps erroneously, but I think not) infer there is a physical world. That is, for me, qualia, have a better claim to being "real" than the inferred physical world. I experience them directly, I do not infer their existence.

Good point.

 

[Tournesol]

True. I suppose I meant what the term has come to stand for in two main divisions of the consciousness studies debate.

I agree that is has acquired that implication, but I think it is very unfortunate -- it leads people to deny the obvious about their own
experience because they don't want consider anythign that smacks
of non-physicalism.

I see it as two different issues: 1) the relationship of consciousness to the physical, and 2) the fact that subjective experience exists at all. I agree the first issue is solvable by reason (most effectively, IMO, in the context of empirical research), but I don't believe the basis of subjective experience can be understood through reason or any objective discipline alone.

I can't see how you could come up with a good answer to (1) that
didn't explain (2) in the process. If the brain generates experience, and
it does so to enhance the organisms survival-value, that explains why
we have experience at all. Are you working from the epiphenomenal position
that consciousness doesn't do anything ?

I don't know how you can say there is no mystery when we all have subjective experience, but we don't know what it is.

We don't know what it is in the (1) sense -- how it relates the physical.
Before people got the idea that it needs to be related to the physical,
no-one worried about it.

Apart from subjectivity is reason. I say it is apart because one needn't think anything to exist subjectively, and no thinking machine produces subjectivity (not yet anyway). So while intertwined, they are existentially independent as well, and consequently each has different rules for realization. If we want to know the taste of pizza, can we realize that by reason? We might be able to figure out how to make a more stretchy dough, or if we should go to one pizzeria or another, but there is no possible way to realize the taste of pizza through reason.

Well, we can figure out "a colour half-way between red and yellow"
by reason.

The aleged ineffability of qualia is exagerated and fuzzy--
how easy they are to think and communicate depends on exactly how you are
thinking and communicating. The problem becomes most acute in
the mathematical language of physics and computer science; I think
that gives us a clue about the nature of qualia.

My overall point, then, is that the attempt to know the nature of qualia through reason employs the wrong method of realization. To realize the source of subjective experience, to really understand its nature, first one must learn to directly experience it (i.e., not reason about it sans that direct experience).

And does that go on to answer the questions ? Is experience a sufficient criterion, or only a necessary one. Understanding involves relating things
together; if you build a wall between subjectivity and objectivity, you will never understand either.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I can't see how you could come up with a good answer to (1) that didn't explain (2) in the process. If the brain generates experience, and it does so to enhance the organisms survival-value, that explains why we have experience at all. Are you working from the epiphenomenal position that consciousness doesn't do anything ?

I am not working from the epiphenomenal position at all, but having the brain “generate” experience isn’t the only alternative. For example, the brain might draw consciousness into the CSN from a general pool of conscious that already exists universally, and in this way individuate it from that generality. So when you say there’s no good answer unless (1) explains (2), it seems you are assuming a fact that is still in dispute (that consciousness is physically spawned).

We don't know what it is in the (1) sense -- how it relates the physical.

Again, you are assuming the (1) sense will explain consciousness. I say it won’t. But if you can demonstrate something physical generating consciousness (such as AI), then you’ll have a stronger argument. As of now physicalist theory is nothing more than that, except they like to talk like theirs is the TRUTH even when they can’t yet make the case.

Before people got the idea that it needs to be related to the physical, no-one worried about it.

Who is “no one”? You mean, no Western thinkers? Plenty of people throughout history have sought to understand consciousness, not empirically or by rationalistic thought, but by deepening their ability to experience the self. You know, there is some logic in exploring subjectivity subjectively.

The West is only now getting to the problem, and since the approach is empirical they assume up front they are going to find the answers in the brain’s neuronal complex. Well, it just may not be found there.

Well, we can figure out "a colour half-way between red and yellow" by reason.

You missed the point. You can figure out concepts of color, you can’t figure out an experience of color. It’s interesting that thinking is experienced, but experience cannot be thought. Might that not indicate the primacy of experience in the proper functioning of consciousness (I’ll explain a bit more about what I mean at the end of this post)?

The alleged ineffability of qualia is exaggerated and fuzzy-- how easy they are to think and communicate depends on exactly how you are thinking and communicating. The problem becomes most acute in the mathematical language of physics and computer science; I think that gives us a clue about the nature of qualia.

One thing I’ve seen plenty of at this site is the dubious physicalist strategy of saying, “If we can’t explain it, we’ll dismiss it! It isn’t real! It’s an illusion!” Maybe the fuzzyness of qualia is due to trying to conceptualize something that can only be known by experience. Maybe the problem is the approach of the conceptualizers, and not with those who recognize there is something unique about subjective experience.

And does that go on to answer the questions? Is experience a sufficient criterion, or only a necessary one. Understanding involves relating things together; if you build a wall between subjectivity and objectivity, you will never understand either.

I’m not trying to build a wall between them, I am saying they are naturally different. I had nothing to do with making them that way, but I can recognize their distinctions and, with a little wisdom, understand how to make progress in each realm. If all you are trying to do it reduce everything to a concept, you’ll never get what I am saying.

What I see is people “living in their minds.” By that I mean they think so incessantly that it creates something like a perpetual mental semi-dream where they relate to their own concepts, beliefs, assumptions, aversions, desires, etc. more than they pay attention to reality. Who knows love better, the deeply loving person, or the brilliant philosopher who provides the perfect explanation? People confuse having great concepts with actually knowing, which is why we have so many geniuses running around advising everybody on what they really know little about experientially.

Give me the courageous experiencer any day of the week. I can trust him to speak and be what he knows instead of being a walking talking brain.

 

[Tournesol]

I am not working from the epiphenomenal position at all, but having the brain “generate” experience isn’t the only alternative. For example, the brain might draw consciousness into the CSN from a general pool of conscious that already exists universally, and in this way individuate it from that generality. So when you say there’s no good answer unless (1) explains (2), it seems you are assuming a fact that is still in dispute (that consciousness is physically spawned).

But (1) was stated as "the relationship of consc. to the physical".
The idea that "the brain might draw consciousness into the CSN from a general pool of conscious" is a conclusion about just that. If it correct,
it is the correct answer to (1) , it would also explain (2), the fact that we have subjective experience at all, in the process.

Again, you are assuming the (1) sense will explain consciousness. I say it won’t. But if you can demonstrate something physical generating consciousness (such as AI), then you’ll have a stronger argument. As of now physicalist theory is nothing more than that, except they like to talk like theirs is the TRUTH even when they can’t yet make the case.

Every known aspect of consc. can be affected by intervention in the physical
brain, and the idea that consc. is generated by the brain is the simplest
explanation for those facts.

Who is “no one”? You mean, no Western thinkers? Plenty of people throughout history have sought to understand consciousness, not empirically or by rationalistic thought, but by deepening their ability to experience the self. You know, there is some logic in exploring subjectivity subjectively.

I don't see much hope that that approach will solve the problem that
will address the particular concern of current Western society, the relationship between consc. and matter.

The West is only now getting to the problem, and since the approach is empirical they assume up front they are going to find the answers in the brain’s neuronal complex. Well, it just may not be found there.

If you are looking at neurons alone, you will not even be able to state
the HP.

You missed the point. You can figure out concepts of color, you can’t figure out an experience of color.

Well, I think you can to some extent. Beethoven could write music he
couldn't hear.

It’s interesting that thinking is experienced,

non-phenomenally

but

phenomenal

experience cannot be thought. Might that not indicate the primacy of experience in the proper functioning of consciousness (I’ll explain a bit more about what I mean at the end of this post)?

One thing I’ve seen plenty of at this site is the dubious physicalist strategy of saying, “If we can’t explain it, we’ll dismiss it! It isn’t real! It’s an illusion!” Maybe the fuzzyness of qualia is due to trying to conceptualize something that can only be known by experience.

I was not arguing against qualia, but against an experience-only
approach (the inverse of the physicalism you complain about)
If we stick to experience alone, we cannot even state the HP

What I see is people “living in their minds.” By that I mean they think so incessantly that it creates something like a perpetual mental semi-dream where they relate to their own concepts, beliefs, assumptions, aversions, desires, etc. more than they pay attention to reality. Who knows love better, the deeply loving person, or the brilliant philosopher who provides the perfect explanation?

know-that or know how ?

 

[Les Sleeth]

But (1) was stated as "the relationship of consc. to the physical". The idea that "the brain might draw consciousness into the CSN from a general pool of conscious" is a conclusion about just that. If it correct,
it is the correct answer to (1) , it would also explain (2), the fact that we have subjective experience at all, in the process.

Not necessarily. I would say the physical intensifies subjective experience rather than creates it. But the neuronal advocates are trying to attribute the whole ball of wax to the physical . . . from start to finish. Isn't that where you stand?

Every known aspect of consc. can be affected by intervention in the physical brain, and the idea that consc. is generated by the brain is the simplest explanation for those facts.

But so what? Let's say your mind could be transported to another planet far, far away by a sophisticated robotic device. Once there, you can will the robot to walk around and do things; you can smell and taste through it; you can think with it and learn things. The one caveat is that to participate in this alien experience, you temporarily lose all memory of your life on Earth when you are drawn into the robot, and have to accept total dependence on the machine.

What that means is, if the AI circuitry of that device is messed with, your mind is messed with too because you are (temporarily) totally dependent on it to remain on that alien planet. Of course, if you walk your robot off a cliff and lose your connection, then you will return to your conscious life on Earth and remember everything.

When the "simplest explanation" is the one that merely benefits someone's belief system, I suspect that is not what William of Ockham was intending for his razor.

I don't see much hope that that approach will solve the problem that will address the particular concern of current Western society, the relationship between consc. and matter.

That's right, especially if Western society is clueless about what consciousness really is. What if a bunch of accountants decided to figure out what joy is by applying the most advance accounting methods known to humanity? Would they ever achieve insight? Just because rationality and empirical research works for lots of stuff doesn't mean it works for everything.

Well, I think you can to some extent. Beethoven could write music he couldn't hear.

True, and I can write a story about a place I've never been. Do you really believe that a concept of something is the same as the experience of it? If you were starving to death, could you feed yourself with the concept of food? It seems like you aren't properly differentiating between reality and the image of reality represented in your mind.

I was not arguing against qualia, but against an experience-only approach (the inverse of the physicalism you complain about)
If we stick to experience alone, we cannot even state the HP

The hard problem IS experience, yet you want to grasp it with the easy problem (demonstrated brain functionality)! If that were possible, then you could program a computer to solve the hard problem.

 

[Tournesol]

What that means is, if the AI circuitry of that device is messed with, your mind is messed with too because you are (temporarily) totally dependent on it to remain on that alien planet. Of course, if you walk your robot off a cliff and lose your connection, then you will return to your conscious life on Earth and remember everything.

I am well aware that other explanantions than the physicalist one are compatible with the facts; there are always an infinite number of explanantions to fit the facts. That's why we need occam's razor.

When the "simplest explanation" is the one that merely benefits someone's belief system, I suspect that is not what William of Ockham was intending for his razor.

Unless you can provide a specific reason to reject the physicalist solution,
that comment rebounds on you: you are rejecting physicalism, despite
its simplicity, because it doesn't fit your belief system.

Would they ever achieve insight? Just because rationality and empirical research works for lots of stuff doesn't mean it works for everything.

Again, I am arguing for a two-handed subjective+objective approach.

True, and I can write a story about a place I've never been. Do you really believe that a concept of something is the same as the experience of it?

The ability of Beethoven to perform an aesthetic activity such as composition without literally having the actual experiences indicates, to my mind, that
the quale/concept distinction is a fuzzy one.

It seems like you aren't properly differentiating between reality and the image of reality represented in your mind.

There is a difference between eating food and imagining you are eating food.

There isn't a difference between "realy" being in pain and "merely feeling" that you are in pain. That is one of the unique features of subjectivity.

The hard problem IS experience,

No. As defined by Chalmers, it is the relationship between experience and
the physical.

yet you want to grasp it with the easy problem (demonstrated brain functionality)!

No, I am noting that all the evidence points towards the idea that consc. being genrated by the brain. How this happens is another matter entirely.

 

[Canute]

I'm not aware of any evidence that brain causes consciousness, can you give some examples? Nor can I understand why you say that the simplest answer to the consciousness question is that it is physically caused. Why is this any simpler than Les's answer?

Beethoven could imagine that he hear in his mind what he was writing perfectly well when he was deaf by the way. A good musician can hear the orchestra playing just by looking at the score. If he had been deaf since birth that would be a different case, but as it is his deafness tells us nothing in general about qualia.

 

[Tournesol]

I'm not aware of any evidence that brain causes consciousness, can you give some examples?

Where do I start ? The whole of psychology and neuroscience supports this
idea. Every identified aspect of consciousness can be affected by drugs, surger,
injusry to the brain etc. The only counterargument anyone has is the
'receiver' idea, the idea that the brain just picks up consciousness from somewhere
else, and physical interventions affect its ability to do so, not "consciousness itself"

Nor can I understand why you say that the simplest answer to the consciousness question is that it is physically caused. Why is this any simpler than Les's answer?

Because it has a simpler ontology. It doesn't require a Universal Consciousness Field that spends millions of years hanging around waiting for a nervous system to manifest in.

Beethoven could imagine that he hear in his mind what he was writing perfectly well when he was deaf by the way. A good musician can hear the orchestra playing just by looking at the score. If he had been deaf since birth that would be a different case, but as it is his deafness tells us nothing in general about qualia.

It tells us that the ineffability of qualia is not absolute; in some cases we
can make good guesses at them without being exposed to them.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I am well aware that other explanantions than the physicalist one are compatible with the facts; there are always an infinite number of explanantions to fit the facts. That's why we need occam's razor.

Occam’s razor, as a methodology, is a bias toward simplicity that has proven useful to empirical research, which is exclusively physical. Therefore, when a physicalist claims this methodology necessitates getting rid of irrelevant components during a dispute over whether something is entirely physical or not, the call for Occam’s razor is a self-serving tactic.

The core of the debate is if physicalness is producing consciousness or not. So if you can’t find it through methods designed to reveal only the physical, how can you then say Occam’s razor demands we eliminate (from modeling discussions) the very thing physical research is going to miss?

Unless you can provide a specific reason to reject the physicalist solution, that comment rebounds on you: you are rejecting physicalism, despite its simplicity, because it doesn't fit your belief system.

I don’t have a belief system, I am waiting until there are more facts before drawing a final conclusion. I can say that I am looking at everything that has gone on/goes on in this world, and not just the physical factors. I haven't met any physcialsts modeling with that sort of scope, so it is hard for me to respect their on consciousness thinking since I see it as narrow.

Further, I don't think physicalists are objective . . . they have decided a priori the world is physical and are determined to model that way even if they have to ignore, dismiss, and razor out anything threatening to get in the way. As I’ve said in debates here before, debating physicalists over the last two plus years here has been no different that debating Biblical creationists who find ways to make their theories fit facts.

So yes, there are specific reasons to reject physicalism, if for no other grounds that it’s an “ism” and not impartial. It is committed to itself rather than the truth, and I’ll always fight that when I see it, especially when it’s done in the guise of dispassionate truth seeking.

No. As defined by Chalmers, it is the relationship between experience and the physical.

The hard problem is that physical principles cannot explain subjective experience, and therefore something more may be required to account for consciousness. The [physicalist] spin you put on the debate makes it sound like there’s nothing to the issue but figuring out how the brain does it.

No, I am noting that all the evidence points towards the idea that consc. being generated by the brain. How this happens is another matter entirely.

Some evidence points toward the brain’s involvement in consciousness, and other factors cannot yet be explained by brain physiology. I say, it is your a priori beliefs that make you jump to physicalist conclusions at every opportunity.

The ability of Beethoven to perform an aesthetic activity such as composition without literally having the actual experiences indicates, to my mind, that the quale/concept distinction is a fuzzy one.

That has nothing to do with the differences! He may have done it conceptually, from memory of sound, but that does not blur the distinction between the concept of music and the direct experience of music. Two completely different things.

There is a difference between eating food and imagining you are eating food. There isn't a difference between "really" being in pain and "merely feeling" that you are in pain. That is one of the unique features of subjectivity.

Again, you cannot seem to differentiate between mentality and raw experience. The experience of physical pain—whether it is stimulated by a smack over the head, one’s delusions, or an electrode hooked to the brain—is experience if pain is actually felt. If, on the other hand, a person is imagining pain and not actually feeling it anywhere, then that is mental.

Mentality is based on conceptualization, reason, logic, imagination; experience is based on sensitivity . . . two different things. We know this because we have clearly distinguished them for doing science. There is hypothesis and there is observation. They work together, but you cannot substitute one for the other and do science properly.

 

[Tournesol]

Occam’s razor, as a methodology, is a bias toward simplicity that has proven useful to empirical research, which is exclusively physical. Therefore, when a physicalist claims this methodology necessitates getting rid of irrelevant components during a dispute over whether something is entirely physical or not, the call for Occam’s razor is a self-serving tactic.

I disagree. The question of simpicity applies to all explanations. An explanation in terms of 1 disembodied spirit is better than an explantion
in termsof 23.

The core of the debate is if physicalness is producing consciousness or not. So if you can’t find it through methods designed to reveal only the physical, how can you then say Occam’s razor demands we eliminate (from modeling discussions) the very thing physical research is going to miss?

I never said we eliminate consciousness per se. I said the idea that
consciousness is separate from matter an universal is an unnecessary
complication, since you still have to explain how a person, as a material
being, cpatures (or receives or concentrates) it.

I don’t have a belief system,

You clearly have certain biases.

I am waiting until there are more facts before drawing a final conclusion. I can say that I am looking at everything that has gone on/goes on in this world, and not just the physical factors. I haven't met any physcialsts modeling with that sort of scope, so it is hard for me to respect their on consciousness thinking since I see it as narrow.

There is a difference between the kind of physicalist who
admits that consc. is at least closely connected to brain function,
and that kind that rejects everything that cannot be reduced
to the language of physics.

Further, I don't think physicalists are objective . . . they have decided a priori the world is physical and are determined to model that way even if they have to ignore, dismiss, and razor out anything threatening to get in the way.

Some physicists are a-priori dogatiasts, some are not.

So yes, there are specific reasons to reject physicalism, if for no other grounds that it’s an “ism” and not impartial.

Would you still reject a-poteriori physicalism ?

 

[Les Sleeth]

I disagree. The question of simpicity applies to all explanations. An explanation in terms of 1 disembodied spirit is better than an explantion in terms of 23.

Well, we are going to have to disagree HUGELY here because I think the Occam concept has a narrow, specialized application that is very much limited to observable physical situations. It doesn't work well when applied to metaphysical questions, whether one's metaphysics is physicalism or spiritualism or . . . (name your poison).

It makes no sense to state that simplicity is universally preferable to complexity. Have you followed any of the debates here by people trying to over-simplify relativity? If something is complex, then it would be moronic to try to make it simple.

Occam's razor was never meant to be interpreted as asserting simplicity is automatically preferable to complexity. It is merely a way of stating that when you have everything you need to explain something, then get rid of all the excess baggage. It is NOT a formula for incessantly being simplistic, especially if that becomes a ploy for "dismissing" things that really aren't explained by one's pet theory.

When it comes to consciousness (specifically qualia/subjectivity), it is not explained by physicalness. I say, the only reason physcialists what to simplify in this case is so they can promote their dogma.

You clearly have certain biases.

And that would be . . .

I am uncommitted, but I am also not going to deny experiences with my own consciousness which do not conform to physicalist theory.

Would you still reject a-poteriori physicalism ?

I don't reject a posteriori physical theorizing. It is a practical and useful exercise to try to model that way. What I object to is individuals clearly committed to physicalism glossing over what is missing from physicalist theory, who won't admit that all they are looking at is physicalness and that is why they see nothing else, and who act like they already know the "truth" when really they are as in the dark as everybody else about certain things.

 

[learningphysics]

The question of "why does experience exist" is not a scientific problem, any more than the question of "why does gravity exist".