The Illusion of Free Will: A Scientific Perspective

[skeptic2]

Welcome to Physics Forums even though you haven't officially arrived yet because you still have zero posts.

Think of all the program variations that are possible in writing a game versus the number that would result in a game that will actually run. Now think of the probability that all the instructions for your next game were encoded in the chaos 13.7 billion years ago and that the universe has been unfolding deterministically like a computer program all these billions of years, resulting only now in your producing a computer game.

 

[Quiksilver421]

Welcome to Physics Forums even though you haven't officially arrived yet because you still have zero posts.

Think of all the program variations that are possible in writing a game versus the number that would result in a game that will actually run. Now think of the probability that all the instructions for your next game were encoded in the chaos 13.7 billion years ago and that the universe has been unfolding deterministically like a computer program all these billions of years, resulting only now in your producing a computer game.

Yeah, what's up with the whole zero post thing?

I'm just not sure if we'd have to build a time machine to gather the data from 13.7 b.y.a, or if we could map out the trajectory of present day atoms/mass.

For option 1- IDK:rofl:

For option 2 we'd have to create a bubble-wrap sphere of spheres within spheres w/a layered curtain of these sensors on the x & y axis' (to cover the holes in between the outer spheres). Although, by measuring the "mass/atoms" we'd end up changing their trajectories for any future data points in the QikSphere (<-made it up) Maybe offset the spheres to counteract the previous spheres interaction (like bouncing a laser off 2000 mirrors, leaving the end trajectory unchanged). :uhh: We'd have to do this to the whole freaking Universe

Seeing step one instead of step 1.37x10^10 would be preferable. Mapping out everything that ever happened... ever... is unfathomable!

Im all for option 1

Ps- I suck at sentence structure, Sry.

 

[eloheim]

Let's define a meaningful decision as an action or decision that benefits the organism that makes it.

That is quite a loaded definition. What does "beneficial" mean exactly? For example, if you're talking about AN organism, it's hard to see how that organism cares about events that will occur long after it is deceased. Now if you're saying that, e.g., ending up with the stunning girl is beneficial to me because I get to enjoy her beauty and make my rivals envious, then to me that makes more sense.

If we accept that there exist meaningful decisions, then we have to decide whether the meaning of those decisions was encoded somehow into primordial chaos that existed at the big bang and which has simply played out by pure determinism since then or whether it occurs by free will.

I know this has been covered before, but even without a predetermined cosmos, that does not ensure that there exists free will. Alternatively, things could (merely) be the result of blind chance. I suppose in some conceptions the determinism is "recovered" on the scale of a multiverse, but this is really not necessary.

 

[skeptic2]

Alternatively, things could (merely) be the result of blind chance.

Does maintaining a car on the road and obeying traffic laws, not only you but all the drivers on all the roads, seem like it could be the result of blind chance?

 

[Whovian]

I just feel like pointing something out. Sorry if I'm acting too scientific for this forum. We haven't rigorously defined free will, so I really can't say whether or not free will can exist with our current understanding of the universe.

Does maintaining a car on the road and obeying traffic laws, not only you but all the drivers on all the roads, seem like it could be the result of blind chance?

Well, no, but there is a reason it was stated as the result of blind chance. In a non-closed system, order can arise.

 

[eloheim]

We haven't rigorously defined free will, so I really can't say whether or not free will can exist with our current understanding of the universe

Well, to me, it means "input" into the universe outside the normal course of the physical evolution of the systems involved. For example, if the universe were a computer program, free will would be if it stopped at certain points, and awaited input from a user sitting at the terminal. So, in other words, there is an intelligence making choices that are more than just the standard 'churning' of the algorithms.

And, as a side note, to address the "free will vs. determinism" issue, discussed above. The computer program could make use of a random number generator, so that its exact outcomes could not be predicted. Like the free will (user input) example, the program could freeze at certain points and proceed based upon the result of the random number generator. Obviously this would make it indeterminant, but also in no way free, or intelligent.

I take it other people may disagree or consider this definition too radical. If so I'd like to hear alternative ideas about the nature of free will.

 

[Maui]

If we accept that there exist meaningful decisions, then we have to decide whether the meaning of those decisions was encoded somehow into primordial chaos that existed at the big bang and which has simply played out by pure determinism since then or whether it occurs by free will. The former is very similar to the concept of deism.

Frankly I have no idea how free will could occur but the alternative, that of all our technology, laws and arts existed in some sense at the big bang, is far more difficult to accept.

In that no-faster-than-light mechanistic universe, we would not have encountered entanglement between space-like separated particles. So either the idea of the existence of such a universe is wrong or we haven't even begun to understand the universe and don't really know what we mean by 'universe', which leaves the question about freewill open.

 

[John Creighto]

What exactly is free will. If your actions aren’t determined by the laws of nature then what are they determined by? Is it our soul, and if so what would make this concept of a soul distinct from nature? It is fine to argue immigrant properties but if we can’t define and measure these properties then what use is such an argument? There is an alternative view of reductionism where what is small is determined by what is large (this is an anti-reductionism) and this would match the free will theorem mentioned above.

This anti-reductionism actually make such ridiculous views as Schweitzer’s cat possible such a viewpoint would be very uncomfortable to science because we can’t measure free will and consequently couldn’t derive deterministic laws of science from such a (property?). Moreover even if their was such thing as free will which partly determines nature all evidence suggests that we are constrained by the laws of nature.

How can any form of dualism be reconciled with our inability to influence the nature beyond what can be modeled with a form of determinism?

 

[Maui]

What exactly is free will. If your actions aren’t determined by the laws of nature then what are they determined by?

This way of thinking leads back to the Big Bang where everything was an undivided whole and because it's not understood(and very likely never will), one can say its potential for explanation of philosophical quesions is very close to zero. You could as well ask - if your actions are determined by the laws of nature(the properties of the constituents that sprung forth during the BB), what determined these properties so that self-reflecting intelligence would arise? There are no self-evident answers to these questions, are there?

Is it our soul, and if so what would make this concept of a soul distinct from nature? It is fine to argue immigrant properties but if we can’t define and measure these properties then what use is such an argument? There is an alternative view of reductionism where what is small is determined by what is large (this is an anti-reductionism) and this would match the free will theorem mentioned above.

I'd guess people love to fill in vacant knowledge with whatever is most accessible to them - as they say "Too stupid to understand science? Try religion!" :)

On a side note, we know that nature abhors vacuum, so we can't put all the blame on them if we are unable to provide an adequate and satisfying answer to the deep questions(e.g. that of determinism and free will).

How can any form of dualism be reconciled with our inability to influence the nature beyond what can be modeled with a form of determinism?

One possibility is that all that is observable with the senses is not absolutely all that exists(we haven't reached the end, science is rather young and really just beginning). Call that hidden variables, yet unknown mechanisms or underlying reality, etc. The purported existence of dark energy is somewhat close to what i have in mind as "something" that can only be 'detected' and inferred as an influence on that which is observable.

 

[josh1492]

How I see determinism:
Determinism-if I do this the result will be that.
action A results in the effect C and etc

How I see free-will:
Free will-I can choose to complete any action or inaction based upon all conceivable possible actions or inactions. The result(effect) is not within my control but my ability to set an event or non event into action is under my complete control.

In my definitions determinism and freewill not only coexist but they are essentially two sides of the same coin. These concepts apply equally to thought as they do to physical action or communication. I am of the belief that to an extent your mental state is the composition of prior thoughts and experiences IE past thoughts determine how you conceptualize other events/thoughts.

I was trying to avoid delving into the semantics of how the OP perceives the world and offer my individual spin on the question.

 

[Whovian]

How I see free-will:
Free will-I can choose to complete any action or inaction based upon all conceivable possible actions or inactions. The result(effect) is not within my control but my ability to set an event or non event into action is under my complete control.

Alright. Please don't take this wrong. Here's what I think about why that kind of free will won't work. What one decides is based on a very complicated system (the brain), but its outcome is still determined by determinism (or, at least, "quantum determinism.") And so ... we've sort of taken care of that.

 

[DrSnarl]

I find it interesting that in a thread on free will, there is no mention of conscious experience. (If there was and I missed it, then I apologize.) How can we even begin to evaluate what "free will" means without first nailing down the elusive problem of conscious experience? It is like trying to explain the behavior of an object without even knowing what the object in question is.

I noticed that someone mentioned the idea of elementary particles having free will. That sounds absurd, but what if we state that a little bit differently? What if conscious experience is a fundamental property of the universe - something that is inseparable from even elementary particles? In other words, do electrons have experience? Is there "something that it is like to be an electron"? If so, then it is quite reasonable to think that advanced (ie. human) conscious experience could arise from matter. If that is the case, then the question of "free will" becomes somewhat misleading. In a sense, we would have free will because we ARE the universe, and the universe IS our will.

As an aside, many people reject this line of reasoning with the following type of counter: "That is complete nonsense. We know that conscious experience is purely a physical result of interactions between our neurons. There is nothing to explain." The rebuttal to this is fairly involved, but let me summarize it by saying that such an argument makes the mistake of equating observable output with conscious experience. It is theoretically possible for a human to behave in an indistinguishable fashion from any other human, and yet be completely unaware of its actions (like sleep walking). This is what is meant by the term "philosophical zombie". Such a zombie would have identical observable output, but would lack conscious experience.

Another attack against this line of reasoning is of this form: "Conscious experience MUST arise from neurological processes because there is no alternative." This is circular reasoning, and it also demonstrates a bit of hubris. There is so much about physics and the human brain that we do not understand.

Here is an interesting thought: Is it possible to model the human brain in a super huge computer? If so, and if conscious experience arises purely from neural interactions in the brain, then it is possible for a computer to have conscious experience. By extension, it would then be possible to write an equation for conscious experience (computers are nothing more than logical equation solvers). If we wrote this equation on a sufficiently large chalkboard, would we effectually give that chalk and chalkboard conscious experience? I would claim that the answer is "no", which invalidates the initial assumption that we can model the brain in a computer, no matter how big or advanced that computer is.

 

[skeptic2]

Whovian, I understand your argument and don't disagree with it, yet I still can't support pure determinism. The reason I can't makes me very uncomfortable because it is the same argument used by creationists or intelligent design advocates, both of which, I am strongly opposed to.

The issue is how to explain the self organization of nature. With regard to creationism, an effective mechanism, evolution, is sufficient to explain development of higher and higher life forms. However I can find no equivalent mechanism to explain how an organism manipulates nature to satisfy its needs. On a human scale that would include inventions, laws, software, literature and the understanding and usage of mathematics to name a few. The probability of these developments occurring by chance, even since the big bang is so remote, either we must consider that these developments were somehow encoded into the chaos of the big bang (Deism, which I don't support) or there must be some, yet undiscovered mechanism, that permits the selection of one effect among several for a given cause.

 

[josh1492]

Alright. Please don't take this wrong. Here's what I think about why that kind of free will won't work. What one decides is based on a very complicated system (the brain), but its outcome is still determined by determinism (or, at least, "quantum determinism.") And so ... we've sort of taken care of that.

What I mean is that free will is the ability to take an action or not to take an action(the number of inactions being infinitely greater than the number of actions) and determinism is the result of that action. Obviously you do not have control over the actual outcome but you have the freedom to choose an action based upon your perception of what the outcome will be. Determinism for me is another way of saying that a free will action will interact with the world and the result will be an "effect" or an "ineffect." Effect being a relational term that is only given meaning when compared or not compared to something else.

This is one of those subjects that I think everyone does understand in basically the same way but because of the complexity of how we interpret information, communicating the ideas with exact detail is very difficult. Even though we are thinking of the same concept communicating this to each other is very difficult...thus this is a shinning example of how breakdowns in communication occur when dealing with exact finite details.

 

[Goodison_Lad]

I find it interesting that in a thread on free will, there is no mention of conscious experience.

I agree, DrSnarl. I doubt there’d be a discussion at all unless we all had the conscious experience of feeling we have free will.

If free will is somehow an illusion, what is not illusory is the conscious experience of the illusion (although I’m sure I’ve seen conscious experience explained seriously as some sort of illusion!). If free will is real in the sense that some decision could be made that is beyond the inevitably of the physical laws playing themselves out, there is still some operational agency that is conscious of executing this free will.

I’m not sure whether ‘genuine’ free will in the absence of conscious experience would mean anything.

Is it possible to model the human brain in a super huge computer? If so, and if conscious experience arises purely from neural interactions in the brain, then it is possible for a computer to have conscious experience.

Your later point about whether modelling the human brain perfectly would produce a conscious computer or a philosophical zombie is another tough question. The key question would be: how could you tell the difference? Arthur C. Clarke commented that when he told people that one day sufficiently sophisticated computers might be built that had conscious emotions, those people put on a very impressive simulation of anger!

 

[josh1492]

Your later point about whether modelling the human brain perfectly would produce a conscious computer or a philosophical zombie is another tough question. The key question would be: how could you tell the difference? Arthur C. Clarke commented that when he told people that one day sufficiently sophisticated computers might be built that had conscious emotions, those people put on a very impressive simulation of anger!

I want to reference an episode of StarTrek, next generation, where Data was excluded from a life of slavery, as all the other robots had to do, because he had developed consciousness. Anyway, everyone knows that shortly after computers develop consciousness they will deem humans a threat to the planet and they will have to exterminate us, for our own good of course. :uhh:

 

[Quinzio]

What I mean is that free will is the ability to take an action or not to take an action(the number of inactions being infinitely greater than the number of actions) and determinism is the result of that action.

But how can this be proved ?
Imagine one takes a decision and the state of the universe is A
I mean, one should re-create the same exact situation A, and then observe that the subject takes another decision. But as we have not a time machine, that's impossible.

 

[Quinzio]

After watching a Sam Harris conference a question came to my mind.
Maybe it's been discussed several times, but I couldn't find any of that.

The starting point is that, according to determinism, the state of the universe in instant $t_1$ could be theoretically determined knowing its state at a previous instant $t_0$.
Well, let's take it for granted, which is not by the way.
Let's go back in the past, where every instant is predetermined by the instant before.
We may eventually arrive to a beginning, let's say the big bang.

Question is: what if all the matter at a certain moment (the first moment) was in an homogeneous state ? If all the matter was compressed into a hot dense sphere of homogeneous matter, then how can determinism be true ?

Otherwise, there must always be, in any moment, as much variables, as we find in a successive moment, otherwise it's not possible to determine the causes of the actual state of universe.
Is then determinism compatible with big bang theory ?

 

[josh1492]

But how can this be proved ?
Imagine one takes a decision and the state of the universe is A
I mean, one should re-create the same exact situation A, and then observe that the subject takes another decision. But as we have not a time machine, that's impossible.

you can recreate events. I can move something and put it back and move it again. Each event is unique but for the sake of determining the result of specific actions in relation to an effect you can do simulations. Kinda feel like I am explaining that that big red ball in the sky is what causes it to be light outside haha...clearly there is some disconnect here.

But I think you are trying to describe how our actions are pre-determined because of all past events and how we have no control of our own actions because we are merely byproducts of our environments. This may be somewhat true in a probabilistic sense..IE people in low income areas are X amount more likely to do Y. Or if you give someone an STD they are whatever % more likely to perform certain actions. But on the individual level it really is up to the individual. It does beg the question, if it is all individualistic, they why do probabilities exist? I think it is because the accumulated influence from a macroscopic event is much greater over a macroscopic area than it is felt over an individual area. In essence I can choose what affects me but when viewing a population as a whole you are going to end up with probabilistic trends. Even me as an individual I am subject to certain probabilities that certain events will influence my actions but then again I really do have the final say about what I choose to influence me.

 

[DrSnarl]

Arthur C. Clarke commented that when he told people that one day sufficiently sophisticated computers might be built that had conscious emotions, those people put on a very impressive simulation of anger!

Nice. :) I had not heard that one before.

 

[chiro]

One thing that I think is important in analyzing determinism has to do with a kind of local analysis in comparison to a non local analysis.

The local analysis could be seen as the current way we analyze things. Local analysis in this context refers to analyzing things in terms of local changes. Non-local analysis refers to analyzing things in terms of non-local changes.

The local analyses usually refer to what we know as differentials or finite differences. In other words when we want to analyze a system, we look specifically at how things change either instantaneously for a continuous/analytic system in terms of the finite differences between immediate time-steps for a finite difference system.

One thing that should be considered is a non-local analyses. In other words, instead of looking at completely local changes, instead consider what happens when we relate changes that are non-local. In other words, instead of dx/dt for a continuous system, consider CX/CT where CX is the change of X with respect to a non-local difference (as an example CT might be 1, 1.5 or even 100 or it could even be variable.

By doing this we consider the possibility that in systems of extreme complexity when we analyze them in terms of a local analysis, that same system may actually yield some more important information when considered in a non-local analysis.

What this means intuitively is that instead of thinking in terms of cause and effect in the short-term, we think about effects in the long term where there is a kind of delay involved instead of having effects happening instantaneously like we naturally expect them to in our local analysis way of thinking.

 

[RAuld]

Functor97,

I believe that much of your argument is otiose; what is relevant is the reality that we experience day-to-day. It seems to me that each of our exisences is governed by three factors:

1. Genetic a priori: that is, evolved characterisitcs such as ability to reason, sensory acuity, genotype and phenotype.

This is the deterministic part of our existence, that we cannot change, also known as fate.

2. Free Will: that is, the decisions that we make day-to-day, where our reason sorts between memory, current evidence from our senses, and our imagined future.

You must surely agree that you take decisions every day, some that you regret; you must sometimes choose to learn something new, and so are choosing to change your future experiences.

3. Chance: those things in life which you simply cannot control and can only account for in retrospect; the wheel of fortune of people who you walk by in the street, jobs that appear at opportune moments, etc.

It is your choice to make the most of these opportunities, or not.

In my view, there is determinism, free-will and random chance!

 

[jduster]

Assuming that there is random chance, then our "decisions" aren't meaningful either. They're just like "dice rolls" and it would be no more consequential than if we were at a fixed path.

 

[beanybag]

Jumping in, hi.

you can recreate events. I can move something and put it back and move it again. Each event is unique but for the sake of determining the result of specific actions in relation to an effect you can do simulations. Kinda feel like I am explaining that that big red ball in the sky is what causes it to be light outside haha...clearly there is some disconnect here.

The disconnect is that you don't seem to see that those are different events. It is not a recreation of the first event in any way, because it occurred at a different time (a few seconds later) under different circumstances (you have memory of moving the cup, it will have some warmth and oils from your hand from previously moving it, perhaps the liquid inside the cup also heated up from some of the kinetic motion, etc.) and probably the events differed as well (you moved the cup a a few centimeters differently than before, in a different arc, with different finger placement, etc.). You cannot recreate the exact event because the past affects the future. You have to undo every moment up to the specified one in order to recreate it. How do we observe you taking a different action than before, however? There'd have to be some outside observer (which is already suspect since observing is not a one-sided action) who is also outside of time - it isn't doable.

This is also why I think the debate is meaningless. Free Will is an incoherent idea. So what if we have free will and therefore possesses the ability to take a different action than we otherwise would have? We only ever end up taking one - it's functionally deterministic (not taking into account relativity, quantum uncertainty, and observer perspectives). And further, why would we take a different action? I take the actions I take because they are the ones I choose based on reason, conditioning, past experiences.. everything that makes me myself. Would any other decision really be mine? It simply doesn't make any sense.

But I think you are trying to describe how our actions are pre-determined because of all past events and how we have no control of our own actions because we are merely byproducts of our environments. This may be somewhat true in a probabilistic sense..IE people in low income areas are X amount more likely to do Y. Or if you give someone an STD they are whatever % more likely to perform certain actions. But on the individual level it really is up to the individual. It does beg the question, if it is all individualistic, they why do probabilities exist? I think it is because the accumulated influence from a macroscopic event is much greater over a macroscopic area than it is felt over an individual area. In essence I can choose what affects me but when viewing a population as a whole you are going to end up with probabilistic trends. Even me as an individual I am subject to certain probabilities that certain events will influence my actions but then again I really do have the final say about what I choose to influence me.

And this is why I think the idea of Free Will is dangerous. It let's people blame others for their circumstances. Sam Harris is exactly right that if you were them, atom for atom, you could not make a different decision than them because you would be them. It allows people to shrug off social responsibility by thinking that people choose to live the way they do. You recognize patterns of causality and still choose to toss them aside for some 'comforting' notion of free will and I don't understand it at all? Why would you want to be 'free' of your memories, reasoning, and bodily functions? They ARE you!

EDIT: I should also point out that free will seems to necessarily require a form of dualism or at least a working model of 'self', which is another concept I find to be incoherent (and illusory). I don't mean to entirely dismiss the qualia of self, free choice, and so on (as I go on to dismiss said qualia), but psychology does seem to have firmly destroyed most of our conceptualization of self - asking if 'I' made a choice can really break down semantically when we parse what 'I' am. I can't imagine a monoist out there who would advocate free will (speak up if I'm wrong please) and it would seem most are physcalists/naturalists (implying determinists or free will denialists). Dualism has enough problems as is -adding to that the incoherency of free will and you have a concept that should really be discarded.

 

[John Creighto]

My self (the molecules and fields which make up me) contain information of who I am and how I behave. The action of these molecules and forces are moved by my thoughts, and the laws which govern these movements I call reason. These laws are not fixed because through my thoughts and the information I process from the environment, I change these rules to achieve my purposes (my will). Well, what I do is governed by laws; who I am, is an interaction of my choices, my thoughts and my environment.

Well, what we do is determined by our state in a deterministic and partly random manner, we learn from each action, and grow in our understanding of the environment. Perhaps free will is not what we do in anyone situation but rather the intelligent process we go through in where we learn how to adapt our actions to the environment to achieve our ends.

 

[apeiron]

So what if we have free will and therefore possesses the ability to take a different action than we otherwise would have? We only ever end up taking one - it's functionally deterministic (not taking into account relativity, quantum uncertainty, and observer perspectives). And further, why would we take a different action? I take the actions I take because they are the ones I choose based on reason, conditioning, past experiences.. everything that makes me myself.

Broadly speaking, freewill boils down to the claim we can make conscious choices. We can always imagine doing otherwise.

If you trace the origins of the idea, you can see in the early days it was the realisation that individuals could do something other than their societies or base desires might demand. The reasoning mind could rise above two kinds of unthinking prompts for action.

This was turned into a dualistic religious deal. The source of this now absolute freedom to chose came from a soul.

Then it became a monistic scientific illusion. Newtonian mechanics reduced all causality to atomistic action and so it seemed any naturalistic account of consciousness or reasoning must be micro-deterministic. Outcomes are already fixed by their initial conditions.

So we go from a mild claim - we can make reasoned choices - to an opposing pair of extreme claims, an immaterial cause guarantees free choice vs material cause forbids actual choice.

As you say, the way out of this bind is just to accept that causes are hierarchical. There are macro-level causes (reason, conditioning, past experiences) that functionally determine our choices - or indeed, are responsible for shaping the fact of choice in the first place.

If you insist on viewing the issue of choice through a Newtonian microscope, the only causation you can see are the micro-circumstances of some present moment. It is how all your molecules are at some instant that "completely determines" the next instant - and every further instant to the end of time.

But if you step back to see the wider view, then you can see that the reasoning brain is having its choices "determined" by past experience, conditioning, etc, and having its actual choice "determined" by some anticipation of future results. So the initial conditions driving some moment of action indeed have a macro-extent, reaching both into a remembered past and a predicted future.

Newtonian particles of course do not enjoy this kind of extended, memory/expectation based view of the world so it is irrelevant to their modelling. But some notion of macro-scale causation is essential for the modelling of more complex systems like brains.

At this point, scientific fundamentalists will again want to insist that macro-causes still reduce completely to micro-causes. But this remains a hollow claim unless the micro-view can actually show us how to construct the kind of global "emergent" states that constitute a memory/expectation based process of conscious reasoning and choice.

Compare for example any attempt to model human choice in terms of molecular motions and game theory - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Game_theory

One demands infinite information - an unlimited number of measurements - because it has no way of fixing the higher level constraints. The other comes up with elegant and simple formulae by directly modelling those constraints.

The freewill debate has heat mainly because scientists get drawn into defending a strong ontological position - that all causality is local effective cause, Newtonian determinism. But science is really about modelling the world. It might be guided by certain ontological intuitions at times, but these are dispensable.

That is what distinguishes science. It becomes the art of the measurable rather than the defence of the immeasurable (whether that be immaterial souls, or the kinds of material descriptions of nature that would require infinite measurements).

 

[RAuld]

Assuming that there is random chance, then our "decisions" aren't meaningful either. They're just like "dice rolls" and it would be no more consequential than if we were at a fixed path.

I never could understand this type of reasoning!

It must be obvious to you as you go through each day that you take decisions: some based upon thorough reasoning because the consequences are too severe to make a mistake, some based upon intuition (i.e. - past experience manifest from the subconscious), some based upon instinct (i.e. - evolved reactions to certain situations).

Whether your decisions are "meaningful" or "consequential" is, frankly, moot. On a cosmological scale they aint, but to you and your family your actions (i'm sure) are important. To say otherwise is to argue from an objective, abstract rationality rather than the subjective experience of the everyday!

 

[Bill_McEnaney]

Guys, have you ever wondered whether determinism would undermine the knowledge(?) we at least seem to get from the natural sciences? Say circumstances, biology, laws of physics and so forth guarantee that I'll always draw the same conclusions when I'm under some set of condition or other. Then it's hard to know why I should trust my judgement any more or any less than I trust yours when you draw the opposite conclusions under exactly the same circumstances. What if deterministic factors guarantee that you'll believe that, say, water consists of H20 when it actually consists of something else instead?

 

[Goodison_Lad]

Then it's hard to know why I should trust my judgement any more or any less than I trust yours when you draw the opposite conclusions under exactly the same circumstances. What if deterministic factors guarantee that you'll believe that, say, water consists of H20 when it actually consists of something else instead?

If pure determinism is the way the universe is built then none of us has any choice about what we believe. Decision-making processes where I might weigh up the evidence, form a conclusion and then make the decision are themselves, by definition, determined.

So, if pure determinism operates, it doesn’t really matter whether my conclusion is right or yours is – they were each unavoidable and inevitable.

Only if the laws of nature contain some wiggle room can the notion of truly free choice be entertained – free, in this context, meaning being able to do something other than that which hard determinism dictates.

I don’t think determinism affects one way or another our understanding of the truth of natural law. Some might, deterministically, be compelled to reject certain evidence. Others would equally be compelled to accept it. In a universe that is not wholly deterministic, and real free will existed, some would be inclined to choose not to accept evidence, while others would be inclined to choose to accept it.

 

[Pythagorean]

Say circumstances, biology, laws of physics and so forth guarantee that I'll always draw the same conclusions when I'm under some set of condition or other.

But the "set of conditions" changes with new knowledge. Organisms change their behavior based on new information.

 

[chiro]

But the "set of conditions" changes with new knowledge. Organisms change their behavior based on new information.

This means that the systems themselves are implicitly defined rather than explicitly defined.

 

[thinker04]

Hi all, new here.

I have a question:

Consider that you were to build a contraption that was as such: A geiger counter that read the decay of an atom from a small radioactive substance, and was hooked up to a machine that flashed a light if it detected decay (Schrodinger's cat thought experiment, but without the cat, box, or poison). Or something similar to this (but for real and based on radioactive decay): http://www.thinkgeek.com/product/e9cb/

Let's also say you make the decision whether to eat breakfast or not in the morning based on if you see the light turn on or not within a 10 second period. If the light turns on within 10 seconds after you start your stopwatch, you eat. If it doesn't, you don't eat.

If radioactive decay is TRULY random, then would your life no longer be "determined" based on actions that could be predicted if all variables were known? Would you still not have "free will", since you would be trading your decision making process from normal deterministic sensory inputs to the random decay of an atom?

If there is some literature on this scenario somewhere, can someone point me in the direction of it please? I couldn't find anything... but don't blame me, it was decided billions of years ago that I would ask this question on this forum before finding anything :D

 

[Whovian]

Would you still not have "free will", since you would be trading your decision making process from normal deterministic sensory inputs to the random decay of an atom?

I imagine the argument for free will would be something along the lines of "you chose to determine your actions based upon the outcome of the experiment of your own free will."

If radioactive decay is TRULY random, then would your life no longer be "determined" based on actions that could be predicted if all variables were known?

Correct; to the best of our knowledge, QM completely ruins determinism, and almost certainly will continue to do so.

 

[Maui]

Hi all, new here.

I have a question:

Consider that you were to build a contraption that was as such: A geiger counter that read the decay of an atom from a small radioactive substance, and was hooked up to a machine that flashed a light if it detected decay (Schrodinger's cat thought experiment, but without the cat, box, or poison). Or something similar to this (but for real and based on radioactive decay): http://www.thinkgeek.com/product/e9cb/

Let's also say you make the decision whether to eat breakfast or not in the morning based on if you see the light turn on or not within a 10 second period. If the light turns on within 10 seconds after you start your stopwatch, you eat. If it doesn't, you don't eat.

If radioactive decay is TRULY random, then would your life no longer be "determined" based on actions that could be predicted if all variables were known? Would you still not have "free will", since you would be trading your decision making process from normal deterministic sensory inputs to the random decay of an atom?

I'd say the whole paradoxical combination freewill-causality-determinism went down the drain with the introduction of superpositions. Superpositions of states are notoriously anti-realistic, so much so that if taken seriously the whole issue turns into chasing a red herring. Put otherwise, superpositions don't imply that things happen because of causality, though they very certainly appear to follow a deterministic pattern from everything we have been able to observe thus far. The paradox of freewill and determinism appears only when causality is treated as fundamental, instead of being just one aspect of that which is observed(which is just a momentary state of fields). What's worse, i don't think we have a candidate for filling up the vacant places of previous believed-to-be fundamental concepts.

If there is some literature on this scenario somewhere, can someone point me in the direction of it please? I couldn't find anything... but don't blame me, it was decided billions of years ago that I would ask this question on this forum before finding anything :D

These are models and some are better than others. Their philosophical underpinnings are quite unclear, so yes philosophically they are more models than facts. The idea that e.g. the contents in one's imagination can be traced back to some grand unified field from 13.7 billion years ago is ridiculous.

 

[Pythagorean]

This means that the systems themselves are implicitly defined rather than explicitly defined.

Well firstly, the border between the two is defined generally by a layer of skin, and it's a border that allows many classes of molecules and energy signatures through, all with varying consequences, so the two are obviously intricately coupled.

But... whether it's implicit or explicit doesn't matter anyway. The question is whether the implicit process is a deterministic process.

We could go further back in time too... during abiogenesis... when the implicit processes were most certainly only allowed to come about because of the explicit processes occurring.