Is the real world deterministic?

[WaveJumper]

WaveJumper, I'm not sure I understand your use of "emergence" here. Emergent properties are not something that happen deterministically. Take the color red as an example of an emergent property. There is no intrinsic property of "red" in matter. But when you combine an apple, the proper lighting, my eyes and my brain, voila, the entire system taken as a whole gives you the emergent property of red. Red is a property of the system as a whole, though it is not a property of any of the individual parts by themselves. There is nothing extra needed besides individual atoms, though. No extra substance is needed to support "red." It is all right there in the configuration of the basic atomic system.

This is my take on emergent qualia in the philosophical sense. But yes, determinism would say that if at any point in time you knew the exact state of the universe, you could predict the future and know the past with absolute certainty.

No, i think your example was bad(i don't think anyone knows how/why we interpret certain wave frequences as 'red'). I referred to emergent properties as properties that were not there until a precise particular combination of molecules were accomplished(e.g. Life). And 'BAM', you have a system that behaves in ways that cannot be explained by the proprties of its constituents parts.

 

[kote]

No, i referred to emergent properties as properties that were not there until a precise particular combination of molecules were accomplished. And 'BAM', you have a system that behaves in ways that cannot be explained by the proprties of its constituents parts.

Causally I would say that irreducibility is not a necessary feature of emergence. You can always explain the system in terms of the atoms. Sometimes the system just throws off some extra 2nd order properties out of the chaos (like qualia/the color red).

I don't claim to know of any mechanism for why red is red either. I just know that it is , and that it corresponds to states in basic physics. There is no explaining emergent qualia from outside the system. I literally can't know what you're thinking without being you - without having the atoms of my body configured exactly the same as yours. But I do know that with the configuration of atoms my body currently has, I'm having the thoughts that I'm having.

If I were physically an exact clone of you, I believe I would be having the exact same thoughts that you are having. That's what it means to believe that qualia are reducible to physical systems. If you have the same physical system, you have the same qualia.

Getting back to the OP's topic, it all works out nicely and consistently in a deterministic world containing consciousness and free will.

 

[WaveJumper]

Causally I would say that irreducibility is not a necessary feature of emergence. You can always explain the system in terms of the atoms. Sometimes the system just throws off some extra 2nd order properties out of the chaos (like qualia/the color red).

I wish this system you speak of, would stop throwing off qualia and would just as easily throw off some dollars my way, as a 2nd order property out of the chaos. Or at least some credit cards or bonds.

 

[apeiron]

apeiron, you drive me crazy. Doesn't consistency demand reducibility? When we're talking about what's basic or "real," we must ignore macroscopic approximations. Any macroscopic theory that is not an approximation must be reducible to physics, if we let physics represent whatever our fundamental microscopic reality is. Either the metaphysical is consistent with the physical realm, or one of your theories is wrong.

Reducibility is part of all modelling I would agree. We generalise to shed the particulars. We discard information (calling it noise) to increase the meaningfulness of what we chose to retain (which we call the signal).

But - the big but - you are assuming that all reality will reduce in the one direction - from the large to the small. From the global to the local. From the macro to the micro.

Yet you have studied philosophy and would agree that reduction is not really about shrinking the scale of analysis but increasing the generality of the statements. And generalisation is a dichotomous reduction. You have to move towards two complementary extremes - in this case, of scale.

So the macro and the micro are equally fundamental in this view. The macro level describes the boundary constraints, the downward causality, the micro level describes the initial conditions, the bottom-up constructive causality.

Even physics actually reduces in these two directions - laws and measurements. Boundary constraints and initial conditions. Forms and substances.

For branding purposes, physics goes around saying we reduce everything to the fundamentally small. And that is indeed half its job. Seeking reality's atoms. But the other half is reducing reality to its global forms, its prevailing laws, its most general principles.

Do QM and GR emerge from the identity of a quark, or does a quark emerge from the principles of QM and GR?

I'm not sure how a "logic of vagueness" is useful. Are you arguing that we should genuinely adopt mutually inconsistent views? Why bother when regular old logic works perfectly well and we can explain phenomena through emergence?

Vagueness is based on the premise that anything is possible, but only the mutually consistent can emerge (or rather develop - emergence is a tarred word these days).

And regular old logic is nested within a larger systems logic. Again, it is all about dividing in opposing directions. You end up with two things that appear completely opposed (as they must be as a result of their journey) yet give you the two extremes that are what is possible.

So if you say all reality is reducible to local substances, micro-properties, then implicit in this is the antithesis, all reality must also be reducible to global forms, macro-organisational principles. And you have no real argument for privileging one over the other.

Though this is what happens in the Western technocratic tradition. Local substance gets called the "real", global forms become the emergent, the platonic, the laws in the mind of god or whatever - the "unreal".

Regular old logic always dichotomises. This is why it is founded on the law of the excluded middle. But old logic did not then demand that you had to chuck one half of the dichotomy away as an emergent macro approximation. That is a more recent metaphysical position.

Regular old logic gave us the choices of chance and necessity, random and determined. And it also gave us even deeper dichotomies - the vague and the crisp, becoming and being, potential and actual. The axis of ontic development that allows things like random and determined events to be the result of global developmental processes rather than having to have some prior local existence.

 

[ThomasT]

With D, we don't make choices.

We engage in behavior that we call "choosing" or "choice making". If you're a determinist, then you believe that the range of choices available to you and the choices you make are determined by antecedent conditions. If you do any sort of arranging or engineering, including reflective thinking, to facilitate certain desired outcomes, then you're a practicing determinist. The idea that the world is fundamentally indeterministic and that it could be different given the same history is contradictory. If you want to maintain that the world is fundamentally indeterministic but that the apparent deterministic evolution is an emergent property related to how we must view the world, then you can pray to a god who plays dice, but you'll still be a practicing determinist.

We don't minimize or eradicate anything under D.

We certainly do act to minimize and/or eradicate wrt various contexts. The assumption of determinism doesn't disallow any behavior that we engage in. Indeed, it's partly through observing individual and collective human behavior and various social conventions and institutions that the assumption of a fundamental determinism becomes such a compelling choice.

There is no willful conduct (an important legal concept). Everything that happens is predetermined. Operant conditioning is an experimental activity. Experiments involve choice and control. Choice and human control do not exist under D. Everything is in effect controlled by "destiny and fate". All human actions are passive.

Determinism doesn't preclude willful conduct. The predestination or fate implied by determinism doesn't render human actions passive. We're still actors in this reality drama, and our actions have consequences which, to some extent, determine our choices and future actions. It's all just too complicated for us to project exactly how the 'big picture' is going to unfold.
Our legal systems are based on the notion and application of deterministic control, even if we don't want to call it that.

With D, no one can be held responsible for their actions.

Of course they can, and are. It's just a matter of contingencies, eg., if you steal cars, etc., and get caught, then you will face prosecution and possible confinement. Responsibility refers to accountability which refers to contingent consequences.

Without D, we can hope to change the future through positive willful action.

Without D, there is no future -- at least no intelligable one. Just a roll of the dice, a flip of the coin. Without D there's no fundamental dynamical principle(s) to search for.

With a classical gas, we can calculate entropy (under constrained conditions) using Boyle's Laws regarding the deterministic relation between pressure, temperature and volume. These laws describe the mass action of particles. However, the position and momenta of individual particles is effectively random. When we measure something repeatedly (assuming no significant time dependency) random error cancels out to give us a well determined result within certain limits. This view of effective determinism and effective randomness is well established in science. I don't see where this "ideological" need for strict D comes from. It can't be proven and conflicts with existing paradigms of QM.

The idea of a fundamental determinism accompanies the search for fundamental dynamical principles. The fact that physics (quantum and classical) involves probabilistic treatments doesn't obviate the search for fundamental dynamics.

So far science hasn't established D. The existing paradigm is still local indeterminism. It is a mistake to place the prestige of science behind a view that neither is proven nor the de facto existing paradigm based on QM and Bell's Theorem. When you say "everyone" believes in D, I question whether this is true.

Physics involves probabilistic treatments where necessary -- and determinism remains the de facto foundational assumption underlying the collection of methods we call physical science.
I didn't say that everyone believes in D. I said that everyone should believe in D.

Why don't you address my point that with D, we lose the concept of causality and only can speak of correlations such that LaTeX Code: R^2 always equals unity or zero?

This doesn't make any sense to me. Anyway, the fact that we mostly just speak of correlations doesn't negate the belief in and search for fundamental pervading and unifying dynamical principles.

Suppose, given that over a certain total dose (X) of cigarettes (packs per day x days), lung cancer always occurs. Also yellow fingers always occur. Both yellow fingers and dose X are fully correlated with lung cancer, but only dose X causes lung cancer. With D, both conditions are simply state attributes that are always followed by lung cancer. Without D, in theory we can perform experiments which involve control of exposure. We can differentiate between cause and correlated consequents. Under D, human control of any situation does not exist.

I don't know what to make of this either.

 

[ThomasT]

Reducibility is part of all modelling I would agree. We generalise to shed the particulars. We discard information (calling it noise) to increase the meaningfulness of what we chose to retain (which we call the signal).

But - the big but - you are assuming that all reality will reduce in the one direction - from the large to the small. From the global to the local. From the macro to the micro.

From the complex to the simple. The way I see it, the search is for a fundamental wave dynamic(s), which, through countless iterations, like some sort of cellular automaton, has given rise to the vast hierarchy of extant media.

If there really is some such dynamic(s) pervading physical reality wrt any and all scales, then we don't have to keep smashing things together at higher and higher energies to get to the bottom of things. It's already right in front of us -- part of our everyday experience. The problem is adjusting our way of looking at things so that we can see it.

 

[JoeDawg]

The idea of choice means selecting from among two or more possibilities. With D there is only one possibility: the selection you were predetermined to make.

Using words like 'predetermined' is just confusing the issue. Either something is determined or not. Predetermined means determined before it happens, not when it happens. In order for something to be predetermined you need a concsious agent rigging the system, think: mind-control.

Unless you believe we are puppets of some god, then there is no 'predetermined', no fate, no destiny, no intention to events. What you have is a series, or rather a conflux of events that logically follow from initial conditions. One of the problems people get into when talking about determinism is that they confuse logical progression with purpose or intent.

Nothing is determined, until it happens, via cause and effect. Prediction and prophesy are what 'pre' is about.

If there's D, then all events are predetermined. I don't see where this requires any kind of consciousness or external agent. It's simply a consequence of D.

The 'pre' part. You're talking about future, about prediction, not events that have actually happened.

Fate/destiny are common words regarding a predetermined future.

Well, yeah, that's why its really inappropriate to use 'pre' when talking about causality

With fate, there is no causality.

Agreed

Under D we have only have correlations of unit or zero value.

Causality and prediction are different things.

I'm saying we have effective determinism and effective randomness

If you like, but that's not saying much of anything, in my book.

Complete D or complete R at all scales are absolutes which are outside the bounds of current science.

Absolutes are outside the bounds of science, period. Science is about obsevation and prediction, not perfect knowledge.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Nothing is determined, until it happens, via cause and effect. Prediction and prophesy are what 'pre' is about. The 'pre' part. You're talking about future, about prediction, not events that have actually happened.

This where we part company. I maintain that with D (not just effective D), the future is assumed to already exist in every detail. All future outcomes are strictly determined by past events such that there are no alternatives. I don't believe you or ThomasT really understand how profound an idea D is, but I guess we'll have to agree to disagree.

 

[JoeDawg]

I maintain that with D (not just effective D), the future is assumed to already exist in every detail.

If the future already exists, one could question the entire idea of causality. Time, in that situation, would simply be a spectrum of events. For it to be determinism, and I don't see any need to qualify it, effect must follow from cause, they don't exist at the same time.

All future outcomes are strictly determined by past events such that there are no alternatives.

There are no alternatives in the sense that one thing leads to another, but defining freewill as the ability to choose what you didn't choose is simply self-contradicting. Its not a problem with freewill, its a problem of poorly defined freewill.

I don't believe you or ThomasT really understand how profound an idea D is.

That's ok, I rarely feel profound.

 

[ThomasT]

I don't believe ... ThomasT really understand(s) how profound an idea D is ...

Well, it wouldn't be the first time that I've gotten in over my head.

 

[petm1]

Well, it wouldn't be the first time that I've gotten in over my head.

This is the feeling I get when I picture my world as if all of the accelerometers are right. Thinking of riding this matter wave we call earth, this deterministic wave dilating into every time and in all possible directions through space, nine point eight meters every second.

 

[z3hr]

I don't think you'll find any proof of anything, it all really depends on religious preferences. In a physical world determinism seems logical because every action has a specific reaction. No one action can have multiple outcomes. One could also say that the "human" or "God" element of choice defies these laws and allows us to change the world in the way that we want to. Then again one could argue that humans are also governed by these same physical laws and their choices are as well.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I don't think you'll find any proof of anything, it all really depends on religious preferences. In a physical world determinism seems logical because every action has a specific reaction. No one action can have multiple outcomes. One could also say that the "human" or "God" element of choice defies these laws and allows us to change the world in the way that we want to. Then again one could argue that humans are also governed by these same physical laws and their choices are as well.

I agree that issues of determinism and free will are philosophical and tend to merge into theological arguments. I have no problem with deterministic scientific theories. The testing of physical theories are almost always in terms of measurements and measurements are subject to uncertainty. My problem is statements which fail to distinguish between theories and physical reality. The fact is that, given our present state of knowledge, experimentally observed quantum outcomes are probabilistic. QM is deterministic only in terms of predicting probabilities. If scientists want to believe physical reality is strictly determined at all scales in every detail, fine. But don't posture that physical reality IS (non-probabilistically)deterministic. I've encountered this in a thread on Chaos Theory in the Classical Physics forum. No one knows that. If it's true, then there is no free will.

Free will would not seem to be substantially random either. By definition, it is purposeful, directed behavior; an emergent phenomenon arising out of the interactions of the organism with its environment over time. To that extent, it may have a small but important probabilistic component insofar as our current best theory (QM) is probabilistic. If there is a substratum, how do we know that it will be fully deterministic?

 

[Descartz2000]

I think it comes down to rejecting the illusion of a 'first cause'. For free-will to occur, there must be a first cause of action, or it is not free, it is caused by a previous condition. It seems ludicrous to think in my brain there is a mind that is based on either phyics, biology, genetics, history, evolution; or based on a first cause being the wholistic mind already in tact. If true, and my mind is the first cause, then this seems to require a supernatural phenomena behind the process (or actually lack of process, as it is free of previous conditions or physical states due to being the first cause). It seems most logical to assume the mind is a product not separate from the brain or the laws of science. 'free' from what? Our biology? our experiences? our genes? The first cause makes little sense as a general concept. It creates the idea of a creator (my mind) without being created (there is no process of coming into being, as it is required to be a first cause, and any process leading up to is the cause). Therefore, accepting a history-dependent and physical basis for mind and consciousness allows us to hang on to science. Without a physcal basis, why even try? Our instruments are not adequate. I predict true 'free-will' will be debunked in the future and will be tallied up to be nothing more than supernatural and pseudo science bordering on atrology and religion. Hey wait, isn't there a religious affiliation of Free Will Baptists? Seems they are similar.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I think it comes down to rejecting the illusion of a 'first cause'. For free-will to occur, there must be a first cause of action, or it is not free, it is caused by a previous condition.

I'll bite. That free will implies a first cause would be true if you assume strict determinism. Current established science is based on probabilistic QM. If don't like it, fine. That's a matter of taste. But that's all it is. Strict determinism is not current science. Unless and until a fully tested, fully deterministic TOE exists, your connection between a first cause and free will is a matter of taste.

There's a bit conceit and hubris about assuming that we can fully comprehend nature. Why should that be possible? Our species has only existed for some 200,000 years (if that). Moreover, 'supernatural' is loaded unscientific term. What we are really talking about is the nature we don't understand given our current level of evolution and the limitations of our collective mind.

This doesn't mean we shouldn't stop trying; but there is one deep question. If there is no first cause, what is the alternative; an infinite regress?

EDIT: I'm not arguing for any particular point of view here, other than respecting the limitations of our species but nevertheless persisting in our quest to understand nature. What you and I said about free will actually leads to a paradox. If there's a first cause, then there can be free will, but only if there is deterministic connection between free will and the first cause. But strict determinism is an argument against free will, whereas a universe with no first cause might allow free will.

 

[apeiron]

This doesn't mean we shouldn't stop trying; but there is one deep question. If there is no first cause, what is the alternative; an infinite regress?

The general alternatives would be...

1) infinite regress
2) some kind of cyclic causality
3) plenitude (everything happens)
4) a vague beginning

 

[SW VandeCarr]

The general alternatives would be...

1) infinite regress
2) some kind of cyclic causality
3) plenitude (everything happens)
4) a vague beginning

A vague beginning? I like that. A little humility at last!

 

[apeiron]

A vague beginning? I like that. A little humility at last!

No, more like a lot of vanity given that the Apeiron was the first model of a vague beginning!

 

[fuzzyfelt]

I'd felt it was fuzzy.

 

[VikingF]

First of all, this is a really interesting question!

The way I see it, both determinism and indeterminism lead to new questions that has to be answered, because if the universe is deterministic, then time has to be infinite in the past, and if it is indeterministic, then randomness has to exist. The reason why time has to be infinite if determinism is true, is because in the deterministic scenario, the history goes the way it does as a result of the "settings" (in lack of a better word) at the time of the BB. However, if that is the case, then we must ask ourselves, "were those "settings" random, i.e. could they have been different?". In case they were/could, then randomness existed atleast then, which actually leads to an indeterministic universe where everything could have been different. If they were not random, then they had to be determined by something before that, and the settings before that had to be determined by something before that as well, etc,etc... And if something random started it all, then randomness has existed atleast once, and in that case, why shouldn't it exist at all times?

I hope you understand my point. :)

 

[SW VandeCarr]

First of all, this is a really interesting question!

The way I see it, both determinism and indeterminism lead to new questions that has to be answered, because if the universe is deterministic, then time has to be infinite in the past, and if it is indeterministic, then randomness has to exist. The reason why time has to be infinite if determinism is true, is because in the deterministic scenario, the history goes the way it does as a result of the "settings" (in lack of a better word) at the time of the BB. However, if that is the case, then we must ask ourselves, "were those "settings" random, i.e. could they have been different?".

I hope you understand my point. :)

I don't think you can necessarily apply the logic that if the universe is deterministic, there must be an infinite regress of causes. There could be a first cause which leads to a an apparently determined sequence of events. For example, the Big Bang could have been a random quantum fluctuation in a 'superspace' or multiverse. On the other hand, there may not be or have been any prior existent at all. Nothing came before and nothing is outside the universe. Everything simply began with the BB. All questions of 'before' or 'outside of' are meaningless. I tend to favor this position unless and until there is evidence of some precursor to the BB.

Likewise, the issue of determinism or indeterminism is largely metaphysical. Scientifically, we must consider all possible outcomes and assign probabilities to them. For law based, highly determined outcomes, there are still the limitations of measurement. My motivation for posting in these types of discussion has to do with scientists and science students taking strong positions on this issue when we have no scientific justification for doing so. What scientists prefer or wish to assume about nature regarding these metaphysical issues has nothing to do with what nature is. I see a problem with such posturing because the general public doesn't necessarily understand the difference between metaphysics and physics. Saying the future already exist in every detail and our future actions are part of a strict causal chain (no free will) may be taken as fact by the public, leading to what I believe is a dangerous kind of fatalism. It's also, I believe, bad science since it says there are really no possible outcomes other than the ones we actually observe. This cannot be justified scientifically and goes against the grain of what is current science.

 

[JoeDawg]

It's also, I believe, bad science since it says there are really no possible outcomes other than the ones we actually observe. This cannot be justified scientifically and goes against the grain of what is current science.

Most scientists make bad philosophers, unfortunately, so do most philosophers.

 

[VikingF]

I don't think you can necessarily apply the logic that if the universe is deterministic, there must be an infinite regress of causes. There could be a first cause which leads to a an apparently determined sequence of events. For example, the Big Bang could have been a random quantum fluctuation in a 'superspace' or multiverse. On the other hand, there may not be or have been any prior existent at all. Nothing came before and nothing is outside the universe. Everything simply began with the BB. All questions of 'before' or 'outside of' are meaningless. I tend to favor this position unless and until there is evidence of some precursor to the BB.

If random quantum fluctuations happened 13.7 billion years ago, then it could just as easily happen today, couldn't it? Or do you mean that our universe is deterministic, but one of many deterministic universes in a indeterministic multiverse, each and every having different "initial values", and hence different content/histories?

 

[Blenton]

I don't understand why people quote the complexity of human behavior to that of an indeterministic universe. We may seem complex in our own rights but who knows we may but pale in comparison to complex structures that exist elsewhere.

To those creators, the mathematics that describe our being may be simplistic in comparison.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

If random quantum fluctuations happened 13.7 billion years ago, then it could just as easily happen today, couldn't it? Or do you mean that our universe is deterministic, but one of many deterministic universes in a indeterministic multiverse, each and every having different "initial values", and hence different content/histories?

I don't mean the universe is deterministic. I simply don't know and neither does anyone else. That's my point. The universe may have begun with a giant quantum fluctuation, or according to M Theory, two 'branes' colliding and maybe this was a random event, and maybe from the particular quantum state that was 'realized' from that event, a deterministic causal chain of events occurred leading to the current state of "everything". But then again maybe there are many causal chains (actually multiple histories) originating in the BB as in the Many Worlds interpretation. Or maybe nothing at all preceded the BB, or at least not anything tha we could ever hope to discover. And maybe the universe is deterministic, or not, regardless of how it began. It's all metaphysical and I don't think any of it can be solved by mathematics or logic alone. We need empirical evidence and testable hypotheses. Our best current science indicates that the universe is locally probabilistic.

EDIT: 13.7 billion years is nothing in the time scales of a multiverse where time could be infinite. I once read about a figure somewhere around 10^133 years for a random quantum fluctuation energetic enough to produce the BB but I can't confirm it right now. Perhaps someone could confirm this or calculate it themselves. This, of course, assumes the physical laws we observe are true throughout the multiverse. The Landscape concept (Susskind) does not assume this.

 

[fuzzyfelt]

No, more like a lot of vanity given that the Apeiron was the first model of a vague beginning!

Perhaps it would be considered contradictory (!), but as far as I understand Heidegger and Derrida, I think they take such notions much further, in better directions.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

If random quantum fluctuations happened 13.7 billion years ago, then it could just as easily happen today, couldn't it?

This doesn't directly answer your question, but does describe how some scientists are viewing the multiverse and our ability to comprehend it.http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/24239/

 

[apeiron]

Perhaps it would be considered contradictory (!), but as far as I understand Heidegger and Derrida, I think they take such notions much further, in better directions.

Any references to what you are thinking about here? I've not come across vagueness-related approaches with these guys. In modern times, Peirce did the most developing (while Russell was the most vigorous at arguing against).

 

[fuzzyfelt]

Sorry, nothing particularly expressed as ‘vague’, but I was just thinking that there are some similarities that may or may not be helpful.

As far as I understand, following some of Heidegger’s ideas, Derrida writes of ‘differance’, where dichotomies exist in the blur of their boundaries.

A critical method encouraging plural interpretations, investigating hierarchies of antinomies, supplements, paradoxes, etc., suggests this is undermined by ‘irreducible incompleteness’, ‘originary synthesis’, a changing ‘aporia’ of potential, an ‘unresolvable indetermination’ of meaning. I said contradictory for various reasons, including that this is argued against ‘logocentrism'.

With some view to the topic, Deconstruction may be regarded as anti-determinist, but inevitable uncertainty has been mentioned.