Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[learningphysics]

The points I want to illustrate with the analogy are that
1. The brain/body, the "pattern that is formed", and the experience itself, all occur or exist in this physical world (just as the radio, the AF and RF signals, and the music occur or exist in the room where the radio is located).

Alright. I don't know if I'd say that the "experience" is happening in the physical world though.

2. The "something" which has the experience is not in the world or part of it (just as the transmitting station is not in the room with the radio or part of it).

Yes. That's fine. But wouldn't a transceiver be a more apt analogy as the connection is two-way like you said?

3. There is an interface of some sort connecting the "something" with the brain/body (just as EM radiation connects the transmitter with the receiver).

Yes. This is fine.

The analogy does not show the flow of information or influence because I have "has experience" analogous to "produces music". One is an input and the other is an output. Moreover, in the radio case, the flow of information is one way only, I believe the link between consciousness and brain is two-way. (The Mars rover is really a better analogy.)

That's fine. But doesn't "produces music" imply a flow of information from the producer? Wouldn't "producing and receiving music" be a more apt analogy. (I just want to make sure I understand your ideas. Not trying to nitpick).

It seems like the big difference between what I said and you said is that I was emphasizing the "experiencer" as a "receiver" and you were emphasizing the "experiencer" as a "transceiver" that can influence or be influenced?

Where we might not agree is with my belief that there is only one such thing in all reality and that it does not reside or exist in our physical universe.

I agree that an experiencer does not reside in the physical universe. I'm not certain that there is only one such thing.

 

[Paul Martin]

If consciousness essentially involve a little man who has the experience, then what about that little man;

Of course we don't literally mean a little man, but 'little man' is just as good a symbol as 'CC', 'TEOx', 'something', 'conscious experiencer', 'driver', or any other symbol we have used for this purpose. Since you chose to use 'little man', I'll go along with it. In my view I consider it to be equivalent to the other symbols which I take to mean "the thing that experiences consciousness".

I don't think I need to caution you, selfAdjoint, but for other readers, please bear in mind that my views on this subject are not orthodox or common. Please don't interpret anything I say as a fact, but simply as my answers to questions based on my personal point of view.

how does he have that experience? Why he must be conscious!

I agree that the little man must be conscious.

And if conscious, since you hold the little man theory of consciousness, he must have a little man inside him.

I don't know what the "little man theory of consciousness" is so I can't say whether I hold it or not. Nevertheless, I do think there is a little man inside the little man. (Using my more usual symbolism, I think that the driver of these human body vehicles is itself a vehicle being driven by a yet higher level driver.)

And by induction every little man must have another little man inside.

I don't accept induction as a reason for concluding that the little men are nested. Nevertheless, I do think they are to some depth (I suspect the depth may be 11 based in part on Plato's suggestion and the number of dimensions in some versions of string theory. But that's not important here.)

The induction step depends on the fact that you explain consciouness in general on the little man theory.

This is irrelevant in my explanation.

If the series can stop, it can only be because we have encountered some other theory of consciousness.

I can't confirm or deny that assertion. But in my "theory of consciousness", the series does stop as I mentioned.

And if we can contemplate such a thing at step n, why can not we contemplate it at step 1?

Here's why in my view: Think of the little men as drivers and organisms as vehicles being driven. I think there may be more vehicles than drivers -- oops! I mean there may be more people than little men. (It's a lot harder to visualize this way, but I said I would use your symbolism so I will). So if we are at level 1, then those little men exist at level 2. But those little men in turn "contain" little men, but again, there are more little men at level 2 than there are at level 3. (More vehicles than drivers.) Similarly there are more at level 3 than at level 4. Since we start with a finite number of organisms here on earth, it is easy to see that at some finite level, the number of little men shrinks to 1. The little man at that level is the only real consciousness. It is the only real driver. The only thing that can experience. The only possessor of free will. The only knower. It is the thing that can and has constructed everything else in reality by pure conscious thought, just as Berkeley proposed. The various levels of reality that are inhabited by these little men, were constructed in a helical pattern as I have described elsewhere in this forum. I see no mystery or problem which cannot be explained in a straightforward way by this model except the single mystery of how that first little man came to exist. But you have to start somewhere and every theory will have an equivalent mystery.

After re-reading this, I must make one correction. Rather than go back to the top and fix it, I think it is better to wait and fix it now after you have read this far. At the beginning when I agreed to use the symbol 'little man' I said I would take it to mean "the thing that experiences consciousness". That's not exactly correct. I should have said that it means the thing that *seems to* experience consciousness. The experience of consciousness in all but the top little man is really an illusion. It is only the top little man who can experience consciousness and when he is vicariously experiencing the experiences of lower level little men, he has the illusion that it is the little man that is having the experience. In other words, the top little man is having the illusion that he *is* the lower level little man. That way, the lower level little man goes around acting as if, and claiming that, he is conscious.

So this final mystery is the answer to your question of why such a thing as consciousness "cannot be contemplated" for any higher level. That top little man is the only thing that can do any contemplating at all.

Any other questions? Thanks for reading.

Oh, BTW it seems to me that all these little men qualify as individuals in Gregg Rosenberg's sense.

Paul

 

[moving finger]

If consciousness essentially involve a little man who has the experience, then what about that little man; how does he have that experience? Why he must be conscious! And if conscious, since you hold the little man theory of consciousness, he must have a little man inside him. And by induction every little man must have another little man inside. The induction step depends on the fact that you explain consciouness in general on the little man theory. If the series can stop, it can only be because we have encountered some other theory of consciousness. And if we can contemplate such a thing at step n, why can not we contemplate it at step 1?

Agreed
MF

 

[moving finger]

I think it is a mistake to jump to the conclusion of "infinite regress" whenever a recursive function is encountered.

Did I suggest infinite regress? You are making a bold leap. My post was simply to illustrate that “trying to identify just what is having the experience” can be answered either by accepting that “the experience creates the experiencer”, or by postulating that “there is some separate entity having the experience”, but the latter does not actually answer the question it simply moves the question.

And I think it helps clarify the discussion to talk separately about the “something having the experience” and the experience itself.

This is exactly where your confusion comes in.

Maybe in actuality one can't exist without the other but we can certainly identify each of them for purposes of discussion.

IMHO I do not think they each can be "indentified" where by identified we mean in the sense of “separating one from the other”

Think of a Yin-Yang symbol. The two halves are intertwined, each defines the other, and you can't have one in isolation without either obliterating the one (in case the background is the same color) or dragging the other along anyway (in case the background is different). Yet it is perfectly plausible and useful to talk about each half separately. .

Simple picture, but not applicable here. I can think one half of the Yin-Yang symbol in isolation, the definition of this symbol is not strictly interdependent with the other half.

But let's go with your suggestion. Instead of talking about “something having the experience”, let's suppose that the “experience ... creates the something” and talk about that. Let's see... The experience creates the something. Hmmmm. What could that something be? Could it be the "something having the experience"?... No, we are taking your suggestion and abandoning that idea for the moment.

You misread the post. I did not say one “cannot” talk about something having the experience. Clearly one can talk about it. But IMHO there is no solution to be found in trying to isolate (ie isolate the something from the experiences) what this “something” is, because this “something” exists only in combination with its experiences.
Thus (as I said in the original post but you chose to ignore) the “experiences create the something”.

The remainder of your post is thus (with respect) not relevant to what I actually stated.

MF

 

[Paul Martin]

Hmmmm, but that means there must be another little man inside him, “having his experience”….and another…. And another…… ohhhhh dear…….
(3rd person objective scientist's problem)

Did I suggest infinite regress?

Yes, you suggested it to me. I don't know what a "3rd person objective scientist" is, or what they think, nor do I know what their problem might be, but " ohhhhh dear……." suggested exasperation of the type I sense when people jump to the conclusion that a particular sequence leads to infinite regress.

You are making a bold leap.

Did I suggest that you made the mistake of jumping to the "infinite regress" conclusion? My comment was simply to point out that IMHO we should not give up too early when analyzing a sequence that might look to some as if it would lead to infinite regress.

“trying to identify just what is having the experience” can be answered either by accepting that “the experience creates the experiencer”, or by postulating that “there is some separate entity having the experience”, but the latter does not actually answer the question it simply moves the question.

First of all, “trying to identify just what is having the experience” is not a question requiring an answer. In my view, and in this case, “trying to identify just what is having the experience” is postulating that there is some (not necessarily separate) entity having the experience and choosing a symbol to represent that entity. When this is done, we can proceed to talk rationally about it and try to understand one another.

Your suggestion that this attempt somehow implies a question which can be answered leaves me wondering just what that question is. Working backward from the two answers you provide, and which you seem to imply are the only two possible answers, I try to uncover the question.

Your first answer, "accepting that “the experience creates the experiencer”" seems to suggest a question of the origin of an "experiencer". Yet it seems you are opposed to defining or identifying the term "experiencer" because somehow that would entail separability.

Your second answer, "postulating that “there is some separate entity having the experience”" suggests a question like, "How might we approach a rational discussion of the notion of an "experiencer"?" But no. You say that this "does not actually answer the question it simply moves the question". Postulating an entity does not "move the question" of how to proceed with a discussion. I give up. What was the question you had in mind?

On second thought, I am going to stop here, make a confession, and edge slowly away from this discussion.

I am somewhat embarrassed to admit that when I first read your post #230 I found it patronizing and offensive. And I am sorry that I composed my response while I was still feeling a little incensed and huffy. That attitude clearly shows through in my response about the "Infinite regress straw man" and I apologize for it. I can understand if this struck you as patronizing and offensive and thus would explain the present non-sensical debate.

I thoroughly enjoy our more sensible discussions, MF. I'll see you there. Sorry about this one.

Paul

 

[selfAdjoint]

It seems that you're saying step 1 is:
The human body is conscious... so the little man theory of consciousness=> there's a little man inside the human body that is experiencing and is conscious etc...

But I'd say this first step is wrong. My belief is that the human body is not conscious or experiencing... but the "little man" is conscious and experiencing... There is no need to say there's another "little man" inside the first one. If there is such a need, then please explain it. The reason we hypothesize a "little man" is because the body itself (the matter of the body) is not experiencing and not conscious.

ie: I'm not saying that the little man exists because the body is conscious... on the contrary, I'm saying the "little man" exists because the body is NOT conscious. So the process ends right there. There's no need to say there's another "little man".

I don't see the infinite regress.

My belief is that there's a substance not made up of any parts... call it a soul if you will... that has experience. The experiences have a correspondence with the physical changes of the body.

Hypnogue... I'll try to read "A Place for consciousness" and see the other option.

I wasn't saying ANYTHING about the human body being conscious. The homunculus or little man theory of consciuness is classical, and mostly now abandoned. But it seems to have acqiuired a new life on these boards. So I was pointing out that contrary to what had been posted, you do not have the option of stopping the regress without abandoning the little man theory.

 

[learningphysics]

So I was pointing out that contrary to what had been posted, you do not have the option of stopping the regress without abandoning the little man theory.

What regress? Here's what you said in a previous post:

And if conscious, since you hold the little man theory of consciousness, he must have a little man inside him.

I do not understand this step above. Why must I hold that if something is conscious he has a little man inside him?

I never used the reasoning that "if something is consciouss he has a little man inside him". So how I have created any type of regress?

 

[StatusX]

Experiences have to be experienced by something. We can't coherently talk about experiences that are mine and not yours if experiences are just out there, not tied to an experiencing subject. If you ever tried to imagine what it'd be like to be someone or something else, or wondered what happens after you die, you know what I'm talking about. If you think its silly to talk about a "soul" (obviously without the religious connotations), then as I suggested before, sign up to be the first to jump in a teleporter. But you won't see me using one.

 

[Picklehead]

I sort of agree, Scotty was, in a way, a mass murder.

 

[selfAdjoint]

What regress? Here's what you said in a previous post:



I do not understand this step above. Why must I hold that if something is conscious he has a little man inside him?

I never used the reasoning that "if something is consciouss he has a little man inside him". So how I have created any type of regress?

Can YOU say If.. Then?

IF someone, anyone, holds that consciousness necessarily involves a little man viewing the "theater of consciousness", and if they agree as Paul does that the little man has to be conscious himself, THEN they must necessarily believe the little man in THEIR heads has a little man in HIS head, and so on ad infinitum.

 

[learningphysics]

Can YOU say If.. Then?

IF someone, anyone, holds that consciousness necessarily involves a little man viewing the "theater of consciousness", and if they agree as Paul does that the little man has to be conscious himself, THEN they must necessarily believe the little man in THEIR heads has a little man in HIS head, and so on ad infinitum.

There exists consciousness... there exists something that is experiencing consciousness... This is about all I've said. I'm simply calling that being "little man" because you chose those words. One "little man". One "theatre".

This one "experiencer" is viewing the one "theatre of consciousness". You keep saying that I'm required to now believe that there is another "experiencer" inside the first. Why? You seem to take it as an axiom.

If you clearly demonstrate the first step of this infinite regress, I think we'll avoid a lot of confusion.

 

[moving finger]

Did I suggest infinite regress? .

Yes, you suggested it to me. I don't know what a "3rd person objective scientist" is, or what they think, nor do I know what their problem might be, but " ohhhhh dear……." suggested exasperation of the type I sense when people jump to the conclusion that a particular sequence leads to infinite regress. .

Sorry, PM, but IMHO “you suggested it to yourself” (or maybe “your experience of my post suggested it to something in PM”) in the way that you interpreted my post. The idea I was trying to convey (obviously not successfully) was that answering the question “what is having the experience” by suggesting that “some X is having the experience” does not provide an answer, it only moves the same question one level down. If PM wishes to interpret this as meaning an “infinite regress” then that is PM’s choice. The intent was not to show infinite regress, but to show that “some X is having the experience” is not in itself an answer.

Your first answer, "accepting that “the experience creates the experiencer”" seems to suggest a question of the origin of an "experiencer". Yet it seems you are opposed to defining or identifying the term "experiencer" because somehow that would entail separability. .

With respect, PM, it seems to me that you are not attempting a rational critique of the ideas presented, but simply (IMHO) taking arbitrary phrases and sentences from my posts and trying to analyse them out of context. This to me seems a waste of both your and my time, sorry. :uhh:

The idea I am trying to convey is summed up very nicely by Antonio Damasio in “The Feeling of What Happens” as follows :

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then. “You” are the music, while the music lasts.

I thoroughly enjoy our more sensible discussions, MF. I'll see you there. Sorry about this one.

Me too.

MF

 

[moving finger]

There exists consciousness... there exists something that is experiencing consciousness... This is about all I've said. I'm simply calling that being "little man" because you chose those words. One "little man". One "theatre".

This one "experiencer" is viewing the one "theatre of consciousness". You keep saying that I'm required to now believe that there is another "experiencer" inside the first. Why? You seem to take it as an axiom.

If you clearly demonstrate the first step of this infinite regress, I think we'll avoid a lot of confusion.

The idea I am trying to convey is summed up nicely by Antonia Damasio in “The Feeling of What Happens” as follows :

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then. “You” are the music, while the music lasts.

MF

 

[learningphysics]

The idea I am trying to convey is summed up nicely by Antonia Damasio in “The Feeling of What Happens” as follows :

MF

That's all well and good. Like I said previously, whether or not the experiencer exists without experience, has never been an issue in this thread. All I've been saying is that there is an experiencer... and asking what exactly is this experiencer?

 

[moving finger]

That's all well and good. Like I said previously, whether or not the experiencer exists without experience, has never been an issue in this thread. All I've been saying is that there is an experiencer... and asking what exactly is this experiencer?

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then. “You” are the music, while the music lasts.

What more do you want to know?

MF

 

[loseyourname]

That's all well and good. Like I said previously, whether or not the experiencer exists without experience, has never been an issue in this thread. All I've been saying is that there is an experiencer... and asking what exactly is this experiencer?

Adjoint is correct to call your hypothesis question begging and paradoxical in that it leads to an infinite regress. That has actually been accepted and is the reason that the idea of a 'homunculus' sitting inside of a Cartesian theatre has been long abandoned. You coming in here and proposing this is like a man posting in the classical mechanics forum proposing a theory of 'impetus.'

The problem lies exactly where you've been told it lies. If you postulate an experiencer inside of the mental world of humans, you've simply begged the question: Well, how does this 'experiencer' experience? To use your original line of reasoning, there must be a second experiencer inside of the first
experiencer's mental theatre. Presumably you can see how this leads to a regress. It has to be cut off at some point. You don't seem to have any idea of how or why it cuts off at any certain point, but you do seem to want to cut it off at the first homunculus. Some mysterious process takes place in this 'experiencer' that allows him to view the contents of the human mental world. Well, that hypothesis is superfluous. If you can postulate some mysterious process inside of your homunculus to avoid an infinite regress, that same mysterious process can be postulated to occur inside of your brain, making the human body itself the experiencer.

 

[learningphysics]

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then. “You” are the music, while the music lasts.

What more do you want to know?

MF

Well... nothing really... the importance of this is that there is some substance that experiences... this substance isn't matter... This substance may go in and out of existence as experiences begin and end.

 

[learningphysics]

Adjoint is correct to call your hypothesis question begging and paradoxical in that it leads to an infinite regress. That has actually been accepted and is the reason that the idea of a 'homunculus' sitting inside of a Cartesian theatre has been long abandoned. You coming in here and proposing this is like a man posting in the classical mechanics forum proposing a theory of 'impetus.'

I don't know what a 'homunculus' is. But I can't simply reject theories because they have lost popularity.

The problem lies exactly where you've been told it lies. If you postulate an experiencer inside of the mental world of humans, you've simply begged the question: Well, how does this 'experiencer' experience? To use your original line of reasoning, there must be a second experiencer inside of the first
experiencer's mental theatre.

I have never asked the question "how does it experience". I've asked the question "what is experiencing".

My reasoning is like this: Atoms of the body and brain are being replaced... so it isn't literally matter that is having experience unless we presume that experiencers live and die as atoms get replaced. So something else has to be this single experiencer that is maintained as atoms are replaced.

I haven't asked how this "something else" is having an experience. All I know is that something is having an experience... if it isn't matter... well then there's something else there.

Presumably you can see how this leads to a regress. It has to be cut off at some point. You don't seem to have any idea of how or why it cuts off at any certain point, but you do seem to want to cut it off at the first homunculus. Some mysterious process takes place in this 'experiencer' that allows him to view the contents of the human mental world. Well, that hypothesis is superfluous. If you can postulate some mysterious process inside of your homunculus to avoid an infinite regress, that same mysterious process can be postulated to occur inside of your brain, making the human body itself the experiencer.

Except that there is no permanent human body. We don't possesses the same body as time passes... atoms are replaced... the body changes... the brain changes. If the body is the experiencer... then experiencers are constantly living and dying as atoms get replaced...

This dynamic nature of the brain and body is the only reason that I postulate something else that must be there. It's the only way I can see a single experiencer coupled with a dynamic physical body. We wouldn't be talking about this if the body was static.

 

[moving finger]

Well... nothing really... the importance of this is that there is some substance that experiences... this substance isn't matter... This substance may go in and out of existence as experiences begin and end.

Why do you feel there needs to be a "substance that experiences", and what evidence is there that such a substance exists?
MF

 

[learningphysics]

Why do you feel there needs to be a "substance that experiences", and what evidence is there that such a substance exists?
MF

There's "something" that experiences. You've agreed with this. I don't know what else to say. Maybe substance is the wrong word. By substance... I mean thing... object... There is some "thing" that is experiencing.

 

[moving finger]

There's "something" that experiences. You've agreed with this.

With respect, “something” that experiences is not the same as a "substance that experiences".

I don't know what else to say. Maybe substance is the wrong word. By substance... I mean thing... object... There is some "thing" that is experiencing.

This (with respect) is the problem. You are thinking that this “something” must be an “object”. Let me repeat again the words of Antonio Damasio :

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then. “You” are the music, while the music lasts.

In other words, the “you” is not an object in the normal 3rd person objective sense, it is not something that can be “isolated” and “put into a box” – the “you” is created, and exists, only in the context of the stories being told, it is not an objective “thing” which can be isolated and studied, it exists as part of the music, as part of the experience. Silence the music, take away the experience, and the “you” is gone.

MF

 

[learningphysics]

With respect, “something” that experiences is not the same as a "substance that experiences".


This (with respect) is the problem. You are thinking that this “something” must be an “object”. Let me repeat again the words of Antonio Damasio :

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then.

And the above is not a thing? Things can go in and out of existence.

“You” are the music, while the music lasts.

If "I" am the music... then going with this analogy, what is the "experience"... "music" also?

In other words, the “you” is not an object in the normal 3rd person objective sense, it is not something that can be “isolated” and “put into a box” – the “you” is created, and exists, only in the context of the stories being told, it is not an objective “thing” which can be isolated and studied, it exists as part of the music, as part of the experience.

Which part of the experience?

So a "part of the experience" is experiencing the "whole experience"?

Why can't I isolate this part and call it the "object that is experiencing"?

Silence the music, take away the experience, and the “you” is gone.

Ok so "music" refers to "experience"... and above "music" also refers to "I". So it is your position that "part of the experience" ("I") experiences the "whole experience"?

 

[moving finger]

The core “You” is only born as the story is told, within the story itself. “You” exist as a mental being when primordial stories are being told, and only then.

And the above is not a thing? Things can go in and out of existence.

I never said that the “You” was not a “thing”.
What I object to is calling the “You” a “substance” (which normally implies something “material”)

“You” are the music, while the music lasts.

If "I" am the music... then going with this analogy, what is the "experience"... "music" also?

The experience is part of the music.

In other words, the “you” is not an object in the normal 3rd person objective sense, it is not something that can be “isolated” and “put into a box” – the “you” is created, and exists, only in the context of the stories being told, it is not an objective “thing” which can be isolated and studied, it exists as part of the music, as part of the experience.

Which part of the experience?

An integral part of the experience, not a “part” that can be extracted and studied in isolation.

So a "part of the experience" is experiencing the "whole experience"?

No, the experience creates the experiencer.

Why can't I isolate this part and call it the "object that is experiencing"?

Because the object does not exist in isolation. It exists only as part of the experience.

Silence the music, take away the experience, and the “you” is gone.

Ok so "music" refers to "experience"... and above "music" also refers to "I". So it is your position that "part of the experience" ("I") experiences the "whole experience"?

“I” is an integral part of the experience. The “I” cannot exist without the experience, and the experience has no meaning without the “I”.
With respect, you seem to want to isolate the “I” from the experience, to separate the “I” and to study it in absence of all experience. IMHO, this is not possible. Experiences create the “I”; the “I” cannot exist in isolation.
MF

 

[loseyourname]

I don't know what a 'homunculus' is. But I can't simply reject theories because they have lost popularity.

You certainly can study up on some history of philosophy so that you can understand that homunculus theories have been abandoned for a good reason without all of us having to come in and list these reasons for you.

My reasoning is like this: Atoms of the body and brain are being replaced... so it isn't literally matter that is having experience unless we presume that experiencers live and die as atoms get replaced. So something else has to be this single experiencer that is maintained as atoms are replaced.

Emergent properties. They needn't even be the strongly emergent, irreducible, spooky kind. Just simple emergence. Think color. No atom or molecule has any particular color, yet macroscopic collections of atoms do. In fact, following your line of reasoning, the atoms and molecules in a blade of grass are constantly being replaced, so it cannot be the matter that has color. Presumably you can see the flaw in the reasoning here. This argument is non-sequitur:

Atoms of entity X are constantly being replaced.
Therefore, any continuing property of X cannot be a property of matter.

The first reason your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise (aside from the fact that no conclusion can follow from a single premise unless the argument is circular) is emergent properties. Collections of atoms can have properties that individual atoms do not have. The second reason is that continuity of individual atoms is not necessary for continuity in the properties of collections of atoms. The color of a blade of grass is just one simple example, but there are many others. The properties of Microsoft Word, for instance, are continuous and hold through time, no matter where the software is installed.

I haven't asked how this "something else" is having an experience. All I know is that something is having an experience... if it isn't matter... well then there's something else there.

You don't have to ask the question yourself. It is this question that generates the incoherency of the homunculus theory and, for this reason, it would do you well to know it. Again, you should read up on pet theories of yours. You'll likely find that many have already been proposed and abandoned because of difficulties that could not be overcome. That is the way good philosophy is carried out and is the reason that philosophers more than persons in any other line of work absolutely must study up on the history of their discipline.

Except that there is no permanent human body.

You're again mistaking individual atoms for collections of atoms. The individual atoms may not endure long within anyone body, but you do only have one body for all of your life.

We don't possesses the same body as time passes... atoms are replaced... the body changes... the brain changes. If the body is the experiencer... then experiencers are constantly living and dying as atoms get replaced...

No they aren't, because the experiencers aren't the atoms. When we replace rivets on an automobile assembly robot, do we say that one arm died and another took its place? Of course not. In fact, over the next 20 years or so, all of the metal will be replaced on the Golden Gate bridge. It will still be the same bridge with exactly the same properties that it had before, except that it will be somewhat stronger.

Also, you seem to be forgetting the important note that matter in the brain is not replaced. Ions and nutrients in the cytosol come and go, but the infrastrucure is set once you reach maturity.

 

[learningphysics]

In fact, following your line of reasoning, the atoms and molecules in a blade of grass are constantly being replaced, so it cannot be the matter that has color.

No. At any moment in time the particular blade of grass has color. The particular collection of atoms has the property of color.

If you're comparing 'color' to the 'ability to experience' then yes... there is no problem in saying that matter can experience even as atoms are being replaced. So 'ability to experience' remains. But there is a serious problem in saying that the experiencer is the same as atoms are replaced.

You can't compare 'color' to 'experiencer'... the first is a property, the second isn't. You can compare 'color' to 'ability to experience'.

Presumably you can see the flaw in the reasoning here. This argument is non-sequitur:

Atoms of entity X are constantly being replaced.
Therefore, any continuing property of X cannot be a property of matter.

If the atoms of entity X are being replaced... then X has no referrent. What are we referring to? Define entity X.

The first reason your conclusion doesn't follow from your premise (aside from the fact that no conclusion can follow from a single premise unless the argument is circular) is emergent properties. Collections of atoms can have properties that individual atoms do not have.

As I said above we aren't talking about continuity in the properties of collections... we are talking about continuity in the identity of the collections themselves. If the experiencer is a 'collection of atoms', and if an atom is replaced... then the collection is different... hence the experiencer is different.

The second reason is that continuity of individual atoms is not necessary for continuity in the properties of collections of atoms.

We aren't talking about continuity of properties. We are talking about continuity of identity... continuity of the experiencer.

The color of a blade of grass is just one simple example, but there are many others. The properties of Microsoft Word, for instance, are continuous and hold through time, no matter where the software is installed.

I don't see the relevance of the Microsoft Word example. Besides we are not talking about properties here. We're talking about identity.

You're again mistaking individual atoms for collections of atoms.

How does it change the argument? How can a collection of atoms remain the same collection if even a single atom in the collection is replaced?

No they aren't, because the experiencers aren't the atoms. When we replace rivets on an automobile assembly robot, do we say that one arm died and another took its place? Of course not.

If you define the arm by a specific set of parts, and one of those parts is replaced then no... it is not the same arm, by definition.

If the experiencers aren't the atoms, then what are the experiencers? If they are 'collections of atoms', then please explain how continuity of identity can be maintained if atoms are replaced.

In fact, over the next 20 years or so, all of the metal will be replaced on the Golden Gate bridge. It will still be the same bridge with exactly the same properties that it had before, except that it will be somewhat stronger.

No, I wouldn't call it the same bridge if all the metal is replaced. If you define Golden Gate Bridge as a 'collection of atoms in a particular configuration' then by that definition it is certainly not the same bridge when the metal is replaced. Does the "entity being referred to" continue to exist as time passes? If the entity is a particular 'collection of metal atoms' then as you said, if the atoms are replaced then that particular 'collection of metal atoms' is gone, and we have a new collection... hence a new bridge, by definition.

Just as with the bridge and the arm, if you wish to refer to experiencers as 'collections of atoms' then you cannot simply say that they remain the same as atoms are replaced.

Also, you seem to be forgetting the important note that matter in the brain is not replaced. Ions and nutrients in the cytosol come and go, but the infrastrucure is set once you reach maturity.

Then I see merit in the argument that it is the matter forming the infrastructure that experiences.

 

[loseyourname]

No. At any moment in time the particular blade of grass has color. The particular collection of atoms has the property of color.

If you're comparing 'color' to the 'ability to experience' then yes... there is no problem in saying that matter can experience even as atoms are being replaced. So 'ability to experience' remains. But there is a serious problem in saying that the experiencer is the same as atoms are replaced.

Nobody has said that. You're arguing with a strawman here.

You can't compare 'color' to 'experiencer'... the first is a property, the second isn't. You can compare 'color' to 'ability to experience'.

That's exactly what I'm doing. What is an experiencer if not some entity with the ability to experience? Just as the blade of grass is an entity of color green.

If the atoms of entity X are being replaced... then X has no referrent. What are we referring to? Define entity X.

Entity X can be any number of things. This is an abstraction of your argument. This 'problem' you are raising has been raised for hundreds of years at least and receives a pretty clear formulation in Descartes. His example is a ball of wax. We can change its shape, its color, even its chemical makeup by various reactions, both physical and chemical, yet it remains the same ball of wax. Philosophers from Russell to Rosenberg, here in the book discussion subforum, have defined the identity of an entity by causal contiguity. Entity X is the causal world-line occupied at various times by various material substances. It is defined by its properties and its history, which taken together are unique and distinguish it from all other individual entities.

There are other theories of identity as well. The literature is literally thousands upon thousands of pages long and you would do yourself well to read some of it before you start coming to conclusions and telling us that we must come to the same conclusions. You'd also do much better to read the material first-hand rather than continuuing to interrogate me. I'm no expert on this matter and you should not trust me to give you a full and adequate account of these theories.

As I said above we aren't talking about continuity in the properties of collections... we are talking about continuity in the identity of the collections themselves.

Identity in some cases is limited by a continuity of a collection of properties. In the case of the ball of wax, it is limited by the necessary and sufficient properties that any material substance must possesses to be considered wax; that is, malleability and the ability to burn slowly and such. As soon as these properties are gone, it is no longer the same ball of wax. Indeed, it is no longer a ball of wax at all. In the same way, the causally contiguous world-line comprised of the neural substrate responsible for your unique phenomenal world will cease to be learningphysics when it ceases to have the necessary and sufficient properties for continuuing phenomenal experience. The world-line will live on, in the form of a rotting corpse, but it will no longer be identified as the person that is you.

If the experiencer is a 'collection of atoms', and if an atom is replaced... then the collection is different... hence the experiencer is different.

Sure, it's difference, but it still has the same identity. Take the Amazon river. The water that is flowing through it is never the same from moment to moment. As long as it occupies the same causal world-line, it remains the Amazon river, the same river, albeit a little different, always in flux.

I don't see the relevance of the Microsoft Word example. Besides we are not talking about properties here. We're talking about identity.

The identity of the program Microsoft Word does not depend on material substrate, does it? You can upload it onto any number of hard drives composed of different atoms. In principle, you can even upload it onto hard drives that are not built from the same material, so long as they use the same logic language and conduct electricity at a high enough speed. In any case, it maintains its identity as Microsoft Word. Many theories of consciousness equate personal identity with software. loseyourname is not the material substrate on which the software of his consciousness operates; he is the software itself. In this way, it is the specific neural architecture and functional causal lines that are established within this architecture, that comprises loseyourname, not the material itself from which these things are built. In fact, the architecture can even change, the functionality can be altered, and as long as the causal world-line being occupied is the same world-line and the necessary and sufficient conditions (read: properties of the neural system) for this world-line to be a continuuing experiencer remain, loseyourname remains.

How does it change the argument? How can a collection of atoms remain the same collection if even a single atom in the collection is replaced?

I would hope at this point that this question has been answered. You should be able to see by now that the identity of the collection of atoms is not defined by the identities of its constituent parts. If you continue to not see this, I'm not going to respond any further.

If you define the arm by a specific set of parts, and one of those parts is replaced then no... it is not the same arm, by definition.

Sure, but again, hopefully you can see by now that the arm is not defined by a specific set of parts. In fact, your very argument proves that it cannot be. The skin on learningphysics' right arm remains the skin on learningphysics' right arm as long as that arm is intact and you are alive, even though the cells are being replaced every couple of days. Therefore, it must be something other than the identities of the constituent cells that defines the identity of your arm.

If the experiencers aren't the atoms, then what are the experiencers?

Beats the heck out of me. I can tell you one thing, though. The simple fact that you don't know the answer to a question does not give you license to propose theories (like the homunculus theory, which is what your theory is, whether you are familiar with the term or not) that have been discredited for hundreds of years. Be content, for the time being, not to know, and then investigate. Don't come to conclusions when conclusions aren't warranted.

If they are 'collections of atoms', then please explain how continuity of identity can be maintained if atoms are replaced.

Again, I hope that I have at least given a cursory once-over of a particular theory of identity that I find to be workable at least. Whether or not it truly explains personal identity I don't know, but I'm confident at least that it can explain how a collection of atoms maintains its identity despite having its constituent parts continually replaced. If this isn't good enough for you, look elsewhere. There are many other theories out there. In fact, as far as I can tell, you have made absolutely no effort to answer your own question. Saying simply that there exists some entity or 'experiencer' in which the identity inheres, without saying what this mysterious thing is, answers nothing. You're essentially answering the question "What is X?" By saying "Well, the being that is defined as X is X." You've ruled out one possibility: the fundamental particles of the material substratum that compose X are not X. Nobody is going to dispute that. Perhaps it is time to move on then.

 

[learningphysics]

You've ruled out one possibility: the fundamental particles of the material substratum that compose X are not X. Nobody is going to dispute that. Perhaps it is time to move on then.

If nobody is going to dispute it, then what is it that you have been disputing in the first place? All I've been arguing against is the identification of an experiencer as matter. I've made no other points. I wouldn't have gone on with this if there wasn't disagreement.

Given the premise:
Experiencer A = {atom 1, atom 2, atom 3, atom 4}
Experiencer B = {atom 1, atom 2, atom 3, atom 5}
atom 4 does not equal atom 5

we know that...
{atom 1, atom 2, atom 3, atom 4} does not equal {atom 1, atom 2, atom 3, atom 5}. They are not the same sets.

Therefore
Experience A does not equal Experiencer B. Changing a single atom changes the experiencer.

If the premise is true the conclusion is true. If the conclusion is false the premise is false.

The solutions you have proposed... experiencer as a causal worldline... experiencer as software... work fine, but neither are collections of atoms. You've proposed that the entities are associated with collections of atoms but not the collections themselves.

Sure, but again, hopefully you can see by now that the arm is not defined by a specific set of parts. In fact, your very argument proves that it cannot be.

Then by the very same argument the experiencer cannot be a "collection of atoms".

The collection of atoms by definition is the set of constituent parts. If you mean something other than the set of consitutent parts, then it makes no sense to use the words "collection of atoms". That's just what a collection is.

Beats the heck out of me. I can tell you one thing, though. The simple fact that you don't know the answer to a question does not give you license to propose theories (like the homunculus theory, which is what your theory is, whether you are familiar with the term or not) that have been discredited for hundreds of years. Be content, for the time being, not to know, and then investigate. Don't come to conclusions when conclusions aren't warranted.

What exactly is the conclusion that you think I've reached? All I've said from the start is that the experiencer is not matter. You've proposed theories that agree with this assessment. As I've made no other points, and as you continue to say that I'm proposing a 'homunculus' theory, I'm forced to conclude that the theories you've proposed are also 'homunculus' theories.

 

[loseyourname]

Perhaps it's just a mishap in the language you used. Speaking of an experiencer that is separate from matter and which views the theater of experience is a homunculus theory. That is different from what I've proposed. Not being identified with a specific set of atoms doesn't mean being separate from matter. Take the example of the Golden Gate Bridge, again. Though it is not identical with the specific set of matter that happens to compose it an anyone time, it is identical with a causal world-line that lies in material conformity to what is referred to by Golden Gate Bridge. The only real necessary condition is spatio-causal contiguity with what was originally built as the Golden Gate Bridge. If the entire thing was dismantled and destroyed, there would cease to be a bridge. Its existence is dependent on matter and there is nothing that is the bridge aside from its matter. You're making an unfounded leap from the premise that a being cannot be identical with the specific set of matter that composes it at anyone time to the conclusion that it is not material. If you can't make the argument from lack of identity with a bridge, you cannot make it with anything. It is not a valid argument.

 

[learningphysics]

Though it is not identical with the specific set of matter that happens to compose it an anyone time, it is identical with a causal world-line that lies in material conformity to what is referred to by Golden Gate Bridge.

I'm confused by the above. "Golden Gate Bridge" is identical with "a causal world-line that lies in material conformity to what is referred to by 'Golden Gate Bridge'"? There is self reference here.

The only real necessary condition is spatio-causal contiguity with what was originally built as the Golden Gate Bridge.

Ok. However the original set of matter that was built is not "Golden Gate Bridge" as "Golden Gate Bridge" is a causal wordline.

If the entire thing was dismantled and destroyed, there would cease to be a bridge. Its existence is dependent on matter and there is nothing that is the bridge aside from its matter.

So a "causal worldline" is matter or material?

 

[loseyourname]

I'm confused by the above. "Golden Gate Bridge" is identical with "a causal world-line that lies in material conformity to what is referred to by 'Golden Gate Bridge'"? There is self reference here.

Of course. It's only the Golden Gate Bridge because we call it that. All names are going be defined self-referentially.

Ok. However the original set of matter that was built is not "Golden Gate Bridge" as "Golden Gate Bridge" is a causal wordline.

I guess I haven't explained very clearly what a 'causal worldline' is. Actually, I'm not going to right now. I'll be back later. Suffice it to say that the original set of matter was part of that worldline called "Golden Gate Bridge;" in fact, it was the beginning of it.

So a "causal worldline" is matter or material?

It doesn't have to be.

 

[learningphysics]

Of course. It's only the Golden Gate Bridge because we call it that. All names are going be defined self-referentially.

I don't understand. Are you saying it is impossible to define the entity being referred to as "Golden Gate Bridge" without using "Golden Gate Bridge" within the definition?

Entity A: "The causal worldline that is in material conformity to Entity A"

Entity A doesn't refer to anything in the above. It is meaningless.

 

[loseyourname]

It's impossible to define it as the Golden Gate Bridge without making reference to the fact that 'Golden Gate Bridge' is its name. How are you going to explain the fact that I'm Adam without making mention of the fact that my parents named me 'Adam?'

 

[Doctordick]

Since we have no idea what the limits of communication are, we
are in no position to assert that qualia are *absolutely* ineffable.

If you have no idea what the limits of communication are, how does a pair of individuals ever come to know they are communicating? Where does the evidence for such a conclusion come from? :tongue:

I would very much appreciate a well thought out response to that question.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Surely the idea that qualia have a high degree of independence from their physical basis would weigh in favour of their reality.

That being the case, how would you respond to the idea that "qualia" constitute the only true reality? Think about that for a while before you respond. :tongue:

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Les Sleeth]

That being the case, how would you respond to the idea that "qualia" constitute the only true reality?

You didn't ask me, but my answer would be that qualia have nothing to do with "constituting" reality outside being part of the constitution of consciousness. They might truly represent aspects of reality to consciousness, but if anything other than consciousness exists, then I can't see how qualia are any more "true reality" than anything else.