Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

In summary: RCIC consists of a series of pumps, valves, and manifolds that allow coolant to be circulated around the reactor pressure vessel in the event of a loss of the main feedwater supply.In summary, the earthquake and tsunami may have caused a loss of coolant at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, which could lead to a meltdown. The system for cooling the reactor core is designed to kick in in the event of a loss of feedwater, and fortunately this appears not to have happened yet.
  • #8,611
etudiant said:
The well informed site Atomic Power Review here suggests these are absorption towers for cleaning some of the water.
http://atomicpowerreview.blogspot.com/2011/06/fukushima-daiichi-update-june-1st.html

Not sure which is right, but had thought that the absorption was just one part of a series of process steps,
so this may indeed be a heat exchanger.
Can anyone tell for sure?

Good info and thanks. Looking at it, I suspect you are right.

I will reduce my hope and optimism that we have closed loop cooling somewhere in Units 1-4 until we have some more information.
 
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  • #8,612
Bandit127 said:
Good info and thanks. Looking at it, I suspect you are right.

I will reduce my hope and optimism that we have closed loop cooling somewhere in Units 1-4 until we have some more information.

I think the equipment in the photo may be for removing cesium from the contaminated sea water in the unit 3 screen area, as referenced in:
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110521e2.pdf
 
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  • #8,613
Is it even possible to selectively remove cesium contamination at the part per 10 million level from sea water? Would not the overwhelmingly more numerous sodium ions saturate the zeolite in short order?
 
  • #8,614
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  • #8,615
That makes sense. I don't like the idea to use some kind of rubber hoses for the cooling system. Something more temperature and pressure resistant would give me a better feeling.
 
  • #8,617
tsutsuji said:
It is the "Sea water circulatory purification system" aimed at purifying the harbor : http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110531_01-e.pdf

Sadly, I concede that you are right - my optimism is popped like a balloon with a pin.

...I wonder how such a small system will cope with the millions of liters of water in the harbour. Those small hoses can probably take 200 l/min at 3 bar. (An informed guesstimate).

For the volume in the harbour, I guess 15m of depth, 300m out to the harbour wall and 1000m width along the seafront and I get 4.5 x 10^6 m3 of harbour water. Or 4.5 x 10^9 litres.

With my guess of 200 l/min, we would pass 4.5 x 10^9 l through in 2.25 x 10^7 minutes. That's about 42 years to pass the water in the harbour through once.
Better I reckon to use it to treat the water that will form the closed loop part of the Unit 2 SFP cooling system.

And - once they have gained the skills to do it with the Unit 2 SFP, the closed loop cooling water for the rest of the SFPs and beyond from there.

(Oops - my unbounded opimism is bouncing back. Apologies...)
 
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  • #8,618
Hmm, I asked myself, how much cesium did they get into the these water masses in the buildings they want to decontaminate.

1 gram of Cs-134 (half life 2.0648 y) makes up 1293 curies.
1 gram of Cs-137 (half life 30.17 y) makes up 86.55 curies.

(Calculated according to the formula described http://www.bautforum.com/showthread...odine-in-nuclear-waste?p=1893658#post1893658".)

So ...
...one megacurie of Cs-134 weighs about 773.4 g.
...one megacurie of Cs-137 weighs about 11.55 kg.

So, if we have about, say, 12000 tons of water with 1 megacurie Cs-134 and Cs-137 each, then this would be a ppm cesium (weight 12kg total), I think.

Too bad Tepco doesn't publish salinity data, so we can only guess the ratio of Cs and seawater salt. But appears to be sure that there is salt in the magnitude of at least tens of tons.
So my layman's estimate is that the ratio seawater salt:cesium in the T/B water could be 10000s-1000s:1.

Does anybody know whether Areva's plant also precipitates salt or is selective to cesium, and if, how much?
 
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  • #8,619
biggerten said:
Since thermocouples require good connections, I can see corrosion introducing offset quite easily. High temperatures, saltwater, steam, oh, I can see error possibilities indeed.

But, can those errors be positive?

I know about theormocouples only from theory, not from practice. AFAIK corrosion of electric wires or terminals near the sensing junction should only increase the resistance of the loop, not the net electric potential generated by the junction. Thus the temperature reading (basically a measure of voltage at the other end of the wires) should be diminished, not increased. Similarly, any damage to the insulation along the wires would create another junction at that spot; if the temperature there is lower than at the normal junction, the reading again will be lowered, not increased. Is this correct?

One possibility for positive errors is electrical "leaks" into the thermocouple wires from other nearby wires. Are there any others?
 
  • #8,621
To complement the plots posted yesterday, here are two plots of the pressures in unit #3 spanning from mar/20 to mar/22. The first one is based on a consolidated table of water levels, pressures and CAMS readings recently posted by TEPCo (http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/images/syusei_level_pr_data_3u.pdf).

plot-pres-un3-t-X-full.png


The second plot uses the pressure readings from the faxes that TEPCo sent to NISA and were distributed by NISA at the time, as part of their periodic press releases (http://www.meti.go.jp/press/).

plot-pres-un3-n-X-full.png


Note that the large transient in the core pressure "A", quite conspicuous in the first graph, is entirely absent in the second graph --- even though the latter uses a subset of the data points of the former. Note also that the max pressure recorded by TEPCo during that transient (11.67 MPa) exceeds the maximum design pressure of the RPV; and that peak is confirmed by three readings over the space of one full hour.
 
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  • #8,622
etudiant said:
If there is about 100,000 tons of similarly contaminated water in the entire plant, that would suggest about 12Pbq *100,000/2700 = about 440 Pbqs of Cesium at Fukushima.
Seems that AREVA really has a job to do.
Has anyone any idea whether their selective precipitation techniques have a prayer of working on this minute quantity of cesium, ( about 0.05 gram/ton) from a salt water solution? They claimed 99.9% to 99.99% removal, but that seems just heroic to me, based on my long ago chemistry background.

They wouldn't get the contract if not ...
A 99.99% cleanup on a contamination of 100mSv/hour would still amount to .01 mS/hour .
That would be 87 mSv / year , 87 times the public allowed dose
 
  • #8,623
GJBRKS said:
They wouldn't get the contract if not ...
A 99.99% cleanup on a contamination of 100mSv/hour would still amount to .01 mS/hour .
That would be 87 mSv / year , 87 times the public allowed dose

Afaik, the water is much more contaminated than that, so even the treated material will be painfully dirty, maybe 1000-10,000x the allowable limit. Still way better than 1,000,000x the limit or more as at present.
The question though is whether there is any experience with selective cesium removal in the presence of an overwhelming amount of sodium. It seems unlikely that anyone has ever needed such a process before, so while the AREVA facility may be the best or perhaps the only option TEPCO had, it may not be a very effective solution.
What is plan B?
 
  • #8,624
Thought I'd be the first to point out that this thread just cleared 1 million views.
 
  • #8,625
Jorge Stolfi said:
Note that the large transient in the core pressure "A", quite conspicuous in the first graph, is entirely absent in the second graph --- even though the latter uses a subset of the data points of the former. Note also that the max pressure recorded by TEPCo during that transient (11.67 MPa) exceeds the maximum design pressure of the RPV; and that peak is confirmed by three readings over the space of one full hour.

Its very annoying that the B pressure reading over the same time period does not do anything interesting, because it makes it hard to be too confident that the pressure really rose to the extent that A reading indicates. What the various pressure readings were doing in the week before the 21st don't really help me get a sense of exactly what may have happened either, eg its not clear to me whether the rpv could attain such high pressures again given how the pressure was for days before the 21st?

But if you added some temperature data to your graph, I think you would end up with a stronger looking indication that something happened that night, since some temperatures peak near or soon after that time, and certain temp sensors go on to give wacky negative values after this event.

As for why the 3 interesting datapoints are missing from the status snapshots that were published a few times a day, it seems inevitable to me because of what time they tended to take readings to publish vs the time of day that the pressure A spike happened. So I am very happy that we have more comprehensive data available to us for some weeks now, its just a shame it isn't enough to draw strong conclusions. Maybe we can be reasonably confident that significant stuff happened early on the 21st and possibly on a few other occasions that week as well, but I do wonder whether we will ever find out what. I don't imagine there is much further data from that time period, so our only hope may be to wait until better idea about state of core & containment are known, and then see if we can get this to match any theories about what happened around the 21st. CAMS data doesn't seem to help in this case, and from memory I think the times that neutron readings went above <0.01 in published data tended to be much earlier on in the crisis, but I will go and double-check this now.
 
  • #8,626
SteveElbows said:
CAMS data doesn't seem to help in this case, and from memory I think the times that neutron readings went above <0.01 in published data tended to be much earlier on in the crisis, but I will go and double-check this now.

Just to confirm that neutron readings are indeed uninteresting around this event, with the ones of interest being recorded in periods 13th march 05:30 to 10:50, and then another batch between 21:00 on march 14th and 01:40 march 15th.
 
  • #8,627
I have updated again my plots, to NISA release 156 (jun/01 12:00).
http://www.ic.unicamp.br/~stolfi/EXPORT/projects/fukushima/plots/cur/Main.html
SteveElbows said:
Its very annoying that the B pressure reading over the same time period does not do anything interesting, because it makes it hard to be too confident that the pressure really rose to the extent that A reading indicates.

The RPV B gauge was acting strange since mar/19 00:00, when apparently it started to correlate more to the drywell pressure than to the RPV A pressure. As soon as the RPV A transient began on mar/21 ~01:25, the B gauge started to drop on its own, going from ~150 kPa just before the transient to ~60 kPa just after it. So while it does not confirm the 11 MPa surge, it does indicate that something special happened a that time.

Moreover I cannot imagine what sort of malfunction could have caused a pressure gauge to register ~10MPa (~100 times atmospheric pressure) for over an hour. My understanding is that those gauges are basically pipes that convey the RPV pressure to the dial on the control room by purely mechanic/hydraulic means. Thus I cannot see how the gauge could register 10 MPa, unless something somewhere was under 10 MPa. And where else could one have such pressures, if not in the RPV?
SteveElbows said:
But if you added some temperature data to your graph, I think you would end up with a stronger looking indication that something happened that night

I will look into that. (The TEPCo documents I just transcribed do not list the temperatures, hopefully some other document does.)
SteveElbows said:
As for why the 3 interesting datapoints are missing from the status snapshots that were published a few times a day, it seems inevitable to me because of what time they tended to take readings to publish vs the time of day that the pressure A spike happened.

Still I would expect that a Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency would at least comment on the RPV pressure apparently exceeding the max design pressure. Would't such an event automatically trigger some bureaucratic response from them? I suppose that either NISA knew of the peak and decided that it was not important/significant; or TEPCo forgot to tell NISA about it.
 
  • #8,628
Jorge Stolfi said:
I have updated again my plots, to NISA release 156 (jun/01 12:00).
http://www.ic.unicamp.br/~stolfi/EXPORT/projects/fukushima/plots/cur/Main.html


The RPV B gauge was acting strange since mar/19 00:00, when apparently it started to correlate more to the drywell pressure than to the RPV A pressure. As soon as the RPV A transient began on mar/21 ~01:25, the B gauge started to drop on its own, going from ~150 kPa just before the transient to ~60 kPa just after it. So while it does not confirm the 11 MPa surge, it does indicate that something special happened a that time.

Moreover I cannot imagine what sort of malfunction could have caused a pressure gauge to register ~10MPa (~100 times atmospheric pressure) for over an hour. My understanding is that those gauges are basically pipes that convey the RPV pressure to the dial on the control room by purely mechanic/hydraulic means. Thus I cannot see how the gauge could register 10 MPa, unless something somewhere was under 10 MPa. And where else could one have such pressures, if not in the RPV?


I will look into that. (The TEPCo documents I just transcribed do not list the temperatures, hopefully some other document does.)


Still I would expect that a Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency would at least comment on the RPV pressure apparently exceeding the max design pressure. Would't such an event automatically trigger some bureaucratic response from them? I suppose that either NISA knew of the peak and decided that it was not important/significant; or TEPCo forgot to tell NISA about it.

I'm a bit confused by this. We had earlier had extensive discussions about the inability of the RPV to hold high pressures because the seal at the top would give at fairly modest levels.
Now we have a damaged reactor holding 100x atmospheric for over an hour. Am I the only one to be disconcerted by this?
 
  • #8,629
etudiant said:
I'm a bit confused by this. We had earlier had extensive discussions about the inability of the RPV to hold high pressures because the seal at the top would give at fairly modest levels. Now we have a damaged reactor holding 100x atmospheric for over an hour. Am I the only one to be disconcerted by this?

The normal operating pressure of the RPV is ~70 bar (= 70x atmospheric ~ 7 MPa), and it is supposedly tested at over ~100 bar (~10 MPa). So the seal definitely is tight up to that much.

Between mar/13 noon and the transient on mar/21 midnight, the RPV of reactor #3 appears to have been communicating in some way with the drywell, since their pressures wandered up and down between 100 kPa (1 bar) and 500 kPa (5 bar) more or less together. (In this period the RPV presure was quite consistently ~75 kPa (0.75 bar) below that of the drywell. This pressure difference corresponds to a water depth of 7 meters, so perhaps there is a communicating-vessels-type explanation for that behavior.)

After the mar/21 transient and the black smoke inident, the drywell seems to have been continuously open to the atmosphere, with the pressure constant at 1 bar exactly; and the torus remained steady at 2 bar, as if its gauge was under 10 meters of water. The slow but steady pressure fall in the RPV could be explained perhaps by closure of the RPV-drywell connection, and condensation of the steam inside the RPV.

I still cannot fgure out where the RPV pressure gauges A and B are located exactly. Is it possible that the space inside the RPV got partitioned by the meltdown into two fairly airtight spaces, with one gauge in each?
 
  • #8,630
Jorge on the anomalous pressure readings around 21 March, from my recollections at the time (i noticed it too):
I think they were inferring pressure from a gage on a pipe through which they were pumping water. Possibly a gage on a fire truck pump.
Check your newspaper reports back then. On about 20th there were phrases "unable to overcome pressure might have to vent again" and on 21st a NYTimes article had phrases "Condition has stabilized" with no explanation. I think they opened a valve. I wouldn't have admitted it either.
Thereafter the two pressure readings came back together and tracked injection flow per your plots (which i were admiring).
Of course i wasn't there so that's a guess , just what i surmised at the time.

As to the thermocouples: there's one more failure mode, wet insulation.
Being dissimilar metals they produce microvolts per degree along any part of the wire with a temperature gradient (google peltier and seebeck)... so they make a predictable micro-voltage proportional to difference between hot and cold ends as you know very well.
Well, being dissimilar metals they'll also make a battery if placed in an electrolyte. That electrochemical effect makes tens of millivolts and will cause substantial error if the insulation gets compromised and water gets to the conductors. The chemical millivolts overwhelm and bury the temperature microvolts. Try it yourself - take a coffee cup of tapwater add a shake of salt and dip two pieces of bare thermocouple wire in it and i bet you get close to 100 millivolts . Then twist the ends together to make a thermocouple and you still get millivolts because the battery effect is stronger than the thermocouple effect.
Given all the steam in there it could be a wet terminal block in a flooded junction box. Might dry out and start working on its own.
 
  • #8,631
etudiant said:
Moreover, given we now know the reactors were doomed within a day of the loss of power, it is not clear any great harm was done by the TEPCO stonewalling during the early days after the accident. Or am I missing something?
I am not so sure. Maybe early venting would have avoided the hydrogen explosions? What if they immediately started sea water injection? Let's wait for the "lessons learned" in the final report.
 
  • #8,632
jim hardy said:
As to the thermocouples: there's one more failure mode, wet insulation.
Great explanation! But why are all those sensor readings published without assessment by TEPCO or NISA? Are they afraid of drawing wrong conclusions?
 
  • #8,633
The water level in the basement of unit 1 reactor building has decreased by 7.9 cm over the last 24 hours : http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20110602/t10013272611000.html

The firm is gauging radioactivity in underground water around the No. 1 reactor and checking if radioactive water is leaking from the building.
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/02_03.html
 
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  • #8,634
[PLAIN said:
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/31_03.html][/PLAIN]
Tokyo Electric Power Company detected 2 million becquerels of radioactive cesium per cubic centimeter of water in the basement of the No. 1 reactor building.

It speculates that radioactive substances from the melted fuel have leaked from the pressure vessel encasing the reactor core.

That is 2x109 Bq/Litre and safe limit is 60 or 90 Bq/L for Cs-134 and 137 respectively.

Why are Tepco reporting sea water contamination in Bq/L and ground water, basement water etc as Bq/cm3?Tepco released these images of their temporary tank farms, note the plastic wrap as additional protection against drips at joints. (click image for high res original)

How do plastic polymers stand up to radiation, UV usually makes plastics go brittle with time. While transporting radioactive substances in plastic pipes, the radiation intensity and energy is higher than the UV radiation from sunlight, so I suspect these pipes will deteriorate with time (possibly faster than expected) and laying these pipes on rough surfaces with sharp stones is also not a good idea as induced vibration of the flowing water on a sharp point load could lead to puncturing.

Are there studies on plastic polymer decay and radiation?

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110602_01.jpg"

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110602_03.jpg"

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/news/110311/images/110602_02.jpg"

(Photo credits: Tokyo Electric Power Co.)
 
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  • #8,635
Atomfritz said:
Hmm, I asked myself, how much cesium did they get into the these water masses in the buildings they want to decontaminate.

1 gram of Cs-134 (half life 2.0648 y) makes up 1293 curies.
1 gram of Cs-137 (half life 30.17 y) makes up 86.55 curies.

(Calculated according to the formula described http://www.bautforum.com/showthread...odine-in-nuclear-waste?p=1893658#post1893658".)

So ...
...one megacurie of Cs-134 weighs about 773.4 g.
...one megacurie of Cs-137 weighs about 11.55 kg.

So, if we have about, say, 12000 tons of water with 1 megacurie Cs-134 and Cs-137 each, then this would be a ppm cesium (weight 12kg total), I think.

Too bad Tepco doesn't publish salinity data, so we can only guess the ratio of Cs and seawater salt. But appears to be sure that there is salt in the magnitude of at least tens of tons.
So my layman's estimate is that the ratio seawater salt:cesium in the T/B water could be 10000s-1000s:1.

Does anybody know whether Areva's plant also precipitates salt or is selective to cesium, and if, how much?

Salinity data are here: http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110522_04-e.pdf

The conductivities show that the salinities are 0.5 - 0.8X that of seawater. The potassium may be a larger problem for a cesium-specific ion exchanger than the sodium, even though its concentration is lower, and there are plenty of other cations to interfere with the process.
 
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  • #8,636
etudiant said:
Is it even possible to selectively remove cesium contamination at the part per 10 million level from sea water? Would not the overwhelmingly more numerous sodium ions saturate the zeolite in short order?

The 99+% removal of Cs+ will require very high affinity for Cs+. At the same time, affinity for Na+, K+, Mg++, and other ions has to be low. I can't find numbers for zeolite, if that's what they're using. I think that there are technologies that might have the high affinity and selectivity required (such as crown ethers), but there doesn't seem to be any certainty about what they're actually doing (maybe they don't know either).
 
  • #8,637
Bandit127 said:
Sadly, I concede that you are right - my optimism is popped like a balloon with a pin.

...I wonder how such a small system will cope with the millions of liters of water in the harbour. Those small hoses can probably take 200 l/min at 3 bar. (An informed guesstimate).

For the volume in the harbour, I guess 15m of depth, 300m out to the harbour wall and 1000m width along the seafront and I get 4.5 x 10^6 m3 of harbour water. Or 4.5 x 10^9 litres.

With my guess of 200 l/min, we would pass 4.5 x 10^9 l through in 2.25 x 10^7 minutes. That's about 42 years to pass the water in the harbour through once.

The "circulatory sea water purification system" is described as being "experimental". They wanted to try it for 4 days and see the results after those 4 days. If the results are good enough, they will increase the number of purifying units : http://www.kfb.co.jp/news/index.cgi?n=201106019

It has been stopped on June 1st because of some bad cable that needs to be changed : http://www.asahi.com/national/jiji/JJT201106010117.html

AntonL said:
Tepco released these images of their temporary tank farms, )

alongside a map showing their locations : http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/images/handouts_110602_01-e.pdf

AntonL said:
note the plastic wrap as additional protection against drips at joints. (click image for high res original)

How do plastic polymers stand up to radiation, UV usually makes plastics go brittle with time. While transporting radioactive substances in plastic pipes, the radiation intensity and energy is higher than the UV radiation from sunlight, so I suspect these pipes will deteriorate with time (possibly faster than expected) and laying these pipes on rough surfaces with sharp stones is also not a good idea as induced vibration of the flowing water on a sharp point load could lead to puncturing.

These tanks are for water moved from units 5 and 6 which - as far as I understand - consists of sea water from the tsunami wave and ground water leaking inside basements through cracks. The sea was clean before the tsunami. So the remaining source of radiation is the ground water. I understand that this water is a concern for people and biological life as a potential health hazard, but is it so radioactive that plastic polymers will suffer ?
 
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  • #8,638
jim hardy said:
Jorge on the anomalous pressure readings around 21 March<..>
Check your newspaper reports back then. On about 20th there were phrases "unable to overcome pressure might have to vent again" and on 21st a NYTimes article had phrases "Condition has stabilized" with no explanation. <..>

Right, Jim, but those newspaper reports were about the rise in containment vessel pressure. The DW pressure had started increasing on March 18th, and by early March 20th JST it reached design max limit, and had provoked a plan to vent the containment (presumably to avoid further calamity, having the events of March 14th in mind.)

However, on the morning of March 20th the containment vessel pressure started decreasing and it was announced that the plan to vent had been set on hold. There was a sustained decrease in containment vessel pressure throughout March 20th and 21st, ultimately leading to its being at atmospheric pressure, so there is little reason to think that the plan to vent was invigorated and enacted during this period.
 
  • #8,639
SteveElbows said:
Just to confirm that neutron readings are indeed uninteresting around this event, with the ones of interest being recorded in periods 13th march 05:30 to 10:50, and then another batch between 21:00 on march 14th and 01:40 march 15th.

I know this is speculation, but I can't help myself. Those readings... are they continuous? If not, it may be that any neutron spikes could have been "lost" just like the pressure/temp readings.
 
  • #8,640
Are there any physicists in the house?

I had an idea a week ago. Turns out, as with nearly all my best ideas, someone else had had it before:

http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/44411

Now, for the questions. Would a prompt recriticality event at Fukushima produce enough neutrinos to be detected at the Super-Kamiokande? If so, could someone sift the recorded "noise" from the Super-Kamiokande looking for anti-neutrinos coming from there, or is the "spurious" data discarded in real-time, as it happens in, say, the LHC experiments?
 
  • #8,641
Jorge Stolfi said:
I will look into that. (The TEPCo documents I just transcribed do not list the temperatures, hopefully some other document does.)

As part of the same release of data some weeks back, there was temperature data in another file, covering a similar time period. This is the file for reactor 3:

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/f1/images/syusei_temp_data_3u.pdf

Unfortunately temperature data of this variety only became available on the 19th, so we don't get a great look at the temperature trends long before the 21st.

The picture is rather messy, but a few of the temps hit new highs around the 01:25 time on the 21st.
 
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  • #8,642
zapperzero said:
I know this is speculation, but I can't help myself. Those readings... are they continuous? If not, it may be that any neutron spikes could have been "lost" just like the pressure/temp readings.

Well the data has long been available, I only looked at it again recently because TEPCO published some corrections & additional data. I don't think the corrections/additions make any difference to the neutron figures but I could be wrong, its been a while since I looked at the original data.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110528e14.pdf

Neutron readings during this period were mostly taken near the main gate every 10 minutes.
 
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  • #8,643
AntonL said:
That is 2x109 Bq/Litre and safe limit is 60 or 90 Bq/L for Cs-134 and 137 respectively.

Why are Tepco reporting sea water contamination in Bq/L and ground water, basement water etc as Bq/cm3?

with a mean gamma ray energy of 662keV per decay ,

this would amount to 18.33 J/day per liter ,

or (230mSv / day) / ingested liter ( for a man of 80 Kg)

or (9.6 Sv / hour ) / ingested cubic meter ( for a man of 80 Kg)

http://www.wolframalpha.com/input/?i=2.0e09+bq+*+662+kev&a=*C.bq-_*Unit-&a=ListOrTimes_Times

(This is only the cesium component , there would be other additional sources , and not counting any betaradiation that would add to the Sv)
 
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  • #8,644
Jorge wrote:
"""However, on the morning of March 20th the containment vessel pressure started decreasing and it was announced that the plan to vent had been set on hold. There was a sustained decrease in containment vessel pressure throughout March 20th and 21st, ultimately leading to its being at atmospheric pressure, so there is little reason to think that the plan to vent was invigorated and enacted during this period.""



That is a very confusing time.
I was and remain puzzled by that day.
Your graph shows i believe a LOT of water injection. Nootice the pressures track injection flow...


""""I still cannot fgure out where the RPV pressure gauges A and B are located exactly. Is it possible that the space inside the RPV got partitioned by the meltdown into two fairly airtight spaces, with one gauge in each? "

What i believe is they used local pressure gages on pipes that go into the RPV from whatever temporary pumps they had jury-rigged. One of those pipes i believe had a valve that was closed or nearly so, so the pump pressure was high and it took them a while to figure that out. when they opened it the situation "stabilized", so valve they opened was afill valve not a vent valve. That's my best guess at a hypothesis that fits observations.

amen to your torus sensor being under water.
What i did not realize until recently is how high above ground the reactor vessel is. My PWR was at ground level. I am wondering if the ~1.5 atm pressures in drywell could be from their flooding it , and the pressure indication due to pressure drop in the fill lines and elevation. Both pressures tracked injection flow for a while.

about a month ago i posted some thoughts about unit 3 and your charts here,
http://tickerforum.org/akcs-www?singlepost=2541679

at time i thought the rpv and containment were both open at top. Less convinced of that now.
 
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  • #8,645
jim hardy said:
Jorge wrote:
"""However, on the morning of March 20th the containment vessel pressure started decreasing and it was announced that the plan to vent had been set on hold. There was a sustained decrease in containment vessel pressure throughout March 20th and 21st, ultimately leading to its being at atmospheric pressure, so there is little reason to think that the plan to vent was invigorated and enacted during this period.""



That is a very confusing time.
I was and remain puzzled by that day.
Your graph shows i believe a LOT of water injection. Nootice the pressures track injection flow...


""""I still cannot fgure out where the RPV pressure gauges A and B are located exactly. Is it possible that the space inside the RPV got partitioned by the meltdown into two fairly airtight spaces, with one gauge in each? "

What i believe is they used local pressure gages on pipes that go into the RPV from whatever temporary pumps they had jury-rigged. One of those pipes i believe had a valve that was closed or nearly so, so the pump pressure was high and it took them a while to figure that out. when they opened it the situation "stabilized", so valve they opened was afill valve not a vent valve. That's my best guess at a hypothesis that fits observations.

amen to your torus sensor being under water.
What i did not realize until recently is how high above ground the reactor vessel is. My PWR was at ground level. I am wondering if the ~1.5 atm pressures in drywell could be from their flooding it , and the pressure indication due to pressure drop in the fill lines and elevation. Both pressures tracked injection flow for a while.

about a month ago i posted some thoughts about unit 3 and your charts here,
http://tickerforum.org/akcs-www?singlepost=2541679

at time i thought the rpv and containment were both open at top. Less convinced of that now.

For information, RPV Pressure instruments sense steam dome pressure on the reactor water level condensing chamber instrument tap outside of the shroud and dryer skirt at about the elevation of the tops of the steam separators. The instruments themselves are in the reactor building outside of containment'
 

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