Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

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In summary, the two people present are debating the existence of qualia. One side believes they are real, while the other side does not. They are also discussing the difference between logical thought and intuitive comprehension. In the end, the two sides are still arguing and no one has come to a conclusion.

Are qualia real?


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  • #1
StatusX
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In wikipedia, qualia are defined as:

...the properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them. These properties are, by definition, epistemically unknowable in the absence of direct experience of them; as a result, they are also incommunicable. The existence or lack of these properties is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy of mind.

There is no way to prove they exist from third person methods alone, but many philosophers argue that we can know about them from the first person. I'm wondering who here thinks these are real and who thinks they are a delusion. For those who think they aren't real, do you at least admit that it seems like they are, but just feel that this intuition is wrong? And for those who do believe in them, do you think science will ever be able to account for their existence and/or specific (intrinsic) properties?

I mean for this to be a way to see who stands where, so I've made the voting public. I'd like people to take this oppurtunity to make some arguments for and against qualia. Obviously, anyone can deny the most convincing argument for their existence and still hold a perfectly consistent world view. But try to be open minded, and argue specifically why this intuition should both exist and be wrong.
 
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  • #2
I've never liked this question. I suppose not everyone will agree, but it's always seemed obvious that there is something that it is like to be in any conscious state. If that is the only restriction on what it is to be qualia, then sure, they exist. The real question is whether they are truly the ineffable phantoms that antiphysicalists want them to be, or whether they are the quantifiable brain events that opponents contend.

Either way, taking a stance on one position or the other seems foolish to me at this point. You do that, and all that ends up happening is that you'll defend that position no matter how absurd it becomes in particular circumstances. As far as I'm concerned, I've seen decent arguments against each side and that's all. There is little evidence at this point on which to base a definitive judgement.
 
  • #3
As the quote mentions, qualia are by defintion unknowable except by direct experience. In other words, if those states you talk about do turn out to be nothing more than quantifiable brain events, then they are not qualia, and qualia don't exist. In fact, it may be a contradiction to believe in physical qualia, but I know some people still do so I left it as a choice.

Also, it is very important to take a stand now. If you believe qualia are real and nonphysical, you believe that there is more to be explained after the entire physical brain has been mapped. Nothing that could be found there could explain qualia, even in principle, so no experimental evidence will sway your opinion.

If this sounds a little unreasonable, maybe it is. Because if they can explain why we believe in qualia, what retort could we give? This paradox is the reason I think many people don't believe in qualia, even though the evidence for them is overwhelming (right now you are observing qualia, as is always the case). I think we are misunderstanding some very basic properties of the extrinsic/intrinsic distinction, and that it is possible both that qualia are real and that there is a physical reason we talk about them.
 
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  • #4
I apologize to Nereid and honestrosewater for appearing to be rude but the people here make it very difficult. :cry: I tried to communicate the necessity of differentiating between logical thought and intuitive comprehension, but I suspect no one here has even begun to comprehend the value of recognizing this fundamental dicodomy. It should be clear to everyone that, by the very definition of the terms, that it is illogical to fail to differentiate between the two. Yet no one seems to be taking the trouble to do so. I can only conclude that no one has even begun to think about the issue. :confused:

StatusX asks if qualia are real. Obviously, the first question which must be answered is exactly what does one mean by real. And then, given the answer to that question, ask if the label "qualia" refers to something which fullfills the specification implied by the label "real". Qualia is something which has been squat up by a number of people. "Real", on the other hand, is a label squat up by most everybody! The general definition of "real" seems to be that it lablels those "things" which are necessary to the world view we hold as valid (and I am very willing to listen to any arguments against that perspective). Under that perspective, statusX's question becomes, what makes "qualia" necessary to the world view you hold? You should be able to give me some logical consequences of the existence of qualia if it is more than just a label for some worthless squat your intuition has created. Please, what phenomena does it explain beyond its own existence?

That is, show to me something about "qualia" that is worth thinking about; I personally have no thoughts on the idea at all and, at the moment, I don't seem to be able to squink any up. :rofl:

Have fun -- Dick

PS my wife tells me I have misspelled the past tense of squink; it should be squaught. I need an opinion – honestrosewater, you are the authority on this. :biggrin:
 
  • #5
Doctordick said:
I apologize to Nereid and honestrosewater for appearing to be rude but the people here make it very difficult. :cry: I tried to communicate the necessity of differentiating between logical thought and intuitive comprehension, but I suspect no one here has even begun to comprehend the value of recognizing this fundamental dicodomy.

FYI, it is possible for two people who understand the distinction to
disagree.


You should be able to give me some logical consequences of the existence of qualia if it is more than just a label for some worthless squat your intuition has created.

Qualia have consequences for

1) The scientific understanding of perception. Since objects do not have
scientifically speaking have all the properties they seem to have, we need
a term for the properties they seem to have

2) Aesthetics. How can a painting seem beautiful if it doesn't seem ? The
difference betwen tasting a wine and reading its label.

3) Ethics. There is cruely to animals, but not cruelty to machines, because machines do not *feel*.

4) Complex behaviour, if Ramachandran is correct. (3 laws of qualia)
 
  • #6
StatusX said:
Also, it is very important to take a stand now. If you believe qualia are real and nonphysical, you believe that there is more to be explained after the entire physical brain has been mapped. Nothing that could be found there could explain qualia, even in principle, so no experimental evidence will sway your opinion.

Of ocurse one can accept that qualia are real in some sense whilst "bracketting£ the question of whether they are physical, etc.
 
  • #7
I voted for the first option (not surprisingly): real and not physical. At the moment I favor Rosenberg's view of what qualia are and how they 'fit in' with the physical world. On this view, qualia are the intrinsic basis for the extrinsic relationships described by phyics. So it's not completely correct here to state that qualia are not physical; by hypothesis, physical phenomena (as described by extrinsic physical theory) literally are the sets of effective relationships engaged in by the intrinsic qualia. So, on this view, it would be more correct to say that physical phenomena are one aspect (but not all aspects) of qualia; they are qualia as seen 'from the outside.'
 
  • #8
Doctordick said:
The general definition of "real" seems to be that it lablels those "things" which are necessary to the world view we hold as valid

That's not a helpful definition. If we have a world view that explains everything but qualia, then they certainly aren't necessary to it. But if qualia are real, then that view is lacking.

You should be able to give me some logical consequences of the existence of qualia if it is more than just a label for some worthless squat your intuition has created. Please, what phenomena does it explain beyond its own existence?

It may not explain anything, and I disagree that it needs to. What about the intrinsic base of the physical, ie, whatever is at the bottom and being acted on by the rules? Its specific character has no logical consequences, but it is real. Of course, you might deny that there is anything at the bottom, but unless you can explain why that should be, you only believe that to protect your view that the extrinsic is all that's real.
 
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  • #9
Tournesol said:
Qualia have consequences for

1) The scientific understanding of perception. Since objects do not have
scientifically speaking have all the properties they seem to have, we need
a term for the properties they seem to have

2) Aesthetics. How can a painting seem beautiful if it doesn't seem ? The
difference betwen tasting a wine and reading its label.

3) Ethics. There is cruely to animals, but not cruelty to machines, because machines do not *feel*.

4) Complex behaviour, if Ramachandran is correct. (3 laws of qualia)

I should just point out that many philosophers who believe in qualia do not believe they fill any roles like these. It certainly seems that all of these functions can be explained by the physical brain.

The paradox of qualia is that they seem to be epiphenomenal, that is, having no functional porperties at all. And yet, they also seem to be real in a way that's stronger than any possible illusions or mistaken intuitions could be. Rather than assume our intuition is wrong and move on, I would like to find a way that qualia could be real and non-functional, and yet for it still to be necessary that they exist for us to actually talk and think about them.
 
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  • #10
Tournesol said:
Doctordick said:
I suspect no one here has even begun to comprehend the value of recognizing this fundamental dicodomy.
FYI, it is possible for two people who understand the distinction to
disagree.
So you are saying that you fully comprehend the difference between using logic and using intuition and that you feel recognition of the difference is of no value? :confused: I suppose you would suggest that the scientific community should accept intuition as just as good a defense of ideas they normally award to logic! :rofl:

Perhaps that is the real reason for your illogical defense of the need for qualia:
Tournesol said:
1) The scientific understanding of perception. Since objects do not have
scientifically speaking have all the properties they seem to have, we need
a term for the properties they seem to have
So qualia are properties objects do not have and we need a name for this! :rofl: :rofl: :rofl: Because your intuition tells you so? That has a familiar ring to it. :biggrin:
Tournesol said:
2) Aesthetics. How can a painting seem beautiful if it doesn't seem ?
Maybe there are important, "scientifically speaking", aspects to the situation which are not yet fully understood. What you seem to fail to understand is that giving a name to something is not a solution to the problem of understanding it. :yuck: All giving it a name does is to assist in acquiring the emotional feeling that you understand it, a very dangerous ("scientifically speaking") anti science illusion. :tongue:
Tournesol said:
3) Ethics. There is cruely to animals, but not cruelty to machines, because machines do not *feel*.
You are giving me a conclusion, not a defense of that conclusion. :uhh: Contrary to what you say above, you apparently have no understanding of the fundamental difference between logic and intuition at all.

Have fun squinking, you are certainly wasting your time trying to think – Dick

PS Speaking of cruelty to animals, I am firmly of the opinion (what my intuition has squinked up) that cruelty is in the mind of the performer of the act. When a tiger chews on the haunch of a living zebra, is it being cruel or is it simply enjoying a meal? On the other hand, in a Sims game, you can surround a Sim with a wall so that it cannot fulfill its needs for survival. In such a case, the Sim will complain a lot and eventually die. Why would someone enjoy doing such a thing? I personally would attach the word "cruel" to the enjoyment of the suffering of others. Different strokes for different folks.
 
  • #11
StatusX said:
If we have a world view that explains everything but qualia, then they certainly aren't necessary to it. But if qualia are real, then that view is lacking.
If we have a world view that explains everything but santa and the easter bunny, then they certainly aren't necessary to it. But if santa and the easter bunny are real, then that view is lacking. Now you need to define what you mean by "explain". :rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

Have fun -- Dick
 
  • #12
Doctordick said:
If we have a world view that explains everything but santa and the easter bunny, then they certainly aren't necessary to it. But if santa and the easter bunny are real, then that view is lacking. Now you need to define what you mean by "explain". :rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

I'm glad you found that so amusing, but I was pointing out how your defintion of "real" was circular. You're the one who needs to clarify.
 
  • #13
Quoted by StatusX: "Rather than assume our intuition is wrong and move on, I would like to find a way that qualia could be real and non-functional, . . ."

I would opine that studies done on patients diagnosed with 'blindsight' show that qualia are in fact functional and not at all epiphenomenal. Apparently, these people do process visual information, they just don't (or wont) consciously access it (or something to that effect). If qualia were real but non-functional, they would not be able to report it, they would just go on behaving as though they were experiencing visual qualia. Qualia, if real, would necessarily have to 'function', in the sense that it would have to do something . . . have some sort of effect, when it is 'kicked'. That is if 'blindsight' (notice the scare quotes) is a real disorder in its own right. But that goes right back to the beginning . . . so, nevermind.
 
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  • #14
Picklehead said:
Quoted by StatusX: "Rather than assume our intuition is wrong and move on, I would like to find a way that qualia could be real and non-functional, . . ."

I would opine that studies done on patients diagnosed with 'blindsight' show that qualia are in fact functional and not at all epiphenomenal. Apparently, these people do process visual information, they just don't (or wont) consciously access it (or something to that effect). If qualia were real but non-functional, they would not be able to report it, they would just go on behaving as though they were experiencing visual qualia. Qualia, if real, would necessarily have to 'function', in the sense that it would have to do something . . . have some sort of effect, when it is 'kicked'. That is if 'blindsight' (notice the scare quotes) is a real disorder in its own right. But that goes right back to the beginning . . . so, nevermind.

This seems to equate qualia with internal processing of sensory data. I don't think this is what philosophers mean by the term. The usual referent is that a quale is "what it is like to have a sensory experience". I believe Chalmers (but maybe not Rosenberg) accepts the distinction, placing sensory signals in the physical box and qualia in the nonphysical.
 
  • #15
IE, the qualia RED is not the color red, but the experience of the color red. But what if one night the cells in your retina that respond to the 'color' red were removed, or anywhere else from eye to brain where color is 'dealt with'. If qualia were non-physical, you wouldn't be able to form a report to tell yourself that you were no longer able to experience the color red. If it were to happen while you were awake and in conversation, you would go on as before without the slightest break, only now you are a zombie.
 
  • #16
IE, the qualia RED is not the color red, but the experience of the color red. But what if one night the cells in your retina that respond to the 'color' red were removed, or anywhere else from eye to brain where color is 'dealt with'. If qualia were non-physical, you wouldn't be able to form a report to tell yourself that you were no longer able to experience the color red. If it were to happen while you were awake and in conversation, you would go on as before without the slightest break, only now you are a zombie.

But you said it yourself: "...the cells in your retina that respond to the 'color' red were removed...". That is why you can report a difference, because there is a physical change. Qualia are what its like to see those colors, and that would also change. But qualia don't do anything, and if you could somehow change just the qualia, no one would be able to tell, including you. That is a big reason why many people don't believe in them.
 
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  • #17
Is it possible even in principle to 'change just the qualia'? Are there any examples of physical effects that completely terminate in such a local area that are analogous to epiphenomena?
 
  • #18
We know and are certain of our experiences, although we can doubt their causes. We can conceive of a situation where we are just "brain-in-vats." We normally assume that when we see a computer, there is physically a computer in front of our physical bodies causing this experience, but it is conceivable that we are hallucinating, or as I said, "brains-in-vats." Now, we also normally assume that we have brains, but I believe it is conceivable that we have not. Perhaps we have something like brains, and we are "things-like-brains-in-vats." In fact, although it has no practical value, we could assume that we know only our experiences, and assume that we should infer nothing beyond: neither that we have brains like we think we do, nor bodies, nor is there physically a computer in front of whatever I am, causing me to experience it that way.

We can be certain of our experiences, and that they exist. The image of the computer, what it's like to see redness, etc., we are sure of those things. We can't be certain of anything beyond them, so clearly, the two are different. Physical things like brains and computers are such things (i.e. things beyond experience which are inferred from experience), so these qualia must be different from such things.
 
  • #19
AKG said:
We can be certain of our experiences, and that they exist.

We can be certain that we have immediate memories of having had experiences, but that is all. Dennett, and the neurological experimenters along with him, testify that our brain processes systematically create false memories in our own best interests. Much better to shy at the false face in the bushes our internal processes have constructed of branches and twigs, than to ignore the real tiger hidden in there because it was only sketchily glimpsed.
 
  • #20
selfAdjoint said:
We can be certain that we have immediate memories of having had experiences, but that is all. Dennett, and the neurological experimenters along with him, testify that our brain processes systematically create false memories in our own best interests. Much better to shy at the false face in the bushes our internal processes have constructed of branches and twigs, than to ignore the real tiger hidden in there because it was only sketchily glimpsed.
You've confused what I meant. When I say "experience," I mean whatever it is you see. I don't mean, when I say you experience a computer, that you have a physical experience of a computer. Indeed, my point was that we can't be sure of any such experiences, but we can be sure of the current experience we have, i.e. we can be sure that to us, we see an image. Whether this image is the result of experiencing a "false" memory or a direct perception, whatever, is irrelevant. If this is confusing, then, in your words, yes, we are certain of our potentially false memories, and that is all. We can be certain of what our memories are, but they could be false, i.e. they may not correspond to anything beyond themselves. Not only could they be false in the sense that they tell us there is a face where there are only twigs, it is conceivable that they are false in that they tell us we're sitting at a computer when we may be brains-in-vats, or even, something-like-brains-(but-not-exactly)-in-vats. We can't even be sure that there are brains beyond our "memories" of brains. Nonetheless, we can be certain that our memories contain brains.
 
  • #21
StatusX said:
I'm glad you found that so amusing, but I was pointing out how your defintion of "real" was circular. You're the one who needs to clarify.
Somehow I just don't believe you. :tongue: It seems much more reasonable that your response was a totally emotional reaction to your impression that my comment implied you had nothing of value to say. :biggrin: If you take the trouble to examine what I said you will discover nothing circular there at all.
Doctordick said:
The general definition of "real" seems to be that it lablels those "things" which are necessary to the world view we hold as valid (and I am very willing to listen to any arguments against that perspective). Under that perspective, statusX's question becomes, what makes "qualia" necessary to the world view you hold? You should be able to give me some logical consequences of the existence of qualia if it is more than just a label for some worthless squat your intuition has created. Please, what phenomena does it explain beyond its own existence?
Now, it becomes circular if you add the idea that "real" is the basis of your world view; but that squat is in your head, not mine. I think the real trouble here is that you don't have the intellectual wherewithal to differentiate between squat and thought. :wink:

Have fun -- Dick
 
  • #22
StatusX said:
(qualia) may not explain anything, and I disagree that it needs to. What about the intrinsic base of the physical, ie, whatever is at the bottom and being acted on by the rules? Its specific character has no logical consequences, but it is real. .


How can the intrinsic base of everything fail to have logical consequences ?
 
  • #23
StatusX said:
I should just point out that many philosophers who believe in qualia do not believe they fill any roles like these.

Some do, some don't.

It certainly seems that all of these functions can be explained by the physical brain
.

I have seen no such explanation.

The paradox of qualia is that they seem to be epiphenomenal,

They do not seem to be epiphenomenal -- introspection tell's us just the opposite,
that pains make us go "ouch!". They can be argued to be epiphenomenal,
but the argument is mistaken as I have shown before.

that is, having no functional porperties at all. And yet, they also seem to be real in a way that's stronger than any possible illusions or mistaken intuitions could be. Rather than assume our intuition is wrong and move on, I would like to find a way that qualia could be real and non-functional, and yet for it still to be necessary that they exist for us to actually talk and think about them.

Why cling to non-functionaliity ? There is no reason too.
 
  • #24
Doctordick said:
So you are saying that you fully comprehend the difference between using logic and using intuition and that you feel recognition of the difference is of no value?

I am saying that two people who employ logic can still disagree.
ie you are not entitled to claim that anyone who disagrees with you august self
is automotically being illogical.

Perhaps that is the real reason for your illogical defense of the need for qualia:

You have not demonstrated any flaw in my logic.
So qualia are properties objects do not have and we need a name for this!

Perhaps yo could suggest your preffered alternative out of:

1) Things do no seem like anything at all; we are zombies and live in perceptual
void

2) Things are exactly as they seem

Because your intuition tells you so?

Introspection is not intuition. Consciousness, self-awareness, exists; it is
a pefectly respectable scientifics phenomeon and deserves an explanation.

Maybe there are important, "scientifically speaking", aspects to the situation which are not yet fully understood. What you seem to fail to understand is that giving a name to something is not a solution to the problem of understanding it.

I never remotely suggested it was. The point of 'qualia' is to put a problem on the table.

Have fun squinking, you are certainly wasting your time trying to think – Dick

Do try to be less patronisng.


PS Speaking of cruelty to animals, I am firmly of the opinion (what my intuition has squinked up) that cruelty is in the mind of the performer of the act. When a tiger chews on the haunch of a living zebra, is it being cruel or is it simply enjoying a meal?

Does it have a choice ?
 
  • #25
Tournesol said:
I am saying that two people who employ logic can still disagree. ie you are not entitled to claim that anyone who disagrees with you august self is automotically being illogical.

You have hit the nail on the head. Doctordick has little more to say than "you're stupid if you don't agree with me." Read his posts . . . you seldom see one where he doesn't imply or outright say it. Yet when it comes time to step up and demonstrate his self-proclaimed brilliance, mostly what we hear is mundane mechanistic perspectives. People committed a priori to 100% mechanical explanations don't seem to reason well outside of mechanical issues (which, IMO, is why they want to reduce everything to mechanics), so I don't think you'll never get anywhere with him or others here who prefer machines to humanity.
 
  • #26
Doctordick said:
Somehow I just don't believe you. :tongue: It seems much more reasonable that your response was a totally emotional reaction to your impression that my comment implied you had nothing of value to say. :biggrin: If you take the trouble to examine what I said you will discover nothing circular there at all.
Now, it becomes circular if you add the idea that "real" is the basis of your world view; but that squat is in your head, not mine. I think the real trouble here is that you don't have the intellectual wherewithal to differentiate between squat and thought. :wink:

So you believe that all that is real is what is necessary to explain what you believe is real (or "the basis of your world view" if you want to slightly obscure your faulty logic with synonyms)? Ok, let's pretend for a second that that isn't circular, and that you're just a run of the mill physicalist who believes only the extrinsic is real. Now, why do you believe that? Please, if you can "think" of a reason that has to be true, I'd love to hear it. But I suspect you're just as much of a "squatter" as you seem to believe everyone else is. You have yet to provide any arguments for why qualia can't be real, other than "they aren't necessary to my world view."
 
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  • #27
StatusX, I will give you credit. It appears that you are trying to understand what I am saying; which is considerably more thought than Les Sleeth or Tournesol seem prepared to commit. I admit I am a rather strange person and am not surprised at all by the difficulty people have understanding me. I made a serious effort to express my opinion that the mechanisms by which we achieve our opinions should be divided into two very different categories. The only decent response I obtained was honestrosewater's squink comment which, although it really gives little hard evidence of understanding, can be taken to imply the existence of two modes was understood. It is quite clear that Tournesol completely missed the entire issue of my presentation. :grumpy:
Tournesol said:
I am saying that two people who employ logic can still disagree.
There definitely exists a very important circumstance where they cannot disagree. That particular circumstance is the case when they agree on the axioms behind the logical proposition. That is exactly the central issue of my presentation. What I was pointing out was that it is very valuable to separate the two mechanisms so that we can always be aware of exactly what is being argued and when the arguments are specious. Axioms are, for the most part, undefendable propositions (that is why they are called "axioms" and not facts). Likewise, anyone who thinks that it is necessary to believe an axiom is "true" in order to discover its logical consequences just doesn't understand logic. :devil:

And that gets me to your first comment:
StatusX said:
So you believe that all that is real is what is necessary to explain what you believe is real
You bring up the issue of "belief". Belief is without a doubt arrived at via squat, not thought and has no place in a logical discussion. As I said in my response, "it becomes circular if you add the idea that "real" is the basis of your world view; but that squat is in your head, not mine" and that is exactly what you are doing here. The issue is that you have not seriously thought about what you mean when you use the word "real". It is a concept which you have arrived at via squinking and you thus presume you know what you mean; however, if you are going to communicate your ideas, you have to be more circumspect than that. Essentially, you are presuming that "real" means the same thing to everyone else that it means to you without making any effort to clarify the issue. :yuck:
Doctordick said:
The general definition of "real" seems to be that it labels those "things" which are necessary to the world view we hold as valid (and I am very willing to listen to any arguments against that perspective).
I put that forward as a very serious contender for the definition of "real". Under it, what is real is no more than an opinion the speaker has squinked up: to a schizophrenic, the voices he hears are real; to the pope, the god he speaks to is real; to an modern physicist, black holes are real; to a scientist a few hundred years ago phlogiston was real.

As I said, I am very willing to listen to any arguments against that perspective, but I certainly won't pay any attention to someone who says they know what is really "real". :rofl:
StatusX said:
You have yet to provide any arguments for why qualia can't be real, other than "they aren't necessary to my world view."
What you seem to be missing is the idea that "qualia" is being put forth as an answer and, as such, it serves no purpose unless it explains something. :uhh:

Gee guys, when I look at a rainbow, I see it as stripes of various colors. When I measure the wave lengths of the light, I get a smooth continuous transition. Now how do I explain that? Is it reasonable to suggest that associations with certain colors are important to our survival: red with blood and berries, green with vegetables, yellow with heat. And that our interest and concern with different colors has evolutionarily produced a striking awareness of specific colors? (I point out that, decision wise, that donkey halfway between two bales is an exceedingly rare event: the brain is an organ devoted to making decisions on whatever information it has.) Or perhaps this should be taken as evidence of the "reality" of "qualia". :biggrin:

Again, what I am preaching against is naming something in order to acquire the emotional feeling that you understand it, a very dangerous anti scientific illusion.

Have fun -- Dick
 
  • #28
Doc, I am with you all the way here. The heterophenomenological stance would require me to take utterly seriously the fact that some one else believes X is real. That is a verifiable datum about that person. But I am under no obligation to believe that X is real because of taking that belief seriously.
 
  • #29
We don't believe in qualia just because other people do, we believe in them because we have access to them ourselves. It is likely they won't be necessary to explain anything (except maybe why we talk about them), but we have to decide whether that is a necessary condition for something to exist. As I explained before, the intrinsic basis of the physical likely exists, and yet exactly what it is (we could be in a computer program for all we know) can't be known. And as long as all the extrinsic properties are as we observe them, physics need not be concerned with it. Yet, to believe that if something doesn't have a functional role, it doesn't exist is to believe there is no intrinsic basis, and that the universe is nothing but an extrinsic, causal flux. That may be true, but it is an unsupported belief, no more logical than the belief that it isn't.

Speaking of the intrinsic base of the physical, it has a couple of properties in common with qualia that I think should be explored. First, if we take the view that rules cannot exist by themselves, but must act on something, then we know that there is an intrinsic basis, even though we can't observe it. However, we can't say exactly what it is. Similarly, we know qualia exist, but we can't describe them. Does anyone see any significance to this parallel?
 
  • #30
StatusX said:
We don't believe in qualia just because other people do, we believe in them because we have access to them ourselves.

That is not true according to the definition of "qualia" that you gave me in your second post to this thread. "As the quote mentions, qualia are by defintion unknowable except by direct experience. In other words, if those states you talk about do turn out to be nothing more than quantifiable brain events, then they are not qualia, and qualia don't exist." As such, the only event that you have direct access to is the occurence of a given sensation. Whether this sensation is simply a brain event or a quale is not yet known. There is no pretheoretical way to directly apprehend the truth of either claim. You directly access the sensation and then infer, likely based on intuitive argumentation, that what you have accessed is not a brain event but rather a quale. If this was indeed a pretheoretical fact and not an inference drawn from within a theoretical (in this case, antiphysicalist) framework, then there would be no disagreement.
 
  • #31
loseyourname said:
You directly access the sensation and then infer, likely based on intuitive argumentation, that what you have accessed is not a brain event but rather a quale.

I'm finding this thread confusing. I thought the "sensation" was qualia. Which would make its existence indubitable. Or is the existence of "sensations" in question?

Can someone post what the definition of "qualia" is, as used in this thread?
 
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  • #32
loseyourname said:
That is not true according to the definition of "qualia" that you gave me in your second post to this thread. "As the quote mentions, qualia are by defintion unknowable except by direct experience. In other words, if those states you talk about do turn out to be nothing more than quantifiable brain events, then they are not qualia, and qualia don't exist." As such, the only event that you have direct access to is the occurence of a given sensation. Whether this sensation is simply a brain event or a quale is not yet known. There is no pretheoretical way to directly apprehend the truth of either claim. You directly access the sensation and then infer, likely based on intuitive argumentation, that what you have accessed is not a brain event but rather a quale. If this was indeed a pretheoretical fact and not an inference drawn from within a theoretical (in this case, antiphysicalist) framework, then there would be no disagreement.

It may have been misleading to talk about what they might "turn out to be." I was just referring to how you aren't taking a stand now, but would rather wait until there's more evidence. I was saying that this stand on qualia is too indecisive, because believing in them is believing that whatever we might find out about physical brain states, they can't completely account for qualia (of course, that renders the second option in the poll inconsistent, but this is just my understanding of qualia). Maybe I should have said that if you are open to the possibility that brain states could explain all there is to qualia, then you really don't believe in qualia as defined above.
 
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  • #33
learningphysics said:
Can someone post what the definition of "qualia" is, as used in this thread?

The defintion is in the first post. You can go to the wikipedia article on qualia for more detail.
 
  • #34
StatusX said:
The defintion is in the first post. You can go to the wikipedia article on qualia for more detail.

Thanks.

Wikipedia:
"Qualia (singular: "quale", pronounced KWAHL-ay) are most simply defined as the properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them"

So ok... redness is not qualia, but "what it is like to see red"... that is qualia?

If we admit that there is "seeing of red"... how can there be any doubt that there is "something it is like to see red".

The fact that we remember and can refer to a particular sensation as redness, shows that there is "something it is like to see red". The property of "what it is like to see red" is incommunicable, but it certainly exists.

Wikipedia
"The existence or lack of these properties is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy of mind."

I strongly question the above statement in Wikipedia. Either I'm still misunderstanding what if being referred to by qualia, or wikipedia is wrong here.
 
  • #35
learningphysics said:
So ok... redness is not qualia, but "what it is like to see red"... that is qualia?

If we admit that there is "seeing of red"... how can there be any doubt that there is "something it is like to see red".

The fact that we remember and can refer to a particular sensation as redness, shows that there is "something it is like to see red". The property of "what it is like to see red" is incommunicable, but it certainly exists.

Wikipedia
"The existence or lack of these properties is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy of mind."

I strongly question the above statement in Wikipedia. Either I'm still misunderstanding what if being referred to by qualia, or wikipedia is wrong here.

It is true, it seems pretty obvious that red looks like something. If this fact could be easily reconciled with physicalism, I doubt anyone would question the existence of qualia. But it can't be, so many people go against their intuition to protect their metaphysical doctrine.

The reason physicalism can't account for qualia (of course, this is also debatable) is that physics only deals with functional roles. Mass is nothing more than how any object responds to a force. Charge is how it responds to an electric or magnetic field. Everything in physics is relationships like this. But a qualia, say, the experience of the color red, is absolute. It is intrinsic, and is not just described by functional roles. Some argue that this "experience" is nothing more than a physical state in which we are more inclined to say things like "that apple is red" and "I am experiencing a red qualia." Physics undoubtedly could explain such a state, but I think we all know that there is more to it than that. There is something it is like to be seeing red, something that red looks like to us. The stand you take just depends on what you value more highly: preserving physicalism or describing how the universe truly is.
 

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