Proof of Reality: Electrical Impulses and The Matrix

[metacristi]

Thank you for telling me what I'm doing.

I do not understand what you are talking about here.You are talking from books but without really managing to build a coherent view from those chunks you mention so often.If we shift the accent from the problem of meaning toward the demarcation between science and pseudoscience by allowing even metaphysics inside science,where valuable as I've argued,my stance is absolutely viable.Ayer's principle was meant to eliminate metaphysics,which he failed to do,but the idea that only fruitful theoretical constructs are allowed within science is still viable and in fact all scientists use it widely.I do not think Quine supported the introduction of redundant constructs in science or preference for programmes which use redundant constructs.Why do you believe for example that the sentence 'God (a certain model) has created our universe' is not a part of science?Because for the moment is a redundant construct.No one says that a research programme having God as an extra axiom (the rest of assumptions being almost unchanged) is not viable,it is,but it cannot have primacy.The principle of sufficient reason is the base of rationality,also at the heart of the whole science.Otherwise even in our usual scientific quest we would be always entitled to introduce inside science constructs which have no role for the predictions the theory makes.For example if by using the usual inductive methods of agreement and so on we establish that the sufficient observed causes for a phenomenon Z are A,B,C there is no good reason to claim also that D is another cause which always appears in conjunction with A,B,C but we cannot observe it for the moment.When sufficient reasons will be produced then D will become also part of science,for the moment its introduction inside science is redundant.Likewise if from a set of assumptions let's say a,b,c,d,e,f ('a' being for example metaphysical,seemingly nontestable itself:strings for example it's hard to believe that we will ever be able to 'probe' at Planck's level) we deduce some predictions potentially testable g,h,i,j,k,l (some of them confirmed experimentally) but we observe that if we renounce at premise 'f' the predictions are the same then we are fully entitled to discard it till new evidence (be it in the form of a theory where it cannot be discarded) will force us to allow it inside science.Why do you insist to a different approach when dealing with the whole scientific programme vs alternative ones (containing redundant constructs)?Even creationists realized that they must prove that God hypothesis is fruitful within scientific theories in order to be entitled to claim epistemological primacy.

I said that 'a' could be metaphysical,it is part of science but there is no obligation for all scientists or would be rational people to believe in it's existence until we will have indirect or direct experimental confirmation.For example if I had lived around 1870 I would have certainly believed in the atomic hypothesis which even made predictions (it was able to accomomdate many observed phenomena in a wide area,previously thought as totally separated) but I would have not condemned physicists as Mach,Herz,Planck for not believing in the existence of atoms.The mistake was that the atomic hypothesis was marginalized when in fact it was theoretically and empirically progressive,even at that time more superior experimentally to the continuous hypothesis.

 

[metacristi]

By the way because we talked of 'verification' versus 'confirmation'.It is a common practice to say that a theory was confirmed when a valid experiment support one of its predictions.This does not imply that the theory is true,verified or the best possible,not even that the theory was made more probable if you wish.Personally I think that the bayesian interpretation of probabilities,widely used in scientific practice,is a very solid base for those who try to justify induction,we do not need to justify induction within logic.Sure we can never prove a theory but we are fully entitled to have a high degree of confidence in the (approximative) truth of scientific statements (even some theories) for which we have a relevant sample of previous succes.We cannot rely on such scientific laws,in spite of the relevant sample of previous successes,on long run indeed but there is absolutely no good reason to not rely on them at our next use of them.Indeed otherwise we would have no science and technology either,why attempt to design a car if we cannot rely on the fact that tomorrow,when we plan to start building it,is uncertain that the laws of physics will still hold?

 

[metacristi]

Your English is just broken enough to make me a little unsure of your meaning. It seemed you were careful to use the words "observed facts" and "objective knowledge." Is your assertion that the empirical method is deserving of "epistemological privilege" limited to knowledge of "externals" and sense data?
.

Yeah I still have to sharpen my english skills,but I think my points of view were enough clear.The science has epistemological privilege being the standard of knowledge on all those aspects of nature where it has managed to obtain suffients reasons for its assertions forcing so all would be rational people to think the same.All rational people will believe that the Earth is round we have sufficient reason for that.Moreover since there is no other viable alternative method which to match the actual version of the scientic method even there where the scientific quest has not obtained yet those sufficient reasons it still has epistemological privilege,though there is no obligation for all would be rational people to believe in its proposals.For example I do not think that science has managed to find sufficient reasons in the case of consciousness so that some rational people are entitled to doubt that AI or the materialistic approach is correct,for example.Still doubting does not equate that some one is entitled automatically to believe that science cannot one day find those sufficient reasons and in any case that all would be rational people should believe that consciousness,at least subjective experiences,will never be understood by the actual approach.Let's allow time and human geinus to settle things.If there is something extra,possible to detect,we will know sometimes.If not we could have 'hints' that something more is implied,though,certainly,we will never gain sufficient resons.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I do not understand what you are talking about here.

That much is plain.

You are talking from books but without really managing to build a coherent view from those chunks you mention so often.

On the contrary, you are talking from books, failing to answer questions and unable to appreciate that a critic need not offer an alternative to point out the shortcomings of your ideas.

If you want to claim an epistemological priviledge, you need to explain why scientific theories have an epistemological standing that differs in kind - not degree - from others. You are more than welcome to attempt this in a non-circular fashion instead of asserting that you've already done so, but if you are just going to waste my time again then please just say so.

 

[metacristi]

Provide first a credible alternative proposal at what I've said above and I will find worth of continuing this discussion.Till then I waste my time either,I do not find your criticism as being substantiated.First I fail to see how your criticism is entitled,why research programmes which contain redundant assumptions are on the same level of rationality with the actual reasearch programme of science,i'm afraid the logic and even scientific practice does not support this view;anyway there is no claim of 'eternal truth',even the current axioms of science are open to rejection if sufficient reasons against are produced.If you could propose an alternative research programme where the God's of Homer are indispensable constructs,though we have to change some other assumptions hold by the actual research programme of science,which explain facts equally well,then yes there is no base to claim primacy for the actual version of the scientific research programme.Unfortunately there is no such proposal.I repeat I don't think Quine referred at successful prgrammes which have redundant assumptions as being on the same level of with programmes where the redundant assumptions have been eliminated.Secondly I fail to see why am I a logical positivist and thus falling under Quine's criticism (as I've explained above there is no supposition that each statement in the premises, taken in isolation from other assumptions,must be potentially testable).

 

[Hugo Holbling]

*sigh* I have already explained - many times - that i need not provide an alternative to note errors in your ideas. You are welcome to offer an argument as to why i am plainly mistaken in so thinking, but ignoring the point is not convincing. Nor, i might add, is mischaracterising my criticisms as supposing you are a logical positivist when i have already disclaimed that idea.

If i am merely taking arguments from books and you have me all figured out then you might be better advised to turn to the actual book i am using and address Quine's assertion that no such epistemological privilege is possible. This, of course, is the matter that you continue to avoid: why is the epistemological footing of Homer's gods different in kind from that of quarks, to refer to a favourite example? I have asked you this time and again, but i am yet to see a non-circular answer (or, indeed, any answer at all). Kindly cease mischaracterising me and offer an answer, or throw your toys at someone else.

 

[Canute]

Metacristi - It would also help me if you explained what you mean by science having 'epistemilogical priviledge'. I've never known what you meant.

 

[metacristi]

*sigh* I have already explained - many times - that i need not provide an alternative to note errors in your ideas. You are welcome to offer an argument as to why i am plainly mistaken in so thinking, but ignoring the point is not convincing. Nor, i might add, is mischaracterising my criticisms as supposing you are a logical positivist when i have already disclaimed that idea.

If i am merely taking arguments from books and you have me all figured out then you might be better advised to turn to the actual book i am using and address Quine's assertion that no such epistemological privilege is possible. This, of course, is the matter that you continue to avoid: why is the epistemological footing of Homer's gods different in kind from that of quarks, to refer to a favourite example? I have asked you this time and again, but i am yet to see a non-circular answer (or, indeed, any answer at all). Kindly cease mischaracterising me and offer an answer, or throw your toys at someone else.

Nothing is set in stone.This is why I do not rely too much on other sources,they good informally but cannot constitute a sort of Bible,especially in this controversial field.The majority of what I write comes from my own thought,facts and logic counts,I do not have to read all books existent to provide a logically defendable stance.


Why is there a difference?Simply because quarks are fruitful theoretical constructs indispensable for the success of the theories using them,at least to accommodate,having power of explanation,the observed facts.This does not mean they exist in reality,as a matter of fact since they are not ddirectly involved in the new predictions made by the theories using them many scientists doubt that they should make part of science itself as of now.However,though 'quark hypothesis' seems an ad hoc hypothesis,it is accepted within the Standard Model,indeed there are different degrees of ad hocness,some have a so high degree of coherence with existing knowledge that fully deserve to become part of science itself,not all are all out crackpots (in the same position was once the neutrino hypothesis now widely supported empirically).

There is no such proposal for the Homer's God research program.I do not say it's impossible to construct one (I still expect your proposal) but it will be tremendously difficult to build one free from internal contradictions able also to keep pace with the standard research program of science.For example you cannot interpret lightning as due to Zeus and in the same time to explain the functioning of capacitors using the electromagnetic theory.

Secondly,assuming that an internally coherent program will ever be provided,the proponent will have first to deal with the following problems,on medium and long run at least:

1.Does the program accommodate all known empirical facts,already explained by the scientific program,with the exitence of Homer's God assumption playing an active role in comjunction with other premises?

2.Are there new testable predictions,apart from accomomdating all known facts,resulting from the combination of the initial assumption (that Homer God's exist) with some other premises?

3.Is the program falsifiable?If yes has the program the potential to be empirically and theoretically progressive,on long run,able to remain at the same level of empirical success with the standard program of science whilst keeping 'active' (in the process of new predictions making) the assumption that Homer's Gods exist without resorting to the ad hoc assumption that 'Homer Gods did it')?Is the program able also to accommodate also neutral facts previously ('fit' them within the program)?

If the answer is again yes but only with the expense of changing large parts of its premises in a very short amount of time then we have a problem.I'm afraid exactly this would have happened if for example we would have accepted let's say 100 years ago that Homer's Gods rsearch program was on the same level of priority with the usual scientific program.What reasons would we have to accept a program that changes almost on a daily basis?This would be a clear sign of the strong adhocness of one of the premises that never changes,I do not know which,but clearly the program as a whole is inferior,with experiments playing a key role.Basically is meaningless to say that we deal with one and the same research program.Why not change the assumption that Homer Gods exist itself?

 

[Les Sleeth]

Yeah I still have to sharpen my english skills,but I think my points of view were enough clear.

Just so you know . . . I wasn't being critical of your English skills or suggesting you need to sharpen them. I was just letting you know if I question what you believe you've already explained, it's because I'm having a little trouble with how you put words together.

The science has epistemological privilege being the standard of knowledge on all those aspects of nature where it has managed to obtain suffients reasons for its assertions forcing so all would be rational people to think the same.

I agree.

Moreover since there is no other viable alternative method which to match the actual version of the scientic method even there where the scientific quest has not obtained yet those sufficient reasons it still has epistemological privilege,though there is no obligation for all would be rational people to believe in its proposals.

Here is where I might have a problem. It depends on if you mean a "viable alternative method" for studying externals, or if you mean for studying anything, including the interior of consciousness. I will explain more below.

For example I do not think that science has managed to find sufficient reasons in the case of consciousness so that some rational people are entitled to doubt that AI or the materialistic approach is correct,for example.Still doubting does not equate that some one is entitled automatically to believe that science cannot one day find those sufficient reasons and in any case that all would be rational people should believe that consciousness,at least subjective experiences,will never be understood by the actual approach.

I agree one isn't logically justified in "automatically" assuming science cannot find the answer to consciousnes. But they would be justified if they have a sound reason to doubt. A crucial aspect of the empirical method is that what has been hypothesized to be true must be experienced (observed). So I would say it is experience which most establishes "epistemological privilege." As William James put it, “Nothing shall be admitted as fact except what can be experienced at some definite time.”

Yet James also said, " . . . everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real." I think that is relevant because not everyone finds sense experience the most valuable of human experiences. As far back as Socrates we hear of individuals recommending "know thy self" (and many of these people are thought of as "wise" human beings). If one were to develop the ability to experience the most inward nature of consciousness, and after repeated experiences one becomes certain that the senses, and therefore empiricism, can never get at it, then one would then be justified in believing science is not the right approach to learning about the nature of consciousness.

Further, with the added choice of acquiring that "inner" knowledge, one wouldn't necessarily agree that empiricism deserves "epistemological privilege."
One might very well decide that self knowledge is one's first priority, and understanding the external aspects of reality is below that in priority.

Let's allow time and human geinus to settle things.If there is something extra,possible to detect,we will know sometimes.If not we could have 'hints' that something more is implied,though,certainly,we will never gain sufficient resons.

This relates to the point I was trying to make in another thread. If what I said above is possible, there will be no way to externalize the experience of consciousness. Therefore, only "hints" we will acquire are if each individual learns to experience the inner aspect of consciousness for oneself. I cannot see your experience, you cannot see mine. You can only experience your own, I can only experience mine.

 

[metacristi]

Hugo Holbling

Our disagreement begins from the assumption of Feyerabend that experiments cannot constitute the base of making the difference.Contrary to what you seems to believe I maintain my view that empirical data is crucial,on the long run at least.While it is true that Copernicus and even Galieo's views were somehow against the 'natural' interpretation of facts,at that time very few preferred them based only on some aesthetic reasons.It was Tycho Brahe's observations and especially the tremendous success of Newtonian mechanics which made all scientists of the time to prefer their views.Thus scientific practice vindicate the appeal to experience on long run in spite of some counter examples along history.In my opinion history is full of examples when the lakatosian view was the closest to what happened,this is why I prefer it.Those who think it is no longer tenable have first to prove their case as being superior in experimental practice (though possible their view was at its turn disproved by some other counter examples).Anyway what counts even on the short run is that thefirst task of science is to work for all our practical purposes in the simplest way and that the principle of sufficient reason is the base of rationality.Since science is openly fallible if other alternative programmes will prove superior the majority of scientists will consider it the standard of knowledge (though possible working to make progressing some empirically degenerating alternative programmes).If you have other proposals (better I hope backed by sufficient reasons) please go ahead.I'm listening.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Why is there a difference?Simply because quarks are fruitful theoretical constructs indispensable for the success of the theories using them,at least to accommodate,having power of explanation,the observed facts.

Fair enough, but the same held for the Homeric gods at the time - that's the point. For these reasons, the Greek gods were as real to people as quarks are to us.

For example you cannot interpret lightning as due to Zeus and in the same time to explain the functioning of capacitors using the electromagnetic theory.

Sure, but the conclusion you want to make doesn't follow: why then eliminate Zeus and not the latter explanation? You may use an epistemological privilege but why shouldn't i grant it to Zeus? Deferring to utility won't help because calling the latter more useful again implicitly relies on the already-granted epistemological priviledge; the same goes for fecundity. The problematic issue is to grant this privilege in a non-circular way.

 

[Les Sleeth]

. . . address Quine's assertion that no such epistemological privilege is possible. . . . why is the epistemological footing of Homer's gods different in kind from that of quarks, to refer to a favourite example?

I would enjoy debating Quine's point if I wasn't busy for the next couple of days. But as a quick answer to why I think epistemological privilege is possible, I'll let my pragmatist leanings show and say epistemological privilege is established by what "works."

When it comes to understanding physcial reality, empiricism has earned the right to claim epistemological priviledge. When what is claimed to be known is applied in a process, laser technology for instance, then we "know" something about the nature of light has been understood (i.e., because we can make it "work" or operate according to predicted principles). While quarks might be unknowable, there is plenty science has proven it knows. Homer's gods however produces no hypotheses we can apply and then prove it is an epistimological model that reveals reality.

Of course, I also believe epistemological privilege is not absolute, but is determined by what one wants to know. So as I argued in my last post to metacristi, I would not agree that empiricism has epistemological privilege in the case of certain subjective experiences.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Deferring to utility won't help because calling the latter more useful again implicitly relies on the already-granted epistemological priviledge; the same goes for fecundity. The problematic issue is to grant this privilege in a non-circular way.

Well, you responded to my point, though not to me, while I wrote it.

But I still believe utility proves itself. On a very basic level, it is what humanity, and for that matter all of life, does relentlessly. Ultimately, when we make things "work," we survive. Philosophers get to sit around and demonstrate the argument is circular, but only if they keep it a rationalization exercise and don't reference experience. In life they behave exactly like everyone else who depends on utility to survive.

Of course, with human consciousness, we also care about what "works" to make us happy, content, fulfilled . . . which is why I say empiricism hasn't proven it can help us know anything about that, and so may not deserve to be given epitimological privilege in every area of human investigation.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

But I still believe utility proves itself. On a very basic level, it is what humanity, and for that matter all of life, does relentlessly. Ultimately, when we make things "work," we survive. Philosophers get to sit around and demonstrate the argument is circular, but only if they keep it a rationalization exercise and don't reference experience. In life they behave exactly like everyone else who depends on utility to survive.

I quite agree, but this is making my point for me: the Homeric gods "worked" in this way, just as myriad other worldviews and methodologies "work" for other groups, cultures and so on. Why should i assign an epistemic privilege to one or the other?

Of course, with human consciousness, we also care about what "works" to make us happy, content, fulfilled . . . which is why I say empiricism hasn't proven it can help us know anything about that, and so may not deserve to be given epitimological privilege in every area of human investigation.

Well, i applaud your caution.

Homer's gods however produces no hypotheses we can apply and then prove it is an epistimological model that reveals reality.

The Homeric gods were used to make sense of the world just as we use quarks (in both cases, along with many other ideas). Without meaning to sound dismissive, i suggest you read (or re-read, perhaps) the classic works of that period if you think no hypotheses were produced or applied.

 

[Les Sleeth]

The Homeric gods were used to make sense of the world just as we use quarks (in both cases, along with many other ideas). Without meaning to sound dismissive, i suggest you read (or re-read, perhaps) the classic works of that period if you think no hypotheses were produced or applied.

Well heck, just when it's getting interesting I have to leave. However, I didn't say the classic works of that period produced no hypotheses or applications.

I am assuming we are all talking about epistimology, and in this case getting proof about the nature of reality. Just because the Greeks made sense of the world through myth doesn't mean they knew anything about reality. But this method of linking experience to what is hypothesized has produced an incredible amount of knowledge. As I've already said, I don't think sense experience is the only sort of experience which brings knowledge. But the qualitative difference in acquiring knowledge between people seeking to know by making up stories, or guessing, or divining, or purely rationalizing versus those who seek confirmation through experience is huge. That's why I said to metacristi that I think experience is what establishes epistimological priviledge.

 

[confutatis]

Of course, with human consciousness, we also care about what "works" to make us happy, content, fulfilled . . . which is why I say empiricism hasn't proven it can help us know anything about that, and so may not deserve to be given epitimological privilege in every area of human investigation.

Good thing the folks who discovered Viagra thought otherwise. Were they still looking for the source of erectile dysfunction in a person's soul, as psychologists always did, a lot of people would still be deprived of a major source of happiness, contentment, fulfillment...

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Well heck, just when it's getting interesting I have to leave.

Not to fret: you can rely on me to disagree with you tomorrow, whatever you might say.

That's why I said to metacristi that I think experience is what establishes epistimological priviledge.

Well, you can perhaps see why this is too vague - especially with "experience" being such a theory-laden concept. Don't you think the Greeks sought "confirmation through experience", too?

 

[metacristi]

Fair enough, but the same held for the Homeric gods at the time - that's the point. For these reasons, the Greek gods were as real to people as quarks are to us.

Sure, but the conclusion you want to make doesn't follow: why then eliminate Zeus and not the latter explanation? You may use an epistemological privilege but why shouldn't i grant it to Zeus? Deferring to utility won't help because calling the latter more useful again implicitly relies on the already-granted epistemological priviledge; the same goes for fecundity. The problematic issue is to grant this privilege in a non-circular way.

I don't think we arrive somewhere if those arguments.Anyway it's hard to see how can you avoid the crackpot ad hoc hypothesis 'Homer's Gods are responsible for all we see or can discover'.Your claim,which I disagree with,was that these systems have equal privilege at least on empirical grouns just because Quine said so.I'm afraid this is not enough and I've shown you above why,maybe on short run you're right,but there is no reason to think this holds also on medium and long run.To prove/disprove convincingly that assertion we need facts and for that first you have to propose an internally coherent model for scrutiny which does not contain redundant theoretical constructs and which avoid also the ad hoc hypothesis 'Homers' Gods did everything'.As far as I know Quine agreed with this,he's still an empirist after all that,there must exist a continuity stronger in some parts,weaker (nevertheless existing) in others,between all enunciations belonging to a scientific system,in contradiction with the acceptance of redundant assumptions,totally isolated from the rest of enunciations.Thus it seems to me that he accepts the principle of sufficient reason at least within the same systems (elimination of redundant assumptions) though allowing a competition between different scientific systems.Anyway since the principle of sufficient reason is one of the first epistemological principles,'engulfed' also by the actual scientific method(s) you'd have also to provide a method of deciding what is real without allowing contradictions of how some enunciations in the system have been inferred.The mere fact that we are entitled to create whatever systems we wish by holding a certain enunciation as being true provisionally (the existence of Homer's God for example) with the expense with having to change possible large parts of the system does not prove that on long run it will still be on the same level of rationality.Finally I really doubt that Quine has ever thought seriously at this since he only wanted to discredit the logical positivist interpretation of the meaning (which he succeeded) and proposed an alternative hypothesis something like Bohm's fully causal interpretation of QM (as Bohm's witnessed he only wanted to show that non local hidden variables are still feasible in spite of von Neumann's fourth postulate).Your position is actually that of Feyerabend and as I said there is no proof that such systems can hold on long run.

So we must wait even if you propose a coherent alternative program,equally supported empirically,to settle the things in a clear way.It might even happen that during this time the assumption that Homer's God exist to be made potentially testable in a clear way (indeed why not?) enabling us to treat it in isolation from other enunciations.

 

[metacristi]

Hugo Holbling

It's not clear to me,you have not proposed an alternative view to mine's,do you disagree also with the epistemological privilege of science based on logical grounds (principle of sufficient reason)?Some people here believe that you support their point of view (pure relativism).Or,not even Feyerabend say that there is no method(s),there is a clear difference between saying that all epistemological systems are equivalent and denying the existence of a metalogical,immutable,method from outside science...

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Your claim,which I disagree with,was that these systems have equal privilege at least on empirical grouns just because Quine said so.

You'll recall that i asked you not to hopelessly mischaracterise me with a ridiculous straw man like this, but apparently that was too much to hope for. I have asked you to justify the epistemological privilege and you have singularly failed, unless you think writing at length will eventually hit on something convincing. Don't waste my time again.

To prove/disprove convincingly that assertion we need facts

No, we don't: facts are theory-laden, as you ought to know. Indeed, this is a basic logical error.

Your position is actually that of Feyerabend and as I said there is no proof that such systems can hold on long run.

Yes, you are keen to assert things but not so willing to provide any justification. If you think Feyerabend proposed a system, i suggest you think again; a remark like that would incline me to think you're not basing this on his work.

Some people here believe that you support their point of view (pure relativism).

Who are these people? Is this a spectator sport?

not even Feyerabend say that there is no method(s)

He said there is no method, and these days most philosophers of science take this as given.

 

[Theothanatologist]

He said there is no method, and these days most philosophers of science take this as given.

No scientific method?

In the immortal words of Arnold Drummond, Whatchoo talking about Willis?

You must have lost your gourd in order to say such silly stuff in the lion's den. Who are those philosophers of science worshipping at the altar of Feyerabend, chanting select winners from the Against Method gospel in the vain hopes of gaining hermetic knowledge?

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I'll not take your bait, dear Ender.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Not to fret: you can rely on me to disagree with you tomorrow, whatever you might say.

I interpret that as you joking, but I would say anyway I am not sure we disagree overall. I assume your opposition to metacristi's awarding empiricism of the title of "epistomological priviledge" is because you believe his is an absolute empirical statement. I've been trying to get him to tell me if he is limiting that privilege to physical/external inquiry, of if he believes it applies to all knowing endeavors.

I only got involved to see if you were using Homer's gods (or anything in a similar class) as a serious contender to empiricism for producing knowledge. Also, I thought if you were primarily objecting to metacristi's (alleged) absolute epistomological statement about empiricism, then I might get you to admit it does have the advantage when it comes to investigating physical apsects of reality (which doesn't meant it should granted epistomological privilege for all areas of investigation).

Well, you can perhaps see why this is too vague - especially with "experience" being such a theory-laden concept. Don't you think the Greeks sought "confirmation through experience", too?

I think we can make it vague by including varieties of experience like delusion, for instance. Most of us know what normal experience is (whether or not anyone can precisely define it); we trust it too, which is why we prefer an experienced doctor to operate on us over an inexperienced one. I don't see how you can deny, in the case of science, what the combination of ordinary sense experience combined with intelligent hypothesizing and logical interpretation has achieved (even if you don't value what empiricism has achieved). Before the experience element was added, thinkers debated for centuries about the nature of reality leaving us mostly bogged down in rationalization. The truth is, we know little more than tautologies through rationalization alone.

As far as Greeks seeking confirmation through experience, I am sure true believers did. And I am pretty sure they didn't find it
in actuality. They might have interpreted "confirmation" was the wind blowing through their window as they made a sacrifice to the gods, but that doesn't mean it was. Besides, I thought we were talking about what produces knowledge? I cannot see a real parallel between the god stuff and investigating the nature of reality.

Maybe the Greek oracles would be a better example, but even if I believed they offered a means of acquiring knowledge, I would say they are in a different class than the empiricists and cannot be compared unless, that is, the Greek oracles were to claim they could give us knowledge of physical reality as well as science. Then I'd want to see them do it, which they nor any other knowledge discpline ever has. That is why I am perfectly willing to grant empiricism "epistomological priviledge" status if it's limited to what's physical.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Good thing the folks who discovered Viagra thought otherwise. Were they still looking for the source of erectile dysfunction in a person's soul, as psychologists always did, a lot of people would still be deprived of a major source of happiness, contentment, fulfillment...

True. I think we just have different ideas of what "happiness, contentment, fulfillment . . . " are. I believe science has great potential for helping to relieve suffering, particularly through correcting or aiding physical problems.

But I do not consider the absence of problems or suffering happiness, contentment, or fulfillment.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I interpret that as you joking, but I would say anyway I am not sure we disagree overall.

I'm glad to continue this discussion because you seem genuinely interested, as opposed to avoiding the issue. You could say i was joking, but generally speaking i prefer to take the opposite point-of-view in a discussion because i feel i learn more that way, irrespective of my actual opinion.

I assume your opposition to metacristi's awarding empiricism of the title of "epistomological priviledge" is because you believe his is an absolute empirical statement.

Not really. If we want to say that science should have an epistemological priviledge, it would appear to be a claim that requires justification. If we want to do so in a non-arbitrary way, it won't do to say that the gods aren't real because they can't be observed or tested, and so on, because we then assume that what is real is what can be tested - which is precisely what we're supposed to show. The question to ask, then, is whether this can be done in a non-circular way.

Secondly, it doesn't help to say that science is successful in certain domains for producing knowledge, because then we run up against the issue of what "successful" or "useful" are supposed to mean. Very many worldviews have been both successful and useful insofar as they have helped their users to make sense of their world and achieve whatever aims they had. That our aims may differ is not a reason for awarding an epistemological priviledge.

We can say, of course, that the obvious distinction here is that certain approaches provide knowledge of reality and that this is why we may attribute an epistemological priviledge; however, that won't do either because, on the one hand, not everyone agrees that science has anything to do with finding true or truthlike theories about reality (as we saw in the other thread) and, on the other, we arrive back at the first problem of trying to explain why some methods tell us what's real while others do not. The most important matter, nevertheless, is to wonder if sentences that long are deliberate or just a result of my stupidity.

I only got involved to see if you were using Homer's gods (or anything in a similar class) as a serious contender to empiricism for producing knowledge.

Well, my arm can easily be twisted: knowledge of what?

Also, I thought if you were primarily objecting to metacristi's (alleged) absolute epistomological statement about empiricism, then I might get you to admit it does have the advantage when it comes to investigating physical apsects of reality (which doesn't meant it should granted epistomological privilege for all areas of investigation).

The serious difficulties mentioned above aside, i might be tempted to admit that, but i'd want to know how we decide when an advantage is present.

I don't see how you can deny, in the case of science, what the combination of ordinary sense experience combined with intelligent hypothesizing and logical interpretation has achieved (even if you don't value what empiricism has achieved).

A fool can deny anything. Can you deny, in like fashion, what other methodologies and worldviews have achieved? Who judges such things but those employing them on the basis of their goals?

Before the experience element was added, thinkers debated for centuries about the nature of reality leaving us mostly bogged down in rationalization.

The rise of empiricism is somewhat more complex that that, but i'll grant you the point.

And I am pretty sure they didn't find it in actuality. They might have interpreted "confirmation" was the wind blowing through their window as they made a sacrifice to the gods, but that doesn't mean it was.

Doesn't that strike you as an unfair and rather too swift dismissal of what the Greeks did with their worldview? Your certainty notwithstanding, it probably behooves us to check (particularly in the context of this discussion).

Besides, I thought we were talking about what produces knowledge? I cannot see a real parallel between the god stuff and investigating the nature of reality.

I didn't expect to see essentialist notions like "the nature of reality" on a physics board, but I'm pleasantly surprised. Concepts like this, along with knowledge in the first place, are again rather more complex. What else are people doing with their ideas, however crackpot we may suppose them to be, but investigating reality? Is everyone an instrumentalist?

Maybe the Greek oracles would be a better example, but even if I believed they offered a means of acquiring knowledge, I would say they are in a different class than the empiricists and cannot be compared unless, that is, the Greek oracles were to claim they could give us knowledge of physical reality as well as science.

I hope I've explained above why this is too quick: Quine's remark, which i presume you know of (after all, I'm just getting this stuff out of books, as I've been told already), was questioning whether there really is this "different class" and I've asked why quarks stand on an epistemological footing different from the gods. Even if I'm talking through my hat, the matter isn't so clear-cut as at least one poster has presumed.

That is why I am perfectly willing to grant empiricism "epistomological priviledge" status if it's limited to what's physical.

That assumes what's to be proven, though: how do you know what's physical in the first place? If we say that empiricism may be granted the privilege because it helps us learn about the physical, we can't then say that we know what's physical because a form of empiricism tells us without expecting some smartass philosopher or an idiot like me to ask if this isn't circular reasoning.

I hope this bluster has given you something to think about (even if only for a few seconds) and attack.

 

[metacristi]

Holbling

We are both wasting our times in this case.But of course your attitude of superiority cannot replace the sufficient reasons you'd need.Why are you trying to look as if you were the keeper of the truth,I don't think you are in such as position,even if you were a professional philosopher,facts speaks and the controversies are even greater now in this field than before.Ask some scientists and you'll hardly find one who is a commited relativist,feyerabendist (though he says that there are still rules,he defended his position against the accusations of pure anarchy).I'm afraid you'll not impose your point of view with sheer arrogance.The quark model,though ad hoc at the time when was proposed,actually made some predictions and there is even indirect evidence for the existence of quarks (the collision electron positron at very high energies where the jets of pions obtained originate from different points showing indirectly the presence of smaller particles whose trajectories are conserved by hadrons,the variety of energies at which exist the J/psi particles which are analogous with the atomic spectres,showing indirectly the existence of two smaller components and so on).Such theoretical constructs are accepted usually even in the absence of indirect or direct evidence or at least potential testability but only if their predictions explain a wide enough range of empirical facts.Sometimes even ad hoc hypotheses are accepted if they are coherent with the body of all accepted scientific knowledge,as I said not all ad hoc hypotheses are on the same level.Even if we were to accept that a specific variant of the Greek Gods research program (when Murray Gell Mann first presented his model of quarks) as being on the same level of priority with that of science's don't you think the latter observations,I presented above, constitute a diproval of that variant of the model?Of course you can build potentially (but I'm not really sure it is an easy task) another variant,which will have the same fate on very short time,anyway this is a clear evidence that the scientific approach is superior on long run.As I said I could easily use the bayesian interpretation of probabilities for that.Why do not address head on my questions,I have addressed yours.

We can never deduce knowledge from observations,we can only infer it indeed,still this does not mean all possible explanations are on the same level of rationality.Observed facts speak,having the principle of sufficient reason at base,of course once we accept the basic assumptions of science,otherwise it becomes an incoherent system.This approach does not exclude absolutely anything,since science is openly fallible,even the basic assumptions are open to revise.If it were not so then I would be fully entitled to claim that my worldview,my 'research system',based also on my own interpretation of some strange experiences,not amenable to scientific inquiry now,that a 'soul' of some sort does survive death,is on the same level with the whole research program of science.Or the Creationist science program.We need a standard of knowledge,the minimum to be accepted by all would be rational people.Of course,my 'research program' is not non rational or irrational.But it is still a mere belief,notwithstanding that rational,I am basically open to accept later that my personal experiences can be explained within the standard program of science with sufficient reasons,without the need to resort at the existence of a soul.But of course it might also happen that science will find sufficient evidence supporting my view.To settle things only facts speak and those who diagree must produce new evidence or a method of establishing what is real proved superior to the actual version implying intersubjectivity and the principle of sufficient reason.Or at least a hypothesis which does not contain redundant assumptions,where all assumptions are valuble to the process of making new predictions,which explains facts already explained by science and makes also some new predictions.Finally,I am curious,if we assume,ad hoc,that qualia is not due entirely to the functioning of the brain or even stronger that science cannot explain consciousness (in contradiction with the basic axiom of science that nature can be understood) as some propose here how can you sustain logically that a research system having these extra axioms is on the same level of rationality with the usual reasearch program of science?Understand of rationality,it is based on all observed facts and the principle of sufficient reason (allowing some valuable theoretical constructs in science though there is no need to believe in their existence before direct or indirect experimental evidence for them).Why are they on the same level?Are you able to step outside what you have read on some books?

 

[Canute]

Sleeth - But the qualitative difference in acquiring knowledge between people seeking to know by making up stories, or guessing, or divining, or purely rationalizing versus those who seek confirmation through experience is huge. That's why I said to metacristi that I think experience is what establishes epistimological priviledge.

I think this is a good point. Empricirical knowledge is gained through experience. This is true whether that knowledge is derived from a scientific experiment, a revelation on the road to Damascus, or a meditative experience of non-dual oneness and many-ness of Being. Science has no privilege over other systems of knowledge that are equally or more emprirical.

Also, as all knowledge derives ultimately from experience it is not always easy to distinguish which is more or less 'emprirical'.

On top of this most scientific 'knowledge' is more theoretical than empirical. Based on observation yes, but there is nothing in the way of experience to 'empiricise' much of scientific theory, and most scientific entities are no more than theoretical constructs.

Science is based more on observation than experience and as such is by definition less empirical than methods based on exploring direct experience.

Hugo - You say that experience is theory-laden. I agree that all observations made via ones senses are theory-laden, for without theory there is no observation, but is experience the same? I don't think so. When I feel angry I feel angry, and I need no theory to interpret my state, I'm just in it.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

But of course your attitude of superiority cannot replace the sufficient reasons you'd need.Why are you trying to look as if you were the keeper of the truth

I'm not, and your explicit attempts to poison the well are rather pathetic. I don't think my ideas are superior to yours; instead, i think that i'll disagree to try to learn something. Alas, you have nothing but invective to offer.

I'm afraid you'll not impose your point of view with sheer arrogance.

Yet you seem to presume to tell me what i think, where i got it from, what my motives are and how i need to address you. Perhaps you should cease pissing in the well and ask yourself if this is the way to present your ideas in the best light?

Why do not address head on my questions,I have addressed yours.

No, you haven't. All you do is write and write without actually saying anything. The privilege you want to award is epistemological, yet you refuse to address the epistemological points at issue here and declare the privilege to be justified by assuming it implictly before you even start. That, alas, is what you are plainly unable to even appreciate, let alone counter. My last post explained this, but you apparently don't follow. How can you award your privilege in a non-circular way? Try again, preferably without insulting me.

To settle things only facts speak and those who diagree must produce new evidence or a method of establishing what is real proved superior to the actual version implying intersubjectivity and the principle of sufficient reason.

This is naive empiricism at its best (and therefore worst). "Facts" don't speak at all; they are theory-laden all the way down. The question here is what we are supposed to mean by terms like "superior" in the first place, a question you steadfastly refuse to answer.

Finally,I am curious,if we assume,ad hoc,that qualia is not due entirely to the functioning of the brain or even stronger that science cannot explain consciousness (in contradiction with the basic axiom of science that nature can be understood) as some propose here how can you sustain logically that a research system having these extra axioms is on the same level of rationality with the usual reasearch program of science?

This only serves to demonstrate your inability to charitably read my posts here and continue the mischaracterisation to make an empty point. By questioning the awarding of an epistemological privilege i do not thereby commit myself to the notion that all ideas are equally rational. This rather disappointing non sequitur makes me wonder if you have any interest in learning anything and prefer instead to just shout at me until i give up.

Why are they on the same level?

Why are you incapable of dealing with me charitably? Why should i argue against your straw men?

Are you able to step outside what you have read on some books?

Are you able to stop insulting me? Others might find your insistence that i can't think for myself and am merely parroting what i read in some books to be objectionable, but not me. In the absence of any justification as to why i should waste my time on someone so insistent on poisoning the well here and telling me i can't think on my own, can you tell me the lottery numbers instead?

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Hugo - You say that experience is theory-laden. I agree that all observations made via ones senses are theory-laden, for without theory there is no observation, but is experience the same? I don't think so. When I feel angry I feel angry, and I need no theory to interpret my state, I'm just in it.

What do you mean by angry? How do you know you're angry, and not sad (say)? You might be right, but it isn't obvious just yet.

 

[Canute]

What do you mean by angry? How do you know you're angry, and not sad (say)? You might be right, but it isn't obvious just yet.

It's impossible for me say what I mean by angry but I imagine you also have experiences of anger (especially here!) so let's say they are the same experiences.

Is your anger theory-laden, (or your hunger, pain etc)? To me they seem to be direct experiences. I might explain them by theory or conjecture, but the experience is surely 'raw', a given fact. I haven't come across anybody who argues that experience is theory-laden - however I also haven't thought about it much until now so maybe I should.

At the moment I would say that when I perceive an orange I am theorising about the pattern of photons and the signals in my brain, however the experience of wanting to eat it (for instance) is direct and non-theoretical.

The trouble is that if experiences are theory-laden then we have no hope of ever knowing truths, since in this case direct experience is not possible.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

I haven't come across anybody who argues that experience is theory-laden - however I also haven't thought about it much until now so maybe I should.

I'll gladly take that role if you like, since all I'm getting elsewhere is insult.

The trouble is that if experiences are theory-laden then we have no hope of ever knowing truths, since in this case direct experience is not possible.

On the face of it, this seems like a strange thing to say: is it a problem because you don't like this conclusion, or because there are faults in the reasoning? The former is unfortunate, perhaps, but not much else, so we'll go with the latter.

I might explain them by theory or conjecture, but the experience is surely 'raw', a given fact.

Is it? Given that I'm unable to do anything for myself and must constantly refer to books I've read but not properly understood, i'll note that Churchland concluded (in a paper of his concerning the problem of theory-ladenness from a neuroscientific perspective) that this "raw experience" was a misnomer: instead, all experience is necessarily interpreted first. Even a basic experience such as "i am experiencing anger" presupposes categories like experience and subject (categories that are denied, in the final analysis, by some), as well as causal chains, etc. No doubt there are others.

According to Bohr (i.e. to ensure my reputation is upheld):

Any experience makes its apearance within the frame of our customary points of view and forms of perception.

The obvious objection is to note that while we may be getting the experience via our interpretation of it, there nevertheless exists a pure experience which is interpreted in the first place. That's beside the point, though: what we're saying is that we have a "raw experience" that may subsequently become distorted, but if any experience must inevitably happen within the framework provided by our "points of view and forms of perception" (in Churchland's account, such a framework is required before our brain can process any experiential information - but i could be misreading it or the research to date may have altered the conclusion, of course) then there is no "raw experience" to speak of. This puts me in mind of Bohr's difficulties with maintaining the separation between subject and object, or observed and observer, but I'm merely taking this from a book (a large book, admittedly) and so i doubt if it has any bearing on the matter.

What do you think?

 

[metacristi]

Hugo Holbling

Yes it's clear that we must end our conversation here,I think it is useless to continue,we have a problem of language too important from the beginning;anyway I've already (implicitly) recognized that explanations of newly observed facts might be theory laden when I said,as Popper observed once,that we cannot deduce explanations from facts,we can only infer them (as matter of fact they could be infinite).Still this does not represent an argument against some general rules,it's not at all evident that all concepts are theory laden,I'd say rather that no,why else Lakatos (pity that he died too early) and others argued and some still argue rightly for the existence of a method,in spite of Feyerabend.Even today many scientists,the vast majority of them in fact,reject his anarchism.You might disagree with me,I don't think you have really succeeded of proving my view incoherent or inferior you did not even understood it (evidently I still accept that I might also not have understood all your points because of language difference),but I don't think your point of view is dominant.On the contrary.Not even among philosophers of science.

Everything goes indeed but only if you provide also a method of establishing what is real.Currently we do not have an infinity of equally valid sciences,we have a single science and possible more variants of the method (though this is very controversial especially among scientists) anyway all these methods have the principle of intersubjectivity,be it only at limit,and the principle of sufficient reason incorporated (used including in the theory making process as I've explained before).The fact that there exist equally valid competing scientific hypotheses does not change too much the situation when talking about the whole of science;it (science) splits into more competing huge research programs indeed,but the above mentioned basic principles,potentially making the difference between them,are still accepted.No problem even if we accept some new assertions as being provisionally true (specific to that version of the research program),even by changing large parts of the actual accepted knowledge,if it offers a valid explanation and respects also the above mentioned basic requirements (something which I still expect from you to provide).

When someone propose as being equally valid (making thus a positive claim) a system that contains in its core some extra assumptions they must either respect the above mentioned basic requirements of the scientific method by providing some sufficient reasons in its favor or propose an equal alternative method of establishing what is real,not containing at least one of the basic requirements.The basic requirements of the actual scientific method(s) I presented above have a strong empirical support over all other proposed,they cannot be let aside,a fact proved by the clear superiority of scientific knowledge over the so called 'common truths',a fact that can be sustained on empirical grounds using the bayesian interpretation of probabilities.So Feyerabend might be somehow right,still keeping some rules,there is not exactly a total anarchy;as I've said I've read once that he defended his position by saying that he does not defend the total anarchy position.

Thus if I were to claim that my worldview is on the same level of rationality with that of science's (which I don't,at least for the moment,I still try to make it empirically progressive) I would be forced either to provide a hypothesis using the soul as a fruitful theoretical construct indispensable for the new predictions made,present indirect/direct evidence sustaining the existence of a soul whilst still accepting the actual basic requirements of the scientific method (+possible some other auxiliary assumptions) which to sustain my hypothesis,or provide a better method of establishing what's real,if I were to reject at least one of those basic requirements of the actual method.If,by accepting the basic requirements of the scientific method(s),some of those new predictions,using the soul as a fruitful construct,would be testable at physical levels and confirmed experimentally (considering also some possible auxiliary assumptions regarding the measurement devices used) then I would be entitled to claim that my research program has even epistemological privilege on empirical grounds.Otherwise no.If my system does not epxplain (counting as predictions) some already known but not unrelated facts,as many as possible,I cannot even claim that it has the same privilege.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Yes it's clear that we must end our conversation here,I think it is useless to continue,we have a problem of language too important from the beginning

It's only a problem insofar as you continue the insults. I'm glad you've refrained in your goodbye speech, at least.

it's not at all evident that all concepts are theory laden

Instead, this is a standard remark in the philosophy of science. I know, because i found it in a book.

I'd say rather that no,why else Lakatos (pity that he died too early) and others argued and some still argue rightly for the existence of a method,in spite of Feyerabend.

At least we agree about Lakatos.

The problem here - yet again - is that you declare things to be so without offering any justification at all; saying that the arguments proceed "rightly" cooks the books before I've even objected. Others, like Dupre, Cartwright, Galison, to name but a few, have noted what you cannot; namely, that denying the existence of a single method does not imply anarchism at all. Instead, it could be that science is far too complex to be accounted for without the plurality of methodologies that we actually see if - ironically enough, given this thread to date - we look instead of theorising.

I don't think you have really succeeded of proving my view incoherent or inferior you did not even understood it

I understand well enough, but see no reason to accept this epistemological privilege when you have used it in your arguments, smuggling it in implicitly beforehand. In any case, my objection was never that it was incoherent or inferior, so i don't know where you're getting this stuff. Either you misunderstood (perhaps my fault) or these are more straw men.

(evidently I still accept that I might also not have understood all your points because of language difference)

*shrug* You could ask for clarification before insulting me, i guess.

but I don't think your point of view is dominant.On the contrary.Not even among philosophers of science.

What "point of view" am i espousing, exactly?

Currently we do not have an infinity of equally valid sciences,we have a single science

Here is your problem: we do not have a "single science" and the talk in the philosophy of science these days is about the disunity of science (i know, because i read it in a book). I suggest you look at Galison's collection of papers for an introduction, if you're interested.

When someone propose as being equally valid (making thus a positive claim) a system that contains in its core some extra assumptions they must either respect the above mentioned basic requirements of the scientific method by providing some sufficient reasons in its favor or propose an equal alternative method of establishing what is real,not containing at least one of the basic requirements.

To begin with, i haven't proposed such a system and called it equally valid; instead, I've time and again asked why an epistemological privilege should be granted to your naive empiricism. The example of the Homeric gods was provided to ask why those gods stand on a different epistemological footing to quarks, to give you a chance to show why your privilege should allow me to choose quarks instead of gods for some reason or other.

In the second place, it isn't at all obvious that anyone interested in this question should allow you to smuggle in an epistemological privilege a priori, as you have here: why should we privilege the scientific method, so-called, when the issue here is precisely to ask why this privilege should be granted to start with? Even if i were to fit your mischaracterisation and declare an alternative epistemology equally valid, we judge the two by some means of comparison - not by assuming the one to be priviledged and asking the other to match up to it. You are assuming the result beforehand in order to justify it, which isn't cricket.

I won't attack the sniff of parsimony i smell here for now...

The basic requirements of the actual scientific method(s) I presented above have a strong empirical support over all other proposed,they cannot be let aside,a fact proved by the clear superiority of scientific knowledge over the so called 'common truths'

Nonsense. How do we decide what "superiority" means in this context? It won't do to say that the scientific method, so-called, has empirical support because that again assumes what is to be proven; namely, that it gets at reality while other methodologies do not.

a fact that can be sustained on empirical grounds using the bayesian interpretation of probabilities.

If you had read any philosophy of science, you'd know that Bayesian analysis is subject to severe skepticism.

as I've said I've read once that he defended his position by saying that he does not defend the total anarchy position.

Why don't you read his own works instead of mischaracterising them? I promise i won't insult you for getting information out of a book, even though i was fair game on that charge.

If,by accepting the basic requirements of the scientific method(s),some of those new predictions,using the soul as a fruitful construct,would be testable at physical levels and confirmed experimentally (considering also some possible auxiliary assumptions regarding the measurement devices used) then I would be entitled to claim that my research program has epistemological privilege on empirical grounds.Otherwise no.

Wrong again. You cannot grant an epistemological privilege on the basis of scientific method or the demarcation criteria you offer here without first explaining why we should accept their epistemological priviledge. That is what you still have failed to do.

Whatever the case, i thank you for an interesting discussion. I hope you will refrain from insult next time, as i sincerely hope we'll cross paths again.

 

[metacristi]

You solve nothing by not allowing empirical facts as the criterion of making the difference between theories on rational grounds (or even different branch of scientific programmes,I mean the whole of science here) at least on long run.You cannot simply say 'concepts are theory ladden therefore you cannot make an empirical difference between alternative theories or programmes',this is on the same foot with saying 'subjective experiences are private therefore science will never be able to accommodate them'.My point is that there is a strong ground for this,even history of science does support this view,I will present later an example;there is an evolution of science,the point of Lakatos.There is absolutely no proof that such a programme where large chuncks of science,not coherent at limit with at least some (many) of old enunciations,is possible practically,though I agree that it is equally valid on short run.You must first prove that such a programme is possible and we can continue the discussion.It seems to me that if I try to retroactively create such a programme (assuming that I do this in 1870 for example but taking in account the later development of science) it would not have stand in a more or less stable form in time.If I understood well,sorry if I mischaracterise again,never inteneded by the way,but you haven't explained too much of your views,you do not support this approach.While such alternative programmes are viable on purely empirical grouns on short run I don't think they resist on long run.Empirical grounds still prove crucial to make the difference.

Some concepts might be theory ladden indeed still we can make the difference using common concepts accepted by competing programmes,at a more basic level.There might exist cases when crucial experiments do not exist indeed,still this does not prove that there are not cases when even instant disproval is possibile,not to mention diproval of specific variants of a programme.As a matter of fact on long run history proves that we can make a difference.Even Kaufmann's experiment is a good exmaple here,though it seems to vindicate Kuhn first.Einstein's theory seemed diproved because it was used a model of Kaufmann's experimental dispositive which was specific for Abraham's model (specific to that theory).Not even Planck,though using another model for Einstein's theory,was able to settle things in 1906.Still in later reviews Bucherer using the results of other experiments (acceptable by both programmes Abraham's and Einstein's) measuring the value of e/m0 settled the things in the favor of Einstein's theory by proving that in Kaufmann's experiments that value is almost constant for SR theory,varying in a significant way for the data of Abraham's model.By 1915 this problem has been completely resolved using empirical grounds entirely.Finally some concepts might be embedded in all those programmes,at a very basic level,like was the atomic theory,thus allowing empirical difference between programmes on long run at least.

 

[Hugo Holbling]

Apparently the several times you've said this discussion is over were not enough. I don't think i can help you here since you still fail to appreciate that you simply cannot use an "epistemological priviledge" to justify an "epistemological priviledge". I already explained the circularity inherent in your approach and left you with plenty of questions and hidden presuppositions in your account to consider; what's clear is that you may not smuggle in your conclusion as a premise as you continue to do, and i think this is plain enough for everyone else that I'm content to leave it for now. Perhaps there is a communication problem here, but my post above stands as it is.

Edit: no need to apologise. Let me know how i can make this clearer, if i can.