Why is there something instead of nothing? Where do the laws of nature come from?

[kant]

That is perhaps the biggest 2 question for the whole of existence.
Without it, there would be no sciences, no human, no anything...at all.
Can the laws come into being without matter/universe? Can the universe come into being without the laws? (It is said that universe might come out of a quantum vaccum, but that( quantum vaccum) itself is a laws, a generalization within the universe. Can we apply the laws of nature outside the universe? Is there such a thing as "nothing"? By "nothing", i mean the non-existence of everything.

 

[Exitsign]

are we supposed to answer? or what . . .

if there are no laws there would be nothing, because if something is something its only something because of ... you guessed it. Laws.

 

[kant]

Well, laws are only significant in relation to matter. It makes zero sense to have laws, but no physical phenonmen.


If there are matters, but no physical law, there would be no physical final say on where that piece of matter come from.


According to modern physic, that piece of matter came out of a quantum vacuum. Can we trust that to be true? How much can we weight a law again it `s own assertions? What is the nature of physical law?

 

[kant]

are we supposed to answer? or what . . .

if there are no laws there would be nothing, because if something is something its only something because of ... you guessed it. Laws.

You are not using your brain enough. (Let this be an unwritten comment to anyone who is like you.)

 

[Exitsign]

Hey kant. I hope you realize essentially you just repeated me.
The difference that made your comment better then mine is that you made it more legible. And cut me some slack, I'm in grade 10, and I perfer talking casual.

Edit: I have no idea what quantum anything is. If you have time and would like to help me out.
PM me or something and explain it a little

 

[selfAdjoint]

ccording to modern physic, that piece of matter came out of a quantum vacuum. Can we trust that to be true? How much can we weight a law again it `s own assertions? What is the nature of physical law?

The nature of physical law is to be testable. It is only as convincing as the sequence of tests it has passed. The idea of the quantum vacuum, and the derived idea that the material uniiverse came out of a quantum fluctuation, are pretty good by this standard but not rock solid.

Of course NOTHING in science is rock solid; everything is open to falsification by experiment or observation. But the quantum vacuum, while better than some ideas, is not as solid as, say, the law of conservation of momentum. The reason for that is that the QV is a conclusion from a complex argument, and so its relationship to experiment depends on the technical details of that argument. And we all know where the Devil resides.

 

[Mycroft7]

The way I see it, those are fundamentally unanswerable questions, which I assume is your point. And when I say unanswerable, I don't mean merely that possible answers are unverifiable, I mean that there is actually no answer that makes sense at all.

For example, "God made the universe and its laws" seems like an answer at first, but it is really just a reframing of the original question. It just becomes, "Why is there God instead of not-God? Why are these laws better than other possible laws?" There have naturally been lots of attempts to answer those questions, but I haven't really encountered any that weren't circular reasoning, or that couldn't just as well be applied to the universe instead of "god," eliminating the middleman.

 

[kant]

The way I see it, those are fundamentally unanswerable questions, which I assume is your point. And when I say unanswerable, I don't mean merely that possible answers are unverifiable, I mean that there is actually no answer that makes sense at all.

For example, "God made the universe and its laws" seems like an answer at first, but it is really just a reframing of the original question. It just becomes, "Why is there God instead of not-God? Why are these laws better than other possible laws?" There have naturally been lots of attempts to answer those questions, but I haven't really encountered any that weren't circular reasoning, or that couldn't just as well be applied to the universe instead of "god," eliminating the middleman.

Well, yes, but i would also like people to challenge those unanswerable. What is beneth the unanswerable. The probing of the infinitestimal separation between the known, and the unknown. They are the most powerful question in the whole of existence. This come down to the nature of natural laws as physical models; when does it lead to absurdity. The absolute limit of objective knowledge. An example would be quantum flutuation that lead to the our universe. Is it scientific? 1) it is extroplating something before the big bang. How do we know? By physical models, formulated within our universe. Does it make sense to perdict stuff that are so obvious 'outside' it`s domain? 2) Physical models in themselves are a bite mysteries. How does it work, and why does it work. The latter is a mystery. What is mathematics, and does it have any meaning if there was nothing? The fact that a single person has a the capacity to understand, question, and decode a bit of that mystery on paper is itself a mystery.



How do you reason without laws. If not, then where do laws come from? Do the system come before the law, or is it the opposite? if we do not start from laws, then how do we reason without laws. The words" reason without laws" is obvious a contradiction, but the means to judge that sentense is itself a laws, no matter how initutive it is. It is a assertion that cannot be answered.

 

[kant]

The nature of physical law is to be testable. It is only as convincing as the sequence of tests it has passed. The idea of the quantum vacuum, and the derived idea that the material uniiverse came out of a quantum fluctuation, are pretty good by this standard but not rock solid.

Of course NOTHING in science is rock solid; everything is open to falsification by experiment or observation. But the quantum vacuum, while better than some ideas, is not as solid as, say, the law of conservation of momentum. The reason for that is that the QV is a conclusion from a complex argument, and so its relationship to experiment depends on the technical details of that argument. And we all know where the Devil resides.

Please read again. You misunderstood. I have no patience to type an explanation.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Please read again. You misunderstood. I have no patience to type an explanation.

I did read it again without changing my opinion of what you wrote. I have no patience with your attitude that everyone else should work to understand you but you have no obligations to make yourself clear to others.

 

[Philocrat]

This topic that you are posting, I have repeatedly dealt with its content in several places on this PF. On the issue of there being something instead of nothing, I have gone down on record in answering that this is due to the spooky appearance and behaviour of matter in the spectrum of reality. Matter appears and behaves at the critical metaphysical level as if it is self-categorising. I am not quite sure if this so. But if this true, then this unfortunately disposes of the whole notion of 'Nothing' or 'Nothingness'. In our account of reality, it is pointless admitting 'Nothing' as a true metaphysical category that may be said to neatly equate something of which matter and matter alone tends to wholly represent.

My argument is that if only something exists and that something is matter and matter alone in its current spooky self-categorising state, then it is the same matter that is the source of all laws of nature. I could be wrong, but that is my own trillion dolar stake!

 

[kant]

This topic that you are posting, I have repeatedly dealt with its content in several places on this PF. On the issue of there being something instead of nothing, I have gone down on record in answering that this is due to the spooky appearance and behaviour of matter in the spectrum of reality. Matter appears and behaves at the critical metaphysical level as if it is self-categorising. I am not quite sure if this so. But if this true, then this unfortunately disposes of the whole notion of 'Nothing' or 'Nothingness'. In our account of reality, it is pointless admitting 'Nothing' as a true metaphysical category that may be said to neatly equate something of which matter and matter alone tends to wholly represent.

My argument is that if only something exists and that something is matter and matter alone in its current spooky self-categorising state, then it is the same matter that is the source of all laws of nature. I could be wrong, but that is my own trillion dolar stake!

Let me try to reformulate your arguement:

There is no such thing as nothing, and that that non-nothingness is filled with matter. Matter is the sourse of all physical laws.


My own reply:

Can you explain the existence of that matter that fill everything? Can we really know if your guess is correct? Can you explain the bases of your guess?

I don t see an arguement. Even if your premises are ture, that reallity is full with these "matter". The question would then be: What are there these "matter", rather than no "matter".

 

[Philocrat]

Let me try to reformulate your arguement:

There is no such thing as nothing, and that that non-nothingness is filled with matter. Matter is the sourse of all physical laws.My own reply:

Can you explain the existence of that matter that fill everything? Can we really know if your guess is correct? Can you explain the bases of your guess?

Sorry, for my late response, Kant. Matter to me, at the metaphysical level, seems to behave very badly in the spectrum of reality. It appears as if it is 'multiply self-categorising' into everything. Of course this is in the assumption that matter (as we were all brought up to define and understand it) is not forstering or maintaining any form of causal relations with 'immaterial entity' and 'nothing'. You may not appreicate this, but the biggest metaphysical headache in philosophy is the need to establish wehther this sort of tripartite relationship exists betweeen these three metaphysical categories - Matter, immaterialism and nothingness (in its absolute sense). So, when you start counting and talk about there being something instead of nothing, metaphysically, you ought to also include 'immaterial entities' (such as ghosts, souls, God, angels etc) in your calculus. You must count and include immatrial entities in the sum totality of Something, given that such something is construed and universally accepted as the 'ULTEMATE METAPHYSICAL CATEGORY'.

In philosophy, the battle of explanation is between the physicalists and the dualists. There are many detailed variations of these, but I’m going to just sum them up under these two headings as roughly opposed to each other. The physicalists are saying that there is nothing over and above the material or the physical. All there is to the human existence is the physical material world --- a world of matter changing from one form to the next.

On the other side of the argument, the dualists say that there is something over and above the material or the physical, that the material is maintaining some form of causal relation with the immaterial. The immaterial is something over and above the material simply because we can neither see, touch, nor explain it in the way that we are able to explain material things and events. So, on this front the battle continues within the philosophy discipline.

My argument therefore is that if the dualist controversy is false, that is there is nothing over and above the material, and the something – nothing relation is discounted from this metaphysical calculus, then perhaps all that is left is the ultimate metaphysical category ‘Something’ and that this is matter.

However, where I am personally concerned is where matter hangs on the metaphysical scale and appears as if it is multiply self-categorising in this spooky way that I have been talking about. And, as I have said it already, I am not quite sure if this is actually the case, especially while the physicalists-dualist controversy is still raging on in philosophy.

I don t see an arguement. Even if your premises are sure, that reality is full with these "matter". The question would then be: What are there these "matter", rather than no "matter".

Well, we only go by what and how science originally defined matter. I have already lodged my personal concerns about this elsewhere on this forum. If you sip through my postings you should see this there. What I said there was that I am not quite sure whether our original scientific definition of matter is doing our understanding of it and the universe at large much good, especially when matter behaves so badly at the metaphysical level. I therefore suggested perhaps the time is due for a revision of its definition.

Equally, we are also explanatorily impoverished when science (physics to be precise) suddenly declares that only a tiny percentage of all the matter in the universe is within the explanatory reach of the researchers in the field. So, what happens to the remaining unexplained aspect of matter? We are told that some part of matter is missing, therefore physics cannot account for it or explain it? Is this true?

Hence, when it comes to the proper definition of matter or what matter really is, your guess is as good as mine. We can only go by the definition that science originally laid down.

 

[theName()]

Hence, when it comes to the proper definition of matter or what matter really is, your guess is as good as mine. We can only go by the definition that science originally laid down.

if your source of everything is matter, and matter is what physics define it. It leads to two contradtion
1)
There is a limit to physic, so there is a limit to how "correct" physics can define matter. Physics can only build models to explain nature, but is the model a true representative of nature. no! Science can only describe how, but it can t tell us why things are the way they are. A model might be a good tool for us to predict experiments, or to help our human brains to conprehen a bit of nature, but there no evident that those physical models matchs nature itself.

2)
With the limit of science being said on 1. Physicists do a remarkable job in explaining nature with their physical models, but all those physical models are formulated 'within' our universe, and after the big bang. physics cannot tell us what happen at the big bang, or in a pre-big bang state because it would be applying those physical models out of there context. What caurse the big bang to happen? There must be some stuff in the pre-big bang state to account for the big bang. That stuff is something that cannot be define by our physical model, or definition, but that doesn t make that stuff less real.

 

[selfAdjoint]

if your source of everything is matter, and matter is what physics define it. It leads to two contradtion
1)
There is a limit to physic, so there is a limit to how "correct" physics can define matter. Physics can only build models to explain nature, but is the model a true representative of nature. no! Science can only describe how, but it can t tell us why things are the way they are. A model might be a good tool for us to predict experiments, or to help our human brains to conprehen a bit of nature, but there no evident that those physical models matchs nature itself.

What science can do, in addition to describing, is to rule out false ideas. For example science can say with confidence that the Earth is not flat and that perpetual motion machines can't exist. This is because the description of those things would contradict the descriptions that science has for more general situations. This gets to the application of mathematics in science, for if your model of nature is a mathematical one, then it has to be logically consistent within its own limits, and the limits of current models of nature extend far enough to rule out those cases.

2)
With the limit of science being said on 1. Physicists do a remarkable job in explaining nature with their physical models, but all those physical models are formulated 'within' our universe, and after the big bang. physics cannot tell us what happen at the big bang, or in a pre-big bang state because it would be applying those physical models out of there context. What caurse the big bang to happen? There must be some stuff in the pre-big bang state to account for the big bang. That stuff is something that cannot be define by our physical model, or definition, but that doesn t make that stuff less real.

Actually Martin Bojowald, a proponent of Loop Quantum Cosmology, has a model which extends through the big bang to the other side. And Lee Smolin has his idea of evolution of universes in which there would be big bangs aplenty. And the string community has their ekpyrotic scenario of colliding branes, which are held in that model to generate the big bang. So your understanding of what is involved in modeling the universe needs to be updated.

 

[Philocrat]

1)
There is a limit to physic, so there is a limit to how "correct" physics can define matter. Physics can only build models to explain nature, but is the model a true representative of nature. no! Science can only describe how, but it can t tell us why things are the way they are. A model might be a good tool for us to predict experiments, or to help our human brains to conprehen a bit of nature, but there no evident that those physical models matchs nature itself.

Yes, there is a limit to physics and how much it can explain. This we are both in agreement and I think most of my postings on this forum either directly or indirect imply this. Besides, I have qualified my postulate with the term ’I am not quite sure if this is the case’. In other words it may be false.

2)
With the limit of science being said on 1. Physicists do a remarkable job in explaining nature with their physical models, but all those physical models are formulated 'within' our universe, and after the big bang. physics cannot tell us what happen at the big bang, or in a pre-big bang state because it would be applying those physical models out of there context. What causes the big bang to happen? There must be some stuff in the pre-big bang state to account for the big bang. That stuff is something that cannot be define by our physical model, or definition, but that doesn’t t make that stuff less real.

There isn’t much contradiction in this either. Yes, physics cannot tell us much about pre-Big Bang events and their accountable histories, yet physics is already predicting the ‘Post-Big bang events’ and their subsequent consequences – the so-called ‘Big Crunch’, which results in the current ‘Big bang –Big Crunch’ cosmological model of the universe. Now check out my response to Crackpot’s posting here: observe what he says about the big-bang cosmological model of the universe and his views about the relationship between a matter-filled universe and ‘Nothing’ or ‘Absolute Nothing’, as he/she prefers to call it:

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=748020&postcount=32

And here I also continue on the same theme. Here I am concerned with two things: (1) the need to know in pure quantitative terms how much of the universe is already successfully explained or is explainable by physics, and (2) the possibility of a revision of the current cosmological model so as to allow some form of causal and relational progress to interplay. With regards to (1) physics is already making a very serious claim (that everything is explainable by physics and physics alone). My question therefore is if this is true, what happens to the unexplained missing parts of the universe, especially as it turns out that a substantial chunk of normal matter (35 – 45% to be precise) is missing from the overall scientific explanation of matter? And with regards to (2) I am also arguing that things will only begin to make sense if the current model permits progress to manifest. Or should it not?

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=512258&postcount=748

I think you should also look at the postings on these links to decipher the origin of my views about this whole notion of there being relationship between Something and other metaphysical categories such as ‘Nothing’, Immaterial Entities, or other ‘metaphysically categorisable alternatives’, given that they are possible in the first place.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=549778&postcount=5

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=481228&postcount=70

Remember that with matter, I have no problem whatsoever in agreeing with you that there is a scientific limitation as to its overall explanation. However, with regards to causal relations between fundamental metaphysical categories (Something (matter), Nothing(0), Immaterialism (souls, ghosts, angels gods, etc.) or their equivalent alternatives)), if we all accept that such relationships do exist between them, then any explanation whether philosophical or scientific should contain coherent and consistent arguments as to how and why this is the case. Conversely, if we chose to deny the possibility of these other metaphysical categories, let alone there causal relations/links, and possibly want to reduce all other categories into this one ‘Something’ we so much desire, then I am suggesting that that something is matter however badly we define and understand matter. And as I have already admitted, I am not quite sure if this is the case. Just take it to be ‘work in progress’ - that I am still working on it.

 

[theName()]

Actually Martin Bojowald, a proponent of Loop Quantum Cosmology, has a model which extends through the big bang to the other side. And Lee Smolin has his idea of evolution of universes in which there would be big bangs aplenty. And the string community has their ekpyrotic scenario of colliding branes, which are held in that model to generate the big bang. So your understanding of what is involved in modeling the universe needs to be updated.

The point is that if the laws of natures are to be accepted as a brute fact in nature, and all physical theory/models are made to explain those laws of nature, then there "is" a definite limitations to the applicable of those models. What happens to the laws of natures at the moment of the big bang, or in a pre-bang state is unknown to us, and therefore a limit to our most advance physical model. The models cannot tell us anything at the moment of the big bang, or in a pre- bang state, because to do so would be apply those models out of there own context.
EX: Some physicists say that our universe might come out of "nothing", and that that "nothing" is a quantum vaccum. It is missleading, because there is actually something in that "nothing", and those are virtual particles. Any ways physicist come to explain the universe coming out of nothing relies on laws of nature as observed within out universe. We have no empirical basis to assert that laws of nature are the same in a pre-bang state, or at the big bang. For all that we know, whatever that stuff that caurse the big bang might be some thing unknow to us, or rather, our physical model, so we can never know.

 

[theName()]

Yes, there is a limit to physics and how much it can explain. This we are both in agreement and I think most of my postings on this forum either directly or indirect imply this. Besides, I have qualified my postulate with the term ’I am not quite sure if this is the case’. In other words it may be false.

The point is that you are not being clear on you mean by "matter", when you define matter by how physics define it. In physics, even in the most empty region of space, where there is not mater, there would still be fields. If you can strip the field away, there is still going to be virtual particles. In other word, there is no such thing as nothing( the none existence of everything) 'within' our universe.

There isn’t much contradiction in this either. Yes, physics cannot tell us much about pre-Big Bang events and their accountable histories, yet physics is already predicting the ‘Post-Big bang events’ and their subsequent consequences – the so-called ‘Big Crunch’, which results in the current ‘Big bang –Big Crunch’ cosmological model of the universe. Now check out my response to Crackpot’s posting here: observe what he says about the big-bang cosmological model of the universe and his views about the relationship between a matter-filled universe and ‘Nothing’ or ‘Absolute Nothing’, as he/she prefers to call it:

The matter of fact in this discussion is " why is there something rather than nothing". You asserted that there is no such thing as "nothing", and that the stuff(you call: matter) are everywhere( all of existence). You assert that matter is what physicists define it to be. I said it would lead to problems if you define the stuff( matter) that is everywhere by how physicists define it. I gave you one example of some 'stuff'( stuff that caurse the big bang) that could not be accounted for by any physical models

And here I also continue on the same theme. Here I am concerned with two things: (1) the need to know in pure quantitative terms how much of the universe is already successfully explained or is explainable by physics, and (2) the possibility of a revision of the current cosmological model so as to allow some form of causal and relational progress to interplay. With regards to (1) physics is already making a very serious claim (that everything is explainable by physics and physics alone). My question therefore is if this is true, what happens to the unexplained missing parts of the universe, especially as it turns out that a substantial chunk of normal matter (35 – 45% to be precise) is missing from the overall scientific explanation of matter? And with regards to (2) I am also arguing that things will only begin to make sense if the current model permits progress to manifest. Or should it not?

In regard to the two points.

1) The dark matter, dark energy stuff can be understood by manipulation of our current physical models. On the other hand, we might just have to accept that the stuff like dark matter, dark energy are just those things that could not be explained in our physics models. In any physical models, there are always going to be unexplain explainers, because unexplain explainers are what what is used to build physical models. Perhaps dark matter, and dark energy might just be those unexplain explainers. If we cannot construct any good experiment to describe them in any scienctific terms. We might never be able to explain dark matter, or dark energy.

2) that depend largely on what you mean by "progress". As i stated in 1, we might never be able to understand what dark matter, dark energe are. Unless we can do experiments to test their properties, we might never be able to understand them.

Remember that with matter, I have no problem whatsoever in agreeing with you that there is a scientific limitation as to its overall explanation. However, with regards to causal relations between fundamental metaphysical categories (Something (matter), Nothing(0), Immaterialism (souls, ghosts, angels gods, etc.) or their equivalent alternatives)), if we all accept that such relationships do exist between them, then any explanation whether philosophical or scientific should contain coherent and consistent arguments as to how and why this is the case. Conversely, if we chose to deny the possibility of these other metaphysical categories, let alone there causal relations/links, and possibly want to reduce all other categories into this one ‘Something’ we so much desire, then I am suggesting that that something is matter however badly we define and understand matter. And as I have already admitted, I am not quite sure if this is the case. Just take it to be ‘work in progress’ - that I am still working on it.

What you call 'matter'. i perfer to call it a 'stuff'-set. If we define the universe, and all the things that is in it as a set. if we call that set the universe-set. I assert that the universe-set is a proper subset of the stuff-set.

 

[asymmetric]

we have the time t that it takes to observe 'A'.
'A' then must be considered as an event.
or a process.
any asymmetric unique minimum volumetric with respect to itself has no such t because there is no event or process for it to be related to or relative to.
t here is not an issue.
infact when we look at these aumv's we are now looking at the ''everlasting'' first brick.

only when it becomes part of an event or a process, does it begin to have an ''age''.
so a cosmic event can be given an age by saying that it started x amount of time ago.
if we go to the granpa of our universe we can fairly and safely say that our universe is at least as old as our cosmic grandfather.
however this will only take us back to when this cosmic grandfather was born.
we will not know what events prevailed before this.
time maps are drawn to try and diagramatically help us to understand the big bang etc.
if they are to be considered correct then they must include a 360 by 360 degrees development.
they are short of doing so.

like there is a search going on for the higgs boson(its something that fits in , so argue the physicists, with what proof that they have...but did it ever exist naturally?) we theorists have to exploit our findings, findings from our own research, and then try to suggest that this or that idea may be true.
its a trial and error situation.
and many of us have been developing ideas and models for 30 or 40 years now.
if we could come up with something that is not involved in 'events' or 'processes' small enough then maybe we could explain a few questions.

for want of finding a way to obtain an empty universal group I stubbled on the fact that no description can fully empty everything out or totally fill something up.

this led me to the ''hypothesis of uniques''.
which states:
''that nothing is the same as anything else not even to itself never''.
this could handle for example Betrand Russells Cretan dilema.

this became my trial framework.
and from this i concluded that the aumv hypothesis could put some light onto many enigmas.
now the reason i call them asymmetric is because their periferias are never exactly the same.
they are unique because their cordinates are unique.
they are the minimum because a universal zero does not exist.
and they are volumetric because if a universal zero doesn't exist then no other zero can exist because ''everything'' is made up of unique ''somethings'' and they are at least like our own universe ie of tri dimensional form.

so like astronomers suggested that our solar system should have a further planet between this one and the other one , i suggest that the posible and probable properties of these aumv's are such that they question the classical reasons given for the ''red shift'' for example...
that they answer g for example.
g cannot be a preferential ''well'', it has to behave in a 360 by 360 degrees manner.
and these aumv's are giving some of these answers.
they also seem to give us an idea about ''limits'' ie concerning why c. etc...

 

[theName()]

what is this got to do with the present discussion so far

 

[selfAdjoint]

And here I also continue on the same theme. Here I am concerned with two things: (1) the need to know in pure quantitative terms how much of the universe is already successfully explained or is explainable by physics, and (2) the possibility of a revision of the current cosmological model so as to allow some form of causal and relational progress to interplay. With regards to (1) physics is already making a very serious claim (that everything is explainable by physics and physics alone). My question therefore is if this is true, what happens to the unexplained missing parts of the universe, especially as it turns out that a substantial chunk of normal matter (35 – 45% to be precise) is missing from the overall scientific explanation of matter? And with regards to (2) I am also arguing that things will only begin to make sense if the current model permits progress to manifest. Or should it not?

What is this 35%-45% of "normal matter" that is missing from the scientific explanation of matter? Science currently has the following categories
Normal matter, reacts to the ellectroweak, strong and gravational forces. What we are made of.

"Dark" matter. Does not react to electroweak or strong force, but does gravitate. Responsible for various behaviors of galaxies, etc. Recently shown by an astronomical example to be physical and not, say, just curved space.

"Dark energy. Not matter at all, responsible for the accelerated expansion of the universe, which has been detected by astronomers.

 

[asymmetric]

suggestions were put forward by me, that for the merging of trillions of minimum volumetrics within a vast volume of these same minimum volumetrics, other neighbouring ones, would be in an elastic non merging phase.
stretched volumetrics cannot then be involved in the creation of certain prosesses or events.
we would expect then, that in these areas, density would be below critical.
however its diminute parts ie each of its minimum volumetric, would still have the basic ''locking'' ability. ie g.
any 2 galaxies have between them a volumetric vast of this nature.
the processes going on in any galaxy will have used up so much of the ''merging'' capabilities of these volumetric minimums that the neighbouring ones will all be stretched.
the vastness of these areas between galaxies must also have a limit as to the separation maximum posible.
this maximum may have the effect then of curving each minimum volumetric involved in the stretching chain and hence the complete vast volume in between any 2 galaxies.
only em will be able to effect and be effected by these stretched volumetrics.
again i put forward that the minimum volumetric posible is our graviton and that its chore becomes a photon only when merging with other gravitons takes place ie when periferias merge to give us p critical. ie other non photon particles etc...

 

[Blueplanetbob]

I am matter, but I disturb the equilibrium of the spacetime outside of my mass.
But spacetime is inside of me.
Is this something to do with gravity?

 

[theName()]

suggestions were put forward by me, that for the merging of trillions of minimum volumetrics within a vast volume of these same minimum volumetrics, other neighbouring ones, would be in an elastic non merging phase.
stretched volumetrics cannot then be involved in the creation of certain prosesses or events.
we would expect then, that in these areas, density would be below critical.
however its diminute parts ie each of its minimum volumetric, would still have the basic ''locking'' ability. ie g.
any 2 galaxies have between them a volumetric vast of this nature.
the processes going on in any galaxy will have used up so much of the ''merging'' capabilities of these volumetric minimums that the neighbouring ones will all be stretched.
the vastness of these areas between galaxies must also have a limit as to the separation maximum posible.
this maximum may have the effect then of curving each minimum volumetric involved in the stretching chain and hence the complete vast volume in between any 2 galaxies.
only em will be able to effect and be effected by these stretched volumetrics.
again i put forward that the minimum volumetric posible is our graviton and that its chore becomes a photon only when merging with other gravitons takes place ie when periferias merge to give us p critical. ie other non photon particles etc...

i don t know what you said, and i don t think you can tell me the relavance of what you said. You contribute nothing to the present discussion.

 

[Blueplanetbob]

I am matter, but I disturb the equilibrium of the spacetime outside of my mass.
But spacetime is inside of me.
Is this something to do with gravity?

As a macro object I disturb spacetime outside of me to effect gravity outside of me. So inside my mass spacetime is disturbed also, to effect gravity inside of me.
If spacetime is absolute, and if the graviton is considered as a purely geometrical inert particle of spacetime excited by the presence of mass, then disturbed and disjointed spacetime would attempt to regain equilibrium.
The gravitons emitted by the extreme spacetime curvature inside of me would be negated by the opposing gravitons emitted by spacetime outside of me, and inertia would be established.
I would float, but the Earth would rise up to meet me
Is this how gravity works?

 

[Rade]

As to question "why is there something rather than nothing", it is a meaningless inquiry, for the fact or existence of a "thing" must already be present priori to the question, and as stated by Aristotle, "to know a things nature is to know the reason why it is" (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Book2.2.90a.30).

 

[regent]

The idea of the quantum vacuum, and the derived idea that the material uniiverse came out of a quantum fluctuation, are pretty good by this standard but not rock solid.
QUOTE]

Care to elaborate this idea which I've never heard of?

 

[kant]

As to question "why is there something rather than nothing", it is a meaningless inquiry, for the fact or existence of a "thing" must already be present priori to the question, and as stated by Aristotle, "to know a things nature is to know the reason why it is" (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Book2.2.90a.30).

I don t think something is meaningless just because there is no why(cause) behind it. The fact of the matter is, even the word "why" has questionable meaning. It invoke a cause y for every effect x. Now, i don t doubt that a lot of the world problems can be pattern into a cause and effect relationship, but what makes that cause-effect relationship the golden rule?

 

[kant]

The idea of the quantum vacuum, and the derived idea that the material uniiverse came out of a quantum fluctuation, are pretty good by this standard but not rock solid.
QUOTE]

Care to elaborate this idea which I've never heard of?

G... did we do an experiment on it where scienctists actually produce a universe from a vaccum?

 

[mosassam]

How do the laws of nature (nonphysical) impose their 'will' on physical objects?

 

[nannoh]

G... did we do an experiment on it where scienctists actually produce a universe from a vaccum?

Yes. They created a universe in the vacuum between their ears.

 

[heusdens]

That is perhaps the biggest 2 question for the whole of existence.
Without it, there would be no sciences, no human, no anything...at all.
Can the laws come into being without matter/universe? Can the universe come into being without the laws? (It is said that universe might come out of a quantum vaccum, but that( quantum vaccum) itself is a laws, a generalization within the universe. Can we apply the laws of nature outside the universe? Is there such a thing as "nothing"? By "nothing", i mean the non-existence of everything.

Remark 1: The Opposition of Being and Nothing in Ordinary Thinking

§ 135

Nothing is usually opposed to something; but the being of something is already determinate and is distinguished from another something; and so therefore the nothing which is opposed to the something is also the nothing of a particular something, a determinate nothing. Here, however, nothing is to be taken in its indeterminate simplicity. Should it be held more correct to oppose to being, non-being instead of nothing, there would be no objection to this so far as the result is concerned, for in non-being the relation to being is contained: both being and its negation are enunciated in a single term, nothing, as it is in becoming. But we are concerned first of all not with the form of opposition (with the form, that is, also of relation) but with the abstract, immediate negation: nothing, purely on its own account, negation devoid of any relations — what could also be expressed if one so wished merely by 'not'.

§ 136

It was the Eleatics, above all Parmenides, who first enunciated the simple thought of pure being as the absolute and sole truth: only being is, and nothing absolutely is not, and in the surviving fragments of Parmenides this is enunciated with the pure enthusiasm of thought which has for the first time apprehended itself in its absolute abstraction. As we know, in the oriental systems, principally in Buddhism, nothing, the void, is the absolute principle. Against that simple and one-sided abstraction the deep-thinking Heraclitus brought forward the higher, total concept of becoming and said: being as little is, as nothing is, or, all flows, which means, all is a becoming. The popular, especially oriental proverbs, that all that exists has the germ of death in its very birth, that death, on the other hand, is the entrance into new life, express at bottom the same union of being and nothing. But these expressions have a substratum in which the transition takes place; being and nothing are held apart in time, are conceived as alternating in it, but are not thought in their abstraction and consequently, too, not so that they are in themselves absolutely the same. ®

§ 137

Ex nihilo nihil fit — is one of those propositions to which great importance was ascribed in metaphysics. In it is to be seen either only the empty tautology: nothing is nothing; or, if becoming is supposed to possesses an actual meaning in it, then, since from nothing only nothing becomes, the proposition does not in fact contain becoming, for in it nothing remains nothing. Becoming implies that nothing does not remain nothing but passes into its other, into being. Later, especially Christian, metaphysics whilst rejecting the proposition that out of nothing comes nothing, asserted a transition from nothing into being; although it understood this proposition synthetically or merely imaginatively, yet even in the most imperfect union there is contained a point in which being and nothing coincide and their distinguishedness vanishes. The proposition: out of nothing comes nothing, nothing is just nothing, owes its peculiar importance to its opposition to becoming generally, and consequently also to its opposition to the creation of the world from nothing. Those who maintain the proposition: nothing is just nothing, and even grow heated in its defence, are unaware that in so doing they are subscribing to the abstract pantheism of the Eleatics, and also in principle to that of Spinoza. The philosophical view for which 'being is only being, nothing is only nothing', is a valid principle, merits the name of 'system of identity'; this abstract identity is the essence of pantheism.

§ 138

If the result that being and nothing are the same seems startling or paraodoxical in itself, there is nothing more to be said; rather should we wonder at this wondering which shows itself to be such a newcomer to philosophy and forgets that in this science there occur determinations quite different from those in ordinary consciousness and in so-called ordinary common sense-which is not exactly sound understanding but an understanding educated up to abstractions and to a belief, or rather a superstitious belief, in abstractions. It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of being and nothing in every example, in every actual thing or thought. The same must be said of being and nothing, as was said above about immediacy and mediation (which latter contains a reference to an other, and hence to negation), that nowhere in heaven or on Earth is there anything which does not contain within itself both being and nothing. Of course, since we are speaking here of a particular actual something, those determinations are no longer present in it in the complete untruth in which they are as being and nothing; they are in a more developed determination, and are grasped, for example, as positive and negative, the former being posited, reflected being, the latter posited, reflected nothing; the positive contains as its abstract basis being, and the negative, nothing. Thus in God himself, quality (energy, creation, power, and so forth), essentially involves the determination of the negative-they are the producing of an other. But an empirical elucidation by examples of the said assertion would be altogether superfluous here. Since the unity of being and nothing as the primary truth now forms once and for all the basis and element of all that follows, besides becoming itself, all further logical determinations: determinate being, quality, and generally all philosophical Notions, are examples of this unity. But self-styled sound common sense, if it rejects the unseparatedness of being and nothing, may be set the task of trying to discover an example in which the one is found separated from the other (something from limit or limitation, or, as just mentioned, the infinite, God, from energy or activity). Only the empty figments of thought, being and nothing themselves are these separated things and it is these that are preferred by 'sound common sense' to the truth, to the unseparatedness of both which is everywhere before us.

§ 139

We cannot be expected to meet on all sides the perplexities which such a logical proposition produces in the ordinary consciousness, for they are inexhaustible. Only a few of them can be mentioned. One source among others of such perplexity is that the ordinary consciousness brings with it to such an abstract logical proposition, conceptions of something concrete, forgetting that what is in question is not such concrete something but only the pure abstractions of being and nothing and that these alone are to be held firmly in mind.

§ 140

Being and non-being are the same, therefore it is the same whether this house is or is not, whether these hundred dollars are part of my fortune or not. This inference from, or application of, the proposition completely alters its meaning. The proposition contains the pure abstractions of being and nothing; but the application converts them into a determinate being and a determinate nothing. But as we have said, the question here is not of determinate being. A determinate, a finite, being is one that is in relation to another; it is a content standing in a necessary relation to another content, to the whole world. As regards the reciprocally determining context of the whole, metaphysics could make the — at bottom tautological — assertion that if a speck of dust were destroyed the whole universe would collapse. In the instances against the proposition in question something appears as not indifferent to whether it is or is not, not on account of being or non-being, but on account of its content, which brings it into relation with something else. If a specific content, any determinate being, is presupposed, then because it is determinate, it is in a manifold relationship with another content; it is not a matter of indifference to it whether a certain other content with which it is in relation is, or is not; for it is only through such relation that it essentially is what it is. The same is the case in the ordinary way of thinking (taking non-being in the more specific sense of such way of thinking as contrasted with actuality) in the context of which the being or the absence of a content, which, as determinate, is conceived as in relation to another, is not a matter of indifference.

§ 141

This consideration involves what constitutes a cardinal factor in the Kantian criticism of the ontological proof of the existence of God, although here we are only interested in the distinction made in that proof between being and nothing generally, and determinate being or non-being. As we know, there was presupposed in that so-called proof the concept of a being possessing all realities, including therefore existence, which was likewise assumed as one of the realities. The main thesis of the Kantian criticism was that existence or being (these being taken here as synonymous) is not a property or a real predicate, that is to say, is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. By this Kant means to say that being is not a determination of the content of a thing.' Therefore, he goes on to say, the possible does not contain more than the actual; a hundred actual dollars do not contain a whit more than a hundred possible ones; that is, the content of the former has no other determination than has the content of the latter. If this content is considered as isolated, it is indeed a matter of indifference whether it is, or is not; it contains no distinction of being or non-being, this difference does not affect it at all. The hundred dollars do not diminish if they do not exist, or increase if they do. A difference must come only from elsewhere. 'On the other hand,' Kant reminds us, 'my fortune benefits more from a hundred actual dollars than from the mere concept of them or from their possibility. For in actuality, the object is not merely contained analytically in my concept, but is added synthetically to my concept (which is a determination of my state), although the hundred dollars in my thought are not themselves increased one whit by this being which they have apart from my concept.'

§ 142

There are presupposed here two different states (to retain the Kantian expressions which are not free from a confused clumsiness): one, which Kant calls the concept (by which we must understand figurate conception), and another, the state of my fortune. For the one as for the other, my fortune and the figurate conception, a hundred dollars are a determination of a content or, as Kant expresses it, 'they are added to such a concept synthetically'; I as possessor of a hundred dollars or as not possessing them, or even I as imagining or not imagining them, is of course a different content. Stated more generally: the abstractions of being and nothing both cease to be abstractions if they acquire a determinate content; being is then reality, the determinate being of a hundred dollars; nothing is the negation, the determinate non-being of them. This determinate content itself, the hundred dollars, also grasped isolatedly in abstraction is unchanged the same in the one as it is in the other. But since, furthermore, being is taken as a state of my fortune, the hundred dollars stand in relation to this state, as regards which the determinateness which they are is not a matter of indifference; their being or non-being is only an alteration; they are transposed into the sphere of determinate being. When, therefore, it is urged against the unity of being and nothing that it is nevertheless not a matter of indifference whether anything (the hundred dollars) is, or is not, we practise the deception of converting the difference between whether I have or have not the hundred dollars into a difference between being and non-being-a deception based, as we have shown, on the one-sided abstraction which ignores the determinate being present in such examples and holds fast merely to being and non-being, just as, conversely, the abstract being and nothing which should be apprehended is transformed into a definite being and nothing, into a determinate being. Determinate being is the first category to contain the real difference of being and nothing, namely, something and other. It is this real difference which is vaguely present in ordinary thinking, instead of abstract being and pure nothing and their only imagined difference.

§ 143

As Kant expresses it, 'through its existence something enters into the context of the whole of experience... we obtain thereby an additional object of perception without anything being added to our concept of the object'. As our explanation has shown, this means simply that something, through its existence, just because it is a determinate existence, is essentially in relationship with others, including also a percipient subject. The concept of the hundred dollars, says Kant, gains nothing by their being perceived. Concept here means the hundred dollars previously noted as thought in isolation. As thus isolated they are, it is true, an empirical content, but cut off, having no relationship with any other content and possessing no determinate character relatively to such; the form of identity-with-self strips them of any connection with an other, so that it is a matter of indifference whether they are perceived or not. But this so-called concept of the hundred dollars is a spurious concept; the form of simple self-relation does not belong to such a limited, finite content itself; it is a borrowed form attached to it by the subjective understanding; the being of the hundred dollars is not self-related but alterable and perishable.

§ 144

The thinking or figurate conception which has before it only a specific, determinate being must be referred back to the previously-mentioned beginning of the science made by Parmenides who purified and elevated his own figurate conception, and so, too, that of posterity, to pure thought, to being as such and thereby created the element of the science. What is the first in the science had of necessity to show itself historically as the first. And we must regard the Eleatic One or being as the first step in the knowledge of thought; water and suchlike material principles are certainly meant to be the universal, but as material they are not pure thoughts; numbers are neither the first simple, nor the self-communing thought, but the thought which is wholly external to itself. ®

§ 145

The reference back from particular finite being to being as such in its wholly abstract universality is to be regarded not only as the very first theoretical demand but as the very first practical demand too. When for example a fuss is made about the hundred dollars, that it does make a difference to the state of my fortune whether I have them or not, still more whether I am or not, or whether something else is or is not, then-not to mention that there will be fortunes to which such possession of a hundred dollars will be a matter of indifference-we can remind ourselves that man has a duty to rise to that abstract universality of mood in which he is indeed indifferent to the existence or non-existence of the hundred dollars, whatever may be their quantitative relation to his fortune, just as it ought to be a matter of indifference to him whether he is or is not, that is, in finite life (for a state, a determinate being is meant), and so on — si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae was said by a Roman, and still more ought the Christian to possesses this indifference.

§ 146

There remains still to be noted the immediate connection between, on the one hand, the elevation above the hundred dollars and finite things generally, and on the other, the ontological proof and the Kantian criticism of it we have cited. This criticism, through its popular example, has made itself universally plausible: who does not know that a hundred actual dollars are different from a hundred merely possible ones? that they make a difference to the state of my fortune? Because this difference is so obvious with the hundred dollars, therefore the concept, that is, the specific nature of the content as an empty possibility, and being, are different from each other; therefore the Notion of God too is different from his being, and just as little as I can extract from the possibility of the hundred dollars their actuality, just as little can I extract from the Notion of God his existence; but the onotological proof is supposed to consist of this extraction of the existence of God from his Notion. Now though it is of course true that Notion is different from being, there is a still greater difference between God and the hundred dollars and other finite things. It is the definition offinite things that in them the Notion is different from being, that Notion and reality, soul and body, are separable and hence that they are perishable and mortal; the abstract definition of God, on the other hand, is precisely that his Notion and his being are unseparated and inseparable. The genuine criticism of the categories and of reason is just this: to make intellect aware of this difference and to prevent it from applying to God the determinations and relationships of the finite.

Source:

Hegel, Science of Logic
Doctrine of Being
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slbeing.htm

 

[heusdens]

Remark 2: Defectiveness of the Expression 'Unity, Identity of Being and Nothing'

§ 147

Another contributory reason for the repugnance to the proposition about being and nothing must be mentioned; this is that the result of considering being and nothing, as expressed in the statement: being and nothing are one and the same, is incomplete. The emphasis is laid chiefly on their being one and the same, as in judgements generally, where it is the predicate that first states what the subject is. Consequently, the sense seems to be that the difference is denied, although at the same time it appears directly in the proposition; for this enunciates both determinations, being and nothing, and contains them as distinguished. At the same time, the intention cannot be that abstraction should be made from them and only the unity retained. Such a meaning would self-evidently be one-sided, because that from which abstraction is to be made is equally present and named in the proposition. Now in so far as the proposition: being and nothing are the same, asserts the identity of these determinations, but, in fact, equally contains them both as distinguished, the proposition is self-contradictory and cancels itself out. Bearing this in mind and looking at the proposition more closely, we find that it has a movement which involves the spontaneous vanishing of the proposition itself. But in thus vanishing, there takes place in it that which is to constitute its own peculiar content, namely, becoming.

§ 148

The proposition thus contains the result, it is this in its own self. But the fact to which we must pay attention here is the defect that the result is not itself expressed in the proposition; it is an external reflection which discerns it therein. In this connection we must, at the outset, make this general observation, namely, that the proposition in the form of a judgement is not suited to express speculative truths; a familiarity with this fact is likely to remove many misunderstandings of speculative truths. Judgment is an identical relation between subject and predicate; in it we abstract from the fact that the subject has a number of determinatenesses other than that of the predicate, and also that the predicate is more extensive than the subject. Now if the content is speculative, the non-identical aspect of subject and predicate is also an essential moment, but in the judgement this is not expressed. It is the form of simple judgement, when it is used to express speculative results, which is very often responsible for the paradoxical and bizarre light in which much of recent philosophy appears to those who are not familiar with speculative thought.

§ 149

To help express the speculative truth, the deficiency is made good in the first place by adding the contrary proposition: being and nothing are not the same, which is also enunciated as above. But thus there arises the further defect that these propositions are not connected, and therefore exhibit their content only in the form of an antinomy whereas their content refers to one and the same thing, and the determinations which are expressed in the two propositions are supposed to be in complete union-a union which can only be stated as an unrest of incompatibles, as a movement. The commonest injustice done to a speculative content is to make it one-sided, that is, to give prominence only to one of the propositions into which it can be resolved. It cannot then be denied that this proposition is asserted; but the statement is just as false as it is true, for once one of the propositions is taken out of the speculative content, the other must at least be equally considered and stated. Particular mention must be made here of that, so to speak, unfortunate word, 'unity'. Unity, even more than identity, expresses a subjective reflection; it is taken especially as the relation which arises from comparison, from external reflection. When this reflection finds the same thing in two different objects, the resultant unity is such that there is presupposed the complete indifference to it of the objects themselves which are compared, so that this comparing and unity does not concern the objects themselves and is a procedure and a determining external to them. Unity, therefore, expresses wholly abstract sameness and sounds all the more blatantly paradoxical the more the terms of which it is asserted show themselves to be sheer opposites. So far then, it would be better to, say only unseparatedness and inseparability, but then the affirmative aspect of the relation of the whole would not find expression.

§ 150

Thus the whole true result which we have here before us is becoming, which is not merely the one-sided or abstract unity of being and nothing. It consists rather in this movement, that pure being is immediate and simple, and for that very reason is equally pure nothing, that there is a difference between them, but a difference which no less sublates itself and is not. The result, therefore, equally asserts the difference of being and nothing, but as a merely fancied or imagined difference.

§ 151

It is the common opinion that being is rather the sheer other of nothing and that nothing is clearer than their absolute difference, and nothing seems easier than to be able to state it. But it is equally easy to convince oneself that this is impossible, that it is unsayable. Let those who insist that being and nothing are different tackle the problem of stating in what the difference consists. If being and nothing had any determinateness by which they were distinguished from each other then, as has been observed, they would be determinate being and determinate nothing, not the pure being and pure nothing that here they still are. Their difference is therefore completely empty, each of them is in the same way indeterminate; the difference, then, exists not in themselves but in a third, in subjective opinion. Opinion, however, is a form of subjectivity which is not proper to an exposition of this kind. But the third in which being and nothing subsist must also present itself here, and it has done so; it is becoming. In this being and nothng are distinct moments; becoming only is, in so, in so far as they are distinguished. This third is an other than they; they subsist only in an other, which is equivalent to saying that they are not self-subsistent.

Becoming is as much the subsistence of being as it is of non-being; or, their subsistence is only their being in a one. It is just this their subsistence that equally sublates their difference.

§ 152

The challenge to distinguish between being and nothing also includes the challenge to say what, then, is being and what is nothing. Those who are reluctant to recognise either one or the other as only a transition of the one into the other, and who assert this or that about being and nothing, let them state what it is they are speaking of, that is, put forward a definition of being and nothing and demonstrate its correctness. Without having satisfied this first requirement of the ancient science whose logical rules they accept as valid and apply in other cases, all that they maintain about being and nothing amounts only to assertions which are scientifically worthless. If elsewhere it has been said that existence, in so far as this at first is held to be synonymous with being, is the complement to possibility, then this presupposes another determination, possibility, and so being is not enunciated in its immediacy, but in fact as not self-subsistent, as conditioned. For being which is the outcome of mediation we shall reserve the term: Existence. But one pictures being to oneself, perhaps in the image of pure light as the clarity of undimmed seeing, and then nothing as pure night — and their distinction is linked with this very familiar sensuous difference. But, as a matter of fact, if this very seeing is more exactly imagined, one can readily perceive that in absolute clearness there is seen just as much, and as little, as in absolute darkness, that the one seeing is as good as the other, that pure seeing is a seeing of nothing. Pure light and pure darkness are two voids which are the same thing. Something can be distinguished only in determinate light or darkness (light is determined by darkness and so is darkened light, and darkness is determined by light, is illuminated darkness), and for this reason, that it is only darkened light and illuminated darkness which have within themselves the moment of difference and are, therefore, determinate being.

Source:
Hegel
Science of Logic
Doctrine of Being
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hl083.htm#HL1_90

 

[heusdens]

The way I see it, those are fundamentally unanswerable questions, which I assume is your point. And when I say unanswerable, I don't mean merely that possible answers are unverifiable, I mean that there is actually no answer that makes sense at all.

For example, "God made the universe and its laws" seems like an answer at first, but it is really just a reframing of the original question. It just becomes, "Why is there God instead of not-God? Why are these laws better than other possible laws?" There have naturally been lots of attempts to answer those questions, but I haven't really encountered any that weren't circular reasoning, or that couldn't just as well be applied to the universe instead of "god," eliminating the middleman.

Here you reason from a strange position, which sees Being and Nonbeing as only seperate, and doesn't recognize the fact that:
- Being and Nonbeing, without any determination, are just the same. And at the same time, they are each others opposites.
- The truth of Being and Nonbeing lies in their unity, which is becoming (in which one passes over in the other).

So, it would be rather nonsense to ask why is there being instead of nonbeing, because you then already separated the two, and don't recognize that they necessarily belong to each other, that one is not defined without the other, that in fact (without anything determined) they are the same and at the same time each others opposite.

Some other way to explain this is, that there is only light, because there is also darkness.

See also my Hegel quotes, who gave a long treatment on this issue, and in which he uses the method of dialectics.

See:
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hl/hlbeing.htm

 

[out of whack]

As to question "why is there something rather than nothing", it is a meaningless inquiry, for the fact or existence of a "thing" must already be present priori to the question

Indeed, and let me add this:

Asking "why" is asking for a reason, a purpose, a cause, or something of the kind. But a reason assumes that someone or something with a motive already exist. A purpose also assumes a existing goal. Even it its simplest form, a cause assumes at least some previous state and some existing rule leading to its effect.

No matter how you look at it, asking "why" assumes the necessity of a pre-condition that would lead to "existence". But of course this pre-condition would also have to exist otherwise "existence" would not follow, so we have a circular question. Asking "why existence" already assumes existence as part of the requested answer, which makes it an ill-conceived question.

It would seem that existence is the ultimate eternal truth.