Proof of Reality: Electrical Impulses and The Matrix

[Canute]

I'm not quite clear whether we really disagree on this or not.

I agree totally with pragmatically assessing the usefulness of new ideas based on what happens. But surely this can only be done after we have defined what we mean by useful, and defining 'useful' has nothing to with pragmatism, it has to do with our agenda and goals. If we want to reduce the population of rabbits then spreading a fatal disease amongst them is useful. However it's not at all useful if we are trying to increase the population. 'Usefulness' only has meaning relative to a goal or overall purpose. Without this context it can only be an empty term.

This is what I meant by saying that 'usefulness' should not be applied to scientific discoveries and methods prior to defining what science is trying to achieve. The term can have no meaning before that is done.

So I'm not in any way against pragmatism, just saying that we have to know what we're being pragmatic about before we start making judgements of usefulness.

At the moment we seem to assume that a discovery is useful if something can be done with it, but this strikes me as a misuse of the term.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I'm not quite clear whether we really disagree on this or not.

I agree totally with pragmatically assessing the usefulness of new ideas based on what happens. But surely this can only be done after we have defined what we mean by useful, and defining 'useful' has nothing to with pragmatism, it has to do with our agenda and goals. If we want to reduce the population of rabbits then spreading a fatal disease amongst them is useful. However it's not at all useful if we are trying to increase the population. 'Usefulness' only has meaning relative to a goal or overall purpose. Without this context it can only be an empty term.

This is what I meant by saying that 'usefulness' should not be applied to scientific discoveries and methods prior to defining what science is trying to achieve. The term can have no meaning before that is done.

So I'm not in any way against pragmatism, just saying that we have to know what we're being pragmatic about before we start making judgements of usefulness.

At the moment we seem to assume that a discovery is useful if something can be done with it, but this strikes me as a misuse of the term.

I think you might have overlooked one thing I said: "It's too bad we got stuck on usefulness. I was trying to segue from Hugo's comment about utility to the idea of pragmatism, which isn't a precise fit. A better description is what "works" in the sense of creating some technology, social system, business plan, etc. and then observing how it functions, looking for areas that thrive and also for areas that seem to less effective."

So forget about "useful," it is not directly relevant to pragmatic evaluation. The standard is what "works," in the sense of paying attention to how designing things (systems) relying on our concepts about the nature of reality is confirmed or contradicted by how well something functions after applying what we've hypothesized to be true.

 

[Canute]

I can go along with that. However in relation to the utility or truth of scientific knowledge, whether the truth of such knowledge should be judged by its 'usefulness', this just seems to shift the problem to what we mean by 'works', and whether this is any better a guide to its value or truth.

Because of this, linking back to the earlier issue, we cannot automatically grant epistemilogical privilege to knowledge gained through scientific methods. Knowledge gained through some other methods also work, and it could be argued that it works much better.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I can go along with that. However in relation to the utility or truth of scientific knowledge, whether the truth of such knowledge should be judged by its 'usefulness', this just seems to shift the problem to what we mean by 'works', and whether this is any better a guide to its value or truth.

Well, I can tell you don't like the pragmatic idea much, which is perfectly okay of course. If you were to read carefully the specific way I've said it is applied, I don't think your stated objections are anything I am talking about. Almost any valuable process can be applied either obtusely or in an enlightened way. I have been recommending the enlightened approach.

Because of this, linking back to the earlier issue, we cannot automatically grant epistemilogical privilege to knowledge gained through scientific methods. Knowledge gained through some other methods also work, and it could be argued that it works much better.

I agree, and in fact that is what I've been implying. I would in no way limit what "works" to science. I do however recognize science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality.

 

[Canute]

Well, I can tell you don't like the pragmatic idea much, which is perfectly okay of course. If you were to read carefully the specific way I've said it is applied, I don't think your stated objections are anything I am talking about. Almost any valuable process can be applied either obtusely or in an enlightened way. I have been recommending the enlightened approach.

No, I'm quite happy with pragmatism, I'm just suggesting that whether one takes a pragmatic approach or not it doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing. This directly relates to the issue below.

I agree, and in fact that is what I've been implying. I would in no way limit what "works" to science. I do however recognize science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality.

Your second sentence here is tautological. Of course science is the best way of producing a testable physicalist explanation of the phsyical world. It would be very surprising if that wasn't true. However this in no way helps us decide the absolute epistemilogical status of its methods and knowledge, or the truth or falsity of its model of reality.

 

[Les Sleeth]

No, I'm quite happy with pragmatism, I'm just suggesting that whether one takes a pragmatic approach or not it doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing. This directly relates to the issue below.


Your second sentence here is tautological. Of course science is the best way of producing a testable physicalist explanation of the phsyical world. It would be very surprising if that wasn't true. However this in no way helps us decide the absolute epistemilogical status of its methods and knowledge, or the truth or falsity of its model of reality.

Ha! I knew it, you are not happy with pragmatism.

Here we go again, but to say it "doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing" tells me you don't accept it as a valid method of evaluation.

In this conversation neither of us have said empiricism deserves absolute epistomological priviledge. To me the issues we've been discussing go beyond science, and have extended into the general issue of how one acquires knowledge.

I don't think it is fair to characterize the statement "science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality" as tautological. I agree it might be true for the 100% physicalist, and who is open to no other facts but physical facts.

I've made no absolute statements even about science's ability to reveal physical aspects; I've only said it has been more effective (at revealing physical aspects) than any other method we now have at our disposal. I did not say or imply it had any epistomological value beyond that because I don't think it does. But why not grant to science what science really has demonstrated it can do? My argument isn't with that, but rather it is with the assumption some science enthusiasts make that only science gives us knowledge and therefore it deserves absolute epistomological priviledge.

This gets us back to my test of a pragmatist evalution of science. I claimed to Hugo that we can tell science is effective in its realm because of how well it predicts and produces things that work (again, physically). By the same standard, we can also judge it by how poorly it predicts or produces things that work. What does it tell us about God? Nothing. Does that mean God does not exist, or instead does it simply tell us science doesn't work with issues of God?

And then we of course can ask . . . well, what does work? Good question I think. I like turning inward, that works for me. Will it "work" for you? You have to try what I do and tell me if it works for you because I cannot observe inside you to find out if it works.

As I said, what "works" in my little pragmatic system is not limited to mundane utility issues (although I use it extensively there too); in truth, for me the main thing I care about is what works to give me understanding, happiness, peace, wisdom, enlightenment, knowledge of God . . . I can honestly report that that practical attitude toward such qualities has helped me weed out lots of deadends quickly, and kept me learning what I want to learn. If it can't prove it works . . . out with it!

 

[metacristi]

Nicely said,indeed we cannot award to science an absolute priviledge,as a matter of fact very few repsectable scientists really claim this.The point is that so far it is the best 'tool' making sense of the observed reality,it's accepted enunciations deserving to be the standard of knowledge,accepted by all would be rational people.

In gnoseology,and implicitly in epistemology,knowledge is defined as being a set of enunciations for which exist sufficient reasons to be considered as being true (provisionally of course we can never attain certitudes in science).Thus to accept something as being knowledge (in general) we must have reasons for that,reasons which are represented by the correspondence with facts (in the form of highly coherent enunciations explaining/describing facts accurately,making also predictions).Since the scientific method has proved to be the most successful so far we are entitled to consider now as being part from the standard of knowledge only the enunciations that have been inferred (not deduced) from observed facts using the actual variant of the scientific method.In spite of the possible attacks on what success means the success of scientific induction is a reality,indeed the so called 'common truths',inferred hastily by people,are very unreliable (anyway there is no alternative,enough different and highly coherent,set of enunciations which to replace the actual accepted scientific knowledge).This does not mean that other enunciations are forbidden to be considered knowledge,on a purely personal base,when a ground exist and the scientific inquiry is not possible (for example the existence of extraterrestrials) but in any case are those people (whose interpretation of some strange,personal,observations is that aliens do exist) entitled to claim that that assumption (aliens exist) makes part from the standard of knowledge if she does not provide also some sufficient reasons for that (at least a scientific hypothesis,making new testable predictions,with prospects to become a scientific theory).The same is valid also in the case of consciousness.

 

[Canute]

This is odd, I replied to this previously but my reply disppeared. Oh well.

Ha! I knew it, you are not happy with pragmatism.

I'm perfectly happy with pragmatism, in fact I practice it assiduously. But one has to have something to be pragmatic about.

Here we go again, but to say it "doesn't make any difference to the epistemilogical issues we were discussing" tells me you don't accept it as a valid method of evaluation.

Look at it this way. In business 'management by objectives' is considered a useful management tool. It is pragmatic. It depends on constant monitoring of performance against targets, with targets quantified and methods of measurement agreed. It is a very pragmatic means of judging performance. However it doesn't work at all until targets have been agreed upon.

In this conversation neither of us have said empiricism deserves absolute epistomological priviledge.

By my definition of empiricism, which is "the view that all knowledge is based on or derived from experience" (Penguin Dict. of Philosophy) meditational practice is more empirical than scientific 'third-person' observation. I do not see any objection to this view. This is especially so when one considers that it is commonly argued that certain knowledge is identical with its object, a scenario only achievable introspectively.

To me the issues we've been discussing go beyond science, and have extended into the general issue of how one acquires knowledge.

Absolutely. Discussions of knowledge inevitably go beyond science.

I don't think it is fair to characterize the statement "science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality" as tautological. I agree it might be true for the 100% physicalist, and who is open to no other facts but physical facts.

Does it matter who says it? The statement says that science is the best method of doing science.

I've made no absolute statements even about science's ability to reveal physical aspects; I've only said it has been more effective (at revealing physical aspects) than any other method we now have at our disposal.

I don't disagree with that. After all it'd be a sorry state of affairs if it wasn't true. Physical aspects are science's specialism.

But why not grant to science what science really has demonstrated it can do?

I do, but no more than that.

My argument isn't with that, but rather it is with the assumption some science enthusiasts make that only science gives us knowledge and therefore it deserves absolute epistomological priviledge.

I think I understand your view, which mostly I agree with, and I realize that you're not arguing for absolute priviledge. However I am. I'm suggesting that direct experience has absolute epistemilogical priviledge. As far as I'm aware this is the orthodox philosophical view. Science is good at what it does, but what does it does not do includes producing certain or absolute knowledge.

This gets us back to my test of a pragmatist evalution of science. I claimed to Hugo that we can tell science is effective in its realm because of how well it predicts and produces things that work (again, physically). By the same standard, we can also judge it by how poorly it predicts or produces things that work.

This is not pragmatic until you have defined 'works'. That may sound pedantic but it is the point at issue.

What does it tell us about God? Nothing. Does that mean God does not exist, or instead does it simply tell us science doesn't work with issues of God?

Never mind God, science cannot ever tell us what matter is. The moment science gets near to reality it is of no use, it becomes metaphysics. These are its limits.

And then we of course can ask . . . well, what does work? Good question I think. I like turning inward, that works for me. Will it "work" for you? You have to try what I do and tell me if it works for you because I cannot observe inside you to find out if it works.

What do you mean by 'works'?

As I said, what "works" in my little pragmatic system is not limited to mundane utility issues (although I use it extensively there too); in truth, for me the main thing I care about is what works to give me understanding, happiness, peace, wisdom, enlightenment, knowledge of God . . . I can honestly report that that practical attitude toward such qualities has helped me weed out lots of deadends quickly, and kept me learning what I want to learn. If it can't prove it works . . . out with it!

I know what you're saying and I agree. However note that here you have started by defined what you mean by 'works'. (Not addressing just mundane utility issues, but understanding and happiness etc). Once you have done that I'm happy with pramatism. You probably do this defining it unconsciously so may think 'works' has some absolute meaning, but it doesn't, and you can't measure something without a yardstick, however pragmatic you are.

What I'm arguing, underneath the detail, is that there is no way of measuring the value of scientific enquiry that is not anthropomorphic and arbitrary. That doesn't mean it isn't worth doing, but just that we should not be dogmatic about the value of science, or the absolute value of the relative knowledge that it produces. 'Works' is mostly self-defining within science, but not in any wider view.

As a route to knowledge science has its strengths, but it also has weaknesses. I think we should accept both.

Mathematician Spencer-Brown also wrote a book called Only Two Can Play This Game (1972). He wrote it under the pseudonym of James Keys. It is dedicated "To his Coy Mistress." It begins with a "Prescript" which itself begins: "If like me you were brought up in a western culture, with the doctrine that everything has a scientific explanation, there will be certain ideas you will not be allowed to know.” This is someone who Russell thanked for solving a few of his set-theoretic problems, so he was no fool.

 

[Les Sleeth]

This is odd, I replied to this previously but my reply disppeared. Oh well.

Something didn't work.

I'm perfectly happy with pragmatism, in fact I practice it assiduously. But one has to have something to be pragmatic about.

I am not exaggerating when I say I am pragmatic about everything.

I know what you're saying and I agree. However note that here you have started by defined what you mean by 'works'. (Not addressing just mundane utility issues, but understanding and happiness etc). Once you have done that I'm happy with pramatism. You probably do this defining it unconsciously so may think 'works' has some absolute meaning, but it doesn't, and you can't measure something without a yardstick, however pragmatic you are.

Actually I defined "works" earlier. I explained I am not content to label something as working until I observe all its consequences. In your example of manangement by objectives, which I have utilized myself, it really does work if it is applied properly. I've counseled managers who over-planned details to the point that keeping track of progress took so much time nothing ever got done. How did I judge that? Well, I know that when people have come together to do business, they need to achieve certain things for the business to survive, and those things weren't getting done with those managers. Of course, if you ask them, they thought MBO was working perfectly for them; but the reason they did was because they weren't looking at the big picture.

Now we could take that a bit further and say, even if the business were thriving, what if the business was one which made cigarettes? That business directly contributes to the deaths of a lot of people, and so while the business is successful, as far as improving the health of society, it doesn't work. So is this business working or not?

Well, I'd say MBO works, when done properly, to bring about effective management. I'd say the business is working if it gives its employees a living. And I'd say that selling cigarettes doesn't work to bring about a healthy society. Each case has its own internal standards, but none of that has to do with the principle of what "works."

If you are concerned I will be so impressed by something working I won't look beyond its immediate application, don't worry. You've talked about a "yardstick." Well, ultimately for me reality is the yardstick I use. I see reality itself as what both allows some things to work, and doesn't allow other things to work. Does the Mafia work? Partially; it may take more time, but the part that doesn't work is destroying it. Does a serial killing work for the killer? Partially; but the part that doesn't work destroys him. Does heroin work? Partially; but . . .

Does love work. Yes, and I've never found a down side if there is one. Does understanding work? Yes, and I've never found a down side if there is one. Does meditation work? Yep, and if it is done correctly I've never found a down side if there is one.

So some things seem to work from start to finish, other things need wisdom to see the full consequences. That is why I still say, the pragmatic perspective, when understood and applied properly, is an excellent means for evaluating things.

Les said: I don't think it is fair to characterize the statement "science seems to work better than any other method we have in investigations of the physical aspects of reality" as tautological. I agree it might be true for the 100% physicalist, and who is open to no other facts but physical facts.

Canute said: Does it matter who says it? The statement says that science is the best method of doing science.

I did not say science is the best method of doing science! I said science is best at investigating the physical aspects of reality. There are other means, such as astrology or psychic detectives, and my statement was meant to place science above those other means in terms of producing consistent results.

When I claimed it might be tautological for the 100% physicalist, I was being a little sarcastic. What I meant was, that for him reality can only be exposed through science. I think it is worth keeping the ideas of science and physical reality separate if for no other reason than to point out the limitations of science.

What I'm arguing, underneath the detail, is that there is no way of measuring the value of scientific enquiry that is not anthropomorphic and arbitrary. That doesn't mean it isn't worth doing, but just that we should not be dogmatic about the value of science, or the absolute value of the relative knowledge that it produces. 'Works' is mostly self-defining within science, but not in any wider view.

I don't know about anthropomorphic; I suspect you might mean humanity-centered, and if so I would agree. But so what? That's all I really care about. Even the health of planet Earth and preserving other life forms I support because I believe humanity will benefit overall. In fact, I can't think of anything I do which ultimately isn't because of my human-centered value system. How can we escape self interest? It is hardly arbitrary if we are capable of being no other way than self-interested. I believe we cannot be any other way, but we can develop enlightened self interest where what we want is good for us and harms no others (and maybe even helps others).

Science can certainly be beneficial to humanity, and that makes me attach value to it.

As a route to knowledge science has its strengths, but it also has weaknesses. I think we should accept both.

True, but everything has its strengths and weakness, including meditation (e.g., I would not rely on it to study physics). I might be wrong but it seems you are hesitant to give science its due. I thought the main objection was to science devotees who try to claim that what science can't reveal must not exist or be relevant, and not to the epistomological methods of science itself. I don't see how anyone can question how effective those methods have been, which was metacristi's point, and to which I agree as long as he doesn't mean to assign absolute epistomological privilege to science (notice I avoided the term "empiricism"? )

 

[metacristi]

There is absolutely no reason now to claim an absolute epistemological privilege for science and the actual variant of empiricism used to establish what is real,not even in what empiricism in general is concerned,since science is based on a series of assumptions regarding the existence of an objective reality and some alternative,highly coherent and sufficiently different,systems of enunciations,potentially better on long run,are logically possible (so far no such successful approach,potentially having a new method,has been proposed).

Still for the moment,from all we know using the principle of sufficient reason,the best approach is empiricism.In accordance with the criterions of truth defined within gnoseology and epistemology (the correspondence with facts+internal coherence+coherence with other accepted enunciations+finally integration within larger-as scope-theories),our models of reality must be non contradictory and capable to describe/explain as many as possible of the observed features of reality.Since at the base of model making is the analogical reasoning,we expect our models to be able to reveal also new features of reality based on what we observe (counting also as predictions of our models).This is why the predictory power (new predictions) is crucial,otherwise there is no good reason to think that our model is something more than an ad hoc explanation without any further prospects.It is exactly here where science's way of knowing has proved superior,so far at least,to all other approaches,giving consistent results,always providing sufficient reasons for its assumptions.This is why when scientists say it's dangerous to carry radioactive materials in the pocket all rational people will avoid this but when an astrologer predicts that on May 12 2011 will come the end of the world very few will really believe.Common knowledge is very unreliable,it usually lacks the sufficient reasons needed.Finally there is no proof that other methods cannot be better indeed (including here the process of establishing what hypotheses deserve to be scientific-now based on the principle of sufficient reason also) unfortunately no one has been found so far.If they exist and can be found by us then certainly no rational people would try to prevent them become the science of tomorrow,we must always define a standard of knowledge,provisionally.

 

[Canute]

Something didn't work.

Lol

I am not exaggerating when I say I am pragmatic about everything.

Nor me.

Actually I defined "works" earlier. I explained I am not content to label something as working until I observe all its consequences.

How do you know which consequences equal 'works', and which equal 'does not work'. Only be defining your objectives.

In your example of manangement by objectives, which I have utilized myself, it really does work if it is applied properly.

I didn't say it didn't work. (Actually I don't think it does, but that's irrelevant here) All I was pointing out was that it is management by objectives. If you have no objectives you have nothing to measure, pragmatically or not. I'm afraid I don't yet understand why you disagree with this.

Now we could take that a bit further and say, even if the business were thriving, what if the business was one which made cigarettes? That business directly contributes to the deaths of a lot of people, and so while the business is successful, as far as improving the health of society, it doesn't work. So is this business working or not?

Depends who you ask. For the managers it's working well. I'm not suggesting that we have to make moral judgements when deciding whether something works or not. We can use any yardstick we like.

If you are concerned I will be so impressed by something working I won't look beyond its immediate application, don't worry.

I have no argument with the way you decide whether something works or not. I do the same. However in both cases our objectives are self-defined, not absolute.

You've talked about a "yardstick." Well, ultimately for me reality is the yardstick I use.

How can you use reality as a yardstick unless you know what it is and understand it? I think what you mean is that you use the evidence of your senses as your yardstick, not at all the same thing.

Does meditation work?

This is an unaswerable question. If you want to know about some kinds of things it does not work, if you want to know about others it does. 'Works' doesn't mean anything until you decide on what you're trying to do.

I did not say science is the best method of doing science! I said science is best at investigating the physical aspects of reality.

I find it odd that you value meditation yet say this, and do not see the self-circularity in it. The two sentences are equivalent. It's like saying meditation is the best way of gaining the knowledge one gains through meditation. It can't possibly not be true.

There are other means, such as astrology or psychic detectives, and my statement was meant to place science above those other means in terms of producing consistent results.

I don't believe that astrology or psychic detective work produces knowledge, but I could be wrong. I'd certainly put science above these.

I don't know about anthropomorphic; I suspect you might mean humanity-centered, and if so I would agree. But so what?

So it follows that there is no absolute way of measuring the usefulness of science, whether it works or not, or whether the fact that in scientific terms it works tells us anything much about whether the scientific model is is true. We have to measure it anthropocentrically (you're right, that's what I meant).

That's all I really care about.

Even the health of planet Earth and preserving other life forms I support because I believe humanity will benefit overall.

Is that really true? It seems rather a selfish view.

In fact, I can't think of anything I do which ultimately isn't because of my human-centered value system. How can we escape self interest? It is hardly arbitrary if we are capable of being no other way than self-interested. I believe we cannot be any other way, but we can develop enlightened self interest where what we want is good for us and harms no others (and maybe even helps others).

I'm afraid I disagree violently, but I don't want to start another disagreement.

Science can certainly be beneficial to humanity, and that makes me attach value to it.

What do you mean by 'beneficial'.

True, but everything has its strengths and weakness, including meditation (e.g., I would not rely on it to study physics). I might be wrong but it seems you are hesitant to give science its due.

Not at all. I've been giving it its due throughout. I think you are giving it more than its due by unconsciously measuring it by its own standards, which are bound to be flattering.

I thought the main objection was to science devotees who try to claim that what science can't reveal must not exist

It's more subtle than that. I would also claim this.

I don't see how anyone can question how effective those methods have been, which was metacristi's point, and to which I agree as long as he doesn't mean to assign absolute epistomological privilege to science (notice I avoided the term "empiricism"? )

What do you mean by 'effective'?

 

[Les Sleeth]

How do you know which consequences equal 'works', and which equal 'does not work'. . . . If you have no objectives you have nothing to measure, pragmatically or not. I'm afraid I don't yet understand why you disagree with this. . . . We can use any yardstick we like. . . . in both cases our objectives are self-defined, not absolute. . . . 'Works' doesn't mean anything until you decide on what you're trying to do. . . . What do you mean by 'beneficial' . . . What do you mean by 'effective'? . . . How can you use reality as a yardstick unless you know what it is and understand it? I think what you mean is that you use the evidence of your senses as your yardstick, not at all the same thing.

I suspect if we talked in person I could explain myself better, trying to cover all the avenues in writing can be frustrating at times. As of now, the responses I chose in the above clips let me know you're not understanding me. Believe me, there's no need to question me about setting objectives. And I do NOT mean the evidence of my senses only. I assume I've not been clear enough about what I mean, so let me try one more time to explain myself.

Let me start off with your remarks about defining what's effective or beneficial. Personally I feel it's a waste of time to talk about that in relation to my meaning of pragmatism because I willing to grant any achievement can be considered effective or beneficial to a situation short term. So you want to shoot your wife? Well, a gun is effective and beneficial to your objective. I am not attaching any value judgements whatsoever to the chosen action. What "works" minimully is anything, and I mean anything, that helps someone achieve an objective.

But people's short term objectives are almost always linked to higher level goals. If you wanted to shoot your wife for the insurance money, I'd start questioning you about what you ultimately want. Why do you want the money? Because you will get out of debt and get to buy things. Why do you want to do that? You think it will make you feel good. After killing your wife and spending that money will you really feel good? And so on . . . In the end I'd ask, so will killing your wife really "work" in terms of your ultimate goal?

The truth is, everything people do is for the purpose of getting what they want, but everything they are doing doesn't necessarily lead to the results they hope for. Why not? Here we get into a little of the deeper meaning of pragmatic evaluation the way I am using it.

I believe that apparent reality has an underlying nature. I've come to that conclusion after noticing reality consistantly functions in certain ways. So the way I use pragmatic evalution is with ONE overall objective: I use the pragmatic approach as a general method to find clues about the underlying nature of reality.

What I do is to look for any sign, whatsoever, that some set of conditions, circumstances, operations, principles, etc. consistantly functions in specific ways. When I think I see that, I pay attention to it because if I can understand something about the underlying aspect, I can design stuff in harmony with that. The assumption is, the more something is designed in harmony with the underlying nature of reality, the better it will work in terms of achieving desired results and consistancy. By the same token, anything working as predicted and consistantly reflects something about that underlying nature. So my pragmatism is an epistomological technique, a way to look for clues.

Now, I rely on two classes of pragmatic evalution. One is for understanding "stuff," as science does (such as in my earlier solar cell example). As I said, I've not found anything better than science for investigating stuff. And the other is human consciousness, which like the rest of reality I think has a "nature" too. But each has different rules for success when designing systems for/with them, as far as I can tell. Human situations, for example, seem to thrive best when they assist people in being happy, developing as individuals, and achieving things.

Is that really true? It seems rather a selfish view. . . . I'm afraid I disagree violently, but I don't want to start another disagreement.

Well, if you believe we are at our best when we are conscious and happy, if you think we are most conscious and happy when doing things that help us thrive, and if you believe to thrive our actions must harmonize with nature, etc. . . . then there is no reason to be concerned about someone who wants to focus on furthering the consciousness and happiness of humnity over all else. I don't see it as selfish, I see it as practical. Afterall, it is unconscious and miserable people causing all the problems in this world.

 

[Canute]

I suspect if we talked in person I could explain myself better, trying to cover all the avenues in writing can be frustrating at times.

Yes, it's a hopeless way of communicating.

However I do not think I am misunderstanding you. I don't disagree with most of what you say.

I am just pointing out what a logical positivist would point out, that you cannot undertake 'pragmatic evaluation' of anything until you have decided on your values, and these are not absolute.

Suppose you wanted to pragmatically evaluate the performance of a member of your staff (I think you said you are in management). How would you do this? You would start by determining the parameters to be measured, the 'performance indicators'. These are your parameters not eternal Forms. You just made them up.

That does not necessarily mean that there is anything wrong with them. It just means that we must be careful not to define things self-referentially, as when we say science is useful. Yes it is useful for splitting atoms and so on, and we couldn't get out of bed in the morning without using the scientific method. Also its theories are useful for making predictions.

However it is not 'useful' in some abstract or absolute way. Pragmatism is subjective in the final analysis. Knowledge is knowledge, and whether it is useful depends only on whether you use it or not.

I'm not making a moral argument, or saying one set of values is better than another. Just that they are all relative. The only one which is absolute is true knowledge of reality. This must score full marks by any pragmatic measure of its truth and value. (I know I'm muddling the issues slightly, but they are all connected).

I believe that apparent reality has an underlying nature. I've come to that conclusion after noticing reality consistantly functions in certain ways.

I believe you can't possibly be wrong. There must be a meta-system if the universe is systematic. I won't bang on about George Spencer-Brown forever but he covers all this in his talks and mathematics. If he's too mathematical for you try Chuang-Tsu, who he completely agrees with. They suggest that you and I are ultimate reality.

So the way I use pragmatic evalution is with ONE overall objective: I use the pragmatic approach as a general method to find clues about the underlying nature of reality.
Me too.

What I do is to look for any sign, whatsoever, that some set of conditions, circumstances, operations, principles, etc. consistantly functions in specific ways.

Like the laws of form?

Well, if you believe we are at our best when we are conscious and happy, if you think we are most conscious and happy when doing things that help us thrive, and if you believe to thrive our actions must harmonize with nature, etc. . . . then there is no reason to be concerned about someone who wants to focus on furthering the consciousness and happiness of humnity over all else. I don't see it as selfish, I see it as practical. Afterall, it is unconscious and miserable people causing all the problems in this world.

I'm not against improving the human lot. But I believe we have a responsibility to do the same for everything that is sentient, for both pragmatic and empirically knowable reasons.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I am just pointing out what a logical positivist would point out, that you cannot undertake 'pragmatic evaluation' of anything until you have decided on your values, and these are not absolute.

Suppose you wanted to pragmatically evaluate the performance of a member of your staff (I think you said you are in management). How would you do this? You would start by determining the parameters to be measured, the 'performance indicators'. These are your parameters not eternal Forms. You just made them up.

I realize you've been saying that, and this is where we are disagreeing in my opinion.

I don't think I have to "decide" anything if my goal is to look at things with a clear mind. We've talked before about the stillness of mind that can be attained through meditation. Sometimes one can be so still the mind becomes like a window that is open, and one is then merely "seeing" through the window. Before the mind is opened like that, one peers through the pane, and of course it always distorts the view; to me, that is parallel to having "values" (or opinions, or bias, etc.) in place as one experiences.

Now, I am not saying there isn't a time to close the window and reflect on what one has seen, and at that time of interpretation one's opinions and values very much make a difference to what one has to say about what has been seen. I might decide this is "valuable" to that, or that is valuable to this, etc. But during the time of "seeing" with an eye for the pragmatic evaluation one will do later, one is merely looking for patterns, consistant behaviors, underlying influences, and so on.

(BTW -- I'm not in management, but I was an organizational development consultant in my former professional life, among other things)

That does not necessarily mean that there is anything wrong with them. It just means that we must be careful not to define things self-referentially, as when we say science is useful. Yes it is useful for splitting atoms and so on, and we couldn't get out of bed in the morning without using the scientific method. Also its theories are useful for making predictions.

Well, I really don't know what you think I said that is self-referential (of course, I've already explained several times I didn't mean "utility" when talking about what "works"). If I were to say, like Socrates, that every proposition is false, then I am being self-referential. You claimed that to say science reveals physical principles is self-referential because it is the same as saying science does science. Yet science is a series of steps involving hypothesizing, sense observation, logical interpretation, and verification. That is science. We know it now, but I don't think it was immediately clear to everyone that science was only going to expose physical aspects of reality. Even today you hear science-types regularly contend that there is no scientific evidence of God or soul or spirit or life force . . . well, duuhhhhhhhh

Certainly to say science has demonstrated it deserves epistomological privilege in the study of physical reality is not self-referential. When asked to define what "demonstrated" means, I claimed one can see how successful science has been at understanding physcial stuff by how well they can apply principles as predicted (i.e., what I define as doing things that "work"). I say it indicates the scientific method really is effective at discovering physical principles, and the underlying physical nature of the universe. Of course, you can claim I've defined the standard by which I judged effectiveness; however, as I argued to Hugo, there is no rational escape from that dilemma. That is why when we add experience to rationalization, we look for something to work as predicted. Sure, we can question that, but then we are left sitting in a mental muddle of our own making, never able to escape our self-imposed and impossible skepticism.

So my acknowledgment that science "works" has no values built into it at all, and is not self-referential in the slightest. It is merely the basis of my observation that if we understand something, then we are able to work with it with more versitility, more broadly, more in-depth than when we don't understand as well. So the test of pragmatism is nothing but a way to look for clues and for helping with verification.

However it is not 'useful' in some abstract or absolute way. Pragmatism is subjective in the final analysis. Knowledge is knowledge, and whether it is useful depends only on whether you use it or not.

I wish we could stop talking about "useful." It's NOT what I meant. I've already admitted that my attempt to link utility to the pragmatic idea of what "works" wasn't precise logically. I might fail to be completely logical sometimes, but I am not the slightest bit confused about the points you keep making about relative value, deciding objectives, etc.

I'll define "works": to apply principles as one understands them, and then for what results to function as one predicted. If something behaves according to plan, then it also reflects something about the nature of reality.

I'm not making a moral argument, or saying one set of values is better than another. Just that they are all relative. The only one which is absolute is true knowledge of reality. This must score full marks by any pragmatic measure of its truth and value. (I know I'm muddling the issues slightly, but they are all connected).

That's a pretty high-falutin' statement. I don't know about you, but as much as I aspire to "true knowledge of reality," I find I must be content to do the best I can do. In my quest to know reality, I don't feel I can afford to pass up any method or aid which might assist me in that quest. Regarding pragmatic measure, it is what it is, and it does what it does. Nothing more and nothing less . . . I have no idealistic illusions about it.

 

[Canute]

I realize you've been saying that, and this is where we are disagreeing in my opinion.

We're going to have to agree to differ. Perhaps we could disentangle this over a beer but we can't seem to here.

Certainly to say science has demonstrated it deserves epistomological privilege in the study of physical reality is not self-referential.

But science cannot explain physical reality. You've said this yourself. Science uses the scientific method to model the scientific evidence in a scientific way in order to produce scientific theories. It's bound to be good at doing it.

When asked to define what "demonstrated" means, I claimed one can see how successful science has been at understanding physcial stuff by how well they can apply principles as predicted (i.e., what I define as doing things that "work").
That is to interpret 'works' as meaning 'can predict physical interactions'. If that's how you define 'works' then yes, science works. It's bound to, seeing that it's entirely concerned with predicting physical interactions. But this your personal definition of 'works'. Other people are free to define it differently.

I say it indicates the scientific method really is effective at discovering physical principles, and the underlying physical nature of the universe.

Does the universe have an underlying physical nature, or is that a scientific assumption? If it has one then certainly science cannot explain it, for it is a metaphysical issue.

Of course, you can claim I've defined the standard by which I judged effectiveness; however, as I argued to Hugo, there is no rational escape from that dilemma.

I agree. If you judge then you must set standards against which to judge. However I'd argue that one does not need to judge, and that this is how one escapes getting trapped in the dillemma.

That is why when we add experience to rationalization, we look for something to work as predicted. Sure, we can question that, but then we are left sitting in a mental muddle of our own making, never able to escape our self-imposed and impossible skepticism.

By that view the universe must remain forever mysterious to us and we must make do with knowing just what works. I don't agree.

So my acknowledgment that science "works" has no values built into it at all, and is not self-referential in the slightest.

I presume you mean that science predicts physical interactions. In that case science definitely 'works'.

It is merely the basis of my observation that if we understand something, then we are able to work with it with more versitility, more broadly, more in-depth than when we don't understand as well.

Fine. (And there is no doubt that science helps us understand things scientifically).

So the test of pragmatism is nothing but a way to look for clues and for helping with verification.

Don't get that bit.

I wish we could stop talking about "useful." It's NOT what I meant. I've already admitted that my attempt to link utility to the pragmatic idea of what "works" wasn't precise logically. I might fail to be completely logical sometimes, but I am not the slightest bit confused about the points you keep making about relative value, deciding objectives, etc.

I think your definition of 'works' (or 'useful' or whatever) is practical and logical. I'm just saying that it is dangerous to overlook the subjective nature of those judgements. It's possible to start thinking that because science makes predictions about physical interactions this shows that it 'works' in some abstract sense. As a method of understanding reality it does not work at all, both for the epistemilogical reasons we've discussed and also because it cannot do metaphysics.

That's a pretty high-falutin' statement. I don't know about you, but as much as I aspire to "true knowledge of reality," I find I must be content to do the best I can do.

I quite agree that the best we can do is all we can do. However it seems that I believe that we can do a lot more than you think we can.

Do you think we should drop this? We seem to be in a rut. I'm happy with a draw.

 

[Les Sleeth]

We're going to have to agree to differ. Perhaps we could disentangle this over a beer but we can't seem to here. . . . Do you think we should drop this? We seem to be in a rut. I'm happy with a draw.

Next time I'm in England we will have that beer! I was ready to drop it but you said a couple of things that inspired a few more comments.

But science cannot explain physical reality. You've said this yourself. Science uses the scientific method to model the scientific evidence in a scientific way in order to produce scientific theories. It's bound to be good at doing it.

What I said is that science explains physical reality better than any other method we now have at our disposal; and, that the best evidence which supports that statement is how much we can design things which work/function/operate according to how science has described physical reality. I am not saying it has yet explained all of physical reality.

Does the universe have an underlying physical nature, or is that a scientific assumption? If it has one then certainly science cannot explain it, for it is a metaphysical issue.

This statement of yours is the main reason I wanted to answer you. If you were a tiny little bacterium living on a huge iceberg in the ocean, and you and other scientific bacteria label all the principles that makes that iceberg exist "physical," then you'd say the iceberg has an underlying physical nature. However, the physical itself has an underlying nature, which is the water out of which it arose.

I often use water analogies because (OMG, I'm about to reveal part of my belief system ) I believe at the foundation of all existence is some single, infinite, eternal, homogeneous substance which I think is the "ground state" of light. Yes, now you know, I am a monist.

What is the matter of our universe then? A monist theory might say it is compressed, oscillating light at some spot in the infinite, eternal ground state continuum. What is the universe doing now? It is decompressing, with its stars flying apart, and its light flying out of the compressed state of atoms. What is energy? As potential it is compression, and as action it is decompression.

This is like the iceberg which is melting back into the ocean. That ice is not really of a different nature than water, but it has taken on traits that accentuate certain water properties. Similarly, I see what we call "physical" as the traits given the foundational substance. The cause of those traits I would parallel to what you've called the "metasystem" (ground state light would be the "absolute"). At the boundary where the physical meets its metasystem and source/the absolute, that is where things get blurry, and that is where I think science is forever going to have problems with the physical side of that boundary. Like the question now of where did all the universe's energy originate? No one can answer it with a physical explanation, and so you hear normally hard core physicists offering what amounts to (IMHO) science fiction (like quantum fluctuations causing multiple universe's to come bubbling up out of nothing).

So you see, my idea of physical isn't all that definitive in the final analysis. I see it mostly a set of conditions or a metasystem of light that we, who are light as well, exist within (for now).

I have a little more to say about this below.

Les said: Of course, you can claim I've defined the standard by which I judged effectiveness; however, as I argued to Hugo, there is no rational escape from that dilemma. . . . That is why when we add experience to rationalization, we look for something to work as predicted. Sure, we can question that, but then we are left sitting in a mental muddle of our own making, never able to escape our self-imposed and impossible skepticism.

Canute said: I agree. If you judge then you must set standards against which to judge. However I'd argue that one does not need to judge, and that this is how one escapes getting trapped in the dillemma. . . . By that view the universe must remain forever mysterious to us and we must make do with knowing just what works. I don't agree.

Those of us who believe "something" is behind the physical aspects of reality are forced to limit ourselves to induction if we wish to theorize. I think it was Quine who pointed out induction doesn't work for the actual application of science. It might help indicate where to look for evidence, but if we ever get to the point where we are observing all facets of a formerly inductive model, it can then be considered deductively and made available to science.

The monist and metasystem concepts can only be described inductively because we cannot see them. If we wish to join them with the modelling done by pure physicalists, the only hope I believe we have is to produce a metasystem-absolute model which logically accounts for the physical workings of reality. No hedging either . . . it has to account for relativity, the constancy of light speed, quantum specifics, time and space, gravity and nuclear forces, etc.

However, even if we inductively come up with a model that logically accounts for every known physical facet, we still cannot say we "know" it is true. That's because (and I thought we both agreed about this), in order to know, one must experience what one hypothesizes to be true. So above when you state I am saying "the universe must remain forever mysterious to us," actually I am only saying that if one uses the intellect alone it must. I am not saying it isn't possible to experience aspects of the metasystem or the absolute (though I don't believe it can be done through the senses since they aren't sensitive enough to detect their own originating structure and construction material). We, (using the language of my model) the conscious light that receives the info senses send us, might be able to feel/experience ourselves and then know something about the foundation of all existence.

But once we are back in the theorizing arena, and we are talking to those who are only using their senses and intellect, it is back to induction and pointing to the holes in physicalist theory. YOU might know, but since that knowledge can only be experienced inside you, and not "observed" externally, I can't see an intellectual bridge that can be built between inner and sense experience except induction, which really doesn't satisfy either side's definition of "knowing."

Now I return once again to why I am willing to say science deserves epistomological privilege when it comes to investigating the physical aspects of reality. What I mean is, as long as we are staying inside the boundaries of the mechanics the "metasystem" sustains which create and maintain our universe, and someone wants to call that "physical," it is okay with me to say science does the best job of investigating it. Science "works" because it really is looking at something that is going on. I don't believe mechanics is all that is going on (like many science types believe), but it's going on nonetheless.

Bottom line: I don't think we who believe there is a metasystem or an absolute can ever interface properly with science. If we really do have a way to experience what we say, then our best hope is to encourage others to learn how to experience it for themselves. There is no line of reasoning, sans experience, that can achieve logical certainty. My strategy here is to grant to science that it is perceiving apsects of reality, while looking for ways to show there are aspects science, and therefore physics, aren't accounting for and never will.

 

[Canute]

Next time I'm in England we will have that beer!

I'll look forward to it.

Yeah I was going to stop but you've said some interesting things. I'm going to comment in little bits because I agree with one bit then not the next all through, and there are all sorts of issues. On the whole I don't think you're as empirical as you think you are.

What I said is that science explains physical reality better than any other method we now have at our disposal;

Not for me it doesn't I'm afraid. Science cannot explain anything important about physical reality. A scientific TOE is of no interest to me whatsoever. I want to understand non-scientific things, like what does 'phsyical' mean, and why do physical things exist.

and, that the best evidence which supports that statement is how much we can design things which work/function/operate according to how science has described physical reality. I am not saying it has yet explained all of physical reality.

How can a discipline that cannot explain the existence, composition, and ultimately even the behaviour of matter be the best way of understanding physical reality?

This statement of yours is the main reason I wanted to answer you. If you were a tiny little bacterium living on a huge iceberg in the ocean, and you and other scientific bacteria label all the principles that makes that iceberg exist "physical," then you'd say the iceberg has an underlying physical nature. However, the physical itself has an underlying nature, which is the water out of which it arose.

I don't think that works, because water is physical. The physical has to arise from something non-physical to avoid an infinite regress of substances. Something without any physical qualities.

I often use water analogies because (OMG, I'm about to reveal part of my belief system ) I believe at the foundation of all existence is some single, infinite, eternal, homogeneous substance which I think is the "ground state" of light. Yes, now you know, I am a monist.

I don't think monism works. How can just one thing exist?

This is like the iceberg which is melting back into the ocean. That ice is not really of a different nature than water, but it has taken on traits that accentuate certain water properties. Similarly, I see what we call "physical" as the traits given the foundational substance.

But what foundational substance could be monist, and why can't science detect it? Also why can't metaphysics come up with any substance that would fit the bill? Why do all questions about ultimate reality have to be unanswerable? If monism is correct then we'll never know it.

The cause of those traits I would parallel to what you've called the "metasystem" (ground state light would be the "absolute"). At the boundary where the physical meets its metasystem and source/the absolute, that is where things get blurry, and that is where I think science is forever going to have problems with the physical side of that boundary.

Very true. The 'problem of consciousness', Zeno's paradoxes, the 'problem of attributes', the origins of matter, science is bounded by the walls of its cave.

Like the question now of where did all the universe's energy originate? No one can answer it with a physical explanation, and so you hear normally hard core physicists offering what amounts to (IMHO) science fiction (like quantum fluctuations causing multiple universe's to come bubbling up out of nothing).

Yes, I don't take all that stuff very seriously. It is impossible for science to explain where energy originated. I doubt science will even ever explain what it is.

So you see, my idea of physical isn't all that definitive in the final analysis. I see it mostly a set of conditions or a metasystem of light that we, who are light as well, exist within (for now).

But isn't light physical?

Those of us who believe "something" is behind the physical aspects of reality are forced to limit ourselves to induction if we wish to theorize.

Yes. This is why Buddhists don't theorise. If you theorise you end with a theory.

If we wish to join them with the modelling done by pure physicalists, the only hope I believe we have is to produce a metasystem-absolute model which logically accounts for the physical workings of reality. No hedging either . . . it has to account for relativity, the constancy of light speed, quantum specifics, time and space, gravity and nuclear forces, etc.

But it can't be done. In the scientific view metaphysical questions are unanswerable, so no scientific theory or model will ever have a sound metaphysical foundation. It must always rest on assumptions.

However, even if we inductively come up with a model that logically accounts for every known physical facet, we still cannot say we "know" it is true.

I agree. Induction cannot bring certainty by definition. A model isn't knowledge, and it is impossible to account for every physical fact (the First Cause for instance).

That's because (and I thought we both agreed about this), in order to know, one must experience what one hypothesizes to be true. So above when you state I am saying "the universe must remain forever mysterious to us," actually I am only saying that if one uses the intellect alone it must.

Agree again.

I am not saying it isn't possible to experience aspects of the metasystem or the absolute (though I don't believe it can be done through the senses since they aren't sensitive enough to detect their own originating structure and construction material). We, (using the language of my model) the conscious light that receives the info senses send us, might be able to feel/experience ourselves and then know something about the foundation of all existence.

And again.

But once we are back in the theorizing arena, and we are talking to those who are only using their senses and intellect, it is back to induction and pointing to the holes in physicalist theory. YOU might know, but since that knowledge can only be experienced inside you, and not "observed" externally, I can't see an intellectual bridge that can be built between inner and sense experience except induction, which really doesn't satisfy either side's definition of "knowing."

Mostly agree, but not quite. I agree that the truth about reality cannot be 'proved'. I think we know enough about logic and metaphysics to be sure of that. However I believe it is possible to work out the truth, and more or less demonstrate it, because it must be the only logical solution. However, for the reasons you give, one cannot go all the way to knowing its truth by reason.

Btw Spencer-Brown argues that we misuse the word 'proof'. Technically what we do in axiomatic systems is demonstrate, not prove. I think this is an important point.

Bottom line: I don't think we who believe there is a metasystem or an absolute can ever interface properly with science.

Maybe never interface with scientists, but there's no problem interfacing with science.

If we really do have a way to experience what we say, then our best hope is to encourage others to learn how to experience it for themselves. There is no line of reasoning, sans experience, that can achieve logical certainty. My strategy here is to grant to science that it is perceiving apsects of reality, while looking for ways to show there are aspects science, and therefore physics, aren't accounting for and never will.

I think that you're wrong here. If there are things that science cannot account for then it is a bad way of understanding reality, or rather it is not a way of understanding reality.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I think that you're wrong here. If there are things that science cannot account for then it is a bad way of understanding reality, or rather it is not a way of understanding reality.

Not for me it doesn't I'm afraid. Science cannot explain anything important about physical reality. A scientific TOE is of no interest to me whatsoever. I want to understand non-scientific things, like what does 'phsyical' mean, and why do physical things exist. . . . How can a discipline that cannot explain the existence, composition, and ultimately even the behaviour of matter be the best way of understanding physical reality?

At last I see why we are disagreeing so strongly on this issue, which has been a mystery to me because we seem to agree about more important things.

I have to say, respectfully, that your first statement above doesn't make sense to me, while your second statement seems to provide a clue about why you believe it.

I would bet my britches you do science all the time with things you want to achieve in your home or profession. You might hypothosize a solution to, say, a leaky espresso maker, replace a seal or clean out mineral deposits, and then observe the results. When the machine works the way you want, you've used the scientific method to achieve your goal. Can you honestly say that approach doesn't work with all such things that can be observed with the senses, or that you personally don't find it valuable to surviving or being more comfortable on this planet?

So what if science cannot explain what it is that establishes the "physical"? As you imply, you and others of us think the answer to that is metaphysical, which is why it is outside the domain of science. You might personally not care about scientific exploration to understand the things you are intersted in, but your personal preferences have no bearing on the objective consideration of whether science is effective in its own realm we have supposedly been talking about in this thread. I mean, really, why judge science by what it cannot do?

I don't think that works, because water is physical. The physical has to arise from something non-physical to avoid an infinite regress of substances. Something without any physical qualities.

Another problem we seem to have is how concretely you take things I say. My analogy is not about water. The physicalness of water and ice has nothing to do with my point. I was trying to analogize that the physical appearances of the universe -- atoms, forces, energy, light -- might be the "forms" of something that starts out "formless." Water represented the formless ocean of my theorized ground state substance, and ice represented a "form" of, and in, that ocean.

I don't think monism works. How can just one thing exist?

It isn't easy to understand, but if it were (and if it is also true of course), then we'd already understand it. But here we run into a big problem with your persective on knowing reality. You say you don't care about the understandings science gives us, yet if I could give you a monistic model that accounts for the physics of things, you wouldn't be able to understand it. So where does that leave us?

I don't know why you find it so hard to see monism as a possibility because if you start breaking down matter, which is the basis of the universe, you find energy, light, forces . . . i.e., just a few basic traits which are able to assume an incredible variety of shapes to give us "appearances." Is it that difficult to imagine those basic traits derive from something even more basic?

But what foundational substance could be monist, and why can't science detect it? Also why can't metaphysics come up with any substance that would fit the bill? Why do all questions about ultimate reality have to be unanswerable? If monism is correct then we'll never know it.

Relying on my water-ice analogy again, what if you were made of ice, and all your detection tools were made of ice? They would be too structured to detect the unstructured condition of their own makeup.

However, I didn't say we'd never know experientially, I only said it can't be known intellectually or through the senses, and therefore scientifically. There is the possibility I've already spoken of, which is to learn to experience the "essense" of our own consciousness, and thereby come to know the absolute foundation of one's own existence. If you could develop that internal skill, you might just see that the basic stuff of your consciousness is the same basic stuff that makes up everything else. Of course, if you did see that, it is yet another step to understand how all the things which exist in our universe are given structure. So there are two main issues in the monistic model: what is the formless foundation, and how does it get structured into "form."

The idea is, the ground state is so flexible and indestructible, that it can take many shapes.

But isn't light physical?

Yes, but I am claiming what "physical" means is some minimum degree of structure. Light as we know it has the structure of transverse oscillation, whose wavelength by the way, is stretching as the universe expands. What if the ground state of light is some non-oscillating but vibrant condition, and not "particles" at all. When compressed it accentuates its vibratory quality, polarizes it, and "particlizes" it? When it decompresses enough I am suggesting it will lose its form and blend into an infinite continuum of formless ground state light.

Yes. This is why Buddhists don't theorise. If you theorise you end with a theory.

That's a joke, right? Buddhist theory could fill a library. Maybe the Buddha himself didn't theorize, but plenty of Buddhists have and still do speculate about the nature of things.

But since you've brought up Buddhism, the Buddha did speak of a ground state, that's what we attain union with in "enlightenment." The monist conception very much fits with Buddhist thinking.

 

[Canute]

At last I see why we are disagreeing so strongly on this issue, which has been a mystery to me because we seem to agree about more important things.

I have to say, respectfully, that your first statement above doesn't make sense to me, while your second statement seems to provide a clue about why you believe it.

Well, I would say your second para. contradicts the first, but it doesn't matter.

I would bet my britches you do science all the time with things you want to achieve in your home or profession.

I agree that I do science every moment of the day, as you say. My life probable depends on it.

Can you honestly say that approach doesn't work with all such things that can be observed with the senses, or that you personally don't find it valuable to surviving or being more comfortable on this planet?

I've never suggested this. I definitely find science useful, up to a point. (Perhaps we ought to define science sometime). My point is that the usefulness of science to me has no bearing on its 'truth' as an explanation of things, or its value as a human activity, and little on its epistemological status.

So what if science cannot explain what it is that establishes the "physical"?

So science cannot provide an explanation of anything, it can only model interactions.

As you imply, you and others of us think the answer to that is metaphysical, which is why it is outside the domain of science.

To be honest I do not think metaphysics is much more help than science. They are two sides of a coin. Science cannot explain anything precisely because metaphysical questions are unanswerable. (Heidegger is good on why this is so).

I mean, really, why judge science by what it cannot do?

How else can one judge it? I enjoy studying science because it provides a lot of evidence as to the nature of reality. However that evidence clearly shows that reality is not scientific.

Another problem we seem to have is how concretely you take things I say. My analogy is not about water.

Yes sorry. I wasn't just picking on water. I was suggesting that there is nothing of which you can conceive that could logically act as 'water' in your metaphor. I'll come back to this below.

It isn't easy to understand, but if it were (and if it is also true of course), then we'd already understand it. But here we run into a big problem with your persective on knowing reality. You say you don't care about the understandings science gives us, yet if I could give you a monistic model that accounts for the physics of things, you wouldn't be able to understand it. So where does that leave us?

This is a tricky issue. In my view monism is not logical, which is why I can't understand it, if you see what I mean. Again see below. Btw it's not that I don't care what science says, it's just that I do not consider that it represents a true understanding of reality. I would say that the existence of metaphysical questions makes that inarguable.

I don't know why you find it so hard to see monism as a possibility because if you start breaking down matter, which is the basis of the universe, you find energy, light, forces . . . i.e., just a few basic traits which are able to assume an incredible variety of shapes to give us "appearances." Is it that difficult to imagine those basic traits derive from something even more basic?

I agree in outline but let's focus on this ultimate monist substance/entity. Is this something or nothing? Does it exist or not-exist? Neither of these are logical answers to the question according to philosophers. In metaphysics it is an undecidable question (if true it is false, if false it is true, since either answer leads to contradictions). This is the problem with monism

However I do half agree with you about monism, in the sense of all things reducing in a wayto one thing. But to make this work logically requires seeing this one thing in a 'non-dual' way, otherwise it's back to the 'problem of essence' and undecidable questions. Note that 'non-dual' means 'not two', and not 'one'.

However, I didn't say we'd never know experientially, I only said it can't be known intellectually or through the senses, and therefore scientifically. There is the possibility I've already spoken of, which is to learn to experience the "essense" of our own consciousness, and thereby come to know the absolute foundation of one's own existence.

Here we agree.

If you could develop that internal skill, you might just see that the basic stuff of your consciousness is the same basic stuff that makes up everything else.

In my view there is no 'might' about it. It is possible and countless people have done it, and will in future. Can't prove this unfortunately, although the scientific evidence supports the idea.

So there are two main issues in the monistic model: what is the formless foundation, and how does it get structured into "form."

Is not the main issue how a single substance can logically exist without changing the meaning of 'exist' (because existence is always relative)?

It is in the nature of reality that metaphysical questions cannot be answered. There must be a reason for this, just as there is for why apples fall down. Monism does not explain our inability to reason our way to the truth, but simply accepts it as a fact. In this sense monism is an appeal to mystery, for it says that if monism is true we cannot ever know why anything exists or what it is. (That's a shortcut through the arguments, I'll expand if it sounds ad hoc). A proper understanding would make clear why there is always an inevitable explanatory gap.

Yes, but I am claiming what "physical" means is some minimum degree of structure.

I agree. This implies that ultimate reality is immaterial, without phsyical properties. This is where I feel monism fails. It cannot get across this gap between the physical and the absolute for it suggests that the absolute exists, and how can something without properties exist (using 'exist' in an everyday sense)?

I passed through monism on my way to the Buddhist view, but I could never make sense of it for these kinds of reasons, and because it does not seem to explain anything, does not lead to any understanding.

Light as we know it has the structure of transverse oscillation, whose wavelength by the way, is stretching as the universe expands. What if the ground state of light is some non-oscillating but vibrant condition, and not "particles" at all. When compressed it accentuates its vibratory quality, polarizes it, and "particlizes" it? When it decompresses enough I am suggesting it will lose its form and blend into an infinite continuum of formless ground state light.

Not sure I understand all that but I'd agree that light plays some fundamental role in cosmogeny. Let there be light and all that. However I don't agree that light can be truly fundamental, for logical reasons outlined (or hinted at) above.

That's a joke, right? Buddhist theory could fill a library.

Buddhist explanations and teachings could fill a library. However these are not based on theorising, they are based on experience. Of course skilled Buddhists theorise about all sorts of things, but if a skilled Buddhist says something is true then it is not an assertion based on a theory. Theoretical knowledge is not considered knowledge. Either you know or you don't.

Maybe the Buddha himself didn't theorize, but plenty of Buddhists have and still do speculate about the nature of things.

In a sense it's true that Buddhists theorise and speculate. But you won't find any of those theories or speculations in the literature. Theorising and conjecturing may be a means to an end, but if all one has is theory then one is not a skilled Buddhist.

But since you've brought up Buddhism, the Buddha did speak of a ground state, that's what we attain union with in "enlightenment." The monist conception very much fits with Buddhist thinking.

I'm afraid this is a misunderstanding, albeit a widespread one. Buddhism is very specifically not monism or dualism. This is why there are no unanswerable metaphysical questions in Buddhism (or Taoism etc). The logic is different. Bear in mind the constant references to the absolute as the 'one and many', or the two Brahmans etc. This is also the reason that the absolute cannot be characterised in words without self-contradiction.

I don't know the Suttras well but there's a great passage in one (Surangama) where the Buddha explains that not only does the absolute neither exist nor not-exist, but that it is a mistake to think either that it both exists and not-exists, or that it neither exists nor not-exists. It is something that cannot be characterised properly in dualistic terms (or any terms at all come to that).

I know how illogical that sounds but if you're into the issue of self-reference and axiomatic systems it can be explained logically, or perhaps 'meta-logically' is a better word. (This is what logician George Spencer-Brown's 'Laws of Form' was all about, and he turns out to be a friend of Wu Wu Wei, highly respected Advaita master).