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Functor97
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As of late i have been musing upon the nature of free will. However i disagree with the standard interpretation of the link between Determinism and free will. Incompatibilism states that Free Will and Determinism cannot co-exist, and i agree with this stance. Where i disagree is with the empirical nature of our reality and the implications for free will.
Quantum mechanics has demonstrated that our universe is (at least at the quantum scale in-deterministic). In the standard Copenhagen interpretation we must assign probabilities to certain events, and we can never discount a certain event from occurring (such as an electron existing out at Pluto). Now this clearly demolishes the deterministic frame work, but what does it say about free will? This is where i disagree with the standard interpretation made by the likes of Kaku (See here http://bigthink.com/ideas/37862), who claim that this demonstrates we have free will. I agree that an observer would be inclined to state that a "mind" has free will as the observer can only calculate the probability of certain actions occurring thereby negating determinism.
However consider the perspective of the "mind". From its perspective, no matter which course of action it takes, it will be unable to determine the results. Certain probabilities may be calculated, but is it not chance which decides the outcome of the event? The mind cannot be certain of that any action it undertakes will cause a particular event, and thus despite its will, it may not reach the desired result. Is this not a contradiction to the very definition of free will?
On the other hand, if you subscribe to Everett's Many worlds interpretation (this world is the world in which x occurs and not x'), is not determinism left intact, and thus our free will negated?
I am inclined to agree with Arthur Schopenhauer's belief that free will is an illusion, but i am not totally convinced. Compatibalists such as Dennett (see Elbow Room) disagree with my stance, but i believe they are confusing uncertainty from the perspective of an observer and ignoring the uncertainty of the "mind". I cannot find a modern philosopher who agrees with my stance, and this somewhat disturbs me, as i may be missing something crucial. I would like to hear other people's opinion on my stance and their advice for searching for sympathetic philosophical works.
Quantum mechanics has demonstrated that our universe is (at least at the quantum scale in-deterministic). In the standard Copenhagen interpretation we must assign probabilities to certain events, and we can never discount a certain event from occurring (such as an electron existing out at Pluto). Now this clearly demolishes the deterministic frame work, but what does it say about free will? This is where i disagree with the standard interpretation made by the likes of Kaku (See here http://bigthink.com/ideas/37862), who claim that this demonstrates we have free will. I agree that an observer would be inclined to state that a "mind" has free will as the observer can only calculate the probability of certain actions occurring thereby negating determinism.
However consider the perspective of the "mind". From its perspective, no matter which course of action it takes, it will be unable to determine the results. Certain probabilities may be calculated, but is it not chance which decides the outcome of the event? The mind cannot be certain of that any action it undertakes will cause a particular event, and thus despite its will, it may not reach the desired result. Is this not a contradiction to the very definition of free will?
On the other hand, if you subscribe to Everett's Many worlds interpretation (this world is the world in which x occurs and not x'), is not determinism left intact, and thus our free will negated?
I am inclined to agree with Arthur Schopenhauer's belief that free will is an illusion, but i am not totally convinced. Compatibalists such as Dennett (see Elbow Room) disagree with my stance, but i believe they are confusing uncertainty from the perspective of an observer and ignoring the uncertainty of the "mind". I cannot find a modern philosopher who agrees with my stance, and this somewhat disturbs me, as i may be missing something crucial. I would like to hear other people's opinion on my stance and their advice for searching for sympathetic philosophical works.