Hetero phenomenology definition in philosophy

[StatusX]

I think you've just misunderstood heterophenomenology, which is what I've been suspecting all along. There really are a lot of misconception about it out there, mostly due, I would suspect, to the fact a given person disagrees with Dennett generally, so they just assume that they disagree with this as well. Heterophenomenology is equipped to deal with the situation you just described. Switching the individual detectors, though the system itself might never know the difference, is something that can be detected. A heterophenomenologist does not only take into account a subject's behavior - that is behaviorism, not heterophenomenology. Also taken into account is any detectable change in neural architecture - the analog of the change made to your radio detector's input circuits.

Maybe so, but then I'm a little confused about what exactly the difference is between heterophenomenology and behaviorism? In what sense are the specific neural impulses part of that set of subjective data, alongside things like "A likes chocolate" and "A believes he experiences"? I'm not denying they should be included, but if you deny qualia (that is, for the heterophenomenologists who deny it, like Dennett), how could the specific neural structure be significant?

 

[loseyourname]

I'm not sure what you're asking, but I'll give you my own understanding of heterophenomenology (which Dennett has told me himself is accurate). It's rather simple. The only dictate is that, as a researcher, you must not assume that your subject's beliefs about his own experience are either correct or incorrect until some corroborating evidence is provided. Any kind of evidence can be considered as long as it doesn't stand alone.

I realize that for many common experiences, it seems obvious that they are correct. For instance, if I believe that I saw Marilyn Monroe, I'm probaby correct, even if I was hallucinating. More mundanely, if I am fed an orange and I say that it tastes like an orange, the heterophenomenologist is not likely to consider this a contentious claim. But there are claims made by experiencing subjects that are contentious. Heck, consider Sleeth. He claims that through direct experience, he knows that consciousness is the fundamental substance in the universe from which matter and energy are derived and which is the driving force behind the emergence of life. Don't you think it is a good idea for a researcher to not assume that he is correct and then explain the claim? Isn't it a better idea to simply seek to explain why exactly he believes that? We shouldn't just assume from the outset that he believes it because his claim is true.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I've been rereading Dennett's CE. I fiind that he seems to apply heterophenomenology to first person experience, although I can't find anywhere where he says so explicitly. But in discussing the phi experiment and Libet's 400 ms gap, he emphasizes that you should take your beliefs seriously, but not embrace them, since his understanding of our beliefs of our recent experience are constructions (either "stalinist" substitutions before the fact or "orwellian" editing of impressions after they have been recorded) which coming from separate independent process and never fully conflated, give us a usable but not strictly accurate idea of reality.

 

[Tournesol]

In which case, philosophy is futile

No, other considerations can be broguht to bear

 

[Tournesol]

So your entire premise is based on "aw, you know what I mean" reasoning? Sounds like Chalmers to me :yuck:.

So you are saying things don't seem like anything at all to you..no colours scents or sounds...poor you.

 

[selfAdjoint]

So you are saying things don't seem like anything at all to you..no colours scents or sounds...poor you.

Oh for goodness sake Tournesol, haven't we gotten beyond these cheap shots? My internal life is very rich, but I am a nominalist on "what it is like". It's not a thing that requires an explanation, it's just a name for what is going on.

 

[StatusX]

I'm not sure what you're asking, but I'll give you my own understanding of heterophenomenology (which Dennett has told me himself is accurate). It's rather simple. The only dictate is that, as a researcher, you must not assume that your subject's beliefs about his own experience are either correct or incorrect until some corroborating evidence is provided. Any kind of evidence can be considered as long as it doesn't stand alone.

So are you saying that heterophenomenolgy leaves the question of whether qualia exist open? If so, then I have no problem with the method, and as I mentioned earlier, the existence or non-existence of qualia may just be an interpretational issue.

 

[selfAdjoint]

So are you saying that heterophenomenolgy leaves the question of whether qualia exist open? If so, then I have no problem with the method, and as I mentioned earlier, the existence or non-existence of qualia may just be an interpretational issue.

From Consciousness Explained, page 73.

The heterophenomenological method neither challenges nor accepts as entirely true the assertions of subjects, but rather maintains a constructive and sympathetic neutrality, in the hopes of compiling a definitive description of the world according to the subjects.

Note that he applies this approach to researchers studying the reports of subjects in the course of an experiment or anthropological investigation. In other word there is a great asymmetry between the humans involved, the trained researcher versus the subject, who is assumed to be an expert on his/her own internal beliefs, but innocent of other relevant expertise.

I don't see how this specialized approach can be applied to a philosophical give and take between equals.

 

[Tournesol]

Oh for goodness sake Tournesol, haven't we gotten beyond these cheap shots? My internal life is very rich, but I am a nominalist on "what it is like". It's not a thing that requires an explanation, it's just a name for what is going on.

What are the criteria for deciding whether or not something needs explanantion ?
What is to stop me saying that "gravity" is just a label for the tendency of things to fall when you let go of them ?

 

[selfAdjoint]

The criterion is that the phenomenon must be communicable and found to be the same for all, by social intercommunication. Then we can all search for an explanation. But some philosophers, searching for a way to stave off mechanism, have hit on the uncommunicable "way it seems to me", which they miscall "what it is" and erected it into an unexplainable primitive for ontology.

 

[Tournesol]

The criterion is that the phenomenon must be communicable and found to be the same for all, by social intercommunication.

That is not a criterion for whether something needs an explanation,
that is a criterion for whether the scientific method can supply one.#

"If we can't explain it we shouldn't explain it" -- "I am the master of this college, what I don't know isn't knowledge"

Then we can all search for an explanation. But some philosophers, searching for a way to stave off mechanism,

One could equally say that qualiaphobia is nothing but a way of shoring up physicalism.

have hit on the uncommunicable "way it seems to me",.

Well, you can't say it in maths very well, but just try communicating the Thory of Relaivity in a symphony or a painting.

which they miscall "what it is" and erected it into an unexplainable primitive for ontology.

Aren't things like space, time and matter unexplainable primitives ?

 

[Mentat]

That is not a criterion for whether something needs an explanation,
that is a criterion for whether the scientific method can supply one.

What would "explanation" of something you can't define, point out, or even communicate mean? What would it be to "explain" something without communicating?

"If we can't explain it we shouldn't explain it"

If one can't explain something -- it is impossible in principle to explain it -- then one shouldn't try.

That seems rather obvious to me.

One could equally say that qualiaphobia is nothing but a way of shoring up physicalism.

Pseudoscience predates science by millenia.

Well, you can't say it in maths very well, but just try communicating the Thory of Relaivity in a symphony or a painting.

Try communicating qualia (the incommunicable) in a symphony or a painting. I've seen many paintings, and I have listened to many symphonies, but I have never once had any reason to believe in qualia.

Besides, he wasn't saying you should be able to communicate it in maths, he was saying you should be able to communicate it. Period.

That "what it is like to me" is incommunicable in principle is what makes it seem a dead-end in scientific reasoning.

Aren't things like space, time and matter unexplainable primitives ?

Who said there was something wrong with unexplainable primitives? What was wrong was erecting one in a desparate attempt to save a world-view.

 

[Tournesol]

If one can't explain something -- it is impossible in principle to explain it -- then one shouldn't try.

And there is one, sweeping all-encompassing mode of explanation...or a variety of language games ? SelfAdjoint's original claim was that
we need not explain qualia. He then said (in effect) that we cannot e
explain qualia scientifically. Note how scientific explanation is surreptitiously taken to be the only relevant kind. Note also how
the "cannot means need not" manoeuvre is needed to prevent anyone
drawing awkward conclusions -- including non-physicalist ones -- from
the possible failure of scientific explanation.

Besides, he wasn't saying you should be able to communicate it in maths, he was saying you should be able to communicate it. Period.

He was saying that, but he shouldn't have been. The communication
issue depends on how you are communicating, just as the explanation
issue depends on how you are explaining.

That "what it is like to me" is incommunicable in principle is what makes it seem a dead-end in scientific reasoning.

Scientific reasoning is not the only kind, mathematical language is not the only kind.

 

[RageSk8]

"Telling Nagel that he may be become able to, thanks to mastering Dennett's theory, to describe what he had previously been unable to describe, is like telling Kant that he may become able, after mastering someone elses theory (Hegel perhaps, or Sellars')to describe what he previously claimed was the indescribable thing-in-itself." - Richard Rorty, Holism, Intrinsicality, Transcendence found in Dennett and his Critics, p. 187.

I agree with heterophenomenolgy, but I I know of no direct argument for it that would work on Tournesol, StatusX, etc. I also doubt that Rorty's strategy, taking the debate together with many other philosophical disputes to a metaphilosophical level, would do much good... This debate is an incredibly hard one to declare a winner on based solely on argumentation. We aren't just working with different assumptions - we are working from different gestalts (thus Rorty's strategy).

 

[Tournesol]

Agree with heterophenomology qua taking subject's reports seriously, or agree with heterophenomology as amounting to an a priori dismissal of qualia ?

 

[RageSk8]

Agree with heterophenomology qua taking subject's reports seriously, or agree with heterophenomology as amounting to an a priori dismissal of qualia ?

The first. Heterophenomenology is a dismissal of qualia - I just wouldn't call it an a priori dismissal.

 

[Tournesol]

So heterophenomenlogists have to ignore reports like "I am having a red quale" ?

 

[loseyourname]

The first. Heterophenomenology is a dismissal of qualia - I just wouldn't call it an a priori dismissal.

Haven't I made it clear that heterophenomenology is just a methodology? It is not a theory. It makes no claim on whether or not qualia exist, either a priori or a posteriori. It just so happens that the most prominent heterophenomenological theory out there, Dennett's, does dismiss the existence of qualia. It is not necessary for a heterophenomenological theory to do so.

 

[Doctordick]

What is to stop me saying that "gravity" is just a label for the tendency of things to fall when you let go of them ?

In what way does that not also qualify as an "explanation" of "gravity". Just because it doesn't give very elaborate details on what it "explains" doesn't make it not an explanation (it at least tells you to expect things to fall). It is just a rather poor, useless explanation in comparison to the accepted scientific explanation. As a matter of fact it is almost exactly my grandmother's explanation of gravity.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Aren't things like space, time and matter unexplainable primitives ?

That depends; are you talking about "unexplainable primitives" such as lines, circles or squares. In which case I would agree with you. Or are you holding that they are primitive in the sense that they exist without reason? In which case I would disagree with you. English is horribly vague.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

Scientific reasoning is not the only kind, mathematical language is not the only kind.

No they aren't; but they are the best understood. What they are capable of communicating they do a pretty good job of obtaining universal agreement, a central requirement of clear communication.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[RageSk8]

So heterophenomenlogists have to ignore reports like "I am having a red quale" ?

No, but they would have to treat that report in the same way as "I see red" or "it is red."

 

[RageSk8]

Haven't I made it clear that heterophenomenology is just a methodology? It is not a theory. It makes no claim on whether or not qualia exist, either a priori or a posteriori. It just so happens that the most prominent heterophenomenological theory out there, Dennett's, does dismiss the existence of qualia. It is not necessary for a heterophenomenological theory to do so.

Do you honestly believe that methodologies are theory neutral? Methodologies have theoretic consequences. Heterophenomenology does not explicitly deny qualia, but it does, it has to, ignore the problem of qualia (if qualia is thought to be ineffable, non-relational, or completely subjective).

 

[loseyourname]

Do you honestly believe that methodologies are theory neutral? Methodologies have theoretic consequences.

I don't believe that all methodologies have no theoretic consequences. I do believe that heterophenomenology does not have any necessary consequences on whether or not we are to except qualia as an explanandum.

Heterophenomenology does not explicitly deny qualia, but it does, it has to, ignore the problem of qualia (if qualia is thought to be ineffable, non-relational, or completely subjective).

You can continue to say this, but the literature does not back you up. Despite his eventual dismissal of the term 'qualia' as having any relevance to consciousness, Dennett does not ignore the problem presented. He simply approaches it the way he approaches any other problem. Rather than attempting to determine whether or not qualia exist in the way your conception says they would, he attempts to determine why someone who believes they do holds that belief. That is hardly willful ignorance. I generally don't claim to be completely certain about very many things, but this one I am. I have had personal discourse with Dennett in which he has confirmed the claims I've made here. You may think it is a logical consequence of the structure of heterophenomenological enquiry that it cannot possibly even consider the problem of qualia, but Dennett does not agree with you, and given that he was the first to clearly formulate what heterophenomenology is, I'll take his word for it.

 

[Tournesol]

No, but they would have to treat that report in the same way as "I see red" or "it is red."

Why ? Presumably there is a reason why the subject chose to phrase it
the way they did, a reason that would reveal something about their psychology, one way or another.

 

[Tournesol]

Do you honestly believe that methodologies are theory neutral? Methodologies have theoretic consequences. Heterophenomenology does not explicitly deny qualia, but it does, it has to, ignore the problem of qualia (if qualia is thought to be ineffable, non-relational, or completely subjective).

I don't see why. I thought it was based on taking subjective reports at face value as far as possible. Obviously one would not be able to procede if
everything someone said is somehow ineffable or incomprehensible, but that is not the situation. If someone says "I am having an ineffable experience",
that is itself a comprehensible statement. It's not as if we had any a priori
reason to suppose that everybody can communicate everything that is going
on inside our heads -- in fact, if you make an engineering guestimate
of the amount of neural processing compared with the bandwidth of speech,
it turns out we couldn't possible do so.

 

[RageSk8]

Why ? Presumably there is a reason why the subject chose to phrase it
the way they did, a reason that would reveal something about their psychology, one way or another.

I agree. I guess this is semantic misunderstanding - of which I take fault for. More or less I believe that heterophenomenology's neutrality on the existence of qualia does not represent a neutral framework for enquiry between people like Dennett and people like Nagel. Now I realize that not all, in fact not most, qualists are New Mysterians. But New Mysterians are qualists in the strongest sense of the word. Anyways... I hope my (upcoming) reply to looseyourname will clarify my position.