Ultimate question: Why anything at all?

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In summary, the conversation discusses the question of why there is something rather than nothing in the universe. The speaker argues that the probability of nothing existing is essentially zero, which explains why the universe exists. However, this argument is not entirely convincing and other perspectives, such as the Taoist belief that the concepts of something and nothing are relative and contextual, are also considered. Overall, the question remains a philosophical one with no definite answer.
  • #386
Thank you DeMystifier. Unfortunately I do not have time to open a new thread but eagerly await a specific paper and reference in which you or someone else explains how the Bohmian model successfully deals with coherent states since I did not find it in your paper on relativistic Bohmian theory which is where the issue was raised. Feel free to send this to me privately if you wish, thanks, RK
 
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  • #387
Hi again!
I think we should seek out our common ground...That we are discussing Goedel is because you evaded my solution of the Liar Paradox. At a point when you were not sure I was serious, and not certain if you really should bother to understand in detail what I was saying :)
Ken G said:
The translated arithmetic is just arithmetic, it can be no more or less inconsistent than arithmetic itself. It is an arithmetical statement that, if a proof could be found that the statement was true as an arithmetic statement, it would demonstrate conclusively and without doubt that arithmetic is inconsistent. Hence, if we assume arithmetic is not inconsistent, we must hold that no proof of that arithmetic statement is possible. That renders the statement empirically true when translated back to English. What all this proves is that it is impossible to make a seamless transition from the syntax of arithmetic to the semantics that we wish to associate with arithmetic to lift it out of the rules of pure logic and bring it into contact with the truths that actually make arithmetic useful and are why we teach it in school.
The Goedel statement is in a formal language, and if it really is there and its correct translation to english is a self referent sentence then there must somewhere be a referential identity defining the goedel sentence! And that Referential identity must be a Liar Identity, and therefore the rules of logic has been broken!

Ken G said:
In other words, your method of removing the paradox
Hey! I like that: You are the first to admit that I have a method! But it SOLVES not "removes" the paradox.
Ken G said:
In other words, your method of removing the paradox]does not remove the purpose of the Godel theorems. Arithmetic is still either incomplete or inconsistent whenever we attempt to marry syntax and semantics, which is the ultimate goal of arithmetic. It doesn't really matter if logic is saved or not, it is the purpose of logic that is under attack, and it seems to have no defense other than arithmetic serves its purpose and we can continue to assume it is consistent, even if it includes semantically true statements that are logically decidable.
Er... don't you mean UNdecidable?
Ken G said:
The alternative is that arithmetic is inconsistent (either because its axioms are or because logic isn't what it's cracked up to be), which seems far worse and we will never accept that unless we have to. Saving logic is a footnote to all that, it just rules out that last possibility in the parentheses.Most people regard the Godel sentence as satisfying both roles at once-- it is a liar sentence, and by being a liar sentence, it is a liar identity, because it refers to itself. Your liar identity is nothing but the explicit recognition that the Godel sentence is self-referential, which most people take as implicit in the Godel sentence. I realize that you are being more careful to explicitly separate the sentence from its self-referential character, but everyone agrees that the self-referential character is the troublesome part, not the sentence itself.f.
This is not true! "by being a liar sentence, it is a liar identity, because it refers to itself."
No liar sentence is identical to its liar identity! And no liar sentence is defined unless its liar identity exists (and is true and well formed).

Ken G said:
It would be easy enough to rule out self-referential statements on the grounds that their self-referential character is not well posed,
No I have shown that their self-referential character is well defined!
Ken G said:
but the Godel proof circumvents that by translating the sentence into arithmetic, so it cannot be ruled out as an arithmetic statement.
This was not necessary...
Ken G said:
This shows that the problem appears when we attempt to attach semantic meaning to arithmetic statements, but that's the whole point of arithmetic,
Here your statement has at least two interpretations...And next is your conclusion...Hmmm...And Again...Hmmmm!
Ken G said:
so the Godel proof is indeed a valid limitation on what we would like arithemetic to be. That limitation is normally expressed that we must regard arithmetic as incomplete, if we want it to be consistent, and if we want to attach semantic meaning to syntactic sentences.
So I can't follow you here...I just declare that I oppose.

Ken G said:
Sure, you recover a syntactic structure by disassociating it with any semantic content. But the issue behind the Godel proof, and paradoxes in general, is the effort to connect syntax with semantics. It is easy to prove that the syntax defines a consistent tautology, what is at issue is whether or not we encounter difficulties when attaching semantic meaning to the syntax. It was hoped we would not, Godel proved that we do. That is also the "point" of a true paradox, to expose the difficulties in attaching semantics to any sufficiently rich syntactic structure.
And the same here...Sigh... it was interesting!

Hopefully you will gather your forces so I can attack! You are defending Goedel and I am after his scalp ;)
Meanwhile I suggest we seek out common ground, or at least a well defined battleground...
Alfred Tarski for instance: He said that natural languages (and all semantically closed languages) are inconsistent because the Liar Paradox can be derived in them, And I oppose! No Liar Paradox can be derived in natural language without breaking the rules of Logic!

Heres my proof again:

Proof (Based on: (a=b) implies (Ta<-->Tb) )

1. Suppose x="x is not true" (assumption)

2. Then x is true if and only if "x is not true" is true (from 1)

3. And we get: x is true if and only if x is not true (from 2)

4. Sentence 3 contradicts the assumption. (QED)

How can the proof be contradicted? By denying the step from 1 to 2?

That is costly! But in case somebody tries...I will provide an independent proof:

First by the Law of Identity:
1 x = x

Next by Double negation of 1:
2 it is not the case that x = "x is not true"

So is it agreed then, that all Liar Identities are logically false!?

And that no contradiction can be correctly derived from:

1 Sentence 1 is not true. (Liar Sentence)
2 Sentence 1 = "Sentence 1 is not true." (Liar Identity)

Meaning no Liar Paradox can be derived with valid means in Natural Language?

Goodby Liar Sentences! Goodby Liar Paradox!
 
  • #388
Ken G said:
This is a valid question, and a long thread, so I don't know if it was taken up. But I think it's fair to include, with the question "why does anything exist?", the question "why ask why in the first place?"

It is a key question because it gets us to our epistemological limits - or rather the limits of a certain epistemology!

This may be why people get uncomfortable. They feel secure in having a method of accounting for the world. Then they discover it suddenly runs out of road. The choice then is either to honestly question their prior beliefs or to declare any further explorations as "unanswerable questions" or "abstract nonsense".

This is what you so clearly state about syntactic paradoxes. You have a universal method for making well-formed statements. And suddenly there is a crisis because - as with the liar paradox - it hits a limit.

And also in the other off-thread conversation about Bohmian interpretations. Again there is a belief in a method of explanation that hits a limit (and Bohmian mechanics is where people just keep digging anyway).

So there are these well-accepted foundational crises in Godelian incompleteness and Quantum weirdness. And I should mention here the Hard Problem which is taken as the foundational crisis of mind science. Yet for some reason the "why anything" question is being treated by some here as not also a standard foundational crisis.

What the "why anything" question in particular draws attention to is the incompleteness of models of causality based on effective cause - the idea that every event is the result of a chain of events. In physics, this "syntax" gives us the various mechanics, the various models founded on the principle of locality. All useful models, but all limited by the ultimate restrictions of their syntax and unable to talk about the larger semantics that so clearly embeds them.

So when confronted by the "why anything?" paradox, there are two lessons.

The first is the discovery that a familiar epistemology does indeed have hard limits. For it, some questions don't even compute. It finds itself making nonsensical statements about "nothing existing" - well-formed statements, but clearly detached from any proper semantic grounding.

The second lesson ought to be that causality is larger than people stuck within a certain paradigm may have believed it to be. And so the correct response is to explore those larger models, hoping to find the syntax that can unlock that semantics. Is there a better way to talk about reality which brings the two parts of the epistemological method - models and their measurements, ideas and their impressions, syntax and their semantics - back into an orderly relationship?

But it still is a curious situation. Why does the "why anything?" question provoke hostility to a much greater degree than Godelian incompleteness or Quantum weirdness.

I suppose with Godel, people might take comfort in the fact it proves we are smarter than our logics (Penrose's position for example). And maths could carry on producing more maths regardless. It was seen as a problem about where maths came from rather than where it was going.

With Quantum weirdness, many people perhaps are comforted by the feeling that eventually it will get explained away. They will be able to make a locality-preserving explanation stick. They will be able to break through the Planck-scale and unify QFT and GR. Although also there is the counter-fact that QM is just so concretely successful as a model. It actually can be used for making technology. So all the metaphysical challenges can be shoved aside, as in the Copenhagen interpretation, and the method simply employed - a case of using the syntax without worrying about the embedding semantics. Although, as has been mentioned, logical positivism or scientific pragmatism is still a definite philolosophy.

But the "why anything" question gets people's goats. Maybe this is because it seems quasi-religious - it was a reason that gods and other kinds of prime movers were invented. Yet actually even a cursory examination of the question shows that god-style explanations fail as just another variant of effective cause reasoning.

So maybe its time has not properly come? Cosmology is quite a new science really. People are still working through the motions of trying to conjure something out of nothingness, as with the tunnelling out of a quantum vacuum. They are still hoping to demonstrate reality as a necessary mathematical fact, as with string theory, or alternatively, reduce it to some ultimate mathematical contingency, as with Tegmark's multiverse.

Science looks busy in this area. And so there is hope. And when the foundational crisis - the lack of semantic content in apparently well-formed statements like "nothing exists" - is pointed out, the response switches to "oh well, limits are limits, whereof what we cannot speak, thereof we should remain silent, etc." Shush child, don't mention the emperor forgot his pants.
 
  • #389
sigurdW said:
Alfred Tarski for instance: He said that natural languages (and all semantically closed languages) are inconsistent because the Liar Paradox can be derived in them, And I oppose! No Liar Paradox can be derived in natural language without breaking the rules of Logic!
But those two things are saying the same thing: a language is not consistent with logic because it allows a liar sentence to be constructed. The liar sentence is self-referential, which breaks the rules of logic. You claim that a language cannot break the rule of logic because the liar sentence is not self-referential. But it clearly is self-referential, and this has nothing at all to do with logic, it has to do with meaning. The goal of language is to infuse syntax with meaning, so for language to succeed, logic must fail, or vice versa. That's all Tarski is saying as well, you are not disagreeing-- you are merely choosing a different side in the conflict (logic over meaning), but it is the existence of the conflict that is relevant, not which side we choose.
 
  • #390
Hi apeiron!
apeiron said:
It is a key question because it gets us to our epistemological limits - or rather the limits of a certain epistemology!
I can accept this as a thesis,but its not very supported.

apeiron said:
This may be why people get uncomfortable. They feel secure in having a method of accounting for the world. Then they discover it suddenly runs out of road. The choice then is either to honestly question their prior beliefs or to declare any further explorations as "unanswerable questions" or "abstract nonsense".

This is what you so clearly state about syntactic paradoxes. You have a universal method for making well-formed statements. And suddenly there is a crisis because - as with the liar paradox - it hits a limit.
Ahem...I thought it was sentences supposed to express statements that could be or not be well formed?

apeiron said:
And also in the other off-thread conversation about Bohmian interpretations. Again there is a belief in a method of explanation that hits a limit (and Bohmian mechanics is where people just keep digging anyway).
And what is an "off-thread conversation?

apeiron said:
So there are these well-accepted foundational crises in Godelian incompleteness and Quantum weirdness. And I should mention here the Hard Problem which is taken as the foundational crisis of mind science. Yet for some reason the "why anything" question is being treated by some here as not also a standard foundational crisis.
Why "crisis", isn't "problem" enough?

apeiron said:
What the "why anything" question in particular draws attention to is the incompleteness of models of causality based on effective cause - the idea that every event is the result of a chain of events. In physics, this "syntax" gives us the various mechanics, the various models founded on the principle of locality. All useful models, but all limited by the ultimate restrictions of their syntax and unable to talk about the larger semantics that so clearly embeds them.
Sorry but "clearly" youre unclear.

apeiron said:
So when confronted by the "why anything?" paradox, there are two lessons.

The first is the discovery that a familiar epistemology does indeed have hard limits. For it, some questions don't even compute. It finds itself making nonsensical statements about "nothing existing" - well-formed statements, but clearly detached from any proper semantic grounding.
I think your tecnique can be improved, why not try giving some examples now and then?

apeiron said:
The second lesson ought to be that causality is larger than people stuck within a certain paradigm may have believed it to be. And so the correct response is to explore those larger models, hoping to find the syntax that can unlock that semantics. Is there a better way to talk about reality which brings the two parts of the epistemological method - models and their measurements, ideas and their impressions, syntax and their semantics - back into an orderly relationship?
I wait eagerly for your results in exploring

apeiron said:
But it still is a curious situation. Why does the "why anything?" question provoke hostility to a much greater degree than Godelian incompleteness or Quantum weirdness.

I suppose with Godel, people might take comfort in the fact it proves we are smarter than our logics (Penrose's position for example).
Nope. No fact! Goedel did prove a conjunction... an either or statement.
apeiron said:
And maths could carry on producing more maths regardless.
First time we agree.
apeiron said:
It was seen as a problem about where maths came from rather than where it was going.

With Quantum weirdness, many people perhaps are comforted by the feeling that eventually it will get explained away. They will be able to make a locality-preserving explanation stick. They will be able to break through the Planck-scale and unify QFT and GR. Although also there is the counter-fact that QM is just so concretely successful as a model. It actually can be used for making technology. So all the metaphysical challenges can be shoved aside, as in the Copenhagen interpretation, and the method simply employed - a case of using the syntax without worrying about the embedding semantics. Although, as has been mentioned, logical positivism or scientific pragmatism is still a definite philolosophy.
Lol!

apeiron said:
But the "why anything" question gets people's goats. Maybe this is because it seems quasi-religious - it was a reason that gods and other kinds of prime movers were invented. Yet actually even a cursory examination of the question shows that god-style explanations fail as just another variant of effective cause reasoning.

So maybe its time has not properly come? Cosmology is quite a new science really. People are still working through the motions of trying to conjure something out of nothingness, as with the tunnelling out of a quantum vacuum. They are still hoping to demonstrate reality as a necessary mathematical fact, as with string theory, or alternatively, reduce it to some ultimate mathematical contingency, as with Tegmark's multiverse.
Anybodys guess?

apeiron said:
Science looks busy in this area. And so there is hope. And when the foundational crisis - the lack of semantic content in apparently well-formed statements like "nothing exists" - is pointed out, the response switches to "oh well, limits are limits, whereof what we cannot speak, thereof we should remain silent, etc." Shush child, don't mention the emperor forgot his pants.
I would like to know what you mean by: the lack of semantic content in apparently well-formed statements like "nothing exists"

To sum up: What are you saying and why are you saying it?
 
  • #391
Ken G said:
But those two things are saying the same thing: a language is not consistent with logic because it allows a liar sentence to be constructed. The liar sentence is self-referential, which breaks the rules of logic. You claim that a language cannot break the rule of logic because the liar sentence is not self-referential. But it clearly is self-referential, and this has nothing at all to do with logic, it has to do with meaning. The goal of language is to infuse syntax with meaning, so for language to succeed, logic must fail, or vice versa. That's all Tarski is saying as well, you are not disagreeing-- you are merely choosing a different side in the conflict (logic over meaning), but it is the existence of the conflict that is relevant, not which side we choose.
Damn its late...Just a few comments now and the
full statement tomorrow.
First: Your statement that "The liar sentence is self-referential, which breaks the rules of logic." At the time of Tarski Logic was Classical logic allowing self reference! Again: At the time there was no no breach of logic if a sentence was self referent. Now they are excluded so now is different.

second: Nah I give up for tonight your statements needs careful commenting ...cya tomorrow :)
 
  • #392
sigurdW said:
First: Your statement that "The liar sentence is self-referential, which breaks the rules of logic." At the time of Tarski Logic was Classical logic allowing self reference! Again: At the time there was no no breach of logic if a sentence was self referent. Now they are excluded so now is different.
There was always the freedom to adjust logic, it doesn't matter what version is used-- the problem is not resolvable by changing logic. If we allow self-reference in logic, then logic itself is what is broken. If we don't, we can save logic, but the connection with the semantics of language is still broken in the way I mentioned above. Either way, we cannot have a system that does everything we'd like, and that is the fundamental issue-- which evil we choose as the lesser when faced with these limitations is a subjective matter, what we must acknowledge is the existence of the limitation.
 
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  • #393
sigurdW said:
apeiron said:
What the "why anything" question in particular draws attention to is the incompleteness of models of causality based on effective cause - the idea that every event is the result of a chain of events. In physics, this "syntax" gives us the various mechanics, the various models founded on the principle of locality. All useful models, but all limited by the ultimate restrictions of their syntax and unable to talk about the larger semantics that so clearly embeds them.
Sorry but "clearly" youre unclear.
Actually I thought that was pretty clear, so let me give you my understanding of what that means. The reductionist approach to physics, where we break everything down to its smallest parts and try to understand the action of everything in terms of elementary interactions between those parts, can be thought of as a kind of syntactic approach. We are trying to understand nature by understanding her syntax, a chain of local causes adding up to one big Cause. But the word "understand" implies a semantic content, which seems impossible to obtain by consideration of pure syntax, just as you could not understand this sentence by analyzing how letters combine to form words or how words are ordered in a sentence. You must have experience, something global or transcendant, to reference, in order to have any hope of following the collisions of meaning in this sentence. An understanding of nature may require similar higher-level processing techniques.
sigurdW said:
I think your tecnique can be improved, why not try giving some examples now and then?
You said this right after he did give an example. The example was the statement "nothing exists." That's an example of a syntactically well formed statement, which, in a perfect world, would allow its semantic elements to merge in a semantically meaningful way. But we know that doesn't always happen. Lesser difficulties emerge from statements like "green is hot", which require a rather special context to avoid being nonsense. But "nothing exists" seems to assert a claim that is not sheer nonsense, but it encounters semantic bugbears if we dig into it. It confronts us with the problem that our words might not really mean anything in any kind of absolute or unimpeachable way, we find that language is itself a kind of bumbling collision of ideas that somehow manages to make sense but is not guaranteed to be well founded.
 
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  • #394
Ken G said:
Actually I thought that was pretty clear, so let me give you my understanding of what that means. The reductionist approach to physics, where we break everything down to its smallest parts and try to understand the action of everything in terms of elementary interactions between those parts, can be thought of as a kind of syntactic approach. We are trying to understand nature by understanding her syntax, a chain of local causes adding up to one big Cause. But the word "understand" implies a semantic content, which seems impossible to obtain by consideration of pure syntax, just as you could not understand this sentence by analyzing how letters combine to form words or how words are ordered in a sentence. You must have experience, something global or transcendant, to reference, in order to have any hope of following the collisions of meaning in this sentence. An understanding of nature may require similar higher-level processing techniques.You said this right after he did give an example. The example was the statement "nothing exists." That's an example of a syntactically well formed statement, which, in a perfect world, would allow its semantic elements to merge in a semantically meaningful way. But we know that doesn't always happen. Lesser difficulties emerge from statements like "green is hot", which require a rather special context to avoid being nonsense. But "nothing exists" seems to assert a claim that is not sheer nonsense, but it encounters semantic bugbears if we dig into it. It confronts us with the problem that our words might not really mean anything in any kind of absolute or unimpeachable way, we find that language is itself a kind of bumbling collision of ideas that somehow manages to make sense but is not guaranteed to be well founded.
The sentence "nothing exists" has two interpretations: it might mean that there is an object called "nothing" and that said object does not exist, or it means that for any object x then x does not exist. Its a question of how language works, to extend concepts of language to apply to nature seems a risky business. Analogue thinking should be avoided if possible.
Also I feel uncomfortable with the concept "syntax" it seems to have to do with joining together words irrespectively of their meanings... but isn't meaning indirectly involved? Words are sorted into classes. And how is that done? Mustnt it be decided by what the word means or how it functions? All I am saying is that we should avoid trouble, and speaking of the syntax and semantics of...say...molecules invites it. So when you call the sentence "nothing exists" syntactically well formed my reaction is...
Is It? So what use is there in having the concept of "syntax" if it can't spot there's something wrong with the sentence?

Connected with this is the idea that the meaning of a sentence depend on its constituents and only on its constituents: Read the following : "You are reading this text." When you read it the sentence is true, but left alone it is not true. The truth and therefore perhaps also the meaning of the sentence depends of something not within the sentence. Understanding and explaining the basic behaviour of sentences is no easy matter...I think.

So my initial reaction is that the sentence" Why anything at all?" is not well formed. The word "is" is missing but including it: "Why is anything at all" doesn't makes me much happier, for "obvious" reasons. We need to really understand the foundations of semantics and logic. The rest of Reality must wait!

I think most of the efforts in this thread is directed towards a certain narrow interpretation of the topic question: Why is there a physical reality? Its nothing really wrong in that...its a tremendous question indeed. But depending of what is meant by the missing word "is"... It raises the question: Why is there truths? Would there be truths even if there were no reality?
And there I think I see some hope: Surely something must be the case here!

Maybe what really is meant by the topic question is something like the following:

Is there among the possibilities of how things could be a possibility where the correct answer to all and any question is no?
And the answere is: NO! (Unless you accept a contradiction as a possibility.)
 
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  • #395
sigurdW said:
The sentence "nothing exists" has two interpretations: it might mean that there is an object called "nothing" and that said object does not exist, or it means that for any object x then x does not exist.
It could probably mean a hundred somewhat different things, in fact. Those are two, but there's also meanings like, the term existence is unclear enough that we cannot assert that anything does it. But that might also mean we cannot assert that for any x that x does not exist because we just can't tell. Or, maybe we think the word "exists" is perfectly clear, but the term "thing" is giving the problem and cannot be associated in an unambiguous way with the clear notion of "existence". So if that were the meaning, it would be more like "no things exist," but maybe ideas do, or maybe Platonic forms do, but they are not regarded as things.

So this is the point-- language is just plain not clear, and this is an important feature of language, because to be completely clear is to be completely necessary, but that is not saying anything worthwhile, it's not flexible or provisional or context-dependent-- so it's also not useful or responsive or alive.

Its a question of how language works, to extend concepts of language to apply to nature seems a risky business.
Yes, it is risky, and this is its purpose. It is supposed to be risky, attempting to communicate involves taking risks. I'd say this very thread makes that clear enough! And attempting to communicate about nature is also risky, because we know we will never completely succeed, but we do have our small victories.
Analogue thinking should be avoided if possible.
On the contrary, that's what thinking is. All thought that is expressed in language is analog thinking, because all language involves drawing analogies, that's exactly what semantics means.
Also I feel uncomfortable with the concept "syntax" it seems to have to do with joining together words irrespectively of their meanings... but isn't meaning indirectly involved?
The purpose of the term "syntax" is to focus on the structure separately from the meaning. So no, meaning is not involved, to whatever extent that separation can be made. That the separation is artificial is a big part of what I've been saying.

So what use is there in having the concept of "syntax" if it can't spot there's something wrong with the sentence?
The syntax of "nothing exists" is noun-verb. If it doesn't have that syntax, that's how we spot something wrong. Whether or not that noun goes with that verb, or what it means when those words collide, is a matter of semantics, and that's where language gets tricky. That's also where mathematical logic gets tricky-- when we want the mathematical constructs to mean something, not just be correctly syntactically combined.
Read the following : "You are reading this text." When you read it the sentence is true, but left alone it is not true. The truth and therefore perhaps also the meaning of the sentence depends of something not within the sentence.
Sure, that's common in language: "my name is Ken," or "it is raining now." These statements are contextual, provisional, and goal-oriented-- which is common for semantic usefulness.
 
  • #396
Ken G said:
If we allow self-reference in logic, then logic itself is what is broken.
No! It is ok with selfreference, it does not make logic inconsistent.
But I think we should discuss that question in a thread about it: How to solve the Liar Paradox.
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=586013 check #38

(Also I think Smullyan has written a treatise on self reference but I haven't read it yet.)
 
  • #397
hi i am trying to understand the quantum mechanics many world theory / interpretation. do the alternate universes split off from only our universe as if this universe is the initial universe from which all others derive or do other universes split off in billions of ways at once as well? also are our conciousness' allowed to travel among these alternative universes or is the conciousness set on one univese and in the billions of universes spliting off from our universe or the other universes another completely new conciousness formed.
 
  • #398
pm97112, you probably sholdn't ask that on this thread, it has nothing to do with the thread.
 
  • #399
bohm2 said:
Why there is something rather than nothing?
The topic is Ancient! A fellow named Parmenides
gave around three thousand years ago
a satisfactory treatment of the problem.

He claimed that the statement:" Nothing is." is self contradictory and therefore not true!
Not much of his texts have survived only the claim but not the proof so let's try ourselves:

We begin by firmly claiming that: Nothing is!
Eh... we are saying that it indeed is so that nothing is!
Oh! Arent we saying that it IS so that it is SO that nothing is?
We are actually saying that something IS when we are saying that nothing is!
But if something is... then nothing is not...
So it is really so that we have proved that something is and nothing is not.

If we change the tense used in the proof
we can likewise prove that nothing was not
and that nothing will never be.

This is Logic as Ancient as we can trace it
 
  • #400
sigurdW said:
The topic is Ancient! A fellow named Parmenides
gave around three thousand years ago a satisfactory treatment of the problem.
He claimed that the statement:" Nothing is." is self contradictory and therefore not true!
What about this indirect subtraction argument against this position posted in post 114 and mentioned in the Rickles piece:
Metaphysical nihilism (MN)

1. There is a world with a finite number n of concrete objects (accessible from our own: i.e. possible relative to ours). Call this world wn.
2. The existence of any object o in wn is contingent.
3. The non-existence of o does not imply the existence of another object o'.
4. There is a world, wn-1, accessible from wn containing exactly one less object than wn. There is a world accessible from wn-1, w(n-1)-1, containing exactly one less object than wn-1.
5. By iterating the above procedure (i.e. by repeated ‘subtractions’) we arrive at a world wn-m = wmin, accessible from wn, that contains exactly one object.
6. Therefore, by steps 2, 3, 4, from wmin there is an accessible world, wnil = wn-m-1, containing no objects at all (= MN).
On Explaining Existence
http://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Rickles_Rickles_fqxi_2.pdf
 
  • #401
i think, why something ?
please let me delve...

Substance = Object = Things
latin
substantia:‘something that stands under or grounds things’

foundational or fundamental entities of reality.

entities = objectssubstances (objects) are distinct from their properties.
properties are just predicates of objects, not the substance itself.
(Being objects of predication but not being themselves predicable of anything else)
i.e. paradigm subjects of predication and bearers of properties.

Bare particular:
is the element without which the object would not exist, that is, its substance, which exists independent from its properties.

Inherence relation:
inherent relation of property with the object.

two types of predicables:
what is ‘said of’ objects (i.e red apple) and that which are ‘in’ objects (the apple is on the table)

substance play an irreducible and ineliminable explanatory (reductive definition but not by physical causes), a fundamental efficient cause by its own.
Metaphysical nihilism (MN)

1. There is a world with a finite number n of concrete objects (accessible from our own: i.e. possible relative to ours). Call this world wn.
2. The existence of any object o in wn is contingent.
3. The non-existence of o does not imply the existence of another object o'.
4. There is a world, wn-1, accessible from wn containing exactly one less object than wn. There is a world accessible from wn-1, w(n-1)-1, containing exactly one less object than wn-1.
5. By iterating the above procedure (i.e. by repeated ‘subtractions’) we arrive at a world wn-m = wmin, accessible from wn, that contains exactly one object.
6. Therefore, by steps 2, 3, 4, from wmin there is an accessible world, wnil = wn-m-1, containing no objects at all (= MN).

hmm.. very similar to.

cosmological argument

1. A contingent being (a being that if it exists can not-exist) exists.
2. This contingent being has a cause of or explanation for its existence.
3. The cause of or explanation for its existence is something other than the contingent being itself.
4. What causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must either be solely other contingent beings or include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
5. Contingent beings alone cannot provide an adequate causal account or explanation for the existence of a contingent being.
6. Therefore, what causes or explains the existence of this contingent being must include a non-contingent (necessary) being.
7. Therefore, a necessary being (a being that if it exists cannot not-exist) exists.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/
 
  • #402
audioloop said:
hmm.. very similar to. cosmological argument
I don't see the similarity.
 
  • #403
bohm2 said:
I don't see the similarity.

not teleologically, just on the same footing "Contingency".
 
  • #404
MarcoD said:
No. By similar reasoning, the number 3 cannot exist since on a scale of real numbers, it has probability 0 of existing.

Sorry for backtracking a thought post mortem, but I just wanted to clear up any fallacies that the original author directed through his/her reasoning. (if this post is not allowed by the standard regulations, just edit/delete it please)

The set of real numbers (shorthand being R) implies the number 3. Probability doesn't work in determining why a certain number exists; of course, we could deform and reform it, but the underlying concepts and overlapping culture would still be untransformed - they would be necessarily identical. Likewise, any subset of a set is automatically granted providing the admission of sets it necessarily pertains to. In problems whence a subset merely _can_ pertain to a collective set (like whether possibility Y exists in system A), then you can apply probability to ascertain the plausibility of certain propositions

On the one hand, the existence of a universe, having many different forms, seems highly probable, but is merely a single possibility out of a massive deluge as engulfing the entirety of human thought. On the other hand, the existence of 3 (or III and '...') is a necessary condition of set R in which case it is an implication of set R. Thus, the criticism fails

However, although one hurdle has been cleared for vacancy in regards to preliminary plausibility, I would argue that there are many more pitfalls to evaluate and thereafter evacuate before excavation can even ensue in pursuit of life's finer pleasures - that of self-sustained understanding.

For one, although there are many different universes and only one state of nonexistance, there are only two contiguities in the constitution of reality - universes, although they may be diverse in development, by execution of emergence, only have one engine of design to match chemistry with. If the universe was created, let's say, then there is only one way that could've happened. It's likw how there are many different books all with different authors and different publishers, but how the books are basically all made the same way - namely via the machinery of the printing press. So, we've reduced the probability of the universe existing to only 1/2 with the chance of the universe existing at all to be equal to the probability of the university being a null set- there is roughly a 50/50 distribution.

As the conclusion forbears no preference for either one of the selected propositons in mind, we can only rationalize that the universe could've existed or not, but can't quite round off the edges in explaining why it came into being- even if simply by mathematical acrobatics.

On that leave, the very existence of the universe is a very interesting thing indeed. By far, "the most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible" - in this case, we depart from that aphorism to terra incognita.
 
  • #405
Seems everybody (including myself) got tired of arguing ;)
I will probably return to argue since I think the questions raised were good questions
and my opponents were serious and honest opposers. There has not been any ad hominem argumenting for example.

The concept of Semantic Content has been mentioned... Perhaps it needs elucidation?
Suppose you write the following on a paper on the table: This paper is on the table.
Its true isn't it? Then hold it in your hand and the same statement is not true.

So: How shall we explain the situation? You will speak about contexts I guess...
I will do essentially the same but in a slightly different way leading to my version of the Theory of Truth
 
  • #406
The reason as to why there is something rather than nothing is because the all is mind; the Universe is mental, meaning that it is consciousness and the way that this energy is focused into form that determines our reality, the greatest goal of them all being perception.
 
  • #407
RaptorWizard said:
The reason as to why there is something rather than nothing is because the all is mind; the Universe is mental, meaning that it is consciousness and the way that this energy is focused into form that determines our reality, the greatest goal of them all being perception.

That doesn't explain why things exist in the first place; it merely hints at the nature of interpretive perception

You're reducing the problem from that of the physical to that of the mental and metaphysical. however, the problem of existence is indifferent to that dichotomy; the phantasms of our haunting have not yet left us in rest. If everything is good, why does good exist? If the universe is only mind, how come the mind exists? Surely, reasoning is not necessary of reality - otherwise, the universe could simply be factored into nothing but the rational in itself and that is certainly untrue
 
  • #408
bohm2 said:
Think of all the possible ways that the world might be, down to every detail. There are infinitely many such possible ways. All these ways seem to be equally probable—which means that the probability of anyone of these infinite possibilities actually occurring seems to be zero, and yet one of them happened. “Now, there’s only one way for there to be Nothing, right?” There are no variants in Nothing; there being Nothing at all is a single state of affairs. And it’s a total state of affairs; that is, it settles everything—every possible proposition has its truth value settled, true or false, usually false, by there being Nothing. So if Nothing is one way for reality to be, and if the total number of ways for reality to be are infinite, and if all such infinite ways are equally probable so that the probability of anyone of them is [essentially] zero, then the probability of ‘there being Nothing’ is also [essentially] zero.” Because there are an infinite number of potential worlds, each specific world would have a zero probability of existing, and because Nothing is only one of these potential worlds—there can be only one kind of Nothing—the probabilily of Nothing existing is zero.


This probability argument bugs me. There are only an infinite number of choices for reality because there is something versus nothing.

So why is it not a 50/50 chance of having something versus having nothing. Why is it that we should include all the possibilities of what reality could be. And who is to say what is not reality is something that could be (or could have been) reality. There is certainly no evidence.
 
  • #409
Diffy said:
This probability argument bugs me. There are only an infinite number of choices for reality because there is something versus nothing.

So why is it not a 50/50 chance of having something versus having nothing. Why is it that we should include all the possibilities of what reality could be. And who is to say what is not reality is something that could be (or could have been) reality. There is certainly no evidence.

Here is a question for you: if you haven't observed something yourself, does that mean it doesn't exist?
 
  • #410
Diffy said:
This probability argument bugs me. There are only an infinite number of choices for reality because there is something versus nothing. So why is it not a 50/50 chance of having something versus having nothing. Why is it that we should include all the possibilities of what reality could be. And who is to say what is not reality is something that could be (or could have been) reality. There is certainly no evidence.
You might want to look at post 180. The authors in those links make the same point you are arguing for, I think. From one of the links in post 180:
When you win the lottery ticket it may be reasonable to infer that other people bought a ticket but, in any case, the very idea of winning a lottery presupposes that other tickets exist and that the winning ticket has been drawn more or less randomly from the collection of tickets. By contrast, our universe being the way it is (“winning the lottery”) does not presuppose that other universes (with different properties) exist-our evidence is simply neutral in this respect. Furthermore, we have no a priori right to presuppose that the values of the parameters characterizing our universe are bestowed on it by some random process-and so no right to presuppose a probability distribution (uniform or otherwise) of the outcomes. Therefore, a judgment of what is natural to infer from our universe being as it is (with us in it) hangs in the air.
 
  • #411
chiro said:
Here is a question for you: if you haven't observed something yourself, does that mean it doesn't exist?

Of course not. But follow my logic here.

If no one has seen something does that mean it doesn't exist?

Of course not, it just means that there isn't a lot of evidence for it existing, is there?

Take any point in history. Moon Landing.

Is it possible that the shuttle carrying them could have crashed?

Yes. We know it is possible because we have observed other shuttle's crash.

Is there a possible reality where the first voyage to the moon with N. Armstrong, crashed?

Yes.

Has anyone observed a reality where this is the case?

No.

So is there strong evidence that this reality exists?

No.

So if there is no strong evidence that all these other realities exist, are we not just looking at the possibility of our reality existing versus nothing?

In my opinion there is just as much evidence supporting the idea that if "reality happens" (whatever the hell that means) that it can only happen in ONE possible way. And it is the way we are experience our world, right now. As there is evidence that reality could happen in any other possible way, where we are all fish, or where the Earth is a cube, or where Gandhi invented the Apple computer.

I'm not an expert, nor have I studied philosophy so forgive me if I make no sense.
 
  • #412
I'm not really saying this from a philosophic view per se (although I'm sure these concepts are in philosophy and are in debate).

All I'm saying is that what we observe is somewhat very narrow when you consider what is to be observed out there if you look at the universe as a whole and consider how much we have not observed not necessarily even through "time" as it were, but also through space.

There is a lot of evidence for patterns in a wide variety of contexts that include the major sciences like biology, chemistry, physics, psychology and the like so the ideas of absolutely anything happening whenever it wants has evidence against that.

However with that being said, it is important to realize that what we observe is just an absolutely tiny and dare I say, almost insignificant part of what is out there waiting to be observed.

A simple mathematical description of this is to consider the subset of all observations that correspond to our own (call it A) where A is a proper subset of U.

If we forget this, we are likely to draw inferences on U only with A in such a strong way that we conclude that A represents U more than it should.

The best way IMO to handle something like this, is just to remember that when we are doing inferencing in any general situation we have two errors.

The first error is that we make a positive inference given that the result is negative and the second is that we make a negative inference given that the result is positive.

When you initially accept that A is a rather small subset of U, then the consideration of the above errors is a lot easier and one can then work backwards from being "super pessimistic" to "more optimistic" as new stuff comes into make the picture that little bit clearer.

It's not that we know nothing absolutely, but that we don't know that much relatively but then again organized knowledge discovery as we know it for our current period of time is not that long.
 
  • #413
Evo said:
This is the kind of question that makes me bang my head on my desk. Why do people spend time on such useless questions? Oh, I know, philosophy asks the questions that don't need to be asked. <bangs head on desk>

Carry on.

I'm OK with whatever inspires people to think.
 
  • #414
FreeMitya said:
I'm OK with whatever inspires people to think.

Ditto.
 
  • #415
Alcatrace IV said:
That doesn't explain why things in the ; it merely hints at the nature of interpretive perception

You're reducing the problem from that of the physical to that of the mental and . however, the problem of existence is indifferent to that dichotomy; the phantasms of our haunting have not yet left us in rest. If everything is good, why does good exist? If is only mind, how come the mind exists? Surely, reasoning is not necessary of - otherwise, could simply be factored into nothing but the rational in itself and that is certainly untrue


well said !
 
  • #416
With regard to why good exists, it's like anything else: you need to a duality to put one thing in perspective.

Good needs to be relative to "not good", nothing relative to "not nothing" and everything else along the same lines.

One can not even analyze, compare, and contrast something let alone to do any kind of analysis on something that has no dual or complement: it's impossible.

Analysis needs a way to make some kind of comparison, and without that comparison there is no way of analysis across the board.

With regards to the mind comment, one thing you might want to do is instead of asking "why" the mind exists, instead ask what would happen if it didn't exist: what would be the alternatives if something did not exist?

This kind of approach that you have tried is basically the hammer and nail situation where if you have a hammer, you treat everything as a nail to hammer in.

The alternative approach is to think about the situation where you didn't have a hammer and then think about what the consequences of such a thing should be instead of intrepreting the nail, screw, or whatever to be in the context of holding a hammer.

Mathematicians do this all the time but in a slightly more subtle way with proof by contradiction, which I think is probably the most important logical principle that has ever been written down.

To prove something, we assume that the opposite is true and try and show that a flaw exists in this model or argument.

Mentally the distinction between this approach the hammer/nail approach may be subtle but it's very far reaching when it comes to general analysis because the person with the hammer is going to miss the whole picture and only get the pixel while the proof by contradiction guy is forced to think about the whole picture (even if done at parts at a time) and if the proof by contradiction guy can't find a fault in the argument, then they are forced to re-evaluate their conclusion.
 
  • #417
This was another interesting argument by this author. He considers 3 possible universe views:

1. Null Possibility
2. All Worlds Hypothesis (e.g. Multiverse)
3. One particular universe

He then argues that option 1 seems less puzzling than option 2 which is less puzzling than option 3:
If all these worlds exist, we can ask why they do. But, compared with most other cosmic possibilities, the All Worlds Hypothesis may leave less that is unexplained. For example, whatever the number of possible worlds that exist, we have the question, ‘Why that number?’ That question would have been least puzzling if the number that existed were none, and the next least arbitrary possibility seems to be that all these worlds exist. With every other cosmic possibility, we have a further question. If ours is the only world, we can ask: ‘Out of all the possible local worlds, why is this the one that exists?’ On any version of the Many Worlds Hypothesis, we have a similar question: ‘Why do just these worlds exist, with these elements and laws?’ But, if all these worlds exist, there is no such further question...

Though the All Worlds Hypothesis avoids certain questions, it is not as simple, or unarbitrary, as the Null Possibility...Of all the cosmic possibilities, the Null Possibility would have needed the least explanation. As Leibniz pointed out, it is much the simplest, and the least arbitrary. And it is the easiest to understand. It can seem mysterious, for example, how things could exist without their existence having some cause, but there cannot be a causal explanation of why the whole Universe, or God, exists. The Null Possibility raises no such problem. If nothing had ever existed, that state of affairs would not have needed to be caused.
Why Anything? Why This?
http://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/phil3600/parfit.pdf [Broken]
 
Last edited by a moderator:
<h2>1. What is the ultimate question: Why anything at all?</h2><p>The ultimate question: Why anything at all? is a philosophical and existential inquiry into the reason for the existence of the universe and all its contents. It questions the very essence of our existence and the purpose behind it.</p><h2>2. Is there a definitive answer to the ultimate question?</h2><p>As a scientist, I believe that the ultimate question does not have a definitive answer. It is a complex and abstract concept that has puzzled philosophers, scientists, and theologians for centuries. However, there are various theories and hypotheses that attempt to provide explanations.</p><h2>3. Can science provide an answer to the ultimate question?</h2><p>Science can provide insights and theories that attempt to explain the existence of the universe and life. However, the ultimate question goes beyond the scope of science as it delves into the realm of philosophy and metaphysics.</p><h2>4. How does the concept of "why anything at all" relate to the Big Bang theory?</h2><p>The Big Bang theory is a scientific explanation for the origin of the universe. It suggests that the universe began as a singularity and expanded rapidly, leading to the formation of galaxies and other celestial bodies. However, the ultimate question of "why anything at all" goes beyond the initial event of the Big Bang and questions the underlying reason for its occurrence.</p><h2>5. Why is the ultimate question important to consider?</h2><p>The ultimate question is important to consider as it allows us to reflect on our existence, our purpose, and our place in the universe. It challenges us to think beyond our everyday lives and encourages us to seek a deeper understanding of the world around us.</p>

1. What is the ultimate question: Why anything at all?

The ultimate question: Why anything at all? is a philosophical and existential inquiry into the reason for the existence of the universe and all its contents. It questions the very essence of our existence and the purpose behind it.

2. Is there a definitive answer to the ultimate question?

As a scientist, I believe that the ultimate question does not have a definitive answer. It is a complex and abstract concept that has puzzled philosophers, scientists, and theologians for centuries. However, there are various theories and hypotheses that attempt to provide explanations.

3. Can science provide an answer to the ultimate question?

Science can provide insights and theories that attempt to explain the existence of the universe and life. However, the ultimate question goes beyond the scope of science as it delves into the realm of philosophy and metaphysics.

4. How does the concept of "why anything at all" relate to the Big Bang theory?

The Big Bang theory is a scientific explanation for the origin of the universe. It suggests that the universe began as a singularity and expanded rapidly, leading to the formation of galaxies and other celestial bodies. However, the ultimate question of "why anything at all" goes beyond the initial event of the Big Bang and questions the underlying reason for its occurrence.

5. Why is the ultimate question important to consider?

The ultimate question is important to consider as it allows us to reflect on our existence, our purpose, and our place in the universe. It challenges us to think beyond our everyday lives and encourages us to seek a deeper understanding of the world around us.

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