Responsibility and Determinism

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In summary, under the account that I am presenting, would is eradicated from the equation altogether now? If one is truly being brain controlled... then one wouldn't know the difference in the aftermath of the decision that he had made unless someone told "one" that one was being directed by a mind control interface device. All one knows is that one's decision is as is... one is not aware that one is being mind controlled... it appears to one to be his own will in action. When one's decisions are taken over by an outside source or albeit some other "power" by manipulation of the "natural" means in which one's brain functions, then
  • #1
moving finger
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Our naïve intuition about responsibility is that we cannot be held responsible if we do not have free will. Under this naïve intuitive account, if I could not have done otherwise than what I did, then I cannot be held responsible for what I did. Such an account is clearly incompatible with determinism, hence the oft-quoted mantra “determinism entails that I am not responsible for my actions”.

I wish to challenge this naïve intuitive view of responsibility. The view I shall put forward is broadly based on the Frankfurt-style cases investigated by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, and on work further developed by Susan Hurley (http://www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley/papers/rria.pdf [Broken])

According to Hurley, what really matters for responsibility is whether we would have done otherwise, if we could have done otherwise. This counterfactual perspective means that if person A, in performing act X, would not have done otherwise (even if she could have done otherwise) then A is responsible for X whether or not she actually could have done otherwise. In other words, the ability to do otherwise (the existence of genuine alternate possibilities) is a red-herring in the assignment of responsibility. The only thing that matters is whether A would have done otherwise, and it is irrelevant whether or not she could have.

Such an account of responsibility is completely compatible with determinism.

I would be interested in the views of other members.

Best Regards
 
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  • #2
What is the difference between would and could? May you please elucidate?
 
  • #3
Outlandish_Existence said:
What is the difference between would and could? May you please elucidate?
I could have done X = it was physically possible for me to do X (but it does not follow that I necessarily would have done X)

Example : Fred was holding a gun, and it was possible for him to shoot John. But though it was possible that Fred could shoot John, shooting John is not something that Fred would (want to) do.

I would have done X = Doing X would be my choice, if I had the choice to do X (but it does not follow that I necessarily have the choice; it does not follow that it is physically possible for me to do X)

Example : Fred is forced, against his will, to shoot John. Fred maintains that he did not want to shoot John, he would have chosen NOT to shoot John if he could have had the choice. But he did not have the choice. Thus Fred is not responsible for shooting John (because he would have chosen not to shoot him, given the choice).

Best Regards
 
  • #4
Can one truly be forced to commit an act against another, against one's own will? Is not to be forced to do an act, an act of giving in? Therefore an act of one's own will... since out of one's own will one has decided to submit to another's will. In spite of everything... it IS one's decision.
 
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  • #5
Outlandish_Existence said:
Can one truly be forced to commit an act against another, against one's own will? Is not to be forced to do an act, an act of giving in? Therefore an act of one's own will... since out of one's own will one has decided to submit to another's will.
If one is physically incapable of doing what one wants to do, yes one can be forced to commit an act against one's will. The classical example is given by so-called Frankfurt-style cases. Here is one example (from Fischer):

Jones is in a voting booth deliberating whether to vote for Bush or Kerry. Unbeknownst to Jones, a neurosurgeon, Black, has implanted a mechanism in Jones's brain that allows Black to monitor Jones's neural states and alter them if need be. Black is a diehard Democrat, and should Black detect neural activity indicating that a choice for Bush is forthcoming, Black is prepared to activate his mechanism to ensure that Jones instead votes for Kerry. As a matter of fact, Jones chooses on his own to vote for Kerry, so Black never intervenes.

In the above case, Jones would thus have ended up voting for Kerry no matter what he (Jones) wanted to do.

Best Regards
 
  • #6
So isn't would eradicated from the equation altogether now? If one is truly being brain controlled... then one wouldn't know the difference in the aftermath of the decision that he had made unless someone told "one" that one was being directed by a mind control interface device. All one knows is that one's decision is as is... one is not aware that one is being mind controlled... it appears to one to be his own will in action. When one's decisions are taken over by an outside source or albeit some other "power" by manipulation of the "natural" means in which one's brain functions, then in one's existence, one's own will now becomes unforced from his own personal perception. Therefore one cannot decipher the "would" of the situation. One experiences the happening as if one has made one's own decision.
 
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  • #7
Outlandish_Existence said:
So isn't would eradicated from the equation altogether now? If one is truly being brain controlled... then one wouldn't know the difference in the aftermath of the decision that he had made unless someone told "one" that one was being directed by a mind control interface device. All one knows is that one's decision is as is... one is not aware that one is being mind controlled... it appears to one to be his own will in action.
In the example given, Jones is not aware, but Black is aware. From Black's point of view (and anyone else outside of Jones who knows the facts), it is possible to say whether Jones was responsible for the act or not - because responsibility follows from what Jones would have done if he had been given the choice (whether or not he actually had any choice), and not from what he actually did.

Indeed, Jones could also be made aware of the outcome subsequent to the episode (Black might tell him what had happened), in which Jones would also then be aware of whether he was responsible for his decision or not.

Best Regards
 
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  • #8
Is a natural yet artificially produced choice not one's will?
 
  • #9
Outlandish_Existence said:
Is a natural yet artificially produced choice not one's will?
isn't an "artificially produced natural" choice an oxymoron?
 
  • #10
I think anything dealing with the term "artificial" should be obliterated :) All things are natural. To answer your question... natural by means of energy... artificial meaning; being that is controlled by an "outside" source.
 
  • #11
Outlandish_Existence said:
I think anything dealing with the term "artificial" should be obliterated :) All things are natural. To answer your question... natural by means of energy... artificial meaning; being that is controlled by an "outside" source.
ok - but you introduced the term "artificial" into the discussion!

are you suggesting that something which is "controlled by an outside source" (ie external to the person) would still count as part of the person's will?

Best Regards
 
  • #12
Yes, I did... poor verbal/written responsibility.

I am saying that the brain is being controlled... yet manipulated by natural means... well, all things 'are' existing by natural means. I think it's a quandary to have such technology. Haha. Give me some time to deliberate on this, Finger.
 
  • #13
moving finger said:
According to Hurley, what really matters for responsibility is whether we would have done otherwise, if we could have done otherwise. This counterfactual perspective means that if person A, in performing act X, would not have done otherwise (even if she could have done otherwise) then A is responsible for X whether or not she actually could have done otherwise. In other words, the ability to do otherwise (the existence of genuine alternate possibilities) is a red-herring in the assignment of responsibility. The only thing that matters is whether A would have done otherwise, and it is irrelevant whether or not she could have.

Such an account of responsibility is completely compatible with determinism.

I would be interested in the views of other members.

Best Regards

I think that he is somewhat mixing emergent layers.
What happens on the physical level of any choice, is not the same as what happens in an agents mind, we need to separate the two.
That's why people who are allegedly "insane" are relieved of their jailtime and rather sent into some institution for the mentally ill, because they were insane and had no choice.
Great simplification aside, my point is that we have created our own world, our perceived world, and this is really all that matters.
Even if someone would prove that "hey guys we are all robots following the physical laws" wouldn't you still feel responsibility inside if you killed someone?
Wouldn't you even ask yourself "did I have a choice?"

The most likely answer from anyone would be "yes I did have a choice!"

I know it's not exactly what you were saying, but I have a feeling that "could" is physical, and "would" is a mental option.
 
  • #14
Outlandish_Existence said:
Yes, I did... poor verbal/written responsibility.

I am saying that the brain is being controlled... yet manipulated by natural means... well, all things 'are' existing by natural means. I think it's a quandary to have such technology. Haha. Give me some time to deliberate on this, Finger.
OK, will do.

Best Regards
 
  • #15
octelcogopod said:
That's why people who are allegedly "insane" are relieved of their jailtime and rather sent into some institution for the mentally ill, because they were insane and had no choice.
I disagree.

Necessary conditions for responsibility are (a) that one can reasonably anticipate the consequences of one’s actions, and (b) that one possesses an understanding of right and wrong.

An insane person, just like a very young child, may not be able to satisfy conditions (a) and/or (b) – and that is why we allow that an insane person, or a very young child, is not responsible for their actions – not because “they had no choice”.

octelcogopod said:
Great simplification aside, my point is that we have created our own world, our perceived world, and this is really all that matters.
Agreed.

octelcogopod said:
Even if someone would prove that "hey guys we are all robots following the physical laws" wouldn't you still feel responsibility inside if you killed someone?
Wouldn't you even ask yourself "did I have a choice?"
Agreed. This is exactly what I mean when I say that responsibility depends on what we would do (if we had a choice), not what we could do.

octelcogopod said:
The most likely answer from anyone would be "yes I did have a choice!"
Of course we think we had a choice. That is not disputed.

octelcogopod said:
I know it's not exactly what you were saying, but I have a feeling that "could" is physical, and "would" is a mental option.
Would does not entail could. We can always ask “what would I have done if X?”, even if X is not a physical possibility. We can never know whether unrealised alternate possibilities were genuine possibilities or not (or just illusions of possibilities), but that doesn’t prevent us from saying “if I could do X, then I would do X”.

Best Regards
 
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  • #16
moving finger said:
According to Hurley, what really matters for responsibility is whether we would have done otherwise, if we could have done otherwise. This counterfactual perspective means that if person A, in performing act X, would not have done otherwise (even if she could have done otherwise) then A is responsible for X whether or not she actually could have done otherwise.

This compatiblist argument falls to counterexamples where the individual's
desires are artificially implanted.

"However, if John were to hypnotise James into being a willing and eager slave whose only desire was to do John's bidding, Hobbes -- but few others -- would say James was free, since he was doing what he wanted. Hobbes' theory seems to miss something, the ability to *choose* what one wants".


In other words, the ability to do otherwise (the existence of genuine alternate possibilities) is a red-herring in the assignment of responsibility. The only thing that matters is whether A would have done otherwise, and it is irrelevant whether or not she could have.

No, because to counter the argumetns form hypnosis, brainwahsing,
etc, an individuals wants have to originate within themselves,
and such origination (naturalistically) require uncaused caused,
i.e. indeterminism.
 
  • #17
Outlandish_Existence said:
Can one truly be forced to commit an act against another, against one's own will? Is not to be forced to do an act, an act of giving in? Therefore an act of one's own will... since out of one's own will one has decided to submit to another's will. In spite of everything... it IS one's decision.

One doesn't have a single desire at a time. If someone
points a gun at your head and makes you rob a bank,
you are doing something against one desire
(the desire to be law-abiding) but in favour of another
(the desire to continue living).

According to one plausible analysis, one's "true" desire
is the one backed up by other, higher desires, desires.
So the dieter has a desire to scoff the cake, but their
true
desire -- they desrie they want to have -- is the desire not to scoff it.
 
  • #18
Tournesol said:
No, because to counter the argumetns form hypnosis, brainwahsing, etc, an individuals wants have to originate within themselves, and such origination (naturalistically) require uncaused caused, i.e. indeterminism.
How can a "want" that originates in indeterminism be the basis for responsibility? By definition, I am not in control of such an indeterministically caused want, therefore cannot be held responsible for it.

Best Regards
 
  • #19
moving finger said:
How can a "want" that originates in indeterminism be the basis for responsibility?

How can a want that originates in determinism be a basis for responsibility?

You are probably appelaig to the "do not pass go" argument, the
idea that there is nothing to an indeterministics choice except
whatever process gernerated it. I my model, choices genreated
by the RIG have to got through the SIS, which is where control lies.
 
  • #20
Tournesol said:
How can a want that originates in determinism be a basis for responsibility?
Precisely in the way that has been described here.

If I do X, whilst believing that Y is an alternate possibility (ie I believe that I could have done Y if I had wanted to), then I am responsible, as long as I can claim that "I would still have done X, even if I could have done Y".

Whether Y is a genuine alternate possibility or not is irrelevant to responsibility, as long as I believe it is an alternate possibility.

Tournesol said:
I my model, choices genreated by the RIG have to got through the SIS, which is where control lies.
The outcome of your model is either deterministic (it is in control) or it is random (it is not in control), depending on the parameters you choose for the model. It has nothing to do with free will.

Best Regards
 
  • #21
MF said:
If I do X, whilst believing that Y is an alternate possibility (ie I believe that I could have done Y if I had wanted to), then I am responsible, as long as I can claim that "I would still have done X, even if I could have done Y".

But if determinism is true, you can only have responsibility
so long as you have the false belief that there are alternative
possibilities. available. So no determinist has moral responsibility..
according to determinsm.
Whether Y is a genuine alternate possibility or not is irrelevant to responsibility, as long as I believe it is an alternate possibility.

You said it!
I my model, choices genreated by the RIG have to got through the SIS, which is where control lies.

The outcome of your model is either deterministic (it is in control) or it is random (it is not in control), depending on the parameters you choose for the model. It has nothing to do with free will.

FW is constitutued by the right combination of parameters. You are using
the Basicness Assumption.
 
  • #22
Tournesol said:
But if determinism is true, you can only have responsibility so long as you have the false belief that there are alternative possibilities. available. So no determinist has moral responsibility..according to determinsm.
Good point, I need to correct that error :yuck:

I unfortunately allowed myself to get diverted from the OP. It is actually the belief in the condition "I would have done X, even if I could have done otherwise" which gives rise to responsibility. I do not need to believe that I could have done otherwise, I only need to believe that "I would have done X, even if I could have done otherwise".

Tournesol said:
FW is constitutued by the right combination of parameters. You are using
the Basicness Assumption.
There is no combination of parameters in your model which results in free will - one either gets determinism, arbitrariness, or an unknown mixture of the two. But not free will.

How would you "test" your model to see whether it really results in free will or not? How would you propose to distinguish the output from determinism, arbitrariness, or an unknown mixture of the two?

Best Regards
 
  • #23
Let’s explain it another way, this time starting from the normal intuitive idea of responsibility.

I would analyse responsibility for an action X in the following way:

Premise 1 : I did X
Premise 2 : I could have done otherwise.
Premise 3 : I believe that “I would have done X, even if I could have done otherwise”
Premise 4 : I understand the reasonably expected consequences of doing X and of doing otherwise, and I have an understanding of right and wrong

(Premise 4 is a natural necessary condition of responsibility that has nothing to do with free will or determinism – we cannot hold an agent responsible for an action if that agent did not have an understanding of right and wrong, or did not understand the reasonably expected consequences of its actions).

Now I define responsibility as : If Premises 1, 3 and 4 are true, then I am responsible for my act X.

Our naïve intuitive view of responsibility would also assume that Premise 2 is true for responsibility to hold. If we assume the truth of Premise 2, the above (I believe) is completely consistent with the libertarian view of responsibility based on free will.

But the truth/falsity of Premise 2 has absolutely no bearing on the issue of responsibility at all. Even if Premise 2 is false, Premises 1, 3 and 4 can still all be true, hence I would still be responsible for my act X.

Best Regards
 
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  • #24
MF said:
I unfortunately allowed myself to get diverted from the OP. It is actually the belief in the condition "I would have done X, even if I could have done otherwise" which gives rise to responsibility. I do not need to believe that I could have done otherwise, I only need to believe that "I would have done X, even if I could have done otherwise".

And the causal history of the desire...hypnosis counterexamples ?


There is no combination of parameters in your model which results in free will - one either gets determinism, arbitrariness, or an unknown mixture of the two. But not free will.


You seem very sure that FW is not a mixture, How can
you be so sure ?

How would you "test" your model to see whether it really results in free will or not?

By performing a concpetual analysis of FW.

How would you propose to distinguish the output from determinism, arbitrariness, or an unknown mixture of the two?

How do you distinguish water from hydorgen and oxygen ?
 
  • #25
Tournesol said:
One doesn't have a single desire at a time. If someone
points a gun at your head and makes you rob a bank,
you are doing something against one desire
(the desire to be law-abiding) but in favour of another
(the desire to continue living).

According to one plausible analysis, one's "true" desire
is the one backed up by other, higher desires, desires.
So the dieter has a desire to scoff the cake, but their
true
desire -- they desrie they want to have -- is the desire not to scoff it.

Here is a what desire is.

Think as you wish to be and you will become that of your desired thoughts, all thoughts are desires and manifest into being, and they are what constitutes the being. Thoughts are the being and the being is the thought. One is whatever that one thinks; the limitation is in the thought of limit.
Every thought is a desire.

If someone points a gun to your head... you have the choice to fight back/be killed... or rob the bank... once you give into robbing the bank, you have made a decision with your own will. Now with your own will/desire/thought you have decided to rob the bank. Your will is yours and no one elses. YOU make your own decisions no matter what the circumstance is... unless of course... you're truly being mind controlled.
 
  • #26
Tournesol said:
And the causal history of the desire...hypnosis counterexamples ?
These are wonderful examples which show (whether free will is true or false) that we cannot necessarily know whether an act follows from original willingness on the part of the agent, or whether the agent has somehow been “manipulated” behind the scenes to do something that they did not actually want to do.

Similar scenarios are the Frankfurt-style cases, of which I gave the example :
Jones is in a voting booth deliberating whether to vote for Bush or Kerry. Unbeknownst to Jones, a neurosurgeon, Black, has implanted a mechanism in Jones's brain that allows Black to monitor Jones's neural states and alter them if need be. Black is a diehard Democrat, and should Black detect neural activity indicating that a choice for Bush is forthcoming, Black is prepared to activate his mechanism to ensure that Jones instead votes for Kerry. As a matter of fact, Jones chooses on his own to vote for Kerry, so Black never intervenes.

Now the reason I posted this example is because Jones is evidently responsible for the decision to vote for Kerry – though Black COULD have intervened and manipulated Jones, he did not have to, since Jones voted for Kerry of his own will. But in fact, unknown to Jones, there is no way that he could NOT have voted for Kerry (because Black would have not allowed him to), thus Jones could not have done otherwise – there were no alternate possibilities open to him (though he did not know that). Jones voted for Kerry thinking to himself “I would still vote for Kerry, even if I could do otherwise”. Jones was responsible for that vote – even though he had (unbeknownst to him) no choice.

The point of these examples is that they show that responsibilty for an action does NOT entail "could have done otherwise", it entails only "I would not have done otherwise, even if I could have done otherwise". If we know exactly what is going on behind the scenes, then we also know whether the agent in question acted of her own will, or whether she was forced to act by some external source (either via hypnosis or neural implants or whatever). But the same examples apply whether one believes in free will or not – even if free will is “true”, we can still play out these kinds of examples – and these examples simply show that it may be the case in certain situations that we simply do not know if people are acting according to their will, or that they are being manipulated - but in either case responsibility entails only that the agent in question did what it did according to its will, responsibility does not entail "could have done otherwise".

So now over to you - what is your point as far as these examples go, Tournesol?

Tournesol said:
You seem very sure that FW is not a mixture, How can you be so sure ?
If you wish to define free will as a mixture of determinism and indeterminism, and indistinguishable from such a mixture, then I have no problem with that – because there is nothing in such a definition which is inconsistent with either determinism or indeterminism But imho that is not what “free will” means to most libertarians.


Quote:
moving finger said:
How would you "test" your model to see whether it really results in free will or not?



Tournesol said:
By performing a concpetual analysis of FW.
OK. Has this been done?

Tournesol said:
How do you distinguish water from hydorgen and oxygen ?
That’s an easy one, Tournesol.
Firstly, let’s establish the principle of “distinguishability”. To distinguish A from B, first define some necessary conditions of each of A and B which are distinguishable. Then test A and B to see whether they meet those particular conditions. However, if the necessary conditions for A are the same as for B, then by definition A and B are indistingusihable.

Now we apply this to water on the one hand, and hydrogen and oxygen (I am assuming a simple mixture of) on the other.
There are many “necessary” conditions for water – we need only choose one or two to ensure distinguishability from our mixture of hydrogen and oxygen. Let’s say “is a liquid at room temperature and pressure”. In the case of a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen we may say “is a gas at room temperature and pressure”.

Neither of these conditions is alone sufficient for us to claim that our sample of water is water, or that our sample of hydrogen and oxygen is a sample of hydrogen and oxygen, but they ARE sufficient to distinguish between water on the one hand, and hydrogen and oxygen on the other.

OK, now over to you. How would you distinguish between genuine free will on the one hand, and a simple but arbitrary mixture of determinism and arbitrariness (what I claim is the output of your Darwinian model) on the other?

Best Regards
 
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  • #28
Outlandish_Existence said:
once you give into robbing the bank, you have made a decision with your own will. Now with your own will/desire/thought you have decided to rob the bank. Your will is yours and no one elses. YOU make your own decisions no matter what the circumstance is... unless of course... you're truly being mind controlled.
I agree with all of this - and none of it entails either "could have done otherwise", or that determinism is false.

All that is entailed by the above is (a) that we have a will and (b) that we are free to act according to that will. If we also believe that we would have so acted even if we could have done otherwise, then it follows that we are responsible for our actions.

Best Regards
 
  • #29
MF said:
And the causal history of the desire...hypnosis counterexamples ?
These are wonderful examples which show (whether free will is true or false) that we cannot necessarily know whether an act follows
from original willingness on the part of the agent, or whether the agent has somehow been “manipulated” behind the scenes to do
something that they did not actually want to do.

We can in principle know about things like neurological manipulation.

There is no reason why a libertarian should accept such counterexamples as examples of genuine FW.

Jones is in a voting booth deliberating whether to vote for Bush or Kerry. Unbeknownst to Jones, a neurosurgeon, Black, has implanted
a mechanism in Jones's brain that allows Black to monitor Jones's neural states and alter them if need be. Black is a diehard
Democrat, and should Black detect neural activity indicating that a choice for Bush is forthcoming, Black is prepared to activate his
mechanism to ensure that Jones instead votes for Kerry. As a matter of fact, Jones chooses on his own to vote for Kerry, so Black
never intervenes.Now the reason I posted this example is because Jones is evidently responsible for the decision to vote for Kerry – though Black
COULD have intervened and manipulated Jones, he did not have to, since Jones voted for Kerry of his own will. But in fact, unknown to
Jones, there is no way that he could NOT have voted for Kerry (because Black would have not allowed him to), thus Jones could not
have done otherwise

UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE HAD ALREADY MADE HIS MADE UP TO VOTE FOR KERRY.

– there were no alternate possibilities open to him (though he did not know that). Jones voted for Kerry thinking
to himself “I would still vote for Kerry, even if I could do otherwise”. Jones was responsible for that vote – even though he had
(unbeknownst to him) no choice.

He was reponsible for it, and it was *his* choice because it was *his* desire, it was
*his* desire, because he could have desired something else.

Frankfurt counterexamples only reinforce the point, which has already been incorporated into the Darwinian theory,
that what is important is the "run up" to the decision.

The point of these examples is that they show that responsibilty for an action does NOT entail "could have done otherwise",

At what point in time ? Could-have-wished otherwise is as important as ever.

it
entails only "I would not have done otherwise, even if I could have done otherwise". If we know exactly what is going on behind the
scenes, then we also know whether the agent in question acted of her own will, or whether she was forced to act by some external
source (either via hypnosis or neural implants or whatever). But the same examples apply whether one believes in free will or not –
even if free will is “true”, we can still play out these kinds of examples – and these examples simply show that it may be the case
in certain situations that we simply do not know if people are acting according to their will, or that they are being manipulated -
but in either case responsibility entails only that the agent in question did what it did according to its will, responsibility does
not entail "could have done otherwise".

If responsibility cannot answer the "Only Some Entities are Credited with Volition", problem without CHDO, CHDO is still necessary.
You seem very sure that FW is not a mixture, How can you be so sure ?
If you wish to define free will as a mixture of determinism and indeterminism, and indistinguishable from such a mixture, then I have
no problem with that – because there is nothing in such a definition which is inconsistent with either determinism or indeterminism
But imho that is not what “free will” means to most libertarians.

I start my argument with a defintion of FW, and my conclusion is compatible with it.

It is important to distinguish between explanation and explanandum. Libertarian
explanations are often supernatural -- we naturalist libertarians are a minority --
and people confusedly think that means the explanandum of FW is supernatural by definition.

At one time, every mental faculty was given a supernatural explanation. As
neurology, computer science, etc, have progressed, that is no longer the case.

It is quite odd that so many people in the present day remain insistent that FW is superrnatural or nothing.

By performing a conceptual analysis of FW.

OK. Has this been done?
By me, yes. My critics don't seem to have an alternative analysis.
OK, now over to you. How would you distinguish between genuine free will on the one hand, and a simple but arbitrary mixture of
determinism and arbitrariness (what I claim is the output of your Darwinian model) on the other?

"Arbitrary" is a straw-man. I go to some lengths to explain how they must be combined.(e.g.: "That does not mean that I think the computer I am using to write this sentence has free will; I see free will as an integral part of human mentality (not as something metahphysically Basic, or Separable), so I would not consider a machine to posess free will unless it could reproduce other aspects of human mentality; and some of the other aspects, such as phenomenal consciousness, pose more of a problem").
 
  • #30
MF, you keep saying things like:

The outcome of your model is either deterministic (it is in control) or it is random (it is not in control . . .

There is no combination of parameters in your model which results in free will - one either gets determinism, arbitrariness, or an unknown mixture of the two.
I fail to see this argument. A 'decision' is rarely, if ever, a single event. We might start weighing choices and act on one, but that choice (generally) is being constantly evaluated, and as newer information becomes available, that information can be acted upon also. Saying we are not in control because of a highly complex, yet random element which is controlled by other decision making elements is rather extreme. I don't see any reason to suggest a random component results in arbitrary or uncontrolled actions.
 
  • #31
moving finger said:
"...what really matters for responsibility is whether we would have done otherwise, if we could have done otherwise.

I agree with that statement.
What I find notable about that statement is the use of the term "if".

In choice decision, it is not enough for a potential alternate choice to be existant. Rather, that alternate choice must also be reasonably viable given the specific circumstances, regardless of its existence within the local frame of reference.
As such, "if we could have done otherwise" is dependent not on the "otherwise", rather whether the "if" portends a reasonably viable circumstantial potential.
 
  • #32
pallidin said:
I agree with that statement.
What I find notable about that statement is the use of the term "if".

In choice decision, it is not enough for a potential alternate choice to be existant. Rather, that alternate choice must also be reasonably viable given the specific circumstances, regardless of its existence within the local frame of reference.
As such, "if we could have done otherwise" is dependent not on the "otherwise", rather whether the "if" portends a reasonably viable circumstantial potential.
I am arguing that it is not necessary for an alternate possibility to exist in order to hold an agent responsible for its action. Check the Frankfurt-style case :

Jones is in a voting booth deliberating whether to vote for Bush or Kerry. Unbeknownst to Jones, a neurosurgeon, Black, has implanted a mechanism in Jones's brain that allows Black to monitor Jones's neural states and alter them if need be. Black is a diehard Democrat, and should Black detect neural activity indicating that a choice for Bush is forthcoming, Black is prepared to activate his mechanism to ensure that Jones instead votes for Kerry. As a matter of fact, Jones chooses on his own to vote for Kerry, so Black never intervenes.

Is Jones responsible for the fact that he voted for Kerry?
Could Jones have not voted for Kerry?

Best Regards
 
  • #33
"I am arguing that it is not necessary for an alternate possibility to exist in order to hold an agent responsible for its action..."

In a court of law(and common sense),that notion is impossible.
For a defendant to be held accountable for actions non-existant in viable choice is ludicrous at best.

The example you gave was of an extreme nature; and clearly holds the distinction of subversion, which is illegal.
 
  • #34
pallidin said:
"I am arguing that it is not necessary for an alternate possibility to exist in order to hold an agent responsible for its action..."

In a court of law(and common sense),that notion is impossible.
For a defendant to be held accountable for actions non-existant in viable choice is ludicrous at best.

The example you gave was of an extreme nature; and clearly holds the distinction of subversion, which is illegal.
Of course the example was of an extreme nature.

Do you deny that Jones is responsible in the Frankfurt example that I gave?

"Common sense" is based on naive intuitive ideas about how the world works - it is not necessarily a reliable guide to logic - as the Frankfurt example demonstrates.

The point is that the example shows the logical possibility that an act need NOT entail alternate possibilities in order to be a responsible act. That point is logically correct.

Best Regards
 
  • #35
"common sense" is the only means of analysiing the genuine
*meaning* of a word -- arguing with artificial defintions is pointless.
You might as well say only red-haired people have FW.
 

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