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Our naïve intuition about responsibility is that we cannot be held responsible if we do not have free will. Under this naïve intuitive account, if I could not have done otherwise than what I did, then I cannot be held responsible for what I did. Such an account is clearly incompatible with determinism, hence the oft-quoted mantra “determinism entails that I am not responsible for my actions”.
I wish to challenge this naïve intuitive view of responsibility. The view I shall put forward is broadly based on the Frankfurt-style cases investigated by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, and on work further developed by Susan Hurley (http://www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley/papers/rria.pdf [Broken])
According to Hurley, what really matters for responsibility is whether we would have done otherwise, if we could have done otherwise. This counterfactual perspective means that if person A, in performing act X, would not have done otherwise (even if she could have done otherwise) then A is responsible for X whether or not she actually could have done otherwise. In other words, the ability to do otherwise (the existence of genuine alternate possibilities) is a red-herring in the assignment of responsibility. The only thing that matters is whether A would have done otherwise, and it is irrelevant whether or not she could have.
Such an account of responsibility is completely compatible with determinism.
I would be interested in the views of other members.
Best Regards
I wish to challenge this naïve intuitive view of responsibility. The view I shall put forward is broadly based on the Frankfurt-style cases investigated by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, and on work further developed by Susan Hurley (http://www.warwick.ac.uk/staff/S.L.Hurley/papers/rria.pdf [Broken])
According to Hurley, what really matters for responsibility is whether we would have done otherwise, if we could have done otherwise. This counterfactual perspective means that if person A, in performing act X, would not have done otherwise (even if she could have done otherwise) then A is responsible for X whether or not she actually could have done otherwise. In other words, the ability to do otherwise (the existence of genuine alternate possibilities) is a red-herring in the assignment of responsibility. The only thing that matters is whether A would have done otherwise, and it is irrelevant whether or not she could have.
Such an account of responsibility is completely compatible with determinism.
I would be interested in the views of other members.
Best Regards
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