Why reductive explanations of consciousness must fail

[hypnagogue]

"At the end of the day, the same criticism applies to any purely physical account of consciousness. For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience. It follows that no mere account of the physical process will tell us why experience arises. The emergence of experience goes beyond what can be derived from physical theory.

Purely physical explanation is well-suited to the explanation of physical structures, explaining macroscopic structures in terms of detailed microstructural constituents; and it provides a satisfying explanation of the performance of functions, accounting for these functions in terms of the physical mechanisms that perform them. This is because a physical account can entail the facts about structures and functions: once the internal details of the physical account are given, the structural and functional properties fall out as an automatic consequence. But the structure and dynamics of physical processes yield only more structure and dynamics, so structures and functions are all we can expect these processes to explain. The facts about experience cannot be an automatic consequence of any physical account, as it is conceptually coherent that any given process could exist without experience. Experience may arise from the physical, but it is not entailed by the physical.

The moral of all this is that you can't explain conscious experience on the cheap. It is a remarkable fact that reductive methods - methods that explain a high-level phenomenon wholly in terms of more basic physical processes - work well in so many domains. In a sense, one can explain most biological and cognitive phenomena on the cheap, in that these phenomena are seen as automatic consequences of more fundamental processes. It would be wonderful if reductive methods could explain experience, too; I hoped for a long time that they might. Unfortunately, there are systematic reasons why these methods must fail. Reductive methods are successful in most domains because what needs explaining in those domains are structures and functions, and these are the kind of thing that a physical account can entail. When it comes to a problem over and above the explanation of structures and functions, these methods are impotent.

This might seem reminiscent of the vitalist claim that no physical account could explain life, but the cases are disanalogous. What drove vitalist skepticism was doubt about whether physical mechanisms could perform the many remarkable functions associated with life, such as complex adaptive behavior and reproduction. The conceptual claim that explanation of functions is what is needed was implicitly accepted, but lacking detailed knowledge of biochemical mechanisms, vitalists doubted whether any physical process could do the job and put forward the hypothesis of the vital spirit as an alternative explanation. Once it turned out that physical processes could perform the relevant functions, vitalist doubts melted away.

With experience, on the other hand, physical explanation of the functions is not in question. The key is instead the conceptual point that the explanation of functions does not suffice for the explanation of experience. This basic conceptual point is not something that further neuroscientific investigation will affect. In a similar way, experience is disanalogous to the élan vital. The vital spirit was put forward as an explanatory posit, in order to explain the relevant functions, and could therefore be discarded when those functions were explained without it. Experience is not an explanatory posit but an explanandum in its own right, and so is not a candidate for this sort of elimination.

It is tempting to note that all sorts of puzzling phenomena have eventually turned out to be explainable in physical terms. But each of these were problems about the observable behavior of physical objects, coming down to problems in the explanation of structures and functions. Because of this, these phenomena have always been the kind of thing that a physical account might explain, even if at some points there have been good reasons to suspect that no such explanation would be forthcoming. The tempting induction from these cases fails in the case of consciousness, which is not a problem about physical structures and functions. The problem of consciousness is puzzling in an entirely different way. An analysis of the problem shows us that conscious experience is just not the kind of thing that a wholly reductive account could succeed in explaining."

- excerpted from "http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html ," by David Chalmers

 

[Jeebus]

"Consciousness appears to be an extremely mysterious phenomenon. It is not clear how a collection of molecules whose chemical composition is not unlike that of a cheese omelet could be aware of anything, to feel pain, or see red, or dream about the future. Quantum mechanics also seems to be very mysterious -- particles going traversing two paths at the same time, for example. So perhaps they are the same mystery. Nobody phrases it that way, of course, but this seems to be a line of intuition that motivates many people. It is often argued that mere neurons could not be conscious or aware, and this seems to be because one can imagine all the working of of a neuron, or even a large group of neurons, without seeing how consciousness could be implicated. But because the mechanisms underlying quantum mechanical phenomena are less viaualizable, or comprehensible, or whatever, it seems not to be as clear that something as mysterious as consciousness couldn't work its way into the machine somehow. Clearly, this intuition survives only as long as the mechanisms of quantum mechanics are mysterious to the person making the argument."

---Rick Grush

Chalmers once said: The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:


-the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
-the integration of information by a cognitive system;
-the reportability of mental states;
-the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
-the focus of attention;
-the deliberate control of behavior;
-the difference between wakefulness and sleep.

I just have one question. How would this correlate with the undeniable existence that some organisms are subjects of experience and that cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, while qualia and other emotions avoid ambiguity of the "consciousness" of an organism?

I know Chalmers discussed this before but I can't remember where or when. The only thing I could think of was Chalmers discussing "the subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities..."

Can you help? Or speak for him?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Jeebus
I just have one question. How would this correlate with the undeniable existence that some organisms are subjects of experience and that cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, while qualia and other emotions avoid ambiguity of the "consciousness" of an organism?

I'm afraid I don't quite understand the question. Rephrase?

 

[Jeebus]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I'm afraid I don't quite understand the question. Rephrase?

Let me try again.

Chalmers once said: The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:

-the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
-the integration of information by a cognitive system;
-the reportability of mental states;
-the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
-the focus of attention;
-the deliberate control of behavior;
-the difference between wakefulness and sleep.

The initial question is basically: How would these seven problems correlate to, let's say, an organism. Since organisms aren't really cognitive systems and don't really 'hold' in visual and auditory informational processing -- how would organisms fit into these simple concepts of consciousness?

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Jeebus
The initial question is basically: How would these seven problems correlate to, let's say, an organism. Since organisms aren't really cognitive systems and don't really 'hold' in visual and auditory informational processing -- how would organisms fit into these simple concepts of consciousness?

[?] Why aren't organisms cognitive systems? The term does not need to refer exclusively to organisms (it can refer to, say, a robot as well), but for the most part, when we talk about cognitive systems we mean organisms or functional cognitive principles exhibited by organisms. Easily the paradigmatic case of a cognitive system is the common human being. Humans exhibit all of the cognitive qualities in the list you provide by Chalmers-- that's the only reason they've been nominated at various points as possible 'essences' of consciousness in the first place.

 

[Mentat]

First off, Chalmers is indeed doing what the vitalist skeptics did before. He's saying that we can just reduce it to more and more physical processes, and never get to the experience part. Well, Daniel Dennett's intentional stance of heterophenomenology allows for those physical processes to be the experience and many scientists are coming up with hypotheses that work just as he predicted (William Calvin and Gerald Edleman are just two examples...they've each written a few very good books, and I highly recommend them, btw).

Secondly, in the case of the vitalists, which Chalmer's himself denounces (while, IMO, basically doing exactly the same thing they did), it was discovered that the physical processes really were life. There is no more to life than the things that biology has uncovered. However, before they uncovered it, it was assumed that there must be some non-physical (spiritual) aspect that accounted for the "life" part of the being, since physical explanations had not yet yielded a satisfactory understanding. Why so many philosophers of the mind fall for this same trap is beyond me, but he himself (Chalmers, that is) exposed it as fallacious, and I say he's doing the same thing.

Lastly, are there any books by Chalmers that I might read to further understand his views?

 

[hypnagogue]

Mentat, I get the idea that either you didn't read the excerpt very closely, or you just don't like what it has to say. Either way, I expected better from you. All of your counterpoints are anticipated and explicitly rebutted in the original post, so rather than make bald assertions, you will need to counter the already detailed counter arguments to make any progress.

Originally posted by Mentat
First off, Chalmers is indeed doing what the vitalist skeptics did before. He's saying that we can just reduce it to more and more physical processes, and never get to the experience part. Well, Daniel Dennett's intentional stance of heterophenomenology allows for those physical processes to be the experience and many scientists are coming up with hypotheses that work just as he predicted (William Calvin and Gerald Edleman are just two examples...they've each written a few very good books, and I highly recommend them, btw).

From the excerpt:

For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience.

How is it that activity in the visual cortex accounts for the experience of the color red? There is an explanatory gap here, and it won't go away by simply ignoring it, as it seems is the strategy of Dennett.

Secondly, in the case of the vitalists, which Chalmer's himself denounces (while, IMO, basically doing exactly the same thing they did), it was discovered that the physical processes really were life. There is no more to life than the things that biology has uncovered. However, before they uncovered it, it was assumed that there must be some non-physical (spiritual) aspect that accounted for the "life" part of the being, since physical explanations had not yet yielded a satisfactory understanding. Why so many philosophers of the mind fall for this same trap is beyond me, but he himself (Chalmers, that is) exposed it as fallacious, and I say he's doing the same thing.

I'm surprised that this is your position, since the last 3 paragraphs of the excerpt explicitly rebuts every one of your objections, and you have done nothing here to analyze or critique the actual rebuttal. Get back to me on this one.

Lastly, are there any books by Chalmers that I might read to further understand his views?

I am still familiarizing myself with Chalmers, but I highly recommend two papers of his I have read:

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/nature.html
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html

His homepage, with many more materials, is at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/

 

[FZ+]

For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience.

Why shouldn't it? In other words, by what method have we eliminated the idea that any such complex physical patterns are indeed conscious? It looks like consciousness, it acts like consciousness, what more is there?

In short, a circular argument. We assume experience as a property that is outside of the physical, and lo and behold! We find experience as a property that is outside of the physical!

The tempting induction from these cases fails in the case of consciousness, which is not a problem about physical structures and functions.

Why not?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue

From the excerpt:
For any physical process we specify there will be an unanswered question: Why should this process give rise to experience? Given any such process, it is conceptually coherent that it could be instantiated in the absence of experience.

How is it that activity in the visual cortex accounts for the experience of the color red? There is an explanatory gap here, and it won't go away by simply ignoring it, as it seems is the strategy of Dennett.

But Dennett's intentional stance does not "ignore" the issue, it provides a way out from the seeming problem, by showing that it needn't be a problem at all. Basically, Dennett said what any scientist would say to the vitalists if any still exist: There is no explanatory gap, there is simply a process, and this process is life, it does not "produce" this mysterious phenomenon.

I'm surprised that this is your position, since the last 3 paragraphs of the excerpt explicitly rebuts every one of your objections...

No, it attempts to. I read that part very carefully, and all I saw was vitalism re-visited. He says:

...each of these were problems about the observable behavior of physical objects, coming down to problems in the explanation of structures and functions. Because of this, these phenomena have always been the kind of thing that a physical account might explain, even if at some points there have been good reasons to suspect that no such explanation would be forthcoming. The tempting induction from these cases fails in the case of consciousness, which is not a problem about physical structures and functions.

Can you not see the ridiculousness of this last claim? Does he honestly believe that the vitalists believed that "life" was just a physical phenomenon and would remain a mystery simply because we'd never be able to explain all of its functions?!? Not at all, they probably made statements exactly like his last one, but were proven wrong anyway.

I am still familiarizing myself with Chalmers, but I highly recommend two papers of his I have read:

http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/nature.html
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html

His homepage, with many more materials, is at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/

I'll check 'em out when I have time . Thanks.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by FZ+
Why shouldn't it? In other words, by what method have we eliminated the idea that any such complex physical patterns are indeed conscious? It looks like consciousness, it acts like consciousness, what more is there?

The "more" is the subjective experience (or lack thereof) on the part of the system in question. Objective observation of behavior can give us clues as to underlying subjective experience, but in the end it is all speculation fueled by analogy to one's own direct experience of consciousness.

False positives and false negatives (is that the term I'm looking for?) are not hard to come by. People with blindsight might objectively appear to have complete subjective visual experience, but in some areas of their visual fields, they in fact do not even though they can interact coherently with objects in their blind spots. Likewise, someone in a coma may appear to be unconscious but may in fact have some conscious experience. So behavioral analyses are insufficient to get a true grasp on the presence or absence of consciousness, not to mention the quality of consciousness, even if they serve as a useful heuristic for most 'normal' cases.

The only reason behavioral analyses of consciousness work in the first place is because we can juxtapose someone else's behavior (including, importantly, verbal reports) with the behavior we ourselves associate with our own conscious experiences. One might call this method of understanding consciousness "objective judgement by way of comparison to subjective experience." If you erase the "by way of comparison to subjective experience" from the equation, as would be done in a purely physical explanation in terms of structures and functions, you have erased the entirety of your understanding of the relevant phenomenon-- you know all about heads but nothing about tails, so your knowledge of the coin is incomplete. This is especially problematic when the phenomenon you want to investigate is tails.

The tempting induction from these cases fails in the case of consciousness, which is not a problem about physical structures and functions.

Why not?

Because you can explain physical structures and functions all you want and you still have not explained the whole picture. Take the typical argument: imagine a colorblind neuroscientist N in the far future who has complete knowledge of the structures and functions of the human brain. In spite of his complete objective knowledge, he still does not have the whole account: he does not know what it is like to see the color red. Now imagine that N has an operation that cures his colorblindess-- he learns something new about consciousness, above and beyond the objective facts about the structures and functions of the brain.

edit: Stated more generally and eloquently by Chalmers--
"Recall the main conceptual distinction between the easy and hard problems. The easy problems - explaining discrimination, integration, accessibility, internal monitoring, reportability, and so on - all concern the performance of various functions. For these phenomena, once we have explained how the relevant functions are performed, we have explained what needs to be explained. The hard problem, by contrast, is not a problem about how functions are performed. For any given function that we explain, it remains a nontrivial further question: why is the performance of this function associated with conscious experience? The sort of functional explanation that is suited to answering the easy problems is therefore not automatically suited to answering the hard problem."

from http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/moving.html

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
But Dennett's intentional stance does not "ignore" the issue, it provides a way out from the seeming problem, by showing that it needn't be a problem at all. Basically, Dennett said what any scientist would say to the vitalists if any still exist: There is no explanatory gap, there is simply a process, and this process is life, it does not "produce" this mysterious phenomenon.

If there is no explanatory gap, try to explain to a colorblind person what the color red looks like by telling him all about the visual processing centers in the brain.

Can you not see the ridiculousness of this last claim? Does he honestly believe that the vitalists believed that "life" was just a physical phenomenon and would remain a mystery simply because we'd never be able to explain all of its functions?!? Not at all, they probably made statements exactly like his last one, but were proven wrong anyway.

There is a key distinction to be made in the two cases. Explaining life involves explaining objectively observable phenomena; explaining consciousness involves explaining subjective experience, which is not objectively observable.

In the case of vitalism, the explanandum is one of structure and function: how is it that organisms can move about, grow, reproduce, etc? Vitalists could not see how physical explanations could account for these objectively observable structures and functions, so they posited the existence of the non-physical spirit. Once the structures and functions of life were shown to be explainable in physical terms, the explanatory posit of the spirit was no longer needed and was discarded.

In the case of consciousness, the explanandum itself is not one of structure and function (if it were, a colorblind person could learn all about the color red simply by reading up on neuroscience). We cannot readily discard the part that is not about structure and function in this case, since it is not an explanitory posit, but rather the thing to be explained. So explaining consciousness purely in terms of physical structures and functions of the brain is not an amenable step in the right direction, it is an outright denial of the issue at hand.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
If there is no explanatory gap, try to explain to a colorblind person what the color red looks like by telling him all about the visual processing centers in the brain.

You can't, because no man can be made to experience something simply by having it explained to them, and the intentional stance doesn't require that. The intentional stance simply dictates that, when one does experience the color red, the experience is completely explainable as processes of the brain (and, if you were capable of reaching into the brain with a probe that could excite just the right neurons, in just the right fashion, you would produce the very same experience).

There is a key distinction to be made in the two cases. Explaining life involves explaining objectively observable phenomena; explaining consciousness involves explaining subjective experience, which is not objectively observable.

Unless the intentional stance is correct, in which case subjective experience is objectively observable, you just have to know what to look for.

In the case of vitalism, the explanandum is one of structure and function: how is it that organisms can move about, grow, reproduce, etc? Vitalists could not see how physical explanations could account for these objectively observable structures and functions, so they posited the existence of the non-physical spirit. Once the structures and functions of life were shown to be explainable in physical terms, the explanatory posit of the spirit was no longer needed and was discarded.

In the case of consciousness, the explanandum itself is not one of structure and function (if it were, a colorblind person could learn all about the color red simply by reading up on neuroscience).

But a person who isn't colorblind can't know anything more about it than a person who is...the only difference is that one has experienced it, and the other hasn't (and if you could excite the other's brain just right, that other would experience it).

We cannot readily discard the part that is not about structure and function in this case, since it is not an explanitory posit, but rather the thing to be explained. So explaining consciousness purely in terms of physical structures and functions of the brain is not an amenable step in the right direction, it is an outright denial of the issue at hand.

This seems to me to be a mystic denial of science's abilities. If the intentional stance turns out to be the way to go, then science will indeed be able to explain consciousness purely in terms of physical structures and functions.

 

[Mentat]

Just to be clear: The intentional stance doesn't dictate that the neurologist should be able to detect some part of the subject's brain that is shaded red, for that particular experience; instead it shows that the subject couldn't see such a shading either, and the experience must thus be an illusion of belief (belief also being a function of the brain).

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
You can't, because no man can be made to experience something simply by having it explained to them, and the intentional stance doesn't require that. The intentional stance simply dictates that, when one does experience the color red, the experience is completely explainable as processes of the brain (and, if you were capable of reaching into the brain with a probe that could excite just the right neurons, in just the right fashion, you would produce the very same experience).

This does not address Hypnogogue's (or Chalmer's) point. You say that the experience of red is explainable as a brain process. But if you look closely at what is being explained, which is a subjective experience, that makes no sense. Physical reductionism does not cross the explanatory gap, as Hypno says. Nor does 'hetero-phenomenology'.

Unless the intentional stance is correct, in which case subjective experience is objectively observable, you just have to know what to look for.

First person experience is not objectively observable. This is why it is called first person experience. All that can be observed is physical behaviour. As someone said, forgotten who, digging into the brain to look for consciousness is just as useful as digging into the Earth to look for gravity. It's making a category error.

But a person who isn't colorblind can't know anything more about it than a person who is...the only difference is that one has experienced it, and the other hasn't.

You acknowledge that there is a difference then?

This seems to me to be a mystic denial of science's abilities. If the intentional stance turns out to be the way to go, then science will indeed be able to explain consciousness purely in terms of physical structures and functions. [/B]

Ifs and buts. Are you sure you've understood the 'intentional stance'? It's not an explanation of consciousness. Could you outline what you mean by it.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I don't think this debate can ever be settled, because the Chalmers wing is into the non-falsifiable "Naw, that's not it either" mode of denial. Whatever biologists discover, whatever capabilities future AIs develop, they will still be saying, "Since you can't convey red in words, you can't explain human conciousness completely". Even a complete listing of every neuron and action that constitutes seeing red, even a computer that can see colors and discuss them in a Turing test won't satisfy them.

The Chalmers wing don't think they have to prove consciousness is more than what is explained, they just want to demand that scientists prove that it isn't.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I don't think this debate can ever be settled, because the Chalmers wing is into the non-falsifiable "Naw, that's not it either" mode of denial. Whatever biologists discover, whatever capabilities future AIs develop, they will still be saying, "Since you can't convey red in words, you can't explain human conciousness completely". Even a complete listing of every neuron and action that constitutes seeing red, even a computer that can see colors and discuss them in a Turing test won't satisfy them.

That was pretty much my point, about how this mystic viewpoint is the enemy of scientific discovery...it was in the days of the vitalists, and it is now.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
This does not address Hypnogogue's (or Chalmer's) point. You say that the experience of red is explainable as a brain process. But if you look closely at what is being explained, which is a subjective experience, that makes no sense. Physical reductionism does not cross the explanatory gap, as Hypno says. Nor does 'hetero-phenomenology'.

But, if one can redefine "subjective experience" as a physical process of the brain, then why should there be an explanatory gap at all?

First person experience is not objectively observable. This is why it is called first person experience. All that can be observed is physical behaviour. As someone said, forgotten who, digging into the brain to look for consciousness is just as useful as digging into the Earth to look for gravity. It's making a category error.

But subjective experience cannot exist separate of the physical processes of the brain...in the first place, if it wasn't physical, then it couldn't interact with the physical; also, if exists separately of the functions of the brain, in any way, then there must be something inside the head that observes these phenomena...that's asking for a homunculus.

You acknowledge that there is a difference then?

A difference between explaining it and experiencing it? Of course. There's a difference between explaining life and experiencing it too.

Ifs and buts. Are you sure you've understood the 'intentional stance'? It's not an explanation of consciousness. Could you outline what you mean by it.

The "intentional stance" is basically a scientific principle, stated in philosophical terms, it is the anti-mysticism. Basically, if something meets all of the physical qualifications for a particular phenomenon, then the phenomenon is occurring. If something meets all of the physical qualifications for life, then it is alive, and there is nothing metaphysical to add to it. If something meets all of the physical qualifications of being conscious, then it is conscious, and there is nothing mystical to add to it.

This is the gist that I've gotten from Dennett's explanations of the intentional stance.

 

[FZ+]

Because you can explain physical structures and functions all you want and you still have not explained the whole picture. Take the typical argument: imagine a colorblind neuroscientist N in the far future who has complete knowledge of the structures and functions of the human brain. In spite of his complete objective knowledge, he still does not have the whole account: he does not know what it is like to see the color red. Now imagine that N has an operation that cures his colorblindess-- he learns something new about consciousness, above and beyond the objective facts about the structures and functions of the brain.

But by that argument, how can you justify the way you take for granted that anyone else is conscious? When the colorblind man is healed, how can you say that he is in fact healed at all, without using structures and so on? And so, without understanding of the idea of red, how can you say that the man knows what the colour red feels like?

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by selfAdjoint
I don't think this debate can ever be settled, because the Chalmers wing is into the non-falsifiable "Naw, that's not it either" mode of denial. Whatever biologists discover, whatever capabilities future AIs develop, they will still be saying, "Since you can't convey red in words, you can't explain human conciousness completely". Even a complete listing of every neuron and action that constitutes seeing red, even a computer that can see colors and discuss them in a Turing test won't satisfy them.

The Chalmers wing don't think they have to prove consciousness is more than what is explained, they just want to demand that scientists prove that it isn't.

I think you've got it bang on. Those who think that consciousness involves first person experience want to see first person experience explained, and not just swept under the carpet by science in the way it was for most of the the 20th century. It's perfectly obvious that an experience of red is a different thing to a bunch of neurons, we should accept that and move on.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
But, if one can redefine "subjective experience" as a physical process of the brain, then why should there be an explanatory gap at all?

If one could redefine 'subjective experience' as a physical process then you'd be right. Unfortunately you can't. That's why they're called subjective experiences. Some diehards are still trying but nobody has succeeded, and they never will. They are different categories of things. Science attempted to do what you have suggested for most of the 20th century. Yet here we no further on than William James was 100 years ago.

But subjective experience cannot exist separate of the physical processes of the brain...

Can you prove that?

in the first place, if it wasn't physical, then it couldn't interact with the physical; also, if exists separately of the functions of the brain, in any way, then there must be something inside the head that observes these phenomena...that's asking for a homunculus.

Yes, these are some of the difficult problems to be solved.

The "intentional stance" is basically a scientific principle, stated in philosophical terms, it is the anti-mysticism.

This is not correct. The intentional stance is a perspective on behaviour, a way of predicting it and interpreting its causes. It can be applied to the behaviour of people, thermostats or lightning bolts. Fundamentally it is much the same stance as that taken by Watson and Skinner and other behaviorists, jazzed up a bit. It says that beliefs and representations are real only to the extent that they can be infered from an agents behaviour by a third-person. It is a 'black box' approach to mind, an approach now largely discarded by science.

Basically, if something meets all of the physical qualifications for a particular phenomenon, then the phenomenon is occurring. If something meets all of the physical qualifications for life, then it is alive, and there is nothing metaphysical to add to it. If something meets all of the physical qualifications of being conscious, then it is conscious, and there is nothing mystical to add to it.

What are the 'physical qualifications' for being conscious? As far as I know nobody knows what these are.

This is the gist that I've gotten from Dennett's explanations of the intentional stance. [/B]

This is not what Dennett says as far as I can tell. He says that if one assumes that an agent is conscious, and also that the agent is rational, and also that the agent has beliefs which affect its behaviour, and then finds that, by taking the intentional stance, one can predict the agent's behaviour, then one can assume that beliefs and representations are physical. If that sounds daft it isn't my fault.

It is tempting to think that anyone as clever as Dan Dennett must have a good point when they write books about a topic. However you can't take this for granted. Academia is a funny place. Dennett covers his tracks well when he's writing, but if you strip away the complexity and get down to basics his ideas are not new and don't make much sense. This conclusion is not just mine, it is widely held. Do you know of any philosophers who agree with him? I haven't found any, but then there's lots I haven't read.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by FZ+
But by that argument, how can you justify the way you take for granted that anyone else is conscious? When the colorblind man is healed, how can you say that he is in fact healed at all, without using structures and so on? And so, without understanding of the idea of red, how can you say that the man knows what the colour red feels like?

Good point. This is why science cannot prove that consciousness exists. It's known as the 'other minds' problem. There is no way of knowing that any mind exists except your own.

 

[pelastration]

Originally posted by Mentat
But, if one can redefine "subjective experience" as a physical process of the brain, then why should there be an explanatory gap at all?

Mentat, it isn't just a process of the brain. Every personal experience has effect on the whole body, and is a multi-dimensional action of the whole body (Brain-dimension, cell-dimension, DNA-dimension, Genes-dimension, etc.). They ALL contain memories, I repeat MEMORIES. Some are more profound, some more dynamic. They are all the time interacting. Don't look to this as a simplistic action.

 

[pelastration]

Originally posted by Canute
Good point. This is why science cannot prove that consciousness exists. It's known as the 'other minds' problem. There is no way of knowing that any mind exists except your own.

Canute ... we learn from experiences of others like written in the Sutra's, in books, scripts and memories of human knowledge. We find information in them that is new to our information storage and may use it or not. The fact that our level of reality shows them as different information is already an 'indication' that also others had consciousness.
FZ+'s red color is of course a convention between observers to 'label' a certain vibration of photon's.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by pelastration
Canute ... we learn from experiences of others like written in the Sutra's, in books, scripts and memories of human knowledge. We find information in them that is new to our information storage and may use it or not. The fact that our level of reality shows them as different information is already an 'indication' that also others had consciousness.
FZ+'s red color is of course a convention between observers to 'label' a certain vibration of photon's.

Fair enough. But first-person reports are not sufficient to scientifically prove the presence of consciousness. There is quite a debate going on as to whether first-person reports of any kind can be considered as scientific data, even in psychology. This is one of the many paradoxes of science's current approach to consciousness.

 

[pelastration]

Originally posted by Canute
Fair enough. But first-person reports are not sufficient to scientifically prove the presence of consciousness. There is quite a debate going on as to whether first-person reports of any kind can be considered as scientific data, even in psychology. This is one of the many paradoxes of science's current approach to consciousness.

Thanks Canute,

but (1) we can not speak about it and - in fact - deny it making us just automatics or computers, (2) accept that personal experciences have a certain 'relative' value that can have statistic significance (on a population of about 6 billion people), or (3) look to blind spots in our understanding what this consciousness means;
Number 3 is my way. What can logic and ratio bring us? What have we missed?

Mentat wants to put all his Monopoly chips on the brain (Mentat please correct me ). Life however is a complexity of multi-dimensions. The solution is to connect some of the basic principles: Dynamics, Isolation and Interconnectivity. Analyses everything ... and you will find out that these three concepts cover 'everything'. It's deeper than Yin-Yang. Try to join them in one concept. I gave some solutions but I am open when you give me better ones. ;-)

Dirk

 

[Canute]

Pelastration

I'm afraid I didn't really understand that. I checked out your second link but didn't go very far.

It says (is it you that says it?) that some sort of tube is the only axiom in the theory. However presumably spacetime has to exist in order for the tube to exist, which seems to imply more than one axiom.

In fact, now I come to think of it, why is the idea of a tube being axiomatic to existence any better than God being axiomatic? Both seem to share the same logical problems relating to their origins.

 

[pelastration]

Originally posted by Canute
Pelastration

I'm afraid I didn't really understand that. I checked out your second link but didn't go very far.

It says (is it you that says it?) that some sort of tube is the only axiom in the theory. However presumably spacetime has to exist in order for the tube to exist, which seems to imply more than one axiom.

In fact, now I come to think of it, why is the idea of a tube being axiomatic to existence any better than God being axiomatic? Both seem to share the same logical problems relating to their origins.

Canute, this tube - a spheric membrane - is - in your Buddhist expression - the Tathagata womb (cf. the Lankavatara Sutra) which is indestructible. That's the postulate.
If spacetime (the Tathagata membrane) is non-breakable then just a simple penetration creates a new zone (which contains: structure).
There energy and matter starts. Two layers of Tathagata are joined LOCALLY.
In QM terms: the QM package or QM basket.

From that moment duality start: the Rounds of Rebirth start (Interdependent causality). Then Sunyata (emptiness) became - just LOCALLY - matter and energy ... thus: stress-friction is created locally (and this friction causes: local suffering in matter and in consciousness).

At that moment our observation (ruled by dual sensors - the 6 senses with are aflamed/excited) will take over control. They will influence and control us ... all the time. Then the five clinging aggregates - sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair will win. The Key is ... do we allow this Yes or No?

Therefor the real understanding of this mechanism - how this stress-friction rules over dual matter and mind - will give you the power and insight to apply the 12 permutations of the Dhamma wheel and the eight 'right' views.

The real freedom is to understand the Stress. In our daily life we call this "Stress" (mental stress), but equally there is the same stress in 'matter', and that's what scientists call 'gravity' (like we are attracted mentally to 'easy' thoughts). Duality is a little BIG 'devil'! ;-).
It always will appear when we believe to have conquered him. That's the Round of Rebirth. It's SO seductive.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by pelastration
Canute, this tube - a spheric membrane - is - in your Buddhist expression - the Tathagata womb (cf. the Lankavatara Sutra) which is indestructible. That's the postulate. ETC...

I'm afraid I don't know anything about Tathagata and so forth, or the sutras.

But I have some questions if you don't mind. What's the relationship between emptiness and the membrane? Doesn't the idea of a physical membrane being fundamental to existence contradict Buddhist ontology completely? How does this theory account for the existence of the membrane in the first place? What is the membrane made of?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
If one could redefine 'subjective experience' as a physical process then you'd be right. Unfortunately you can't. That's why they're called subjective experiences. Some diehards are still trying but nobody has succeeded, and they never will. They are different categories of things. Science attempted to do what you have suggested for most of the 20th century. Yet here we no further on than William James was 100 years ago.

Wrong. I'm not saying that someone has done it, but there are theories that have yet to be refuted, which do not link subjective experience to the physical processes, but show that the physical processes are the subjective experience.

Yes, these are some of the difficult problems to be solved.

And, until they are, one should assume that subjective experience cannot exist separate of the physical processes, right?

This is not correct. The intentional stance is a perspective on behaviour, a way of predicting it and interpreting its causes. It can be applied to the behaviour of people, thermostats or lightning bolts. Fundamentally it is much the same stance as that taken by Watson and Skinner and other behaviorists, jazzed up a bit. It says that beliefs and representations are real only to the extent that they can be infered from an agents behaviour by a third-person. It is a 'black box' approach to mind, an approach now largely discarded by science.

Well, first of all, after having re-read Dennett's own definition of the intentional stance, it appears that all it does is put content before consciousness. He proposes that any action contains the content of that action...if I were to tell you that I'm hungry, you (as the scientist) would have to believe that this is true (this is the heterophenomenological approach, which deals with subjective experience - as stated by the subject - in the same manner we naturally deal with fictitious stories: Whatever the author says is true about this world is true, whatever he never mentions is not true about that world). So, if one first takes into account the content of the statements of the subject, then one removes such problems as "zombies", and one can move on toward a third-party understanding of the subject's consciousness...ideally anyway.

Secondly, scientists have not largely discarded the view, so far as I can tell. William Calvin mentioned the book favorably, as did (IIRC) Joseph LeDoux, in one of his books.

What are the 'physical qualifications' for being conscious? As far as I know nobody knows what these are.

No, but there are theories. Note: Theories, not hypotheses (though there are many more of these).

It is tempting to think that anyone as clever as Dan Dennett must have a good point when they write books about a topic. However you can't take this for granted. Academia is a funny place. Dennett covers his tracks well when he's writing, but if you strip away the complexity and get down to basics his ideas are not new and don't make much sense. This conclusion is not just mine, it is widely held. Do you know of any philosophers who agree with him? I haven't found any, but then there's lots I haven't read.

Didn't Rorty agree with him, for the most part? I suppose its true that I can name more scientists who agree with him than philosophers, now that I come to think of it.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
Wrong. I'm not saying that someone has done it, but there are theories that have yet to be refuted, which do not link subjective experience to the physical processes, but show that the physical processes are the subjective experience.

I honestly have never come across one, although of course many people believe one is possible.

And, until they are, one should assume that subjective experience cannot exist separate of the physical processes, right?

Exactly. Until they are, or are proved not to be, we shouldn't assume anything at all.

Well, first of all, after having re-read Dennett's own definition of the intentional stance, it appears that all it does is put content before consciousness. He proposes that any action contains the content of that action...if I were to tell you that I'm hungry, you (as the scientist) would have to believe that this is true

Not quite. The scientist doesn't have to assume that your words are true.

(this is the heterophenomenological approach, which deals with subjective experience - as stated by the subject - in the same manner we naturally deal with fictitious stories: Whatever the author says is true about this world is true, whatever he never mentions is not true about that world). So, if one first takes into account the content of the statements of the subject, then one removes such problems as "zombies", and one can move on toward a third-party understanding of the subject's consciousness...ideally anyway.

I don't quite see it like that, but I roughly agree.

Secondly, scientists have not largely discarded the view, so far as I can tell. William Calvin mentioned the book favorably, as did (IIRC) Joseph LeDoux, in one of his books.

Perhaps you're right. What is true is that there has been remarkably little proper analysis published of 'hetero-phenomenology' outside of philosophy.

No, but there are theories. Note: Theories, not hypotheses (though there are many more of these).

Again, I don't know of any. Can you give an example?

Didn't Rorty agree with him, for the most part? I suppose its true that I can name more scientists who agree with him than philosophers, now that I come to think of it. [/B]

It's honest of you to acknowledge this. His theory appeals to scientists for obvious reasons, but is less appealing to people with no axe to grind.

“None of this stuff about heterophenomenology helps one bit with answering that hard question. It only concerns easy questions, such as how good experimenters/theoreticians can be at mind-reading, how good subjects can be at mind-describing -- and I'm ready to grant that both experimenters and subjects can be as good as you like, as good as any cognitive science could need, right down to the last JND!

But that still won't tell you how/why JNDs feel like something -- though, given that they do, mysteriously, feel like something, it will explain why they feel like this rather than like that. But that's an easy question again; it presupposes, or "brackets" [to use your Husserlian phrase] the answer to the hard question of how/why any of these excellent functional correlates/substrates of behaving feel like anything at all (rather than just functioning, i.e., doing, zombily).

Harnad on Dennett on Chalmers on Consciousness
http://www.ecs.soton.ac.uk/~harnad/Tp/dennett-chalmers.htm

(This link is worth checking for some of the obvious counter-arguments to Dennett. I'd be interested to know whether you think Harnard's objections can be answered. I can't see how they can be. Dennett doesn't seem to answer them anywhere).