 Quote by KingOrdo
No theories tell you "why". If the graviton account is correct, then you're in the same spot: Why do these particles make massive things move toward each other? Why does gravity attract and not repel? Those are not scientific questions.
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No theory tells you why something is ultimately true, but a theory can tell you "why" something is true in terms of some more basic elements of the theory; for example, we can use Maxwell's equations to derive the fact that electromagnetic waves can only travel at a single velocity, c. Likewise, in quantum electrodynamics the way that charges attract and repel each other as a function of distance is not treated as a fundamental assumption, but instead can be derived from the way charged particles exchange virtual photons. Something similar might be true of a quantum theory of gravity.
 Quote by KingOrdo
Yes, I do think "GR is 'prima facie incommensurable' with Newtonian mechanics"--I think it's ultima facie incommensurable, too. Sure, it is an accurate theory within certain limits. But so what? Putting the planets on circular orbits is accurate within certain limits--doesn't mean it's right.
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Perhaps you should define what you mean by "incommensurable", since it sounds like you're saying that
any theory is "incommensurable" with any other theory that makes different predictions than it in any circumstances, even if the new theory reduces to the old theory in certain limits, limits which cover every circumstance in which the old theory has successfully passed experimental tests (as with Newtonian mechanics and GR). Would you say that any new theory of physics--say, a theory of particle physics that goes beyond the Standard Model--is "incommensurable" with existing theories? If so, presumably the fact that a new theory would be "incommensurable" with existing ones is not actually a good reason to think that no new theories will be found to supplant older ones, unless you think physics is already complete.
 Quote by KingOrdo
Right. That would be fine, because it would show GR to be an approximation of the graviton theory, just like Newtonian gravity is an approximation of GR. But the point is that absent any empirical evidence that necessitates the inclusion of gravitons (cf. the perihelion precession of Mercury in the case of GR (though of course here the theory came first)), I don't want them. This is a fine point, an a certainly arguable one, but I am very resistant to letting physics stray too far from its observational roots.
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But Einstein didn't construct GR because he wanted to explain the precession of the perihelion of Mercury, or any other specific observational problem that didn't fit with Newtonian mechanics (as
this page mentions, in Newtonian mechanics it was already predicted the perihelion of Mercury's orbit would precess somewhat because of the gravitational influence of bodies other than the Sun, and although the known planets weren't enough to explain the amount of precession astronomers hypothesized that there could be another unobserved planet near the Sun which would make up the difference, so it wasn't completely obvious that this observation actually contradicted Newtonian mechanics). Einstein was motivated by purely theoretical concerns like the inconsistency between Newtonian mechanics and special relativity. Would the 1910 version of you say that he "doesn't want any relativistic theory of gravity", since there is no empirical evidence that necessitates it, in spite of the clear theoretical conflict?
 Quote by KingOrdo
Right. So now you've asked me to prove a negative: That gravitons don't exist. I can't do that.
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I'm not asking you to "prove" it, just give me a reason to think it is improbable in any way, any more so than any other broad hypothesis about new physics beyond what we already know. For example, do you consider "gravitons exist" more implausible than "GR will no longer work precisely at the Planck scale", or "Quantum mechanics will no longer work precisely at the Planck scale"? There seem to be strong theoretical arguments that
one of the last two must be true.
 Quote by KingOrdo
Your theory is unfalsifiable. We don't yet have strong empirical evidence in favor of gravitational waves; but, assume they exist. Then GR takes care of explaining and predicting them very nicely. I can hand you buckets of observations justifying my belief that gravitation is a phenomenological manfestation of the curvature of spacetime.
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"Manifestation of the curvature of spacetime" is just a word-picture which one is free to discard even in GR itself, as I mentioned before; it would be better to say something like "all gravitational phenomena can be derived from the equations of GR", since these equations don't necessarily have to be interpreted in terms of "spacetime curvature". And as for your "buckets of observations", of course none of them is in conflict with the hypothesis of a theory of quantum gravity which diverges noticeably from GR at the Planck scale but which becomes almost indistinguishable from GR far from the Planck scale.
 Quote by KingOrdo
All you can give me to justify the graviton is some talk--albeit not incoherent talk--about best fit with perturbation theory and the assertion that, were I to build a Solar System-large particle detector, I could find the graviton. That's not enough for me.
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The theoretical reasons for postulating gravitons go well beyond "best fit with perturbation theory" (in fact I think most physicists expect a complete theory of quantum gravity to be non-perturbative), they include things like the theoretical incompatibility between GR and quantum theory at the Planck scale, the fact that string theory is known to reduce to GR in certain limits even though it wasn't constructed to have anything to do with gravity, and a number of other hints in the direction of a theory of quantum gravity like the
Bekenstein bound on the amount of information that can be contained in a black hole which can be derived from a number of different plausible theoretical assumptions.
 Quote by KingOrdo
Why would it be "a priori impossible"? Obviously it would not. Something is "a priori impossible" iff, roughly, there is some contradiction in its meaning. It is a priori impossible that I will one day be a married bachelor. It is not [/i]a priori[/i] impossible that there is a God, and He is a massive chicken. Obviously nothing to do with gravitational waves is a priori impossible.
But I'm not interested in the a priori--this is science. I'm interested in empirical evidence. Show me a graviton--or some other empirical evidence that it exists--and I'm on board. Pure reason convinces me in philosophy, but not in science.
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I should not have used "a priori impossible" since that phrase has a specific philosophical meaning and this is the philosophy forum...I was thinking of "a priori" more in the
statistical sense of a prior probability we should assign to something in the absence of evidence, and I erred in saying "impossible" when I just meant something like "very unlikely". So again, why do you think the idea of a quantum theory of gravity which reduces to GR in certain limits is even particularly unlikely (more likely to be false than true, say)? If you are really concerned with justifying everything in terms of observational evidence, then since we have no evidence about Planck-scale physics either way, it would make more sense for you to say something like "there is insufficient basis at present for judging this hypothesis to be
either more likely false than true
or more likely true than false".
 Quote by KingOrdo
I think everyone here will agree that the term 'photon' commonly refers to real photons and not virtual photons. If I ever want to talk about virtual photons, I will use the term 'virtual photons'.
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I don't think physicists are always so careful about using the word "virtual" when referring to the photons in Feynman diagrams, so I disagree that the word photon "commonly refers" only to non-virtual photons, but I suppose this isn't a very important point either way.