Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?

metacristi

It seems to me very likely that this will be the case, at least a long time from now. For example it is unlikely that biology or economics could be 'reduced' to a theory of everything in physics. However this does not mean that our inability to make the reduction implies that, in absolute, that TOE (very probable not complete, probably needing auxiliary assumptions to cope with the 'higher level' sciences) cannot handle the higher level sciences (biology, economics etc).

The explanation can be that the phenomena are so complex (or chaotic) that we are unable to offer a clear explanation or solve the equations which appear (a good example today: it becomes cumbersome, basically impossible, to solve Schrodinger's equations for very complex systems, still there is basically no good reason to think that the standard formalism of QM cannot handle them, that the standard formalism does not hold for them).

This is particularly important in the case of consciousness studies, the brain is one of the most complex systems in the universe (some philosophers even believe that its functioning involves chaotic events which, though deterministic in nature, cannot be predicted accurately). Some other philosophers of science think that there are good reasons to believe that the phenomenon of 'multiple realizations' plays an important role (the multiple realization implies that different, at least slightly different, brain states can produce basically identical mental states).

Upon them the actual incapacity to bridge the gap between the functional 'top-down' and the 'bottom-up' approaches might be due, apart from the huge complexity of the brain (or the chaotic features), exactly to the 'multiple realization' phenomenon, very difficult to account of, probably even for the technology of the foreseable future. As a conclusion 'greedy reduction' (at the laws of physics) might be possible, in theory at least, but it is unlikely that we will be able to do that at least in the foreseable future.

Philocrat

Yes, this is a fair summary of the problem as faced both by science and by philosophy. But as I have already pointed out somehwere above, TOE only makes sense if we have a clear and worthwhile reason (or reasons) for it. So, the key question still remains: WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF REDUCING EVERYTHING TO PHYSICS? I have made an attempt to make sense of the possible answer to this question by suggesting a few useful reasons for the whole notion of reductionism in the first place.

BIOLOGY: That by reductively rearranging or reprogramming genes in the living organisms we can structurally and functionally improve them. Enhance their functionality, extend their lifespans and make them live longer, reduce or eliminate decaying etc.

PHYSICS: That by reducing things to smaller and smaller scales we may be able to see what we could not see at the macroscale. For example, nanoscale rearrangement of things could improve their structures and functions. We may create self-sufficient, super-sized, super-structured, super-functioning entities. Supper-activities such as inter-state migration, teleportation, time travel etc, may be rendered possible in the forseeable future.

COSTS: By understanding the world to ever smaller and smaller scale we can reduce costs of things, make higher quality things for less money. This would help the human race create and sustain a more progressive society? Is this true?

MANAGABILITY: That the world is easier to manage if we understand it at every explainable or reducible layer. For every layer that is successfully explained or reduced, we are better off knowledgewise. It is to the human advantage to understand the world at every level. Makes sense, but reducibility and its possibility is another matter.

Well, there are hundreds of other reasons that may be given for reductionism, but these are just a few ones that are currently being suggested. Valid or not valid, but the standard assumption is that we do have worthwhile reasons for reducing everything to physics.


THE POSSIBILITY OF TOE

The standard assumption is that everything can be reduced to physics. If we can do this, reduce every layer of the world or discipline to pure physics, what happens to each of this reduced layer or discipline? Would the reductive process itself involve physical reorganisation or rearangement of each reduced layer or discipline? Or perhaps total re-engineering of things in world? I distinguished between ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM (ER) and NON-ELIMINATIVE REDUCTIONISM (NER) as the two main fundamental metaphysical categories of the whole notion of reductionism. Personally, I am not quite sure which of these two types that Physics is advocating. What do you think about this? Do you think that physics is advocating the ER or NER? Can physics eliminatively reduce everything to physics?

Coversely, if we cannot reduce the multi-layered world to physics for all sorts of reasons already given on this thread and elsewhere, would this trigger the advocates of TOE to re-examine their ambition and reasons for it? Would we then turn our attention to us, the proposers and the perceivers of these ideals?

I personally do not rule out its possibility and I retain this position in a rather optimistic way and I think it would be a total disaster to view it otherwise. For all the reasons given and ungiven, TOE is essential if the whole notion of "HUMAN PROGRESS" is to be entertained at all. We just need to know these things if we are to move an inch on the path of progress. Who knows, the whole human survival may very well depend on it.
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Save our world from destruction........Stay GREEN!

saviourmachine

It's semantics indeed. Like DoctorDick's comparison with a dictionary. "Certain knowledge" is defined in other terms from the dictionary, so it does mean what it means because it means that to us. That doesn't say anything about its "existential state". Whatever that is! Because I also said now something limited to our "verbal world".

<off-topic>
By the way, it's interesting to see the difference between the texts of DoctorDick and Philocrat. Both of you I find difficult to follow. DoctorDick, because your texts have such a small "definition density". With common words you tackle difficult concepts, without using many terms that are in use in contemporary science and philosophy. It's like you're writing assembly code. Philocrat, because your texts have such a big "definition density". You use many new definitions that nobody before, ever thought of creating words for. I guess you've immediately a word for the problem I've with understanding you both. It's like you're writing a high-level programming language that nobody knows.

Does anybody feel that the same way?

metacristi

Nice post philocrat. Certainly, at least for the moment, the main view in the scientific community is that of ER, this based on the previous success of the actual scientific methodology (nonwithstanding that minimal). The fact that the components and processes of this universe can be isolated and profitably analyzed in isolation (that is reductionism) has proved to be too successful in the past to be abandoned at once. Besides there is a widespread acceptance among scientists that science (the actual methodology) is always objective and can surely lead us to the truth.

So even if scientists could not prove in a clear way that everything can be reduced to physics (to a certain TOE in physics for example) that would not discourage them to try further to reduce all higher level sciences to that TOE (possibly by adding some extra auxiliary assumptions, that it by extending the physical theory). Of course for all our practical purposes scientists will use the models provided by the higher level sciences, for example now chemistry is doing very well though there are enough reasons to think that it can be reduced entirely at physics (the best existing physical theory, QM). This is valid even if full reduction would be achieved (for simplicity reasons, exactly as we still use Newtonian mechanics for the majority of our practical purposes).

Neither will it be easily accepted in the scientific community that the goal of science is socially dependent, dependent on scientists finally. For this would imply that scientists have to recognize that we do not know that science really lead us to the truth, that high coherence and simplicity of theories + the practical successes of science do not also involve that science approaches truth (see the problem of 'success' of science, hotly debated in the philosophy of science; unfortunately, in spite of what many scientists believe now, we do not have yet sufficient reasons, beyond all reasonable doubt, to think that 'empirical success' involve approaching truth, in absolute).

The only way to really shaken the belief in reductionism were its failure at the level of physics itself. Something still possible, in quantum physics we already accept that the distinction perceiver-percieved is not so clear, the contextual approaches are much more valued now (the measurement device does influence the object under 'scrutiny'), basically there is still possible a return to Chew's 'bootstrap' (holistic) approach characteristic to the physics of the 60s. Sure this does not automatically mean that all higher level sciences cannot be reduced, at least in theory, for example, to the 'quantum fields' approach but certainly this would have an impact, scientists would be forced to recognize at least that full reduction might be impossible.

Canute

One small point. The association of physics with reductionism does not seem to be a necessary one, so the failure of one does not necessarily entail the failure of the other. In my view it doesn't matter whether one analyses the universe reductively or holistically. The answers come out the same in the end. There's a New Age idea floating around that reductionism is to be avoided. Its supporters seem to have missed the fact that most 'mystical religions' adopt very reductionist methods of analysis, and Buddhist analysis is far more reductionist than science in this respect, albeit that it is also more holistic.

Philocrat

metacristi, could you be kind enough to expand upon the following items:

Would this include (a) The Eperimenter-Experiment Relations, (b) Secondary qualities (smell, taste, qualia, etc), (c) Forms, (d) Scale of Reference, (e) Observer-Object Relations, etc.? Will such an extended system embrace Metaphysics as viable tool of Explanation and Disambiguation?

Sorry that I am not aware of this holistic conept. I am aware of the PARTS-WHOLE Relations that I have exhaustivelly examined over the years, both programtically and naratively. What I uncovered in those examinations just sent a chill down my spine. This is what forced me to make the fundamental distinction between (a) Open System, (2) Semi-closed/Semi-open system and (3) Closed system a few pages above on this thread. I summarised it as guidelines for mathematicians and logicians so that we don't risk falling into the metaphysical trap of making another Category Mistake with regards to this notion of Parts-Whole Relation. So, the lesson to learn here is that anyone who takes upon him or herself to embark upon the critical examination of this relation, must pay absolute attention to these three fundamental metaphysical categories involved. Our current world tends to occupy a range between (1) and (2) and I am not quite sure whether the current mathematics and logic clearly account for them. This is still within the scope of debate. However, (3) is ruthlessly diffcult to comprehend. The more I think about it, the more it seems mathematically and logically far removed from reality. It is as metaphysically and epistemologically hair-raising as it can get. This is one issue that I would not mind at all being enlightened on by anyone who knows it any better.

Pardon me that I have not read anything about what you are refering to. Please let me know whether hollistic implies a methology for a complete description of the Parts-Whole Relations.

Philocrat

Canute, I remember that you tried once somewhere on this PF to educate me on the Buddhist Reductive System. Could you be kind enough to give it another go and expand upon the following item:

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....Buddhism is reductionist while being holistic....
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It just sounds redically paradigmatic in scope. Is it REDUCTIVE MONISM, or perhaps a sort of methodology for eliminatiing parts from a whole? I can at least appreciate and deal with the notion of CAUSAL RELATIONS of things and the multidisciplinary attempts to schematically explain them. Is the holistic approach a methodology for completely weaving these causal relations together?

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Save our Planet from Destruction ......... Stay GREEN!

Bobby R

(QUOTE=Canute) When you say: "I am aware that..." are you not saying "you are conscious that..."? And does this help understand consciousness?

Doctordick

I apologize to anyone who has been following this thread. I have taken a few weeks off because it is clear to me that no one on this forum has any comprehension of what I am trying to communicate. Everyone on this forum and I are operating on totally different levels.
Without even looking, I know the truth of that comment depends on the meanings of the words making up the comment and thus is not an exact statement in any sense at all. I am interested in "exact analysis", a concept apparently foreign to the perspective of everyone posting on this forum.
If you had been reading my posts carefully you would have realized by now that I am not happy with any definitions except the very few I have decided are essential. It is my opinion that if one goes forth presuming they understand any human language correctly they have left exact science in their wake. The only human language which even approaches the status of exact is the language of mathematics and even that language has some subtle problems. From my perspective anyone who is "happy" with any definition has failed to look at the problem of definition carefully.
And here we arrive at the crux of your post. You would rather stir that pot of vague terms than think about the issue I have brought up. It seems that you would rather keep the issue of a difference between "things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, wrong" and "there were things which they think they know to be factually true where such judgment was, in fact, right" as insignificant as possible. I think you do this because to admit that the issue is significant would require you to think about it and that is one thing you want to avoid at all costs. I would say that you think you know a lot of things that you don't really know but you would rather muddy the issue than admit there could be any truth to that idea. As I said earlier, you have a habit of taking very dogmatic positions.

At this point I also have become convinced that your real reason for refusing to allow me to use the terms "knowable" and "unknowable" to refer to the two different kinds of presumed true facts because the usage is too short and difficult to stir into confusion. As I said earlier, I will use the adjective "knowable" to denote the fact that the term being modified by that adjective is, in fact, something which is real in the sense that no acceptable explanation can ever fail to include it: i.e., any explanation will be deemed false if the "knowable" thing is denied by the explanation. I will use the adjective "unknowable" to denote the fact that the term being modified by that adjective is, in fact, a figment of our imagination: i.e, one of those things we think we know but we are wrong about. When I use those two terms, that is exactly what I mean. You have said that you understand the fact that these two possibilities exist and if you cannot consistently convert those two terms (when I use them) to those two categories, then we will just call the conversation off.
Thank you saviormachine, I will try to stay focused. On reason I presumed you were backing away is that the last post from me, which you failed to respond to contained a lot of important relationships. I doubt you understood it all and proceeding without understanding is pretty well a waste of time. But don't let that bother you; we can always get back on track later. I will try to communicate to Canute on that step.

My definition of an explanation, that it is a defined method of establishing expectations based on known information, is stated the way it is because the definition does not require the known information be defined and thus avoids the issue of the vagueness of the language used to express that information. I can use the simple concept of a set to refer to "what is to be explained". What is to be explained is "A" and "A" can be any set of elements and the elements can be anything. The central issue in a real explanation is that the known information can change thus, as we are not all knowing, "A" , in general, can never be assumed to be completely known. We need to be able to refer to exactly what we know (or think we know) and we need a way to refer to changes in what we know (or think we know) without actually defining either. That is the essence of my definitions of sets "B" and "C" in the complex post.

Try and follow a thought experiment regarding the following problem: I have some set "A" in my head and I am going to take arbitrary collections of elements of "A" (sets "B") and give them to you. Based on "C" (the entire collection you have so far received) you are to come up with a method of establishing your expectations: i.e., your estimate as to the probability of getting any conceivable specific "B". On a small scale this is a problem given to students all the time: if I gave you a "one" and then gave you a "two" and then a "three", you would probably put a high probability on getting a four. But this problem becomes far more difficult when the number of elements involved become far in excess of number you can think of simultaneously on a conscious level. It is my intention to lay out an analytical method of achieving that result which can be extended to any finite number of elements.

What is important here is to come up with a method of establishing expectations without specifically defining the elements of A. Definitions are very seldom well though out as they are almost always arrived at intuitively. No one knows how intuition manages to achieve the results it does and the process cannot be analytically defended in any detail at all. Defining things before we have any idea as to the rules which determine what elements will occur is a very dangerous intellectual step. On the other hand, we need to have some way of referring to these elements or we cannot think about them at all. So we need a labeling method which does not establish any definition of these elements. I propose that attaching a numerical label to each element of interest is an easy solution. There are an infinite number of such labels and none of the labels need carry any implications as to what it is that is being labeled.

However, establishing such a set of numerical labels does provide one with a list of numbers which maps directly into a referenced set "B" above. Likewise "C" becomes a collection of such lists. This allows one to express the problem to be solved in a very simple manner: if your expectations can be expressed as yes, I expected that "B" or no, that "B" was a surprise or any probabilistic range between the two, then the method used to generate that expectation can be seen as a mathematical function. That is, the set of numbers which constitute the list labeling that "B" are the arguments of the function and the value of the function is your expectation. Since the number of elements in "B" is finite and the number of "B"s in "C" is finite, the function can be seen as a tabular function with a finite number of entries.

Knowing that function (writing down the lists for each "B" you were given) constitutes an explanation per the definition I have put forth. It amounts to the explanation, "it's in the list so I expect to see it". It is at least an exact explanation of the elements you have been given. The tabular function can be thought of as the rule which determines whether or not a particular "B" is possible; some one asks you if you expect to see a certain "B" all you have to do is assign the numerical labels (in what ever way you assigned them) and then check to see if that set is in your table. Now I am not proposing this procedure as a reasonable way to solve a real problem, I am putting it forth to point out an interesting facet of the representation.

Suppose, for the fun of it, someone gave you all the elements but one from some "B" and asked you what element could be added to make that list a valid example of one of the sets you were given. Your table is very close to answering that question. Can anyone out there think of a way to make that result possible in every case?

Think about that question for a while. The correct answer is very enlightening.

Have fun – Doctor Dick

Tournesol

If you are referring to the issue of universals , bare particulars, etc, it does nothing of the kind.


If you stipulate that knowledge means certainty, it turns out that we don't know anyhthing. Which is a bit drastic.


If 'know' is stipulated to mean 'best available hypothesis' that is entirely consistent.

Bobby R

[Quote="As you say, opinions are cheap and common!"]
In July of 2004 “Philocrat” asked a reasonable question about whether Physics could explain everything in the whole universe. I’ve watched this thread and made a few comments myself. Each time I see those who cannot respond without using some negative slur toward those to whom they are unable to respond or understand. I wonder about their own ability to think. I especially focus on the “Common” remark. Books, quotes from the intellect and personal experimentation are sources used by knowledge seekers. However, even the smartest of the smart will blend information with “Common Sense” to formulate an opinion. It is wise to remember, those who choose to degrade the common may expose their own ignorance. Further, the only cheap opinion would be the one without thought. …Bobby R.

Daminc

I've been trying to follow this thread but, quite frankly, I got p*ssed of with DoctorDicks attitude. Canute, you've got a lot more patience than I :)

One of the questions/debates, whatever you want to call it, referred to the meaning of certain words, one of which was 'understanding'.

I've found this definition through a previous research regarding 'communication':

This, in my opinion, is something that DoctorDick (as well as many other people including myself) has to think about.

eNathan

If so, we have no free will

Faust

It's interesting how the original question (Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?) ended up as a debate on communication. Perhaps it's only natural, since the meaning of the question itself is too obscure to have, in my opinion, any relevance. Just thinking about the question from a few different perspectives revealed the potential for confusion, which probably explains why this is the longest running thread here.

Let's start with "can". "Can" everything be reduced to pure physics? Possibly so. "Can" everything be reduced to dogmatic religion? Certainly so. "Can" the whole world be an illusion? Some people say so. The real point for me is, so what? What if something "can" be represented or misinterpreted as being something else? What does that really mean? "Can" the greatest romantic novel, the most profound philosophical teatrise, the most exact scientific theory, be reduced to a collection of the 26 letters of the English alphabet? Of course it can, but the question remains: so what?

I won't even get into the mess of what "everything" is supposed to mean, whether it must be limited to our sensory perceptions of the world or also include abstract ideas such as logic, commonsense, intuition, morals, aesthetics. Or what "reduced" means, whether it means the establishment of a cognitive model for sensory perceptions or the unification of the various academic disciplines. Or what "pure physics" means, whether it is just a bunch of mathematical symbols entirely devoid of meaning in any natural language, such as English, or whether those symbols require an interpretation in terms as vague as "uncertainty", "duality", "relative", which are so often used by modern physicists.

All in all, it's as the old Arab proverb says: "foolish questions beget foolish answers". Something like that.

Doctordick

Well, I am certainly sorry that I p*ss you off; it was never my intention!
And it is exactly that process which interests me. Two things appear to be true: first, the process must begin with no common ground and secondly it appears that at least some understanding can be achieved. As far as I can see, the problem of understanding one another is precisely the problem of understanding anything. And, I would be very pleased to find anyone willing to think about it. I personally have spent a lot of time thinking about it.
Don't you see the similarity between the two questions "can everything be reduced to 'communication'" and all the other possibilities you bring up? Isn't it first essential to establish the pitfalls of comunication before one establishs what is meant by the question? It seems to me we are both talking about the same issue.
The other side of the coin is, "the first step in finding an answer is asking the right question!" By the way, as physics is often held to be "the mother of all exact science", I interpret the reference "pure physics" to mean "exact science" which must be the intention if one is to allow what is included in "physics" to change. (If you don't allow advances, the answer is clearly "no!")

Have fun -- Dick

Faust

I don't know which issue you are talking about, and reading your previous posts hasn't helped me much. In any case, I was only pointing at the vagueness of the question. I think a better-phrased question would have raised a more interesting debate. But that's just my opinion.

I interpret "pure physics" to mean "the study of the movement of particles through space and time". I still think the question needs rephrasing.

Les Sleeth

In my opinion, anytime you see a discussion about something as real as physics turn into a communication debate, then you know rationalistic philosophy has been dominating the dialogue.


I'm going to disagree with you a bit here. I know this is a long thread, but I think early on we established what the question was. It might have degenerated into a semantics battle, but up front I think most everyone was clear that:

"Can" meant is it provable.

"Everything" meant all that exists.

"Reduced" meant, can all that exists be accounted for at this time . . .

"Pure physics" meant physical principles only.


My analysis of the debate is that committed physicalists believe all existence can be explained/accounted for with physical principles alone, but the most honest of the physicalists admit that at this time they can't do it. Those more inclined to exaggerate what physics can explain tried to convince we skeptics physicalism is pretty much a done deal.

My mother didn't raise a dummy, so I ain't buyin' physicalist propaganda. I know, beyond any possible doubt, that physical principles at this time cannot be proven to explain all existence. Further, I doubt that they will EVER account for reality (with proof) in the future, but that's just my personal, unproven opinion. If it's done, then I'd have no choice but to accept the ugly truth of physicalism.