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Ultimate question: Why anything at all? |
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| Mar12-12, 10:39 AM | #290 |
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Ultimate question: Why anything at all? |
| Mar12-12, 11:01 AM | #291 |
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Explication consists in the statement that they Negate each other. To this a definition of Truth should be added together with the basic Laws of Logic And perhaps we are done! (BTW "Everything" seems to be what is neither nothing nor someting.) |
| Mar12-12, 12:14 PM | #292 |
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I have some good news for you - since nothing cannot be, it follows that non-existence cannot be as well. We are all eternal!
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| Mar12-12, 12:15 PM | #293 |
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Corrected for you |
| Mar12-12, 12:53 PM | #294 |
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![]() Death IS not: You will never notice you are dead. to exist is but another word for to be..."exists" = "is" |
| Mar12-12, 01:19 PM | #295 |
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But I have noticed quite a few people's deaths. This is rigorous enough for me as a confirmation that death is/exists. Death is one of those very few things that you are 100% certain that exists. |
| Mar12-12, 01:39 PM | #296 |
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I gave the only answer there is on the topic question... But your question is proper since it may point to an inconsistency in the logic used. Otherwise the normal procedure is to try deriving a paradox,say by: This is not as it is! But honestly I think a logic thread for such matters should be used. Let us use "How to solve the Liar paradox" in Philosophy in General discussions in PF lounge |
| Mar12-12, 06:38 PM | #297 |
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So it is very like a Lie group/gauge symmetry approach in modern particle physics where particles are excitations in a quantum field and the properties of particles are the result of irreducible symmetries - localised constraints that exist/persist because they can't get cancelled away. So all this talk about some-thing, no-thing and every-thing is rather missing the point. A systems ontology sees objects as emergent regularities. And that in turn demands the interaction between global contexts and local potentials. Or in other words, between constraints and degrees of freedom. "Things" are not fundamental! And so set theory is not a good reasoning tool here. The analogy of whorls in a stream is useful. You can't scoop up these turbulent features in a bucket and make a enumerable collection of them. It turns out that the context of the stream was necessary to their existence. http://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=301514 As to Peircean scholarship, there is a ton of it. But also it can be quite daunting as it is a way of thinking that is quite unfamiliar to most unless they have studied systems science or hierarchy theory. And Peirce creates a lot of his own jargon. Plus he was half crazy - like Goedel, probably an occupational hazard. ![]() His basic triadic system is outlined on this Wiki page - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Categories_(Peirce) - And for a taste of his own writing, here is a commentary on the structure of his cosmological argument.... |
| Mar13-12, 06:17 PM | #298 |
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Thanks Apeiron for the reply - I need some time to read everything, including your other thread about Vagueness.
I skimmed through it, and some parts are serendipitously close to a post about the emergence of the laws of physics and their co-evolution with the universe (linked to Davies, Wheeler, etc.) I had half-written and I wanted to submit to this forum - at this point I am not sure I need to post it any more. |
| Mar13-12, 07:07 PM | #299 |
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The universe is not "computing with infinite means" and so this greatly restricts the kinds of laws it can have. By contrast, most cosmological modelling still presumes that existence is unlimited. As with Tegmark's multiverse, the string Landscape, or the Many Worlds interpretation of QM, anything seems possible because there are no material limits to constrain what exists in "lawful" fashion. One face of the "why anything.." question is the corollary "...when there could have been nothing." But just as much of an issue is "why just something when there could have been everything?". The shift Davies is making is from laws as creating cause - things need to be made to happen otherwise they just wouldn't - to laws as restrictions. That is, the problem is how to limit the apparent fecundity of reality to some rational sub-set. Why instead of potential primal chaos have we ended up with a rather orderly, law-bound, universe? Either this is just an anthropic fluke (the prevailing religion of cosmology based on the belief that reality computes with infinite means). Or it might just be that only one stable, persisting and self-consistent outcome was possible. The second view does not necessarily rule out multiverses of course. The "one solution" might be broad enough to include something like Linde's eternal inflation scenario or whatever. So our own existence in a branchlet does become anthropic luck. But it would still be a new direction of thought (or rather, a return to older ones like Peirce, Hegel, and even Anaximander) to argue that the laws of nature are materially constrained and not free to be just anything. At the other end of the scale, as with Wheeler pre-geometry or current loop approaches to extracting regular spacetime from quantum foams, the thinking is the same. If we start with unlimited degrees of freedom and let constraints on those freedoms spontaneously emerge to create lawful order, then was there only ever just one solution possible? |
| Mar14-12, 09:01 AM | #300 |
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| Mar14-12, 09:03 AM | #301 |
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| Mar14-12, 04:33 PM | #302 |
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Why anything exists at all is a somewhat religious question and i am afraid can only be 'answered' within the bounds of religion, i.e. not here. |
| Mar14-12, 08:41 PM | #303 |
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That works for me too as it is a proper generalisation - a universal category rather than some local particular. And as such, it quite directly invokes its dichotomistic "other". Which is what makes it a well-formed idea in metaphysics. So to even want to have a word that denotes the general state or condition of being, there must be the antithetical possibility of non-being. Hegel then unites the two in the third category of becoming in this fashion... In this view, nothingness comes into definite existence along with being. So being is whatever becomes, and in so doing, what it did not become also now distinctly "exists" as non-being. In this fashion, non-being gets granted an absolute kind of non-existence. It is not just defined by an absence of things (like the empty set approach), but by the now demonstrable absence of a generalised thingness (ie: being). And you need there to actually be being for this to happen. If there was no something, there would also be no true nothingness! So you can see how the usual forms of logical argument such as syllogistic reasoning do not work at the highest levels of metaphysics. Like Hegel, Peirce and others, we need to step up a level to logic capable of self-referentiality - one where there is a further dimension of becoming or development, and where the law of the excluded middle does not (yet) apply. So to be clear, the conclusion here is that rather than the existence of something excluding even the possibility of nothing, it is the existence of something that guarantees non-existence is also in fact quite actual - that is, actually and demonstrably non-existent. ![]() Equally, before being became actual, non-being was not actual either. Both shared equal status as mere possiblia - inhabitants of the realm of vagueness, the general ground of becoming. |
| Mar15-12, 08:02 AM | #304 |
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But it is interesting to see that scientists don't proffer a view either. Nor for that matter, have the best philosophers, the deepest thinkers, come up with a hint of an answer, no matter the the complexity of material offered. I don't think any progress has been made on this question in the last 2,500 years. No critisism intended of course - I don't have a clue either. But it certainly IS the ultimate question. |
| Mar16-12, 05:35 PM | #305 |
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Looking for an answer to the question "why there is anything rather than nothing" is, in the strictest sense, a nonsensical question. Observe that merely asking the question "why there is anything" always perceive (recognizes) there is something to begin with. Except for sentient beings of whom "why" questions can be asked, only "what" and "how" questions are relevant to things (and processes) that exist in the universe.
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| Mar16-12, 07:05 PM | #306 |
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![]() In the broad view taken by metaphysics, and holistic modelling in science, there are four "why" questions when it comes to causality. And one of these is final cause - for what pupose, for what ultimate goal? Final cause usually gets subsumbed (concealed?) in natural laws or qualitative concepts. For example, the second law of thermodynamics. Or the principle of adaptive fit in evolutionary theory. These allow us to answer why things are as they are in a teleological sense. Of course, the logical positivist approach to philosophy of science leads people to claim that there is only teleology as epistemology, not teleology as ontology. But that is just a useful belief to simplify modelling IMO. The "why anything" question serves to return us to the fundamentals of causation and its modelling. So we need to be willing to challenge our "simple and convenient" causal or logical beliefs. Not just reassert them. As for your general argument - there is always going to be something, never nothing - well I agree. And that is what then leads to a metaphysics that proposes a further fundamental dimension of development, the trajectory from the vague to the crisp. As Hegel says, nothingness is a crisp concept so can only exist in emergent, contingent, fashion. It is the "everything that is not". And so it cannot itself "be" until there is also the "everything that is". |
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