Difference between "To Cause" and "To Make

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Discussion Overview

The discussion centers on the distinction between "to cause" and "to make" in the context of propositions and their truth values, particularly in relation to logical fatalism and free will. Participants explore the implications of these terms in philosophical arguments about truth and causation.

Discussion Character

  • Debate/contested
  • Conceptual clarification
  • Exploratory

Main Points Raised

  • Some participants assert that a proposition's truth is established by an event occurring, suggesting that the event "makes" the proposition true rather than "causing" it to be true.
  • Others question whether logical fatalism claims that the truth of a proposition causes its manifestation in reality, suggesting that this interpretation may misrepresent the argument.
  • A participant expresses confusion over the difference between making and causing, indicating a lack of clarity in the argument being presented.
  • Another participant emphasizes that stating a proposition does not make it true, arguing that truth is determined through empirical investigation.
  • One participant provides examples involving John Lennon’s death to illustrate that true statements do not cause the events they describe.
  • Some participants agree that making a true statement does not cause the event it describes, but they seek clarification on what position is being argued against.
  • A later reply suggests that the author confuses the instance of a proposition with the proposition itself.
  • One participant critiques the argument, stating that it does not adequately support the thesis of free will, while another participant finds the author's other arguments to be acceptable.
  • Another participant argues that the author needs to demonstrate that the true proposition itself does not determine the event it represents, regardless of any statement made about it.

Areas of Agreement / Disagreement

Participants express differing views on the implications of the distinction between "to cause" and "to make," with some agreeing on the lack of causation in the relationship between propositions and events, while others challenge the clarity and strength of the arguments presented.

Contextual Notes

Participants highlight the need for clearer definitions and distinctions between propositions and their truth values, as well as the implications for discussions on free will and determinism.

Imparcticle
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What's the difference between "to cause" and "to make" in this context:

Consider: My wearing a short-sleeved shirt today [Oct. 28] is what makes (the proposition expressed by) "Swartz is wearing a short-sleeved shirt on Oct. 28, 1997" true. It is not the other way round. Logical fatalism confuses the semantic (truth-making) order. It makes it appear that the truth of a proposition 'causes' an event to occur. It is, rather, that the event's occurring tomorrow 'makes' (but does not cause) the proposition to be true today. This is not 'backwards causation': the relation between an event and the truth of the proposition describing that event is not a causal relation whatever. It is a semantic relation.

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill1.htm#intro


Thankx.
 
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Does logical fatalism really say that the truth of a proposition causes its manifestation in reality? I think Schwarz might be arguing a straw-man here.
 
He's saying that a proposition makes an event true today because it has happened, but he says it does not cause it to be true. I don't see the difference between making and causing something to occur. :confused:
 
I still don't follow his reasoning. A proposition is only a statement. Stating something to be true doesn't make it true. The truth of a statement is determined through empirical investigation.
 
He makes a clearer example following the aforementioned one:
The logic of the preceding paragraph can perhaps be made apparent by switching the example to one of speaking about the past rather than the future.

John Lennon was shot and killed in 1980. Let's suppose a group of ten persons is arguing about the year of his death. Alice says that it was 1976; Betty, that it was 1977; Cathy, that it was 1978; Denise, that it was 1979; Edith, that it was 1980; Freda, that it was 1981; etc.

Of the ten claims made, only Edith's is true. The other nine are false. Now ask yourself: Does Edith's making a true claim today (about the year of Lennon's death) account for Lennon's killing? Did Edith's asserting a truth today about Lennon's killing somehow or other 'force' Mark David Chapman to fire five bullets into Lennon's chest? Of course not. Now what if the year of the discussion were 1975? Alex says, "Lennon will be killed in 1976." Bellamy says that it will happen in 1977. Charles, that it will happen in 1978. Damien, that it will happen in 1979. Eduardo, that it will happen in 1980. Frank, that it will happen in 1981. Graham, that it will happen in 1982. Etc. Of the ten discussants, one, namely Eduardo, gets it 'right'; the other nine make false predictions. Does Eduardo's true prediction (in 1975) somehow or other 'force' Mark David Chapman to fire five bullets into Lennon's chest five years later, in 1980? Of course not.

Similarly you and I can make all sorts of predictions – some true, some false, some on the basis of excellent evidence ("There will be a lunar eclipse on Sept. 19, 2499"), some on the basis of no evidence whatever ("Simon Fraser University will remove all tuition fees in 1999") – but those that are true do not 'force' the predicted events to occur.

does that make sense?
 
Sure. He's saying exactly what I'm saying - that making a true statement does not cause the event the statement is describing to occur. I don't know of anyone who says that it does. This is where my question comes in. What position exactly is he arguing against?
 
He is confusing an instance of a proposition with the proposition itself.
 
loseyourname said:
Sure. He's saying exactly what I'm saying - that making a true statement does not cause the event the statement is describing to occur. I don't know of anyone who says that it does. This is where my question comes in. What position exactly is he arguing against?

The aforementioned quotes are excerpts from his essay which deals with free will. He is arguing free will exists. The quotes I posted are a part of the basis on which he is arguing that the future is not forced and thus there is free will, basically. He has other arguments but that's the basic idea.
 
Imparcticle said:
The aforementioned quotes are excerpts from his essay which deals with free will. He is arguing free will exists. The quotes I posted are a part of the basis on which he is arguing that the future is not forced and thus there is free will, basically. He has other arguments but that's the basic idea.

Stating a proposition doesn't cause an event to occur.
Therefore, the future is not determined.

I hope his other arguments are better, because that aint one to send home to mother.
 
  • #10
His other arguments are okay.
 
  • #11
His argument is incorrect. He argues that stating a proposition which happens to be true does not cause the event which the proposition represents to happen. What he NEEDS to argue, to support his thesis, is that the proposition ITSELF which is true--independent of any statement of it--does not determine (whether by causation or not) the event which it represents.
 

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