to cause and to make?

Consider: My wearing a short-sleeved shirt today [Oct. 28] is what makes (the proposition expressed by) "Swartz is wearing a short-sleeved shirt on Oct. 28, 1997" true. It is not the other way round. Logical fatalism confuses the semantic (truth-making) order. It makes it appear that the truth of a proposition 'causes' an event to occur. It is, rather, that the event's occurring tomorrow 'makes' (but does not cause) the proposition to be true today. This is not 'backwards causation': the relation between an event and the truth of the proposition describing that event is not a causal relation whatever. It is a semantic relation.

The logic of the preceding paragraph can perhaps be made apparent by switching the example to one of speaking about the past rather than the future.

John Lennon was shot and killed in 1980. Let's suppose a group of ten persons is arguing about the year of his death. Alice says that it was 1976; Betty, that it was 1977; Cathy, that it was 1978; Denise, that it was 1979; Edith, that it was 1980; Freda, that it was 1981; etc.

Of the ten claims made, only Edith's is true. The other nine are false. Now ask yourself: Does Edith's making a true claim today (about the year of Lennon's death) account for Lennon's killing? Did Edith's asserting a truth today about Lennon's killing somehow or other 'force' Mark David Chapman to fire five bullets into Lennon's chest? Of course not. Now what if the year of the discussion were 1975? Alex says, "Lennon will be killed in 1976." Bellamy says that it will happen in 1977. Charles, that it will happen in 1978. Damien, that it will happen in 1979. Eduardo, that it will happen in 1980. Frank, that it will happen in 1981. Graham, that it will happen in 1982. Etc. Of the ten discussants, one, namely Eduardo, gets it 'right'; the other nine make false predictions. Does Eduardo's true prediction (in 1975) somehow or other 'force' Mark David Chapman to fire five bullets into Lennon's chest five years later, in 1980? Of course not.

Similarly you and I can make all sorts of predictions – some true, some false, some on the basis of excellent evidence ("There will be a lunar eclipse on Sept. 19, 2499"), some on the basis of no evidence whatever ("Simon Fraser University will remove all tuition fees in 1999") – but those that are true do not 'force' the predicted events to occur.

Sure. He's saying exactly what I'm saying - that making a true statement does not cause the event the statement is describing to occur. I don't know of anyone who says that it does. This is where my question comes in. What position exactly is he arguing against?

The aforementioned quotes are excerpts from his essay which deals with free will. He is arguing free will exists. The quotes I posted are a part of the basis on which he is arguing that the future is not forced and thus there is free will, basically. He has other arguments but that's the basic idea.