 Quote by guigus
Russell's definition, in the form you cited, is just a pedagogical one. You cannot use the concept of a number to define a number, for obvious reasons. Despite that, the definition is rigorously correct. One just needs to reformulate it in a number-free way. I already gave a first formulation: a class of similar classes. That is, a number is a class containing only classes that are similar to each other. Then, you have to define similarity without resorting to the concept of a number. By which the one-to-one correspondence between the elements of any two classes will not suffice, as it still depends on the numbers two and one. Meanwhile, Russell's definition remains correct.
|
The definition does not use the concept of number to define a number. He first defines, for any class, the "
number of a class" as the class of all classes that are similar to it (presumably bijectively), and then goes on defining a "number" as anything that is a "
number of a class". Succinctly; he states that a number is an equivalence class (under bijection) of classes. There is no circularity here (nor pedagogy, but I'll leave it at that).
Sure it is rigorous insofar his system of axioms is, but it is not a definition of what a number is. It is a definition of what he calls "numbers" with respect to his axiomatic system of classes, but it does not encapsulate the general concept of a number. It was proposed, as I understood OP, as a universal definition of what it means to be a number. That simply cannot be done.
Compare with the concept of a function. It has many definitions in different axiomatic settings, but they don't contradict each other, nor are they battling for the status as the "correct" definition of a function. They simply reflect how a function can be treated in the particular setting one find oneself.
The concept of a number, and a function, remains a part of language, not logic.