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  1. Ferris_bg

    Philosophy Forum is closing

    I want to use this post to thank all the people who followed and wrote in this forum. Thank you for the time spend here, we had some very nice discussions and it was always a pleasure to me to read your posts and share my thoughts with you. I wish you all the best guys, and always remember to...
  2. Ferris_bg

    Consciousness and the Ship of Theseus

    You can check this thread out.
  3. Ferris_bg

    A criticism of supervenience-based physicalism

    pftest, as I wrote before in this thread, supervenience does not entail emergence, which your examples illustrate. Supervenience is not emergence. They are not the same thing.
  4. Ferris_bg

    A criticism of supervenience-based physicalism

    pftest, no one knows if mind supervene on brain, that's just the physicalist position. So when one attempts to defend it, one assumes this as true and goes on from there. I can say mind supervene on legs then you can say "yeah, but people with no legs still have minds". Then I can say prove it...
  5. Ferris_bg

    A criticism of supervenience-based physicalism

    I think your example illustrates emergence. And supervenience does not always entail emergence. Supervenience condition: Two systems engaged in the same physical activity will produce identical mentality (if they produce any at all). And, yes, I completely agree that emergence is a...
  6. Ferris_bg

    How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

    How does it feel to be entropy? I suppose good. :)
  7. Ferris_bg

    How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

    The difference between the hard problem of consciousness and the other hard problems for science is in the way the questions "why" have arisen. If we have only our cognitive type of experience, we wouldn't ask questions like "how it feels", but we would still ask questions like "why is there...
  8. Ferris_bg

    How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

    Functionalism falls in the property dualism category (aka non-reductive physicalism). As you can see from the picture in wiki, the mental is considered a "property" of the physical substance. The problem with these types of theories is that they can't account for mental causation aka the mental...
  9. Ferris_bg

    How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

    There is a difference (psychological vs phenomenal) for sure and the Knowledge Argument is still a serious challenge for physicalism.
  10. Ferris_bg

    How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

    Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind-brain identity theory and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory, in philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and can then be correlated with types of physical events...
  11. Ferris_bg

    How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

    We don't know if there are any mental states, which are the same for different individuals. We can only guess. That's why I gave the example with the same person at different ages. What I know from introspection is that the same chemicals can cause me different qualia, but I am also able to...
  12. Ferris_bg

    How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

    Yes, you are right it's not, but its part of what non-reductive physicalism is. [Mind-body supervenience] The mental supervenes on the physical in that any two things (objects, events, organisms, persons, etc.) exactly alike in all physical properties cannot differ in respect of mental...
  13. Ferris_bg

    How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

    Just a quick example clarifying supervenience: We have 2 different brains - B1 and B2. If the mind is identical with the brain these will always produce different mentality (M1 != M2 where B1 = M1 and B2 = M2). // reductive physicalism If the mind supervene on the brain these can...
  14. Ferris_bg

    How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

    That sounds like the Zombie argument from Chalmers, but I don't like it and to be more precise, the word "conceive" in it.
  15. Ferris_bg

    How physicists handle the idea of Free Will?

    Here are the four standard models of mind-body interaction. If we accept that the mind is a property of the whole, then as you say at first it seems logical that the mind influences the whole. There is a however one problem with this assumption and its well illustrated by the Supervenience...
  16. Ferris_bg

    Would artificial intelligence and singularity mean the end of humanity?

    I don't see a problem with the strong AI (lets suppose one day there is such thing), if its more adaptive than the humans, then its quite normal to come the end of homo sapiens. If you think, if we stop aging, we won't need strong AI for such a process, every next generation will at some point...
  17. Ferris_bg

    Mind-body problem-Chomsky/Nagel

    Q_Goest, disregardthat, The idea behind the epiphenomenalist defense is that knowing is certain neural firing. For your BRAIN the mental states and their definitions are just different firing patterns, for YOU they are what we feel. P and M are distinct, but correlated. Imagine how would...
  18. Ferris_bg

    Mind-body problem-Chomsky/Nagel

    Q_Goest, The defense of the epiphenomenalist against the knowledge paradox is that "when Sarah knows that she has a toothache or remembers the feeling she had when she first fell in love, there is a causal chain which leads from the neurophysiological cause of her toothache or her feeling to...
  19. Ferris_bg

    Mind-body problem-Chomsky/Nagel

    Apeiron, let's not repeat the same things again, re-read your own posts and see for yourself in which category the http://philpapers.org/browse/systems-theory" is, I tried my best to explain it (not that it's really something to explain) a few times, I won't do it again however in this thread...
  20. Ferris_bg

    Mind-body problem-Chomsky/Nagel

    You should re-read the post, his argument is against non-reductionism. I already explained it in details in a https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=3202969#post3202969" and told you that the system view, which you support, is a type of NRP. As for the pan-topic, there is a slight...
  21. Ferris_bg

    Mind-body problem-Chomsky/Nagel

    I think physicalism last hope is causal overdetermination. In fact it's a choice between overdetermination and epiphenomenalism, with both facing huge problems. If we discuss the 3 materialistic theories - reductive physicalism, reductive functionalism and non-reductive physicalism, we see...
  22. Ferris_bg

    Mind-body problem-Chomsky/Nagel

    I think we already discussed the https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=485718", and I would love to read PhizzicsPhan's papers and discuss them in a thread dedicated to the panpsychism itself. So PLEASE someone do us all a favor and separate the threads.
  23. Ferris_bg

    Mind-body problem-Chomsky/Nagel

    https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3259211&postcount=157" believes that the mind-body problem is nothing more than a "translation barrier" between the first and third person accounts. So he concludes that "if you can overcome them, the problems vanish". No, they don't, they just get...
  24. Ferris_bg

    Determinism Question - possibility of scientific explanations for human behaviour

    Yes Ken, the materialistic view at life is bleak indeed, however I have good news for you - no one has proved its validity yet. There are some very old problems for the reductive physicalism (http://www.iep.utm.edu/qualia/" [Broken]). It turns out that epiphenomenalism is the most "stable"...
  25. Ferris_bg

    Determinism Question - possibility of scientific explanations for human behaviour

    We had a nice https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=478799" (present in the reductionist view). Free will can be defined as a unique type of downward causation, which the mental state can apply over the physical. And by unique is meant a causation, which would not be the same in two...
  26. Ferris_bg

    Does anyone know what a soul is?

    I_am_learning said it very well, nobody knows. If someday humans solve the consciousness you will have an answer. Until now, if you believe that the mind follows from the matter, you deny the soul, if you think otherwise, you embrace it.
  27. Ferris_bg

    Against solipsism - a form of idealism

    As I said before "the solipsistic mind is less likely to put constraints on itself in a particular universe, instead of interacting with other minds", and I base this assumption on the EV proposition - "as I wrote every decision of an omnipotent being (OB) must have exactly the same expected...
  28. Ferris_bg

    Against solipsism - a form of idealism

    Thanks for the link Singham, Russell's thoughts on solipsism are an interesting read. ryan_m_b, I appreciate your comments on the thread, please explain why you don't agree with the EV proposition and the suggested mechanisms.
  29. Ferris_bg

    Against solipsism - a form of idealism

    As I wrote every decision of an omnipotent being (OB) must have exactly the same expected value (EV) for him. Do you agree with this? The only difference could make his interaction with other OBs, so my hypothetical assumption is based on that. The other minds are just part of his mind. It...
  30. Ferris_bg

    Against solipsism - a form of idealism

    The solipsistic mind would be more likely to act this way, because it will "create something more". It will create permanent dependence with the other minds, not just temporal. But on the other side, if we accept that the solipsistic mind is omnipotent, then its every decision will have exactly...
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