Against "realism" Ok, no problem. That's not a problem, once I indeed favour a Bohmian interpretation. What he describes as naive (out of memory, once we start a new thread about it, I would have to reread it) is naive if taken as an axiom. EPR argue that this special situation follows from locality. Such an argumentation is not naive at all. It is clearly important to recognize that it is the first part of Bell's theorem (and, essentially, the EPR argumentation) that from weak realism and locality follows what is appropriately named "naive realism". Many presentations of the violation of BI fail to recognize this, and from point of view of these presentations it looks like only the "naive realism" (which is, indeed, quite unreasonable to postulate even in classical situations), fails. To give up weak (meatphysical) realism is quite another category. It means to give up the search for realistic explanation with only one reason: One does not like the fact that all realistic explanations require a preferred frame. Then, giving it up does not preserve the realistic versions of Einstein causality or relativistic symmetry: Without reality, they are about nothing, thus, become meaningless anyway. Thus, they have to be given up anyway. No reason to give up metaphysical realism.