This discussion is moved from the thread "my paper on the Born rule" (post #40). The key claim is: Wallace and Greaves and many others seem to accept the claim that if there are naturally distinguishable branches/worlds in the Everett approach, then it is natural to assign probabilities proportional to world counts, producing a difficult conflict with the Born rule. They claim, however, that world counting is incoherent. Page 21 of Wallace's paper cited above gives the most elaboration I've seen defending this view. How correct is their claim? Are world counts incoherent in all contexts, or only in some? In particular, are they coherent in this situation of most interest to me: counting arguments suggest that relative to the parent world where we started testing the Born rule, our world is very unusual, having seen measurement statistics close to the Born rule, while the vast majority of worlds should instead see near uniform measurement statistics. In posts to follow, I'll quote Wallace's argument, and offer my own opinions.