I agree, I should not have called it an "accident". Not just the breaking of ERT procedures but the crash in the first place - calling any of this an accident implies it was inevitable, when in fact it was preventable.Yes, it is news because if it happens in the future at SFO we might not have the evidence of it happening. To call it an accident IMO is much too nice term for the lack of following basic ERT procedures.
We should debate who's at 'fault' in this accident response case. The NTSB is doing it with the crew of the plane. Criminal charges are not on the table, proper training and actions should be examined and there is very little incentive for the city to look very deeply into it.Using this kind of "news" now day's gives them a chance to debate who's at fault. Go figure.
How about a sign in the windshield of each pilot that saysHowever, Asiana argued that the pilots and co-pilot believed the automatic throttle would keep the plane going fast enough to reach the runway — when in fact the auto throttle was effectively disengaged after the pilot idled it to correct an unexplained climb earlier in the landing.
I can't give you a reference, but counter-intuitively, monitoring airspeed on final approach is usually NOT done, because (as in this incident) you don't have time to take any meaningful action if the airspeed is wrong. So diverting your attention away from monitoring other things to check the airspeed is counter productive.How about a sign in the windshield of each pilot that says
"Plane does not fly by its self, always monitor airspeed"
normal approach and landingBy midfield downwind, complete pre-landing checklist.
For Commercial, establish proper landing configuration.
- Gear down.
- Cowl flaps closed.
- Prop full forward (when manifold pressure below 15 in.)
Abeam touchdown point, add carb heat and reduce power.
Maintain altitude and level pitch attitude momentarily to dissipate airspeed.
Retrim aircraft to establish airspeed within flap operating range (white arc).
Lower flaps to 10 degrees.
Establish initial approach airspeed (1.4 Vso); retrim if necessary.
- Explain how airspeeds are arrived at (mfr.’s recommended airspeed, minimum airspeeds, and Vfe).
At 45-degree point from the landing threshold, clear for traffic and turn base.
Extend flaps and retrim if necessary to maintain approach airspeed; apply wind drift correction.
Lead turn to final to roll out on runway extended centerline.
Once the field is assured, extend final flaps.
Adjust pitch for desired airspeed and power for rate of descent.
Emphasize importance of monitoring airspeed.
76 Mar 31, 2014 Air Cruisers Submission
177 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Accident Investigation Submissions
178 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Submission Appendix A
179 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Submission Appendix B
180 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Airlines Submission Appendix C
181 Mar 31, 2014 Asiana Pilots Union Submission
182 Mar 31, 2014 Boeing Submission
183 Mar 31, 2014 Letter from KARAIB
Oh well, just let it crash? That really makes no sense. And no, the approach is not so fast that you don't have time to correct if something is wrong. That's kinda the whole point of a missed-approach procedure.I can't give you a reference, but counter-intuitively, monitoring airspeed on final approach is usually NOT done, because (as in this incident) you don't have time to take any meaningful action if the airspeed is wrong. So diverting your attention away from monitoring other things to check the airspeed is counter productive.
What is "everything else"? There are really only three main issues to deal with continuously:If everything else about the approach is correct, the laws of physics mean the airspeed will also be correct. The problem here seems to be that nobody on the flight deck decided the entire approach was sufficiently FUBAR that the best decision would have been to go round and try again.
Reprimanding Johnson "sent a bad message throughout the department that getting to the bottom of something, getting to the truth, may not always be to your benefit," Smith said.
Randle said Johnson was being disciplined for doing the right thing.
"The goal appeared to have been to punish him for bringing the video to the attention of the department, which would never have disclosed what had occurred had it not been for the video," Randle said. "This amounted to punishing Mark for being honest in turning in the video."
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the flight crew’s mismanagement of the airplane’s descent during the visual approach, the pilot flying’s unintended deactivation of automatic airspeed control, the flight crew’s inadequate monitoring of airspeed, and the flight crew’s delayed execution of a go-around after they became aware that the airplane was below acceptable glidepath and airspeed tolerances. Contributing to the accident were; (1) the complexities of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems that were inadequately described in Boeing’s documentation and Asiana’s pilot training, which increased the likelihood of mode error; (2) the flight crew’s nonstandard communication and coordination regarding the use of the autothrottle and autopilot flight director systems; (3) the pilot flying’s inadequate training on the planning and executing of visual approaches; (4) the pilot monitoring/instructor pilot’s inadequate supervision of the pilot flying; and (5) flight crew fatigue which likely degraded their performance.