Is Hussein's power over Iraq overstated?

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In summary: UN ambassador in line?In summary, John Bolton is making the outrageous claim that professionals in our intelligence community produced a "political" document (NIE) with the intent of making policy. The guy is a certifiable loon. 16 separate intelligence agencies had to come up with a consensus assessment, and the findings contained in the NIE must of necessity be moderate and qualified. The truth is probably a lot starker and more clear-cut, but the conclusions were moderated to accommodate doubts and uncertainties. The fact that Cheney et al held up this NIE for over a year suggests that the version drafted in 2006 may have been even more direct and more certain about the cessation of Iran's weapons program.
  • #1
turbo
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John Bolton is making the outrageous claim that professionals in our intelligence community produced a "political" document (NIE) with the intent of making policy. The guy is a certifiable loon. He would have us believe that the analysts and administrators of 16 separate intelligence agencies conspired to down-play the danger posed by Iran. To anybody who has thought this through, the concept is absurd on the face of it. These 16 intelligence agencies had to come up with a consensus assessment, and the findings contained in the NIE must of necessity be moderate and qualified. The truth is probably a lot starker and more clear-cut, but the conclusions were moderated to accommodate doubts and uncertainties. The fact that Cheney et al held up this NIE for over a year suggests that the version drafted in 2006 may have been even more direct and more certain about the cessation of Iran's weapons program.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/05/AR2007120502234.html

Bolton is not letting this die. He is beating the war-drum for the neo-cons, and attacking the loyalty and integrity of the employees of each of the 16 intelligence agencies in the process.
 
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  • #2
turbo-1 said:
Bolton is not letting this die. He is beating the war-drum for the neo-cons, and attacking the loyalty and integrity of the employees of each of the 16 intelligence agencies in the process.

no wonder:

Iran stops accepting U.S. dollars for oil
16:34 | 08/ 12/ 2007

TEHRAN, December 8 (RIA Novosti) - Iran has stopped selling its oil for U.S. dollars, the Iranian ISNA news agency said on Saturday, citing the country's oil minister.

"In line with a policy of selling crude oil in currencies other than the U.S. dollar, the sale of our country's oil in U.S. dollars has been completely eliminated," ISNA reported Oil Minister Gholamhossein Nozari as saying.

He also said "the dollar is no longer a reliable currency."
http://en.rian.ru/world/20071208/91488137.html

It's simple. As Bush/Cheney/etc have demonstrated with Iraq, US politicians don't care what the facts are. They're going to do whatever they want & nobody's going to stop them, especially not the Democrats.
 
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  • #3
That could hurt. It will be interesting to see what happens in the next few days and week on the world currency markets. The euro, yen and yuan would presumably strengthen.

Maybe a mixed blessing perhaps. Good if US exports increase, but not so good if cost of imports increases.
 
  • #4
My Guess:

Bolton usually just reads talking points, but when he does think it's with his mustache.

In his defense it is a rather powerful mustache.
 
  • #5
Astronuc said:
That could hurt. It will be interesting to see what happens in the next few days and week on the world currency markets. The euro, yen and yuan would presumably strengthen.

Maybe a mixed blessing perhaps. Good if US exports increase, but not so good if cost of imports increases.
Costs of imports increasing is not as much of a problem, since aside from energy, much of these purchases are discretionary and quite a bit of the market is captive. If the profit-margins of chip-makers are depressed, they can absorb some of that. The US is a huge market for PCs and our market crucial to the financial health of the producers, even if the dollar is depressed. Toys, gadgets, and other stuff that is not essential will go unsold if prices in the US rise, leading to price reductions so that China, etc, can keep production up. Don't expect soaring prices on discretionary goods. China relies on cheap labor and very little oversight to streamline production, so decoupling energy costs from the value of the dollar should not have a huge effect on them. They can dump stuff here very cheaply even if their energy costs increase steeply. Also, they are heavily invested in the dollar, and will not allow that huge foreign investment to collapse, so expect more Chinese investment if the dollar sags. Tips from a dummy.
 
  • #7
I'm not sure if I should be mad because it feels like you're just trying to distract me with a monkey, or be mad at the fact that it's working.
 
  • #8
GleefulNihilism said:
I'm not sure if I should be mad because it feels like you're just trying to distract me with a monkey, or be mad at the fact that it's working.
He's cuter (and considerably wiser-looking) than Bolton. :rofl: He is equally stern-looking with at least as much real justification as Bolton. Do we have a new UN ambassador in line?
 
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  • #9
turbo-1 said:
He's cuter (and considerably wiser-looking) than Bolton. :rofl: He is equally stern-looking with at least as much real justification as Bolton. Do we have a new UN ambassador in line?

You have a problem with the current UN ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, as well?
 
  • #10
BobG said:
You have a problem with the current UN ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, as well?
He has been echoing the neocon line that Iran has a nuclear weapons program and needs to be stopped. He is not as outspoken and radical as Bolton, but he is a hawk - not the kind of person that we need in the UN. These guys get regular briefings on intelligence and they know (and have known for a long time) that the intelligence contradicts their claims about Iran, yet they persist in pushing Iran with sanctions and military threats with no attempt at diplomacy. These people are reckless.
 
  • #11
turbo-1 said:
These people are reckless.
"These people" ?
 
  • #12
mheslep said:
"These people" ?
Yes, these people. Cheney, Wolfowitz, Bolton, Bush, Khalilzad and all the other hawks in the administration who are trying to push us into another war by making claims that are contradicted by the intelligence. When the CIA, the NSA, and 14 other intelligence agencies can issue a consensus report (remember, that means that all of them have to agree to the wording) that says "with a high level of confidence" that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program 4 years ago, that's a pretty firm assesment. The neocons in this administration have been claiming all this last year that Iran has an active weapons program when they knew last fall that the NIE flatly contradicted that assertion. Then they send out Bolton and others to "refute" the NIE and claim that the intelligence agencies conspired to use the NIE to further some political agenda. He provides not a shred of evidence to support that assertion - he just floats it out there hoping that citizens of the US are stupid enough to fall for the lies and warmongering again. Remember WMDs, yellow-cake, Saddam's ties to Al Qaeda? All false.
 
  • #13
turbo-1 said:
When the CIA, the NSA, and 14 other intelligence agencies can issue a consensus report (remember, that means that all of them have to agree to the wording) that says "with a high level of confidence" that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program 4 years ago, that's a pretty firm assesment.
But that's the only part of the report that's not agreed upon:
Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to these represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear weapons program.
Wait a minute... Isn't the NIC the author of the NIE? Why did they exclude themselves? Maybe that's what Bolton meant by:
Fifth, many involved in drafting and approving the NIE were not intelligence professionals but refugees from the State Department, brought into the new central bureaucracy of the director of national intelligence. These officials had relatively benign views of Iran's nuclear intentions five and six years ago; now they are writing those views as if they were received wisdom from on high. In fact, these are precisely the policy biases they had before, recycled as "intelligence judgments."
 
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  • #14
turbo-1 said:
Yes, these people. Cheney, Wolfowitz, Bolton, Bush, Khalilzad and all the other hawks in the administration who are trying to push us into another war by making claims that are contradicted by the intelligence. When the CIA, the NSA, and 14 other intelligence agencies can issue a consensus report (remember, that means that all of them have to agree to the wording) that says "with a high level of confidence" that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program 4 years ago, that's a pretty firm assesment. The neocons in this administration have been claiming all this last year that Iran has an active weapons program when they knew last fall that the NIE flatly contradicted that assertion. Then they send out Bolton and others to "refute" the NIE and claim that the intelligence agencies conspired to use the NIE to further some political agenda. He provides not a shred of evidence to support that assertion - he just floats it out there hoping that citizens of the US are stupid enough to fall for the lies and warmongering again. Remember WMDs, yellow-cake, Saddam's ties to Al Qaeda? All false.

Neither Wolfowitz nor Bolton are part of the Bush administration anymore. They both belong to the American Enterprise Institute (aka Administration Exile Institute) along with Perle, Yoo, and David Frum.

Gen Tommy Franks once called Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith "the dumbest [expletive] guy on the planet." I'm not sure you could reach a consensus on that. They should scrap the polls and go to a play-off system among the guys we had developing an Iraq plan.

Only came to mind because Feith (who actually did find a job post-Bush), visited his old cronies at the AEI and blamed the mess in Iraq on Bremer. Should be interesting once all the books come out pointing the finger at the other guys in government. Dang - a playoff system after all!
 
  • #15
:rofl: Bolton's article is so badly written as to be laughable.

Here are my favorite parts (from the same link Turbo provided already in the OP):
Consider these flaws in the NIE's "key judgments," which were made public even though approximately 140 pages of analysis, and reams of underlying intelligence, remain classified.

Then, later follows with:
Second, the NIE is...insufficiently supported.

So, let's see, there are 140 pages of analysis and reams of underlying intelligence that are classified, so he is not privy to their contents nor are the rest of us, yet he has determined that even knowing this, he can judge whether the claims are sufficiently or insufficiently supported? If you KNOW there are large amounts of evidence you have not seen, why would you jump to the assumption there isn't support for the claims when it's just as likely the support is simply among those classified documents?
 
  • #16
Moonbear said:
So, let's see, there are 140 pages of analysis and reams of underlying intelligence that are classified, so he is not privy to their contents nor are the rest of us, yet he has determined that even knowing this, he can judge whether the claims are sufficiently or insufficiently supported? If you KNOW there are large amounts of evidence you have not seen, why would you jump to the assumption there isn't support for the claims when it's just as likely the support is simply among those classified documents?

Par for the course.
 
  • #17
turbo-1 said:
... Remember WMDs, yellow-cake, Saddam's ties to Al Qaeda?
WMD, agreed.
Ties to AQ? No. The ties may have been not responsibly checked, exaggerated even, nonetheless Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was in Iraq while Saddam was still in power. The connection between AQ and the regime is disputed, but clearly not demonstrated false.
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/13jul20041400/www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/s108-301/sec12.pdf", starting pg 334
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1089901831124_85311031/?hub=World" (before Iraq war)
http://http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&ct=res&cd=1&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.9-11commission.gov%2Freport%2F911Report.pdf&ei=9vZeR_PQEI-6zQShyvg2&usg=AFQjCNHGlh1FX-h5OMtRGzOky5zJfmQnbQ&sig2=m8ERVaAxSYu7-G2DdIV1ew" (only listed as Iraq/AQ connection - please no strawmen about the actual 911 attack)
According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq.
 
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  • #18
turbo-1 said:
John Bolton is making the outrageous claim that professionals in our intelligence community produced a "political" document (NIE) with the intent of making policy. The guy is a certifiable loon. He would have us believe that the analysts and administrators of 16 separate intelligence agencies conspired to down-play the danger posed by Iran.

No he wouldn't. He'd have us believe that a handful of deputy principals shepherding the NIE through the draft process arranged and worded findings for a political purpose. He's not questioning the substance of the intelligence at all, nor does he have to. The key judgments indicating the IC's confident belief that Iran had a nuclear weapons program as late as 2003 and that the likelihood Iran can acquire weapons goes up as early as 2009 pretty much justifies the Administration's current policy. So unless you're the type who's trusting enough of Tehran to think this NIE proves Iran has given up now evidenced ambitions for nuclear weapons--a view Bolton accuses the coordinating deputies of holding--then you can't ignore the NIE's judgment that their enrichment capacity will open the door for to Iranian nukes in short order.

Bolton is not letting this die. He is beating the war-drum for the neo-cons, and attacking the loyalty and integrity of the employees of each of the 16 intelligence agencies in the process.

Why not? Should Beltway desk jockies get a permanent honeymoon from criticism? And if the process that produced NIEs are so free from political concerns, why do people leak'em piecemeal? Let's face it, there's likely guys at State or Langley who feel as politically passionate as you do. The only difference is that you don't get paid to have your views color the facts.
 
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  • #19
mheslep said:
WMD, agreed.
Ties to AQ? No. The ties may have been not responsibly checked, exaggerated even,
And this is not a big deal?

nonetheless Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was in Iraq while Saddam was still in power. The connection between AQ and the regime is disputed, but clearly not demonstrated false.
The administration claimed it was true when it clearly was not demonstrably true. That is the crux of the argument.

Besides, the argument about Zarqawi and the sleeper cells only reveals the following (from your second link):

"Reporting since (February) suggests that senior al Qaeda associate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has established sleeper cells in Baghdad, to be activated during a U.S. occupation of the city."

The reported added: "These cells apparently intend to attack U.S. targets using car bombs and other weapons. (It is also possible that they have received CB materials from terrorists in the KAZ)," referring to chemical and biological materials and the Kurdish Autonomous Zone. "Al Qaeda-associated terrorists continued to arrive in Baghdad in early March."
So, at best, we have Zarqawi setting up base in Baghdad long after the US decision to invade Iraq was essentially established (i.e., the US invasion was what was responsible for Zarqawi's presence in Iraq).

http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/13jul20041400/www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/s108-301/sec12.pdf", starting pg 334

Before going as far as pg. 334, one reads the following:
(U) Following the publication of the October 2001 paper, the CTC began drafting another paper that would eventually become Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship. The paper was drafted based on widely expressed interest on the part of several senior policy makers, according to CIA. Throughout the drafting process (October 2001 to June 2002), the two offices took different approaches to assessing Iraq’s links to terrorism as a result of their different missions and perspectives. According to the CIA’s Ombudsman for Politicization, the CTC was aggressive in drawing connections to try to produce information that could be used to support counterterrorism operations, while the NESA took a traditional analytic approach, confirming intelligence with multiple sources and making assessments only based on strongly supported reporting. Analysts worked on several drafts over the eight month drafting period, but CTC management found them unsatisfactory and ultimately produced a draft without NESA’s coordination.

(U) The Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) directed that Iraq and ul-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship be published on June 21,2002, although it did not reflect the NESA’s views. CTC’s explanation of its approach to this study and the analysts’ differing views were contained in the paper’s Scope Note, which stated:

(U) This intelligence assessment responds to senior policymaker interest in a comprehensive assessment of Iraqi regime links to al-Qa’ida. Our approach is purposefully aggressive in seeking to draw connections, on the assumption that any indication of a relationship between these two hostile elements could carry great dangers to the United States.
 
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  • #20
Gokul43201 said:
The administration claimed it was true when it clearly was not demonstrably true. That is the crux of the argument.

Except, of course, there's no intelligence contradicting this judgment.

Besides, the argument about Zarqawi and the sleeper cells only reveals the following (from your second link):

So, at best, we have Zarqawi setting up base in Baghdad long after the US decision to invade Iraq was essentially established (i.e., the US invasion was what was responsible for Zarqawi's presence in Iraq).

By that reasoning, you could argue that the threat of invasion prompted the September 11th attacks as well. After all, Baghdad lived under that threat for 12 years prior to March 2003. In fact, this is a fairly common argument amongst Iraq War proponents.

Before going as far as pg. 334, one reads the following:

Murky was drafted by principals from two offices answering two separate questions. We can infer that CTC's objective was to identify any possible avenue of cooperation between al Qaeda and Iraq whereas NESA sought to determine whether or not available intelligence supported, ruled out, or inclusively addressed operational activity along those pipelines. The answer policymakers got back is "yes, we have links, but we're unable to tell you whether or not these links translate into operational cooperation."

From this point on, it's a judgment call as to whether or not it's appropriate to assume that connections between al Qaeda and Iraq should be treated as operational. That depends entirely on your view of the risks associated. I imagine Zarqawi's return to Iraq in 2002 and a spike in activity in Ansar al-Islam led policymakers to heavily favor a dimmer perspective.
 
  • #21
Pelt said:
Except, of course, there's no intelligence contradicting this judgment.
There's also no intelligence contradicting my assertion that there are nuclear jellyfish being bred by DPRK.

By that reasoning, you could argue that the threat of invasion prompted the September 11th attacks as well.
Except, of course, that Baghdad had nothing to do with 9/11.

Murky was drafted by principals from two offices answering two separate questions. We can infer that CTC's objective was to identify any possible avenue of cooperation between al Qaeda and Iraq whereas NESA sought to determine whether or not available intelligence supported, ruled out, or inclusively addressed operational activity along those pipelines. The answer policymakers got back is "yes, we have links, but we're unable to tell you whether or not these links translate into operational cooperation."

From this point on, it's a judgment call as to whether or not it's appropriate to assume that connections between al Qaeda and Iraq should be treated as operational. That depends entirely on your view of the risks associated. I imagine Zarqawi's return to Iraq in 2002 and a spike in activity in Ansar al-Islam led policymakers to heavily favor a dimmer perspective.
This is perfectly fine. What is unacceptable, however, is for instance, Cheney's repeated claims of overwhelming evidence of operational support.
 
  • #22
Gokul43201 said:
This is perfectly fine. What is unacceptable, however, is for instance, Cheney's repeated claims of overwhelming evidence of operational support.
The idea that Saddam would tolerate the presence of militant fundamentalist Muslim groups in Iraq is ridiculous. He would have stamped them out ruthlessly as soon as his intelligence apparatus discovered them. Cheney and the other neocons knew this, but they figured that the US public would be too stupid to figure this out. Turns out that they were right - the press repeated these stupid neocon assertions and the public lapped them up. The reason that the West and most Arab countries supported Saddam was because he was a bulwark against fundamentalists. They even looked aside when he gassed the Kurds because of his perceived value in keeping the ME stable.
 
  • #23
Gokul43201 said:
There's also no intelligence contradicting my assertion that there are nuclear jellyfish being bred by DPRK.

Sure there is. The lack of any reporting of nuclear jellyfish breeding in any country with a far more resourceful nuclear and biological capability. Perhaps you're confusing intelligence with scientific evidence?

Except, of course, that Baghdad had nothing to do with 9/11.

If you believe that, then you probably shouldn't reason a connection between al Qaeda and Baghdad based on the threat of invasion.

This is perfectly fine. What is unacceptable, however, is for instance, Cheney's repeated claims of overwhelming evidence of operational support.

First of all, the VP said there was overwhelming support of "links," not "operational support" (i.e., participation in any specific al Qaeda operation). The question of what is "overwhelming," particularly in intelligence, is a judgment call (as evidenced by the two separate objectives in drafting Murky). It's up to decision-makers, not providers, to determine whether or not some collation of product supports a policy. That not only includes the Administration but at least the Select Intelligence committee members in Congress as well.
 
  • #24
turbo-1 said:
The idea that Saddam would tolerate the presence of militant fundamentalist Muslim groups in Iraq is ridiculous. He would have stamped them out ruthlessly as soon as his intelligence apparatus discovered them.

Of course, that judgment is directly contradicted by the physical presence of militant fundamentalist Muslim groups--IMI and its descendant Ansar al Islam operated in Sulaymaniyah.
 
  • #25
Pelt said:
Of course, that judgment is directly contradicted by the physical presence of militant fundamentalist Muslim groups--IMI and its descendant Ansar al Islam operated in Sulaymaniyah.
You forgot to mention that they were deep in the Kurdish zone, and that the Kurds had established a high degree of autonomy under US enforcement of the "no fly" zones. Saddam was not tolerant of religious fundamentalism and under his rule, Iraq was the most secular of the Arab states.
 
  • #26
mheslep said:
WMD, agreed.
Ties to AQ? No. The ties may have been not responsibly checked, exaggerated even, nonetheless Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was in Iraq while Saddam was still in power. The connection between AQ and the regime is disputed, but clearly not demonstrated false.
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/13jul20041400/www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/pdf/s108-301/sec12.pdf", starting pg 334
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1089901831124_85311031/?hub=World" (before Iraq war)
http://http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&ct=res&cd=1&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.9-11commission.gov%2Freport%2F911Report.pdf&ei=9vZeR_PQEI-6zQShyvg2&usg=AFQjCNHGlh1FX-h5OMtRGzOky5zJfmQnbQ&sig2=m8ERVaAxSYu7-G2DdIV1ew" (only listed as Iraq/AQ connection - please no strawmen about the actual 911 attack)

Gokul43201 said:
And this is not a big deal?

The administration claimed it was true when it clearly was not demonstrably true. That is the crux of the argument.
I agree it is a big deal, but one can not make that point or hold the govt. accountable by making false assertions. The claim from post #12 was simply "...Ties to Al Queda. All false". That is unsupportable as clearly shown by the cites.
 
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  • #27
turbo-1 said:
You forgot to mention that they were deep in the Kurdish zone...

If Halabja is deep in the Kurdish zone, the so is Kirkuk. The city lies in territory that US-PUK combined forces had to take back from Ansar al Islam and Iraqi Army in the last days of March 2003.

...and that the Kurds had established a high degree of autonomy under US enforcement of the "no fly" zones.

Both Kirkuk, Halabja--in fact, most of Sulaymaniyah--lie south of the Northern no-fly zone.

Saddam was not tolerant of religious fundamentalism and under his rule, Iraq was the most secular of the Arab states.

The most secular? What about Egypt or Syria, neither of which happens to have one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam located within its borders? Hussein was not above appealing to Islamism when it suited him. He did it in 1980, he did it in 1991 and he did it repeated between his ejection from Kuwait straight through to Iraqi Freedom. The man did have a tribal and religious constituency in Anbar, Saladin, and Ninevah too look after.

mheslep said:
I agree it is a big deal, but one can not make that point or hold the govt. accountable by making false assertions. The claim from post #12 was simply "...Ties to Al Queda. All false". That is unsupportable as clearly shown by the cites.

Regardless of the breadth and depth of Hussein's relationship with al Qaeda prior to the invasion, the 2006-7 flare up in sectarian violence after the Samarra attack makes one thing clear: alliances between radical Sunni Islamists and Baathists in the insurgency is deadly enough without state power behind it. Anyone whose seen Sunni factions operate in Saladin and Anbar can testify to that.
 
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  • #28
Timing is everything. During the US invasion, Ansar al-Islam controlled a small area in northern Iraq on the Iranian border. Do you contend that Hussein was in a position to wipe them out at that time? I think not. It's not like they set up shop in Baghdad when he still had control. Hussein kept a tight rein on religious fundamentalists.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansar_al-Islam
 
  • #29
turbo-1 said:
Timing is everything. During the US invasion, Ansar al-Islam controlled a small area in northern Iraq on the Iranian border. Do you contend that Hussein was in a position to wipe them out at that time? I think not. It's not like they set up shop in Baghdad when he still had control.

Hussein most certainly was in a position to deal with Halabja. He had a whole year to deal with them, and even Republican Guard in the area at his disposal (those units didn't "leave" until they got their asses handed to them on 29 March 2003). Instead, Hussein was quite content to watch Ansar al-Islam terrorize Halabja and then launch attacks into PUK controlled territory.

Hussein kept a tight rein on religious fundamentalists.

Did he? So that 1991 Shia uprising was nothing? Come on. The man's rein on radical Islamists extended insofar as he kept his constituents in al-Anbar and Ninevah happy. When his plan to resist the invasion collapsed in March 2003, the Baathists had to turn to especially the Anbar Islamic nationalists to carry on the fight. He brutalized Shiis and even Sunnis when the need arose, but the fact remains that even Baathist Iraq was unable to suppress the strong influence of al Dawa, SCIRI and Sadr in Najaf and Karbala, Sufi Sunnah in Saladin, or Salafism in Ninevah and Anbar. Like many other dictators before him, Hussein survived as much by making and breaking alliances with pressure groups as he did by suppressing them.

Had the Baathists succeeded in organizing their resistance movement before the fall of Baghdad, their component of the insurgency might not have largely collapsed within a year and been absorbed by the emerging Sunni sheikhs to the west. Instead, the Coalition did what no one expected, got to Baghdad in three weeks and destroyed any semblance of organization in the Fedayeen Saddam. It took half a year for Awda to reemerge from the shadows of the precursors of the Mujahadin Supreme Council and Islamic Army and even then it was a pale shadow of its intended self. After all, it had already loss Uday Hussein and by the time it announced Saddam was in prison.
 
  • #30
Pelt said:
... Like many other dictators before him, Hussein survived as much by making and breaking alliances with pressure groups as he did by suppressing them.
Exactly.
Hussein's support of the Palestinian http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/04/03/world/main505316.shtml" is another example; if those same Palestinians had tried to run a popular movement inside Iraq that in anything posed a challenge the Bathist rule then Hussein would have no doubt squashed them too.

-------------
Happy Holidays All
 
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  • #31
mheslep said:
Exactly.
Hussein's support of the Palestinian http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/04/03/world/main505316.shtml" is another example; if those same Palestinians had tried to run a popular movement inside Iraq that in anything posed a challenge the Bathist rule then Hussein would have no doubt squashed them too.

-------------
Happy Holidays All

It's surprisingly easy to overestimate the man, especially now that he's dead and Iraq these days is so full of life in many of the worst possible ways. But consider this. After the 1991 uprisings, Hussein failed to quell the Kurdish rebellion and essentially lost most of the territory north of Kirkuk. In the South, he never managed to stamp out Shia imams no matter how hard he tried--the man did his level best to wipe out the Sadrs and still the son managed to raise the second largest private army in Iraq within months of Baghdad's fall. Also, the 1991 uprising itself is spectacular in its scope both in geography and daring. Honestly, it's remarkable Hussein did as well as he did in 1991. Baathist rule over Iraq was concentric, with Baghdad fully under Hussein's control and the outlying governorates held in check by frequent kleptomania and occasional brutality. It was also nothing compared to Hafez al Assad's hold on Syria.
 
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1. What evidence supports the idea that Hussein's power over Iraq is overstated?

There are several pieces of evidence that suggest Hussein's power over Iraq may have been exaggerated. One is the fact that he was overthrown and captured by the US-led coalition in 2003, indicating that he did not have complete control over the country. Additionally, there were numerous uprisings and rebellions against his rule throughout his tenure, suggesting that not all Iraqis were under his control.

2. Why do some people believe that Hussein's power was not as strong as it seemed?

Some people believe that Hussein's power was not as strong as it seemed because of the propaganda and fear tactics used by his regime. The media was heavily controlled by the government, and any dissent or opposition was met with severe consequences. This created the illusion of a strong and stable regime, when in reality, there were many underlying issues and discontent among the population.

3. Was Hussein's power over Iraq primarily based on fear?

While fear played a significant role in maintaining Hussein's power, it was not the only factor. He also used patronage and bribery to gain loyalty from certain groups and maintain control. Additionally, his Ba'ath party had a strong ideology that appealed to many Iraqis, and he was able to use this to his advantage in gaining support.

4. Did Hussein's power over Iraq extend beyond its borders?

Hussein's power did extend beyond Iraq's borders to some extent. He had a strong influence in the Middle East region, particularly through his involvement in conflicts such as the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. However, his power and influence were limited compared to other regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.

5. How has the perception of Hussein's power changed over time?

The perception of Hussein's power has changed over time, especially after his downfall in 2003. Before the US-led invasion, he was often portrayed as a strong and ruthless dictator, but after his capture and execution, his image shifted to that of a weak and cowardly leader. However, some still view him as a symbol of Iraqi nationalism and resistance against foreign intervention.

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