Fine, but completely irrelevant to the point I was making here. The definition of understanding I refer to requires consciousness. You may “disagree” with the definition in the sense that you mean something different when you use the term, but that is completely irrelevant.moving finger said:(a) you have already agreed that your definition of understanding is not the only definitionTisthammerw said:Again, when I said “understanding requires consciousness” I was explicitly referring to my definitions, not necessarily everybody else’s
(b) I have said many times that I do not agree with your definition. In my definition, it is not clear that understanding requires consciousness.
Since I was (rather explicitly) referring to only my definition, it follows that we necessarily agree that the statement using those terms is analytic!Since we do not agree on the definitions of the terms we are using, it follows that we do not necessarily agree that a statement using those terms is analytic!
It’s so blatantly obvious that it is worth repeating:It’s so blatantly obvious that it is worth repeating :
We can only agree on which statements are analytic and which are not if we firstly agree on the definitions of the terms we are using
I was only referring to my definitions of the terms when I claimed the statement was analytic.
Do you understand this?
Program X is a placeholder for any alleged program that would allegedly produce TH-understanding. If I have shown that no TH-understanding comes about even when program X is run, what would you conclude? If you do not think I have shown this, please answer my questions regarding this matter (e.g. do you believe that the combination of the man, the rulebook etc. somehow creates a separate consciousness that understands Chinese?). Simply saying “you have not shown this” does nothing to answer my questions or to address the points of my argument.If the agent is not conscious it cannot possess TH-Understanding, by definition.Tisthammerw said:program X stands for any program that would allegedly produce understanding (the kind of understanding I am referring to is what you have called TH-understanding). And yet we see that program X is run without TH-understanding.
This does not mean that all possible computers are incapable of possessing either consciousness or TH-Understanding, and you have not shown this to be the case.
You’ll get no argument from me about that.By your definition of TH-Understanding, TH-Understanding requires consciousness. Period.
True, and “MF-understanding does not require consciousness” is another way of saying “understanding does not require consciousness with the definition of understanding moving finger is using.”“TH-understanding requires consciousness” is another way of saying ““understanding requires consciousness with the definition of understanding that Tisthammerw is using”Tisthammerw said:So, “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytical statement (with the definitions I am using). Or if you prefer, “TH-understanding requires consciousness.”
Sorry, I misspoke here. It should have read:Does this question make any sense to you? It doesn’t to me.Tisthammerw said:If you consider the question of whether a computer can have TH-understanding (perceive the meaning of words etc.) what the @#$% are you doing replying to my posts?
If you consider the question of whether a computer can have TH-understanding (perceive the meaning of words etc.) a waste of time, what the @#$% are you doing replying to my posts?
Ah, I see you’ve decided to reply to the latter half of post #239.
The argument you’re referring to uses two definitions, remember? That’s two premises.Just because you have split your definition between two premises changes nothing.Tisthammerw said:This is not a circular argument. Why? Because the conclusion is not a restatement of any single premise.
The same is true with modus ponens and any other logically valid argument.The premises combined result in the same thing
You have not shown that bachelors are unmarried, you have simply defined it that way.you choose to define understanding such that it requires consciousness. You have not shown that understanding requires consciousness, you have simply defined it that way.
Obviously, my conclusion logically follows from my definitions of “understanding” and “consciousness.” But so what? All analytical statements are the result of somebody’s definition. The only question is whether the definitions are unconventional (like defining the word “cheese” to mean “piece of the moon”) and I really don’t think mine are.
The fact that your definition would require three heads would be a sound argument, but your definition of “understanding” is rather unconventional, whereas mine is not. I honestly think that if we took a Gallup poll the majority of people would say “Yes, this matches my definition of understanding.” But since it seems unlikely we will agree on this point, let’s just simply recognize that “understanding requires consciousness” is an analytic statement if we use my definitions (not necessarily everyone else’s). So let’s get straight to the program X argument on whether computers (at least in the current model I’ve described, e.g. a complex set of instructions operating in input etc.) can possess what you have dubbed TH-understanding.Using your “logic”, I could define understanding to be anything I like (“understanding requires 3 heads” for example), and then use your deductive argument to then show that it follows that understanding requires 3 heads. Are you suggesting this would be a sound argument?