In his opening post on Chapter Seven of Gregg Rosenberg's A Place for Consciousness, Hypnagogue says this: Now there have already been several replies to this on the original thread, and most of them seem delighted that the unwarranted claim of physicalism that nature is causally closed under physics is being challenged. I want to open the opposite conclusion for discussion. It seems that what Rosenberg is doing here is denial of his, and the qualists' problems. He has come close to admitting that if nature is causally closed under physical interactions, then the qualist position is just what they have accused the physicalist position of being: incoherent. On the horns of a dilemma between epiphenomenalism and dualism, as he says. Now if your premises lead you to a false conclusion, you should reject those premises. This is the basis of the famous proof technique called reduction ad absurdam in logic and contrapositive in mathematics. And the only reason to suppose that natrue is not causally closed under physics is that the qualist premises require it! Do a thought experiment; leave the qualist position out, and try to imagine any evidence for non-closure under physical causes. Science is often accused on these boards of ignoring everything outside of physical causes, but it does that because it works! No experiment has ever shown any force or energy flow other than physical ones. And indeed if there are non-physical forces, that are truly causal, then you are back at dualism in all but words, since you have posited an independent principle required to explain the world.