In this opening chapter, Rosenberg touches on what phenomenal consciousness is and the philosophical problems it poses, and proceeds to develop a sketch of how his conceptual framework will place it within the natural order. What is phenomenal consciousness (also known as p-consciousness, subjective experience, raw feels, and qualia)? Rosenberg gives various ways for understanding what is meant by the term, including Thomas Nagel's dictum of "what it is like," the method of introspectively cataloguing the qualities apparent in one's own immediate experiences, and conceptually isolating phenomenal consciousness from other senses of the word consciousness (e.g. Ned Block's "access consciousness"). P-consciousness presents us with the mind-body problem. What is the ontology of the mind, what is the ontology of the physical world, and how are they related? Can we create a coherent paradigm in which both can be seen to be the natural consequences of the same fundamental building blocks? Rosenberg poses Liberal Naturalism as the paradigm from which he will address the problem. This view demands that we come to a coherent and complete account of subjective experience without making ad hoc claims that jut discontinuously from what we otherwise know about the world. Interactionist substance dualist acounts are almost universally considered to violate the second criterion; Rosenberg argues that physicalist accounts violate the first; and it is arguable that views such as epiphenomenalism violate both. Thus, when Rosenberg comes to satisfy both conditions, he will have arrived at a truly unique and novel theory in that it will neither suppose that subjective experience is physical, nor that it interacts with the physical. Rosenberg sets out to achieve a non-ad hoc account by motivating the case, on grounds independent from the mind-body problem, that the physicalist understanding of the world is incomplete. In particular, he argues that our understanding of causality is conceptually deficient, and proceeds to create a new account of causality that is not. This new account of causality rests upon three bases: effective properties, receptive properties, and carriers. Of this triumvirate, physical theory includes only effective properties, and the two aspects it omits will prove to be crucial in establishing Rosenberg's Liberal Naturalist account of subjective experience.