Consciousness Studies: Priority Misdirected and Conclusions Fated? Consciousness seems to be at the heart of subjectivity. If so, then how can it be sufficiently externalized to observe in order to empirically "prove" what it is? The attempts to define consciousness in terms of how it functions exemplifies the problem of proving what is most fundamental to consciousness; that is, since the nature of consciousness cannot be observed, but the science mind wants to observe it anyway, the functionalist simply defines consciousness by what can be observed. Consequently, such externalized approaches only tell us certain ways conscious operates, not if something more basic than “functions” establishes consciousness in the first place. Since we ourselves possess consciousness, and since it is functioning, then theoretically we could have direct access to a “fundamental nature” if it exists. In that case, the sort of agreement we would reach wouldn't be through externalized experiments as we do in normal science research, but through first developing an internal focus capable of observing itself, and then sharing and comparing what we each learn. One must wonder if there’s misdirection built into an approach to “conscious studies” that is primarily externalized, and which fates it to produce a functionalist model. If we accept that we must experience to know, and if the core of consciousness is innately subjective, then when we study it, shouldn’t the first priority be an internalized approach, which is then followed up by what we can confirm through empirical observation?