"A possible weak point in Dennett’s account is the claim that the phenomenal aspect of our experience is a complex of judgements and dispositions. Many philosophers see the central question of consciousness as explaining the seemingly ineffable subjective quality of our experience, or qualia. Dennett claims that there are no such thing as qualia; the quality of conscious experience is a result of micro-judgements made by various parts of our brain. For Dennett there is no reality to the subjective quality of our experience over an above the fact that there seems to be that subjective quality." - Guy Douglas "The category of meta-representation, like the category of representation on which it rides, is sure to be of importance in any good answer to the question of whence cometh the power of (human) minds, but there is still too much play in our mutually agreed-upon anchoring of these categories. I suspect that the major reason for this slippage and cross-communication among researchers is that nature still harbors too many intermediate cases of interest. Darwin noted that it was the extinction of the bulk of the intermediate forms that permitted us to frame species concepts; had nature not eroded a gully separating one from the next, we would be unable to draw a line ("in a principled way" as philosophers like to say) to that purpose. What counts--what ought to count--as marking off true [meta-]representation from its nearest kin? The pigeonholes are easy enough to name, but we must be alert to the prospect that we have named some procrustean beds." ---- Dan Dennett But as Dennett wants to argue that there is no central control, then how is it that it seems to others as though there is, and it seems subjectively as though I am a singular conscious agent? Dennett has at least two metaphors designed to be of assistance here. Firstly, he has the theory that the idea of self is a product of a ‘center of narrative gravity’. What he means by this is this is that the brain works in parallel to process narratives of content. In many ways it is a natural language that serves to present the appearance of a unified stream of consciousness, and a unified ‘intender’. Secondly he has the idea that consciousness is a species of ‘mental fame’: "Those contents are conscious that persevere, that monopolize resources long enough to achieve certain typical and symptomatic effects - on memory, on the control of behaviour and so forth."