Did the South have a chance to win the Civil War?

[BWV]

It comes down to just one mistake that cost them the war - voting to secede after Lincoln's election. How would the planter class that ruled the South made out if they had recognized abolition was inevitable and bargained for some form of compensated emancipation that left their former slaves as low-paid sharecroppers under horrible oppression, just like what happened after the war?

 

[Drakkith]

It comes down to just one mistake that cost them the war - voting to secede after Lincoln's election. How would the planter class that ruled the South made out if they had recognized abolition was inevitable and bargained for some form of compensated emancipation that left their former slaves as low-paid sharecroppers under horrible oppression, just like what happened after the war?

Substantially better than most did, and infinitely better than the nearly 2 million men killed or wounded during the war.

 

[member 656954]

What was the objective of your OP, @timmeister37?

Brainstorming thirteen scenarios out of a four-year war and claiming them as mistakes certainly generates debate, but your contention seems to be that Foote was wrong and that the South had a chance of winning.

Given Foote's topic knowledge and support for the South - in interview he said he would have likely joined the Confederate Army - why has his statement in particular seemingly offended you?

 

[Klystron]

What's interesting is that at no point did the Confederacy lose a major battle due to lack of arms or ammunition. Most of the disparity was, as far as I know, really in the sense of lack of powder and ammunition for gunnery training, lack of artillery for all but the most essential cities/forts, and heavy rationing of existing stocks of ammunition and powder even for the frontline armies. Basically, the CSA just barely had enough to equip their armies with very little left over for the non-essential (but often important) tasks.

Contrast this with the Union, where men supposedly had a quota for the number of rounds they were required to fire per day during sieges, and had so much ammunition, powder, and other supplies stockpiled that even the loss of entire supply depots to enemy action had virtually no effect beyond the short-term.

As for railroads, I think the best example is Lee's Army of Northern Virginia nearly having itself starved into destruction because of the limited capacity of the ill-kept railroad system leading to Richmond. There was an immense amount of food sitting out in the southern states that simply could not be gathered and transported because of the relatively poor rail network.

That's my understanding at least.

In addition to the above well-stated perspective; during technological transitions in quality and capability particularly of firearms, numerical data provides limited understanding. For example, prior to regular access to five and six shot revolvers accounts of rangers and raiders include braces of pistols holstered and worn on the shooters body, saddle and horse.

Each pistol, musket, rifle, and shotgun would be individually loaded with specific ammunition before entering combat, with a ram and powder measure designed and often required for each weapon. Most fired once per barrel. Misfires, especially in damp weather, combined with mechanical failures dictated several alternate firearms within easy reach. Reloading on the run from horseback during battle remained problematic, greatly impacting tactics.

Gun sights, often rudimentary, barrel and gun stock designs were just becoming standard requiring dedicated practice as mentioned above to master each weapon's idiosyncrasies. Imagine carrying braces of five single-shot pistols each with its bullet mold, powder measure and ram. Multiply by each marine, soldier or ranger in a company where most officers carried personal weapons and the combined count before and after a battle seems formidable. This ignores artillery, railroad guns and other weapons not carried by soldiers.

A typical Union troop mid 1860's likely carried a standard rifle or carbine capable of firing four five or six cased ammunition rounds before reloading. Officers and NCOs (non-coms) also carried revolvers often standardized to fire six identical rounds as their carbines; the latter more for convenience for logistics, reloading and practice. Each soldier received similar training with interchangeable mass produced weapons including slings, cleaning kits and holsters. Companies from different states might carry different firearms and volunteers might arrive with personal weapons* but the Army tended toward standard supply.

Many technological innovations altered 19th Century battlefields. Certainly assembly lines mass producing interchangeable parts improved logistics and training into modern times.

*more likely earlier in the Civil War. Some early revolvers loaded cap & ball ammunition. Rifles circa 1850's might require a paper cartridge to load a standard powder weight and also act as wadding. See the Crimean War for technology later used in 1860's America.

 

[BWV]

however despite the increase in firepower, casualty rates in Civil War battles were slightly less than in the Napoleonic Wars, likely because soldiers on the losing end could disengage without being run down and slaughtered by cavalry, which ceased to be a factor on the battlefield

 

[Astronuc]

Skip to minute 24 in that video.

At 3:36 in the video, the gentleman mentions that the largest gun/arms manufacturer in the South, in Richmond, made a little over 30k guns during the Civil War. Springfield arms manufacturer in Massachusetts made between 15k and 20k guns per month. Before that, the gentleman compares population, pre-war GDP equivalent (8% in the South, 92% in the North) and manufacturing (manufacturing potential of NY City alone exceeded that of the entire South). There were many disparities.

In the decades after the Civil War, Alabama became one of the nation's leading iron and steel producers. Although Gadsden and the Florence Sheffield District along the Tennessee River contributed to this rise, the Birmingham District became the largest iron and steel producer in the southern United States.

http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/h-1638

 

[russ_watters]

If the South's war was managed by the exact same people but those people did not make the thirteen mistakes that I listed, then the South probably would have won the war.

Do you watch sports? In any close game you can usually point to a small handful of key moments that if they together had gone the other way, the winner and loser could reverse. But so what? If you're being objective in your analysis, you'll recognize that 13 things is a lot to reverse while not allowing for the other side to reverse any of its mistakes (or do you think the North fought a perfect war with what it had?).

But let's say that each of those 13 things was a coin-flip and all 13 were needed to change in order for the South to win. That means that if you could re-play the civil war over and over again and the random choices/chances fell differently each time, the South would win only once per 8,000 re-plays of the war.

Is that really what you are arguing so hard for? That the south had a 1 in 8,000 chance of winning the war (but at least that's not zero!)? If that's all you're after, I'll certainly let you have it.

But if you want to argue that each of those was so likely that the South had a good chance of winning the war (25%? 45%?), nah, I'm not buying it.

So stop with the handwaving and put a number on how likely you think it was that the South could have won the war. Because otherwise, this is just an argument about how close to zero "not zero" is.

 

[Vanadium 50]

I was going to make the 1:8000 point, but some of the Thirteen Points contradict each other. "Defend New Orleans!" "Defend Atlanta!" and "Defend all the little forts!" are calls on the same resource: troops. And we have been asking the OP for almost a week to put a hard number on it. That hasn't happened yet.

I would also argue that the odds of the Doughfaces to remain in power in the early 1860's were higher than 1:8000.

 

[Dale]

I did not need to reference any historian's analysis other than my own in the OP since i provided supporting evidence for my thesis. FWIW, the historians Gary Gallagher, James McPherson, and Kenneth Gott are all on record for agreeing with my thesis.

FYI, this is not how this forum works. All posts must be consistent with the professional literature on the topic. That includes historical analysis. The proper response to such a request would have been simply to cite Gallagher, McPherson, or Gott where they made similar claims.

Please realize that this is an essential part of what makes PF different from other sites. Such a request for references should always be honored and complied with here.

 

[Drakkith]

however despite the increase in firepower, casualty rates in Civil War battles were slightly less than in the Napoleonic Wars, likely because soldiers on the losing end could disengage without being run down and slaughtered by cavalry, which ceased to be a factor on the battlefield

Indeed. One could argue that the Civil War had no cavalry, only mounted infantry. Yet another example of how changing technology in the form of weapons and field fortifications radically changed warfare.

 

[HallsofIvy]

What one would have done if one had lived during the civil war is interesting to speculate on and impossible to say with any certainty! I was born in Georgia of a family that had lived in Georgia for many years (since 1790- before that they lived in Virginia). I am now convinced that the South seceding was a terrible mistake and that slavery is a horrid blot on out history. But if I had lived in Georgia (although my family, like most southern families of the time, did not own slaves) I certainly would have joined the Confederate army).

 

[BWV]

Indeed. One could argue that the Civil War had no cavalry, only mounted infantry. Yet another example of how changing technology in the form of weapons and field fortifications radically changed warfare.

there was fighting from horseback, just not on primary battlefields, cavalry was for scouting and raiding but as you say, would dismount and take cover if seriously engaged.

FWIW the rifled muskets in the ACW could fire around 3 times per minute while WW1 machine guns could sustainably fire around 500 per minute. so roughly 150 infantry had about the firepower of a machine gun, although the Maxim gun had an effective range of over 2,000 yards while the 1861 Springfield was only effective out to 400-500 yards (although way farther than smoothbore musket range of about 100 yards)

 

[Astronuc]

There is a book by Jack Kelly, Gunpowder Alchemy, Bombards, and Pyrotechnics: The History of the Explosive that Changed the World, in which it covers the history in Europe and US mostly. I believe it covers the period during the Civil War and perhaps the types of arms enabled by the technology.

With regard to railroads in the Confederate States, consider:

The outbreak of war had a depressing effect on the economic fortunes of the Confederate railroad industry. With the cotton crop being hoarded in an attempt to entice European intervention, railroads were bereft of their main source of income.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_the_Confederate_States_of_America#Railroads

At the beginning of the war (1861), the Northern states included 20,000 miles of railroad while the Confederate states had 9,000 miles (1,700 miles total in the three border states of Missouri, Kentucky and Maryland).

Some things one can observe in:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confederate_railroads_in_the_American_Civil_War

Two gauges didn't help with interchange and distribution (see Montgomery, AL to La Grange, GA, and Danville to Richmond, and southern GA). One would have to do multiple transfers, or change bogies/trucks.
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/df/Railroad_of_Confederacy-1861.jpg
A single trunkline from Chattanooga to Lynchburg vulnerable to disruption
No line between Greensboro, NC and Danville, VA until 1864
Coal fields in TN, KY and VA were not yet well developed, if at all.

Incidentally, "West Virginia was the only state in the Union to separate from a Confederate state (Virginia) during the American Civil War."VW was admitted to the Union on June 20, 1863.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/West_Virginia#Separation_from_Virginia

It appears that the big coal fields in the Confederate and Border States did not develop until after the Civil War.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Norfolk_and_Western_Railway#Coal

In 1885, several small mining companies representing about 400,000 acres (1,600 km2) of bituminous coal reserves grouped together to form the coalfields' largest landowner, the Philadelphia-based Flat-Top Coal Land Association. The N&W bought the association and reorganized it as the Pocahontas Coal and Coke Company (PCCC).

In southern West Virginia and Virginia, the Virginian Railway, which was build to haul coal, wasn't established until 1907! Coal became a major export.

If the South hadn't lost the Civil War, they would have won. But seriously, if the Confederate States had become independent, then there may have been a prolonged conflict for territories between the Mississippi River and California. Mexico might have tried to reclaim Texas. One can only speculate what might have been.

 

[phinds]

One can only speculate what might have been.

Which, really, is what this entire thread has been about

 

[Astronuc]

Which, really, is what this entire thread has been about

But, of course.

The lesson from all wars is "Don't go to war". Instead, stay home an innovate - ideally with sustainable technology.

 

[Vanadium 50]

If the South hadn't lost the Civil War, they would have won.

Deep, man. Deep.

 

[mathwonk]

still fighting the civil war? ahh yes, Coronavirus stay - at - home syndrome.

 

[jedishrfu]

With respect to winning a war or not, one has to seriously consider battles. There are many times where military intelligence is off and a battle is lost because you deployed your men too soon or too late or at the wrong location or simply misread the signals.

A classic example was Pompey's defeat at Caesar's hand. He was forced into a battle by a few goading politicians who pestered him to get in there and defeat Caesar. He had an army that was well trained and well supplied and twice the size of Caesar. However, Caesar in a desperate move of brilliance correctly read Pompey's plan and realized that Pompey's cavalry would flank his army so he thinned his lines and added those soldiers to the flanking side. Pompey's cavalry was repulsed and routed, Pompey's soldiers saw that and bolted and Caesar won the day.

In contrast, Pompey's original plan was to simply starve Caesar and his army by waiting which would've led to soldiers defecting and the army falling apart. Haste makes waste was the phrase of the day that day.

Similar things happened during the Civil War. Gettysburg was lost because Lee lost a key advisor, General Stonewall Jackson, known for his reconnoitering skills. Units were reorganized and some commanders were new their positions. Both sides made mistakes but the Union army held their positions on the high ground and the Confederate army lost their first day momentum.

However, the interesting thing to me is how acoustics played a role in a couple of key battles where generals didn't hear the critical signal (aka cannon fire) and begin their attack. The delay allowed the other side to hang in there, regroup, and recover.

https://www.todayifoundout.com/index.php/2013/10/acoustic-shadow-american-civil-war/

Now if only these generals had read Sun Tze's Art of War instead of Clausiwitz things would have been different. We will never know but endless simulations can be played out for the fun of imagining.

https://www.todayifoundout.com/index.php/2013/10/acoustic-shadow-american-civil-war/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_War

 

[member 656954]

One can only speculate what might have been.

Fun as that is, the OP doesn't seem to have been around for a while, so has the speculation run it's course?

 

[phinds]

Fun as that is, the OP doesn't seem to have been around for a while, so has the speculation run it's course?

Jeez, we can only hope so !

 

[Klystron]

Even if the OP's premise lacked foundation, possibly skirted forum rules and some later posts indicated recalcitrance to recalibrate a thesis; the thread explored several interesting narratives.

When the libraries open again, I look forward to reading Shelby Foote and recent Civil War period histories.

 

[phinds]

Even if the OP's premise lacked foundation, possibly skirted forum rules and some later posts indicated recalcitrance to recalibrate a thesis; the thread explored several interesting narratives.

When the libraries open again, I look forward to reading Shelby Foote and recent Civil War period histories.

You can probably stream Ken Burn's Civil war documentary.

 

[jedishrfu]

Or better yet his Baseball one too.

 

[Mondayman]

Even if the OP's premise lacked foundation, possibly skirted forum rules and some later posts indicated recalcitrance to recalibrate a thesis; the thread explored several interesting narratives.

When the libraries open again, I look forward to reading Shelby Foote and recent Civil War period histories.

Indeed, personally I would like to see more military history threads on PF. Good for generating interesting discussion.

 

[phinds]

Or better yet his Baseball one too.

That one was good but did not compare to his series on the Roosevelts

 

[StatGuy2000]

The problem I have with counterfactual arguments about differences in historical outcomes is that such discussions rest on assumptions that inherently cannot be assessed, as well as the discounting of chance or seemingly random events in the shaping of said historical events.

For example, how much of the relative strengths and successes or failures of the Union and Confederate forces in the US during the American Civil War are due to chance events?

 

[Bystander]

more military history threads on PF.

Gets into politics TOO quickly, therefore, verboten.

 

[timmeister37]

Or better yet his Baseball one too.

On the baseball documentary, i kept waiting for the part when the narrator would talk about when most baseball players started wearing jockstraps with protective cups, and it was never even mentioned! How did people bat with any confidence without a protective cup before the advent of protective cups?

 

[jedishrfu]

It aired on PBS and they may have been squeamish about the topic.

They did have one about the Merkle Boner:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merkle's_Boner

I think it was an amazing miscarriage of the rules. Merkle failed to tag second base. A player saw that and while the fans were running all over the field found the ball (or subbed in a different ball) and tagged the base and declared him out.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fred_Merkle

In the bottom of the 9th inning, Merkle came to bat with two outs, and the score tied 1–1. At the time, Moose McCormick was on first base. Merkle singled and McCormick advanced to third base. Al Bridwell, the next batter, followed with a single of his own. McCormick trotted to home plate, apparently scoring the winning run. The fans in attendance, under the impression that the game was over, ran onto the field to celebrate.

Meanwhile, Merkle ran to the Giants' clubhouse without touching second base.

Cubs second baseman Johnny Evers noticed this, and after retrieving a ball and touching second base, he appealed to umpire Hank O'Day, who later managed the Cubs, to call Merkle out. Since Merkle had not touched the base, the umpire called him out on a force play, meaning that McCormick's run did not count.

The run was therefore nullified, the Giants' victory erased, and the score of the game remained tied. Unfortunately, the thousands of fans on the field (as well as the growing darkness in the days long before large electric lights made night games possible) prevented resumption of the game, and it was declared a tie. The Giants and the Cubs ended the season tied for first place and had a rematch at the Polo Grounds, on October 8. The Cubs won this makeup game, 4–2, thus the National League pennant.

 

[russ_watters]

For example, how much of the relative strengths and successes or failures of the Union and Confederate forces in the US during the American Civil War are due to chance events?

For example, the weather plays a huge role in war.

 

[Astronuc]

For example, the weather plays a huge role in war.

For example, rain and unpaved roads = mud.

High winds affect ballistic trajectories, especially for long range or high altitude artillery.

Disease/illness, e.g., dysentery, is another factor.

 

[HallsofIvy]

One problem the North had was that the onus of the offensive lay on the North and bad weather tends to hurt the offense more than the defense. Also the new rifled muskets, not to mention rifled cannon, tended to give the defensive the edge. Lee's two attempts to invade the north, which led to the South's worst defeats, were probably bad mistakes.

 

[TeethWhitener]

Now if only these generals had read Sun Tze's Art of War instead of Clausiwitz things would have been different.

Everybody likes to crap on Clausewitz, but when he works, he works (just look at the spanking the Iraqis got in Desert Storm). Remember, Clausewitz was familiar with most of the features that would come into play in the Civil War; after all, On War was written largely in response to Napoleon’s stunning successes—and equally stunning collapse—and the Napoleonic wars really had it all: insurgency (what Clausewitz called “People’s War”), conventional warfare, siege warfare, varying terrains and climates, not to mention the growing importance of technologies such as rifled muskets. The only big thing Clausewitz doesn’t really touch on is naval warfare.

Most of the objection to Clausewitz has been the misperception that he advocated a direct approach to strategy (as opposed to the indirect approach of Sun Tzu or, more recently, Liddell Hart). But Clausewitz himself advocated, for instance, that it’s better to march around an enemy fortification than through it (and using this idea, devised principles for proper placement of defensive fortifications). He also spelled out the notion of asymmetry of defense and offense, which naturally leads to the conclusion that a direct offense requires many more times the firepower and resources than defending against that direct offense. In this sense, the North proceeded as they should have in the Civil War.

 

[jedishrfu]

The battle between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu actually comes to a head in the battle for China in the 1940's where the Nationalists used western strategies of Clausewitz and the Communists used Sun Tzu.

The major difference was in Sun Tzu's strategy to attack the weak spots of the enemy rather than go head to head against a superior force. A strategy Quantrell's Raiders used to great effect during the Civil War.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Quantrill

In Sun Tzu's case, he would have the enemy chasing him around as he attacked poorly defended installations.

 

[TeethWhitener]

The battle between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu actually comes to a head in the battle for China in the 1940's where the Nationalists used western strategies of Clausewitz and the Communists used Sun Tzu.

Is this really the case? By this point, the direct approach was discredited by the insanity of WWI and folks like Liddell Hart picking up the pieces and favoring indirectness (Liddell Hart fought in WWI).

Regardless, I still think it’s largely a misunderstanding of Clausewitz. Several others have argued a similar point, e.g.:

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41296-018-0272-x