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That's actually not true. We have to make similar assumptions in classical physics, but they are just not made explicit.... needed (and meaningful) only in MWI.
That's actually not true. We have to make similar assumptions in classical physics, but they are just not made explicit.... needed (and meaningful) only in MWI.
No. In classical physics, we approximate probabilities by relative frequencies, in the same way as we approximate exact positions by measured positions. By regarding a relative frequency as an approximate measurement of the exact probability, no assumption about alternative worlds need to be made.That's actually not true. We have to make similar assumptions in classical physics, but they are just not made explicit.
How do you know that's a good approximation? You don't. In classical probabilities, a sequence of flips of a fair coin can give you a relative frequency of anything between 0 and 1. We assume that if we flip enough times, then the relative frequency will settle down to 1/2 in the case of a fair coin. But that is the assumption that our world is a "typical" one.No. In classical physics, we approximate probabilities by relative frequencies
How do you know it in case of high precision measurements of position? One generally assumes it without further ado, and corrects for mistakes later.How do you know that's a good approximation?
In theory but not in practice. If one flips a coin 1000 times and finds always head, everyone assumes that the coin, or the flips, or the records of them have been manipulated, and not that we were lucky or unlucky enough to observe a huge statistical fluke.In classical probabilities, a sequence of flips of a fair coin can give you a relative frequency of anything between 0 and 1.
Nobody ever before the advent of MWI explained the success of our statistical reasoning by assuming that our world is a typical one. Indeed, if there are other worlds, we cannot have an objective idea at all about what happens in them, only pure guesswork - all of them might have completely different laws from what we observe in ours. Hence any statements about the typicalness of our world are heavily biased towards what we find typical in our only observable world.But that is the assumption that our world is a "typical" one.
I can't tell whether you actually have a disagreement, or not.How do you know it in case of high precision measurements of position? One generally assumes it without further ado, and corrects for mistakes later.
That's the assumption that our world is "typical". So you're both making that assumption and denying it, it seems to me.In theory but not in practice. If one flips a coin 1000 times and finds always head, everyone assumes that the coin, or the flips, or the records of them have been manipulated, and not that we were lucky or unlucky enough to observe a huge statistical fluke.
No.That's the assumption that our world is "typical". So you're both making that assumption and denying it, it seems to me.
Just remember, hair-splitting is irrelevant to world-splitting.No.
In common English, to call something typical means that one has seen many similar things of the same kind, and only a few were very different from the typical instance. So one can call a run of coin flips typical if its frequency of heads is around 50% and atypical if it was a run where the frequency is outside the $5\sigma$ threshold required, e.g., for proofs of a new particle (see https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/31126/ ), with a grey zone in between.
This is the sense I am using the term. All this happens within a single world. It is not the world that is typical but a particular event or sequence of events.
But I have no idea what it should means for the single world we have access to to be ''typical''. To give it a meaning one would have to compare it with speculative, imagined, by us unobservable, other worlds. Thus calling a world typical is at the best completely subjective and speculative, and at the worst, completely meaningless.
aren't the many worlds theoretical-There is no collapse in Many Worlds.
that article above--See this article--- - fails simply because the use of Wikipedia makes research infotainment. Plus a lot of thought experiments. Neumaier has it spot on-??? @StevenDarryl was describing the smooth evolution of the emergent worlds. It was not even remotely a reformulation of MWI.
You may believe so but MWI asserts exactly the opposite.
See this article - but only if you don't mind Vongher's provocative style.