- #176
sudhirking
- 63
- 2
Lol
because there are things smaller than elctrns
and they fall to the ground because the build of up of the ground contains more gracvity on a scale than comparred to he single electron.
Ready to publish - Impressive.sudhirking said:… that uses my theory of everything
however i am self taught and i am only a freshman
PS what is a PF Mentor
sudhirking said:Lol
because there are things smaller than elctrns
You have no idea what you're talking about, I'm sorry.Lol
because there are things smaller than elctrns
and they fall to the ground because the build of up of the ground contains more gracvity on a scale than comparred to he single electron.
Dragonfall said:What can we say about entangled pairs and their gravitational attraction? I know there's no quantum gravity yet, but take a guess.
NothingDragonfall said:Will no one hazard a guess?
peter0302 said:What is the question?
Dragonfall said:The question is: how do you describe gravity of a system consisting of two entangled particles? How does it differ from the description of a system consisting of two non-entangled particles?
I don't think you understand entanglement. Entanglement means that some property of the particle is defined by reference to the other. When that property is unamibuously measured in one, its value for the other is known.Dragonfall said:The question is: how do you describe gravity of a system consisting of two entangled particles? How does it differ from the description of a system consisting of two non-entangled particles?
vanesch said:You won't find a no-go theorem because it is very well possible. What I'm claiming is that I don't see how one could ever *demonstrate* a superdeterministic theory to be superdeterministic, even if it were. I'm claiming that the only way to PROVE that a theory is superdeterministic is to follow through the complicated relationship between "thing that apparently makes the choice of the measurement" and the emitted pair of photons.
Because *anything* could be used to set up the measurement angles (and that "everything" might be outside of the lightcone of the emitting atom at the event of emission, so your "in the field of the detectors" won't hold: take as an example remote starlight from opposite directions which decides the detector angles: when the emitting atom is emitting the pair of photons, this starlight is still on its way and couldn't have reached (or anything else at c couldn't have reached yet) the emitting atom). Even if a theory were superdeterministic, you wouldn't be able to demonstrate it, as it would involve a complicated follow-up which is FAPP impossible.
Well, my point is that it won't be doable to demonstrate it. Even if we have it (without knowing).
I know that I cannot prove the claim that QM does or doesn't apply to the human brain. But the point is, *it doesn't matter* for the results.
You can put the Heisenberg cut just anywhere, and it will yield in the majority of cases, the right result.
So QM results do not NEED a detailed follow-up through a complicated chain of events, once you've the essential part - and that's in part because we can accept externally given "free will" decisions. But a superdeterministic theory CANNOT do that: it wouldn't give self-consistent results if we "forced" it into free will decisions which are not compatible with its dynamics which is supposed to generate superdeterministic correlations. So in a superdeterministic theory we have no choice but to follow up through all the complicated chain of events up to the "determined experiment choice".
ueit said:I disagree. The superdeterministic character of the theory is only a consequence of the fact that the theory contains a (local) field that does not decreases quickly with distance (as the classical EM field does). The mechanism proposed by the theory can be verified statistically in different ways, not necessarily using EPR experiments. For example one can replace the resultant, pseudorandom field produced by all particles in the universe with a random field that has the same statistical properties (like the probability of the field to have a certain amplitude in a certain time interval). Then, one could model the dynamics of an atom or molecule in this random field and calculate the emission spectra. Because both the properties of the random field and the motion of the particles composing the atom/molecule are calculated using the proposed mechanism, a correctly predicted spectra is a proof of the theory.
Maaneli said:Well recall that the assumptions in Bell's theorem are that
1) Kolmogorov classical probability axioms are valid.
2) locality is valid (no causal influences can propagate faster than c between two events).
3) causality is valid (future measurement settings are "free" or random variables).
One could only reject locality as is often done, and get a nonlocal HV theory such as the pilot wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm.
PhilDSP said:Thanks for this clarification. In saying "non-local" about the general pilot wave theory, you mean that in the sense that the system response cannot be determined on the basis of a single instance in time and space don't you?
You're not saying that such a pilot wave must have a "faster than light" transfer of information or energy, are you?
Maaneli said:Well recall that the assumptions in Bell's theorem are that
1) Kolmogorov classical probability axioms are valid.
2) locality is valid (no causal influences can propagate faster than c between two events).
3) causality is valid (future measurement settings are "free" or random variables).
Notice that "realism" is not at all the issue in Bell's theorem, despite the common claim that it is.
DrChinese said:Repeating for the sake of completeness: Realism ABSOLUTELY is assumed and critical to Bell's Theorem. Not sure why this is hard for some folks to accept, so let's reference the paper itself: On the EPR Paradox. When Bell says that there is a simultaneous A, B and C (circa his [14] in the original), he is invoking realism. He says "It follows that c is another unit vector...". His meaning is that there if there is an a, b and c simultaneously then there must be internal consistency and there must be an outcome table that yields probabilities for all permutations of outcomes a, b and c that are non-negative. That is where both the Kolmogorov axiom comes into play (also in Bell's []12]), as does EPR style Realism (explicitly formulated here in a way in which Einstein would have to accept).
Bell's conclusion is that if hidden variables are added, they must be non-local. Alternately, QM is complete as is; the EPR paradox is solved with the answer that EPR rejected as "unreasonable" (because Realism is rejected).
Maaneli said:But already discussed that the realism assumption is no different than the realism assumptions made in other physics theorems, and that if you remove realism, it is impossible (or at least inconcievable) to derive an inequality along with the assumptions of locality and causality (and indeed it would become problematic how to define locality and causality without realism) that can be empirically tested and that differs from Bell's. I recall I also challenged you to try and do this...
DrChinese said:So I would completely agree with your statement that violation of a Bell Inequality does NOT imply Realism must be rejected. It could be 1) 2) or 3) above instead. As before, I do not think there is a disagreement between us on this particular point.
DrChinese said:A minor nitpick about your 3), Causality: I would change the meaning of causality slightly to be: The future cannot influence the past. If it could (causality violated), it would be possible to draw diagrams where Alice and Bob are causally connected at space-like separated points without there being any non-local influence. I do not believe 3) is mentioned explicitly in Bell's original paper, but I don't think that really changes the sense of Bell's conclusion.
Vanesch said:You seem to forget that the particularity of a superdeterministic theory is that the essential correlations found, are due to specific correlations in the CHOICES made by the experimenters because their choices are not "free", and that if we allowed them to be truly random and independent, then the theory would NOT yield the correct results (THAT's what it means to be superdeterministic).
Let us take a toy example. Let us imagine that I have a switch and a light bulb. When I simply OBSERVE the switch states and the light bulb states, I see a perfect correlation: when the switch is "ON", the light is "ON", and when the switch is "OFF", the light is "OFF". This is an observed correlation, but it doesn't teach me much about any mechanism behind it: are the switch and the light bulb both activated by a common mechanism ? Is the switch causing the light bulb to go on and off ? Is the light bulb causing the switch to go on or off ? Is this just a weird correlation in nature ? Difficult to say.
However, in "normal" deterministic theories, we take it that we can CHOOSE the state of the switch. I can actively, and "freely" pick the state of the switch, and THEN I look for correlations. If I flip the switch to on, I see that the light goes on, and if I flip the switch to off, I see that the light goes off. Assuming that I did this "freely", then I can now CONCLUDE that the correlation between light bulb and switch is a CAUSAL relation: the switch must cause something that lights the light bulb. On the other hand, if with an external battery, I light the bulb, I don't see the switch flipping over. So this is a one-way causal relationship: the switch CAUSES the light bulb to go on.
It could have been different: there could have been a computer that activated electromagnetically a switch, and that also activated through a different circuit, the light bulb. It would have been a 'common cause' scenario, and me flipping the switch "freely" wouldn't make the light bulb light up.
However, a superdeterministic theory would say the following: even if I "freely" flip the switch, and I see a perfect correlation with the light go on or off, this is NO PROOF for a causal relationship between the switch and the light bulb, because there might have been a COMMON CAUSE which made me exactly flip the switch at the right times when that common cause also made the light go on and off. So imagine that the light bulb going on and off is actually caused by, I don't know, some Radioactive Decay or so, that there is strictly no relationship with the switch, but nevertheless, whatever causes the radioactive decay to happen also happens to influence my brain and makes me flip the switch at exactly the same moment when the light goes on or off. THAT is what a superdeterministic theory tells us: that the correlation I observe between a "freely made" choice and an observed phenomenon does NOT imply a causal relationship from the thing that was determined by the "choice" (flipping the switch) and the observed phenomenon (the light goes on or off), but rather, that my "choice" was exactly in tune with whatever caused really the phenomenon, because it had a common origin.
If I have a superdeterministic theory, I have to work out exactly HOW I am going to make these choices, and demonstrate that my choices are going to be exactly such that a correlation is going to appear AS IF there was a direct causal link. If I don't do that, but I make a "shortcut" to introducing GENUINLY RANDOM choices, then my superdeterministic theory would this time NOT show any correlation - because there IS no causal link between the flipping of the switch and the bulb - there is only a correlation between the choice I made and the light bulb which I did now away with, and hence be in contradiction with the observed correlations.
Now, saying that you COULD eventually do a small-scale calculation with not a brain that makes the "decisions", but a much smaller system - a 3-particle system or something, that might show some hope of being tractable with a computer simulation, doesn't prove ANYTHING. After all, it is very well possible that there IS a small scale correlation with a *particular* simple setup. Imagine for instance that we use a simple periodic oscillator to flip the switch, and that we use an identical oscillator to power the light bulb. Then we WILL find of course a "superdeterministic" correlation without there being a causal link, if the frequencies and phases of both oscillators are identical. But that's simply because the "free choice" made by an oscillator is a simplistic "free choice". It doesn't demonstrate AT ALL that if we use *no matter what mechanism to do the free choosing* we will ALWAYS obtain the same correlation, which is exactly what a superdeterministic theory needs to demonstrate before being able to explain those correlations in a non-causal matter.