Interesting thread on the concept of falsifiability, but it seems to have totally misrepresented the concept. A few posters made the distinction between falsification and falsifiability, but by and large, this distinction went unnoticed. Tried to post in that thread, but it was locked. So, if anyone wants to take this issue up, please feel free. My understanding is that falsifiability differs from falsification in a critical way. Falsifiability, as the name implies, is the ability for a proposition to be false. If there is no way for a theory to be demonstrated to be false, then, Popper postulated, it can be guaranteed to be worthless as an explanation of phenomena, and thus, not scientific. This seems to be a matter of testability. If a theory is not testable, then we know up front that the proposition at hand has no real predictive power. This is the distinction Popper was trying to make. Lakotos, Kuhn and others have attempted to show the shortcomings of this approach, and have, to a degree, succeeded. However, as a fundamental test of one's approach, falsifiability works quite well. It works, for instance to differentiate creationism and intelligent design from theories that can be tested and used to predict phenomena in the world. In this regard, falsifiability is quite useful. This differs markedly from falsification, which appears to be what the other thread turned into a discussion of. Falsification is a product of falsifiability, but the reverse is not true. .